The development of the United Nations register of conventional arms: Prospects and proposals

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The development of the United Nations register ofconventional arms: Prospects and proposalsMalcolm Chalmers a & Owen Greene aa Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, United KingdomVersion of record first published: 05 Feb 2008.

To cite this article: Malcolm Chalmers & Owen Greene (1994): The development of the United Nations register of conventionalarms: Prospects and proposals, The Nonproliferation Review, 1:3, 1-17

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Malcolm Chalmers & Owen Greene

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEUNITED NATIONS REGISTER OF

CONVENTIONAL ARMS:PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS1

by Malcolm Chalmers and Owen Greene

Drs. Malcolm Chalmers and Owen Greene are based at the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford,United Kingdom.

T ransfers, production, andholdings of conventionalarms are security issues of

concern to many states. In the after-math of the Gulf War in 1991, therewas wide agreement that "somethingmust be done" to try to prevent thesort of destabilizing build-up in con-ventional arms that had taken placein Iraq in the 1980s. Specifically, itwas felt that measures were neededin order to encourage responsibilityand restraint in the transfers of con-ventional arms to regions of tensionsuch as the Middle East. At thesame time, the end of the Cold War,and the resulting unprecedented co-operation between the world's ma-jor arms suppliers (the UnitedStates, Soviet Union, United King-dom, and France) heightened expec-tations that progress could be madetowards international agreement onmeasures to restrain transfers.

Inspired by the ConventionalForces in Europe (CFE) Treaty,numerous proposals for regionalconventional arms control weremade in 1991.2 However, these did

not achieve widespread support. Thepolitical will to negotiate structuralarms control agreements3 in the re-gions of greatest concern (the Mid-dle East and East Asia) was weak.The incentive to help domestic armsproducers offset the decline in do-mestic orders through increasedoverseas sales was substantial. And,in any case, there were significantproblems in defining what balancedlimits or constraints should be in amultipolar region. As a consequenceof all these factors, the two maininitiatives for global action on con-ventional arms to emerge after theGulf War did not involve structuralarms control. They were (a) the"P5" process4 and (b) the UnitedNations Register of ConventionalArms.

Since the P5 process stalled onChinese opposition to the U.S. F-15 sale to Taiwan in late 1992, theUnited Nations Register is at presentthe only significant global agreementrelating to conventional arms. Thisarticle will therefore examine thehistory of the U.N. Register and then

analyze its prospects. Specifically,it reviews proposals for strengthen-ing the Register and proposes waysof expanding it. The Register at-tempts to build mutual confidencebetween states through "transpar-ency" or "the systematic provisionof information on specific aspectsof activities in the military fieldunder informal or formal interna-tional agreements."3 Thus, it facili-tates timely consultations betweenstates on potentially destabilizingarms build-ups. As a transparencyregime, it does not regulate or limitmilitary activities directly. It ishoped, however, that increasedtransparency will encourage restraintby increasing the pressures, bothdomestic and international, againstpotentially destabilizing productionor transfers of arms.

HISTORY OF THE U.N.REGISTER

The initial proposal for a Regis-ter in 1991 was for a "Register ofInternational Arms Transfers. " How-

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ever, the name (and proposal) waschanged in response to criticisms bymany arms importing states aboutthe exclusion of military holdingsand domestic arms production. InDecember 1992, the U.N. GeneralAssembly agreed that the Registerwould initially concentrate on sevencategories of arms transfers: battletanks, armored combat vehicles,heavy artillery, combat aircraft, at-tack helicopters, warships, and mis-siles and missile launchers. In 1994,a U.N. Group of Experts began tomeet to review implementation andto consider ways in which the Reg-ister could be expanded, specificallyto include domestic production andmilitary holdings.

The Register is a voluntary trans-parency measure, and does not in-volve limits or controls on armstransfers or holdings. It is entirelycompatible with the jealously-guarded rights of states to decide forthemselves what conventional forcesthey need for self-defense. It aimsat improving international transpar-ency relating to arms transfers andholdings, to build mutual confi-dence, and to promote timely inter-national consultations on potentiallydestabilizing regional arms build-ups. It is thus a relatively modestmeasure, which partly explains whyit has survived. Nevertheless, manyhope that increased transparencymight encourage restraint: it couldincrease international and domesticpressures against "irresponsible" orpotentially destabilizing productionor transfers of major weapons sys-tems, and promote informed publicdebate. Exchanges of official infor-mation on conventional arms couldalso provide a basis for regionalconfidence- and security- buildingarrangements.

One of the guiding principles un-

derlying the Register is that thereis no general presumption that tradein the weapons that are covered bythe Register is illegitimate. It canbecome so in particular circum-stances, for example, if a country issubject to a U.N. embargo. But inmany circumstances, conventionalweapons are seen as a legitimatemeans of national and collectivedefense, and the importation ofweapons for these purposes can, byextension, also be acceptable.

States were invited to submit in-formation to the United Nations byApril 1993 on their exports andimports of major conventional armsduring 1992. Most states missed thedeadline. Nevertheless, 80 countrieshad responded in time (followedlater by Sri Lanka, Lebanon, andUkraine) to be included in the firstannual report of the Register, whichwas published in October 1993.6 Allof the top 14 exporters of major con-ventional arms (as identified byStockholm International Peace Re-search Institute (SIPRI)) submittedreports. However, a few "secondtier" suppliers such as North Koreaand South Africa, did not provideinformation. Of the top 20 armsimporters for 1992 identified bySIPRI,7 14 submitted reports; how-ever, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Thailand,Syria, Taiwan, and United ArabEmirates did not participate. Alto-gether, the vast majority of trans-fers of major conventional arms in1992 were probably reported to theRegister. Many commentators hadbeen skeptical about whether theRegister would reveal any new in-formation about the arms trade, butthey were proved wrong even in thefirst year of the Register's operation.

Overall, participation was high inEurope and North and SouthAmerica, patchy in Asia, and poor

in the Middle East and Sub-SaharanAfrica. Nevertheless, Israel andEgypt submitted reports, as didChina, India, Pakistan, South Ko-rea, Malaysia, and Singapore,among others.

However, not all 80 governmentslisted by the United Nations pro-vided information on imports orexports. Nigeria simply sent a noteexplaining that all of its records hadbeen destroyed in a fire. South Af-rica responded by noting that itwould be inappropriate for it to re-port on its arms transfers while theU.N. arms embargo against it re-mained in place. Croatia sent a simi-lar note, saying that "it is still un-der the sanctions imposed by reso-lution 713 (1991), and that conse-quently no import of arms or mili-tary equipment has taken place."Similarly, Oman, Grenada, andParaguay sent notes explaining whythey could or would not, for a vari-ety of reasons, provide any infor-mation for 1992. Qatar, Tunisia,Mexico and Panama submitted somebackground information with noaccompanying data (or "nil returns")on their arms transfers. All of thesestates were included among the "par-ticipants" in the Register.

About a third of all states provid-ing appropriate information ontransfers provided nil returns forboth imports and exports. In mostcases, this was entirely plausible,and reflects the fact that the trade inmajor conventional weapons isheavily concentrated among rela-tively small numbers of suppliersand recipients. However, in somecases there must be doubts about thereliability of the report. The belea-guered Georgian government saidthat no official transfers of majorconventional arms had taken placein 1992, but "on the other hand we

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have to indicate that illicit aims tradetook place. A great number of [ma-jor conventional arms] were im-ported from the Russian Federationby Ossetian and Abkhazian separat-ists." The Russian return explicitlyexcluded exports to Azerbaijan,Armenia, Moldova, and Belarus, aswell as transfers of control associ-ated with the division of the forcesof the former Soviet Union. Thegovernments of Yugoslavia (Serbia),Kazakhstan and, later, Ukraine alsoprovided nil returns.

There is some skepticism aboutthe validity of some returns. Never-theless, it seems clear that most gov-ernments reported in good faith, andoften had to go to considerablelengths to collect the required in-formation. Even states with quitewell-developed arms export controlstypically had no system for moni-toring the numbers of major con-ventional arms transferred acrosstheir frontiers each year. Export li-censing records do not indicate howmany arms were exported (export-ers often do not use the full quotaon the license) or when the trans-fers took place (licenses usually lastfor several years).

The first report of the Registerprovided a surprising amount of newinformation. First, to the best of theauthors' knowledge, no country hadpreviously provided public informa-tion on annual numbers of conven-tional weapons imported or ex-ported. Moreover, significantlymore transfers were reported thanhad been identified by two of themain independent "arms watchers"-SIPRI and the International Insti-tute of Strategic Studies (IISS). Thisis particularly true of land systemssuch as tanks, heavy artillery, andarmored combat vehicles, which canbe relatively difficult to track using

the open literature. Many partici-pants thus opted for a policy of open-ness in spite of traditional sensitivi-ties in providing official (and thus"undeniable") information on theirarmaments. Indeed, Peru even re-ported that its navy imported fourarmored personnel carriers (APCs)from embargoed South Africa.Moreover, because nearly all majorexporters reported, the Register con-tains substantial information on im-ports by non-participating countriessuch as Saudi Arabia, and Thailand.This is no doubt irritating to the non-participating governments, but theywill have to accept such enforcedtransparency as long as the mainsuppliers continue to participate inthe Register.

Finally, 24 countries provided"background information" on theirmilitary holdings of arms coveredby the Register; of these, 15 alsoreported on their procurement fromnational production. This back-ground information is not publishedin the annual report, but is publiclyavailable.8 Most of the countriesproviding information on militaryholdings or procurement are mem-bers of the Conference on Securityand Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),all of whom already regularly ex-change similar information betweenthemselves on a confidential, inter-governmental basis.

A U.N. Group of Experts hasbeen convened to review the opera-tions of the Register and make rec-ommendations for its future devel-opment. The Group consists of rep-resentatives from 23 governments,and is composed so that it can op-erate as a de facto negotiating groupfor the U.N. General Assembly.9 Itmet in February and June 1994, andis due to hold one more meeting be-fore it reports in the summer. At the

top of its agenda is the question ofwhether and how the Register shouldbe extended to cover procurementfrom national production and mili-tary holdings. It will also considerwhether the categories and report-ing requirements should be revisedor extended, and ways of increasingthe effectiveness and value of theRegister.

The success of any proposals forextending the scope of the Registerare likely to depend substantially ondecisions made to improve the wayit operates. Therefore, this articlediscusses some ways that the Regis-ter might be strengthened. It thenexamines a number of proposalsbeing made for expanding the Reg-ister. First, we discuss the possibleexpansion of the Register to includeholdings and procurement. Second,we focus on the possibilities for ex-panding, or adding to, the existingseven categories of systems coveredby the Register. Finally, we exam-ine proposals that the Register beexpanded to include greater infor-mation on the types and models ofsystems reported.

STRENGTHENING THEREGISTER

At present the Register is a purelyvoluntary regime. There is no defi-nition of what it means to be a "par-ticipant," and obligations are not de-fined in a treaty or framework con-vention. Resources for the Registerare extremely modest, and no deci-sions have been made as to how toorganize development beyond thework of the 1994 Group. There aregood reasons for all of this, and itwould certainly be premature to at-tempt to establish the Register in aformal convention at this stage.Nevertheless, if the Register is to


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become a significant and permanentfeature in the international system,it must be gradually strengthened asan institution, and the rights andobligations of participants must bedefined and developed. It is alsoimportant that while the Group con-centrates on means of extending anddeveloping reporting requirements,it does not neglect measures to im-prove implementation. The develop-ment of implementation review pro-cedures and resources is important,as are other measures to improve thereliability and timeliness of reporteddata. Mechanisms are needed toprovide guidance (and perhaps dis-pute resolution) where there is con-fusion or disagreement.

We suggest three areas where dis-cussion is needed: (i) whether"participation" should be defined ;(ii) whether there is a need for aregular review procedure for theRegister, and if so what form itshould take; and (iii) the potentialvalue of establishing "common lists"of systems covered by the Register.

Should participation be defined?

On the recommendation of the1992 Panel, the current Register setsout three ways in which data is sub-mitted to the United Nations:

First, states provide numericaldata and countries of origin/desti-nation. Although the definition ofa transfer could still be improved inthe light of the first year's experi-ence, the requirements for filling inthis part of a return are fairly clear.

Second, space is provided on theform for information on "descrip-tion of item" and "comments on thetransfer." If provided, this informa-tion is published in the annual re-port. However, this column can befilled in at member states' discre-

tion; no specific pattern is pre-scribed.10 Unlike the main part ofthe form, this section is both volun-tary, and less defined.

Third, states are invited to sub-mit background information "in anyform they wish" on "their militaryholdings, procurement through na-tional production, and relevant poli-cies." This information is not pub-lished in the Secretary-General'sreport on the Register; however, thisdoes not mean that "backgroundinformation" provided is confiden-tial. In line with the 1992 Panel'srecommendation that "the availablebackground information submittedby Member States be open to thepublic,"11 the Secretary-General'sreport states that the backgroundinformation is available at the Cen-ter for Disarmament Affairs (CDA)for consultation.

A "common sense" definition ofRegister participation might be thatit involves (at a minimum) satisfy-ing the first of these three require-ments. Participation in the Registeris of course voluntary. To be countedas a participant, however, it couldbe argued mat a country must pro-vide at least some data (even if thisonly involves a nil return).

However, this was not the case inthe 1992 returns. At least seven ofthe 80 countries listed as having re-plied to the request for informationdid not complete the form at all.Because of the understandable de-sire to maximize the "headline" fig-ure for participants in year one, theUnited Nations did not requirecompletion of the standardized formfor inclusion on this list. This isquite apart from the more complexproblem of whether returns are accu-rate.

If the Register is expanded, fur-ther subdivisions of the return to in-

clude exports, imports, procure-ment, and holdings could be created.Whichever subdivisions are chosen,however, there should be a cleardefinition of what is required to bedeemed a participant in any one ofthese categories.

To be listed as having partici-pated, a country might be requiredto have filled in the standardizedforms for transfers, plus whateverequivalent is agreed for procurementand holdings. No confirmation ofthe accuracy of the data submittedwould be required, no matter howincredible it appeared. But, a coun-try would have to provide some data--or a nil return-to qualify for thelist of full participants. The advan-tage of such a system is that it wouldestablish a clear incentive for statesto follow the guidelines. States willhave already noticed that some othergovernments-such as Nigeria andSouth Africa-have been included inthe headline total without filling inthe forms. If this practice were tobe allowed to continue without anypolitical cost, it might create a dan-ger that an increasing number ofcountries will choose to submit datain whatever form and at whateverlevel of detail seem suitable to them.The main method the Register usesto persuade governments to divulgedata is through the potential politi-cal cost (small but real) of being seenas a nonparticipant.

As the Register expands, theremay be several states each year whorespond in some way to the requestfor reports, but in a way that quali-fies them only to be listed as "otherreplies," not as "full participants."Accordingly, the headline number of"full participants" would be less thanit would otherwise be. Provided thatthe number of replies continues torise in the next few years, however,


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this risk may be relatively low.Moreover, the Register's success islikely to be judged increasingly bythe quality of the returns as well asthe number of replies. There is apossibility that a small number ofcountries—we estimate seven in1992-will be excluded from the to-tal if "participant" were clearly de-fined. But, these will probably becountries such as Tunisia and Libyathat have, in any case, not providedany useful data. By including all re-sponses in the report, but with adivision between "full participants"and "other replies," public damageto the headline figure should be rela-tively limited, while pressure onstates to participate fully would stillincrease.

Improving reliability andimplementation review

As the Register expands, the needto have a repository of expertise andadvice will also grow. The experi-ence of the first year suggests veryclearly the difficulties of operatingthe Register without giving theUnited Nations any role in remind-ing and encouraging governments tomake appropriate returns, or in pro-viding advice and training to na-tional officials. An expanded rolefor U.N. officials is therefore, in ourview, likely to be an important partof successful Register development.Such a role in turn will require ad-ditional resources.

Yet, some desirable central func-tions, such as a mechanism for de-ciding whether or not a state has"participated," cannot be entirelydelegated to U.N. officials. TheCDA can play an initial advisory,monitoring, and administrative role.But, it may need to be backed up bya body capable of taking political

responsibility for the implementa-tion and development of the Regis-ter.

This role could be assumed by astanding panel of governmental ex-perts, similar in size and composi-tion to the current group. Such apanel could meet as often as neces-sary to fulfill its functions, whichcould be both advisory (as atpresent) and operational. Thesefunctions could include:

* Carrying out regular reviews ofthe operation and possibilities forfurther development of the Regis-ter. Such reviews might, for ex-ample, examine proposals for thefurther development of the Register'scategories, definitions, and proce-dures. The panel might also reviewthe success of each year's returns,and suggest ways to improve proce-dures. Under this system, the 1994Group would be seen as only onestage of a continuing review process,and the pressure on it to make "once-and-for-all" choices might be re-duced. There are many potentiallyuseful proposals on the table whichare worthy of serious consideration,but which may need to be deferredin the interests of securing core ob-jectives and improving participation.Agreement to defer an issue, how-ever, may depend on whether therewill be future opportunities to re-turn to the issue. This in turn sug-gests that one of the outcomes ofthe 1994 review should be an agree-ment that future reviews will takeplace on a regular basis. A standingpanel would also help to address thewidespread concern that the 1994Group is meeting a year too soon,and prepare the ground for a moregradual, but consensual, process ofregime building.

* Responding to specific requestsfrom the Committee for Disarma-

ment and/or the General Assemblyto address specific issues within itspurview.

* Acting as a dispute resolutionpanel where there are doubts or dis-putes on issues such as whether astate's submission qualifies it to belisted as a "full participant."

Agreement on common lists ofsystems covered by the Register

Another possible task for a stand-ing panel would be overseeing thecreation of an agreed list of thosesystems that are included in each ofthe Register categories. It wouldmake national returns easier to com-pile for officials, most of whom haveno direct knowledge of what theUnited Nations means by particulardefinitions, or what was in thepanel's (or group's) collective mindwhen it agreed on a particular defi-nition. Even if there were no re-quirement to include type/model inreturns, an agreed list would reducethe potential for misinterpretation ofwhat are, in some cases, rather am-biguous guidelines. This might re-duce the costs and administrativeburdens of adhering to the regime,particularly if the proposals to addmilitary holdings and procurementfrom national production areadopted.

Compiling such a list could bean evolutionary process. Thosestates that provide information ontheir military holdings could beasked to attach a list of the systemsthat they have included in their re-turn for holdings.n States could beasked to do so even if the 1994Group were to decide to leave hold-ings as part of "available backgroundinformation. "

For each system, states would beasked to provide enough informa-

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tion to distinguish it from other sys-tems~e.g., gun caliber for battletanks. But, governments would havethe option to furnish information onthe systems they included in theirholdings data without stating howmany of each system they possess.In some countries, and perhaps insome weapons categories, such anarrangement might provide a usefulmeans of contributing to Registerreliability and consistency, whilemeeting the security concerns thatarise when exact numbers of par-ticular systems are released. Act-ing on the advice of appropriate ex-perts, perhaps based at the CDA,the standing panel could then ex-amine the lists submitted on an an-nual basis and seek to agree on acommon list of systems that clearlyfall within each of the Register cat-egories. When there is a consensusthat a system clearly falls within aparticular category, it would be in-cluded in a published list of systemsto be circulated in future years.When there is no consensus, sys-tems would not be included and thedebate would continue in futureyears.13

Such a system could draw on theexperience of the CSCE in recentyears. In the process of negotiatingthe CFE Treaty, the problems cre-ated by intractably ambiguous cat-egory definitions were to some ex-tent circumvented by agreement onlists of systems covered by the treaty.In addition, for each new system in-troduced, states are asked to pro-vide photographs, weight, and cali-ber data. For Register purposes, itmight not be appropriate to insistthat participants provide such com-prehensive data. Yet, there is a caseto be made for developing an agreedupon-though not necessarily ex-haustive-list of systems that defi-

nitely come under each categoryheading.

REVISING AND EXPANDINGCATEGORIES

Introduction

Part of the task of the 1994 Groupis to consider "the addition of fur-ther categories of equipment. " Inconsidering the task of its succes-sor, the 1992 Panel felt that "a keyprinciple for adding categoriesshould be that of military relevancein terms of the significance of theirimpact on regional and global secu-rity."14

In considering the expansion oraddition of categories, there issometimes a temptation to think thatmore is always better, subject onlyto security concerns. This attitudeshould be resisted. First, additionalcoverage involves additional admin-istrative effort. If a substantialamount of time is spent collectingdetailed data on systems of onlymarginal relevance, there may befewer resources available to ensurethat the correct data are supplied forthose systems that matter most.Moreover, every time definitions arechanged, there is bound to be sometransition cost. If changes occur toooften, it may become difficult todiscern trends in transfers, procure-ment, and holdings over time, thusundermining the value of the Regis-ter as a measure of "destabilizingbuild-ups" of weapons. And, if toomuch detail is asked of countries,especially those with less developedbureaucracies, there is a danger thatparticipation could decrease. The ex-perience of the U.N. standardized.system for reporting militaryexpenditures suggests that request-ing a mass of detailed information

is counter productive if only a fewgovernments (31 in this case in1993) are prepared to provide it.

Second, there is always a dangerthat an expansion of the number ofmodels included in any one categorywill make it more difficult in thecase of returns by states that do notinclude item descriptions to distin-guish the more important systemsfrom the less significant ones. More-over, it is premature to assume thatmost states will provide item de-scriptions for their transfers, mili-tary holdings, and procurement fromnational production in the near fu-ture.

On the other hand, there couldbe some cases in which an expan-sion of the types of weapons cov-ered by the Register can be justi-fied. It would be surprising if therewere not some anomalies which, asa result of the first two years' expe-rience, it would seem sensible to re-solve. If significant changes do seemdesirable, in the light of the overallrationale of the Register, it may bebetter to make them now, before theexisting categories become too es-tablished.

Even if no additional categoriesare created, and no item descriptionsare provided, the addition of extraitems can be of value if the items inquestion are judged to be of a signifi-cance comparable to, or greaterthan, some of those already in theRegister.13 How to apply this crite-rion will inevitably, however, be amatter of judgement. In each case atrade-off will have to be made be-tween the potential costs and ben-efits of a proposed expansion.


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Ground and air systems

Adding ground and air systems al-ready subject to CFE Treaty

The first five Register categoriesuse some of the same phraseologyas the definitions of the weapons"limited" by the CFE Treaty. In ad-dition to "limiting" systems in cer-tain categories, the CFE Treaty alsodefines a wider group of systemswhich are "subject to the Treaty."These additional systems are notsubject to numerical limitations.16

But countries are obliged to "ex-change information" on them as partof their annual returns, and they arealso required to place certain limitson their operations. Theseare: "primary trainer aircraft, un-armed trainer aircraft, combat [sup-port] helicopters, unarmed transporthelicopters, armored vehicle launchbridges, armored personnel carrierlook-alikes and armored fightingvehicle look-alikes. "17

The Register does not include allof these systems, which are also thesubject of CSCE-wide informationexchange through the Vienna Docu-ment of March 1992. Indeed, thereis no reason in principle why theRegister should include all systemssubject to CSCE transparency re-gimes. In considering whether thereare potentially destabilizing systemswhich are not covered by the Regis-ter, however, it might be useful toreflect briefly on those systemswhich are at present subject toCSCE transparency but are not cov-ered by the Register. The systemscovered by the treaty are:

* Primary trainers and unarmedtrainer aircraft—The equipment sub-ject to the CFE Treaty (but not lim-ited by it) includes 17 types of pri-mary trainer aircraft. By contrast,

the Register specifically excludesprimary trainer aircraft "unless de-signed, equipped or modified" toengage targets "by employing guidedmissiles, unguided rockets, bombs,guns, cannons and other weaponsof destruction." At the very least,there is a need to clarify which sys-tems are included in the Register andwhich are not. A common list ofsystems might be of value. Thegroup might also want to considerwhether to widen Register transpar-ency to include all those aircraftsubject to the CSCE transparencyregime. The number of systems in-volved is quite small. But traineraircraft can, in times of conflict,often provide a significant incrementto combat capability.

* Combat support helicopters andunarmed transport helicopters—While attack helicopters are the onlyhelicopters limited by CFE Treaty,they are not the only helicopterssubject to information exchange. TheVienna Document requires states toprovide data on all helicopters inmilitary service, specifying whethertheir primary role is, for example,"specialized attack, multi-purposeattack, combat support, or trans-port." Only the first two of theseroles are included in "attack heli-copters." Thus, for example,Sweden's CSCE declaration of De-cember 1992 (also provided to theUnited Nations as part of its back-ground information) includes itsholdings of unarmed transport andcombat support helicopters, as wellas its holdings of search and rescueand anti-submarine warfare helicop-ters.18 And the protocol to the CFETreaty on Existing Types of Con-ventional Armaments and Equip-ment provides a list of existing typesof both combat support helicopters(25 types) and unarmed transport

helicopters (18 types).It is worth considering whether

the Register should be expanded toencompass all military helicoptersthat are already included in CFE andCSCE information exchanges. It isnot at all clear, for example, whytroop transport helicopters are ex-cluded from the Register, while ar-mored personnel carriers, even with-out any integral weapons, are in-cluded. Because of their greatermobility and versatility, the helicop-ters are likely to be able to make atleast as significant a contributionto surprise attacks and large scaleoffensive actions as the personnelcarriers. Similar arguments couldbe made for all military helicopters.

* Armored vehicle launchedbiidfiÊS-Both the CFE Treaty andthe 1992 Vienna Document requireparticipant states to exchange dataon the number of armored vehiclelaunched bridges in their invento-ries. It is generally acknowledgedthat such systems can play a crucialrole in large scale offensive opera-tions, at least in terrain with rivers.Although not limited on a nationallevel in the CFE Treaty, therefore,the number and deployment of thesesystems is a matter of real concern.In terms of their potential contribu-tion to destabilizing build-ups ofoffense-capable forces, the case isquite convincing. Whether this is apriority in 1994, however, may de-pend on whether non-CSCE states--for example those in the MiddleEast—share the concern of CSCEstates about such systems.

* APC look-alikes and armoredfighting vehicle (AFV> look-alikes--In addition to the armored combatvehicle category, the CFE Treatycontains a provision for informationexchange on "APC look-alikes andAFV look-alikes." This category


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consists of armored vehicles basedon the same chassis as, and exter-nally similar to, an APC or an AFVwhich does not have a cannon orgun of 20 millimeters or more, andwhich cannot transport a combatinfantry squad. Examples of systemsin this category include armoredrecovery vehicles, armored fire di-rection post vehicles, armored ob-servation post vehicles, armoredsurface-to-air guided missile carri-ers, and armored command vehicles.APC ambulances are specificallyexcluded.

It would be possible to add alllook-alikes to the Register, thusbringing CSCE and Register trans-parency in this area closer together.It is less clear that the military jus-tification for such a step is strongenough to make this a priority atthis stage. Some useful additionalinformation could be provided onarmored support vehicles. Sincethese normally operate in closeconjunction with armed vehicles,however, the value of this extra datamay be rather limited. If one wereto prioritize between claims for ex-pansion, therefore, the case may beless strong for look-alikes than foraircraft or helicopters.

Adding ground and air systems notalready subject to the CFE Treaty

If it is the case that a system'sinclusion in the CFE Treaty doesnot necessarily mean that it shouldbe included in the Register, the con-verse is also true. A ground or airsystem that is not in the CFE Treaty,might qualify for inclusion in theRegister. The area in which this isperhaps clearest is specialized sup-port aircraft. In the course of the1992 Panel, there was considerablediscussion about the possibilities for

adding such systems to the Registerat a later date. Specific mention wasmade of:

"(a) aerial refuelling aircraft; (b)reconnaissance aircraft (fixed androtary wing); (c) airborne electronicwarfare equipment (fixed and rotarywing); (d) airborne early warningand command and control systems(fixed and rotary wing). "19

If the criterion of military rel-evance were the only one used, itwould seem hard to justify the ex-clusion of at least some additionalair systems. Refuelling aircraftclearly have an important role inextending the range and capabilityof both air defense fighters andbombers. Modern advanced earlywarning (AEW) aircraft play a criti-cally important role in battle man-agement, both in defensive and of-fensive operations; and the transferof such systems to a region is oftenseen as a matter of regional, if notglobal, concern. Fixed wing trans-port aircraft, such as the ChineseY-8 or Lockheed Hercules C-130,although not on the 1992 Panel's list,can play a crucial role in powerprojection.

If the principle of including air-craft that are not designed to carryweapons were to be accepted, how-ever, it would be important tó agreewhere the line is to be drawn be-tween those which are militarily sig-nificant and those which are not.One possibility might be to confinecoverage of non-combat aircraft tothose in service in the armed forces.But acceptance of this principlemight in turn have implications fordefinitions of what is meant by "mili-tary holdings" (see "Defining 'mili-tary holdings'" section infia).

Weapons for "low intensity" wars?

It is sometimes argued that cat-egories used in the CSCE are too"Euro-centric," and there may be adegree of truth to this proposition.Yet, the most obvious division maybe not between weapons of value inEurope and those relevant to the restof world, but between those weap-ons that are "indispensable for sur-prise attacks and large scale offen-sive military operations" against a"well-armed" opponent and thosethat can only be of value against a"poorly-armed" opponent.

Against a well-armed opponent(such as Iraq, India, or Germany),the types of systems covered by theCFE Treaty and the U.N. Registerwould indeed form an indispens-able part of any ground offensive.Highly mobile armored vehicleswould be needed to provide adequateprotection against defending fire;and offensive action could not hopeto succeed without having the capa-bility of at least neutralizing anopponent's air power. This, in turn,normally requires a state to havedeveloped sophisticated air capabili-ties of its own.

Insofar as the aim of the Registeris only to cover those systems thatwould be of significant offensivevalue in a war between well-armedstates, there may be relatively littleneed to make significant adjustmentsto the existing five categories be-yond those already discussed. Theremay, for example, be a case for in-cluding additional types of supportaircraft when it can be proven thatthey could be of significant offen-sive value. But, there seems littlereason for reducing further (for ex-ample) the thresholds for includingsystems such as artillery and rock-ets.


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Yet, two caveats have to be added.First, the categories developed forthe CFE Treaty and the Register areof clearest relevance to interstate warin those parts of the world wherestates have acquired significant ar-senals of major ground and air sys-tems. The latter includes most CSCEstates, the Middle East, South Asia,and East Asia: areas of the worldthat together account for approxi-mately 97 percent of total worldmilitary spending.20

The categories may be less satis-factory in the remaining parts of theworld— notably Latin America andsub-Saharan Africa-where levels ofmilitary spending per person tendto be lower, but which accounted for41 percent of the world's armed con-flicts in 1989-92.21 A significantnumber of states in both these re-gions have only small arsenals ofRegister systems, many of which areoften unserviceable. They thereforedepend more heavily on lighterweapons than their European andAsian counterparts, both for offen-sive and defensive purposes. Yet,the absence of large stocks of heavyweapons and sophisticated air forcesin these regions does not in itselfremove the potential for surpriseattack. Rather, it means that thepossession and deployment of othersystems become a more importantcomponent ofthat potential. Againsta weak opponent, a surprise attackcan be launched, and territory con-quered and held, without the weap-ons that would be necessary for thispurpose in regions with more de-veloped arsenals. Mobility can beprovided by cross-country civilianvehicles, and firepower by machineguns, mortars, and portable missilelaunchers. Poorly-armed opponentsand civilians can be conquered andintimidated without the need for

heavily armored vehicles or heavyartillery, as a number of recent wars(such as those in Chad and Soma-lia) illustrate.

Moreover, the concentration onheavy weapons in both the CFETreaty and the Register is based ona focus on potential conflict betweenstates. Such a focus may well havebeen justified in the late 1980s,when the main concern of arms con-trol was to regulate, and make lessdangerous, the confrontation be-tween two cohesive military alli-ances. In the 1990s, when intrastateconflict is much more central to theconcerns of the international com-munity (not least in Europe), it isless clear—at least conceptually—thattransparency measures should focusexclusively on heavier weapons.While interstate conflict should re-main a central concern of the Reg-ister, there is a case for at least con-sidering whether, either in the Reg-ister itself or in complementary re-gional measures, lighter weaponsshould be included. It might be par-ticularly appropriate to examinewhether enough use is being madeof the Register's potential to comple-ment the U.N.'s peacekeeping andpeacemaking efforts.

In this context, a recent exampleof conventional arms control "on theground" in conflict situations is in-structive on which weapons are con-sidered most relevant in practice.The NATO ultimatum to the war-ring parties in Sarajevo, issued inFebruary, called for the withdrawal,or regrouping and placing underU.N. Protection Forces(UNPROFOR) control, of the:"heavy weapons (including tanks,artillery pieces, mortars, multiplerocket launchers, missiles and anti-aircraft weapons)"22 of both theBosnian Serbs and the Bosnian

government. All weapons with acaliber of 12.5 millimeters or more,including heavy machine guns andall missiles, were considered to be"heavy weapons" in this ultimatum.Rifles and small arms, by contrast,remained subject to the cease-firebut could be retained by the oppos-ing forces.

The adoption of a similar lowerlimit in Category III of the Registerwould have the effect of bringing inlarge numbers of additional crew-served weapons (mortars, heavymachine guns, cannon, and anti-tankweapons), while still excluding per-sonal weapons, such as rifles andsubmachine guns. It might help toencourage exporters of such sys-tems to areas of tension, togetherwith their governments, to improvetheir procedures for monitoring andcontrolling these exports.

However, an expansion of theRegister now to cover large numberof lower-caliber weapons could im-pose substantial additional report-ing burdens at a time when memberstates may also have been asked toprovide data to the United Nationson military holdings and pro-curement from national production.It may be better to postpone a ma-jor expansion of this category to afuture review.

Land mines

Finally, a case has been madefor considering whether the Regis-ter should be used to increase pres-sure for control of the world-widetrade in landmines. On December16,1993, the U.N. General Assem-bly passed a non-binding resolutioncalling for a ban on exports of landmines. The United States has ex-tended its own moratorium on ex-ports of these weapons, and has


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called on others to do the same.23

And the U.S.-based organizationHuman Rights Watch has recentlycalled for the inclusion of land minesin the Register.24

The inclusion of these "weaponsof mass destruction by slow motion"might pressure the remaining ma-jor suppliers of land mines to fol-low the General Assembly's lead.Moreover, most of the largest pro-ducers (including the former So-viet republics, Italy, and China) doalready participate in the Register.

On the other hand, the proposalto include land mines raises quiteimportant issues of principle. First,on what basis would land mines bejudged to meet the criteria for in-clusion in the Register? In terms oftheir contribution to human suffer-ing, the case is clear. Moreover, insome contemporary conflicts they doplay a crucial role in hampering themovement of opposing forces andas a weapon of terror against enemyterritory. But, is this enough to meetthe 1992 Panel's suggestion that"military relevance" should be thekey?

Even if it were accepted thatmines were militarily relevant, theremay be a second argument. It is of-ten argued that central to the Regis-ter concept is concern only with "le-gitimate" weapons, i.e. whose pos-session is generally judged to be anacceptable part of national self-de-fense. If it is decided, perhapsthrough modification of the Inhu-mane Weapons Convention, thattrade in these systems should beended, they can no longer be seenas part of legitimate trade. If therewere serious progress towards a glo-bal ban on the trade in mines, itwould make sense for transparencymeasures to take place as part of aregime specifically concerned with

mines. Unlike the Register, suchmeasures would be concerned withrevealing illegitimate trade, not an-nouncing legitimate transactions.Until and unless the trade in minesis again viewed as legitimate, itmight be better to seek other meansof monitoring and exposing it.25 Ifsuch measures are not taken, how-ever, there may be a case for recon-sidering the inclusion of these sys-tems in the Register.

By far the biggest criticism of thecurrent categories relates to the un-satisfactory nature of Category Vu:"Missiles and Missile Launchers."Moving to a more satisfactory treat-ment of these systems would re-move one of the more obviousanomalies in the current system.

The problems of this category, al-ready recognized by the 1992 Panel,were further highlighted by 1992Register returns. They called intoquestion the value of includinginformation on the current basis. Forexample, total U.K. stocks of mis-siles and missile launchers were es-timated to be 23,892, more than halfthe U.S. holdings of 43,975. Bycontrast, Germany reported missilestocks of only 40 (excluding clas-sified holdings).26 In the absence ofmore detail, these figures are almostmeaningless, and cannot contrib-ute significantly to the enhancementof transparency between states.

Generally speaking, however, itremains true that many states find itmore difficult to be transparentabout missiles—especially missileholdings-than about any of the othersix categories. This hypothesis issupported by an analysis of the back-ground information on militaryholdings and procurement from na-

tional production provided by statesto the United Nations in 1993. Atotal of 24 countries provided somedata on procurement and holdings,and of these 10 countries (Austra-lia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile,Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,Nicaragua, and Sweden) includeditem descriptions for their holdingsof the first six Register categories.But only one country-Canada-pro-vided item descriptions for its hold-ings of missiles and missile launch-

Missiles And Missile Launchers ers.27

Thus, the automatic inclusion ofall missiles in any "deepening" pro-posal may reduce significantly theextent to which states are preparedto accept development of theRegister's reporting requirements inother areas. Given the special sta-tus member states already give tomissiles in their returns, the possi-bility of formalizing this status,through the adoption of a ratherdifferent set of requirements formissile transparency than for theother categories, might be consid-ered. For example, the existing Cat-egory VII could be divided into twoseparate categories: (a) VII missilelaunchers and remotely propelledvehicles (RPV's), and (b) VIII mis-siles. Any additional requirementsfor transparency in the first sevencategories of launchers (includingmissile launchers and RPV's)— forexample for descriptions, procure-ment, and holdings-could be sepa-rately debated in the case of the newcategory.

Additional data on missiles couldbe included in the main Registertables. For "types" information inparticular, however, there may be acase for developing transparency formissiles less rapidly than in the caseof the first seven categories. The ar-gument for such an approach would

10 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1994

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be that the first stage should be tomaximize the number of countriesthat release gross figures on missilestocks and procurement. Only whenparticipation has reached some, un-specified, level would the possibilityof also releasing types data be con-sidered.

Longer-range missiles

The Register might make a mod-est contribution to the developmentof the Missile Technology ControlRegime (MTCR) by including a sub-category in the missiles categoryspecifically for those missiles witha range of 300 kilometers or more.The number of systems reported inthis subcategory is likely to be verysmall, and might be confined totransfers between MTCR states. Butit could usefully reinforce the dis-tinction between transfers of short-range missiles and transfers oflonger-range missiles. It might alsobe a useful contribution towardsdeveloping a more general transpar-ency regime for longer-range mis-siles, encompassing military hold-ings and procurement from nationalproduction as well as transfers.

Yet, as in the case of land mines,the argument could be made thatthe Register should not be used as ameans of monitoring trade in thosesystems where active considerationis being given to a prohibition onuse or transfer. Moreover, were itto be suggested that such a proposalshould also cover holdings, thenuclear weapon states (particularlythose with limited stockpiles) wouldbe likely to have serious problems.Even if the general case for in-creased transparency in longer-rangemissiles is accepted, therefore, itmay be that some other forum-suchas a Nuclear Weapons Register - i s

more appropriate for its realiza-tion.28

Ground-to-air missiles

The final issue regarding Cat-egory VII is whether the groupmight want to re-examine the deci-sion of the 1992 Panel that the Cat-egory "does not include ground-to-air missiles [GAM's]." One of thearguments put forward in favor ofthis apparently anomalous exclusionwas that GAM's are said to be de-fensive in nature and thus not "de-stabilizing." Yet, such a character-ization is open to dispute. The of-fensive or defensive character of aweapon depends very much on thecontext in which it is deployed, with"defensive" tactics and weapons of-ten being a key element of offensiveoperations. In at least two recentcases, moreover, GAM systems havebeen specifically identified as asource of tension. The NATO ulti-matum to forces surroundingSarajevo specifically mentions theneed to withdraw, or place underUNPROFOR control, "missiles andanti-aircraft weapons. "M North Ko-rea has recently complained stronglyabout the proposed deployment ofPatriot missile systems in SouthKorea. At the very least, therefore,some states view such systems ashaving an offensive potential.

More generally, however, sincethe Register is not a control device,the inclusion of any weapon systemcannot be taken as an acceptance ofthe assumption that the systems inquestion are "destabilizing." The1992 Panel does not use this crite-rion, stating only that weapons couldbe added to the Register if they are"of military relevance in terms oftheir impact on regional and globalstability." In view of this, GAM's

would appear to be a strong candi-date for future inclusion in the Reg-ister.

Weapons of mass destruction

The 1992 Panel suggested that thepossibility of adding "systems forthe delivery of weapons of mass de-struction not already covered by theRegister" should be included in thework of the 1994 Review. Yet most,if not all, such weapons are alreadycovered in the existing seven cate-gories. "Combat aircraft" should in-clude strategic and tactical bomb-ers, irrespectiveof possible payload."Warships" should include strategicsubmarines. "Missiles and missilelaunchers" should include (a) inde-pendent launchers for all ballisticand cruise missiles with a range ofover 25 kilometers; and (b) all bal-listic and cruise missiles with arange of over 25 kilometers. Despitethe Register's title, even a missileexclusively designed and equippedto carry nuclear warheads shouldstill be declared.

As long as the Register's standard-ized definitions only apply to trans-fers, this has few practical implica-tions. It implies that transfers ofTrident D5 missiles from U.S. own-ership to U.K. ownership should beincluded in the Register.30 But weknow of no other recent internationaltransfers of delivery systems whoserole is primarily nuclear. Indeed, anincreasingly strong internationalnorm is being developed againstsuch transfers, with the sole excep-tion of the U.S.-U.K. relationship.

Were the same categories that arecurrently used for transfers to beused for reporting of military hold-ings and procurement from nationalproduction, virtually all the nuclear-capable missiles of the five recog-


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nized nuclear weapon states wouldhave to be included, together withmissiles of other states that may bedeveloping nuclear weapons co-vertly. If, in addition, these coun-tries were to include item descrip-tions in their holdings and procure-ment returns, significant additionalinformation on nuclear arsenals andtheir development would becomeavailable.

REPORTING WEAPON TYPES

The Register in its current formalready includes provision for statesto provide further information on therole and model of the weaponswhich they report. An additionalcolumn, divided into two parts, "de-scription of item" and "commentson the transfer," is provided in thestandardized reporting form. Oneof the items on the agenda of the1994 Group is whether to make thecompletion of this part of the formless "voluntary" than it is at present.There would be a number of advan-tages from doing so. It would give amore accurate picture of the signifi-cance of particular purchases. Itwould make it easier to make ap-propriate allowance for the largeamount of trade in second-hand sys-tems (for example, a large propor-tion of German exports in 1992consisted of former German Demo-cratic Republic systems surplus toGermany's own requirements). Itwould help address the concern thata numerical representation of thearms trade ignores the qualitativedimension. It could also serve as acrosscheck of whether states havecorrectly understood the Registerrequirements.

Yet, if fuller item descriptions areto be included, the group will haveto overcome the resistance that re-

mains on the part of most majorarms exporting nations. North At-lantic Treaty Organization (NATO)and European Union (EU) membershave been unable to agree upon acommon position on reporting oftypes. The United States, UnitedKingdom, Japan, and France did notgive type information in 1993, whileGermany, the Netherlands, Austra-lia and Canada did.31 By contrast,some other states were more likelyto include types data than they wereto provide procurement and hold-ings information. Both Brazil andItaly argued for the inclusion of suchdata in the 1992 Panel in order toemphasize the relatively low-tech na-ture of their own exports.32

PROCUREMENT ANDHOLDINGS

One of the most important issuesfor the 1994 Group will be how tofulfill its mandate to examine the mo-dalities of an early expansion of theRegister to include procurementthrough national production andmilitary holdings. Wide agreementamong U.N. member states in 1991to establish the Register was securedpartly on the basis of an understand-ing that such an expansion wouldtake place.33

An important reason why thereis wide demand to extend the Reg-ister to cover national procurementis that this would complement in-formation on transfers, and thus pro-vide more complete information ontrends in military holdings. It wouldalso address the concern that thecurrent Register imposes greatertransparency on major arms import-ers than on countries with substan-tial domestic arms industries. More-over, whereas relatively few coun-tries have much to report in any one

year on transfers or procurement ofmajor conventional arms, virtuallyall countries have significant mili-tary holdings. Such an extensioncould therefore help to extend theperceived relevance of the Registeras a means of monitoring levels ofconventional arms.

Yet, expanding the Register tocover both procurement from na-tional production and military hold-ings would substantially increaseinternational transparency in an areawhere there has previously beenlittle publicly available official in-formation. A decision to ask gov-ernments to provide details of theirholdings of conventional arms, evenif phased in over two or three years,would require a considerable com-mitment of political energy in orderto make it work. It would constitutea major advance in transparency,which some of the world's more se-cretive states are likely to resist. Thedata publicly available on stocks ofconventional weapons held by manymajor developing states are accurateonly within rather wide margins oferror. Even a massive Cold War in-telligence effort by NATO came upwith estimates for Soviet and EastEuropean conventional arsenals thatproved—in the light of subsequentCFE Treaty declarations-to be notalways very accurate. The lack of acomparable NATO intelligence ef-fort vis-à-vis the armies of develop-ing states means that official esti-mates for these states may in somecases be even sketchier. As a conse-quence, by revealing their stocks ofaircraft and tanks, states might wellbe telling other states (and, perhapsof greatest concern, potential re-gional adversaries) facts that werenot previously known. How impor-tant such data will be in militaryterms should not be overstated.


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Equipment numbers are only onecomponent of military power. As the"conventional balance" debate of the1980s in Europe showed, however,numbers also have a political sig-nificance. States with large arsenals--even if composed largely of obso-lete systems-may be reluctant to ex-pose themselves to the propagandavalue that returns on military hold-ings could provide to their critics.

Governments may decide thatsuch transparency is in their secu-rity interests because it will reas-sure others that they have only "rea-sonably sufficient" arsenals. For, inthe absence of official data, exag-gerated unofficial data- often de-rived in turn from worst case intel-ligence estimates-carry wide cred-ibility. But few countries will findit easy to break with traditions ofmilitary secrecy. Considerable efforthas been devoted to convince gov-ernments to provide even the mod-est amount of data required by thecurrent Register on transfers, despitethe knowledge that transactions are,in many cases, also being reportedelsewhere (either officially by a trad-ing partner or unofficially by SIPRIand others). Asking these same gov-ernments to provide data on weap-ons holdings is likely to be an eventougher task.

Defining "military holdings"

If "military holdings" are to beincluded in the Register on a stan-dardized basis, it will be necessaryto define what is included in thisterm. This is by no means a straight-forward issue. It is clear from the1992 Panel's discussion of the defi-nition of transfers that military hold-ings should exclude systems held byother states on one's own territory,but include systems held outside na-

tional territory by one's own forces.The remaining definition issues canbe divided broadly into two:

* First, should the holdings ofarmed forces, other than regularmilitary forces, be included in "mili-tary holdings"? Not all the armedforces under government control areregular military forces. In the firstplace, there are reserve forces thatoperate on reduced manning levelsin peacetime, and whose equipmentis often kept in various forms of stor-age ready for mobilization. It wouldbe possible to confine Register trans-parency simply to "active" forces(say of 70 percent manning orabove), on the argument that theseforces are particularly suitable forsurprise attack. Such an arrange-ment creates difficulties in decidingon a common position on whichforces should be considered "ac-tive," and also ignores the fact thatreserve forces play a vital role inmany countries' preparations forcombat, both defensive and offen-sive. Moreover, since countries varygreatly in their active/reserve bal-ance, the exclusion of the latter couldseverely distort comparisons be-tween states. The case for includingthe holdings of both active and re-serve forces, therefore, seems ratherclear-cut.

Matters may be rather more dif-ficult when one comes to forces thatare not primarily military, but whoare nevertheless armed. Many gov-ernments have border troops, coastguard troops, and internal securityforces that can possess significantnumbers of such systems and whichcould, in some circumstances, be re-deployed for military duties. Forexample, Russia's 100,000 bordertroops are reported to possess 1,500armored combat vehicles, 90 heavyartillery pieces, 70 aircraft, 200

helicopters and "about" 212 patroland coastal combatants. Russian in-ternal security troops hold another1,200 armored personnel carriers.34

All these systems, if they are locat-ed within the CFE Treaty area, aresubject to information exchange.

* Second, should the holdingsof bodies other than armed forcesbe included in "military holdings"?For example, should the Registercover systems in transit, held byfactories, held in historical collec-tions, or awaiting disposal? Inreaching a decision on this matter,it may be useful to take the experi-ence of the CFE Treaty into account.The CFE Treaty deals with thesedifferent categories as follows:

1) Equipment in storage ormothballed is subject to the overalltreaty limits, but exempt from thesub-limits on items in active units.

2) Equipment decommissionedawaiting disposal, awaiting export,or used only for research and de-velopment is subject to informationexchange but not subject to the over-all treaty limits.

3) Equipment in the process ofmanufacture, in historical collec-tions, or in transit through the CFETreaty area for less than seven daysis not subject to either informationexchange or limitation.

Were the Register to be based onsimilar principles, only equipmentin the last three categories would beexcluded from the count. The great-est impact of this would probablybe on items held by arms manufac-turers. It would mean that items stillin the process of manufacture wouldbe excluded. Once completed, how-ever, they would be included evenbefore they were handed over to aclient. By providing "backgroundinformation" on its holdings ofweapons awaiting export, Bulgaria


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has already demonstrated how sucha system could have a significant im-pact on the number of weapons de-clared. In seeking to establish a cleardefinition of military holdings, theGroup of Experts will have to con-sider whether or not this shouldbecome a general principle.

Implementation requirements

One of the main problems thatwill be encountered if military hold-ings are added to the Register isthat it will generate a demand forlarge quantities of information that,in many cases, may not be readilyavailable. Given the average lifetimeof equipment, the number of itemsin military holdings could be 30 to40 times as great as those bought(domestically and from elsewhere)in a given year. This information hasalready been compiled and providedby NATO states, and could also beprovided by other CSCE participantsfrom existing CSCE informationexchange arrangements (with someamendment). Yet, some countriesmay find they have substantial extradata collection requirements. Statesdo not always retain accurate recordsfor stocks of older weapons, espe-cially if weapons are in storage and/or mothballed. Once states have es-tablished a baseline inventory, col-lection costs would diminish sub-stantially. At least in the first years,however, allowance will have to bemade for technical difficulties andgenuine error in the compilation ofinformation.

A withdrawals section in theRegister?

Our discussion of the choices in-volved in defining "procurementfrom national production and mili-

tary holdings," raises the furtherquestion of how to define at whatstage a system ceases to be part ofmilitary holdings. Systems are takenout of holdings because of accidentor war, because of scrapping obso-lescent systems, and because of saleto other states. But how does oneaccount for systems that are returnedto a factory or dockyard for refit orupgrading? For the sake of com-pleteness, it appears we may alsoneed a definition of "withdrawalfrom holdings." Such a definitionshould probablyexclude "temporary "withdrawal of systems from servicefor refit/upgrading, even when sys-tems are temporarily disabled or dis-armed (for example refits for frig-ates). But, it should include "per-manent" withdrawal from service,even if the system retains a militaryrole.

Should withdrawals be includedin the Register? Arguments for sucha system include:

* If and when returns on militaryholdings are included, it will in anycase be possible to deduce a figurefor withdrawals from the change inholdings between two years, com-bined with procurement data for theyear in question. Requiring an ex-plicit statement on withdrawals,however, will act as a valuable cross-check (both within governments andpublicly) on the consistency of re-turns.

* The numbers involved are rela-tively modest compared with thosein "holdings." Data collection maybe correspondingly easier.

* It may create a modest addi-tional incentive for states to scrapolder systems. Some states couldpresent themselves as actually re-ducing their arsenals even before de-claring their holdings.

If the case for including with-

drawals data in the Register wereaccepted, the first step might be toask governments to consider supply-ing this data as part of their "back-ground information. " After an ini-tial trial period, however, the datacould either be used to create a newstandardized form or incorporatedinto those that already exist for trans-fers and procurement from nationalproduction.

TRANSPARENCY ANDOPENNESS?

It has increasingly become appar-ent that one of the drawbacks withsome existing transparency agree-ments is that the required informa-tion is normally exchanged on aconfidential state-to-state basis.33

For example, some governmentsbelieve that they would be commit-ting a breach of confidentiality werethey to reveal their own CFE Treatyreturns publicly, even if they aremade available to a large number offoreign governments.

This lack of domestic opennessin existing transparency regimes maytend to weaken the effectiveness ofthose regimes. It means that it is leftto states to monitor whether otherstates are complying with their in-ternational obligations. In some cir-cumstances, governments will bewilling to use the data provided topress their counterparts to changetheir approach. The vigor withwhich they pursue this quest islikely, however, to be moderated inlarge measure by an assessment ofthe potential damage to wider inter-state relations of making an issueout of a particular set of data. More-over a state's ability to put effectivepressure on other states will be re-stricted by the prohibition on pub-lic disclosure. As a consequence,


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sensitive issues are likely to beraised later than they would havebeen if data were freely available toparliaments and non-governmentalorganizations.

In contrast to CSCE-based trans-parency regimes, the data providedto the U.N. Register of ConventionalArms is publicly available. The firstannual report on the Register, pub-lished in October 1993,reproducedthe data provided by participatingstates on their exports and importsof major conventional armaments incalendar year 1992.36 The publica-tion of the report was swiftly fol-lowed by a number of independentstudies of the Register returns byacademics in Europe and NorthAmerica.37 Moreover, the "back-ground information" provided to theUnited Nations on military holdingsand procurement from national pro-duction is also publicly available,even when it includes (as in the caseof Sweden) national CSCE returns.The United Nations has not pub-lished the background informationprovided in 1993. It does, however,make it available to researchers, andall the information relating directlyto military holdings and procure-ment from national production hasbeen reproduced in a recent paper.38

Without public disclosure of Reg-ister data, it is unlikely that the firstyear of its operation would have at-tracted much attention. The anoma-lies it contains would have remaineda matter for inter-governmental con-sultation, and the pressure on gov-ernments to reduce these anomaliesin future years would have been sig-nificantly reduced.

Nor does the Register simply re-port data that were already availablein the public domain. Our study ofthe Register suggests that a large pro-portion of the arms transfers re-

ported had not been included in ei-ther STPRT Yearbook or the IISSMilitary Balance 1993/94. the twomost authoritative independentsources of information in this field.39

The publication of the Registerwould mean that these organizationscould significantly improve theircoverage of the conventional armstrade in years to come.

Already the experience with theRegister may suggest a lesson forother transparency regimes. In a fewcases, there may be valid securityarguments (such as the potentialvalue to terrorists of knowing thelocation of weapon systems) for re-stricting the information that is madepublicly available. In most cases,however, the case against publica-tion is based on political rather thansecurity considerations. Both inNATO and in former Warsaw Pactcountries, the legacy of Cold Warsecrecy remains strong, and somegovernments remain uncomfortablewith the idea of detailed parliamen-tary scrutiny of their security poli-cies. Yet, it is also increasingly rec-ognized that the democratization ofdefense policy can itself contributeto peace and security in Europe.With this in mind, NATO is nowengaged in a major program to pro-mote the development of mech-anisms for democratic control ofdefense policy in former communistcountries of Eastern Europe and theformer Soviet Union.40 One way toenhance that accountability, both informer communist states and inNATO members, would be for themembers of CSCE to agree to maketheir annual data exchanges publiclyavailable. For when transparencyand public openness go together, thevalue of both is enhanced.

This does not mean that confi-dential transparency agreements be-

tween states do not have a role insome circumstances. For example,the effectiveness of supplier regimes(such as the Missile TechnologyControl Regime, Nuclear SuppliersGroup, Australia Group, Coordinat-ing Committee for Multilateral Ex-port Controls (COCOM), and,potentially, P5 pre-notification oftransfers) often depends to a signifi-cant extent on exchanges of sensi-tive technical information, whichstates may only be willing to sharewith other regime members ortrusted allies. Yet, when a transpar-ency regime is global, and/or it in-volves an exchange of data betweenall governments with an interest inan issue, then the general principleshould be that information be madeavailable to national parliaments andthe general public, unless there areconvincing security arguments (suchas potential value to terrorists)against disclosure. As argued above,the effectiveness of the transpar-ency regime itself, as well as gov-ernments' accountability to nationallegislatures, may be undermined byundue secrecy.

CONCLUSION

Even if it is only developed mod-estly, the U.N. Register of Conven-tional Arms could still make animportant contribution to interna-tional security. After a few years,the reported information will allowa more accurate understanding oftrends in the trade, procurement, andholdings of major conventionalarms. Because it is official informa-tion, it can formally be used as abasis for discussions on regional andglobal security in the U.N. Secu-rity Council and other internationalfora. Thus, it could facilitate coop-erative actions by Security Coun-


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cil (or the P5) to prevent regionalconflict, or promote the develop-ment of regional confidence- andsecurity- building measures. For ex-ample, countries in the Asia-Pacificcould use Register reports as a ba-sis for regional discussions on con-ventional arms transfers or procure-ment, and thus on broader securityissues. It is also important to notethe potentially important domesticeffects of the Register. Even the pro-cess of establishing systems to col-lect relevant data may stimulate gov-ernments into improving their regu-lations and monitoring systems forarms transfers and production.Moreover, information in the Reg-ister may help national legislaturesand the general public to scrutinizegovernment policies more effec-tively, thus democratizing debatesand perhaps encouraging gov-ernmental restraint. Thus, both inits international and domestic effectsthe U.N. Register of ConventionalArms could be a useful additionalmember to the family of interna-tional transparency agreements.

Yet, the Group of Experts faces anumber of difficult choices in de-termining where the Register shouldgo next. In this article we have ar-gued that the prospects for theRegister depend on a successfulblending of two elements: astrengthening of the operation of theRegister on the one hand, and a skill-ful handing of the difficult choicesover expansion of coverage on theother. In its first two years of op-eration, the priority has been tomaximize participation. As a result,governments have had considerablelatitude to choose how to participate.In the future, however, the advan-tages of loose guidelines will needto be balanced against the risks of adrift away from the Register's found-

ing principles of universality andnon-discrimination. There is alreadya danger that the Register could endup producing high levels of trans-parency between those states whoneed it least, and much less betweenthose who need it most. This dan-ger can best be avoided by insistingon clear and universal guidelines forparticipation, even if as a result theprocess of "deepening" is less rapidthan some countries would wish.

1 This is an abbreviated version of two papersprepared for an international workshop on thedevelopment of the Register held in Montereyon April 6-9 1994. The complete papers havebeen published in Malcolm Chalmers, OwenGreene, Edward Laurence, and Herbert Wulf,eds., Developing the United Nations Register ofConventional Arms, Bradford University,Bradford Arms Register Studies Number 4, May1994. The authors wish to thank the FordFoundation for financial support, and Kim Tayfor editorial assistance.2 For example, see Office of Technology As-sessment, Global Arms Trade (Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991);Michael Klare, "Gaining Control: Building aComprehensive Arms Restraint System," ArmsControl Today (June 1991), pp. 9-13; Congres-sional Budget Office, Limiting ConventionalArms Exports to the Middle East (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992).3 Defined as "agreements which seek to imposelimits on the military capabilities which statesmay possess or acquire."4 As part of this initiative, the five permanentmembers of the U.N. Security Council (the "P5")held a series of meetings during 1991 and 1992aimed both at developing common guidelines forconventional arms exports in general, and alsoat the development of procedures for pre-notifi-cation and consultation among the five on plannedarms sales to the Middle East. Since these stateswere also the five main exporters of conventionalarms (collectively accounting for more than 80percent of all arms transfers agreements in 1991and 1992), agreement between them could po-tentially have had a significant impact.After the meeting of October 17-18, the five coun-tries involved issued a communique outliningcommon (but broad) guidelines for conventionalarms transfers, though each state was to remainresponsible for the interpretation of these guide-lines in relation to its own exports. In relation tothe Middle East, the states pledged to notify eachother when transferring major weapons systemsto the region. For almost a year after this meet-

ing, experts from each of the governments metin order to agree upon which arms transfers wouldrequire notification, discuss how much advancenotice would be required and in what detail, andto define the limits of the "Middle East" for thepurposes of the regime. Unfortunately, it proveddifficult to make progress on most of these is-sues, with persistent disagreements betweenChina and the other participants. After the Bushadministration's decision to sell 150 F-15 air-craft to Taiwan in September 1992, China with-drew from the process in protest. Since then theP5 process has remained suspended, though notformally abandoned.5 United Nations study on ways and means ofpromoting transparency in international transfersof conventional arms. U.N. General Assemblydocument A/46/301, September 1991, p.13.Transparency measures have become an increas-ingly important part of the arms control agendaover the last decade. They were given consider-able impetus by the 1986 Stockholm agreement,and by the series of CSCE-based transparencyagreements that followed. An increasing num-ber of states outside Europe, for example in SouthAsia, the Middle East, and Latin America, havenow begun to explore ways of developing suchregimes. There is a growing recognition thatsuch measures—which may range from prior no-tification of major exercises to exchanges of dataon military arsenals and doctrine—can play a valu-able role in reducing mistrust between potentialopponents.

Moreover, in comparison with measures of struc-tural arms control, transparency measures areoften easier to negotiate. By its nature, structuralarms control needs to be based on some defini-tion of what constitutes an acceptable, or at leastless unacceptable, level of relative capabilities:for example a definition of which countries areentitled to have ballistic missiles and which arenot. Transparency measures, by contrast, usu-ally impose identical obligations on all partici-pants in an agreement; and they do not seekagreement on whether particular military activi-ties are acceptable or not. Rather, by providingmore information on those activities, they pro-vide the data on which further discussions–onboth a bilateral and multilateral basis–can thenbuild. For a more developed discussion of therole and possible limits of transparency measures,see Malcolm Chalmers and Owen Greene, Imple-menting and Developing the United Nations Reg-ister of Conventional Arms. Bradford Arms Reg-ister Studies No. 1 (Bradford University, May1993), pp. 20-25.6 United Nations Register of Conventional Arms:Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GeneralAssembly document A/48/344, October , 1993,p. .7 SIPRI Yearbook 1993 (Oxford: Oxford Uni-versity Press, 1993), p. 445.8 Recently, this information was published inMalcolm Chalmers and Owen Greene, Back-ground Information: an analysis of informationprovided to the UN on procurement from na-tional production and military holdings in the


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first year of the Register of Conventional Arms.Bradford Arms Register Studies No. 3 (BradfordUniversity, March 1994).9 The Group has also appointed Edward Laurence(in Monterey) and Herbert Wulf (in Bonn) asexpert advisors.10 Report on the United Nations Register of Con-ventional Arms, U . N . General Assembly docu-ment A / 4 7 / 3 4 2 , August 14, 1992, p. 13.11 Malcolm Chalmers and Owen Greene, B a c k -ground Information, op. cit.12 It would also be possible to request that thisinformation be provided with data on transfersand procurement through national production.However, because it will often be the case thatthe numbers of items in these returns are typi-cally very small, this would often be equivalentto a request to reveal the precise type of the itemstransferred.13 Even without a mechanism for agreement oncommon lists, the publication of national listsmight, over time, lead to significant convergencebetween national approaches. An invitation togovernments to provide such lists, therefore, doesnot depend on either the creation of a standingpanel or a strengthened role for the Center forDisarmament Affairs.14 Report on the United Nations Register of Con-ventional Arms. A/47/342, op. cit., pp. 17-18.15 "Significance" here is defined as "their im-

pact on regional and global stability." Report onthe United Nations Register of ConventionalArms. A/47/342, op. cit., p. 17.16 The one exception is armored vehicle launched

bridges, which are subject to a limit of 740 heldby each group (that is, former alliance) in activeservice. Individual national limits are not estab-lished.17 Article II, para. 7(Q) of the CFE Treaty quoted

in Arms Control Today, (January/February 1991),p. .18 Malcolm Chalmers and Owen Greene, Back-ground Information, op. cit., p. 64.19 Report on the United Nations Register of Con-ventional Arms. A/47/342, op. cit., p. 17.20 International Institute for Strategic Studies,Military Balance 1993-1994 (London: Brassey's,1993), pp. 224-228.21 Ramses Amer et al., "Major Armed Conflicts,"in SIPRI Yearbook 1993, op. cit., Table 3.2.22 NATO communiqué, February 11, 1994, para6.23 "Ban the mine." Economist, January 7, 1994,p. 15.24 Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Hu-man Rights, Land mines: A Deadly Legacy(October 1993), pp. 115-116.25 It should be noted, however, that the Registerincludes trade in missiles, including those cov-ered by the Missile Technology Control Regime.In contrast to the case of mines, however, it isnot currently being proposed that there be aworld-wide ban on trade in such missiles, only aselective one.26 Malcolm Chalmers and Owen Greene, Back-ground Information, op. cit., p. 43 .27 Malcolm Chalmers and Owen Greene, Back-

ground Information, op. cit., p. 38. Canada de-clared holdings of 845 AIM 7 (Sidewinder) and784 AIM 9 (Sparrow) air-to-air missiles. Aus-tria made a nil return for "Missiles/Systems" andthe Netherlands left blank the space entitled "Mis-siles and Missile Launchers" in its holdings dec-laration.28 Malcolm Chalmers, "Transparency and the ex-isting nuclear weapons states," memorandum sub-mitted to the House of Commons Foreign Af-fairs Committee enquiry into weapons prolifera-tion and control, February 1994.29 NATO communiqué, February 11, 1994, para6.30 If this interpretation were followed by theUnited States and United Kingdom in their 1992returns, it would suggest that no Trident saleswere completed in calendar year 1992.31 In its letter of transmittal dated April 29, 1993,the United States stated that it "considers that itwould be useful to provide additional detaileddata on type and designation of arms transfers.We are therefore consulting with other interestedStates regarding what additional data would beuseful. We hope to be in a position before thenext report is due to provide supplemental data."United Nations Register of Conventional Arms:Report of the Secretary-General. A/48/344, op.cit., p. 109. To our knowledge, supplementaldata have not yet been submitted.32 Herbert Wulf, "The United Nations Registerof Conventional Arms," Appendix 10F, SIPRIYearbook 1993, op. cit., p. 540.33 For the first year of operation of the Register,participating states were asked to provide, as partof their reply to the Secretary-General, "avail-able background information" regarding theirmilitary holdings, procurement through nationalproduction, and relevant national arms importand export policies, legislation, and administra-tive procedures. Of the 83 governments that hadreplied to the Secretary-General's request for in-formation for the 1992 Register by January 1994,24 states provided data on military holdings, ofwhich 15 governments also provided informa-tion on procurement through national produc-tion. A further six governments provided someinformation on holdings and/or procurement intheir reply, rather than in "background informa-tion."34 International Institute for Strategic Studies,Military Balance 1993/94 (London: Brassey's,1993), p. 106.35 For further d i scuss ion , see JaneSharp, "Conventional arms control in Europe,"SIPRI Yearbook 1993, op. cit., pp. 629-630.36 United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.A/48/344, op. cit.37 For example, see Edward Laurance, SiemonWezeman, and Herbert Wulf, Arms Watch: SIPRIReport on the First Year of the UN Register ofConventional Arms (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1993); Malcolm Chalmers and OwenGreene, The United Nations Register of Con-ventional Arms: An Initial Examination of theFirst Report, Bradford Arms Register Studies No.2 (Bradford University, October 1993); Natalie

Goldring, Moving towards transparency; anevaluation of the United Nations Register of Con-ventional Arms. BASIC Report 93 .6 (BritishAmerican Security Information Council, Novem-ber 1993); Ian Anthony, "Assessing the UN Reg-ister of Conventional Arms," Survival (Winter1993), pp. 113-129.38 Malcolm Chalmers and Owen Greene, Back-ground Information, op. cit.39 For a detailed analysis, see Malcolm Chalmersand Owen Greene, "The United Nations Regis-ter of Conventional Arms: the first year of op-eration," in Verification Technology Informa-tion Centre (VERTIC), Verification 1994: Peace-keeping. Arms Control and the Environment(London: Brassey's, 1994).40 See, for example, Michael Quinlan, "The roleand oversight of armed forces within democraticsocieties," NATO Review, 5, (1993).


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The development of the United Nations register of conventional arms: Prospects and proposals

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