The design and functions of natural
language
The design and functions of natural language
How general questions of language relate to foreign language teaching (FLT)
2
1 Some general questions of language from a
biolinguistic perspective
1 Language design — The way language is. What is language?
2 Faculty of language (FL) — What is FL? Its internal structure discussed
separately elsewhere
3 Natural language (NL) – unique — How is FL/NL unique to humans?
4 Formal properties of grammar and language acquisition
5 Functions(!) of language — More than one function! Communication is
secondary!
6 Language and communication — How is language put to use?
7 Language and thought — How does language relate to thought?
Discussed separately elsewhere
8 Evolution of FL — How did FL evolve? Discussed separately elsewhere
The design and functions of natural language
How general questions of language relate to foreign language teaching (FLT)
3
2 How general questions of language relate to
foreign language teaching (FLT)
1 FLT and Questions of (1) Language design (The way language
is. What is language?) and Questions of (6) Communication
A “foreign language” (FL) is a natural language. Everything that applies to an FL
student’s first language (L1) also applies to FL (L2). For example,
Language ≠ speech.
Language ≠ communication. L ≠ use of L. And Communication ≠ Language.
Verbal communication presupposes knowledge of a language.
FLT ≠ teaching communication.
The dominant FLT doctrine of “Communicative” language teaching (CLT) does
not appear to understand that.
CLT “sets as its goal the teaching of communicative competence” (Richards
2006:2). If so, then the goal of CLT is based on a fundamental misunderstanding
of both language and communication, and FLT.
The design and functions of natural language
How general questions of language relate to foreign language teaching (FLT)
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2 FLT and Questions of (2) The faculty of language (FL) and (4)
Language acquisition
The acquisition of any natural language presupposes an innate Universal Grammar
(UG), a component of FL. If it wasn’t for innate FL, the acquisition of both L1 and
L2 would be impossible.
An important difference between the acquisition of L1 and the acquisition of L2 in
FLT is that a student of L2 possesses a linguistic system, L1, which is both
structurally and functionally complete.
FLT needs to reckon with a functionally complete L1 in students of L2.
positive and negative transfer
virtually complete and almost entirely positive transfer of “communicative
competence” acquired in the use of L1 to the use of L2
How aware is CLT of such important facts???
The design and functions of natural language
How general questions of language relate to foreign language teaching (FLT)
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3 The notion of language in FLT and Language Pedagogy
The term language is used in several different senses in both informal and in
technical usage.
Informal usage:
‘Language is a means of communication’
‘Language is communication’
‘Language is verbal behavior’
‘Language = speech’
“A language… is something essentially social, a practice in which people
engage” (Dummett 1976, cited in Chomsky 2005a (TFLD):117)
‘Language is a social institution’ (Miller 2011)
In technical usage, by contrast, language is never identified with performance, use
of language, verbal behavior, communication, or speech; nor is it regarded as a
“social institution,” which is incoherent even within sociology (Miller 2011).
The design and functions of natural language
How general questions of language relate to foreign language teaching (FLT)
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In technical usage, a distinction is made between competence and performance:
competence ≠ performance
performance = use of language (in communication)
competence = knowledge of language
In technical usage, language may denote:
a speaker’s mental grammar (MG), or competence, sometimes called his I-
language
the set of all and only the linguistic expressions that MG can construct and
interpret, an infinite set
the innate faculty of language (FL), containing a Universal Grammar (UG)
natural language (NL), a universal system, realized in the form of particular
languages as its variants; in this usage, NL is a close synonym of UG or FL
What concept of language is adopted in FLT/LP?
What can you expect if one or another notion of language is adopted?
One of these is the common-sense notion of language, which is incoherent!
The design and functions of natural language
Language from the biolinguistic perspective
7
3 Language from the biolinguistic perspective “Language” is a mental organ of a biological organism
Faculty of language (FL)
Acquisition of language and use of language are made possible by “a component
of human biology,” FL, essential to “the human intellectual capacity” (TFLD 2, 3).
“Language” is I-language: a person’s internal language, a state of FL
“… language, is a state of the faculty of language, an I-language, in technical
usage” (TFLD 2).
“Linguistics as I see it at least is a part of cognitive psychology, which in turn is a
part of biology” (Chomsky 2002:42).
Linguistics is indeed a natural science (É. Kiss 2007)
The design and functions of natural language
Functions of language
8
4 Functions of language
4.1 Symbolizing, “symbolic thought” – primary function
NL symbols vs. animal signals – Do they relate to the external world?
NL symbols—concepts(—?)the mind-independent external world!
mind-internal external to the mind
“… even the most elementary concepts [or items] of human language do not
relate to mind-independent objects by means of some reference-like relation
between symbols and identifiable physical features of the external world, as seems
to be universal in animal communication systems” (TFLD 4). “[English] words
don’t refer; English people refer; it’s an act” (Chomsky 2002:43).
“mental creation of possible worlds” (Jacob 1982:59, cited in TFLD 3–4).
“language is primarily an instrument of thought” (Chomsky 2013b:36)
For an even more radical, “Un-Cartesian,” view, on which, roughly, language is
thought, see Hinzen (2007, 2013, 2014) and Hinzen & Sheehan (2013).
The design and functions of natural language
Functions of language
9
The “projected world”
NL symbols—concepts—mental/possible worlds—the external world
mind-internal mind-independent
projection
intentionality
(or grammar, cf. Hinzen)
The design and functions of natural language
Functions of language
10
4.2 Communication — secondary function of language
The “externalization” of “the infinite variety of internal structures that enter into
thought, interpretation, planning, and other human mental acts” is “a secondary
process” (TFLD 4).
4.3 Five interrelated problems of language
1 The “apparently human-specific conceptual-lexical apparatus”
2 The “principles that allow infinite combinations of symbols”
3 The “referential apparatus that is used to talk about the world” in absence of (!) a
direct ‘mind–world interface’
+1= 4 How linguistic expressions (the “combinations of symbols”) are mapped
onto thought (i.e., combinations of concepts manufactured by LOT, cf. Fodor
1975, 1998, 2008, or by “Mentalese,” cf. Pinker 1994). For Hinzen, the question is
meaningless, because there is no LOT or Mentalese, or any mapping onto it (cf.
Hinzen 2013, 2014 and Hinzen and Sheehan 2013).
+1= 5 How language is put to use in communication; how language is usable in
communication at all
The design and functions of natural language
The three factors of I-language acquisition
11
5 The three factors of I-language acquisition 1. The faculty of language. Genetic endowment. Universal, species-specific.
Enables the individual to interpret part of the environment as linguistic
experience.
2. Experience – Filtered/interpreted/constructed by FL
Data are “preanalyzed in terms of principles specific to the language faculty”
(TFLD 7).
3. Principles not specific to the faculty of language
Principles of data analysis
Principles of efficient computation
Principles of structural architecture
The “burden of explanation” of the “biology of language, its nature and use, and
perhaps even its evolution” must shift “from the first factor, the genetic
endowment [i.e. UG], to the third factor, language-independent principles of
data processing, structural architecture, and computational efficiency” (TFLD
9).
The design and functions of natural language
The logical problem of language acquisition (LPLA)
12
6 The logical problem of language acquisition
(LPLA) LPLA: the “ease, rapidity and uniformity of language acquisition in the face of
impoverished data” (Chomsky 1955).
The poverty of stimulus problem “is just a special case of basic issues that arise
universally” (TFLD 7).
Plato’s problem (in Bertrand Russell’s (1948/2009:xiv) paraphrase):
“How comes it that human beings, whose contacts with the world are brief and
personal and limited, are nevertheless able to know as much as they do know?”
The design and functions of natural language
Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy
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7 Tension between descriptive and explanatory
adequacy
7.1 Introduction
(1) Descriptive adequacy (DA)
G of L is a model of MG
(2) Explanatory adequacy (EA)
General rules and principles of G must be derived from UG
The tension between DA and EA
(1) + (2) UG is overloaded the explanatory power of UG is lost
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Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy
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7.2 UG & Gs, NL & Ls
“Even to achieve a very limited approximation to descriptive adequacy” (TFLD 7)
led to having to assume a rich and heavy UG sufficiently richly articulated for it
to be able to “impose narrow constraints on possible outcomes,” the
attainable I-languages (TFLD 7).
UG NL
G L
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Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy
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7.3 Creativity of language and its implication for linguistic
theory
Observed fact of language use (OFLU) Generative mental grammars
a. Creative use of L G is a generative rule system – 1st generative revolution
b. Knowledge of L MG – 2nd generative revolution/cognitive revolution:
Goal of linguistic theory: account for MG (and its acquisition)
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Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy
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7.4 Limited variation across Ls and its implication for linguistics
Striking similarities
Differences follow a “pattern”
UG
Observed differences are variation: Ls are variants of NL
Natural languages may not differ from one another in unpredictable ways
The design and functions of natural language
Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy
17
7.5 The poverty of stimulus problem and its implication for
linguistic theory
Poverty of stimulus
No negative evidence
No evidence for many rules of grammar
Fragmentary sample of L
(Very short period of time)
(Early age, children)
Problem: How is LA possible at all?
UG must be innate.
Content and structure of UG
Explanatory adequacy
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Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy
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7.6 To summarize
Descriptive adequacy (DA)
G of L is a theory of L; L = MG ; G is a model of MG
Explanatory adequacy (EA)
Language acquisition: MG UG
7.7 Descriptive and explanatory adequacy
7.7.1 OA forces DA
OA: all and only the sentences of L; infinite G: model of MG, a generative
mental rule system
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Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy
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7.7.2 LA EA UG G, a theory of MG
Creative use of L generative mechanism – OA; MG–DA
LA innate UG. (EA)
MG UG. (EA)
Content & structure of UG?
7.7.3 The content and structure of UG
Content & structure of MG
MG (of L) G, a generative theory
(meets OA)
Innateness Hypothesis
creative use of L
LA, poverty of stimulus
UG (of NL), innate
Descriptive Adequacy
Explanatory Adequacy
of
observation:
observation:
The design and functions of natural language
Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy
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7.7.4 The content and structure of MG (in the “format framework”, TFLD)
MG is richly articulated; structural principles; constraints; categories;
structural configurations/operations: (LA) UG format of G OA & DA
“If [language] acquisition is a matter of selection among options made available by
the format provided by UG, then the format must be rich and highly
articulated allowing relatively few options; otherwise, explanatory adequacy [=
an account of LA] is out of reach” (TFLD 8).
For example: Coordinate Structure Constraint (CSC)
(3) * Who did you divide the cake between John and _____?
(1) * Ki között osztottad fel a tortát János és _____?
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Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy
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7.7.5 Content & structure of MGs content & structure of UG
CSC holds universally reduce CSC to a principle in UG assume CSC is a
principle of UG
Desirable consequences:
1. CSC –a universal property of NL.
2. Prediction: CSC may not be violated in any language.
3. Prediction: CSC is not learned; enhances explanatory adequacy of G.
4. CSC eliminated from G; simpler G; Occam’s Razor.
Generally:
Gs of Ls get smaller and smaller. – Parsimony; LA: learnability of L
Addition of a principle P to UG enhances EA – LA: No need to learn P
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Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy
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7.7.6 UG: Undesirable consequences of the “format framework”
UG grows fatter and fatter EA – Parsimony
Sophisticated architecture involves redundancies – Parsimony
UG becomes more and more complex; – Innate UG highly articulated?
UG is quickly overloaded EA
What seems “the best theory of language” turns out to be “a very
unsatisfactory” theory “from other points of view” (TFLD 8).
Some of these “other points of view”:
Parsimony – size, redundancies
Evolution of FL
Use of language. How is language usable at all?
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Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy
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7.7.6.1 UG in EST: 5 levels of representation, each with its own cyclic
operations — redundancy (hurting parsimony)
Two interface levels:
“SOUND” (Phonetic Form PF, Sensorimotor System SM)
“MEANING” (Semantic Representation, Conceptual-Intentional System CI)
Three language-internal levels: LF (Logical Form)
S-Structure (Surface Structure)
D-Structure (Deep Structure)
Can the “internal levels, not forced by interface conditions… be eliminated, and
the five cycles reduced to one” (TFLD 11)? (Yes: phases, Chomsky 2005b.)
The design and functions of natural language
Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy
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7.7.6.2 Islands
Wh-extraction
(2) a. What are you looking at?
b. What are you looking at ____?
c. you are looking at what
Wh-islands — CSC
(3) a. * Who did you divide the cake between John and?
b. * Who did you divide the cake between John and _____?
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Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy
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7.7.7 Tension between DA and EA “the format framework” of UG:
Format of UG (rich and highly articulated) EA
DAEA
1. DA: G – construction-based structural rules – format of G
2. EA: rules of G reduced to principles in UG – “format of UG”
7.7.8 Evolution of FL: Is FL isolated?
Principles of UG entirely specific to language
FL is isolated ?
Evolution of FL: independent ?
7.7.9 How is language usable at all?
Use of L for communication: externalization of linguistic expressions
Expressions: constructed in MG
Thoughts: constructed in Conceptual Structure CS
Linguistic expressions paired up with thought may be externalized as sound.
thought—expression—sound
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Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy
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7.7.10 Use of language — Grammar: some of it is wasted, some of it keeps
getting in the way
Discrete infinity
When was the last time you constructed an infinitely long sentence?
Grammar gets in the way; partially unsuited to communication.
(4) a. John tried to persuade Mary to marry him
b. John tried [John to persuade Mary [Mary to marry John]]
c. Johni tried [PROi to persuade Maryw [PROw to marry himi/j]]
Computational efficiency/easy interpretation dictates (4b): represent every
“understood” argument. Communicative efficiency/easy externalization dictates
(4a): do not pronounce each “understood” argument. How is the meaning of (4a)
or (5a) understood (when there’s a lot that is not pronounced)?
(5) a. Who did John try to persuade Mary to marry?
b. Who did John try [John to persuade Mary [Mary to marry Who]]
c. Whoz did Johni try [PROi to persuade Maryw [PROw to marry tz]]
Nobody understands the meaning of (4a) or (5a) unless they know that each is a
funny (or indeed natural) way of expressing (4b) and (5b), respectively.
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Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy
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Clash between syntactic structure and communicative structure
(6) A dog stole my purse.
Subject Object – Syntactic structure
Agent Patient – Thematic structure
Old New – Information structure
(7) $ My purse stole a dog.
Subject Object – Syntactic structure
Agent Patient – Thematic structure
Old New – Information structure
(8) My purse was stolen by a dog.
Subject – Syntactic structure
Patient Agent – Thematic structure
Old New – Information structure
Grammar: never quite suited to communication.
Grammatical structure: hierarchic (two-dimensional)
Communicative (information) structure: flat (one-dimensional)
How does language resolve these conflicts?
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Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy
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7.8 Tension between DA & EA in the “format framework”–
summary and conclusions
DA achieved at the expense of seriously compromising EA
Format of a G apparently required by DA:
Gs of Ls are “complex and varied rule-systems” (TFLD 7) formulated in terms of
structural configurations and operations (and restrictions on operations) on
structural configurations, involving
a total of five levels of representation (sound, meaning, LF, SS, DS),
each with its own set of cyclic operations.
EA rules removed from Gs of Ls into UG, in order that UG can account for
LA by imposing “narrow constraints on possible outcomes” (i.e. MGs of Ls),
leaving few choices for the child (TFLD 7). UG (over)loaded with categories,
configurations, etc. jeopardizes account of LA EA & biological evolution
of FL fall out of reach.
Some new technology is called for.
A radically different approach, i.e., a conceptual change is called for.
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Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy
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7.9 Rethinking FL
beyond UG (and EA) “more principled” explanation of FL.
CI
MG
SM
MG—CI (conceptual domain): Expressions are meaningful.
MG— SM (sensorimotor domain): Speech.
FL not isolated from other cognitive domains; evolution of FL ~ evolution of
other cognitive faculties Account of FL “more explanatory”
7.10 The Faculty of Language
The Faculty of Language in the broad sense (FLB)
The Faculty of Language in the narrow sense (FLN)
(Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002)
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Tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy
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(Hauser, Chomsky, and Fitch 2002:1570)
The design and functions of natural language
On explanations (a short digression)
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8 On explanations (a short digression)
8.1 What constitutes a (principled) explanation?
A (principled) explanation — a deductive argument: phenomenon to be
explained (explanandum) logically follows as a conclusion from a set of premises
(explanans); initial assumption: general principle (ideally a “law of nature”)
All genuine explanations are principled.
“explanation”:
(1) an attempt at an explanation (regardless of its success)
(2) a genuine explanation (a successful principled explanation)
A theory is a principled explanation
A theory of language is a principled explanatory hypothesis, based on general
assumptions deductively lead to a major conclusion about the explanandum
The design and functions of natural language
On explanations (a short digression)
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8.2 How can an explanation be “more principled” than another?
E.g., how can a theory of language offer a “more principled explanation of
linguistic phenomena” than another (TFLD 1)?
A more principled explanation EM vs. a less principled explanation EL:
An assumption AM in EM may be used to derive (as a conclusion) what serves as a
basic assumption AL in EL (AL is reduced to AM).
Chomsky: “We can regard an explanation of properties of language as principled
insofar as it can be reduced to properties of the interface systems and general
considerations of computational efficiency and the like” (TFLD 10).
A more explanatory theory of language is a “principled explanation in terms of
interface conditions and general principles” (TFLD 11), therefore a “principled
explanation [of linguistic phenomena is one] that addresses fundamental
questions of the biology of language” (TFLD 19, bold mine throughout, Cs Cz).
The design and functions of natural language
On explanations (a short digression)
33
8.3 How are axioms in a more principled explanation of language
more general than others?
Formulated in terms of conditions imposed upon expressions of language by
(properties of) the interface systems and the general principle of computational
efficiency, both external to language.
(This is the conceptual change mentioned earlier: look beyond language to
better understand FL.)
The design and functions of natural language
On explanations (a short digression)
34
8.4 Major stages in the development of linguistic theory
(1) Shifts in the explanandum, (2) fundamental assumptions increasingly
general, (3) yielding previous assumptions as logical consequences
8.4.1 Traditional Grammar
Description without explanation – no deductive arguments, no theory, little
consistency, description arbitrary (rather than derived from general assumptions)
8.4.2 Historicism
“Linguistics = history of a language”
“Theory = Chronological and causal explanation” — (a misunderstanding!)
The design and functions of natural language
On explanations (a short digression)
35
8.4.3 Structuralism
Explanation: structural patterns (inductive generalizations about the structure of
expressions)
Assumption: Language = set of sentences (the explanandum)
Grammar = taxonomy of structural patterns (the explanation)
Not understood: the set of sentences of L is infinite
no taxonomy can account for an infinite number of objects
Ls have universal properties
Misunderstanding: “Ls may differ in unpredictable ways” “each L is
unique” its grammar needs to be “worked out” inductively from the data
(observed “facts” of language use) by discovery techniques the ultimate goal of
linguistics: a manual of “discovery procedures”
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On explanations (a short digression)
36
8.4.4 Generative Grammar
Stage 1 (Observational Adequacy)
Understood (Assumption): the set of sentences of L is an infinite set (the
explanandum)
Conclusion (conceptual change = (1st) generative revolution): A grammar of L
must be a generative rule system (= the explanation)
A generative rule system that accounts for all and only the sentences of L is said to
be observationally adequate. (Chomsky 1957)
Stage 2 (Descriptive Adequacy)
General assumption: sentences of L are the product of mental grammars. The
generative rule system is mental (2nd generative revolution/cognitive turn).
A grammar of L is a generative mental grammar.
A theory L that takes L to be a generative rule system (the explanandum) in its
speakers’ minds, and accounts for expressions of L as structures generated by a
mental grammar, is descriptively adequate. (Chomsky 1965, 2006)
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On explanations (a short digression)
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Stage 3 (Explanatory Adequacy)
Assumption (understood): mental grammars (languages) are acquired.
Language acquisition (LA) yields mental grammars in speakers’ minds.
A theory of L/MG (MG, the explanandum) must account for that.
The explanation: account of LA (“innate UG MG”)
Central assumption: UG (LAD) is innate in children.
Rules in MGs of Ls “originate” in UG.
Rules in theories of MGs of Ls must be derived from (= reduced to) general
principles in UG (= the condition of explanatory adequacy).
A grammar that meets this condition is explanatorily adequate. (Chomsky 1965)
Innateness of UG – the central idea in the explanation of MGs and their
acquisition
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On explanations (a short digression)
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Stage 4 (“Beyond Explanatory Adequacy”, Chomsky 1993, 2004a)
1 Account of FL in terms of language-independent principles
Assumption: interface conditions imposed on expressions of L by SM and CI,
embedded in a system of cognitive domains
Assumption: language-independent principle of efficient computation
Explanation: a theory of language formulated in terms of interface conditions,
general language-independent principles of computational efficiency, & innate
UG.
2 New questions arise: evolution of FL
LA: acquisition of (MG of) L in an individual – an ontogenetic process
Evolution of FL: development of FL in the species – a phylogenetic process
Biology of language involves its evolution (the explanandum).
Explanation: account of the evolution of FL.
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On explanations (a short digression)
39
8.5 Explanation and understanding: a brief summary
explanation = theory = understanding.
Understanding: You understand some phenomena P just in case you have an
explanation for P.
An explanation for P: a deductive system of arguments, i.e., a theory, which leads
to P as its logical consequence (or conclusion).
The theory predicts P. = P is derived.
The design and functions of natural language
Principles and parameters (P&P)
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9 Principles and parameters (P&P) UG: innate set of parameters (e.g., head-first, as English, or head-last, as
Hungarian; [lexical-] configurational, as English, or discourse-configurational
[“non-configurational”], as Hungarian, etc.).
Language acquisition: setting innate parameters in UG.
9.1 P&P formulated in terms specific to language (Chomsky and
Lasnik’s (1993) construction-based approach to UG)
Principles and parameters formulated in concepts specific to language (e.g.,
islands, filters, constraints on structural operations, such as movement).
Prediction: Linguistic computation is unlike any other computation.
9.2 P&P formulated in terms of language-independent principles
Abandoning the format-framework for UG.
Chomsky: “shifting the burden of explanation from the first factor, the genetic
endowment, to the third factor, language-independent principles” (TFLD 9).
The design and functions of natural language
Principles and parameters (P&P)
41
9.3 “Levels of explanatory adequacy”
Level I — explanation for language is derived from principles of UG, a genetic
endowment specific to language, which accounts for LA.
Level II — “beyond explanatory adequacy”: linguistic rules and principles derived
partly from language-independent principles apparently imposed upon language
by systems that are external to FL(N) and interact with it: CI (conceptual-
intentional domain) and SM (sensorimotor domain).
The design and functions of natural language
Optimal design
42
10 Optimal design
10.1 I-language (IL) optimally designed?
Interface levels CI and SM impose (conflicting!) conditions on linguistic
expressions (LE).
CI: LE paired up with thought – hierarchic (or 3D)
SM: LE assigned phonetic form (PF) – linear (1D!)
“one of the most fundamental questions of the biology of language: to what
extent does language approximate an optimal solution that it must satisfy to be
usable at all, given extralinguistic structural architecture?” (TFLD 9–10).
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Optimal design
43
10.2 The Strong Minimalist Thesis (SMT)
Language (=I-language, a state of FL!) is optimally designed for the computation
of LEs that meet interface conditions.
Language is optimally designed for the expression of thought; “language is an
optimal solution to interface conditions that FL must satisfy” (Chomsky 2005b). –
A heuristic and a research program, rather than a “fact.”
SMT is almost certainly wrong: “no one expects” SMT to hold fully (Chomsky
2005b).
The interface systems CI and SM appear to contribute to language design
asymmetrically (Chomsky 2005b). CI conditions appear to dominate; SM
conditions dictated by communicative efficiency are secondary. “language is in
many ways “poorly designed” for communicative efficiency: … ambiguity, garden
paths” etc. (Chomsky 2005b). (See section 4 on functions of language.)
Ambiguity: Flying planes can be dangerous.
Garden path: Le szoktam az italról kaparni a zárjegyet. (Pléh–Lukács 2014:748)
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Optimal design
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10.3 Conflicting interface conditions
10.3.1 Duality of semantics (cf. Chomsky 2005b & TFLD 13-14)
Structure of LE:
Argument/Thematic structure (AS) – ‘who did what to whom’
Discourse-semantic structure (DS) – old vs. new information, topic–comment
AS DS
AS Hierarchically structured LE Linearized LE DS
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Optimal design
45
10.3.2 Resolutions of the AS DS conflict
10.3.2.1 “Format based” solution: (multiple levels of structure)
D-structure (AS) Transformations S-structure (DS)
10.3.2.2 Minimalist solution: (No D-structure, no S-structure, no LF)
External Merge AS ( mapping to the “conceptual” interface CI)
Internal Merge DS ( mapping to the “phonetic” interface SM)
“Single representation” of LE — contains all information for further computation
at CI & SM: no ordering in AS ( External Merge)
“edge” properties (DS) ( Internal Merge = “movement”)
Linearization only when LE mapped to SM (no linearization at CI, TFLD 15)
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Optimal design
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10.4 Conflict resolutions: Hungarian and English
The conflict between conditions imposed by AS (CI) and DS (SM) is real.
AS is hierarchic (but purportedly unordered).
DS is flat & ordered (“linearized”).
English is a “configurational” language: syntactic “base structure” is AS (from
top to bottom).
Hungarian is a “discourse-configurational” language: (the “top” of) syntactic
structure is DS (cf. É. Kiss 1987, 1995, 2003).
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Optimal design
47
10.5 Conflict resolution: “Configurationality parameter”
New UG parameter: (“thematic-”)configurational/discourse-configurational;
subject-prominent/topic-prominent (É. Kiss 1995)
Configurational (subject-prominent): English
Discourse-configurational languages (É. Kiss 1995)
In Europe: Hungarian, Basque, Catalan, Bulgarian, Russian, Greek, Finnish,
Romanian, Turkish, Armenian.
In Asia: Nepali, Hindi, Korean (Japanese, Chinese).
In Africa: Somali, Chadic, Aghem and Kikuyu (Bantu family), Yoruba, Berber.
American Indian languages: Haida, Omaha, Mayan languages, Quechua.
Austronesian languages: Ilonggo.
Topic-prominent languages: one-to-one correspondence between syntactic and
notional predication structures.
The design and functions of natural language
Structure and interpretation of linguistic expressions: Principle of minimal structural distance vs. minimal linear distance (Chomsky 2013a,b 2015)
48
11 Structure and interpretation of linguistic
expressions: Principle of minimal structural
distance vs. minimal linear distance (Chomsky
2013a,b 2015)
“Language is beautiful but unusable” (Chomsky 2013a). “It’s great for talking to
yourself, but not so much for talking to others” (Chomsky 2013c).
“Aristotle’s dictum should be modified: language is not sound with meaning [as
Aristotle proposed], but rather meaning with sound (or some other
externalization)… language is primarily an instrument of thought” (Chomsky
2013b:36).
“Rather than being useless but perfect, language is useful but imperfect, just like
other biological systems” (Pinker & Jackendoff 2004:229).
The design and functions of natural language
Structure and interpretation of linguistic expressions: Principle of minimal structural distance vs. minimal linear distance (Chomsky 2013a,b 2015)
49
Principle of minimal structural distance (Chomsky 2013a,b
2015)
Linear proximity is ignored in processing linguistic expressions; the interpretation
of linguistic expressions is structure-dependent; what matters is not linear distance
but structural distance, the proximity of elements in a hierarchic structure.
(4) a. Can eagles that fly swim?
b. Instinctively, eagles that fly swim. (Chomsky 2013b)
The auxiliary in (a) and the adverb in (b) are both associated with swim, the
element farthest away linearly — but not structurally.
(5) Le szoktam az italról kaparni a zárjegyet. (Pléh–Lukács 2014:748)
If interpretation was based entirely on linear arrangement, (5) would not be a
garden path sentence (but half bad and the rest different in meaning). But (5) has a
“correct” interpretation, on which the preverb le is structurally united with the verb
kaparni, half a sentence away if you regard its linear position.
The design and functions of natural language
Summary and final conclusions
50
Summary and final conclusions
Language
Language is I-language, a system of computational, conceptual-interpretive, and
“externalizing” mechanisms, internal to the mind.
The traditional notion of language (“mind-independent language,” some
“linguistic system external to the mind”) is incoherent.
Functions of language
Symbolizing thought. A “language of thought” – primary
“Communication” — secondary. Externalized LE
The design and functions of natural language
Summary and final conclusions
51
An explanatory model of language
A principled explanatory theory of language is one that “addresses fundamental
questions of the biology of language” (TFLD 19) and is formulated in terms of
“properties of the interface systems” (TFLD 10) and “language-independent
principles of data processing, structural architecture, and computational
efficiency,” “the third factor,” (TFLD 9).
The CONCEPTUAL CHANGE: to better understand FL, look beyond
language and consider mental domains external to and in interaction with it, a
system of subsystems in which language is embedded.
The ontogeny of language: its development or growth in the individual.
The phylogeny of language: its evolution in the species.
A principled explanation of language accounts for both.
The design and functions of natural language
Summary and final conclusions
52
Optimal design
Language is torn between CI and SM
Linguistic expressions (LE) cannot do justice both to the conditions imposed upon
them by CI and to the conditions imposed by SM.
Conceptual structures may (at least) be two-dimensional, i.e. hierarchic.
Spoken utterances are one-dimensional, i.e., flat.
Hierarchic conceptual structures need not (in addition) be linearly arranged.
Externalized utterances must have a linear structure (their only structure).
If LE were to satisfy one set of conditions, they must violate the other. What
preferences are made by the computational system—meet CI, or meet SM?
Language appears to favor CI (structure of LE is hierarchic). Its primary
function
Communication, the externalization of LE, is secondary. “[Language] is great for
talking to yourself, but not so much for talking to others” (Chomsky 2013c).
The design and functions of natural language
References
53
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