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8/9/2019 The Era of Suleyman Magnificent-crisis of Orient..
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Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Journal of
Middle East Studies.
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The Era of Suleyman the Magnificent: Crisis of OrientationAuthor(s): Subhi Labib
Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Nov., 1979), pp. 435-451Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/162212Accessed: 15-03-2015 09:48 UTC
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8/9/2019 The Era of Suleyman Magnificent-crisis of Orient..
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Int.
J.
Middle
East
Stud.
IO
(1979),
435-451
Printed
in
Great Britain
Subhi Labib
THE
ERA
OF
SULEYMAN
THE MAGNIFICENT:
CRISIS
OF ORIENTATION
When the
Prophet
Muhammad died on
7
June
632,
the
larger part
of
Arabia
had
already accepted
Islam. In
fact,
Islam
had
created
a solid
Arab
community
that
dominated Arabia and was ready to begin its amazing expansive
movement
in
world
history.
The
Arab
conquests
put
an
end
to
the Sassanid
Empire
and
deprived
the
Byzantine
Empire
of
its
Asiatic dominions
up
to the Taurus
and of
all its
African
possessions.
Muslim
troops
crossed Gibraltar and subdued
almost
all the
Iberian
peninsula.
In
brief:
with
their
conquests
in
the seventh
and
eighth
centuries
(634-751)
the Arabs
became
the
neighbors
of the Franks
and
Byzan-
tines
on
the
other
side of the
Mediterranean.
In Asia
the
subjection
of
Persia
brought
them
into
northern India
and
the Turkish
vassal
states
of China in
Central
Asia.
In
the second
half
of
the
seventh
century
the Arabs
began
to establish
them-
selves as
a
new
power
in
Central Asia.
They
crossed
the
Oxus
and
gained
a
permanent
foothold
in
the areas
beyond
it. In
the first half
of
the
eighth
century
Islamic
troops conquered
the
Jaxartes'
provinces
where the centers of
Hellenistic
culture and
Buddhism
were soon to
become centers of
Islamic
and
Arabic
culture.
A
confrontation with
China,
whose Turkish
vassal
states
were
occupied
by
Islamic
troops,
was
inevitable. A
55-year
struggle
between
China and
the
Arabs
ended in
751
when
the Islamic
forces annihilated
a
Chinese
army
on the
Talas
River.
China lost
its
control over
Central
Asia.
The Arabs'
huge
success was
owing
not
only
to Arab or Islamic
military
capacity
and
religious
zeal
but
also
to the world situation at that
time:
the
weakness
of
both the
Byzantine
and
Sassanid
empires, centering
on
their
struggle
for
supremacy
and their
efforts to
check
the barbarian
invaders.
The
continuing
challenge
and
gigantic imperial
responsibilities
took
a
heavy
toll
of
their
resources and
energy.
Internal weaknesses were
not
easy
to
overcome.
The
obvious
disintegration
in
Persia,
predating
the clash with
the
Arabs,
and
the
revolts of
Byzantine
provinces
in
the East
as
well as unstable
Byzantine
rule
in
the
West
accelerated
the
expansion
of
the Arabs. Furthermore
the
Byzantine
Empire was facing an insoluble problem - lack of manpower - and Gaulish and
Germanic
Europe
did
not
represent
a
Mediterranean
power.
The
disunity
of
India
encouraged
the
Arabs to march
upon
northwest
Indian
areas,
which
had
already
been
incorporated
into the
Persian
and
Hellenistic
cultures.
Owing
to
0020-7438/79/0300-0408
$0I.50
?
1979 Cambridge University
Press
435
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8/9/2019 The Era of Suleyman Magnificent-crisis of Orient..
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436
Subhi
Labib
local
conflicts,
the Arabs
could invade
the Indus
Valley.
China of the
seventh
and
eighth
centuries
was not
strong
enough
to
check the eastward
drive
of
the Arabs.
It was not even able to support Persia against the invaders; when the defeated
Persian
king
sent
several
embassies to
the
son of heaven
he declined to offer
any
military help against
the
victorious
Arabs.
The
Arabs
gained
the
support
and
cooperation
of
the
indigenous
population
in
the
area
they conquered,
thus
furthering
their
expansive policy.
On the
western
front the
Berbers took
a
major
part
in
the invasion of
Spain
as
well as in
the
raids
on
Sicily
and the western
Mediterranean.
They
even
supported
the Arabs
in
subduing
rebellious
Berber tribes
and
Berbers
allied with
Byzantium
in
the
Maghrib.
On the eastern
front
(Oxus-Jaxartes)
the Persian mawali
(clients)
who
fought with the Arabs were in fact fighting against their old 'national' enemies,
the
Turks. On both
frontiers,
Islam
became a
dynamic
factor
of
integration
and
inspiration.
The
new Muslims
of
the
conquered
areas
-
Persia
and the
Maghrib
are the best
examples
-
were now
ready
to die
in
establishing
the Islamic
principles
of
equality
among
the believers.
It
was
Islam
that
gave
them
backbone
and
put
into
their hands a
weapon
against
their masters: the
Arabs and
the
Arab
Umayyad
house
(661-750).
With
the rise of the Abbasids
the
Empire
became
primarily
Muslim,
and
exclusive
Arab
predominance
ceased.
Power now
lay
not with the Arab
tribes but
with
professional
soldiers and administrators.
The
soldiers
were Persians
as
well
as
Arabs;
from the middle
of
the ninth
century, they
were
usually
chosen
from
among
the Turkish slaves
of the
Caliphs,
whose
power by
the
beginning
of the tenth
century
was
in
steady
decline.
The nomadic
Turkish
peoples
began
to
play
a decisive role in Islamic
history
-
the
Maghrib
excluded
-
in
the tenth
century.
Before
the
end of that
century
and
during
the
eleventh
century,
several
migrations
of
Turkish
peoples deeply
affected
the
history
of
Eastern
Europe
and the
Middle East. The
most
important
Turkish
migration
into
the
Islamic
East
was that
of the
Saljiiqs,
known
by
the
name
of the
family
(Saljfq)
that
led them.
The
Saljuqs
entered Ma-wara'
an-Nahr
(Transoxiana)
in the late tenth
century
and
adopted
Sunni Islam before
crossing
the
Oxus,
that
is
to
say,
before
their
penetration
into the Islamic
world.
As
auxiliary
troops
of
the
warring
Muslim
powers
in
Khurasan
and
Transoxiana
they
soon overcame their
masters.
In
the first
half
of
the eleventh
century
they
even
expanded
their
military
and
political
power
to Iran.
In
1055
they
entered
Baghdad
as
deliverers
of
the Abbasids
or as
champions
of the Sunni
cause,
thus
putting
an end
to
the
Buyid
(Shi'i)
hegemony
over the
Abbasid
(Sunni) Caliphate.
Not
only
did
they
seize
power
in
the Abbasid
Empire,
they
also
challenged
Fatimid
rule
in
Syria.
Furthermore,
they
broke
through
the traditional frontiers
between Byzantium and the Islamic world. After controlling Armenia the Saljuqs
won
a
decisive battle
against
Byzantium
at
Manzikert,
near Lake
Van,
in
I071.
It
was the most
disastrous battle
in
Byzantium's
later
history.
The
immediate
result
of
Manzikert
was
the
intensive
migration
of
the Muslim
Saljfq
and
Turco-
men
hordes into
Asia
Minor,
the
heartland of the
Byzantine
Empire
in Asia.
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8/9/2019 The Era of Suleyman Magnificent-crisis of Orient..
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The
Era
of
Suleyman
the
Magnificent 437
Under
the
pressure
of
increasing
Turkish
expansion
in Asia
Minor,
and
owing
to their lack
of armies and
pressing
financial
difficulties,
the
Byzantines
repeated-
ly appealed to the Pope for help in expelling the Turks from Asia Minor. The
papacy,
whose
policy against
Islam had
been successful in
Spain,
Italy,
and
Sicily,
was now
ready
to extend
the
war
against
the
Turks. Manzikert
justified
Western
intervention.
The
goal
of the West was not
only
to rescue
Byzantium
but also to release
the Christian
holy
places
from
the
hands of the unbelievers.
Neither
aim was realized.
The
crusading
challenge
for the
deliverance
of
the
Holy
Land ended
in a
complete victory
for Islam.
Even
Asia
Minor was almost
lost
to the Turkish hordes while
the Franks
were
holding Constantinople (1204-
1261).
Not
only
in
Syria
and
Egypt
but also in
North
Africa,
the
Islamic
ecumene
built an
impregnable,
unshakable barrier between
Africa
and
the West.
This
is
the most
decisive
and definite
change
in
the
history
of Africa from the rise
of
Islamic world
power
to the
Portuguese
discovery
of the
Cape
of Good
Hope,
and
even
the
Spanish
discovery
of
America
-
that is to
say
from
the seventh to
the sixteenth
century.
During
this
long
period
Islamic
maritime
power
in the
Mediterranean deteriorated
considerably.
The
long
challenge
with
Byzantium
but,
more
importantly,
with
the Christian
Western maritime
trade
republics
-
primarily
the Italian but
also
the Normans in
Sicily
and south
Italy
-
put
an end
to Islamic naval
power
in
the Mediterranean. Never
again,
after the loss of
Cilicia, Crete,
Cyprus,
Sicily,
Malta,
and the Balearic
Islands,
did medieval
Islamic
powers
regain
their
position
of
superiority
in
Mediterranean waters.
Even the creation of a
huge
navy
(with
seven
hundred
vessels,
considered the
biggest navy
in
the
Mediterranean) by
the Almohad
Caliph
'Abdal-Mu'min
(II30-II63),
cannot minimize the
significance
of
this
basic historical
change.
Only
in
the
sixteenth
century
did the Ottomans
revive Islamic naval
power
in
the
Mediterranean for a
limited
period.
In terms of
economic
history
and
challenge,
the Muslims
gradually
became the
only
big
business
partners
of the Italian
merchants.
In
accordance
with
the
state's newly crystallized Islamic Mediterranean policy, these Italian merchants
were
allowed to trade
only
at
certain
points
on
the Islamic
Mediterranean coast.
In
other
words,
the
African
and
Asiatic
(Syrian)
coastline of the Mediterranean
remained an
iron
curtain built
up
by
Islam to
face the
West. This Islamic
front
was able
to check
all
the
crusading enterprises.
Even the
rapid
Mongol
expansion
in
the thirteenth
century
did not
destroy
it;
Egypt
survived the
Mongol
storm.
Thus,
no Asiatic or
European
power endangered
Islamic
superiority
and
pene-
tration in
Africa from
the
rise of
the Islamic world
power
in
the seventh
century
until
the
Portuguese geographical
discoveries
in
the sixteenth
century.
The
situation in Asia was somewhat different. The huge Mongol Empire established
a
Pax
Mongolica
throughout
Asia
and
opened
its
trade routes
-from the
frontiers in
Asia Minor and the Black
Sea
to
the
Chinese
ports
-
to its
neighbors.
Western
merchants and Frankish
missionaries
began
to
cross
Asia for
the
first
time
since the
rise
of
Islam. The Pax
Mongolica
or
Pax
Tartarica,
which
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8/9/2019 The Era of Suleyman Magnificent-crisis of Orient..
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438
Subhi
Labib
lasted
for about
a
century
(from
the
middle
of
the thirteenth
century
to
the
middle of the
fourteenth)
ended
with the
disintegration
of the
Mongol
Empire.
During
the
Mongol
era of
world
supremacy, however,
no effective
political
or
military cooperation
came
into
being
between
Mongols
and Franks. Not less
important
is
the
fact
that Islam
began
to
spread among
the
Mongols
themselves
as
well as
among
their Turkish
subjects,
thus
expanding
the
Islamic
ecumene.
Ii
In
1243
the
Mongols destroyed
the
Rum-Saljuq army
at
K6sedagh
(near
Siwas),
transforming
Turkish Anatolia into
a
Mongol
protectorate.
But
the
Mongols respected
the
independence
of the Greek
emperor,
who
resided
in
Nicaea after
the
loss
of
Constantinople.
They
did not attack
Frankish
Con-
stantinople.
In
fact,
both
the
Greek and the Frankish
emperors
were allowed
to
keep
their
holdings
to counterbalance
the
Saljuq
vassal state in Asia
Minor.
In
126I
the Greeks
recovered
Constantinople,
but
they
never succeeded
in reinte-
grating
their
empire. They
even
neglected
the fortification and defense
of
the
remnant
Byzantine holdings
in Asia Minor after
moving
their
capital
to
Constan-
tinople.
But,
it
was neither
the remote
Mongols
nor
the
weak
Rum-Saljiq
dynasty
that filled
the vacuum
in Asia Minor
after
1261;
this was
destined
for the
Turcoman Ghazi
emirates,
whose
population
increased
steadily
through
Turkish
immigrants escaping
the
Mongol
devastations, and also at the
expense
of the
Greek
population
in the
newly occupied
Anatolian
areas.
By
the middle of the
fourteenth
century
the
Ghazi
emirates
had
annexed
almost all the Asiatic
possessions
of
the
Byzantines.
The
Ottoman
Ghazi
emirate was
the
most successful
and militant. After the
capture
of
Bursa
(original-
ly
Brusa),
Nicaea
(Iznik),
and
Nicomedia
(Izmit),
the Ottomans
strategically
presented
the
most acute
and
pressing
peril
to
Constantinople.
Moreover,
the
conflict
between the
competing
emperors
John
VI
Cantacuzenus
and
John
V
Palaeologus
ended
in the
Ottomans
successfully
establishing
Islamic
rule
in the
Balkans, and from about 1365 Adrianople (Edirne) became their new residence.
Furthermore,
the
untimely
death of the Serbian
King
Stephen
Uros
IV
Duschan
in
1355
and
the death of
the
Hungarian
King
Louis
(Liajos)
the
Great
of
Anjou
in
1382
left
a
vacuum
in
southeastern
Europe
which
was filled
by
the
Ottomans,
and not
by
the
Hungarians
with
whom
Bosnia,
Bulgaria,
Wallachia,
and Mol-
davia
did
not
intensively
cooperate
-
as their
vassal states
-
against
the
Ottoman
peril.
The
new
masters,
the
Ottomans,
concentrated
on
subduing
the
area
between
the
Danube
and
the
Maritza.
In
1389,
barely
40
years
after
they
began
to settle on
European
soil,
the Ottomans
won
a
decisive
victory
at the
Battle
of
the Amselfeld (field of the blackbird; Turkish Kosovo). Thereafter they became
the most successful
power
in the
Balkans.
In the defeat at
Kosovo,
Serbia
-
like
Bulgaria
before
her
-
became
a
vassal
state
and the Serbians
had
to
fulfill their
military
obligations
in all the
major
battles
of
early
Ottoman
history:
in
Bayezid's
attack on
Wallachia
in
1395,
in
the
victorious
engagement against
the
Crusaders
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8/9/2019 The Era of Suleyman Magnificent-crisis of Orient..
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The Era
of Suleyman
the
Magnificent
439
at
Nicopolis
in
1396,
and,
finally,
in the fatal battle of Ankara
against
Timur
Lenk
in
1402.
Thereafter,
the
Ottomans lost
their
possessions
in Asia Minor
to
the
Mongols,
and
they
had to recreate their
domination
in
Europe after the
Mongol
retreat.
Western
Europe
did
not
make use
of this rare
chance. Almost
exactly
at that time
- the middle
of the
fourteenth
century
-
the German colonial
movement
in
southeastern
Europe
came to
a
standstill.
In
1413
Sultan Mehmed
I
restored
Ottoman
unity,
and the Turkish menace
was once more
crystallized
when
H-ungary
proved
unable
to
regain
Serbia
or
any
strategic
position
to the south of the
Danube. With Murad's
(Murad
II:
142i-1451)
victory
against
Hungary
and
her allies at
Varna in
i444,
the
Otto-
mans consolidated
their
power
on the Danubian line.
The
Hungarian
hero
(and
regent
of
Hungary during
the
minority
of
Ladislau
V),
John
Hunyadi,
insisted
on
avenging
the defeat
of
Varna. He
penetrated
into Serbia and met
Murad II
in
Kosovo,
where the Christian
resistance
fought
its
last
battle
(1448)
to
rescue the
Balkans. After
1448,
it
was
only
a matter
of time before Christian resistance
in the
Balkans was
brought
to an
end.
On the
Islamic and
Turcoman front the
Ottomans absorbed
all
other
Turco-
man
Ghazi
principalities,
but
they
still
had to face two
opponents
in
Anatolia.
First,
the
Shi'i
Turcomen; second,
the
Karamanians whose
prince
resided
in
Konya
and
enjoyed
the
support
of the
Mamluk Sultans as well as the
rising
religious
and
military
order
of the
Safavids
in
Iran.
Although
Safavid activities
accelerated the
crystallization
of the
challenge
between Iran and the Ottoman
Empire,
the
capture
of
Constantinople
was
the more
pressing
question
after
the
Ottoman success
in
storming
and
destroying
the
Hexamilion,
the Greek
wall
across the Isthmus of
Corinth,
in
1446
(and
after Murad's
triumph
at Kosovo in
1448).
The
Ottoman
state,
which inherited the
Byzantine Empire
in the
first
half of the
fifteenth
century,
needed the
natural
imperial
capital
of
the
area,
Constantinople.
Before the
end
of
May 1453,
Constantinople
was in
the hands of
the
Ottomans,
and
Hagia
Sofia was
converted into a
mosque
when Sultan
Mehmed the
Conqueror entered it to pray. Soon the Ottoman Sunni conqueror proclaimed
himself the
protector
of the
Orthodox
Christians,
the
Greek
Church,
thus
announcing
the
main
religious
orientation
and the cultural
characteristic
of the
Empire:
Islamic
and
Christian
orthodoxy
under
Turkish
leadership.
The
traditional
rights
and
obligations
of
an
Orthodox Patriarch in
an Islamic state
were established.
In
his wars in
Europe
and Asia
Mehmed
II
was
annihilating
the
strategic
position
of
Venice and Genoa in
the Ottoman
waters,
not
only
in
the
Aegean
and
the
Sea
of
Marmara but also
in
the
Black
Sea,
even before the
annexation
of
the
Crimea in
I475.
On the Danubian front Mehmed failed to take Belgrade in 1456,
the last
barrier
to his
crossing
the
Danube and
marching
upon
Hungary,
owing
to the
effectiveness of
Hungarian
resistance
under
Hunyadi's
leadership.
Thereafter he
concentrated his
efforts on
incorporating
the whole
Balkan
peninsula
to
the
south
of
the
Danube
and
proceeding
into
Italy.
In the
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Subhi
Labib
Balkans Mehmed's
success
was
sure.
His forces sent to south
Italy
in
1480
captured
Otranto
(near
Brindisi).
The
fall of
Otranto
might
have
been
followed
by the sack of Rome, but Mehmed died suddenly in 1481, while he was preparing
an
immense
expedition.
The
Ottoman
forces
did
not
penetrate
into
Italy
and had
to evacuate
during
the
rule
of
Bayezid
II.
Furthermore,
Mlehmed
checked Uzun
Hasan's
power
in
the East.
Uzun
Hasan
(I423?-1474), originally
the chief
of
the Turcoman tribes known
as
the
Ak-Koyunlu
(
=
the
white
sheep)
or the
Ak-Koyunlu dynasty
or
state,
extended
his
protection
to the
Greek
Emperor
of
Trebizond as
well as
to the
Turcoman
beys
of
Karaman,
the
bitter enemies
of
the
Ottomans in east
Anatolia. In
1472,
he
even became
an
ally
of
Venice,
Cyprus,
and the
Knights
Hospitallers.
He
prom-
ised to send a force of
30,000
men to the shores of the Mediterranean
where
they
were to
be
joined
by
Venetians armed with firearms.
This
remained
only
a
plan.
What
really
happened
was
a
separate
quarrel
between
the Islamic
powers.
At
first
the Ottomans routed Uzun
Hasan's
forces.
This
victory
was
essentially owing
to
the use
of firearms
by
the
Ottomans,
and
Uzun Hasan
had to
give
up
further
incursions into Ottoman
territory.
In
I474
lMehmed's
forces
easily
completed
the
conquest
of
the
Karamanid
possessions.
Thereafter
the
Ottomans
had to
face
the
Dhu'l-Qadr
(Zulkadir
or
Dhulghadir)
in
Elbistan,
and
their
overlords,
the
Mamluks,
in
southeastern
Anatolia.
Mehmed died
in
1481.
Two
sons survived him:
Bayezid,
the
candidate of the
Devshirme
party,
and
Jem,
the candidate
of
the
Turkish
nobility.
In their
competition
for
power
Bayezid
reached the
capital
earlier
and became
sultan.
Jem
decided to resist
but
had to
flee
to
Europe
when
he
failed
to
gain
power
in
Anatolia. The
story
of
Jem
is
unique
in Ottoman
history.
The
simple
fact that
a
brother of the
ruling
sultan
was still
living
and free could
disturb
the internal
peace
and order
of the
Ottoman
state.
The
European
powers,
which
were still
hopelessly fighting
the
Ottomans,
understood how to
make use
of the
oppor-
tunity.
Even
the Mamluk
sultan
in Cairo was
now
very
anxious
to
catch
the
victim that he
once
barely
supported
to
gain power.
In
1495
Jem
died in
myster-
ious
circumstances,
and the constant
danger
that a coalition of Christian
powers
might
invade
the
Ottoman
Empire using
Jem
as their
instrument was
over.
Now
Bayezid
continued
the
work of
Mehmed II: the
consolidation
of the
Ottoman
power
on the Danubian
line,
along
the
eastern Islamic
frontier,
and
in the eastern
Mediterranean.
Bayezid's
rival in
Hungary
was
King
Matthias
I
(I458-1490),
son
of the
Hungarian
hero
John
Hunyadi.
In the
Balkans he retained a
small
area in
northern
Bosnia with the
support
of
the
Croatian
nobility.
No serious
conflict
occurred
between
him and
Bayezid.
In
fact
Matthias Corvinus
almost
dropped
the
idea
of
serious offensive operations against the Turks; instead he began to realize his
dreams
of
uniting
Central
Europe
under his
own rule and
of
acquiring
the
im-
perial
crown.
An unsuccessful Ottoman attack
on
Belgrade
and
raids
into
Transylvania,
Croatia,
and Carinthia
ended in
1495
when
Bayezid
once more
concluded
a
truce
with
Hungary,
in order
to
concentrate
on the
Italian
conflict.
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In
fact,
the French
claim
to
supremacy
in
Italy
accelerated the Ottoman
penetration
into the Adriatic and the raids
upon
the Italian littoral.
Venice,
facing
both France
and Ottoman
penetration,
was
alarmed at the
growth
of
the
Ottoman
fleet both
in number and activities - not
only
in the
Aegean
but also in
the
Adriatic,
where Venice still
possessed
her old
strongholds
on the coasts
of
Dalmatia,
Albania,
and the Morea.
Furthermore,
the
Ottoman fleet was
sup-
ported
by
the Muslim corsairs who were
becoming
a formidable
power
at
sea.
Owing
to financial
difficulties
and lack of
manpower
the
Signoria
could
not
equip
a
fleet
strong
enough
to beat
the Ottomans. The
Holy League,
formed
in
1501,
including
the
Pope,
France,
and
Hungary,
was weak from
the
beginning,
and
the Ottomans
annexed a number
of
Venetian
naval
strongholds
in
the
Adriatic.
In
1503
and
in
1506 respectively,
the
continental-Mediterranean
European
Ottoman war
was
concluded
and the Christian
states,
implicated
directly
or
indirectly
in the
war,
obtained a truce from the Sultan.
Poland
was included in the
peace treaty
of
I
503,
which also
asserted
the Porte's
acquisition
of Moldavia and the
annexation of
Kilia and
Akkerman,
at
the
mouth
of the Dniester.
In
fact,
lack
of
cooperation
between the
Jagellon
brothers
to
fill
the vacuum
left
by
the
disintegration
of the Golden Horde
established Ottoman
suzerainty
in what we call Romania and the
Crimea.
After
1503
Bayezid
had to face the
threatening
situation
in
Anatolia and on
the
Islamic
front,
where the Safavids
had
strong religious
and
political
chances to
establish their
power
for three essential reasons. First there were the
military
victories
of
both the
Ak-Koyunlu
of
Diyar
Bakr
and the Timfrids over the
Kara-
Koyunlu
of
Azerbaijan
and
Irak.
The
dynastic
feuds
among
the
Ak-Koyunlu
after the death of
Uzun
Hasan
(1453-1478)
ended also the
close alliance
of
the
Safavids with the
white
sheep
tribal
confederations,
who
then became the
target
for
Safavid
political
and
military
ambitions.
In
fact,
the
contemporary
Mamluk
sultans
missed the chance to
consolidate
their
power
in the
area,
and
the
rapid
collapse
of the
Ak-Koyunlu
left a
political
vacuum
in
Diyar
Bakr
and
Azerbaijan
which
was
only
filled
by
the Safavids. Furthermore the Timfirids failed to
maintain themselves in western Iran after the death of Shah Rukh (1405-
1447).
In
1500
Isma'il as-Safawi entered
Azerbaijan.
In
I50i
he routed the
forces
of
the
Ak-Koyunlu,
and in the same
year
he
proclaimed
himself
the
first ruler
of
the
Shi'i
dynasty
in Persia.
There
were hundreds of thousands of Shi'i of
various
persuasions
in Anatolia
who
could be
suspected
of
favoring
the Safavids.
The unbroken
vigorous
Safavid
propaganda
in Anatolia
in
the
second
half of the
fifteenth
century
won remarkable
success
among
the Turcomen in different
parts
of
Ottoman Anatolia. As
early
as
1502
Bayezid, already conscious of the danger to the Ottomans of the new Shi'i
emperor
in
Persia,
Shah
Isma'il,
had
ordered the
deportation
of Shi'i
elements
from
Asia
Minor to
the Morea. The
Shi'i nomadic
rebels
in
Anatolia,
distin-
guished
at
the
time
by
their
red hats
(known
as
Qizilbash),
owed
religious
as
well
as
political allegiance
to
their Safavid
leaders
in
Persia and
began
to undermine
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Subhi
Labib
Ottoman
rule in Anatolia.
Their
leader,
Shah
Kuli,
preached
the end of Ottoman
domination.
An
Ottoman
army
drove
Shah Kuli from
Teke
(in
southwestern
Anatolia),
where the revolt
began,
toward
Kaysari
in east Anatolia.
Near this
town
a battle was
fought,
in
151
I,
in which
the
Anatolian Safavids were
defeated
and
chased
from
Asia Minor.
Like the Ottomans
the Safavids
recognized
and
represented
the
principles
of
Ghazw
and Futuwwa
with
their
dynamic
impact
on both Islamic
expansion
and
Islamic
urban
communities
in
Anatolia. The Futuwwa
was
a
brotherhood
or
fraternity
that
combined Islamic ethics
and
mystical
inclinations
with
the
virtues
of
the
Turkish or Persian
warrior.
Akhism,
a
specific
Anatolian Futuwwa with
Shi'i
coloring,
had
already
been
acknowledged by
Sunni
authorities.
It
spread
in
towns and
dominated the Islamic
'guilds,'
the
groups
of
artisans
and
craftsmen,
which never
possessed
the
monopoly
of
production
and distribution in
an
Islamic
town.
With the
development
of
the
Ottoman centralistic
administration
in the
fifteenth
century
and
owing
to their Shi'i
links,
the
guilds
lost
the freedom
they
had
enjoyed
during
the
early period
of islamization and turkification
of Asia
Minor.
It
was
exactly during Bayezid's
and
Selim's
rule
that this fundamental
change
was
enforced.
Both sultans
simultaneously
suppressed
the
'guilds'
and
Shi'ism
in
Anatolia.
In
1512
the
ageing
Sultan
Bayezid
II was forced to abdicate
and
give
way
to
his
son
Selim
I
(1512-1520),
who led the inevitable war
with the Safavid
Shah
Isma'il of Persia and the Mamluk Sultan Qansufhal-Ghauri of
Egypt.
The
conflict of the three Islamic
powers
for
hegemony
in the Middle
East
culminated
in
1514
when Selim
I
defeated the Safavids
at Chaldiran.
There
is no
doubt
that the
victory
at Chaldiran was
essentially owing
to the new
'Frankish
Weapon,'
the firearms
which
the
Ottomans
adopted
rapidly,
extensively,
and
with
great
effect.
This
Ottoman
victory
did not terminate
Safavid
rule;
but the
Safavids did
not
dare to attack
Asia Minor
after their defeat at
Chaldiran,
and
the
Shi'i in
Anatolia
were
now
at
the
mercy
of
Ottoman rule.
The Ottoman triumph at Chaldiran and the annexation of Dhu'l-Qadr by
Selim
accelerated the decisive
military
confrontation
between
the
Mamluks
and
the
Ottomans.
In
fact,
the two
big
Sunni
powers preferred
to reckon
up
rather
than to
face the
Portuguese
danger
in the Indian Ocean
with double
energy.
Once
more firearms
decided the
future of the Islamic
Middle
East.
Like the
Safavids,
the Mamluks
did not
even
try
to overcome
or circumvent
Ottoman
artillery by
executing
a
massive
surprise
attack
in
the
appropriate
moment.
With
their
victory
at
Marj
Dabiq
in
1516
and
Raidaniyya
in
1517
the Ottomans
inherited
the Mamluk
empire,
which
included
Egypt,
Syria,
northern
Sudan,
great dominions and supremacy in the Red Sea area as well as overlordship of
Yemen
and the
Islamic
holy
cities.
Selim also
began
the
annexation
of
the
Maghrib.
During
the
reign
of
Bayezid
II
began
the Ottoman
penetration
into
the
western
Mediterranean.
The
fleet
was
employed
to rescue
Moorish
refugees
before
and
after
the
fall of
Granada
in
1492.
During
Selim's
rule
the
Ottomans
gained
a
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foothold in the
Maghrib,
where the
Spaniards
had
already occupied
the
principal
points
on the coast
within a few
years (before
the end
of
the
fifteenth
century
and
the beginning of the sixteenth). Although the Spanish policy of expansion was
based
on
the
occupation
of
strategic
points
from
which
raids
could
be carried
out
in the
surrounding
countryside
at
favorable
moments,
Selim decided
to free the
Mediterranean
coasts of the
Maghrib
from the new
aggressors
and to
reestablish
the
traditional Mediterranean barrier
between
Africa and the west.
Not
only
the
political
weakness of the
Maghribi
states and the
discovery
of
the
Cape
of Good
Hope,
but
also the
conquest
of
the Mamluk
empire, Libya
included,
made the
Ottoman intervention
in
the
Maghrib
inevitable.
The
Ottoman
conquest
of
North
Africa
was,
in
fact,
initiated
by
the Barbarossa
brothers,
who
shifted
their theater of
action
from
the
Aegean
Sea to the
western Mediterranean.
The
famous
admiral
or
champion
among
them,
Khayr
ad-Din,
refused to
cooperate
with the Christian
powers
and
linked
his
destiny
with
that
of the
Ottoman
Empire.
In
I519
he
swore
homage
to Sultan
Selim,
who
gave
him
the
title
of
pasha
and
appointed
him
Beylerbey
of
Algiers.
Between
1517
and
1574
the
Ottomans
completed
the annexation of
the
Maghrib
except
for
Morocco. In
other
words,
all the
Mediterranean outlets of the
African
and
Asiatic trade
routes
were
now
under
the control of
the Porte
and of the
state
of
Morocco.
But
before
the end
of
the
fifteenth
century
the
Portuguese
were to discover the
route
of
the
Cape
of
Good
Hope,
thus
ending
the
unique
significance
of
the
geographi-
cal location of the Islamic world in the traffic between East and West. Sultan
Selim, however,
kept
up
the
Islamic/Egyptian
traditional
monopolistic
trade
policy.
The
treaty
he concluded with Venice
(I517)
was
more
or
less a
copy
of
pre-Ottoman agreements
between
the
Mamluks and
the
Signoria.
Furthermore,
Selim
was
concentrating
on
increasing
his
Mediterranean naval
power.
In
1515
he
began
with
the creation of
a
great
arsenal at
Istanbul,
where
a
new,
more
powerful
fleet was built. Also
in
the South
Seas
the Ottomans
inherited
Egypt's
responsibility.
It
is
important
to
notice
that
the Ottomans
were involved in
the
challenge
against
the
Portuguese
even
before the annexation
of the Mamluk empire. After the famous victory of the Portuguese against the
combined
Egyptian
and Indian
forces at Diu
in
1509
Sultan
Bayezid
II
offered
his
support
to
Egypt
in her
jihad
against
the infidels. In
15
1 four
hundred
guns
and
about two tons of
gunpowder
were
sent
by
the
Ottomans to assist the
Egyptian
forces
fighting
against
the
Portuguese
in the
south.
Moreover,
the
Ottomans
placed
at the
disposal
of
the Mamluk
government
two thousand
warriors
trained
to
use firearms. This
force,
under the command of
Salman Re'is
(
=
Salman
al-'Uthani),
reached Cairo
in
1512
and
was
immediately
sent
to
the
Red
Sea
headquarters,
where
a
bitter
quarrel
began
between the Mamluk
admiral, Emir Hussein, and Salman. In 1517 the Ottomans took Cairo while the
Egyptian
forces were
fighting
to
strengthen
their
position
in
Yemen
instead of
checking
the
Portuguese
advance in
the Indian Ocean. Before
Salman
Re'is
arrived in
Cairo to
meet Sultan Selim in
1517,
he had had
Emir
Hussein
killed.
Both Selim
and his son
Suleyman
retained
Salman Re'is
as
the Ottoman admiral
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Subhi Labib
in the
south,
where
the
Egyptian
Mamluk and
Yemenite forces were still
fighting
against
Ottoman domination
in Yemen.
III
Selim left to his son
Suleyman
(1520-1566)
an
empire
vastly
increased
in
size
and
resources
and able to
resume
the
offensive
against
the Christians
on a
formidable
scale.
Belgrade
surrendered
to the
Ottoman
forces
in
August
1521
and the
route to
Hungary
was
open.
On
29
August 1526
came the
devastating
Hungarian
defeat at Mohacs.
Ten
days
later,
the
victors entered Buda. Two-
thirds
of
Hungary
were
now
lost to the Ottomans.
The
victory
at
Mohacs
encouraged Suleyman to march upon Vienna. The siege of Vienna in 1529 was,
in
fact,
the
most
daring
military
enterprise
in Ottoman
history
and
the
climax of
the
Turkish drive westward.
The Christians
held
out
against
the
Turkish
assault,
however,
and it was not
the Christian
defence
but
the difficulties of the
Ottoman
expedition
which
decided the future
of the Ottoman assault
on
Vienna.
Problems
of
supply
and
transport
were
especially
hard
to resolve.
In
spite
of
his
earlier
misadventure
Suleyman repeated
his march
to
capture
Vienna
in
I532.
The
campaign
did not
fulfill its
aim,
nor
did he reach Vienna.
In
spite
of
his
failure to
capture
Vienna,
Suleyman
was
the
ruler
of the
biggest
empire
in
the
'ancient world'
to
the west
of India.
He
challenged
not
only
the
Archduke
of
Austria and
claimant to
the throne
of
Hungary,
but also Charles
V,
the last
Emperor (15 I9-1556)
of the
Holy
Roman
Empire.
In their
conflict
Suleyman
and
Charles
had to determine
the future
of
Italy
and the
supremacy
in
the western
Mediterranean.
Suleyman's
ally
in
this
conflict was Francis
I,
the bitter
enemy
of Charles
V.
The Ottomans
possessed
every
means to
accomplish
their
supremacy
in
the western Mediterranean after
their
overwhelming
success
in the eastern
Mediterranean:
great
arsenals,
abundant
timber,
and
good
warriors. What
they
needed was
an efficient
high
command,
a
match
for Andrea
Doria,
the
best admiral
of his
time
and the
Genoese
ally
of Charles.
Suleyman
appointed
Khair ad-Din Barbarossaadmiral
of the Ottoman fleet
in
the
Mediterranean
(I533).
He
and his
splendid
sailors
and corsairs
were
well
trained
in
ceaseless
sea
forays against
the
Christians.
In
1534
Barbarossa
and the
Ottoman
fleet
captured
Tunis,
but
in
the
following year
Charles led
a
campaign,
took
it,
and restored
the Hafsid
ruler under
his
suzer-
ainty.
Charles's
Spanish
troops
were now stationed
in
La
Goletta,
the fortress
that controlled
the Tunisian
coast.
The
challenge
for
supremacy
in
Italy
reached
its
climax when
Francis
I
declared war
on Charles
in
1536,
hoping
to
regain
Genoa and to
enter
Milan.
Francis's ally, Suleyman, did not attack Italy at the same time. In 1537, after the
Ottomans
had finished
their
naval
preparations,
Khayr
ad-Din advanced
to
Otranto,
raided
Apulia,
and
kept
the
command
of the
strait of Otranto.
But
in
spite
of this
success,
neither Khair
ad-Din
with
his
big
fleet,
nor
Francis,
who
badly
needed financial
support,
was
able
to stabilize
his
position
in
Italy.
The
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445
Ottomans
did not dare
to
attack
Rome,
and
Francis
began
to
negotiate
with
Charles
for
peace
on the Italian front. The
French
danger
to
Genoa was
over,
and Andrea
Doria
began
to attack Barbarossa
in
the
strait
of
Otranto.
A
turning
point
in
the
sea war for
supremacy
was effected when
Suleyman
ordered
his
forces
to concentrate
on
attacking
Corfu
instead of
Italy.
Corfu was a
Venetian island
and an
important goal
of
the Ottoman
strategy
to
dominate
the
central Mediterranean. With
Khayr
ad-Din's
attack on
Corfu,
Charles
won
a
new
ally against
the
Ottomans
-
Venice
-
and
a
new
league
between
the
Emperor,
the
Pope,
and
Venice was
created.
In
1538
the
Ieague's
fleet
was
defeated
at
Prevesa
by
Barbarossa.
Although
the Christians lost
only
a few
ships,
Prevesa was not followed
up
with a
decisive
engagement.
On
the
other
side,
neither
Suleyman
nor
his
ally,
Francis
I,
renewed
his
attack on
Italy
after the
failure of
1536-1537.
The Ottomans
kept
their
supremacy
in the Mediterranean
from
Prevesa to
Lepanto
(1538-I571).
Soon after
Prevesa
the Christian
League
lost its value. Then Venice
aimed
essentially
at
getting
Charles's
support
to
stabilize
its
position
in the eastern
Mediterranean,
and Charles had to
concentrate on
defending
his
position against
the Berber corsairs
in
the
western
Mediterranean.
In
1540
the
Signoria
had to
conclude a
separate
and
humiliating
peace
treaty
with
the Porte.
On
the other
side,
Charles
renewed
his
attack
upon
the
strongholds
of
the
Muslim
fleet and
corsairs in
Barbary
without
success. The
splendid
imperial
armada of
5I6
sails,
carrying I2,330 sailors and 24,000 soldiers, suffered a disastrous defeat in
1541
(at
Algiers)
caused
by
storms and rains.
After this natural
catastrophe
Charles
was
neither
ready
nor
able
to
repeat
the assault.
Consequently
the
Holy
Roman
Empire
as well as
Europe's
Mediterranean maritime
powers acknowledged
the
de facto Ottoman sea
supremacy
in
the
Middle Basin
from
their defeat
at
Prevesa
in
1538
till
their
victory
at
Lepanto
in
1571. During
this
period
the Ottomans
completed
the
conquest
of
Tunis in
1569,
but the
strong
Turkish Armada
which
attacked the
Hospitallers
in
Malta in
1565
failed to
crush the Christian
resistance
in the central
Mediterranean. In
the
Levant the
Ottomans
assured
their
supremacy by taking Cyprus from Venice in 1570-1571. Once more the Christian
powers
-
Venice,
Genoa,
Spain,
the
Hospitallers,
and
the
Pope
-
formed an
alliance to check the
growing
supremacy
of
the
Ottomans in the Mediterranean.
In
other
words,
the
conquest
of Tunis in
I569
and
of
Cyprus
in
1571
led to the
inevitable
confrontation at
Lepanto,
the last
decisive
naval battle
in the
Mediterranean
until the
eighteenth
and
nineteenth centuries.
Lepanto,
which
ended in the
overwhelming
defeat of
the
Ottomans
(7
October
I57I),
also
put
an end
to
Islamic-Ottoman naval
supremacy
in the
Mediterranean,
in
spite
of
the fact that the Porte
restored
its
fleet
immediately
after the battle, that Venice concluded 'humiliating' peace terms with the Porte
in
1573,
and
that
the
Christians failed to
vanquish
the
corsairs
in
North
Africa.
Venice could
not afford
a
long
war
with the
Porte.
Also,
the brief
period
when
Phillip
II
had
been
able to
concentrate
his
forces
in
the
Mediterranean
had come
to an end.
Spain
was
now
deeply
involved
in
Western
Europe
and her financial
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446
Subhi Labib
crisis could
not
allow
any
big military
and
naval
engagement
in the
Mediter-
ranean.
Like
Venice
in
1573,
Phillip
had to
make
peace
with
the Porte
in
I581,
thus
giving up
the idea of
revenge
in
Africa under the
pressure
of
his
precarious
position
in
Europe.
In
I588
the
Spanish
Armada
was lost
in the
naval war
against England
and
during
its
journey
back. Even
after this
Spanish
catastrophe,
which created new
chances
for
the
Ottomans
in
the
Mediterranean,
the Porte
did not
develop
a
new
maritime
policy
which
would
assure Islamic
supremacy
after the
retreat
of
Spain
and
the
decline of
Venice.
In
fact,
neither
Suleyman
the
Magnificent
nor his
successors
began
constructive
plans
for the
future
-
either
in
the
Mediterranean or in the Indian
Ocean;
nor could
the
unhealable
struggle
on
the
heretic front
be
overlooked or
underestimated.
The
important
rivals of the Porte
after the
acquisition
of the Mamluk
empire
were the Shi'i Safavids.
Suleyman
found in France and Francis I a Christian
ally
against
Charles V.
In
the east
Charles
tried to establish
his
relations with Shah
Tahmasp (1524-1576).
In
1529
Charles's
envoys
met the
Muslim
rival of the
Ottomans. This
rapprochement
between the
Habsburgs
and the
Safavids
had
relatively
or almost
no
positive
or
military
effect. At
any
rate,
it
was one
of
Suleyman's pretexts
to attack
Persia,
in
order to solve frontier
problems
and
to
take
Iraq,
where the
Shah's
governor
of
Baghdad
had
offered
submission
to the
Porte. In
I534
Ottoman
forces
even succeeded in
entering
Tabriz.
Shah
Tahmasp
already
knew that his forces could not match
Suleyman's
Janissaries
and field artillery. He avoided all risk of a
great
battle and even removed his
capital
to
Qazvin.
In
1538
Basra
was
also
annexed.
There,
the
Porte established
an
arsenal and
a
base
of
operations
which had
little
strategic
importance.
In
1548 Suleyman
marched
once
more
upon
Tabriz,
but did not
conquer
it. He
returned
to Istanbul
in
December
1549
without
realizing
conclusive
results.
A
protracted
war
(1553-I555)
ended
in
the
destruction
of
the
Persian
border
defenses
that had
long
been
the main
point
of
departure
for
Persian
raids
into
Asia
Minor.
Now
Suleyman
was
ready
to
conclude
peace
with
the Safavids:
in
the
peace
of
Amasya
(May
I555)
the
Porte
abandoned
all
claim
to Tabriz
but
retained Iraq, together with most of Kurdistan, western Armenia, and western
Georgia.
This
peace
did
not terminate
the hostilities on the heretic
front,
which
drained Ottoman
resources
and
manpower during
the
following
centuries.
Suleyman
did
not
entirely
neglect
his
Islamic
obligations
in
the south.
In
1525
his
admiral
Salman Re'is
exacted from certain
Yemenite
coastal
areas
a
nominal
obedience;
a
confrontation
with
the
Portuguese,
however,
did
not
take
place.
In
1538
the
Porte established
Ottoman
rule
in
Aden
and
ended
Egyptian
resistance
in the
Yemen.
With the
reconquest
of
Basra in
I546
Suleyman
was
strategically
able to
attack
the
Portuguese
from
the Persian Gulf
as well as
from
the Red Sea. He sent three important expeditions against the Portuguese in the
Indian
Ocean.
The
first,
in
1538,
was to
support
Bahadur
Shah,
the
sultan of
Gujarat,
to
regain
Diu. In
spite
of
the
huge
armada
the Turkish
admiral
ordered
the
lifting
of the
blockade
of
Diu
after
about
twenty
days
of
siege.
The
two other
expeditions
hopelessly
tried to
capture
Ormuz on the Persian
side
of
the
Gulf,
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Magnificent 447
thus
stabilizing
the
Portuguese position
in western India as well as in the Gulf -
Ormuz,
Maskat,
and Bahrain. In the Red Sea
Suleyman,
on the
contrary,
chastised the
Portuguese
and
preserved
the medieval
policy, averting
'the evil
deeds
of
the
Portuguese
infidels' in that
Islamic
sea,
though
he
could not
annex
Christian
Ethiopia.
IV
Suleyman
lived
during
a
decisive
period
of world
history.
He was victorious
in
Europe
and the
Orient,
but
his
success was
obviously
limited.
Suleyman
consolidated
Ottoman
possessions
in
Europe,
and the
Danube became the
undisputed
Ottoman
frontier
in
the
north.
But
he
failed
to
incorporate
the
remote Danube or to take
Vienna,
the
gateway
to the center of
gravity
in the
west.
According
to his
concept,
which
he inherited from
later
medieval
Islam,
Rome was the center
of
the
Christian/Frankish
west. That
concept
was
un-
historical,
or at
least
not
up
to date. Rome
was never the
capital
of the
Holy
Roman
Empire,
whose center of
gravity
was to the north and
west
of the
Danube,
not to
the
south
of
it.
In
any
case,
Suleyman
also failed to
conquer
Rome or to
gain
a
foothold
in
Italy.
In
short,
the two red
apples,
Rome
and
Vienna,
did not
fall
into the
hands
of
the Ottomans.
Furthermore,
the Ottomans
did not
restore
the
unity
of the
Mediterranean,
although
Mehmed
the
Conqueror
revived the
Roman
imperial
title ;asar after the fall of
Constantinople.
The local
history
of
Western
Europe during Suleyman's reign
was dominated
by
two essential events:
the
rivalry
of the
Habsburgs
and
Valois,
and
the
Christian
Reformation
which
deeply
divided the
West.
They
did
not,
however,
seriously
change
the
balance
of
power.
From
1519
to
1559
the two
dynasties
struggled
for
supremacy
in
Europe
and
in
the western
Mediterranean.
Nevertheless,
after
1529
-
more
exactly,
after
the decisive
battle
of Pavia
(I525),
in which France
was defeated
-
the
French were
checked
and their
future success
comparatively
limited
until
1559
when the
Habsburg-Valois
struggle
came to an end with the
treaty of Le Cateau-Cambresis.
Le Cateau-Cambresis is a landmark
in
European history.
After
this
peace
treaty,
the
activities of
Europe
were stimulated and the
goal
was
the Atlantic
Ocean,
which
the
Turks,
Suleyman
the
Magnificant
included,
almost
entirely
neglected.
Charles
V
realized
that the heart of his
Empire
was in
Spain
and not
in
Central
Europe
and
Germany.
And it
was
Spain
more than the
imperial
gold
crown
that
made Charles
-
Spain,
and the
mines
of
America.
Suleyman
failed
to
realize the
significance
of
this
change
or to
foresee its
deep
impact
upon
Europe's
future and on
European
policy
from
then on.
In the Habsburg-Valois challenge for supremacy in Europe, Suleyman played
a
part
which
must be
considered of
second-grade importance.
Then
the
very
Christian
King
Francis
I
did not
cooperate (or
did not
succeed
in
cooperating)
with
Suleyman
in
his attack on
Italy.
Outside
Italy
their
cooperation
did
not
endanger
Charles's
position
in
Western
Europe.
Behind
and above
the
struggle
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448
Subhi
Labib
between
the
Habsburgs
and
Valois
(Francis
I
and his
successor
Henry II)
was a
clear
aim,
and
Suleyman
missed its
significance:
this
aim was
to hinder
the
Habsburgs' predominance
in
Europe,
to
hinder the concentration
of
power
in
one hand.
And this
was,
and
is,
exactly
the
backbone
of
the Germanic
way
of
political thinking
and
political
behavior.
The other
essential event that dominated the
local
history
of
Western
Europe
in the
sixteenth
century
was
the Christian Reformation.
To
weaken
the
position
of Charles and the
Habsburgs
in
Germany,
Suleyman
the
Magnificent
was
ready
to
encourage
the Protestant
movement.
He
even
promised
on
oath
that he would
not
harm the Protestant
princes
if
Germany
came
under his
sway. Suleyman
also
encouraged
the
spread
of
Calvinism
in
Hungary.
The
Ottoman
campaigns
against
Vienna
and
Austria, however,
worked
on
Germany
to
the
disadvantage
of both
Francis I and
Suleyman
the
Magnificent.
At
any
rate,
the rise of
Protestantism
in the
sixteenth
century
-
after the
discovery
of
the Americas
and
the
Cape
of
Good
Hope
-
is
the
best
proof
that
Europe
had
overcome
the
Islamic
pressure
or Islamic
danger
and
was
in
need
of
an
inner
religious
movement or
Reformation
to
counterbalance the
papacy
and
the
dominant
Catholic
Church.
v
Suleyman's activities did not match the new dimensions of the world in which
he
lived,
or,
simply
the
contemporary
politico-economic
map.
As we know
now,
in the
north
Suleyman
did not
confront the core
powers
of
Europe.
He
must
have
calculated
the
danger
of Russia for the
future
of
his
empire.
Then he conceived the bold
plan
of
uniting
the
Don
to the
Volga
by
means
of a canal which could
have
asserted Turkish
control of
the lower
Volga
and the
Caspian,
thus
providing
a
directly
link with
the
Ozbecks
who
were
enemies
of Persia and
Turkey's
allies
in
Central
Asia. But
this
vital
project,
too,
was
neglected
by
Suleyman's
successors.
In the east his policy was almost unbelievable, in spite of all his victories.
Suleyman
did
not establish Ottoman Rule in Tabriz. He did
not even overcome
the
technical difficulties-
problems
of
supply
and
transportation,
the
pre-
requisite
for
success
in
Tabriz. Almost
the
same
problems
led to
his
failure to
take
Vienna.
More disastrous
was his
inadequate
Mediterranean
and
Indian
Ocean
policies.
The backbone
of
naval
policy
was
only
the
raiding
principle
of
jihad,
which
could
not
or
did
not
promote
a
durable,
solid,
or
progressive
Ottoman
role
in the
Mediterranean.
Suleyman,
as
well as his
father
Sultan
Selim
I
and
his
son and successor Sultan Selim II (1566-1574), challenged the Spanish penetra-
tion
into
Islamic
North
Africa,
but
none of them ever
created
a
constructive
Ottoman
policy
there.
The
African
coast
became
the
corsair coast
for
centuries
to come.
Suleyman
the
Magnificant
and
Selim
II
continued
the
traditional
Ottoman
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of
Suleyman
the
Magnificent 449
policy
to
end
the
political position
of
Venice
in the
Mediterranean.
To
reach
this
aim,
they
also
kept
up
the traditional Ottoman
policy
of
encouraging
the other
Italian trade
republics,
Venice's
relatively
weak
rivals,
who could never revive
the traditional
medieval trade routes after the Dutch and
English
broke into the
Mediterran
and the Indian Ocean.
Suleyman
also
took
France
as his
ally
in
the
Mediterranean,
but
France was
not,
or not
yet,
a Mediterranean maritime
power. Consequently,
she could
not
replace
Venice
in the area.
Suleyman's
Capitulation Treaty
with France is
almost
always
overestimated
by European
and American scholars. The
Capitula-
tion
Treaty
of
1535 (Francis I/Suleyman)
is
more or less an extension
of
the
treaties
between
the Italian
maritime
trade
republics
and
Egypt
in
the
later
Middle
Ages
-
before the Ottoman
invasion and
the
discovery
of the
Cape
of
Good
Hope.
It
could never
have met
the
challenge
of the economic
and
political
situation
in the
sixteenth
century,
when
Egypt
and the Islamic
Mediterranean
virtually
lost their
monopolistic
position
in world trade.
Also
the
Greek,
Armenian,
and
Jewish
merchants
-
in
fact,
the
intermediaries
between
Ottoman business and the
West
-
could not
inaugurate
the
big
maritime
and trade business between the East and the
West.
In
spite
of
their
vital
role
for
the
Ottoman
Empire,
we have
to
keep
in mind that
they
were then second
class
subjects
or
tolerated 'citizens.'
In
the
sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries the
only
reasonable
solution
toward a constructive Ottoman
policy
in the Mediterranean would have been
close
cooperation
with
Venice.
The
Italians,
and above
all the
Venetians,
had
been
very
interested
in
mutual
understanding
with
the Mamluk
Sultan
in
order
to survive the two
big
pressures: unhampered
Ottoman
military
expansion
and
Portuguese
economic
pressure following
the
discovery
of
the
Cape
of Good
Hope.
The Mamluk Sultan refused
close
cooperation
with Venice. It
is
truly
amazing
that
the Ottomans
kept up
the traditional Islamic
protectionist
trade
policy
without
shaping
it to match the
needs,
the
situation,
or
the
scope
of a
new
world
-
the world
after
the
European
geographical
discoveries and
their
revolutionary results: a world of competition, not monopoly. In other words,
Suleyman
did not
understand how to initiate and
to
take the
necessary
steps
to
keep pace
with the
changing
world of the sixteen
century.
It was
during
the
reign
of
Suleyman,
who
failed
to
take Vienna
or to reach
Rome and
who,
through
his Christian and non-Christian
spies
and
advisors,
was
well informed about the
increasing
significance
of
the
Americas
for
Europe
and
his
imperial
rival,
Charles
V,
that the Ottoman
Empire
was
obviously
in need
of a more constructive maritime and trade
policy
in
the Mediterranean
and
the
Indian Ocean
to
counterbalance
Charles's
policy
or
Europe's progress
in the
Atlantic and the Indian Oceans. A constructive policy would also have counter-
balanced the
overwhelming power
of
the
Janissaries
and at
the
same
time
protected
the state
and
its
subjects
against
the abuse of
the
principle
of
jihad.
Suleyman
preferred
to
repeat
his
attacks
upon
Vienna,
the
Christian Mediter-
ranean,
and Persia
than
to take
Morocco
and
reach
the
gold
sources and
slave
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8/9/2019 The Era of Suleyman Magnificent-crisis of Orient..
17/18
450
Subhi Labib
areas
of
West
Africa,
as well as the Atlantic coast
in
order to
correctly
face or
compete
with
the
rising
transatlantic/Atlantic
European/
Christian
powers.
Then
the
European
oceanic discoveries ended not
only
the traditional
monopoly
of
the
Muslim
intermediaries
between East
and
West but also broke the
traditional
frontiers
of the
challenge
between East and West and erected new ones. In
other
words,
the
European
oceanic discoveries
set
new dimensions for the
East/West
challenge
which
the Ottomans did not
really
or
sincerely
take
into
considera-
tion.
For the Turks there was
simply
no
compelling
motive to undertake
trans-
oceanic
journeys,
because
they possessed
shorter routes
to
the Indian Ocean. But
it
was,
above
all,