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The Dionysian Innovation
Author(s): Alfred G. SmithReviewed work(s):Source: American Anthropologist, New Series, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Apr., 1964), pp. 251-265Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the American Anthropological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/669007 .
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TheDionysiannnovation
ALFRED G. SMITH
Univeristy f Oregon
INTRODUCTION
T HEstudy of culture is itself a culture. Anthropology itself is a learned and
patterned way of life of a group of people. It is, in fact, the behavior of one
group of people toward other groups of people. Anthropology also has a his-
tory. Like any other culture, anthropology changes-through innovation,
diffusion, and other processes. It is a tradition that studies other traditions.
Americananthropologists are now beginning to study theirown traditions in
the way they have long studied those of other peoples. In the spring of 1962,the Social Science Research Council held a conferenceon the history of anthro-
pology (Hymes 1962; Mitchell 1962). The importance of that conference,wrote
Hymes, lay "not in the intrinsic value of what occurred-but in the fact that it
did occur." It inaugurated a development that led within six months to a ple-
nary session on the history of anthropology at the annual meeting of the Ameri-can Anthropological Association. These beginnings in America coincide with a
new interest shown by British anthropologists. They too are re-examining the
relation between ethnology and history (Evans-Pritchard 1961; Smith 1962;
Schapera 1962). They admit that synchronic and diachronic analyses of cul-
tures are essential to each other. This turn in British orientations should make
us recognize an obvious corollary: studying the history of anthropology also
involves studying the culture of anthropology. We are studying our own
ethnohistory.
One approach to the study of any culture is through its artifacts andmentifacts. In anthropology the ideas of "race," "culture area," and "the
superorganic"are what potsherds and cult gods are for other tribes and tradi-
tions. In this paper I consider the history of one mentifact of the anthropo-
logical culture. I aim to show that this serves the same function as the studyof any other phenomenon in any other culture: it adds to our understanding of
human behavior in general.In 1928, Ruth Benedict introduced the term "Dionysian" to cultural
anthropology.Since that time this Benedictine innovation has been
accepted,rejected, and modified, and it has generated elaborate discussions. Many of
these discussions have tried to evaluate the concept and judge whether it is
legitimate or out of bounds (e.g. Nadel 1937; Williams 1947). This normative
approach has been common in our discussions of other anthropological menti-
facts. Anthropologists have long argued about such concepts as cultural evolu-
tion, cultural logics, and even that of culture itself (e.g. Kroeber and Kluck-
hohn 1952). These discussions meet significant needs, but the normative way
251
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252 American Anthropologist [66, 1964
they approach anthropology is not the way anthropologists approach other
cultures. The ethnohistory of anthropology, however, considers the Dionysianinnovation without accepting or rejecting it. To the ethnographer and histor-
ian of this culture the innovation is not a topic for debate but a phenomenonto be observed and explained.
In this study I survey the anthropological literature and take a historical
inventory of definitions, contexts, and evaluations of the Dionysian concept.I regard the acceptance and rejection of the innovation as choices made by
anthropologists. These choices are based on values, and there is a standard set
of values throughout the anthropological tradition. These choices also reveal
behavioral moieties among anthropologists, and reveal their statuses and roles.
Finally, anthropology is regarded as a subsystem of a larger cultural setting.This setting changes and as it does, anthropology and the Dionysian innova-
tion change with it. The basic thesis of this study is that the history and culture
of anthropology can be analyzed in an anthropological manner; that one ap-
proach to this kind of analysis is through the artifacts and mentifacts of the
culture; and that such an analysis can provide new perceptions for the studyof other cultures.
VARIETYAND CHANGE IN THE INNOVATION
The historical inventory reveals that the Dionysian concept has, andalways has had, many different meanings. Today many popular accounts
about anthropology, accounts written for non-anthropologists, accept the
Dionysian innovation. However, they give the term seemingly contradictoryand incommensurable meanings. Herskovits (1955:339), for example, states
that Dionysian is "equivalent to the extraverted," while Keesing (1958:157,427) states that it is "introverted behavior." Neither introvert nor extravertis correct or incorrect. The meaning of Dionysian is whatever meaning it has
for any acceptor or rejector of the innovation.
Hoebel (1958:647) states that Dionysian "emphasizes sensate experience,"while Benedict (1934:79, 80) wrote of the Dionysian "escape from the bound-aries imposed on him by his five senses, to break through . . . the usual sensoryroutine.. . into another order of experience." Herskovits' extravert (1955)and Keesing's introvert (1958), Hoebel's sensate (1958) and what we may callBenedict's exosensate (1934), are only four of the seemingly contradictorymeanings that anthropologists have given the term. Titiev gives its meaningstill another turn when he identifies Dionsyian with Sheldon's somatotonic
type (1954:436). Other anthropologists identify it with the conventions of a
group, while still others identify it with individual inspiration. Some regarditas a release from inhibitions, and some as a pursuit of things beyond the
pleasure principle. These are not full definitions, but all of them do refer to acharacteristic pattern of behavior, or to a personality characteristic, or to
some characteristic beliefs, or experiences, or goals. However, they do notconcur in what these characteristics are, how they are characteristic, or what
they are characteristic of.
These various meanings of Dionysian are themselves innovations. They
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SMITH] The Dionysian Innovation 253
stem from the fact that the concept has many features. Each anthropologistselects different features for emphasis, and then equates his own Dionysian
concepts with another concept, from Jung, Sorokin, Sheldon, or some other
typologist. Herskovits and Keesing used the Jungian concepts of introvertand extravert. These concepts also have many different features, and here
again each anthropologist selects different ones for emphasis. Herskovits re-
garded the Dionysian to be passionate, suspicious, magical, and extravagant;he regarded the extravert to be emotional and aggressive. These perceptionsof passionate and of emotional have common denominators and led Herskovits
to identify Dionysian and extravert (1955).
Keesing selected other features. His Dionysian was individualistic; his
introvert saw the world from a subjective point of view. Keesing's perceptionsof individualism and subjectivism also had common denominators and led
him to identify Dionysian and introvert (1958). All of these anthropologistsfollowed one of the processes of innovation that Barnett has isolated and
analyzed: identification (1953:189-207). They equated different features from
different contexts. Incidentally, Jung himself, the innovator of the terms
"introvert," "extravert," and "sensate," regarded Dionysian as a sensate
extraversion (1923:179-180).These anthropologists did not, of course, take their definitions from
Benedict alone. They also defined the term through other sources, such as non-Benedictine information about North AmericanIndians, and the ethnopsycho-
logical orientationsthat weredeveloped by Boas, Sapir,and Mead. Earlier anal-
yses of Dionysian cults by classical scholars such as Harrison, and by Spengler,had also prepared anthropologists for the concept. It was Nietzsche's descrip-tions of Dionysian rites, however, that were the primary prototypes for Bene-
dict's own innovation (cf. Mead 1959). She, for her part, quietly ignored what
these rites symbolized for Nietzsche. He glorified Dionysus as the apotheosisof the Natural Man in whom "the illusion of culture was cast off from the
archetype of man; here the true man, the bearded satyr revealed himself,shouting joyfully to his god . . . Nature which has become estranged, hostile,
or subjugated, celebrates once more her reconciliation with her prodigal son,man" (Nietzsche 1872:989, 955). Benedict adopted Nietzsche's typologybut ignored his ideology. By and large, her innovation was a product of what
Barnett has called "simplification" (1953:218-220).Benedict wrote that she used only those aspects of Nietzsche's conceptions
that were pertinent to the Indian cultures she was studying (1930: note 2).It is obvious, however, that she used only what was pertinent, not to her
Indian cultures, but to her own anthropologicalculture. It was her culture that
would not accept Nietzsche's ideas of the Natural Man and of the illusion of
culture. Benedict's simplification and her rationalization of pertinence to
Indian cultures, reveal a guileless ethnocentrism that even an anthropologistcan exhibit toward his own traditions.
Nietzsche in turn had developed his typology from the cults of the Greek
god Dionysus. This was not a native Hellenic god, but an interloper from
Thrace whom the Greeks had adopted and Hellenized. As a late arrival, and
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254 American Anthropologist [66, 1964
through a series of identifications, simplifications, and other innovative
processes, Dionysus appropriated from the older Greek gods many of their
attributes and functions. At different times and in different places he acquired
at least 60 different cult names (Farnell 1909: 118-170). Under the cult epithetAigobolos, the goat-shooter, he was worshipped with human sacrifice. As
Aisumnates, the arbiter, he was revered for the abolition of human sacrifice.As Bakxeios, a vegetation and chthonian deity, the primary component of his
orgiastic rites was intoxication. And so on through the alphabet. Whetherthere are any common denominators among these related cults has long beena source of disagreement among Hellenists (Harrison 1922:424-5; Rohde
1925:259-260). In short, the Dionysian concept has always had many differ-ent meanings. Its polymorphism simply conforms to the processes of innova-tion that artifacts and mentifacts observe everywhere. Since tools change and
vary largely as the rest of the culture changes and varies, these innovationscan often serve as diagnostic traits of a culture.
THE VALUESYSTEM
We can study the innovations in a culture in order to discover the valuesof that culture. The acceptance and rejection of an innovation involve
choices, and values are the criteria used for making these choices. Thus the
vicissitudes of the Dionysian concept mark the things that anthropologistsvalue.
They reveal first of all the prevalence of ambivalent values in anthropology.That is, most of the values that lead to acceptance also lead to rejection. The
Dionysian innovation is accepted for the same reasons it is rejected. For ex-
ample, Driver (1961:536) accepts the innovation "as far as it goes" because itfits the life ways of the Plains Indians, while Lowie (1937:279) rejects the in-novation because it does not fit Plains culture. Both Driver and Lowie in
reaching opposite conclusions invoke the same criterion: let the concept fit the
culture. As we shall see, most of the criteria that anthropologists use for mak-ing choices-most of their values-are ambivalent in that they lead to contra-
dictory choices. This also means that widely differing choices are based on acommon set of values.
The correspondencebetween concepts and cultures is itself valued through-out the anthropological tradition. Some anthropologists accept the Dionysianinnovation because they recognize a correspondence between culture and
personality as expressed in such concepts as introvert and extravert, Other
anthropologists reject the innovation because they donot see such a correspond-ence.
Anthropologists also value wholes. The Dionysian innovation is most often
accepted because it applies to cultures as wholes. This is its greatest attractionin the popular accounts about anthropology. The innovation is also rejectedbecause it does not apply to cultures as wholes. This is the most persistentcharge leveled against the innovation, and it was fired against Benedict's
original papers. Radin, who urged that anthropology study any part of aculture only for its relevance to the whole culture (1932:27), rejected the
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SMITH] The Dionysian Innovation 255
Dionysian innovation because it "dogmatically includes and excludes in an
unjustifiable and arbitrary manner" (1932:179). The concept is selective. It
separates and divides the parts from the whole. Thus Barnouw (1949) even
charged that the concept is atomistic. Both the acceptors and the rejectorsprize the whole, and impugn the complementary disvalues of selectivity and
atomism. Some anthropologists (e.g. Lowie 1937:288-291; 1940:383-390) ac-
cept the ideal of seeing cultures as wholes, but doubt that it is a practical or
attainable ideal. Dionysian may have a meaning that gives it a high intrinsic
value, yet it may be difficult to apply, giving it a low extrinsic value.
Anthropologists also value differences.Popular accounts accept the Diony-sian innovation because it serves to contrast cultures. It emphasizes cultural
differences: somepeoples
areDionysian
and others are not. Thisemphasison distinctions is also a popular ground for rejecting the innovation: the
Dionysian concept ignores differences. For example, the Plains Indians and the
Kwakiutl are not Dionysian in the same way. Moreover, no one tribe is alto-
gether Dionysian. "Extravagant sensation seeking . . . is not the configurationof Plains culture, for equally strong, if not so spectacular, is another web of
traits ... " (Hoebel 1956:179). This devotion to differences leads to a scepti-cism about cultural similarities and generalizations. Common denominators
are based on simplification, the blurring of distinctions, and over-simplifica-
tion is a common charge against Benedict, and by Benedict against Spengler,and by others against the concept as a whole. The simplicity of the Dionysian
concept contributed to its popular acceptance, but for professional acceptanceit had to be qualified. Its simplicity also permitted the concept to be inter-
preted in various ways and this led to its ambiguity.
Differences, selectivity, and simplification are of course matters of degree.
Anthropologists show a high regard for such degrees, whether they accept or
reject the innovation. Driver (1961:536) accepted Benedict's innovation "as
far as it goes"; Kroeber (1935, 1955) said it does not go far enough; and Lowie
(1937:279) said it goes too far. Anthropologists value degrees as well asdifferences.
They also value consistency. Most acceptors like the Dionysian innovation
because it gives the various traits of a culture coherence and consistency. It
makes a culture hang together. Both the acceptors and the rejectors look for
consistency, but they look for it in different places. The acceptors look for it
mainly in the cultures, while the rejectors look for it more in the approach to
cultures. This leads them to opposite conclusions. Thus the ambivalence of
consistency,as of
manyother
values,is often a
corollaryof
ambiguity. Manyrejectorsmaintain that the criteriafor selecting traits and for interpreting them
are not constant and consistent from one culture to another. Therefore they
reject the Dionysian innovation with the popular complaint that it involves
artistic perception rather than a rigorous methodology. The innovation is
also rejected because it overstresses consistency. It makes a culture appear too
rigidly structured. The rejectors' concern for consistency is tempered bytheir devotion to differences and their regard for degrees.
Finally, many principles are valued by the anthropological culture as a
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256 American Anthropologist [66, 1964
whole, but some are valued by only one or another segment of the culture.
For example, the innovation is sometimes rejected on the ground that it is
static. Dionysian cultures "spring, fully grown, from history like Minerva
from Jupiter's head" (Nadel 1937). Like any of the Utopias from Plato'sRepublic on, Dionysian cultures have no history. The concept does not explainwhat gives rise to a Dionysian way of life. These rejectors value causality and
dynamics in anthropological descriptions and analyses. All segments of the
culture do not value dynamics equally, and the acceptors tend to ignore it.
These values have all been identified by analyzing the acceptances and
rejections of one innovation. This method may reveal only one kind of value.
Here it reveals such values as the devotion to differencesand degrees, and the
high regard for wholes and consistency. It has not revealed how anthropolo-
gists value such things as bravery, reputation, and power. It may be thatwhen anthropologists discuss their own mentifacts they are only concerned
with methodological ideals and avoid social ones. The method of analysis that
is used here can, however, be applied in different cultures and the results
compared. Are Samoan values as ambivalent as these anthropological ones?
Do the Eskimo have as high a regard for wholes?
ROLEAND STATUSGROUPINGS
Theforegoing analysis considered the values leading to the acceptanceand rejection of the Dionysian concept, but it did not consider who accepts
and who rejects. To that end we can analyze the contexts of explicit statements
on the Dionysian innovation in the anthropological literature. This also in-
volves the more delicate task of noting those contexts where the concept mighthave been used but was not used. In these cases the innovation was probably
rejected, for it is unlikely that the writers were unfamiliar with it. It is particu-
larly difficult to investigate such rejections, for the innovation can be
quietly ignored without explanation. Nevertheless, this procedure reveals
several sets of behavioral moieties that crisscross the anthropological culture.There is a chameleon-like quality in anthropological writings. The same
anthropologists who accept the Dionysian innovation when they write a popu-lar account about anthropology, reject it when they write a researchstudy in
anthropology. They discuss it in almost all introductory textbooks, but al-most never in professional journals. Although the Dionysian innovation wasmade in two research publications (Benedict 1930, 1932), the term is conspicu-ous by its absence in practically all research studies afterwards. It does not
appear in the indexes of the AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, where such other
terms as "folk-urban" and "themes" are listed. It is not indexed in other
anthropological journals. Nor has the concept been used heuristically for fur-ther research, although comparable innovations such as "cultural focus" havebeen used as a guide for new inquiries (e.g. Wheat 1954). The fact that the
Dionysian concept may be used by an anthropologist in a textbook, but not
in a monograph or article, is a cultural phenomenon that calls for an explana-tion. It suggests a behavioral moiety based on roles.
It is also evident that there are status moieties in anthropology. Research
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SMITH] The Dionysian Innovation 257
studies are written for a peer group, while popular accounts are written for a
patron group. The peer group includes professional anthropologists, such as
professors, curators, and other initiates. The anthropological patrons include
students, the public, and professionals in other fields. As patrons they are boththe sponsors and the clients of the peer group. Of course, both the peer and the
patron groups include a range of statuses. The patrons, for example, rangefrom housewives who happen to pick up a book about anthropology to profes-sional sociologists for whom anthropology is a collateral field.
The popular accounts are written by peers for patrons. Thus they reveal
only the peers' perceptions of the patrons. This is the way the patrons will be
considered here, although it is like describing the Navaho from a Hopi concep-tion of them. The
peerswill
speakfor themselves.
The historical inventory of statements about the Dionysian concept reveals
that the peers and patrons have different expectations of anthropology. It is
clear that the Dionysian concept meets the expectations of the patrons and
not of the peers. Differences between the two groups in their approach to seven
anthropological concepts and methods were noted: ethnocentrism; cultural
relativism; explanations; values; personal identifications; academic identifi-
cations; and technical analyses. The approach of the patrons to each of these
items is compatible with their acceptance of the Dionysian innovation, and the
approach of the peers with their rejection of it.The patrons often study other cultures in order to answer questions about
their own culture. All popular accounts state this as an aim of anthropology.Thus the patrons often look to anthropology for cultural alternatives to their
own way of life, and they tend to regard the polygyny of the Paiute with an
ethnocentric interest. The peers generally have a less personal and less ethno-
centric interest in other cultures. Their monographs and articles generally
study other cultures for their own sake. This point requires a full elaboration
and it is the topic of the next section of this paper where the Dionysian innova-
tion is related to this ethnocentric interest.The personal interest in cultural alternatives leads most patrons to become
concerned with cultural relativism. They generally understand cultural rela-
tivism to mean that each culture has its own standards of values (cf. Hersko-
vits 1955:348-366; Honigmann 1959:113-117). It is research rather than
personal alternatives that leads the peers to become concerned with cultural
relativism (cf. Beals and Hoijer 1959:674-5). The peers generally understand
cultural relativism to mean that cultural laws have limited generality. This is
a different kind of relativism. Thus thepeers
tend to look for constants and
variables, while the patrons tend to look for the uniqueness or difference of
each culture. The Dionysian innovation describesa unique and distinctive wayof life. This is more what the patrons expect of anthropology than what the
peers expect.The patrons also prefer a high ratio of explanation to information. They
always call for more interpretation and commentary. The peers often feel that
if there is enough information it will explain itself. They always call for more
data. This is illustrated by the proportion of description to interpretation in
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258 American Anthropologist [66, 1964
popular accounts and in journals. Proportionally, the popular accounts havemuch less description. The primary aim of the Dionysian concept is to explainand interpret the behavior of various tribes. This makes it attractive for the
patrons and precocious for the peers.When the peers write for patrons, they assume that the patrons are inter-
ested in anthropology as part of a quest for personal values and purposes.Patrons commonly seek explanations in terms of good and better, or interpreta-tions expressed through goals and human destiny. Within the peer group,
however, values are often thought to be elusive and difficult to investigate
scientifically. Peers sometimes believe that explanations in terms of goals are
teleological, which assumes that the future determines the present. This theyconsider to be a pre-scientific direction of inquiry. The peers prefer to look for
explanations in causes, which assumes instead that the past determines the
present. One of the greatest attractions of the Dionysian innovation is its
value oriented formulations and goal directed explanations. These value orien-
tations distinguish the Dionysian concept from such other typologies asSteward's formative cultures or Mead's event-triggered and calendrically-
triggered cultures.
Patrons who come to anthropology in pursuit of values can identify them-selves with the Dionysian way of life, whether that way is perceived as a
sensate extraversion or an introverted transcendentalism. They can recognizemany of the Dionysian traits in themselves. They can imagine themselves
playing Dionysian roles and acting extravagantly, passionately, and indi-
vidualistically. Moreover, the Dionysian concept gives these traits coherence.Patrons can appreciate that this unity of characteristics can give meaning to aman's life. Thus the patrons can see that the Dionysian path to self-fulfill-ment is a possible model for themselves. The peers are less concerned with
finding these kinds of personal identifications in anthropology. Instead theygenerally seek to identify themselves with their peers and with scholarship
and research.The popular accounts about anthropology also suggest that patrons tend
to identify anthropology with sociology and psychology. These fields are knownfor such typologies as sensate, introvert, and extravert. The Dionysian conceptin anthropology supports these academic identifications. The peers, however,are not so ready to identify their academic domain with these behavioralsciences. They tend to emphasize the distinguishing characteristics of anthro-
pology and to separate cultural analyses from social and psychological ones.With this they reject such typologies as sensate and introvert, and
they rejectthe Dionysian typology.In general, patrons do not turn to anthropology in pursuit of technical
analyses involving subsistence patterns, kinship systems, or material cul-ture. Most popularaccounts either explain that they do not present these topicsfully, or they excuse themselves for presenting them. The peers are oftenimmersed in these kinds of analyses. Instead of broad concepts that may be
esthetically satisfying, the peers seek conclusions warranted by scientificevidence. The Dionysian concept is not formulated from this kind of tech-
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SMITH] The Dionysian Innovation 259
nical evidence. It is not based, for example, on the ratio of movement responsesto shading responses in a Rorschach. Thus the Dionysian innovation is againmore acceptable to the patrons than to the peers.
These differences in the perceptions of ethnocentrism and cultural relativ-ism, of values and explanations, of personal and academic identifications,and of technical analyses reflect the differences between two status moieties:
patrons and peers. These status moieties also explain the role moieties within
the peer group. The same anthropologists accept the Dionysian innovation
when they write for patrons, and reject it when they write for fellow anthro-
pologists. These moieties are not like the structural divisions of the Toda and
the Iroquois, but they are organizational divisions within the anthropologicalculture (cf. Radcliffe-Brown 1952:11). Naturally, the social
organizationof
anthropology involves much more than these particular divisions and group-
ings. But whatever its social organization may involve, it is important to the
historian and ethnographer of this culture. Statuses and roles define and regu-late the behavior of the anthropologist. They entail obligations to act in
appropriate ways, and they permit others to anticipate appropriate behavior.
Without an analysis of role and status groupings, the traditions and changes in
anthropology would be incomprehensible.
RELATION TO THE CULTURALENVIRONMENT
As there are these subsystems within the anthropological culture, so
anthropology itself is a subsystem in a larger cultural setting. Anthropologyis that part of a broader cultural tradition that studies other cultural tradi-
tions. When its own cultural environment changes, anthropology and the
Dionysian tradition change with it. Therefore, anthropology is likely to ex-
hibit some ethnocentric orientations.
The relation between a culture and its setting is often indicated by its
artifacts. A Paiute seed grinding stone indicates clearly if not completely how
the Paiute were related to their environment. Similarly, the Dionysian menti-fact indicates how the anthropological culture is related to its environment.
The Dionysian concept is an example of what Boas (1902) called an esoteric
doctrine. These doctrines are ethnologically significant because they express"the reaction of the best minds in the community to the general cultural en-
vironment."
The publication of Patterns of Culture in 1934 introduced the Dionysianartifact to patrons. The book was a phenomenal success. It sold over half a
millioncopies
intwenty years (Ray 1956).
It owed apart
of this success to
the anthropological peer group. They promoted the book by assigning it in
classes, and even its rejectors recommended it widely (e.g. Linton 1952).
Nevertheless, the book really succeeded because the patrons felt that it met
their personal needs. It related anthropology to the life and problems of the
day. Patterns of Culturein general, and the Dionysian concept in particular,
explained and illuminated many aspects of American life in 1934.
After the title page of Patterns of Culturethere is an inscription page which
bears a single proverb from Digger Indian lore: "In the beginning God gave
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260 American Anthropologist [66, 1964
to every people a cup of clay, and from this cup they drank their life." After
an introductory chapter, the book begins by putting this epigraph in its
historical setting. In the beginning the Digger Indians had a cup of clay, but
now their cup is broken. "Our cup is broken. Those things that had givensignificance to the life of (the people) were gone, and with them the shape and
meaning of their life . .. There were other cups of living left, and they held
perhaps the same water, but the loss irreparable" (Benedict 1934:22). This
was not only an epigraph for the Digger Indians and for Patterns of Culture:
it was also a keynote of American life in 1934.
The depression shocked the faith that Americans had in their own tradi-
tions. Coolidge had said that the business of America is business, but now
business was bankrupt. At the same time, droughts turned the land of plentyinto dustbowls and wastelands. Okies and Arkies and 15 million unemployed:their cup was broken. Perhaps there vjere other cups of living left-in New
Deal reforms, or across the sea in fascist demagogues and communist revolu-
tionaries-but the loss was irreparable.When the cup was broken, norms were shattered. A fundamental premise
of Benedict's book was that norms and customs differ from place to place and
time to time. Economic competition, for example, is not a basic trait of Human
Nature; among the Zufii it is an aberrant form of behavior. "The statistically
determined normal on the Northwest Coast would be far outside the extremeboundaries of abnormality in the Pueblos" (Benedict 1934:254). In other
words, norms arevariables. This variety of norms calls for tolerance, an accept-ance of cultural differences,and even of individual abnormalities. If some indi-viduals are misfits in their society, they "are, as Sapir phrases it, 'alienatedfrom an impossible world' " (Benedict 1934:270). Given the opportunity, how-
ever, they can make a significant contribution to the life of their people.This spoke to the America of 1934. Following the upheaval of the first
World War, Harding had inaugurated the 'twenties with the solecism of re-
turning to normalcy, meaning a return to the traditional ways of the goodold days. This ideal or normalcy came tumbling down with the crash. In theold time traditions, being out of work was a social abnormality and a personaldisgrace, but in the depression it became almost normal and accepted. Fifteenmillion unemployed were "alienated from an impossible world." The optimismthat had been a normal part of the American dream became an abnormal fear,even a Roosevelt fear of fear itself,-and Benedict offeredthe fearful Dobuansas a mirrorfor America. The country could not return to normalcy. That cupwas broken. So it turned to reformsinstead.
Benedict's Zufii, Dobuans, and Kwakiutl are folk cultures. The appear-ance of her descriptions of them complemented a renewed interest in folksocieties throughout America. The country had become disenchanted withits traditional symbols of success and the good life. Time magazine's man ofthe year in 1929 had been Walter P. Chrysler, and in 1930, Owen D. Young,but in 1931 it named Mahatma Ghandi (Wecter 1948:2). The millionaireswere succeeded by a man who wore no shoes and represented a folk society.
The depression increased the interest in the little man and the under-
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SMITH] The Dionysian Innovation 261
privileged. There was a heightened concern for minorities, for the first manfired and the last man hired. One of these minorities was the aged who were
memorialized in Life Begins at Forty, the Townsend Plan, and the Social
Security Act. Another minority, the American Indian, received new recogni-tion and a New Deal in the Wheeler-Howard Act in 1934. The Okies and
Arkies of the dustbowl, the poor Whites of Tobacco Road, the poor Negroesof Porgy's Catfish Row became symbols of the cultural diversity of America.
Regionalism became a byword in social studies and literature. WPA writers
and TVA planners cultivated grass roots and the concern for poor agrarianareas. A country that had awakened to its own folk was ready for the Zufii,the Dobuans, and the Kwakiutl. It was also ready for the Dionysian innova-
tion.
Benedict was explicit about the relevance of her folk cultures to American
society. "The understanding we need of our own cultural processes can most
economically be arrived at by a d6tour . . . I have chosen three primitivecivilizations . . . " (1934:56). One of these civilizations was the Kwakiutl
whom she labelled as "typical Dionysians" and as "a parody on our own
society."The parody is graphic and sweeping. Basic to both the Kwakiutl and the
American cultures is a "will to superiority" that is rooted in economic compe-
tition. The potlatch of the Kwakiutl economy is the conspicuous consumptionof the American economy. These forms of displaying wealth symbolize that
both societies are made up of status seekers and self-glorifiers.Both societies
are dedicated to rugged individualism and free enterprise. All this is part of
the Dionysian way of life as Benedict defined that way.In the America of 1934, however, the Dionysian way, as Benedict defined
it, was the way of the past. The Dionysian ways of the American frontier had
ended in Oklahoma in 1890, and the Dionysian ways of the American economyhad ended on Wall Street in 1929. The symbols of American culture changed.Social planning replaced rugged individualism. A managed economy replacedfree enterprise. Welfare legislation replaced laissez faire. The recovery pro-
gram instituted broad controls. It regulated the banks and stock exchanges.The AAA created a kind of agrariancollectivism. The NRA established indus-
trial syndicates. Lacerated by the depression, the country sought social
solidarity more than individual autonomy. The new emphasis on restraint
and controls and the de-emphasis on individualism marked a transition in the
character of the American culture, from a Kwakiutl to a Zufii configuration.
Of course, the American culture, or any other, has never been consistentlyApollonian or Dionysian in these terms. The men who symbolized the Diony-sian orientations of the 'twenties-Chrysler, Young, Hoover-exhibited an
Apollonian restraint and formality in public relations. Likewise, the peoplewho symbolized the Apollonian orientations of the depression years-theRoosevelts-exhibited personally a Dionysian flamboyance. The repeal of
prohibition, the epidemic of candid cameras, the swing to jazz, John Dillinger,
Jean Harlow, these were not Apollonian aspects of life in the 'thirties. At
best there were conflicts between the Apollonian and the Dionysian. For
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262 American Anthropologist [66, 1964
Benedict and for most of the social scientists of that time, the fundamental
conflict was between the older Dionysian individualism and the newer Apol-lonian social consciousness. In this conflict, Benedict placed herself firmly on
the side of the Apollonians.She did not hesitate to take a side. Indeed she made a strong plea for
"passing judgments upon the dominant traits of our own civilization" to
"cast up their cost in social capital." For some of these traits "the price is
great, and the social order may not be able to pay the price" (1934: 248-250).Her specific judgments were unequivocal. The Kwakiutl ethos "is suffi-
ciently close to the attitudes of our own culture to be intelligible to us and
we have a definite vocabulary with which we may discuss it. The megalo-maniac
paranoidtrend is a definite
dangerin our
society. . .
Rivalryis
notoriously wasteful. It ranks low in the scale of human values. It is a
tyranny from which, once it is encouraged in any culture, no man may free
himself. The wish for superiority is gargantuan; it can never be satisfied. The
contest goes on forever . . . In Kwakiutl institutions, such rivalry reaches its
final absurdity ... The social waste is obvious. It is just as obvious in the
obsessive rivalry of Middletown where houses are built and clothing boughtand entertainments attended that each family may prove that it has not been
left out of the game. It is an unattractive picture" (1934:222, 247).
For the American public of the 'thirties, Benedict's judgments had theweight of anthropological science behind them, and she gave solid supportto the popular values of the day. Thus the Dionysian innovation related
anthropology to the larger cultural setting, and Patterns of Culturewon greatpopular acceptance.
As a paperback Patterns of Culture has sold a million and a quarter copiesby 1964 (Dempsey 1964). In 1964, however, the book does not bear the same
meaning that it did in 1934. In 1964, it is read more for its overall thesis of
patterning, for its eloquent interpretations of the Zufii, Dobuans, and the
Kwakiutl, and for its prestige as a classic. It is read less for its application ofthe Dionysian concept to life in the United States. Today, the Dionysianinnovation is still popular in textbooks, although its acceptors have modifiedit radically. As the culture changes and its environment changes, the toolsthat relate the one to the other also change. For a while old tools may survivein the inertia of cultural lag. One day, however, the Dionysian concept mayno longer be meaningful in the larger cultural setting. Then it may join thebutton hook and the pen wiper in a museum of the obsolete.
EXTENSIONS NDCONCLUSIONS
Any mentifact can be informative, even a minor one like the Dionysianconcept of the anthropological culture. In this paper the Dionysian innovationhas served as an example and a point of departure. We can extend the analysisof this mentifact to others in order to expose other values, other status group-ings, and other parts of the culture. For example, the Apollonian innovationhas been more widely accepted than the Dionysian one. There is a far greater
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SMITH] The Dionysian Innovation 263
literature on the Apollonianism of the Pueblos than on the Dionysianism of
the other Indians of North America. Other conceptual artifacts, such as
"animism," "relativism," and "structure," are also rich ores for the historian
and ethnographer of anthropology. They are what Lovejoy called "unit ideas"in the history of a tradition (1936:3). They are for anthropology what "prim-itivism" and "the great chain of being" are in the tradition of European
speculative thought. For anthropology, however, they are not ideas to be
analyzed philosophically, but mentifacts to be studied culturally. They are
products and functions of social organization, value system, and other partsof the culture.
Our analyses of processes, such as innovation, acceptance, and rejection,can also be extended. Benedict
herself,for
example, rejecteda
major partof
her own Dionysian innovation. In one of her original papers (1932) she estab-
lished a realist-nonrealist division. Although Plains culture is Dionysian and
the Pueblo culture is Apollonian, they are both realist cultures. The Plains and
non-Pueblo Southwest are both Dionysian, but one is realist and the other
nonrealist. "The two categories operate at a different level and cross-section
each other." This realist-nonrealist antithesis does not appear in Patterns of
Culture, and it has completely disappeared from the literature. What values
did it violate? Perhaps typologies in the sciences are like species in nature:
extinction is the rule and immortality the miracle.We can also extend our knowledge of how anthropological innovations are
made. What are the characteristics and circumstances of the innovator? Is
acceptance an anonymous process, or does anthropology maintain sentries at
its gates? And besides acceptance and rejection, the processes of culture changealso include diffusion, competition, and identification. To what extent, for
example, had professional works diffused to the patrons and prepared them
for Benedict's work? In the competiton among anthropological ideas, were
Benedict's ideas, because she was a lady, treated with more respect than
seriousness? When do anthropologists identify themselves with the largerculture and when do they act purely as scholars? Naturally, the history and
culture of anthropology can extend well beyond the study of these particular
processes and mentifacts.
Such studies may make anthropologists more objective, for objectivityincreases as knowledge about the observer's point of view increases. It is
easier, however, to demonstrate that such studies are important because they
apply the methods and hypotheses used in the study of other cultures; and
in applying them, they test them, reformulate them, and foster newmethods
and hypotheses. For example, the present study identified an innovation
within a culture and then analyzed its rejections and acceptances in order to
identify the values that are held in that culture. It also found that most of
the values in this culture are ambivalent. These methods and hypotheses can
be further tested and reformulated in studying other cultures.
The new interest in the history of anthropology gives anthropologists one
more culture to study. We study the culture of anthropology itself, and thereby
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264 American Anthropologist [66, 1964
we promote the same methods and concerns that we have in studying the
Dyak, Eyak, or any other culture. We investigate the same general problemsof human behavior.'
NOTE
1I am grateful to Theodore Stern for his helpful reading of the final draft.
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