The Effectiveness of Aero-Space Power and “The Japanese ... · ―maneuverist‖ approach and the...

The Effectiveness of Aero-space Power and the ―Japanese Way in Warfare‖

Air Power Studies Vol.4 1

The Effectiveness of Aero-Space Power and

“The Japanese Way in Warfare”

Tomoyuki Ishizu

It must be noted that the English version does not necessarily reflect the original

Japanese text.

Introduction

More than a century has passed since the Wright brothers succeeded in

the first powered aircraft flight. Since then, air power has evolved to

become an indispensable element of military strength whose

capabilities were decisively verified in the Iraq War.1

Colin Gray, in providing an overview of the history of air power

development, stated that air power was only experimental and marginal

adjunct to the Army from the early 1900s to the 1920s, before

developing into a useful and important force from the 1920s to the

1940s. Gray noted that air power became absolutely indispensable from

the 1940s to the 1990s, and he went as far as saying that since the

1990s it appears to have developed into a force that can win wars

independently.2

In today’s international environment air power is considered to have

the following seven distinctive characteristics, namely: (1) ubiquity, (2)

the overhead flank, (3) range and reach, (4) speed of passage, (5)

geographically unrestricted routing, (6) superior observation, and (7)

flexibility in concentration.3 Certainly, there are no other examples of a

single force or ―power‖ that has developed so rapidly in the short

period of about a century, a fact that makes the idiosyncrasies of air

power all the more notable.

Tomoyuki Ishizu

2 Air Power Studies Vol.4

Additionally, already by the 1950s some had begun to recognize the

hidden potential of the domain of outer space, giving rise to the concept

of ―aero-space power.‖ Today, vigorous debate is underway regarding

whether outer space should be perceived as an extension of airspace, or

alternatively, in the same way as cyberspace theorists argue, as a

so-called independent domain.4

This paper first gives an overview of the history of aero-space power

development while considering its usefulness. Secondly, it discusses

how Japan should incorporate those distinctive characteristics in its

own national strategy.

1. The First Turning Point: World War II

In the history of war, the usefulness of air power as a tool of national

strategy was demonstrated clearly for the first time in World War II

(1939 to 1945).

Air power developed into an indispensable element in all aspects of

war, from the German army’s ―blitzkrieg‖ and the Japanese navy’s

surprise attack on Pearl Harbor to the Allied Forces’ strategic bombing

of Germany (which involved air force and army aviation units), and on

to the United States Army Air Forces’ bombing raids and the dropping

of the atomic bomb on Japanese cities.5 The ―Battle of Britain,‖ the

―Battle of the Atlantic,‖ the Russo-German War, the invasion of

Normandy, ―Operation Market Garden,‖ the battles of Midway and

Guadalcanal are only a handful of such examples.

It is certainly true that the subsequent development of air power ran

into a large number of legal, political and ethical issues, as exemplified

by the problems surrounding strategic bombings and the use of the

atomic bomb. However, following World War II, there was no one who

denied that air power would play a major role in subsequent wars. That

is because air power’s potential capabilities had blossomed remarkably,



especially as a result of technological developments. It was clear that

technological feasibility was becoming no longer a constraint for air

power.

However, as Bernard Brodie astutely pointed out, although the

usefulness of air power was firmly proven in World War II, this was not

the air power that Giulio Douhet viewed as ideal, but the outcome of a

concept envisioned by Billy Mitchell, i.e., anything that flies can

become weapons.6

2. Two Pioneers—Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell

Going back in time, this section reflects briefly on the views on air

power propounded by the two theorists whom Brodie touched on:

Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell.

The outline of Douhet’s major work, Command of the Air, can be

summarized as follows:7 (1) It is becoming increasingly difficult to

distinguish between combatants and non-combatants in modern

warfare; (2) Today, it is highly unlikely that a regular ground force

would succeed in an attack; (3) On the three-dimensional stage that an

air battle would take place in, means of defense against aggressive air

power cannot possibly exist as long as one secures an advantage of

speed and altitude; (4) In that case, the country should prepare a

strategy that incorporates powerful bombing directed at the heart of the

enemy’s population, politics, and industry. Furthermore, it is necessary

to first deliver a heavy strike to crush civilian morale in the enemy

country, so that the government of the enemy country has no other

option but to seek reconciliation; (5) To that end, an independent air

force that possesses a long-range bomber unit has to constantly

maintain a posture of readiness for combat.

Needless to say, Douhet’s views of air power have drawn much

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criticism even till the present day.

For instance, Douhet, who underestimated the strength of the

enemy’s will to fight back, expected the citizens of the enemy country

to fall into a state of panic easily with just a few bombing attacks,

allowing the spirit of defeatism to spread immediately. In truth,

however, as evidenced by the examples of strategic bombing on

London, Berlin, Tokyo, and other cities during the Second World War,

the people fought strongly and tenaciously to the end even in the face

of large-scale bombing attacks.8 He was also completely mistaken in

predicting that a country would not be able to defend itself against

attacks from the enemy’s bombers. The Battle of Britain demonstrated

clearly that Great Britain was able to build an effective air defense

system by organically combining newly developed radars with bombers.

It was not necessarily true that bombers would definitely break

through.9

On the other hand, if we were to reflect from the present day,

Mitchell’s views on air power would seem somewhat more balanced.10

Mitchell considered it necessary to have all kinds of aircraft to engage

in an air battle. For him, it is not necessarily important to carry out

strategic bombing; rather, it is vital to deploy a diverse range of air

power under the integrated management of an independent air force

headquarters, and to eliminate the subordination of air power to the

ground and naval forces.

Moreover, in contrast with Douhet’s attitude of mostly disregarding

the usefulness of ground forces, and his advocacy of bombing the

enemy country’s central functions and resources that lies behind this

attitude, Mitchell at least acknowledged the importance of other

military branches and collaborative work. In fact, Mitchell was an early

advocator of the creation of parachute units.

Nevertheless, the interests of both Douhet and Mitchell, and other



theorists as represented by Hugh Trenchard and Alexander Seversky,

were basically limited to the domain of the sky.11

In contrast with this, J.F.C. Fuller and B.H. Liddell-Hart drew out,

from military power as a whole, the usefulness of air power. Their

theory on armored warfare, based on the principle of the joint use of air

and ground power, was eventually materialized in the form of the

Blitzkrieg (German for ―lightning war‖) employed during the Second

World War.12

Apart from these two English theorists, visionaries

during the interwar period, exemplified by Charles de Gaulle (France),

Heinz Guderian (Germany), and Mikhail Tukhachevsky (Soviet Union),

were constantly exploring the potential of the joint deployment of air

power and land power (military land power. This was the birth of the

―maneuverist‖ approach and the theory of maneuver warfare.13

In Japan as well, Isoroku Yamamoto considered the joint deployment

of air power and sea power (naval power), which led to the surprise

attack on Pearl Harbor. There were also other figures, as represented by

Kanji Ishiwara, who explored the deployment of air power in ways that

were closely resembled Douhet’s views.14

3. The Second Turning Point—The Gulf War

After the Second World War, even as air power was partly incorporated

into nuclear strategies during the Cold War period between the United

States and the Soviet Union, it developed steadily through the course of

the Berlin Blockade, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Its

usefulness The Gulf War that erupted in 1991 served as impressive

proof of the usefulness of air power, and became a major turning point

in considering its value.

In battles conducted in the air during the Gulf War—referring

generally to Operation Instant Thunder designed by John Warden, and

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Operation Desert Storm, which was actually set in motion—attacks

were carried out simultaneously and in parallel against command

headquarters, command, control and telecommunication systems, and

important infrastructural facilities regarded as the focal point of Iraq.

The aim of the attacks was to cause malfunction of the enemy’s

functions and strategic paralysis, as well as to damage enemy systems;

to achieve these ends, the representative means used were penetration

using stealth aircraft, standoff precision strikes, recognition of the

situation, and power projection, all of which were backed by the latest

information technology of the time.15

In truth, Operation Desert Storm

suggested the fact that air strikes carried out at the beginning of war

have an important, and even decisive, impact on the course of the

overall operation thereafter and its outcome.16

Instead of capturing the

enemy as a system and attacking them cumulatively, the outcome

focused on conducting simultaneous strikes in parallel.

It is widely known that under the U.S.-Soviet Cold War system, the

word ―strategy‖ was generally used to mean ―nuclear arms‖ in the

1970s and 1980s.17

Going further back, it was even used simply to

mean ―long range‖ during the Second World War.

On the other hand, one notable feature of the Gulf War was the fact

that conventional arms—particularly those regarded as tactical

weapons—were effectively deployed to achieve objectives that were

strategic in the true sense of the word. In short, Warden’s greatest

achievement lies in the fact that he used the fruits of the development

such as stealth and precision guidance technology, as symbolized by the

expression ―RMA,‖ to restore within the U.S. Air Force policies aimed

at achieving true strategic objectives through conventional arms. The

immense role that air power demonstrated in the Gulf War was just the

result of this shift in views and theories on air power.18

While strategic effect was at the core of Warden’s theories, strategic



effect is not limited to simply using firepower against the enemy on the

battlefield, but encompasses a deeper meaning. Looking back, strategic

effect had already been achieved during the Berlin Blockade from 1948

to 1949, when air power had had an important—and even

decisive—effect without a single bomb being dropped.19

On the other hand, John Boyd, regarded as a figure who had a

significant influence on ground battles during the Gulf War in the

aspects of theory and concept, had already been known prior to the

eruption of this war for his presentation of the usefulness of the

decision-making cycle known as the OODA loop: (1) Observe, (2)

Orient (assess the situation), (3) Decide, and (4) Act.20

The OODA loop is, so to speak, the formulation of a model for the

ideal decision-making process based on the experiences of air battles

during the Korean War. It posits that a speedy and accurate conclusion

can be reached through the repetition of the abovementioned four

processes of the cycle.

4. The Air Power Renaissance—John Warden and John Boyd

In this section, I will attempt to reconsider the air power views

presented by Warden and Boyd, two theorists of the Gulf War.21

Although evaluation of Warden differs greatly, there is no doubt that

he was the main architect of the overall strategy for the Gulf War.

While Warden respected Fuller as an ―intellectual master,‖ he strongly

opposed the central operating concept adopted by the U.S. Army at the

time, known as ―Air Land Battle‖—a battle strategy touted as the ideal

by ―maneuverists,‖ whom Fuller is a representative of. This was

because for Warden, even this concept gave air power only a

subordinate role, and more than that, was unable to draw out the

strategic effect of air power.22

In fact, Warden was the one who coined

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the term ―global reach‖ to describe the characteristics or the role of air

power.

One feature of Warden’s views on air power during the Gulf War was

that they captured the enemy as a system; even today, the concept of the

―five rings‖ is still widely known. He felt that, without necessarily

engaging and fighting against the enemy’s land power, it would still be

possible to generate that strategic effect by using air power to attack

points that are important to the enemy’s war potential. Operation

Instant Thunder, which was conceptualized for the Gulf War, was the

exact opposite of the idea behind Operation Rolling Thunder in the

Vietnam War.23

On the other hand, Boyd is also highly esteemed as a figure who

contributed to the success of the Gulf War, even though he was not

directly involved in the war. In particular, he is credited with having

great influence on the formulation of the ―Left Hook‖ maneuver during

Operation Desert Storm, and many U.S. military officers who had been

strongly influenced by his views had participated in the Gulf War.

For Boyd, speed is the key to winning all wars. It was probably this

view that contributed to his emphasis on the unbroken cycle of

adaptation to the environment, or mutual interaction with a constantly

changing environment, as well as the emphasis on the discretionary

powers needed to achieve that end. The formulation of the new

textbook Warfighting for the U.S. Marine Corps, and not the Air Force,

strongly reflects the influence of Boyd, who had placed great

importance on the theory of maneuver warfare.24

According to Boyd, it is possible to win a war by controlling the

decision-making cycle. This view gave birth to the concept of the

OODA loop, and further, to the idea of entering the enemy’s OODA

loop. According to Boyd, turning the decision-making cycle more

quickly than the enemy will cause the enemy to lose track of the



situation, and become confused about what is happening to itself. The

accumulation of confusion then leads to paralysis, making it impossible

for the enemy to fight back.

In that sense, Boyd can be regarded as one of the postmodern

theorists.25

For him, psychological paralysis of the enemy was an

important factor. On the other hand, Warden continued to place an

emphasis on physical paralysis. If we were to describe the difference

between the theories of Boyd and Warden somewhat simplistically, we

could say that Warden focused on ―how to act,‖ while Boyd was

interested in ―how to think.‖ For this reason, it should also be possible

to compare these two 20th century theorists with the two 19th century

theorists, Antoine-Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz.26

By

examining the views on air power of the two theorists in a

complementary way, we should be able to gain many useful insights

even in the present day.

However, there is no doubt that both Warden and Boyd contributed

greatly to the development of the theory of strategic paralysis as well as

the theory that places importance on the effect known as ―EBO.‖ In

addition, both these theorists are highly regarded for the fact that they

focused on the value of the strategic dimension rather than the value of

the dimension of air power tactics and operations (theater of war), and

also for the fact that they emphasized the importance of the theoretical

or conceptual aspects of war in addition to its technical aspect. In this

way, a theory of air power was reborn in the truest sense of the word.

This is the reason why it has earned the title, ―air power renaissance.‖

While it is true that air power could not produce the decisive

outcomes that some theorists had anticipated during the Gulf War. The

fact remains that without air power, United States and its

allies—Coalition of the Willing—could not have destroyed the Iraqi

Tomoyuki Ishizu


troops with just a small sacrifice. Before the Gulf War, the central role

of air power had been considered to be that of providing support for

land power. During the Gulf War, however, the role of air power was

not merely to define a combat space or warzone within an extremely

short time, but appeared to have gained the ability to determine the

outcome of the war by itself. As a result, the expression ―air dominance‖

came to be used mainly by the U.S. Air Force.27

This expression is

almost synonymous with the concept of ―command of the air‖ that

Douhet advocated.

More importantly, air power, underpinned by technological

development, brought about changes in the concept of the capabilities

required for occupation. In other words, it is becoming increasingly

likely to actually occupy a certain territory without relying on

conventional land power. For example, the designation of no-fly zones

in Iraq after the Gulf War and the surveillance activities are proof of the

fact that air power now has a certain level of ability to occupy enemy

territories. Moreover, this trend is becoming increasingly pronounced

with the emergence of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) or drones.

Conversely, the role that is demanded of land power today does not

necessarily include the occupation of territory; rather, it appears that its

main role has been shifting to the ―mopping up‖ operation after a war.

In other words, air power produces a functional effect by striking the

enemy at its most vulnerable points, and robbing it of its capability to

engage in organizational activities.28

Today, land power fulfills the role

of restraining the enemy, while air power executes the attack; this

division of labor between land and air power is the opposite of what it

used to be. Unquestionably, air power, not land power, is becoming the

primary mobile force there.29

In fact, air power after the Gulf War and into the present day has

been deemed to be almost synonymous with Western wars, and



particularly with American wars, and this perception has surfaced in

concepts such as ―The Western Way in Warfare‖ and ―The American

Way in Warfare.‖30

While there has been some controversy to date over why there is a

need for powerful land power and sea power, there have been no

discussions as to why there is a need for air power. The question that

lies at the heart of debates over air power does not concern its

usefulness, but rather, which military branch should maintain that

capability. From this point of view, it appears that Douhet’s and

Mitchell’s views on air power are finally becoming a reality.

The Gulf War is often described as ―the first space war.‖31

It is

certainly true that efforts by the ground, sea, and air forces as well as

the marine corps to strengthen their respective military power through

the utilization of space was a major factor that provided the momentum

for this war. As Gregory Billman pointed out accurately, the Gulf War

―provided space power with its first large-scale opportunity to

demonstrate its capabilities‖32

.

It is widely known that after the Gulf War, various countries,

particularly the United States, have gradually developed the ability to

carry out precision guided bombing strikes without being affected by

weather conditions, as represented by the example of JDAM. This is

achieved through the adoption of guiding devices that harness GPS

technology. Furthermore, through the utilization of satellite

communications to command and control armies on a global scale, they

have also begun deploying UAVs controlled remotely from the home

country, which is far away from the battlefields.

In a study titled The Influence of Space Power Upon History, Gray

explained that after the Gulf War, war has begun to exhibit the

characteristics of ―intelligence war‖ in the space age; intelligence plays

Tomoyuki Ishizu


a central role in such wars, while space becomes the primary theater of

war. In addition, it is important for space commons not to be

challenged; to that end, he advocates that it is necessary to establish

space control, while at the same time invoking conventional theories

and concepts of geopolitics and sea power.33

5. Air Power and the Spirit of the 21st Century—Strategic Effect

The characteristics of air power demonstrated during the Gulf War

proved to be a perfect match for the spirit of the late 20th century,

symbolized by the expression ―post-heroic warfare—warfare without

any war casualties.‖

One of the characteristics of Edward Luttwak’s representative work

Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, is its highly positive rating of

the usefulness of air power based on the concept of post-heroic warfare,

which is his own worldview on the advent of an age of war that does

not incur any war casualties.34

As Eliot Cohen astutely observed, in the

future, any country would probably consider it possible to introduce

and deploy—in phases—military power that is deemed dangerous when

deployed through land power.35

It is interesting to note that the idea of air power as a means for

preserving humanitarianism during a war concurs with the views of

visionaries during the interwar period. This is because the

overwhelming destructive capability of air power, paradoxically, has

the ability to end a war quickly, ultimately making it a humanitarian

act.36

While emphasis was also placed on the humanitarian aspect of

poison gas at the time, at any rate, such consideration for

humanitarianism has only served to further enhance the value of air

power today.

Moreover, as Clausewitz has observed in the past, while the fact

remains that the ultimate aim of war is to compel the enemy to bend to

the will of our side, it is undeniable that the means to achieve that end



is gradually shifting from overt violence to coercion, at least among

advanced democracies in the West. As coercion is an act that works on

and influences the enemy’s leadership, there is no doubt that the value

of air power that allows for the selective use of military power will be

further enhanced.37

It is a well-known fact that use of cruise

missiles—that is, air power—as a means of coercion has begun. This is

not gunboat diplomacy, but the emergence of ―tomahawk diplomacy.‖

While there may be room for the discussion about the right and

wrong of this development, air power is the most suitable means for

bringing about the materialization of the concept of pre-emptive strikes,

observed in American and Russian guidelines on the use of military

force in recent years.38

As I have already mentioned, the Gulf War was an important turning

point in the history of air power. Cohen, as described earlier, drew the

following conclusion about this war: ―American leaders at the end of

this century indeed have been vouchsafed with a military instrument of

a potency rarely known in the history of war.‖39

On the other hand, Luttwak pointed to the fact that in the present day,

which might be described as the era of ―routine precision,‖ the value of

air power and its positioning as a tool of national strategy have risen

significantly. As precision becomes increasingly dominant part of our

routine today, people are now putting great trust in the degree of

precision that air power is equipped with.

In this sense, air power is a perfect match for the spirit of the late

20th century. However, this trend has continued to grow stronger even

in the 21st century. Air power (aero-space power), which encompasses

the domain of space, will probably become a symbol of the modern era.

The fact that the conventional concept of ―battlefield‖ has changed to

the concept of ―battle space‖ speaks eloquently of the

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three-dimensional aspect of war.

Furthermore, theorists today even assert that through air power, it has

become possible to create system paralysis and achieve the strategic

effect in a very real sense, without going through the process of

military destruction and war of attrition.40

It is as if the ideals of the

visionaries, particularly the ―maneuverists‖ (in passing, the source of

the strong combat ability of the U.S. Marine Corps today lies in its

speed), are finally being realized. In truth, however, theorists of air

power have their eyes on something far beyond that.41

In fact, there are many among these theorists who advocate breaking

away from the conventional military theories and concepts that were

basically constructed from the viewpoint of land power, and moving

toward the development of new theories and concepts that are unique to

air power.42

Their argument is that attention should be given only to

the strategic effect that air power is equipped with; in other words, the

―strategic‖ dimension that lies beyond the dimensions of ―tactics‖ and

―operations (theater of war).‖43

Among theorists of advanced democracies of the West, in particular,

we also see arguments for the need to break away from our previous

preoccupation with combat, and regardless of whether it is the enemy

or ally, to focus our interest on their systems and leadership instead.44

If we were to consider the astounding development of air power as

well as of space power and cyber power in recent years, it should be

safe to say that the potential for gaining a decisive victory in war

without dispatching large-scale military forces is growing steadily.

6. The Range of Space Power and Cyber Power

These theorists have already shifted their focus to the domain of

space.45

It is a well-known fact that as early as 1959, the term ―aero-space



power‖ came to be used in the United States, and the broad definition

of air power that includes the domain of space was adopted.46

Not

surprisingly, Opinions are divided on the question of whether space

power is something auxiliary to air power, or whether it is something

independent from air power.47

Up until now, through satellite launches into orbit and their

management, the space domain mainly fulfills the role of (1) space

support. While 24-hour reconnaissance and surveillance platforms that

serve as the foundation for the space domain are being built, the use of

space for military purposes has remained at the level of support for

ground, sea, and air forces and the Marine Corps through C4ISR; there

have been no actual cases of power projection from space. Apart from

this, there is also growing awareness of the following roles: (2)

Expansion of military power; (3) Space control; and (4) Adaptation of

military power.48

There are four ways to grasp space conceptually: (1) The viewpoint

that space should remain, as before, as a ―sacred domain‖ that is

unrelated to war; (2) The viewpoint that the value of space should not

be overrated due to its extreme vulnerability; (3) The viewpoint

inspired by geopolitics, which perceives that control of space, the

ultimate ―high ground,‖ means controlling war itself; (4) The view that

it is necessary to establish space control, as suggested by theories on

sea power in particular.49

Indeed, even today, the role of space even in the United States

appears to be deliberately restricted to two of the abovementioned four

roles: space support and expansion of military power.50

In the near

future, however, the space domain will probably begin to assert its

identity by incorporating the remaining two roles, and unique theories

of space power will probably develop.51

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Today, reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities from the ultimate

high ground of space using platforms represented by artificial satellites,

as well as the joint deployment of ground, sea, air forces and Marine

Corps, are increasingly becoming feasible technologically as well. So

operational concepts and other related issues have started being

discussed. They are theories based on the idea of engaging in battle

from space.52

Furthermore, a concept of space as an independent military domain,

which is very different from the concept of space as a platform, is

beginning to emerge; this perspective assumes the possibility of battles

that take place within the space domain.53

In addition, theorists have

emerged who talk about astro-politic, or geopolitics in the space

domain, while offering perspectives on the use of space in the far

distant future.54

However, it is certainly true that until today, theories and concepts

about space power that are independent from those about air power, or

theories and concepts about aero-space power that integrate both space

and air power, have practically not been established. Nevertheless,

there is no doubt that these two domains are contributing significantly

to the wars of the present day while producing a synergistic effect, and

many theorists for these domains will probably begin to emerge in the

near future.55

Next, let me talk briefly about cyberspace and the power of

cyberspace. Cyberspace has strong compatibility not only with air

power but with all military branches or military domains.56

Not only is cyberspace a domain that connects everything on a global

scale; today, it is increasingly becoming a central nervous system or

center of gravity of countries.57

The term central nervous system of a

country does not cover only military activities; instead, it refers to a

center of gravity that encompasses all aspects of a country’s activities



including economy, finance, diplomacy, and others.58

Ironically though,

this has led to the formation of an ―Achilles’ tendon‖ for the United

States, as most of the activities of the United States are dependent on

cyberspace.59

In cyberspace today, activities are carried out in a way that overlaps

with all the domains of land, sea, air, and space, despite being

qualitatively different from these domains; this is not something that is

limited only to the United States.60

This is why the expression ―digital

commons is used.‖61

Cyberspace is characterized by the smaller degree of conventional

restrictions that it imposes in relation to distance, space, time, and

injection of resources; in this sense, even smaller countries or non-state

entities that do not possess large-scale resources are able to participate

in this domain with relative ease. Moreover, if we were to compare the

costs required in battles involving air power and space power, the costs

required for the development and deployment of cyberspace are almost

inconceivably low. For this reason, it comes across as an extremely

attractive option to countries and other entities that are interested in

engaging in asymmetric or irregular warfare. Furthermore, in

cyberspace, there is a strong possibility that some form of attack could

be carried out anonymously through support or funding from a country.

That is precisely why there have been bold predictions that countries or

non-state entities which are able to take maximum advantage of this

domain will win the next war. Notable characteristics of cyberspace

are: (1) The wide-ranging ―frontlines‖ that it covers, thereby making it

(2) Possible to maintain distance from the enemy, while at the same

time (3) Conduct activities on a global scale.62

Much like space, cyberspace is a domain that is closely related to the

destruction that involves functional effects of the enemy, instead of

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physical destruction.63

In this sense, cyberspace is a postmodern

combat space.

One immediate challenge concerning cyberspace is the fact that, like

space, cyberspace has become a domain that not only the United states

but other countries can use. This is the very reason why the United

States is now seeking new ways of coping with the situation. For

example, Estonia is said to have become a target of cyberattacks in

2007, and Georgia in 2008. Iran’s nuclear fuel facilities were also

apparently targeted in 2010.

Cyberspace comes in very handy when it comes to conducting a war

in peace time. Cyberwar, in its broad sense, refers to a hostile action in

cyberspace, where there is no demarcation line between peacetime and

wartime. Hence, experts are divided in their views on whether it would

be the police force or military power that should respond to such

situation. In the end, it is realistically impossible, and even meaningless,

to distinguish between war and crime in cyberspace. In fact, a cyber

―attack‖ means no more than an intentional action

undertaken—regardless of whether it is during peacetime or

wartime—to cause confusion on the other party’s computer and within

its network, by such measures as changing various programs. In this

sense, cyberwar can be interpreted as one form of traditional

information warfare.

Of course, in wartime also, cyberspace makes it possible to carry out

an attack on the enemy’s C4ISR using soft skills without causing any

physical destruction; for this reason, cyberspace has drawn attention as

an attractive option.

Indeed, debate continues today over whether cyberwar can be

defined as ―war,‖ but this argument does not seem to be very

meaningful. Regardless of whether cyberwar is categorized as a ―war‖

or not, cyberattacks are being carried out every day as one of the means



of exercising military power.

In fact, the U.S. Cyber Command, which was established in 2010

under the umbrella of the U.S. Strategic Command, is responsible not

only for defensive operations, but also it is being discussed whether it

should engage in offensive operations when necessary. The U.S. Cyber

Army is expected to be upgraded to a Unified Combatant Command

(UCC) unit in the near future, which is proof of the fact that cyberspace

is being taken seriously as a new combat space.

Theories and concepts concerning cyberspace, cyber power, and

cyberwar are still in the process of development. However, the fact

remains that the primary objective of cyberwar or cyberattacks is to

deny the enemy’s freedom of behavior in cyberspace, and it might be

appropriate to cite theories of sea power here as well. Cyberwar and

cyberattacks are not much different from wars in other domains in the

sense that time and speed are regarded as the most important factors.

Theories of cyber power are likely to be established in the near future.

Of course, if the opponent does not have a computer network to

begin with, it is impossible to launch such war or attack. This situation

creates additional room for asymmetric warfare.

Now, I shall attempt to offer an outlook on the future of space power

and cyber power.

Realistically speaking, and at least in the foreseeable future, it is

probably reasonable that space and cyberspace operations should be

conducted under the control of traditional forces and operational

domains. This is because traditional forces can give much support in

the area of their expertise for operations in space and cyberspace. In

other words, both space and cyberspace are domains that are

characterized by their joint operability, and only in cooperation with

traditional forces or operational domains can operations in space and

Tomoyuki Ishizu


cyberspace become worthwhile.

The role that space and cyberspace will play, in the immediate future,

in relationship with power will probably be limited to that of its

important promoter.64

For today’s air power to display its ability, it is

essential that it gain various forms of support that are directed to

operations in space and cyberspace. This is precisely why the synergy

effect across these domains is crucial, and this fact is probably most

applicable to the case of the United States.65

In any event, air power,

space power, and cyber power are domains where the maximum

synergy effect of their respective capabilities can be expected, and so

air power will probably not give up its leadership role very easily.

In the near future, however, theorists in the domains of cyberspace

and space will probably advocate independence from other military

domains as cyber power and space power gradually increase, just like

theorists of air power promoted independence in the past.

An important point to note here is that political will, to say nothing

of financial backup and technological prowess of the nation is vital in

order for military power potential in space and cyberspace can blossom.

This is one of the six factors that Alfred Thayer Mahan cited in talking

about sea power.66

7. Problems surrounding Air Power

While this paper has so far focused mainly on the characteristics of air

power, air power is by no means a cure-all; in fact, air power faces

many challenges and limitations.

More importantly, the essence of the problems regarding the

usefulness of air power lies in how it can be deployed as part of a

national strategy. After all, the usefulness of air power, or its lack

thereof, can only be assessed within the framework of national strategy.

For instance, the reason the United States is able to freely deploy air



power today, just like the British Empire conducted imperial policing in

the past, is that the current international environment allows it. In other

words, it is the result of the United States’ overwhelming presence as a

superpower in the international political stage.67

If the current international environment should undergo changes and

a country or non-state entity equipped with air power that is

comparable to that of the United States should emerge, we might see air

battles return to the ―dog fights‖ of the past when they lacked

determinism. Currently, the concept of distributed lethality has been

developing gradually in the U.S. Navy, which reflects the concerns in

the Navy arising from the changes in the international environment.

As I have already discussed the issues confronting air power in my

thesis Ea Pawaa no Kanosei to Genkai (Reconsidering the Possibilities

and Limits of Air Power), I shall only point out some of the main

points.

The first point is the paradox inherent in war. In the hypothetical

situation where a country or non-state entity emerges to challenge the

United States by using various means while avoiding a war with an air

power counterpart, will the United States be able to cope with such a

form of asymmetric war? This has become a pressing issue of our times

as a problem concerning the usefulness of air power against terrorism

and insurgencies or its usefulness in ―small wars‖ or unconventional

warfare. In addition, with the frequent occurrence of so-called ―gray

zone‖ situations, where it is neither purely peacetime or wartime, can

air power prove its value?

Actually, experts are divided in their opinion about the usefulness of

air power against asymmetric warfare.68

This is because it is all but

impossible to carry out an attack without incurring any loss of civilian

lives—collateral sacrifice—because terrorists and rebels blend in with

Tomoyuki Ishizu


civilians. Furthermore, they also rarely provide goals or targets that air

power can take aim at. Eventually, success in a war or in a battlefield

only gives rise to new friction and conflict, so the ―fog of war‖ cannot

be dissipated easily. Some theorists feel that through air power, it may

be possible to return to the limited warfare that took place in Europe in

the mid-18th century; however, the idea of such a bloodless war and

victory without any collateral sacrifice is only an illusion.

Secondly, history has taught us that synergy effect between the

respective branches of military services is what bring about victory in

war. For example, air power deployed as part of a national strategy that

does not involve an injection of land power can only achieve a limited

effect, and this was demonstrated spectacularly in the Kosovo conflict

that took place in the second half of the 1990s.69

It is true that in the assessment of Operation Allied Force in 1999,

some argued that the operation was the greatest achievement in the

history of air power. In other words, they thought that the result of the

78-day long bombing of Serbia proved the validity of Douhet’s theory.

However, there were more important political factors that contributed

to the success of the operation, namely: (1) NATO hinted at the

injection of land power in the end; (2) The international community

took steps to isolate Serbia; and (3) Political and economic pressure

was applied to the Serbian leadership. It is not acceptable to disregard

these political factors and discuss victory in war or conflict only from

the military perspective.70

Even if we were to limit the discussion to the military dimension in

relation to the point (1) above in regard to Operation Allied Force, in

attacks such as the Blitzkrieg or Battle of Britain in the Second World

War and even the Battle of the Atlantic, the synergy effect of the

ground, sea, and air forces (Sea, Air and Land Teams) as well as the

Marine Corps contributed to the final victory of the allied forces; the



Kosovo conflict was no exception to this rule.71

Third, even in the present day when air power has been significantly

bolstered by technological advancement, we have not been able to

completely overcome the inherent weaknesses of air power, such as the

intermittency of its temporal and spatial ability to occupy territories,

dependency on the functions of a base, limited payload, ease of

destruction, cost, and vulnerability to weather conditions.72

Fourth, since the emergence of precision guided weapons, the need

to carry out the area bombings or carpet bombings seen in the Second

World War has declined significantly; however, even precision

bombings, which appear to be a humane means of attack at first glance,

has given rise to a new paradox. That is, as a result of the improvement

in precision, which in itself should have been expected to limit the

number of war casualties, we are beginning to witness situations where

people are compelled to hesitate and reconsider carrying out a bombing

itself.73

With the rise in people’s expectations for precision of such weapons,

even a single failure or collateral sacrifice—sacrifice made in order to

achieve the objective of war—has now become unacceptable. To quote

Luttwak’s words mentioned earlier, with a touch of irony, this is the

very paradox concerning the usefulness of air power.

The fifth point is that situations that require military intervention by

the United States alone are very unlikely politically in the future. Even

if such situations were to occur, the United States would need the

cooperation from allies and friendly nations; however, does America

have the will to carry out operations in cooperation with countries that

the US may not necessarily consider to be useful militarily in future?

The sixth point, which I think carries more importance, is that if

people were to continue adhering to the traditional narrow definition of

Tomoyuki Ishizu


air power, which states that ―air power = air force,‖ it would be

necessary to answer the question of why there is a need for an air force

that acts as an independent player now, when military forces are

heading toward integration, for example. It goes without saying that the

usefulness of air power as discussed in this paper is a subject that

belongs in a different dimension from the issue of maintaining an air

force as an independent military branch, and we should not be overly

concerned with the narrow internal logic of the organization.

The term ―air power‖ includes aircraft, ammunition, and sensors that

belong to an air force, as well as air force capabilities of the navy and

marine corps, attack helicopters and tactical missiles of an army, and

also various types of UAVs or drones that are held by the respective

military branches. What we need to understand is the fact that

operations in the aero domain today involve capabilities that go beyond

the traditional framework of military forces. As I have explained above,

air power cannot possibly demonstrate its capability without the

cooperation with other military domains, such as space and cyberspace.

In fact, Benjamin S. Lambeth went so far as to say that air power is a

term that refers to the completeness of an entity that includes the

auxiliary domains such as space and cyberspace, and which

encompasses elements like training, tactics, proficiency, leadership,

decisiveness in the execution of an operation, and experience of actual

combat.74

This also includes a number of invisible and unpredictable

elements.

In addition, air power and intelligence are two sides of the same coin.

According to Lambeth, the ability to obtain intelligence that is

comprehensive is a prerequisite for air power to fully exhibit its

capabilities.75

In the end—just as Phillip Meilinger astutely pointed out

after the Gulf War—air power is the act of targeting, and targeting

means intelligence.76

If that were the case, we should always



remember the importance of intelligence in air battles.

Upon careful consideration, the original concept of air power was not

limited to the military power held by the air force; instead, it used to

have a broad definition that include factors such as aviation industry in

the private sector and its personnel, national policy and how its citizens

understand it. Before we knew it, however, the meaning of air power

become trivialized. There is a need to rethink what ―air power,‖ or

―aero-space power,‖ actually mean.

The seventh point is that it is not necessarily the capability of air

power that is contributing the usefulness of air power, but rather, the

networked military capability based on information technology, as

represented by GPS that uses space domain as its platform; this begs

the question of whether air power is no more than one component.77

In short, it is a question of whether the usefulness of air power in the

future hangs upon the degree of integration of military power, including

space and cyberspace.

In reality, in operations in Afghanistan by the United States from

2001 and the Iraq war in 2003, the guidance by the special forces on the

ground (land forces) that had infiltrated into Iraq, as well as the ground

support from the local army was indispensable for air power to function

effectively. Similarly, the roles of platforms to launch cruise missiles

and for the landing and departure of aircraft, and the roles of the naval

vessels (sea power) as a means of mass transportation in those wars

cannot be underestimated. Furthermore, the role of artificial satellites

in reconnaissance and surveillance operations and its role in guiding

various aircraft and weapons (space power), as well as the impact of

networking (cyber power) are immeasurable.

The fact is that the role of land power is now being reevaluated in

light of the outcomes of insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. For this

Tomoyuki Ishizu


reason, the question of how air power can be deployed in COIN

operations is likely to become an issue in the future. Also, how air

power can deal with the problem of anti-access capabilities of other

countries presents another challenge for air power.78

The final point is that even if we examine military power only in the

form of air power, there is a possibility that the unity of command in

exercising air power was what led to the success in recent wars. In

other words, the key to victory may lies in the style of command, or

how an organization works.

8. Air Power that Keeps Taking Up a Challenge

Next, let us consider the interplay between war or the exercise of

military power, and the spirit of the 21st century.

If air power were to develop by leaps and bounds as a result of

technological advancement, the probability of war would become

severely limited due to political, social, and ethical constraints; under

such circumstances, would air power be able to develop its potential or

capabilities fully? It is likely that these constraints would become

stronger as if in inverse proportion to technological development

regarding air power, and the capability of air power would probably

face huge limitations in reality.

Supposing the usefulness of air power in a military context were

proven, could we say that it is also useful as a tool to attain a nation’s

political goals? As Cohen shrewdly pointed out, what complicates the

problems surrounding air power in recent years is the harsh reality that

technology itself is the main theorist of air power today, and that

invention is the ―mother of adaptation‖ in the immediate future.79

In

the future, would it be possible to establish theories and concepts, and

strategies and doctrine as well, regarding air power, based on a clear

understanding of the objectives and means of war?



Hence, it is important to consider the future image of air power in

Japan and its potentials, based on a good understanding of the

aforementioned issues and limitations. To begin with, is it possible to

properly build the defensive military power, theories, and concepts

demanded by Japan’s national strategy, as well as strategies and

doctrines, upon the foundations of an air power that easily produces

strategic effects if its aggressive characteristics were used?80

I came to the conclusion that to deal with new types of warfare, a

new form of military force is necessary, which is an integrated military

force with air power at its core. While air power is not a panacea, it will

certainly play a vital role in creating an integrated military force, which

needs to be buttressed by its own culture—an integrated culture.

9. A “Japanese Way in Warfare”

Today, while Japan has started to develop its readiness for joint

operations, Joint operations are essential in order to maximize the

effectiveness of military power. integration of the respective branches

of military is indispensable in order to effectively exercise military

power, which as a nation’s strategic tool. At the same time, there is an

urgent need to build up military power with highly sophisticated

network that links space and cyber space, among others.

Air power is going to play a central role in the process. The biggest

challenge will be how to create unity of culture and how to manage

continual organizational realignment. To create a united culture is

particularly critical, as it closely relates to whether or not a joint

operation will be a success.81

It is necessary to reexamine the original meaning of the term ―air

power‖ or ―military power,‖ and thoroughly examine Japan’s industrial

infrastructure, government policies, and public awareness in a

comprehensive manner, and decide a future direction. Military power,

Tomoyuki Ishizu


and especially air power, is a manifestation of a nation’s combined

ability. Therefore, a unified will as a nation —such as the necessity of

communications between industries, academia, and military (Ministry

of Defense, Self-Defense Forces)—is important. This includes Japan’s

space policy and cyber policy as well.

Next, let us consider air power of the future and ―Japanese way in

warfare.‖ What Japan needs today is to develop air power theories and

concepts of its own, and establish a ―Japanese way in warfare‖ that is

rooted in Japan’s distinctive world view.82

The concept of the ―Japanese way in warfare‖ is yet to gain

popularity among the general public. This phrase is a copy of the

concept, ―the British way in warfare‖ propounded by Liddell Hart.

Liddell Hart pointed out that Britain used a national strategy known as

―the British way in warfare‖ in an attempt to maintain and run the

British Empire. Even though the United States has been showered with

various criticisms until today, it is in the process of establishing a

―American way in warfare‖ backed by its technological prowess,

industrial power and also the principle of democracy.

―Japanese way in warfare‖ is nothing but a figurative expression

and it is by no means a concept that advocates war. What it really refers

to is Japan’s unique national strategy that takes consideration of Japan’s

historical views on war and peace, as well as geopolitical conditions

and the way its military force is run.

Of course, this does not suggest that Japan could not have a unique

national strategy in the past. This writer’s view is the opposite. For

example, it is probably appropriate for the so-called ―Yoshida Doctrine‖

after the Second World War to be rated more highly as a national

strategy that was unique to Japan.83

At the same time, now that

diplomacy and security policy have reached a major turning point, there

is a need to build a ―Japanese way in warfare‖ as a new national



strategy in the sense that Japan should be more actively involved in the

development of an international order. This is what this writer believes.

However, it is not easy to formulate a ―Japanese way in warfare‖ in

reality. As Seversky had shrewdly observed, the United States is a

nation of air power in the same way that Rome is a nation of land

power and the United Kingdom is a nation of sea power; these three

major powers had harnessed their unique culture, national strategy, and

military power—or in other words, made use of their unique ways of

warfare—to rule the world and achieve peace, or order to be more

precise84

.

Is Japan capable of constructing its own national strategy based on

air power, given the fact that it is a small country that might not have

the makings of an air power nation? In light of this, is it even possible

for Japan which lacks the qualifications to be a nation of air power and

cannot be described as a major power in the least, to build a unique

national strategy founded upon air power? Furthermore, while the

United States has a national strategy based on its roles as: (1) The party

responsible for maintaining balance of power on a global scale; (2) The

ultimate protector to relay as a last resort; (3) The coordinator and

leader of collective security; and (4) A protector of human rights, and

the value of its air power as a means for executing these roles is highly

regarded, but on the other hand, what kind of national strategy will

Japan be able to present in order to utilize air power?85

Upon careful consideration, Japan is in stark contrast to the United

States, in that Japan has historically had characteristics as a land nation

or a land power. So it does not seem possible for Japan to develop

easily into an air power nation. If we consider such factors as the

government’s policies on air power, expansion of the defense and

aviation industries, public awareness about air-related issues, and

Tomoyuki Ishizu


Japanese culture in particular, it is clear that there is quite a difference

between Japan and the United States.

It’s important to note that such expressions as ―continental country‖

or ―nation of land power‖ haven’t accurately captured Japan’s history

or current situations. Japan does not possess such broad expanses of

territory or immense land power that Germany or Russia (Soviet

Union) used to, or which China does today, nor does it have a national

strategy of a continental country based on these factors. If we venture

to look for a term that can most aptly express the current situations of

Japan, it probably is an ―island state,‖ which is a sad reality. Japan is

not a continental country in the true sense of the word. At the same time,

despite its geographical conditions and heavy reliance on the ocean for

food and industrial resources, Japan is not a maritime nation or nation

of sea power, on a par with such entities as the ancient Phoenicians

(such as Carthage), ancient Athens, Venice and Genoa in medieval

times, or the United Kingdom today.

There were some periods in history when Japan directed its attention

to the ocean (or to the Korean Peninsula, Chinese mainland, Southeast

Asia, etc. that lie beyond the oceans). Just to focus on the relationship

with the Korean Peninsula, we can cite a number of examples such as

the battle of Goguryeo at the start of the 5th century, the battle of

Baekgang in 663, the Toi invasion in 1019, the Mongol invasions of

Japan in 1274 and 1281 (the battles of Bun’ei and Koan), the early

wakou piracy era that began in the 14th century and the latter wakou

piracy era of the 16th century, Japanese invasions of Korea by

Toyotomi Hideyoshi from 1592 to 1598 (battles of Bunroku and

Keicho), the first Sino-Japanese war (1894 – 1895), the Russo-Japanese

war (1904 – 1905), and Japan’s annexation of Korea (1910).

However, when we consider the low levels of public awareness

especially about the issues concerning the maritime environment



nowadays, it is only natural to conclude that Japan is lacking in

qualities to become a maritime nation. To repeat an important point, a

crucial element in considering these issues is the will of the people and

the country, or in other words, a world view of the country. It is true

that in recent years, we have seen significant improvement in what

Mahan refers to as quality of governments.86

However, what about

public awareness and public will—in short, the quality of the people

that Mahan spoke of? The Japanese government designated a day in

July as ―Marine Day‖ in an effort to raise awareness among its people

that Japan is a maritime nation; however, the big question is, to what

extent do they understand the fact that Japan relies on the ocean for its

survival?

So what Japan is compelled to do is come up with a Japanese way of

approach that is rooted in its own world views, different from the

Roman way or British way or American way in warfare. There is also

the question of how aero-space power can be incorporated.87

The era when war was an exclusive prerogative of a military is now a

distant past. In an era of total war, which has arguably continued till

today, and in recent wars characterized by asymmetric warfare in the

forms of the devastating force of nuclear weapons, terrorism, and

insurgencies, there is a need for a sophisticated art in formulating a

strategy. This is yet another reason why we need to develop a ―Japanese

way in warfare‖, in which civilians play a central part.

Georges Clémenceau, who had experienced the First World War,

once said that ―War is too important to be left to the generals,‖ but in

today’s context, war has become too important a civilian business to be

left to soldiers and politicians.

In devising ―Japanese way in warfare,‖ it naturally is important to

examine separate concrete issues such as Japan’s geopolitical

Tomoyuki Ishizu


conditions and the build-up of defense capabilities. In fact, it’s the

accumulation of such analyses from the military perspective that

underpins a ―Japanese way in warfare.‖

At the same time, it is also necessary to present a broad framework

of politics or national strategy, in order to create a ―Japanese way in

warfare.‖ One example might be a policy to strongly advocate the

nation’s soft power (or smart power) as a means to implement national

strategy, as opposed to overly dependent on military power.88

In other

words, it is a method of entrusting national security of Japan to its

strength as a cultural nation in the international community.89

If there

is anything we should learn from Julian Corbett today, it would be the

simple fact that military power is not the only means that can guarantee

the security of a nation; if there is anything we should learn from

Clausewitz’s views on war, it would be the fact that war is nothing but a

continuous process of political negotiations using different means from

diplomacy.90

The bottom line is that the first thing that Japan needs to do is to

clarify its national goals and national interests.91

It would be

meaningless to discuss military power or military strategy if you ignore

such political questions as ―which direction Japan is heading‖ or ―what

kind role Japan is willing to play in the international community.‖ What

Japan needs to do right now is to set a clearer national strategy, and to

stipulate when, and how and with what objective it will exercise (or not

exercise) military power. This is because—as the Vietnam War and

Kosovo conflict have plainly shown—if the national strategy that

military power is supposed to support is vague, the usefulness of

military power will be severely diminished. In the end, national

strategy is nothing more than the way of life of a country.

Conclusion



It is important to analyze the trends in latest research across the world

in the field of air power or aero-space power, and incorporate the

results into Japan’s defense policy. At the same time, it is also

important to establish uniquely Japanese— indigenous—views on air

power, while taking a log-term view of what Japan’s air power should

be like in the future, and to consider theories and concepts, as well as

strategies and doctrines based on the future image of air power. And it

is important to have a conviction that there is something universal in

these ideas, and to disseminate into the world. In other words, Japan’s

theories and concepts on air power must contain qualities both

indigenous and universal.

―Theory rules!,‖ as Gray succinctly expressed.92

It is only natural

that many experts on air power have a strong inclination to focus on a

technological aspect of air power. However, for air power to be a viable

force, formulating theories and concepts is as crucial as research and

development of technology. Especially in the current environment

where we are compelled to maximize effectiveness out of limited

resources, an ideology is decisively important.

While technology is important to all forms of military power, and

especially air power or aero-space power, we should never end up

espousing technological supremacy. The sad truth is that history

teaches us that in many cases, advocates of technological supremacy

would turn into advocates of air force supremacy (and will probably

into space and cyberspace supremacy).

Finally, I shall offer some concrete ideas on what we can do right

away in order to establish Japan’s views on air power and to develop air

power.

Gray has presented 27 maxims as the general theory on air power, so

one way to start is to examine the validity of the theory in detail.93

The

Tomoyuki Ishizu


questions you need to look into are: (1) What can be achieved through

air power alone, (2) What can be implemented relatively well through

air power, (3) What is something air power is not very suited for, and

(4) What is something air power is not capable of. After sorting out the

answers to these questions, the next step is to determine whether they

can be applied to Japan’s air power.

Another useful method is to read carefully with a critical eye the

twelve reference materials John Andreas Olsen listed, as they might

offer useful tips that help formulate Japan’s air power.94

1 Introductory texts in Japanese on air power include the discussions found in:

Tomoyuki Ishizu, Kyoichi Tachikawa, Narishige Michishita, and Katsuya

Tsukamoto, eds., Ea Pawaa: Sono Riron to Jissen (Gunjiryoku no Honshitsu

Shiriizu (1)) [Air Power: Theory and Practice (Essence of Military Power Series

(1))] (Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo Shuppan, 2005); Tomoyuki Ishizu and Williamson

Murray, eds., 21 Seiki no Ea Pawaa: Nihon no Anzenhosho wo Kangaeru [Air

Power of the 21st Century: Reflections on the Security of Japan] (Tokyo: Fuyo

Shobo Shuppan, 2008). Part of this paper is amended and revised from

Tomoyuki Ishizu, ―Ea Pawaa no Kanosei to Genkai [Reconsidering the

Possibilities and Limits of Air Power],‖ in Air Staff College, Air Power Studies,

Premier Issue, 2014. 2 Colin S. Gray, ―The United States as an Air Power,‖ in Colin S. Gray,

Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), p. 102. Tony Mason

also uses the expression ―From Peripheral to Pervasive to Dominant‖ to describe

the dramatic advance of air power from its infancy. Tony Mason, Air Power: A

Centennial Appraisal (London: Brassey’s, 2002), pp. 1-79. 3 Colin S. Gray, ―The Advantages and Limitations of Air Power,‖ in Gray,

Explorations in Strategy, pp. 67-71. 4 For discussions similar to this, see Benjamin S. Lambeth, ―Airpower,

Spacepower, and Cyberpower,‖ Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 60, 1st Quarter,

2011, pp. 46-53; Benjamin S. Lambeth, Mastering the Ultimate High Ground:

Next Steps in the Military Uses of Space (Santa Monica, CA: RAND

Corporation, 2003), Chapter 2. 5 Williamson Murray, War in the Air 1914-45 (London: Cassell, 1999), pp.

116-200; Richard Overy, ―The Air War in Europe, 1939-1945,‖ and Richard R.

Muller, ―The Air War in the Pacific, 1941-1945,‖ in John Andreas Olsen, ed., A

History of Air Warfare (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2010). 6 Bernard Brodie, ―The Continuing Relevance of On War,‖ in Carl von Clausewitz,

On War, eds. and trans., Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1976); Bernard Brodie, ―The Heritage of Douhet,‖

in Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton



University Press, 1959).

7 Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force

History, 1983 [reprint]). 8 Richard Overy, The Bombing War: Europe, 1939-1945 (London: Allen Lane,

2013); Overy, ―The Air War in Europe, 1939-1945,‖ in Olsen, ed., A History of

Air Warfare. 9 Robert A. Pape, ―Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War,‖ International

Security, 15: 2 (Fall 1990); Robert A. Pape, ―The True Worth of Air Power,‖

Foreign Affairs, 83, No. 2 (March/ April 2004); Robert A. Pape, Bombing to

Win: Air Power and Coercion (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). 10 William Mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development and Possibilities of

Modern Air Power- Economic and Military (New York: Dover Publication, 1988

[reprint]); Alfred F. Hurley, Billy Mitchell: Crusader for Air Power

(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1975); Phillip S. Meilinger,

―Proselytiser and Prophet: Alexander P. de Seversky and American Airpower,‖

in John Gooch, ed., Air Power: Theory and Practice (London: Frank Cass,

1995), pp. 17- 19. 11 In a certain sense, Hugh Trenchard could be described as a British air power

theorist of greater importance than Mitchell. This is because Trenchard’s

influence was highly significant to the development of British air power during

the interwar period (creation of the world’s first independent air force in 1918),

and the deployment of air power by the major countries during the Second

World War. For details, see Phillip S. Meilinger, ―Trenchard and Morale

Bombing,‖ in Phillip S. Meilinger, ed., Air War: Theory and Practice (London:

Frank Cass, 2003); Tami Davis Biddle, ―British and American Approaches to

Strategic Bombing,‖ in Gooch, ed., Air Power, pp. 100-104. 12 Alex Danchev, Alchemist of War: The Life of Basil Liddell Hart (London:

Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998); Azar Gat, Fascist and Liberal Visions of War:

Fuller, Liddell Hart, Douhet, and Other Modernists (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1998); Azar Gat, British Armour Theory and the Rise of the Panzer Arm:

Revisiting the Revisionists (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); Tomoyuki

Ishizu, Rideru Hato to Riberaruna Sensokan [Liddell Hart and Liberal War

Views] (Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsa, 2008), Chapter 9. For example, while some

of Liddell Hart’s early works positioned aircraft as the only means for warfare in

the future, his interests later shifted toward combat through cooperation between

air and ground forces. 13 For details on this point, see Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift: Thoughts

on Twenty- First Century Warfare (London: Brassey’s, 1985); Martin van

Creveld, Steven L. Canby, Kenneth S. Brower, Air Power and Maneuver

Warfare (Alabama: Air University Press, 1994); Robert Leonhard, The Art of

Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare in the Twentieth Century (Lawrence, Kansas:

Kansas University Press, 1991). 14 Williamson Murray, Tomoyuki Ishizu, eds., Nichibei Senryaku Shisoshi –

Nichibei Kankei no Atarashii Shiten [History of Japan-U.S. Strategic Ideology –

A New Perspective on Japan-U.S. Relations], Sairyusha, 2005, Chapter 4.

(Williamson Murray, Tomoyuki Ishizu, eds., Conflicting Currents: Japan and

Tomoyuki Ishizu


the United States in the Pacific [Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2009], Chapter 5)

15 Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power (Ithaca,

N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008), Chapter 8; John Andreas Olsen, Strategic

Air Power in Desert Storm (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 269- 274. 16 Benjamin S. Lambeth, ―Understanding Air and Space Power Today‖ (Lecture

delivered at the Air Staff College in March 2017) 17 To date, there are many cases that refer to missiles (rockets) under the command

of the air force as well as the army. 18 John A. Warden Ⅲ, ―Smart Strategy, Smart Airpower,‖ in John Andreas Olsen,

ed., Airpower Reborn: The Strategic Concept of John Warden and John Boyd

(Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2015), pp. 93- 127; John A.

Warden Ⅲ , The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington, D.C.:

National Defense University, 1988); David S. Fadok, John Boyd and John

Warden: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic Paralysis (Maxwell, Alabama: Air

University Press, 1995); John Andreas Olsen, John Warden and the Renaissance

of American Air Power (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007); Daniel T.

Kuehl, ―Airpower vs. Electricity: Electric Power as a Target for Strategic Air

Operations,‖ in Gooch, ed., Air Power, pp. 250- 251. 19 David Jordan, ―Air and Space Warfare,‖ in Davis Jordan, et al., Understanding

Modern Warfare (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.

204. 20 Jordan, ―Air and Space Warfare,‖ in Jordan, et al., Understanding Modern

Warfare, pp. 200- 201; James Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the

Art of War (Boston: Little Brown, 2002); Frans Osinga, Science, Strategy and

War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (London: Routledge, 2007), Chapter 1. 21 Jordan, ―Air and Space Warfare,‖ in Jordan, et al., Understanding Modern

Warfare, pp. 200- 3; Olsen, Strategic Air Power in Desert Storm, pp. 269- 274;

John Andreas Olsen, ―Airpower and Strategy,‖ in Olsen, ed., Airpower Reborn,

pp. 6- 8. 22 In contrast with views held by the U.S. Army that ―AirLand Battle‖ was one of

the factors contributing to success in the Gulf War, Warden perceived instead

that such a concept was precisely what posed an obstacle to the latent capability

of air power. In this sense, there was a decisive difference in the air power views

of air power supremacists as represented by Warden, and ―maneuverists‖ who

are positioned with theorists such as Fuller and Boyd. As a result of the

introduction of the operational concept of ―AirLand Battle‖ into the U.S. Army

during the mid-1970s, the role of air power was perceived as having regressed

back to that of support for land power; however, this trend did not last long.

That was because of the birth of new theories on strategic air power in the true

sense of the word, and these were theories propounded by Warden and Boyd.

For details, see David Jordan, ―Air and Space Warfare,‖ pp. 200- 202. 23 David Jordan, ―Air and Space Warfare,‖ p. 203. 24 Although Liddell Hart made no mention of this at all in Warfighting, his

influence on the doctrine of the U.S. Marine Corps was apparent. Ishizu, Rideru

Hato to Riberaruna Sensokan [Liddell Hart and Liberal War Views], Chapter 9. 25 Frans P. B. Osinga, ―The Enemy as a Complex Adaptive System: John Boyd and

Airpower in the Postmodern Era,‖ in Olsen, ed., Airpower Reborn, pp. 48- 92.



26 Olsen, ―Airpower and Strategy,‖ in Olsen, ed., Airpower Reborn, pp. 6- 8. 27 Benjamin S. Lambeth’s assertions are as follows: In the approximately 30 years

from the Vietnam War to the end of the large-scale combat in Iraq in 2003, the

character of ―regular‖ air power of the United States developed into something

―strategic‖ in the truest sense of the word. In this respect, its characteristics

could be described as secrecy, precision, all-weather, 24-hour attack capabilities,

and the ability to engage in intelligence activities in combat space in real-time.

However, this does not immediately mean that victory in war can be achieved

through air power alone; rather, it is to create conditions for victory by the

integrated military forces by enabling an almost non-resistant mobility on the

ground. To put it simply, air power provides the condition to keep the land

power of allies free from enemy attacks, making it possible to attack the enemy

freely. In short, rather than achieving victory, it ensures the attainment of victory.

For details, see Lambeth, ―Understanding Air and Space Power Today.‖ 28 Lambeth, ―Airpower, Spacepower, and Cyberpower,‖ p. 47. 29 Ibid. 30 Tomoyuki Ishizu, ―Nihonryu no Senso Houho – Sofuto Pawa to Nihon no

Kokka Senryaku‖ [The Japanese Way of Warfare – Soft Power and Japan’s

National Strategy], Takashi Kawakami, ed., Atarashii Senso to wa Nanika –

Houho to Senryaku [What is the “New War”? - Methods and Strategies] (Tokyo:

Minerva Shobo), 2015, pp. 138-155. 31 Colin S. Gray, ―The Influence of Space Power upon History,‖ Comparative

Strategy 15, 1996, p. 300. 32 Gregory Billman, ―The Inherent Limitations of Space Power: Fact or Fiction?‖

in Bruce M. Debois, ed., Beyond the Paths of Heaven: The Emergence of Space

Power Thought (Maxwell, Alabama: Air University Press, 1999), p. 511. 33 Gray, ―The Influence of Space Power upon History,‖ pp. 293- 308. 34 Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Yasuhiro Takeda,

Katsuya Tsukamoto, trans., Mainichi Shimbunsha, 2014. 35 Eliot A. Cohen, ―The Mystique of U.S. Air Power,‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No.

1 (January/February 1994). 36 While Douhet is a representative, an excellent study on the evaluation of

Douhet’s theories is Claudio G. Segre，―Giulio Douhet: Strategist, Theorist,

Prophet?‖ Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.15, No.3 (September 1992). 37 Colin McInnes, ―Fatal Attraction?: Air Power and the West,‖ Contemporary

Security Policy, Vol. 22, No. 3 (December 2001), pp. 41- 44. 38 Tomoyuki Ishizu, ―Senso no Shoraizo – Senso to Shakai, Soshite Jidai Seishin‖

[The Future Vision of War – War and Society, and ―Spirit of the Era‖], Journal

of World Affairs, Vol. 65 No. 4, April 2017. 39 Cohen, ―The Mystique of U.S. Air Power.‖ Furthermore, in the same study,

Cohen pointed out that air power is giving rise to significant changes not only to

strategy, command, and control, but also to the concept of war itself. Even

Luttwak has commented, ―Through the Gulf War, the characteristics of air

power that had been considered a given fact by theorists in the 1920s as

represented by Douhet, Mitchell, and Trenchard, but which had been lying

dormant till the present day, have finally returned. […] Through this war, the

Tomoyuki Ishizu


promise of victory in war through air power has finally been fulfilled.‖

40 Olsen, ―Airpower and Strategy,‖ in Olsen, ed., Airpower Reborn, pp. 8- 9; Colin

S. Gray, ―Airpower Theory,‖ in Olsen, ed., Airpower Reborn, pp. 156-180; Colin

S. Gray, Airpower for Strategic Effect (Maxwell, Alabama: Air University Press,

2012), Chapter 9. 41 See William S. Lind, Gregory A. Thiele, 4th Generation Warfare Handbook

(Helsinki: Lastalia House, 2016) on the theories on ―maneuverists.‖ Reaffirming

this, for example, Warden has criticized that even such theories cannot

sufficiently reflect the characteristics of air power. For details, see Peter R.

Faber, ―Paradigm Lost: Airpower Theory and Its Historical Struggles,‖ in Olsen,

ed., Airpower Reborn, pp. 11- 47. 42 Olsen, ―Airpower and Strategy,‖ in Olsen, ed., Airpower Reborn, p. 9. 43 Gray, ―Airpower Theory,‖ in Olsen, ed., Airpower Reborn, p. 170. 44 Ibid., pp. 156- 80. 45 Ibid., pp. 156- 80; David E. Lupton, On Space Warfare: A Spacepower Doctrine

(Maxwell, Alabama: Air University Press, 1988), p. 7; Jordan, ―Air and Space

Warfare,‖ in Jordan, et al., Understanding Modern Warfare, pp. 212- 219. 46 The premise of this term lies in the recognition of the space domain as an

extension of the air domain, but today, the view that denies this recognition and

perceives space as an independent domain equipped with an independent power,

is increasingly becoming more influential. For this reason, the term ―aero -space

power‖ itself has been perceived as a problem by some. 47 For details on this point, see Lambeth, Mastering the Ultimate High Ground ,

Chapters 1 and 2. 48 Lambeth, ―Airpower, Spacepower, and Cyberpower,‖ pp. 48- 49. The

expressions used originally for these four roles are: space support, force

enhancement, space control, and force application. Generally, space control

guarantees the free use of space by the country and its allies, but denies the free

use of space by enemies. This concept is based on theories of sea power. 49 Lupton, On Space Warfare, Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. 50 Lambeth, ―Airpower, Spacepower, and Cyberpower,‖ p. 48. 51 For works on theories of space power, see Peter L. Hays et al., Spacepower for

a New Millennium: Space and U. S. National Security (New York: McGraw Hill,

2000); Lambeth, Mastering the Ultimate High Ground. It is already widely known

that China conducted successful tests on anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons in 2007.

In 2010, ballistic missile interception tests conducted outside the atmosphere

were also successful. From 2010 to 2011, North Korea activated a GPS jamming

device that impacted Korea. In Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the United

States apparently experienced GPS jamming from the Iraqi forces. Elizabeth

Quintana, ―The New Space Age: Questions for Defence and Security,‖ RUSI

Journal, Vol. 162, No. 3 (June/July 2017), pp. 88- 109. 52 For details, Hays et al., Spacepower for a New Millennium, ―Current Military

Space Issues‖; Jordan, ―Air and Space Warfare,‖ in Jordan, et al., Understanding

Modern Warfare, pp. 213- 214. 53 Hays et al., Spacepower for a New Millennium, ―Future Military Space

Missions‖; Jordan, ―Air and Space Warfare,‖ in Jordan, et al., Understanding

Modern Warfare, pp. 215- 216.



54 For example, see Everett C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the

Space Age (Oxford: Routledge, 2001). However, the contents of the book only

applied geopolitical concepts and terminology to space indiscriminately, and

was highly lacking in concreteness. 55 David Jordan, ―Air and Space Warfare,‖ p. 221. 56 For details on cyberspace, cyber power, and cyberwar, see Quintana, ―The New

Space Age‖; Nigel Inkster, ―Measuring Military Cyber Power,‖ Survival, Vol. 59,

No. 4 (August-September 2017), pp. 27- 34; George J. Rattray, Strategic

Warfare in Cyberspace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001); James P. Farwell, Rafal

Rohozinski, ―New Reality of Cyber War,‖ Survival, Vol. 54, No. 4

(August-September 2012), pp. 107- 20; Richard A. Clarke, Robert Knake, Cyber

War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About it (N.Y.:

FarperCollins, 2010), etc. 57 Lambeth, ―Airpower, Spacepower, and Cyberpower,‖ p. 50. 58 Ibid. 59 The most notable example can be said to be a so-called electromagnetic pulse

(EMP) attack. 60 Lambeth, ―Airpower, Spacepower, and Cyberpower,‖ p. 50. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Lambeth, ―Understanding Air and Space Power Today.‖ 65 Lambeth, ―Airpower, Spacepower, and Cyberpower,‖ p. 46. 66 Mahan listed six basic elements that have an impact on the sea power of a

country. (1) Geographical location; (2) Terrain (including industrial products

and climate); (3) Spread of territory; (4) Population; (5) Qualities of the

citizens; (6) Qualities of the government (including state systems). Among these,

in the aspects of population and qualities of the citizens, Mahan placed

particular focus on the number of people engaged in maritime activities such as

sea transportation and fishery, and at the same time, raised the issue of the

people’s inclinations in this respect. He also asserted that the presence of

policies that actively support the activities of the country’s citizens at sea or in

colonies is the greatest factor in enhancing the country’s power to a global scale.

This is the quality of the government as described by Mahan, but the three

elements mentioned here can also be applied directly to land power, air power,

as well as space power and cyber power. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of

Sea Power Upon History, Kenichi Kitamura, trans., (Tokyo: Hara Shobo), 1982,

Chapter 1. 67 Trenchard, as aforementioned, considered it possible to use air power on the

function of maintaining security in the British Empire, but this is the concept of

imperial policing. Thinking of it, it is not inconceivable for Britain, which had

experienced in the First World War the threat of a direct attack on the country as

a result of the development of air power, and which had worried about the

defense of the British Empire that had spread out geographically to its greatest

extent after the World War, to be the first to utilize the capabilities that air power

is equipped with.

Tomoyuki Ishizu


Meilinger, ―Trenchard and Morale Bombing,‖ in Meilinger, ed., Air War. In

addition to discussions on whether air power should be used aggressively,

Trenchard asserted that the characteristic of air power lies in its psychological

effect. He also deemed it necessary for air power to gain independence from the

army and navy in order for it to carry out strategic bombing missions on enemy

states in large-scale wars. For details on this point, see David Jordan, ―Air and

Space Warfare,‖ in Jordan, et al., Understanding Modern Warfare, pp. 193- 4. 68 Philip Sabin, ―Air Strategy and the Underdog,‖ Ishizu, Tachikawa, Michishita,

Tsukamoto, eds., Air Power, pp. 270–305. 69 Benjamin S. Lambeth, ―Modern Air power in Practice: The Gulf War and the

Kosovo Conflict,‖ Ishizu, Tachikawa, Michishita, Tsukamoto, eds., Air Power,

pp. 242–267. 70 This fact is also applicable to the Gulf War and the 1982 Falklands War. In

regard to the factors behind victory in the Gulf War, the following outcomes can

be listed for the political dimension: (1) Secured a certain degree of legitimacy

in the international community for the use of military power, such as the

adoption of UN Security Council Resolution; (2) Led by the United States, Arab

states were mobilized, thereby avoiding the confrontational structure of ―Middle

Eastern Arab world vs. Western world‖ or ―Islam vs. Christianity‖ in this war;

(3) Frequent negotiations with the Soviet Union leading to success in the Soviet

Union’s indication of a certain degree of understanding toward the use of

military power; (4) Success in keeping Israel out of the ray after the war

erupted; (5) In the use of military power, a clear objective was established, and

excessive involvement in Iraq was avoided (for example, the overthrowing of

the Saddam Hussein regime). Under such positive political conditions, the

outcomes in the military dimension included: (6) In accordance with the Powell

Doctrine, about six months leading up to the war, the necessary preparations

were made, including bringing together a concentration of ammunition and food

in the Middle East; (7) Training was carried out for soldiers (for example, on

desert battlefields) until they reached a satisfactory level of proficiency; (8)

Success in incorporating the results of the information technology revolution

into military power, mainly for the United States; (9) Close cooperation with

allies and friendly nations, and the smooth implementation of joint combat

within the U.S. Forces as well as joint combat with allies. Going deeper, the

questions raised in Harry G. Summers’ work The New World Strategy: A

Military Policy for America’s Future (Yoshio Suginoo, Hiroshi Kubo, Trans.,

Kodansha, 2002) completely missed the point. To the questions of where the

United States failed in the Vietnam War (and tracing further back, in the Korean

War), and where it succeeded in the Gulf War, Summers pointed to the extent to

which politicians intervene in the military domain as one of the distinguishing

factors. In other words, it failed in the Vietnam War due to the excessive

intervention of politicians in military affairs, and conversely, succeeded in the

Gulf War as politicians kept their role to that of providing a broad direction for

the war while according the military a broad range of free discretion. However,

this argument lacks empirical evidence in reality, and conversely, is considered

to have done no more than given birth to a new ―Aikuchi legend.‖ It was

virtually a reworking of the work of Erich Luddendorf, who asserted after the



First World War that Germany’s defeat in the war was not the responsibility of

the military, but the result of the words and actions of some powers in the

country, such as politicians, socialists, and Jews. For the factors behind Britain’s

victory in the Falkland War, see National Institute for Defense Studies,

Fokurando Sensoshi [History of Falklands War], 2014, Preface. 71 For example, in the Iraq war of 2003, the experience ―boots on the ground‖

drew much attention; this suggested the importance of land power not only in

the military dimension, but also in the political sense. The growing importance

of air power in wars is ultimately no more than something that is relative. 72 Similarly, Gray raised many of the weaknesses of air power. For details, see

Gray, ―The Advantages and Limitations of Air Power,‖ in Gray, Explorations in

Strategy, pp. 74-77. 73 There have been active debates over the RMA and the war revolution until the

present day, but in reality, the phenomenon of ―revolution‖ here in the true sense

of the word refers to the significant rise in the people’s expectations of greater

outcomes with less sacrifice. As Philip Sabin pointed out astutely, as a result of

the rise in people’s expectations of the precision of air power to a ―revolutionary‖

level, it has conversely become more difficult to deploy air power, as if in

inverse proportion to the technological capability (or possibilities) presented by

air power. For details, see Philip Sabin, ―Air Strategy and the Underdog,‖ Ishizu,

Tachikawa, Michishita, Tsukamoto, eds., Air Power, pp. 270–305. Also see

Philip Sabin, ―Air Power's Second Century: Growing Dominance or Faded

Glory?,‖ Journal of the JAPCC, 15 (Spring 2012); Philip Sabin, ―The Future of

UK Air Power,‖ RUSI Journal, Vol. 154, No. 5 (October 2009). 74 Lambeth, ―Understanding Air and Space Power Today.‖ 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Arthur K. Cebrowski, John J. Garstka, ―Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin

and Future,‖ Proceedings, Vol. 124/1/1, 139 (January 1988). 78 Lambeth, ―Understanding Air and Space Power Today.‖ 79 Cohen, ―The Mystique of U.S. Air Power.‖ 80 The assumption that air power is inherently offensive is inaccurate. It would be

more accurate to say that if air power is deployed in an offensive operation,

there is a strong possibility that it will produce a strategic effect. This is because

it is ultimately the role of the government to make a decision on whether to use

air power in an offense or in an defense. For details, see Gray, ―Airpower

Theory,‖ in Olsen, ed., Airpower Reborn, pp. 170- 171. 81 Tomoyuki Ishizu, ―’The Japanese Way in Warfare’: Japan’s Grand Strategy for

the 21st Century,‖ Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. Xll, No. 1 (Summer

2000); Tomoyuki Ishizu, ―Air Power in Japan’s National Strategy,‖ RUSI

Journal, Vol. 153, No. 5 (October 2008). 82 Ishizu, ―Nihonryu no Senso Houho‖ [The Japanese Way of Warfare], Kawakami,

ed., Atarashii Senso to wa Nanika – Houho to Senryaku [What is the “New

War”? - Methods and Strategies], pp. 138-155. 83 For details on this point, see Shinichi Kataoka, ―The Strategy of the Maritime

Nation Japan: From Yukichi Fukuzawa to Shigeru Yoshida,‖ Hiroshi Nakanishi,

Tomoyuki Ishizu


―Diplomatic Strategy of a Defeated Nation: Yoshida Shigeru and His

Successors,‖ Murray, Ishizu, eds., Conflicting Currents, Chapters 3 and 7. 84 For details on what peace is, see Michael Howard, The Invention of Peace & the

Reinvention of War (London: Profile Books, 2002). In the same book, Howard

explains that ultimately, peace is nothing more than order. 85 Gray, ―Air Power and Defense Planning,‖ in Gray, Explorations in Strategy, p.

118. 86 For example, in response to the conclusion of the United Nations Convention on

the Law of the Sea (enacted in 1982, entered into force in 1994, ratified by

Japan in 1996), the Government of Japan established Marine Day (enforced in

1996), and formulated the Basic Act on Ocean Policy that covers the

comprehensive promotion of maritime policies, as well as the Basic Plan on

Ocean Policy (2008) and New Basic Plan on Ocean Policy (2013). These

examples are representative of Japan’s proactive efforts to promote maritime

policy. 87 Tomoyuki Ishizu, ―Japanese Air Power,‖ in John A. Olsen, ed., Routledge

Handbook of Air Power (Oxford: Routledge, forthcoming). 88 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics , (Yoichi

Yamaoka, Trans.) (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha), 2004. 89 For details on the potential of culture as the source of a nation’s power, see

Heita Kawakatsu, Bunkaryoku – Nihon no Sokoryoku [Cultural Power: Japan’s

Latent Potential] (Wedge), 2006. 90 For details on Corbett’s views on war, see Tomoyuki Ishizu, ―Shii Pawa – Sono

Kako, Genzai, Shorai‖ [Sea Power – Its Past, Present, and Future], Kyouichi

Tachikawa, Tomoyuki Ishizu, Narushige Michishita, Katsuya Tsukamoto, eds.,

Shirizu Gunjiryoku no Honshitsu (2) Sea Power [Essence of Military Power

Series (2) Sea Power], 2008. For details on Clausewitz’s views on war, see Carl

von Clausewitz, On War, Takichi Shimizu, trans., Chuko Bunko, 2001, Vol. 1, p.

24, and Vol. 2, p. 522; Tomoyuki Ishizu, et. al., eds., Kurauzevitsu to Sensoron

[Clausewitz and ―On War‖] (Tokyo: Sairyusha, 2008), Chapter 9. 91 This should be taken into consideration in the review of the National Security

Strategy formulated in December 2013. 92 Gray, ―Airpower Theory,‖ in Olsen, ed., Airpower Reborn, pp. 156- 180; Gray,

Airpower for Strategic Effect, Chapter 9. 93 Gray, ―Airpower Theory,‖ in Olsen, ed., Airpower Reborn, pp. 170- 171. 94 Olsen, ―Airpower and Strategy,‖ in Olsen, ed., Airpower Reborn, p. 3, footnote

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