THE ETERNITY PROBLEM: NUCLEAR POWER WASTE STORAGE

DUANE CHAPMAN*

This paper treats an importantproblem that has not been treated elsewhere: the relationship between the evolution of the nuclear power industry and the costs of centralized and on-site storage of spent fuel. The conclusion is that centralized storage, as current policy contemplates, would be cheaper given an expanding nuclear industry as projected during the 1970s. But given the current sit- uation of no expansion- i.e., no new orders- the cost advantage of centralized storage disappears. Moreover, if the components of decommissioned reactors are to be stored on site-as seems likely- then perhaps spent fuel should be stored there also.

I. INTRODUCTION

The effective moratorium on new nuclear plant construction has an impact on the amount of anticipated spent fuel, and the economies of scale that accrued to a centralized storage program with an expanding nuclear industry are smaller with a diminished industry. Permanent on-site storage, with con- stant average costs, now may be economically competitive. In addition, the increasing possibility of permanent on-site storage of decommissioned reac- tors reduces the risk avoidance motivation for shipping spent fuel to central- ized repositories. This paper reviews the available data on nuclear waste storage. Projections of waste fuel are related to projections of future nuclear power use. Cost functions are derived for a centralized waste storage program with one location in Nevada and another at an eastern site. Cost functions for “eternal” storage on site at reactors are compared with the centralized storage functions. Reactor waste policy is reviewed briefly due to its impor- tant implications for fuel waste policies. The conclusion argues that the re- duced scale of future nuclear generation eliminates the cost advantage of centralized storage.

The analysis is confined to those matters related to comparative cost of fuel waste storage location policies and the scale of the nuclear power in- dustry. More general philosophical issues, such as that of intergenerational equity, are relevant to overall nuclear waste policy but are beyond the scope of this discussion.

*Professor of Resource Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Western Economic Association International 64th Annual Con- ference, Lake Tahoe, Nev., June 20, 1989, in a session organized by Darwin C. Hall, California State University, Long Beach. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Wendy Bacon and Joseph Baldwin. The abstract was suggested by a reviewer.

Contemporary Policy Issues Vol. VIII, July 1990

80

OWestem Economic Association International

CHAPMAN: ETERNITY PROBLEM: NUCLEAR POWER WASTE STORAGE 81

II, CURRENT STATUS OF NUCLEAR POWER AND SPENT FUEL

The nuclear power industry has not attained the growth anticipated pre- viously. In 1976, utilities had planned to build 234 reactor units with 236,000 megawatts (MW) of capacity (1 megawatt equals 1,000 kilowatts). No orders have been placed since 1978. By early 1989 (figure l) , additional planned expansion had nearly been eliminated. This leaves a cumulative total of 123 reactors, with a capacity of 115,000 MW, currently holding operating or construction licenses.’ Because each year’s operation of a 1,000-MW plant produces about 25 metric tons uranium (MTU) of waste, the scale of expected growth is the major determinant of the cumulative amount of material.* (A metric ton is equivalent to 1.1 U.S. tons.)

Several offsetting uncertainties affect the capacity-waste relationship. First, the 10 civilian nuclear power units that have shut down permanently have done so without attaining the 30 years of full service anticipated orig- inally (see below). As plants close prematurely, less waste per plant accu- mulates. Second, the current projected total of 123 reactors includes the Seabrook and Rancho Seco units, which may be closed, as well as five other units that have been closed temporarily for two or more years. Any of these seven reactors that do not operate will reduce the projected cumulative waste. The third uncertainty implies that nuclear waste could be higher for given levels of electricity generation. The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) assumes that each reactor will become more effi- cient and generate more electricity per unit of nuclear fuel. If this efficiency increase does not develop, then more waste will result for given generation levels than is projected currently.

Figure 2 portrays expected annual production of fuel waste.3 The expan- sion case assumes a resumption of nuclear power growth that will reach 248,000 MW of capacity by the end of the 2020 planning period. Conversely, the no-new-orders case assumes a permanency of the past 10 years’ lack of orders. In cumulative amounts, the expansion case reaches 126,642 MTU of

1. See Monthly Energy Review (1989) and Chapman (1983, p. 218). The Department of Energy publication includes Shoreham as being in startup for operation. In table 2 of this paper, the unit is listed as shut down.

2. Technically, the amount of waste produced depends on the type of reactor, design burnup, thermal efficiency, and operating practice. For example, a typical 1,000-MW pressurized water reactor (PWR) with 31.6 percent thermal efficiency, 33,000 MWDt/MTU burnup, and 60 percent capacity factor would discharge 25 MTU of waste annually for most of its operating life. For detailed discussion, see U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Man- agement (1986a, chap. 9), and U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration (1987, p. 225).

3. See U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (1986a, vol. 1, p. 15, vol. 2, p. A-1). For another Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management report without detail, see the 1987 Fee Adequacy report (1987a). The later detailed analysis (1987b) excludes explicit data on an eastern granite site.

82 CONTEMPORARY POLICY ISSUES

FIGURE 1 U.S. Nuclear Reactor Capacity: Operating and Planned (1965- 1988)

Capacity MW (thousands)

250

200

I 5 0

I00

5 0 4 0 30 20 10

waste by 2020, and this figure is increasing by 5 MTU per year at that time. The no-new-orders case totals 87,449 MTU of waste, and annual production is declining to zero.

Note that the two cases differ dramatically in their implications for nuclear waste after 2020. With the expansion case, both nuclear plant operations and waste production are accelerating at the end of the period. With the no-new- orders case, the nuclear era essentially concludes as the last reactors are closed.

In this analysis, military waste equivalent to 8,000 MTU of spent fuel is included within the totals. However, the growing interest in weapons plant reconstruction could result in significant amounts of decommissioning waste from these plants. Consequently, in the future, the nuclear weapons waste may be separated from spent fuel and combined with weapons plant waste.

CHAPMAN: ETERNITY PROBLEM: NUCLEAR POWER WASTE STORAGE 83

FIGURE 2 Annual Spent-Fuel Generation: 'Itrro Cases

6.0 - 5.5 - 5.0 - Expansion Case

4.5 - 4.0 - 3.5 - 3.0 -

1.0 ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' I ' ' ' ' I ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' I ' ' ' I ' ' 1 1984 1990 1996 2002 2008 2014 2020

Year

Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Life Cycle Cost, (1987b, p. 16).

The 640 MTU of spent fuel deposited at West Valley, N.Y., is excluded from both cases. At present, spent fuel is stored at all reactor sites except for the West Valley material. This cumulative amount was 19,000 MTU by mid-1989 (see U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, 1986a, table B-1).

111. ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN CENTRAL REPOSITORY STORAGE

The basic outline of current policy, according to the Department of Energy's OCRWM, is to develop a repository at Yucca Mountain, Nev. This location is north of Death Valley and borders both the Nevada Test Site and the Nellis Air Force Range. The Test Site is the major location for testing nuclear weapons and is partially contaminated. The Nellis base currently uses bombing and gunnery areas north and west of the proposed waste storage site (see U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste

84 CONTEMPORARY POLICY ISSUES

Management, 1986b, vol. 1, pp. 2-1, 3-33). Presumably, if the repository is developed, then military activities that might be hazardous to a repository would either cease or be relocated.

Legislation enacted in December 1987 authorizes the OCRWM to study this Yucca Mountain site for development of the first repository. The autho- rization to proceed with a second eastern repository has been cancelled, but the need for an eastern repository may be reconsidered (see U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, December 1987/January 1988, p. 1).

The legislation provides special cash payments to American Indian tribes and/or states agreeing to be hosts. After permanent waste storage begins, Nevada will receive $20 million annually. A tribe or a state that hosts a temporary Monitored Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility might receive $10 million annually. If Nevada hosts both facilities, then it will receive both amount^.^

The new legislation not only cancelled the eastern repository but also left the status of the temporary MRS unresolved. Two motivations for an eastern MRS remain. A temporary MRS facility in the East would reduce exposure to radioactivity from transporting waste fuel. If no eastern MRS facility exists, then the typical truck shipment of spent fuel would travel 2,000 miles from an eastern reactor to the Yucca Mountain site (see U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, 1986b, pp. 7-96, A-44). A second motivation is that an eastern MRS facility would permit federal acceptance of utility waste while the Yucca Mountain site was being completed.

The central repository concept assumes that when a repository reaches a maximum of 70,000 MTU, it is closed, filled, sealed, and marked (see U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, 1986a, p. A-10). No further security is anticipated. The no-new-orders case implies a total of two repositories. The expansion case implies two reposi- tories within the planning period as well as other future sites.

An important physical factor affecting waste storage economics is the decay rate curve for radioactivity. Table 1 represents the decline in radio- activity in waste through decay. The waste fuel never becomes non-toxic but does decline to 70 percent of the toxicity level for ingesting uranium ore after 100,000 years (see U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Waste Management, 1980, pp. 3-37, 38). The radioactivity curves are unchanged by location-i.e., they are the same regardless of whether waste storage is centralized or is on reactor sites. Similarly, decay in heat discharge by waste fuel generally has the same general decay pattern.

4. See U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (De- cember 1987/January 1988, p. 2). A host tribe or state receives half these amounts after an agreement is signed but before the waste arrives.

CHAPMAN: ETERNITY PROBLEM: NUCLEAR POWER WASTE STORAGE 85

TABLE 1 Rapid Decline in Radioactivity of Waste Fuel

After Percentage Remaining

2 years 50%

5 years 10 years

100 years

25 % 15%

2%

200 years 4/10 of 1%

1,000 years 1/10 of 1%

2/1,000 of 1 % 100,000 years

Note: One year after removal from reactor, about 2 million curies per MTU remain. The

Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Waste Management (1980, pp. 1-4). second column shows the proportions remaining at subsequent periods.

For the repository program, much of the cost is fixed and includes siting, evaluation, mitigation, administration, closure, and decommissioning. One can represent the preferred OCRWM centralized program with a first repos- itory at the Yucca Mountain location, a temporary MRS facility in perhaps Tennessee, and second permanent repository at a generic eastern location. For the expanding industry case, the total cost is $28.5 billion (in 1988 dollars) before discounting. The generally higher cost curve in figure 3 il- lustrates this. By contrast, for the no-new-orders case, the sum of the cost projection is $26.4 billion. This is shown by the lower curve in figure 3.5 Suppose that the cost streams are discounted with a 3.5 percent real interest rate. The present-value amounts are $13.1 billion with 126,642 MTU by 2020 for the expansion case and $12.7 billion with 87,449 MTU for the no-new- orders case.

Adding 45 percent to the accumulated waste fuel total increases present- value cost by only 3 percent. This is because the two cost curves are identical for 30 years and discounting gives little economic significance to the cost differences that emerge later.

One can reproduce the estimates by these total cost and average cost relationships:

TC, = $11.8 billion + $10,60OQ (1)

$11.8. 109 Q AC, = $10,600 +

5. See cases C-20 and C-24 in U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (1986a), inflated to 1988 dollars with the GNP index. See note 3.

86

900

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300 z

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100

CONTEMPORARY POLICY ISSUES

- - -

.------ No orders

- Exponslon - -

L - -

- 1 \ T

d f\/

- I

I I I I I I

1980 I995 2010 2025 2040 2055 2070 2089

FIGURE 3 Cost Projections: No Orders and Expansion Cases

(1983-2089)

Year

where Tcb is the total cost of waste burial in dollars, Q is waste in MTU, and ACb is the average cost of waste burial in dollars per metric ton of waste. Equation (2) was defined as dollars per MTU. One can reformulate equation (2) so as to define p b as average cost per kilowatt hour (kWh) for waste burial:

11.8. 10” Pb=0.0513 + (3)

where P, is expressed in terms of mills per kWh and G is generation. (A mill equals V1o of a cent. G = 206.8 million kWh for each MTU, derived from the assumptions in note 2.) Equation (3) is average cost, but note that marginal cost is a very low V20 of a mill per kWh. This is rather astounding and reflects the high fixed costs and low incremental costs reported above. For the no-new-orders case with 87,449 MTU waste projected, the average cost is 0.7 mills per kWh while the marginal cost of additional waste is 0.05 mills per kWh.

CHAPMAN: ETERNITY PROBLEM: NUCLEAR POWER WASTE STORAGE 87

IV. COST OF AT-REACTOR STORAGE

As section I1 noted, all U.S. civilian spent fuel ever produced currently is stored at reactor sites except for the 640 MTU now at West Valley. One method of at-reactor storage uses air-cooled casks that bypass the typical five- to 10-year swimming-pool storage. The Pacific Northwest Laboratory study of temporary at-reactor costs provides a basis for using this method to estimate permanent or eternal costs (see Merrill and Fletcher, 1983).

Pacific Northwest examined a 15-year period for storing a total of 276 MTU waste. (This could be the waste from a large unit with 18.4 MTU waste per year.) The initial capital cost is $5 million and rises by $1.4 million per year as new casks are installed. Operating costs, including insurance, rise to $600,000 per year.

When this 15-year analysis is extended to a 30-year reactor operating life, operating costs (OM) rise to $1.2 million annually after 30 years. Each of the 45 casks needed to store the full 30-year amount of 552 MTU might be replaced every 100 years after initial use.

These data make possible an illustrative cost calculation of infinite stor- age:

(4) 30 m

P V = c j=O

where PV is the present value of the cost of at-reactor storage over an in- finitely long period, K, is capital investment in year t , and OM, is annual operation and maintenance. The real interest rate (i) is adjusted for inflation and is 3.5 percent. The exponent 100 in the denominator of the capital cost term reflects an “eternal,” 100-year cask-replacement cycle.

The solution to equation (4) is $51 million (in 1988 dollars).6 Given the 552 MTU, this represents a present-value cost of permanent cask storage of $92,000 per MTU.

Pacific Northwest estimated material and security costs for fuel waste storage during the initial period after the waste was removed from the reactor. Radioactivity and thermal discharge are at their highest during this initial period, and both decay as discussed above. Consequently, the cost of each subsequent storage period is no higher than that of prior periods. The initial- period estimates serve as an upper boundary of later-period cost.

6. The Merrill and Fletcher (1983) study provides much more detail than does the recent Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (1989) study, which apparently gives selected costs.

88 CONTEMPORARY POLICY ISSUES

One can reformulate at-reactor storage cost into total cost and average cost functions and express it in mills per kWh:

TC, = $92,00OQ

AC, = $92,000 (6)

P, = 0.44. (7)

The TC and AC terms again are in dollars as they were with equations (1)-(3). Equation (7) defines the average cost of on-site storage as 0.44 of 1 mill per kWh.

V. COMPARISON

Figure 4 summarizes these results. First, if the status quo continues with no new orders, then at-reactor storage would be somewhat less costly than centralized storage. Second, the expansion case shows the costs of centralized storage and at-reactor storage to be about equal. Third, if nuclear generation grew very rapidly so as to use the full, 140,000-MTU capacity of two sites, then the average cost would decline to-but would not fall below-the at- reactor cost. (Figure 4 does not show this.) Fourth, the current charge of 1 mill per kWh of nuclear generation (in 1988 dollars) appears to be satis- factory. Utilities now collect this 1 mill fee from their customers and pay it to the OCRWM so as to cover the ultimate cost of fuel waste disposal. The fee seemingly should increase over time at or near the general inflation rate.

VI. THE DECOMMISSIONING INTERFACE

Historically, public policy has viewed waste fuel and reactor decommis- sioning as distinctly different issues. Waste fuel has been termed high-level waste, for which regulatory responsibility has rested with the OCRWM. Decommissioning policy at the federal level has been monitored by the Nu- clear Regulatory Commission. Reactor waste has been defined primarily as low-level waste.

Generally, decommissioning has been seen as the full and immediate dis- mantlement of reactor material and its relocation at reactor waste storage sites. These sites probably would be general low-level waste sites that would store medical, research, and industrial nuclear waste in addition to reactor waste.

Radioactivity decay in shut-down reactors is comparable, in a qualitative way, with that applying to high-level waste fuel. That is, much of the reactor waste hazard decays quickly, as does the fuel waste hazard (table 1). Con- sequently, although prompt dismantlement after shutdown generally is con- sidered the preferred policy, this in fact is not occurring. Table 2 shows the

CHAPMAN: ETERNITY PROBLEM: NUCLEAR P O VER WASTE STORAGE 89

FIGURE 4 Comparison: Centralized and At-Reactor Storage

3.0 -

8- APPROXIMATE 1988 VALUE

CENTRALIZED STORAGE COST

Total Cumulative Nuclear Generation (trillion kWh)

decommissioning status of the 10 commercial nuclear plants that have been closed. Of these 10 units, only the Shippingport reactor is being dismantled. The small size and simple design of Shippingport allow its major components to be lifted intact and placed on a ship for transport through the Panama Canal and to ultimate storage in Washington state. Whether modern, 1,000- MW plants can be so treated remains to be seen.

Because reactor waste and fuel waste are the focus of unresolved storage problems, and because both become less hazardous over time, an obvious motivation exists for resolving each problem simultaneously rather than sep- arately. A large-scale program for waste fuel transport and centralized stor- age has no merit if reactor waste remains at reactor sites. Similarly, shipping massive volumes of reactor waste while fuel waste remains in locus seems questionable.

Political reasons exist for considering reactor sites as permanent or eternal storage locations. Political support for nuclear power frequently has been strongest among the groups employed at nuclear facilities or benefiting from

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CHAPMAN: ETERNITY PROBLEM: NUCLEAR POWER WASTE STORAGE 91

their property tax contributions. These areas may have fewer objections to becoming hosts for nuclear wastes than do those localities that opposed nu- clear plant construction.

Multiple reactor locations should be particularly good candidates due to their large contiguous land areas and experienced security forces. Ten areas have three commercial reactor unit sites and many more have two reactor^.^ Because of their large nuclear capacity, each of these 10 areas generally has a good transportation system for moving waste and (new) nuclear fuel.

VII. CONCLUSION

The United States is the site of one-fourth of the world’s 434,000 MW of planned nuclear plant capacity. U.S. capacity now in commercial operation exceeds the combined total of France and Russia, which are the second- and third-largest countries in terms of capacity (see Nuclear News, 1989). U.S. policy will affect waste planning in much of the world.

The primary policy focus regarding U.S. fuel waste is the development of the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada as the first central underground re- pository. The original design contemplated a 70,000-MTU capacity that ul- timately would be sealed, decommissioned, and left. This capacity is more than sufficient to hold the mid-1989 level of approximately 19,000 MTU now stored at reactor locations. However, if one assumes a continuing in- dustry with no new orders, then the 87,449 MTU anticipated would-given past design criteria-require two central repositories. The second repository would be in an eastern state. Alternatively, authorities should consider a single repository with enlarged capacity.

The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management wants to develop a short-term Monitored Retrievable Storage facility so as to shorten at-reactor storage time and reduce population exposure to waste fuel transport. Current legislation authorizes the continued study, but not the implementation, of this concept.

Given an expanding nuclear industry, new central repositories would need to be developed every 10 to 15 years. The planning horizon, however, has focused on the amount of waste that would accumulate by a specific year and has ignored the accelerating amounts of waste that would continue to be produced.

Analyzing the OCRWM preferred system reveals a very low marginal cost and a high fixed cost. Therefore, present-value analysis shows major scale economies with average cost at 3.4 mills per kWh for current waste levels and asymptotically approaching one-half of 1 mill per kWh as nuclear gen-

7. See Nuclear News (1989, pp. 69-88). The three-reactor locations are in the following nine states: Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Illinois, New York (at Oswego and at Indian Point), Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Washington.

92 CONTEMPORARY POLICY ISSUES

eration approaches the 29 trillion kWh figure associated with the 140,000- MTU waste capacity of two repositories. The current fee of 1 mill per kWh appears adequate for the centralized system if it is adjusted for future infla- tion. At-reactor eternal storage is estimated to be just less than one-half of 1 mill per kWh. (All dollar figures are in 1988 dollars.)

One may conclude that if the current absence of new orders continues, then centralized storage has no overall economic advantage.

The decay curve for radioactivity in spent fuel has very important eco- nomic implications. Two years after spent fuel is removed from a reactor, only 50 percent of the original radioactivity remains. And, after 10 years, only 15 percent remains. But the nature of the long-lived elements means that the overall rate of decay decelerates. After a century, 2 percent remains. After 1,000 years, the waste still retains 0.1 of 1 percent of its original radioactivity. Even after 100,000 years, the very low 0.002 of 1 percent still is sufficiently hazardous so as to require segregating the material-hence the appropriateness of the “eternal” descriptor. At this point, after 100,000 years of storage, the hazard is less than that contained in uranium ore.

The major facet of centralized storage versus at-reactor storage in this context is the issue of abandonment. Current central storage plans call for the Nevada site to be filled, sealed, marked, and left 50 years after it reaches capacity. The “eternity problem” will be left underground. At-reactor storage of fuel waste or reactor waste means eternally dedicating current surface reactor sites for waste.

The decommissioning interface raises serious problems not yet recog- nized. Reactor waste exhibits the same form of decay as does fuel waste. The decay is very rapid initially, but some components require the same eternal segregation. The “spent reactors” remain currently on site, just like actual spent fuel. Nine of the 10 closed reactors now are in on-site storage. No sites have been accepted by host states for reactor waste storage, just as none have been accepted for the centralized storage program for fuel waste.

One solution might be to dedicate existing multiple-reactor sites as eternal waste locations. The nine sites with three or more reactors are distributed throughout the country in areas having high concentrations of nuclear capac- ity. Authorities should consider some form of regionalized storage for both fuel waste and reactor waste.

Given the absence of economic incentives for centralized fuel waste stor- age, and given the inertial drift of decommissioning policy toward partial or full on-site storage, a common policy should be developed for fuel waste and reactor waste.

CHAPMAN: ETERNITY PROBLEM: NUCLEAR POWER WASTE STORAGE 93

REFERENCES

Chapman, D., Energy Resources and Energy Corporations, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y ., 1983.

, 'Economic Implications of Reactor Decommissioning for Spent Fuel Disposal," Staff Paper No. 87-4, Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., 1987.

Merrill, E. T., and J. F. Fletcher, Economics of At-Reactor Spent Fuel Storage Alternatives, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, PNL 4517, Richland, Wash., 1983.

Monthly Energy Review, February 1989.

Nuclear News, 'Lacrosse-Dairyland Announces Permanent Shutdown,- June 1987, 3 1-32.

, 'Waste Management Update," March 1988, 42-85.

, 'World List of Nuclear Power Plants," February 1989, 69-88.

Smith, R. I., et al., Technology, Safety, and Costs of Decommhioning a Reference Pressurized Water Reactor Power Station, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratory, NUREG/CR-0130, Richland, Wash., two volumes and addendum, 1978, 1979.

U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Historical Plant Cost and Annual Production Expenses for Selected Electric Plants 1985, 1987.

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Analysis of the Total System Life Cycle Cost for the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program, two volumes, 1986(a).

, Environmental Assessment: Yucca Mountain Site. Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevado, three volumes, 1986(b).

, Nuclear Waste Fund Fee Adequacy, 1987(a).

. Analysis of the Total System Life Cycle Cost for the Civilian Radioactive Waste

, Bulletin, December 1987/January 1988.

, Dry Cask Storage Study, February 1989.

Management Program, two volumes, 1987(b).

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Waste Management, Final Environmental Zmpact Statement, Management of Commercially Generated Radioactive Waste, three volumes, 1980.