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A Moderate Position on the Phenomenology ofThought
Angela Mendelovici
Princeton University
February 1, 2010
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How Intentionalism and the Phenomenal IntentionalityTheory Can Maintain
A Moderate Position on the Phenomenology ofThought
if They Accept the Efficient Concept View
Angela Mendelovici
Princeton University
February 1, 2010
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Outline
1 PoT and the relationship between representation andconsciousness
2 The efficient concept view
3 A moderate view on PoT
4 Conclusion
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Outline
1 PoT and the relationship between representation andconsciousness
2 The efficient concept view
3 A moderate view on PoT
4 Conclusion
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The phenomenology of thought
It’s like something to think.
Thoughts have phenomenal character.
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The phenomenology of thought
It’s like something to think.
Thoughts have phenomenal character.
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Thoughts
Thoughts are occurrent mental states (or events or processes).
Thoughts represent.
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Mental representation
Some mental states display aboutness, ofness, or intentionality(Brentano, 1874).
Some mental states represent, or have content.
Mental representation is a phenomenon to be explained.
Mental representation can be picked out ostensively, althoughthere is room for revision of our original examples.
Representational vehicles
The states that do the representing (words, signs, thoughts,percepts, concepts)
These states can be brain states, functional states, etc.
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Mental representation
Some mental states display aboutness, ofness, or intentionality(Brentano, 1874).
Some mental states represent, or have content.
Mental representation is a phenomenon to be explained.
Mental representation can be picked out ostensively, althoughthere is room for revision of our original examples.
Representational vehicles
The states that do the representing (words, signs, thoughts,percepts, concepts)
These states can be brain states, functional states, etc.
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Phenomenal consciousness
It’s “like something” to be in certain states (Nagel, 1974).
What it’s like is a state’s phenomenal character.
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The phenomenology of thought versus associatedphenomenology
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The phenomenology of thought versus associatedphenomenology
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The phenomenology of thought versus associatedphenomenology
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The phenomenology of thought versus associatedphenomenology
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Why care about PoT
PoT might be of independent interest.
However, my interest in PoT arises from an interest in therelationship between mental representation and consciousness.
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Why care about PoT
PoT might be of independent interest.
However, my interest in PoT arises from an interest in therelationship between mental representation and consciousness.
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Why care about PoT
PoT might be of independent interest.
However, my interest in PoT arises from an interest in therelationship between mental representation and consciousness.
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The relationship between representation and consciousness
A typical view
Block (1990)
Intentionalism
Dretske (1995), Tye(1995)
Phenomenalintentionality theory
Horgan and Tienson(2002), Pitt (2004)
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The relationship between representation and consciousness
A typical view
Block (1990)
Intentionalism
Dretske (1995), Tye(1995)
Phenomenalintentionality theory
Horgan and Tienson(2002), Pitt (2004)
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The relationship between representation and consciousness
A typical view
Block (1990)
Intentionalism
Dretske (1995), Tye(1995)
Phenomenalintentionality theory
Horgan and Tienson(2002), Pitt (2004)
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The challenge with thought
These theories are mostplausible for perceptual
states.
What should they sayabout thought?
Intentionalism
Dretske (1995), Tye(1995)
Phenomenalintentionality theory
Horgan and Tienson(2002), Pitt (2004)
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The challenge with thought
These theories are mostplausible for perceptual
states.
What should they sayabout thought?
Intentionalism
Dretske (1995), Tye(1995)
Phenomenalintentionality theory
Horgan and Tienson(2002), Pitt (2004)
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The challenge with thought
These theories are mostplausible for perceptual
states.
What should they sayabout thought?
Intentionalism
Dretske (1995), Tye(1995)
Phenomenalintentionality theory
Horgan and Tienson(2002), Pitt (2004)
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The problem for intentionalism
1 A visual experience of unique red
2 A thought about unique red
Intuitively same content, different phenomenal character
So, representational content does not suffice to determinephenomenal character.
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The problem for intentionalism
1 A visual experience of unique red
2 A thought about unique red
Intuitively same content, different phenomenal character
So, representational content does not suffice to determinephenomenal character.
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The problem for intentionalism
1 A visual experience of unique red
2 A thought about unique red
Intuitively same content, different phenomenal character
So, representational content does not suffice to determinephenomenal character.
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The problem for intentionalism
1 A visual experience of unique red
2 A thought about unique red
Intuitively same content, different phenomenal character
So, representational content does not suffice to determinephenomenal character.
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Intentionalist solution: impure intentionalism
Representational content together with something elsedetermines phenomenal character.
This is known as impure intentionalism.
Dretske: A representation must be phylogenetically fixed.Tye: A representation must have nonconceptual content.
Concepts do not satisfy the extra conditions that arepresentational state must meet in order to have phenomenalcharacter.
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Intentionalist solution: impure intentionalism
Representational content together with something elsedetermines phenomenal character.
This is known as impure intentionalism.
Dretske: A representation must be phylogenetically fixed.Tye: A representation must have nonconceptual content.
Concepts do not satisfy the extra conditions that arepresentational state must meet in order to have phenomenalcharacter.
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Intentionalist solution: impure intentionalism
Representational content together with something elsedetermines phenomenal character.
This is known as impure intentionalism.
Dretske: A representation must be phylogenetically fixed.Tye: A representation must have nonconceptual content.
Concepts do not satisfy the extra conditions that arepresentational state must meet in order to have phenomenalcharacter.
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Intentionalist solution: impure intentionalism
Representational content together with something elsedetermines phenomenal character.
This is known as impure intentionalism.
Dretske: A representation must be phylogenetically fixed.Tye: A representation must have nonconceptual content.
Concepts do not satisfy the extra conditions that arepresentational state must meet in order to have phenomenalcharacter.
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Intentionalist solution: impure intentionalism
Representational content together with something elsedetermines phenomenal character.
This is known as impure intentionalism.
Dretske: A representation must be phylogenetically fixed.Tye: A representation must have nonconceptual content.
Concepts do not satisfy the extra conditions that arepresentational state must meet in order to have phenomenalcharacter.
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Intentionalist solution: impure intentionalism
Representational content together with something elsedetermines phenomenal character.
This is known as impure intentionalism.
Dretske: A representation must be phylogenetically fixed.Tye: A representation must have nonconceptual content.
Concepts do not satisfy the extra conditions that arepresentational state must meet in order to have phenomenalcharacter.
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An extreme view on PoT
On this strategy, there is no phenomenal character whatsoevercorresponding to concept use
in thoughtor in or corresponding to perception.
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An extreme view on PoT
On this strategy, there is no phenomenal character whatsoevercorresponding to concept use
in thoughtor in or corresponding to perception.
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An extreme view on PoT
On this strategy, there is no phenomenal character whatsoevercorresponding to concept use
in thoughtor in or corresponding to perception.
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An extreme view on PoT
On this strategy, there is no phenomenal character whatsoevercorresponding to concept use
in thoughtor in or corresponding to perception.
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Why think there is PoT
If the phenomenology corresponding to thoughts onlyconsisted in visual and verbal associated phenomenology, thenthinking about a megagon would be something like this:
“megagon”
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Why think there is PoT
If the phenomenology corresponding to thoughts onlyconsisted in visual and verbal associated phenomenology, thenthinking about a megagon would be something like this:
“megagon”
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Why think there is PoT
If the phenomenology corresponding to thoughts onlyconsisted in visual and verbal associated phenomenology, thenthinking about a megagon would be something like this:
“megagon”
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Why think there is PoT
If the phenomenology corresponding to thoughts onlyconsisted in visual and verbal associated phenomenology, thenthinking about a megagon would be something like this:
“megagon”
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The problem for the phenomenal intentionality theory
Phenomenal character determines representational content.
If thoughts don’t have phenomenal character, then they don’trepresent.
If two thoughts have the same phenomenal character, thenthey can’t have different representational contents.
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The problem for the phenomenal intentionality theory
Phenomenal character determines representational content.
If thoughts don’t have phenomenal character, then they don’trepresent.
If two thoughts have the same phenomenal character, thenthey can’t have different representational contents.
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The problem for the phenomenal intentionality theory
Phenomenal character determines representational content.
If thoughts don’t have phenomenal character, then they don’trepresent.
If two thoughts have the same phenomenal character, thenthey can’t have different representational contents.
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The problem for the phenomenal intentionality theory
Phenomenal character determines representational content.
If thoughts don’t have phenomenal character, then they don’trepresent.
If two thoughts have the same phenomenal character, thenthey can’t have different representational contents.
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Phenomenal intentionality theorist solution
Thoughts have rich phenomenal character.
PoT is distinctive: thoughts with different representationalcontents have different phenomenal character.
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Phenomenal intentionality theorist solution
Thoughts have rich phenomenal character.
PoT is distinctive: thoughts with different representationalcontents have different phenomenal character.
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Phenomenal intentionality theorist solution
Thoughts have rich phenomenal character.
PoT is distinctive: thoughts with different representationalcontents have different phenomenal character.
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PoT is impoverished
1 A visual experience of unique red
2 A thought about unique red
The phenomenal character of thought is not as rich as thephenomenal character of perception, even when they representthe same contents.
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PoT is impoverished
1 A visual experience of unique red
2 A thought about unique red
The phenomenal character of thought is not as rich as thephenomenal character of perception, even when they representthe same contents.
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PoT is impoverished
1 A visual experience of unique red
2 A thought about unique red
The phenomenal character of thought is not as rich as thephenomenal character of perception, even when they representthe same contents.
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Is PoT distinctive?
PoT is distinctive: thoughts with different representationalcontents have different phenomenal character.
Different thought contents, same phenomenal character
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Is PoT distinctive?
PoT is distinctive: thoughts with different representationalcontents have different phenomenal character.
Different thought contents, same phenomenal character
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Two extreme views on the phenomenology of thought
Impure intentionalist’s Phenomenal intentionality
strategy theorist’s strategy
There is some PoT 8 XPoT is impoverished X 8
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Outline
1 PoT and the relationship between representation andconsciousness
2 The efficient concept view
3 A moderate view on PoT
4 Conclusion
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Concepts
Concepts
The constituents of occurrent thoughts, although they may beinvolved in other states as well
Vehicles of representation
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Concepts
Concepts
The constituents of occurrent thoughts, although they may beinvolved in other states as well
Vehicles of representation
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Some questions about concepts
What is the structure of concepts?
What kinds of contents do concepts represent?
How do concepts behave?
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Some questions about concepts
What is the structure of concepts?
What kinds of contents do concepts represent?
How do concepts behave?
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Some questions about concepts
What is the structure of concepts?
What kinds of contents do concepts represent?
How do concepts behave?
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Some questions about concepts
What is the structure of concepts?
What kinds of contents do concepts represent?
How do concepts behave?
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Three views of concepts
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Molecularism
Apparently complex concepts are composed of simpler concepts.
Concepts (vehicles) are fairly complex.
They have parts that are representations.
Contents are fairly complex.
They have parts that are themselves contents.
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Molecularism
Apparently complex concepts are composed of simpler concepts.
Concepts (vehicles) are fairly complex.
They have parts that are representations.
Contents are fairly complex.
They have parts that are themselves contents.
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Molecularism
Apparently complex concepts are composed of simpler concepts.
Concepts (vehicles) are fairly complex.
They have parts that are representations.
Contents are fairly complex.
They have parts that are themselves contents.
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Molecularism
Apparently complex concepts are composed of simpler concepts.
Concepts (vehicles) are fairly complex.
They have parts that are representations.
Contents are fairly complex.
They have parts that are themselves contents.
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Molecularism
Apparently complex concepts are composed of simpler concepts.
Concepts (vehicles) are fairly complex.
They have parts that are representations.
Contents are fairly complex.
They have parts that are themselves contents.
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Molecularism
Apparently complex concepts are composed of simpler concepts.
Concepts (vehicles) are fairly complex.
They have parts that are representations.
Contents are fairly complex.
They have parts that are themselves contents.
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The complex content view
Concepts (vehicles) are fairly simple.
Contents are fairly complex.
Comparison with words.
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The complex content view
Concepts (vehicles) are fairly simple.
Contents are fairly complex.
Comparison with words.
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The complex content view
Concepts (vehicles) are fairly simple.
Contents are fairly complex.
Comparison with words.
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The complex content view
Concepts (vehicles) are fairly simple.
Contents are fairly complex.
Comparison with words.
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The efficient concept view
Concepts (vehicles) are fairly simple.
Contents are fairly simple (e.g. they do not specify necessary andsufficient conditions for category membership or the intuitivesatisfaction/application conditions of a concept).
Concepts can be unpacked to yield more complex concepts.
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The efficient concept view
Concepts (vehicles) are fairly simple.
Contents are fairly simple (e.g. they do not specify necessary andsufficient conditions for category membership or the intuitivesatisfaction/application conditions of a concept).
Concepts can be unpacked to yield more complex concepts.
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The efficient concept view
Concepts (vehicles) are fairly simple.
Contents are fairly simple (e.g. they do not specify necessary andsufficient conditions for category membership or the intuitivesatisfaction/application conditions of a concept).
Concepts can be unpacked to yield more complex concepts.
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The efficient concept view
Concepts (vehicles) are fairly simple.
Contents are fairly simple (e.g. they do not specify necessary andsufficient conditions for category membership or the intuitivesatisfaction/application conditions of a concept).
Concepts can be unpacked to yield more complex concepts.
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The efficient concept view
Example:
When you think that there is a cat in the other room, you arenot occurrently entertaining
the necessary and sufficient conditions for cathooda prototype of a catexamples of particular cats or types of catstheories of catsetc.
But these contents can be retrieved when neededthrough the process of unpacking.
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The efficient concept view
Example:
When you think that there is a cat in the other room, you arenot occurrently entertaining
the necessary and sufficient conditions for cathooda prototype of a catexamples of particular cats or types of catstheories of catsetc.
But these contents can be retrieved when neededthrough the process of unpacking.
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The efficient concept view
Example:
When you think that there is a cat in the other room, you arenot occurrently entertaining
the necessary and sufficient conditions for cathooda prototype of a catexamples of particular cats or types of catstheories of catsetc.
But these contents can be retrieved when neededthrough the process of unpacking.
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The efficient concept view
Example:
When you think that there is a cat in the other room, you arenot occurrently entertaining
the necessary and sufficient conditions for cathooda prototype of a catexamples of particular cats or types of catstheories of catsetc.
But these contents can be retrieved when neededthrough the process of unpacking.
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The efficient concept view
Example:
When you think that there is a cat in the other room, you arenot occurrently entertaining
the necessary and sufficient conditions for cathooda prototype of a catexamples of particular cats or types of catstheories of catsetc.
But these contents can be retrieved when neededthrough the process of unpacking.
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The efficient concept view
Example:
When you think that there is a cat in the other room, you arenot occurrently entertaining
the necessary and sufficient conditions for cathooda prototype of a catexamples of particular cats or types of catstheories of catsetc.
But these contents can be retrieved when neededthrough the process of unpacking.
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The efficient concept view
Example:
When you think that there is a cat in the other room, you arenot occurrently entertaining
the necessary and sufficient conditions for cathooda prototype of a catexamples of particular cats or types of catstheories of catsetc.
But these contents can be retrieved when neededthrough the process of unpacking.
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Motivating the efficient concept view
Why think that concepts do not represent the contents weintuitively associate with them?
1 It takes time to retrieve these associated contents.2 Retrieval involves having a new thought.3 We sometimes fail at retrieving these associated contents.
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Motivating the efficient concept view
Why think that concepts do not represent the contents weintuitively associate with them?
1 It takes time to retrieve these associated contents.2 Retrieval involves having a new thought.3 We sometimes fail at retrieving these associated contents.
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Motivating the efficient concept view
Why think that concepts do not represent the contents weintuitively associate with them?
1 It takes time to retrieve these associated contents.2 Retrieval involves having a new thought.3 We sometimes fail at retrieving these associated contents.
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Motivating the efficient concept view
Why think that concepts do not represent the contents weintuitively associate with them?
1 It takes time to retrieve these associated contents.2 Retrieval involves having a new thought.3 We sometimes fail at retrieving these associated contents.
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Motivating the efficient concept view
Why think that concepts do not represent the contents weintuitively associate with them?
1 It takes time to retrieve these associated contents.2 Retrieval involves having a new thought.3 We sometimes fail at retrieving these associated contents.
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Experiences of cashing out
These associated contents are experienced as related to theoriginally entertained contents.
They are experienced as further cashings out of theseoriginally entertained contents.
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Experiences of cashing out
These associated contents are experienced as related to theoriginally entertained contents.
They are experienced as further cashings out of theseoriginally entertained contents.
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Experiences of cashing out
These associated contents are experienced as related to theoriginally entertained contents.
They are experienced as further cashings out of theseoriginally entertained contents.
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Experiences of cashing out
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Experiences of cashing out
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Derived content
Unpacking
Experiences of cashing out
We can define new notions of content, derived content, out ofa subject’s dispositions to have experiences of cashing out.
We can distinguish source content from derived content.
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Derived content
Unpacking
Experiences of cashing out
We can define new notions of content, derived content, out ofa subject’s dispositions to have experiences of cashing out.
We can distinguish source content from derived content.
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Derived content
Unpacking
Experiences of cashing out
We can define new notions of content, derived content, out ofa subject’s dispositions to have experiences of cashing out.
We can distinguish source content from derived content.
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Derived content
Unpacking
Experiences of cashing out
We can define new notions of content, derived content, out ofa subject’s dispositions to have experiences of cashing out.
We can distinguish source content from derived content.
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Derived content
Unpacking
Experiences of cashing out
We can define new notions of content, derived content, out ofa subject’s dispositions to have experiences of cashing out.
We can distinguish source content from derived content.
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Derived content
Derived content
A concept that represents P derivatively represents Q (along witheverything Q derivatively represents) just in case its subject is disposed toexperience Q as a further cashing out of P (in certain circumstances C).
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Derived content
Derived content
A concept that represents P derivatively represents Q (along witheverything Q derivatively represents) just in case its subject is disposed toexperience Q as a further cashing out of P (in certain circumstances C).
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Derived content
Derived content
A concept that represents P derivatively represents Q (along witheverything Q derivatively represents) just in case its subject is disposed toexperience Q as a further cashing out of P (in certain circumstances C).
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Concept individuation
One way to individuate concepts is by their source content.
We can also individuate concepts by their derived content.
The folk/intuitive/commonsense way of individuatingconcepts is by derived content.
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Concept individuation
One way to individuate concepts is by their source content.
We can also individuate concepts by their derived content.
The folk/intuitive/commonsense way of individuatingconcepts is by derived content.
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Concept individuation
One way to individuate concepts is by their source content.
We can also individuate concepts by their derived content.
The folk/intuitive/commonsense way of individuatingconcepts is by derived content.
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Concept individuation
One way to individuate concepts is by their source content.
We can also individuate concepts by their derived content.
The folk/intuitive/commonsense way of individuatingconcepts is by derived content.
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Folk content
Derived content specifies application/satisfaction conditions(and truth conditions, for thoughts).
Derived content allows us to better predict behavior.1 Allows us to include certain parts of a concept’s associated
content (e.g. helps predict vixen-related behaviors)2 Allows us to exclude (or minimize the relative importance of)
idiosyncratic parts of source content
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Folk content
Derived content specifies application/satisfaction conditions(and truth conditions, for thoughts).
Derived content allows us to better predict behavior.1 Allows us to include certain parts of a concept’s associated
content (e.g. helps predict vixen-related behaviors)2 Allows us to exclude (or minimize the relative importance of)
idiosyncratic parts of source content
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Folk content
Derived content specifies application/satisfaction conditions(and truth conditions, for thoughts).
Derived content allows us to better predict behavior.1 Allows us to include certain parts of a concept’s associated
content (e.g. helps predict vixen-related behaviors)2 Allows us to exclude (or minimize the relative importance of)
idiosyncratic parts of source content
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Folk content
Derived content specifies application/satisfaction conditions(and truth conditions, for thoughts).
Derived content allows us to better predict behavior.1 Allows us to include certain parts of a concept’s associated
content (e.g. helps predict vixen-related behaviors)2 Allows us to exclude (or minimize the relative importance of)
idiosyncratic parts of source content
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Outline
1 PoT and the relationship between representation andconsciousness
2 The efficient concept view
3 A moderate view on PoT
4 Conclusion
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Two extreme views on the phenomenology of thought
Impure intentionalist’s Phenomenal intentionality
strategy theorist’s strategy
There is some PoT 8 XPoT is impoverished X 8
These two strategies involve taking extreme views on PoT.
The efficient concept view allows for a third strategy that is open toboth intentionalists and phenomenal intentionality theorists.
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Two extreme views on the phenomenology of thought
Impure intentionalist’s Phenomenal intentionality
strategy theorist’s strategy
There is some PoT 8 XPoT is impoverished X 8
These two strategies involve taking extreme views on PoT.
The efficient concept view allows for a third strategy that is open toboth intentionalists and phenomenal intentionality theorists.
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Two extreme views on the phenomenology of thought
Impure intentionalist’s Phenomenal intentionality
strategy theorist’s strategy
There is some PoT 8 XPoT is impoverished X 8
These two strategies involve taking extreme views on PoT.
The efficient concept view allows for a third strategy that is open toboth intentionalists and phenomenal intentionality theorists.
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The general strategy
Intentionalism and the phenomenal intentionality theory aretheories about source content.
Concepts have fairly impoverished source contents.
It’s plausible that these impoverished contents match theimpoverished phenomenal characters of thoughts.
Intentionalism: Source content determines phenomenalcharacter.
Phenomenal intentionality theory: Phenomenal characterdetermines source content.
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The general strategy
Intentionalism and the phenomenal intentionality theory aretheories about source content.
Concepts have fairly impoverished source contents.
It’s plausible that these impoverished contents match theimpoverished phenomenal characters of thoughts.
Intentionalism: Source content determines phenomenalcharacter.
Phenomenal intentionality theory: Phenomenal characterdetermines source content.
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The general strategy
Intentionalism and the phenomenal intentionality theory aretheories about source content.
Concepts have fairly impoverished source contents.
It’s plausible that these impoverished contents match theimpoverished phenomenal characters of thoughts.
Intentionalism: Source content determines phenomenalcharacter.
Phenomenal intentionality theory: Phenomenal characterdetermines source content.
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The general strategy
Intentionalism and the phenomenal intentionality theory aretheories about source content.
Concepts have fairly impoverished source contents.
It’s plausible that these impoverished contents match theimpoverished phenomenal characters of thoughts.
Intentionalism: Source content determines phenomenalcharacter.
Phenomenal intentionality theory: Phenomenal characterdetermines source content.
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The general strategy
Intentionalism and the phenomenal intentionality theory aretheories about source content.
Concepts have fairly impoverished source contents.
It’s plausible that these impoverished contents match theimpoverished phenomenal characters of thoughts.
Intentionalism: Source content determines phenomenalcharacter.
Phenomenal intentionality theory: Phenomenal characterdetermines source content.
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The general strategy
Intentionalism and the phenomenal intentionality theory aretheories about source content.
Concepts have fairly impoverished source contents.
It’s plausible that these impoverished contents match theimpoverished phenomenal characters of thoughts.
Intentionalism: Source content determines phenomenalcharacter.
Phenomenal intentionality theory: Phenomenal characterdetermines source content.
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The problem for intentionalism
1 A visual experience of unique red
2 A thought about unique red
Same content, different phenomenal character
So, representational content does not suffice todetermine phenomenal character.
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The problem for intentionalism
1 A visual experience of unique red
2 A thought about unique red
Same content, different phenomenal character
So, representational content does not suffice todetermine phenomenal character.
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The problem for intentionalism
1 A visual experience of unique red
2 A thought about unique red
Same content, different phenomenal character
So, representational content does not suffice todetermine phenomenal character.
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Solution
1 A visual experience of unique red
2 A thought about unique red
Same derived content
Different source content, and thus differentphenomenal characters
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Solution
1 A visual experience of unique red
2 A thought about unique red
Same derived content
Different source content, and thus differentphenomenal characters
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Solution
1 A visual experience of unique red
2 A thought about unique red
Same derived content
Different source content, and thus differentphenomenal characters
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A new issue for the intentionalist
Two thoughts with the same representationalcontent must have the same phenomenalcharacter.
Example: two cases of thinking about a piano;same content, different phenomenal character
The efficient concept view allows us to say thatin such a case
The thoughts have different source contents,and hence different phenomenal characters.The thoughts have the same derived contents.(This accounts for our intuition that theyrepresent alike.)
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A new issue for the intentionalist
Two thoughts with the same representationalcontent must have the same phenomenalcharacter.
Example: two cases of thinking about a piano;same content, different phenomenal character
The efficient concept view allows us to say thatin such a case
The thoughts have different source contents,and hence different phenomenal characters.The thoughts have the same derived contents.(This accounts for our intuition that theyrepresent alike.)
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A new issue for the intentionalist
Two thoughts with the same representationalcontent must have the same phenomenalcharacter.
Example: two cases of thinking about a piano;same content, different phenomenal character
The efficient concept view allows us to say thatin such a case
The thoughts have different source contents,and hence different phenomenal characters.The thoughts have the same derived contents.(This accounts for our intuition that theyrepresent alike.)
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A new issue for the intentionalist
Two thoughts with the same representationalcontent must have the same phenomenalcharacter.
Example: two cases of thinking about a piano;same content, different phenomenal character
The efficient concept view allows us to say thatin such a case
The thoughts have different source contents,and hence different phenomenal characters.The thoughts have the same derived contents.(This accounts for our intuition that theyrepresent alike.)
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A new issue for the intentionalist
Two thoughts with the same representationalcontent must have the same phenomenalcharacter.
Example: two cases of thinking about a piano;same content, different phenomenal character
The efficient concept view allows us to say thatin such a case
The thoughts have different source contents,and hence different phenomenal characters.The thoughts have the same derived contents.(This accounts for our intuition that theyrepresent alike.)
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A new issue for the intentionalist
Two thoughts with the same representationalcontent must have the same phenomenalcharacter.
Example: two cases of thinking about a piano;same content, different phenomenal character
The efficient concept view allows us to say thatin such a case
The thoughts have different source contents,and hence different phenomenal characters.The thoughts have the same derived contents.(This accounts for our intuition that theyrepresent alike.)
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One way to think of it
The same derived content can be derivatively represented byconcepts with different source contents.
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One way to think of it
The same derived content can be derivatively represented byconcepts with different source contents.
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One way to think of it
The same derived content can be derivatively represented byconcepts with different source contents.
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The problem for the phenomenal intentionality theory
Phenomenal character constitutes or otherwise determinesrepresentational content.
Thoughts have rich phenomenal character.
PoT is distinctive: thoughts with different representationalcontents have different phenomenal character.
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The problem for the phenomenal intentionality theory
Phenomenal character constitutes or otherwise determinesrepresentational content.
Thoughts have rich phenomenal character.
PoT is distinctive: thoughts with different representationalcontents have different phenomenal character.
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The problem for the phenomenal intentionality theory
Phenomenal character constitutes or otherwise determinesrepresentational content.
Thoughts have rich phenomenal character.
PoT is distinctive: thoughts with different representationalcontents have different phenomenal character.
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The problem for the phenomenal intentionality theory
Phenomenal character constitutes or otherwise determinesrepresentational content.
Thoughts have rich phenomenal character.
PoT is distinctive: thoughts with different representationalcontents have different phenomenal character.
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PoT is impoverished
1 A visual experience of unique red
2 A thought about unique red
Problem:
The phenomenal character of thought is not veryrich.
That’s OK, because the representational contentof thought is not very rich either.
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PoT is impoverished
1 A visual experience of unique red
2 A thought about unique red
Problem:
The phenomenal character of thought is not veryrich.
That’s OK, because the representational contentof thought is not very rich either.
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PoT is impoverished
1 A visual experience of unique red
2 A thought about unique red
Problem:
The phenomenal character of thought is not veryrich.
That’s OK, because the representational contentof thought is not very rich either.
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Is PoT distinctive?
PoT is distinctive: thoughts withdifferent representational contentshave different phenomenal character.
Same phenomenal character, differentcontent
The efficient concept view allows us tosay that
Dimitri and Dimitra’s concepts havethe same source content, and hencethe same phenomenal character.Dimitri and Dimitra’s concepts havedifferent derived contents.PoT is distinctive if by “content”we mean source content, but not ifwe mean derived content.
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Is PoT distinctive?
PoT is distinctive: thoughts withdifferent representational contentshave different phenomenal character.
Same phenomenal character, differentcontent
The efficient concept view allows us tosay that
Dimitri and Dimitra’s concepts havethe same source content, and hencethe same phenomenal character.Dimitri and Dimitra’s concepts havedifferent derived contents.PoT is distinctive if by “content”we mean source content, but not ifwe mean derived content.
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Is PoT distinctive?
PoT is distinctive: thoughts withdifferent representational contentshave different phenomenal character.
Same phenomenal character, differentcontent
The efficient concept view allows us tosay that
Dimitri and Dimitra’s concepts havethe same source content, and hencethe same phenomenal character.Dimitri and Dimitra’s concepts havedifferent derived contents.PoT is distinctive if by “content”we mean source content, but not ifwe mean derived content.
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Is PoT distinctive?
PoT is distinctive: thoughts withdifferent representational contentshave different phenomenal character.
Same phenomenal character, differentcontent
The efficient concept view allows us tosay that
Dimitri and Dimitra’s concepts havethe same source content, and hencethe same phenomenal character.Dimitri and Dimitra’s concepts havedifferent derived contents.PoT is distinctive if by “content”we mean source content, but not ifwe mean derived content.
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PoT and representation and consciousness The efficient concept view A moderate view on PoT Conclusion References
Is PoT distinctive?
PoT is distinctive: thoughts withdifferent representational contentshave different phenomenal character.
Same phenomenal character, differentcontent
The efficient concept view allows us tosay that
Dimitri and Dimitra’s concepts havethe same source content, and hencethe same phenomenal character.Dimitri and Dimitra’s concepts havedifferent derived contents.PoT is distinctive if by “content”we mean source content, but not ifwe mean derived content.
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PoT and representation and consciousness The efficient concept view A moderate view on PoT Conclusion References
Is PoT distinctive?
PoT is distinctive: thoughts withdifferent representational contentshave different phenomenal character.
Same phenomenal character, differentcontent
The efficient concept view allows us tosay that
Dimitri and Dimitra’s concepts havethe same source content, and hencethe same phenomenal character.Dimitri and Dimitra’s concepts havedifferent derived contents.PoT is distinctive if by “content”we mean source content, but not ifwe mean derived content.
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PoT and representation and consciousness The efficient concept view A moderate view on PoT Conclusion References
Is PoT distinctive?
PoT is distinctive: thoughts withdifferent representational contentshave different phenomenal character.
Same phenomenal character, differentcontent
The efficient concept view allows us tosay that
Dimitri and Dimitra’s concepts havethe same source content, and hencethe same phenomenal character.Dimitri and Dimitra’s concepts havedifferent derived contents.PoT is distinctive if by “content”we mean source content, but not ifwe mean derived content.
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PoT and representation and consciousness The efficient concept view A moderate view on PoT Conclusion References
Is PoT distinctive?
PoT is distinctive: thoughts withdifferent representational contentshave different phenomenal character.
Same phenomenal character, differentcontent
The efficient concept view allows us tosay that
Dimitri and Dimitra’s concepts havethe same source content, and hencethe same phenomenal character.Dimitri and Dimitra’s concepts havedifferent derived contents.PoT is distinctive if by “content”we mean source content, but not ifwe mean derived content.
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PoT and representation and consciousness The efficient concept view A moderate view on PoT Conclusion References
Outline
1 PoT and the relationship between representation andconsciousness
2 The efficient concept view
3 A moderate view on PoT
4 Conclusion
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Desiderata for PoT
Imp
ure
inte
nti
on
alis
tst
rate
gy
Ph
eno
men
alin
ten
tio
nal
-it
yth
eori
stst
rate
gy
My
stra
teg
y
There is some PoT 8 X XPoT is impoverished X 8 X
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The relationship between representation and consciousness
A typical view
Block (1990)
Intentionalism
Dretske (1995), Tye(1995)
Phenomenalintentionality theory
Horgan and Tienson(2002), Pitt (2004)
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The relationship between representation and consciousness
The efficient concept viewallows these views to take
a moderate (andplausible) position on the
phenomenology ofthought.
Intentionalism
Dretske (1995), Tye(1995)
Phenomenalintentionality theory
Horgan and Tienson(2002), Pitt (2004)
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The relationship between representation and consciousness
The efficient concept viewallows these views to take
a moderate (andplausible) position on the
phenomenology ofthought.
Intentionalism
Dretske (1995), Tye(1995)
Phenomenalintentionality theory
Horgan and Tienson(2002), Pitt (2004)
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The End
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References
Block, N. (1990). Inverted earth. In Tomberlin, J., editor, PhilosophicalPerspectives, 4, Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, pages 54–79.Ridgeview Publishing Company, Atascadero.
Brentano, F. (1973/1874). Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge.Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and
the Phenomenology of Intentionality, pages 520–533. Oxford UniversityPress, Oxford.
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review,83(4):435–450.
Pitt, D. (2004). The phenomenology of cognition or what is it like to thinkthat P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69(1):1–36.
Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory ofthe Phenomenal Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge.
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