The Ethics of Descent in Plotinus

The ethics of descent in PlotinusAuthor(s): Euree SongSource: Hermathena, No. 187 (Winter 2009), pp. 27-48Published by: Trinity College DublinStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23317522 .Accessed: 07/03/2014 16:14

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The ethics of descent in Plotinus*

by Euree Song

Plotinus is usually known as an otherworldly mystic, who devoted himself entirely to the inner ascent to the transcendent

God, which would imply a complete departure from this world, a total indifference to all external and human affairs.

Accordingly, his '/Veo-Platonism' has been suspected of being a kind of Platonism by half, which concentrates on theological or

metaphysical questions while thereby leaving out the whole

scope of practical philosophy. In such a one-sided philosophy, labeled as 'Platonism without Socrates'1, there would be no room for ethics or politics in the sense of 'philosophy about human affairs (he peri ta anthrpeia philosophia)' as is envisaged by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics (X, 1181 bl 5). Of such a 'Plato dimidiatus2 might be expected, if any ethics, no more than an 'ethics of escape' which urges us to flee to the 'divine

homeland', but keeps silent about the philosopher's return to the Cave and his involvement in politics in Plato's Republic. In this view, it remains at most an ethics of a hermit who cares only for his own otherworldly happiness consisting in the

contemplation of the divine.3

Recently, the conventional image of Plotinus as a mystic or

metaphysician without ethics or politics has been challenged from various angles. First of all, it has been argued that Plotinus

This paper has been developed starting from my German dissertation deepening some aspects. An earlier version of it was presented at a Korean Society of Greco Roman Studies Colloquium and a Japanese Society of Neo-Platonic Studies Meeting in 2009. I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the audience for discussion.

' Walter Brcker, Piatonismus ohne Sokrates. Ein Vortrag ber Plotin (Frankfurt:

Klostermann, 1966). 2

Willy Theiler, 'Plotin zwischen Platon und Stoa', Les sources de Plotin. Entretiens sur l'antiquit classique V (Vandoevres-Geneva : Fondation Hardt, 1960), 67. 3

This view finds its authoritative expression in John M. Dillon's influential

article, 'An Ethic for the Late Antique Sage' ['Late Antique Sage'] in Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, ed. Lloyd P. Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1996), 315-35. Dillon characterizes Plotinus' ethical stance as 'an uncompromisingly self-centered and otherworldly one' and passes subsequently the verdict: 'If we feel that an ethical theory should include an element of concern for others for their own

sake, then, I think, Plotinus cannot be said to have an ethical theory.' (331-2)


28 Euree Song

envisages an ethics which is not at odds with his metaphysics, but, on the contrary, has a firm footing in it. So, for instance, Plotinus' metaphysics of the self-diffusive Good is said to be reflected in an 'ethics of giving',4 while his theory of double

activity serves to illuminate the relationship between

contemplation and action, whereby action is regarded as an external activity of contemplation which makes up an internal

activity.5 Due attention has been paid to Plotinus' figure of the

sage who embodies a Plotinian ideal of life.6 To the Plotinian

sage are attributed not only the theoretical virtues, but also the

practical ones.7 It is also observed that he cares for others

(including his body) as well as himself.8 In this connection, it is noticed that Plotinus accuses contemporary Gnostics of

confining themselves to their personal interests without concern for the community.9 Attempts have been made, furthermore, to

4 Dominic J. O'Meara, Plotinus. An Introduction to the Enneads \Introduction\ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 108-110.

5 Andrew Smith, 'The Significance of Practical Ethics for Plotinus' ['Practical Ethics'] in Traditions of Platonism: Essays in Honor of John Dillon, ed. John J. Cleary (Aldershot and Brookfield: Ashgate, 1999), 227-236; 'Action and contemplation in Plotinus' [Action], in The Philosopher and Society in Late Antiquity. Essays in Honor of Peter Brown [Philosopher and Society], ed. Andrew Smith (Oakville: The Classical Press

ofWales, 2005), 65-72 (for the general theory of double activity see 71, Note 3). 6 Pauliina Remes, 'Plotinus's Ethics of Disinterested Interest' ['Disinterested

Interest'], Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 44, no. 1 (2006), 1-23; Alexandrine

Schniewind, L'thique du sage chez Plotin. Le Paradigme du Spoudaios [thique du

sage] (Paris: J. Vrin, 2003); 'The Social Concern of the Plotinian Sage' ['Social Concern'], in Philosopher and Society, 51-64. 7

In Enn. I 4 [46] On Happiness, Plotinus conceives the sage, i.e. the wise man

(sophos), as a man who is 'perfect in virtue (teleios pros aretn)' and for this reason attributes to him practical virtues such as courage (15, 15-16). In Enn. I 3 [19] On

Dialectic, he clearly states that one cannot be a sage without the lower virtues, i.e.

practical virtues. 8

As to the sage's care for others, Schniewind emphasizes his 'educational role vis

vis the ordinary man', namely his role as a 'guide' who leads other people to the

good ('Social Concern', 59). See also Schniewind, Ethique du sage, 200-203. Remes

argues that insofar as the Plotinian sage treats his friend as he treats himself, as described in Enn. I 4 [46] 2-25, Plotinus' ethical deliberation is 'not purely agent centered' ('Disinterested Interest', 11). She attributes to him, furthermore, an 'agent neutral' position which she also ascribes to the Stoics (17-19) and values the

knowledge of the world-order which frees the sage from 'just one, particular and limited point of view', although she complains that Plotinus gives 'disappointingly few practical clues' (23). 9

Schniewind, thique du sage, 13-14. Cf. Enn. II 9 [33] Against the Gnostics or

Against those who say that the maker of the universe is evil and the universe is evil, ch. 15, 18-20: 'So pleasure is left for them, and what concerns themselves alone, and what


The ethics of descent in Plotinus 29

connect the Plotinian sage with Plotinus himself as portrayed by Porphyry in Vita Plotini, as a model philosopher 'present to himself and others at the same time' (8, 19).10 Finally, the

'paradigm' for the Plotinian sage who harmonizes or reconciles

contemplation with action has been sought for in the World

Soul,11 or the Demiurge in Plato's Timaeus or in the

philosopher-king in the Republic}1 This approach is supported by a theory of a scale of virtues,

according to which the practical virtues (also called 'political' or

'civic'), albeit subordinated to the theoretical virtues, constitute the first stage in an upward movement of Godlikeness.13 Hence it seems legitimate to hold that the practical life in Plotinus forms an integral part of the philosophical life in pursuit of

'becoming godlike', |1OL0jcti 0e, which is the avowed goal of Platonic philosophy.14 The 'escape' from this world mentioned in Plato's Theaetetus 176b means for Plotinus nothing but an

escape from vice to virtue, which leads to that aspired goal, as indicated at the beginning of his treatise On Virtues (12 [19]).

However, the practical or political virtues which the Plotinian sage possesses appear to be quite limited, when Plotinus assigns to them merely the administration of desires, emotions and opinions in the human individual soul.15 This kind of preoccupation with the 'inner republic' of the individual soul appears to leave little room for concern for the res publica, the human community. Within this framework of thought, the

other people have no share in (to ou koinon pros allous anthrpous), and what is

nothing but a matter of their needs.' 10 Smith, 'Practical Ethics', 229.

11 Smith, 'Action', 66-67.

12 O'Meara, 'Neoplatonist Conceptions of the Philosopher-King' ['Philosopher

King'], in Plato and Platonism, ed. Johannes M. Van Ophuijsen (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1999), 281-283.

13 Plotinus suggests the idea that the 'political' virtues manifest a kind of

Godlikeness, in so far as they put measure into our life, since God, the Supreme, is the measure of all things. Cf. Enn. I 2 [19] 2, 20-23: 'And so far they [political virtues] are a measure (metra) which forms the matter of the soul, they are made like the measure There and have a trace in them of the Best There.'

14 For this interpretation see O'Meara, Platonopolis. Platonic Political Philosophy

in Late Antiquity [Platonopolis] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 31-39; 'Political Life and Divinization in Neoplatonic Philosophy' [Political Life], Hermathena ( 1994), 155-157.

15 Enn. 12 [19] 2, 13-20.


30 Euree Song

Plotinian sage is certainly far from Plato's philosopher-king or -

queen who rules the city for the common good. Moreover, Plotinus seems to suggest that likeness to God in

the proper sense can be achieved by the soul purified from

bodily affections through the intellectual virtues, the God in

question being divine Intellect.16 This kind of intellectual

purism gives the impression that the political virtues form a

necessary stage on the scale of virtues only to be surpassed or

play at most an instrumental role in the assimilation to God. If this impression were right, the philosopher, having reached

higher virtues, should not need lower virtues anymore.17 Or he would need them, insofar as he has a body, but would reduce

the very need of them by making use of his practical wisdom. So his selfish reason would counsel him to avoid any troublesome

situation, say, a war, in which he needs to be brave. This kind of

'egoistic'18 concept of the role of practical reason amounts to the

fundamentally unpractical and apolitical attitude of the

practically wise man who really cares for himself.19

16 Enn. I 2 [19] 3, 19-21; 4, 1-6. 17

Actually, Plotinus says that the man who reaches higher principles and measures will act (praxsei) according to these and leave (katalipn) the life of the good man which political virtue requires behind and live the life of the gods (12 [19] 7, 23

27), which may lend support to such an interpretation. However, the expression 'leave behind' does not necessarily mean 'break with'. Plotinus maintains the continuity between the good man and god. There is a copy-model relation between them (28 31). Cf. Remes, 'Disinterested Interest', 5; Julia Annas, Platonic Ethics. Old and New

(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999), 68-9; Kieran McGroarty, Plotinus on Eudaimonia. A Commentary on Ennead I. 4. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), xvii-xviii.

18 Here, practical reason functions in an 'egoistic' way in the sense that the

person who reasons puts his own interests before the interests of others, whereby it is

not excluded that he cares for the good of others, but merely instrumentally. For a

useful discussion of the term 'egoism' in the context of the modern charge of 'egoism'

against ancient ethics see Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York, Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1993), 127-128, 225-226. Annas warns us that to

characterize ancient ethical debates in terms of egoism and altruism as used in modern

debates is to risk confusion and anachronism. She prefers to use the neutral terms

'self-concern' and 'other-concern' (226). 19 This fits, indeed, well with the portrait of the Plotinian sage sketched in the

treatise On Happiness (I 4 [46] 14, 14-20): 'The man who belongs to this world may be handsome and tall and rich and the ruler of all mankind (since he is essentially of this region), and we ought not to envy him for things like these, by which he is

beguiled. The sage will perhaps not have them at all, and if he has them will himself reduce them, if he cares for his self (eiper hautou kdetai). He will reduce and gradually extinguish his bodily advantages by neglect, and will put away authority and office.'

His concern for the self does not, however, exclude the concern for others, as we will



Given that Plotinus embraces this thoroughly self-centered

position, it surprises us that he accuses contemporary Gnostics of caring only about their own interest without concern for the

community.20 Can he criticize his adversaries without

jeopardizing his own ideal of the sage? Indeed, he goes so far as to demand that those who have attained gnosis, the privileged knowledge of God above and human salvation, should act justly and set right the things here below.21 Is this all merely a

politically correct statement of a gentleman who has in truth

long since gone into internal exile?

Now, Plotinus does not seem to satisfy himself with

demanding the 'knower' to act rightly in private when he

requires that the sage commanding the knowledge of the Good itself should engage himself politically in favor of the res publica, as we will see. But political engagement would lay restraints on the pursuit of the sage's self-interest, if the sage should put aside his blissful contemplation in order to do politics in the interest of the community. Is Plotinus requiring sacrifice from the sage for sake of the common good? Or is he suggesting that the sage's political activity promotes ultimately his own good? Plotinus'

requirement that the sage be politically active recalls Socrates' demand for the philosopher's return to the Cave in Plato's

Republic, which points to the tension or conflict between

contemplation and action on the one hand, and between the care for the good of oneself and the care for the good of others on the other.

This paper aims to elucidate Plotinus' approach to this old

problem. First, I would like to draw attention to the crucial

passage in which Plotinus' requirement that the sage be

politically engaged is expressed, but controversially interpreted. On the grounds of my interpretation, I shall establish the thesis that Plotinus does not confine himself to an 'ethics of ascent', but develops an 'ethics of descent' as well, to put it in terms of Plato's allegory of the Cave. To answer the question why the Plotinian sage should descend into the 'cave' of the political life,

see. Plotinus' sage is reminiscent of Socrates who is admirably self-sufficient and free from mundane concerns, but cares nonetheless for others in order to make them care for their true self.

20 See above note 9. 21 Enn. II 9 [33] 15, 22-24.


32 Euree Song

I suggest exploring Plotinus' conception of the providential care of the soul for this world, whereby 'providence' turns out to be a moral principle which upholds a benevolent and just order of the world. Embedded in a theory of teleology, Plotinus' theory of providence will shed light on the twofold care of the human

soul, one side being for self-perfection and another for the

perfection of the world, whereas the care for the world is

encompassed in a broad project of the self-realization of the human soul, which in turn lies in the plan of divine providence. On this basis, I finally argue that the sage's care for the world involves governing and directing the world according to the law of providence. It will be shown further that the ethics of descent in Plotinus does not lead us back to entanglement with abysmal worldly concerns, but encourages us, though not yet being masters of life, but rather apprentices, to bring order to our

chaotic world and our own confused soul by using our own

reason, inspired and guided by an 'otherworldly' vision of the Beautiful and the Good.

I. The Descent of Soul The idea that the sage eventually goes into politics in order to assume responsibility for the res publica - although, we can

imagine, he will not long hold political office, is suggested in the treatise On the Good or the One (VI 9 [9]), which Porphyry puts at the end of his Enneads-tition as representing the final station of the philosophical 'ascent'. After having urged that the soul should let go of all outward things and turn entirely inwards

ignoring all things and even herself so as to come to be in

contemplation of the One or the Good, Plotinus turns to the

descent of the soul:

...] and having been in [the One's] company and had, so to put it,

sufficient converse with it, [the soul] must (del) come and

announce, if she could, to another that transcendent (ekei) union.

Perhaps also it was because Minos attained this kind of union that

he was said in the story to be the familiar friend of Zeus, and it was

in remembering this that he laid down laws in its image, being filled

with lawgiving by the divine contact. Or, also, one22 may think

22 In fact, the subject of this sentence can refer either to the soul or Minos. In the latter case, one should render 'he may think political matters unworthy of him', as

Pierre Hadot, for example, reads because he finds it difficult to consider that



political matters unworthy of oneself and want to remain always above; this is liable to happen to one who has seen much.2?

Plotinus claims that the soul's union with the One should be followed by a return to the world so as to communicate her

experience to others, as far as possible. It is remarkable that he links the return of the soul to the legendary king Minos'

legislative activity and political engagement. This motive of return into politics evokes the descent of the philosopher into the Cave in Plato's Republic VII. Especially Plotinus' assumption that one, who has seen much, may wish to remain above, echoes the philosopher's reluctance to involve himself in politics (519c 520a). Now, Plotinus does not complete his story. He does not declare that his sage, despite the wish to remain there above, should descend to the cave of political life like the Platonic

philosophers in Callipolis. He may feel this unnecessary because he assumes that the necessity of the return into the cave is just the other side of the reluctance to return in the case of the Plotinian sage as well as in the case of the Platonic philosopher. The lack of a concluding remark may, however, lead one to think that Plotinus leaves open the real possibility for the sage to remain above.24 Does Plotinus give us any clues to deciding this?

announcing a mystical vision is a 'political matter' (Plotin Trait 9 (Paris: Cerf, 1994), 98-99). I sympathizes, however, with O'Meara's reading according to which the

subject refers to the descending soul and with the underlying interpretation that

'political action is precisely, for the Neoplatonists, the attempt to communicate divine life' ('Philosopher-King', 281), an interpretation which I hope to reinforce in this

paper. Robbert van den Berg ('Live unnoticed! The invisible Neoplatonic politician', in Philosopher and Society, 103) rightly notices the possibility of different readings, but he fails to undermine O'Meara's position. If the subject in question refers to Minos, O'Meara's position that the soul, having reached the goal of ascent, should descend into the cave of political activity can be even more safely maintained because the reluctance to political engagement of which Plotinus subsequently speaks concerns

only Minos, not the soul who has experienced the union with the One in general. 23 Enn. VI 9 [9] 7, 20-28. The works of Plotinus will be cited, if not otherwise

indicated, in the following translation slightly modified: Arthur H. Armstrong trans., Plotinus [Enn.] (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966-88). 24

Actually, Remes seems to hold this view, although she thinks that it 'does not sit well with the idea of the sage as generously good' ('Disinterested Interest', 13). She also finds a predecessor of 'Plotinus's sage torn between contemplation and other

regarding action' in the rulers of Plato's Republic (13), but insists that 'it is entirely possible that the place occupied by some sages will not involve teaching or social

activity' (22) unlike Plato's philosopher-kings or queens who are also reluctant to rule, but end up with ruling in the service of their city.


34 Euree Song

Indeed, there are several lines of thought suggested by Plotinus' writings that seem to favor the idea that the sage should descend to the cave of political activity. First, it is worth

noting that the passage quoted above is by no means the only place in which Plotinus speaks of the descent of soul to the world. For our purpose, the following passage in the treatise entitled On the Descent of the Soul into Bodies (IV 8 [6]) is

particularly interesting because it makes an allusion to the soul's reluctance to descend to the sensible world:

Since this nature is twofold, partly intelligible and partly sensible, it

is better for the soul to be in the intelligible, but all the same, since

she has this kind of nature, she is necessarily bound to be able to

participate in the sensible, and she should not be annoyed with

herself (otiK yavaKTTiToi' a>Tr|v eairrr) because, granted that

all things are not the best, she occupies a middle rank among realities, belonging to that divine part but being on the lowest edge of the intelligible, and, having a common boundary with the

sensible nature, gives something to it of what she has in herself.25

Plotinus maintains that it is necessary for the soul to participate in the sensible nature and to communicate something of her

own, although it is better for her to remain in the intelligible. His remark that the soul 'should not be annoyed with herself

signals that the soul is reluctant to descend to the sensible. It is

important to notice that the necessity in question is not a kind of external compulsion, but rather an inner requirement which is rooted in the very nature of soul. This characterization of

necessity allows us to understand the reason why Plotinus claims that the soul 'should not be annoyed with herself.

Therefore, we must clarify the nature of soul which necessitates her descent in order to fully understand the reason

why the soul should descend. In what follows, I would like to draw attention to Plotinus' concept of the 'law of nature', which is crucial to understanding the nature of soul. The 'law of nature' is introduced into the discussion of 'incarnation' in the treatise mentioned above (IV 8 [6]), in which the question why soul descends is explicitly addressed. As Plato's heir, Plotinus undertakes to reconcile two divergent views of the descent of the soul in Plato's works: soul's katabasis is considered, on the one

25 Enn. IV 8 [6] 7, 1-8.



hand, as an imprisonment or a punishment as a result of her fault26 and, on the other, as a divine mission to fulfill an

organizing function in the government of the universe.27 He

argues:

For everything which goes to the worse does so unwillingly, but, since she goes by her own motion (opct ye |iT|U OLKeia), when

she experiences the worse she is said to be punished for what she

did. But when it is eternally necessary by the law of nature ((f)L)(jeto

v6|itp) that she should do and experience these things, and

descending from that which is above her, she meets the need of

something else in her encounter with it, if anyone said that a god sent her down he would not be out of accord with the truth or with

himself.28

Plotinus is explaining the necessity of the descent of the soul by appeal to the 'law of nature'. To clarify his concept of the law of

nature, it is useful to look at his discussion of the myth of creation in Plato's Timaeus in the preceding chapter. According to his reading, Plato does not put forward a cosmogony implying the temporal creation of the world, but a cosmology concerning the perpetual pattern in 'the nature of the whole'.29 The 'law of nature' appears to refer to this eternal order of the nature of things in toto. It is by this eternal 'law of nature' that the soul necessarily descends into the body.

Now, Plotinus connects the descent of soul by the 'law of nature' with the sending of soul by God in the Timaeus. Plotinus sees in the divine mission in Plato's myth a kind of natural necessity. In a parallel context, he even declares that there is no need for anyone to send the soul because the descent occurs according to a natural process, as it were, automatically, like the sprouting of beards in time.30 This law of nature, however, is not imposed from without. Rather, it lies in those themselves who are subject to it and subsequently 'implants a

26 Phaed. 62 b 2-5; 67 d 1; 113 dl-114 c6; Phaedr. 246c2-6, 248 c5-8, 249a 5 b I ; Resp. 619 d7.

27 Ti. 34b8; 41 a7-42 e4. 28 Enn. IV 8 [6] 5, 8-14. 29 Cf. Enn. IV 8 [6] 4, 40-42: 'things in the nature of the whole [...] always

become and exist in the same way ( yp kv 4>U(jei or! tv Xwv, [...] Ta del o "/Lyvo^eya Te rai ovTa)'.

30 Enn. IV 3 [27] 13, 5-8; 14-17.


36 Euree Song

longing, a birth pang of desire to come there where the law within them as it were calls them to come'.31 The law of nature, thus, operates as an internal necessity of the nature of each

thing. This concept of the law of nature can furthermore be

compatible with the view that the soul goes down 'by her own motion'. To be sure, her downward movement is not 'voluntary' in the sense that it follows deliberative choice. Nevertheless, Plotinus acknowledges a voluntary factor in the form of natural

impulse, compared with sexual instinct and an unreasoned

tendency to noble deeds.32 This point is finally backed by a

teleological account:

So then the soul, though she is divine and cornes from above, enters

into the body and, though she is a god of the lowest rank, comes to

this world by a spontaneous inclination (poufj avre^ovaCq)), her

own power and the setting in order of what comes after her being the cause of her descent [...] manifesting her powers, making

apparent works and activities which if they had remained quiescent in the intelligible world would have been of no use (ou matn) because they would never have come into actuality.33

Plotinus is apparently taking up Aristotle's teleology, encapsulated in the formula that nature does nothing in vain

(ouden matn). From this teleological perspective, the 'why' of the descent of soul is to be found in its purpose or goal (telos).

According to Plotinus' teleological account, the soul descends into the body in order to actualize her latent powers, i.e. to realize her own nature.

Prima facie, this motivation of self-realization seems simply

'egoistic'. On closer inspection, however, it emerges that this

self-concerned motivation of descent embraces an aspect of concern for the good of others. The self-realization that the soul has to achieve through her descent consists in the 'setting in

order (kosmsei) of what comes after her', namely the body and the sensible world. In doing so, she 'meets the need of

31 Enn. IV 3 [27] 13,31-33. 32 Enn. IV 3 [27] 13, 17-21. For a detailed discussion see Denis O'Brien, 'Le

volontaire et la ncessit. Rflexions sur la descente de l'me dans la philosophie de

Plotin', Revue philosophique 167 (1977) 401-422; Thodice plotinienne, thodice

gnostique (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), 14, note 24. 33 Enn. IV 8 [6] 5, 24-32



something else {eis allou tou chreianf. In this way, she benefits others and does not seek exclusively to promote her own profit.

Moreover, the soul's descent contributes to 'the perfection of the All', which is the very finality of the divine mission of the soul expressed in the Timaeus:34 By descending into the body and meeting its needs, the soul fulfils not only her own nature, but also 'the nature of the whole' as well, which is basically beneficent.

As to the beneficent character of 'the nature of the whole', it should be noted that Plotinus, as a faithful Platonist, adheres to the overall goodness of the universe. He gives voice to a deep conviction of his optimism: 'For there was certainly nothing which hindered anything whatever from having a share in the nature of good, as far as each thing was able to participate in it.'35 Particular emphasis is laid upon the goodness of the

intelligible beings. Their power, as Plotinus puts it, 'could not stand still as if it had drawn a line round itself in selfish jealousy (/boion perigrapsanta phthon)'? In his cosmology, it is this unselfish and benevolent power that has created and ordered the sensible world. This beautiful world is, thus, a 'revelation

{deixis) ' of the power and goodness of the intelligible world.37 In

the end, the goal of creation is to give the good and this world itself is a 'gift (dosis)'38 of'the self-giving and self-communicating Good'.39

Consequently, the soul, being a member of the intelligible world, also has a benevolent power, namely a power to give the

good, 'like a light which depends on the sun in the upper world but does not grudge (phthonoun) of its abundance to what

34 Enn. IV 8 [6] 5, 2. 35 Enn. IV 8 [6] 6,16-18. 36 Enn. IV 8 [6] 6, 12-13. This expression evokes the benevolence of the

demiurgic god in the Timaeus, who is good and thus feels no jealousy with regard to

anyone (Ti. 29el-3). 37 Enn. IV 8 [6] 6, 23-25. 38 Enn. IV 3 [27] 14, 5-19. 39

O'Meara, Platonopolis, 76. See also Pierre Hadot, 'Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus in Plotinus' Treatise Against the Gnostics', in Neoplatonism and Early Christian

Thought: Essays in honour of A. H. Armstrong, ed. Henry J. Blumenthal and Robert A. Markus (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1981), 136: 'Hence the principle "bonum diffusivum sui" is the principle which, for Plotinus, explains and justifies the unfolding of the whole of reality.'


38 Euree Song

comes after it.'40 Hence, in Plotinus' view, benevolence is part of the very nature of soul, apart from the question whether she is conscious of it or not.

To sum up, Plotinus assumes a double care of soul for the self and for others reflecting a double striving towards perfecting the self and towards perfecting the world through self communication. By incorporating the care for others in the care for the self, Plotinus suggests that self-perfection implies self communication. Although he does not overlook that the soul could be reluctant to descend and be annoyed with herself, he seems to be confident that the soul, once fully understanding her own nature and knowing her place in the hierarchy of

beings, would be persuaded to descend in order to communicate her own good.

Political engagement is to be conceived, I suggest, as part of the soul's endeavor to communicate her own good to this sensible world. To support this suggestion, I will appeal to Plotinus' concept of providence, which is embedded in his

teleology of nature, and attempt to show that the care of the soul for this world, expressed in her political activities, represents a providential order of the cosmos as a whole.

II. The Law of Providence In the treatise On Providence I (III 2 [47]), the descent of soul into this world is explained by her caring nature: It belongs to the very nature of soul to care for (epimeleithai) the bodily nature and to govern (dioikein) it.'" To refer to this benevolent and 'administrative' care, Plotinus also uses the term 'pronoia', which is rendered usually as 'providence'.42 The providential care of the individual soul for the body is embedded in the

general scheme of so-called divine Providence, a providence which concerns the bodily world as a whole. This divine

universal Providence is presented sometimes as a work of the

40 Enn. IV 8 [6] 4, 3-5. 41 Enn. III 2 [47] 7, 23-25. In this respect, Plotinus refers in Enn. IV 3 [27] 7,

12 to Phaedrus 246b 6: 'All soul cares for all that is soulless.' 42 Cf. Enn. VI 7 [38] 26, 7-12.



Intellect, but more specifically as an activity of the World-Soul or her Reason.43

While the individual body owing to its imperfection and

deficiency depends on a great deal of help from the soul and so causes a troublesome providence, the body of the cosmos, being perfect and self-sufficient, needs a kind of 'brief command' and stands under the 'royal supervision' of the World-Soul.44 In this

connection, Plotinus describes the universal care of the world soul as ruling 'without trouble' (apragmn: 28) and differentiates this from the particular care executed directly by the individual soul herself (cf. autourgos: 29).

This characterization of the providential care of the world soul evokes in my interpretation the 'kingly' or 'political' art or

expertise (techn) discussed in Plato's Statesman. Plato first divides knowledge (epistm) into practical and cognitive (gnstike), and the latter in turn into the purely theoretical {to kritikon) and the 'directive' part {to epitaktikon) which commands and guides actions. The art of kingship or

statesmanship is then classified as a 'directive art' {epitaktik techn).45 This political art is, further, described as a sort of 'architectonic' art directing other arts and not a mere handicraft.46 Finally, the political art turns out to be an

'expertise that controls all of arts, and laws, and cares for every aspect of things in the city, and weaves everything together in the most correct way'.47 In this light, the World-Soul in Plotinus

appears as an expert in politics. Divine Providence can be therefore conceived as a political activity of the divine politician.

This interpretation can be strengthened by the following passage, in which Plotinus portrays the reason of the All as a

legislating and administrating reason in a 'city of good laws'. The divine reason 'knows already what the citizens are going to

43 For an overview of Plotinus' concept of divine providence see Myrto Dragona Monachou, 'Divine Providence in the Philosophy of the Empire', Aufitieg und

Niedergang der Rmischen Welt M. 36. 7 (1994), 4476-86. Enn. IV 8 [6] 2, 12-29.

45 Plato, Politicus, 258e 4-260c 6.

46 Aristotle uses the expression 'architectonic art' in the Nicomachean Ethics (I, 2, 1904a 26-28) exactly to describe the political art. He equally makes the distinction between an architect and a manual worker in the Metaphysics A 981a 30-b2 and the

Physics II 194b 1-7. 47 Plato, Politicus, 305e 2-6.


40 Euree Song

do and why they are going to do it, and legislates with regard to all this, and weaves together (crwixjxxivovTOs) by means of laws all their experiences and arts and the honour or dishonour that their acts merit, so that all that happens in the city moves as if spontaneously into a harmonious order.'48 Like Plato's

statesman, the divine politician in Plotinus is presented as a 'weaver' producing a unified political fabric from different

threads in the city. In the passage just quoted I would like to underline two

points, which I think shed light on the question of how divine Providence functions. First, the reason of the world soul works

by means of laws. Second, the world-reason coordinates things to yield a harmonious order in the cosmic city. Accordingly, Providence does not 'improvise', but operates lawfully, i.e. in an established pattern.49 Yet Providence does not employ mechanistic laws. Rather, the laws of Providence serve a

purpose, namely a harmonious order in the cosmos. Here

emerges a teleological framework underlying Plotinus'

conception of Providence. The providential laws not only install

regularity in the course of things, but also establish an overall

harmony in the cosmos. As a result, the Plotinian cosmos is an

organized structure in which everything fits together according to a single rational plan.50

The 'lawful' operation of Providence fits well with the idea that the divine politician or king exercises a universal care. Hence Plotinus does not plead for particular providence in the sense that God or the gods personally interfere in worldly affairs in favour of particular persons: 'Here it would not be right for a

god to fight in person for the unwarlike; the law says that those

who fight bravely, not those who pray, come safe out of wars;

for, in just the same way, it is not those who pray but those who

48 Enn. IV 4 [28] 39, 13-17. 49 I owe this characterization of Providence to Dorothea Frede's description of

the stoic concept of Providence in her article 'Theodicy and Providential Care in

Stoicism', in Traditions of Theology. Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background and

Aftermath ed. Dorothea Frede and Andr Laks (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2002),114. 50 The idea that Providence has a single goal in view evokes Plato's universal

teleology put forward in the Phaedo, namely in the context of the critique of

Anaxagoras' theory of mechanical causation, whereby 'the good and necessary (99 c5)' is suggested as final cause for the cosmos as a whole. Cf. Dorothea Frede, Platons

Phaidon. Der Traum von der Unsterblichkeit der Seele (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche

Buchgesellschaft, 1999), 115.



look after their land who are to get in a harvest, and those who do not look after their health are not to be healthy'.51 Thus, for

Plotinus, it is out of the question to 'bargain' with the divine, which is part of traditional religious practice rooted in the notion of arbitrary, but manipulable gods.52

To approach more closely the way of functioning of

Providence, it is useful to recall that the ordering force of the cosmos is a divine reason, i.e. a perfectly rational being. As a work of reason, the 'political' order of the universe is essentially rational. Providence upholds this rational order of the universe.53 But what kind of rationality is at work? As to this question, it is

telling that Providence in Plotinus operates with a 'mathematical' principle, according to which the providential order of the universe is expressed in proportional equality and not in an arithmetical one.54 It is crucial that the notion of

proportional, geometrical equality is introduced in Plato's

Gorgias 508a to formulate a principle of justice. It concerns

precisely distributive justice, a justice consisting in giving to each

according to his merit or value (/kat'axian).55 As we have seen, the cosmic politician in Plotinus also

weaves the honour or dishonour that the citizens' acts merit into his fabric. Against Gnostic antinomianism, Plotinus defends this kind of justice in the cosmic city: 'It is agreed that there are

judgments and punishments here. How, then, is it possible rightly to disapprove of a city which gives each man his deserts? In this city virtue is honored and vice has it appropriate dishonour.'56

Now it is of particular interest that Providence employs such a 'meritocratic' system of rewards and punishments in regulating the reincarnation of the soul. The lesson is clear: in the long run

51 Enn. III 2 [47] 8, 36-40. 52 In this regard, Plotinus inherits from Plato a critical attitude towards the

traditional concept of gods in the Republic II. 53 In this respect, Plotinus seems to be much indebted to Plato's theory of Providence in the NomoiX (885e-899e).

54 Enn. Ill 3 [48] 5, 1-6: 'Thus, from the beginning to the end, providence comes from above; it is equal, not according to number, but according to proportion (ok ot| otov kt' dpt0p.v, XA kgit' vaXoyiav), which is different in different places as in an animal, all is related from beginning to end; but each part has its own function.'

55 Cf. [Plato], Definitions 41 le 2. 56 Enn. 119 [33] 9, 18-21.


42 Euree Song

vice does not pay. For the soul as an immortal being, there is no

hope of escaping divine justice. In this regard, the providential order of the world is fundamentally just. This is, I think, exactly the core of Plotinus' doctrine of theodicy.

In this connection, Plotinus refers to 'decree of Adrasteia' in Plato's Phaedrus (248 C 2), a 'divine law' which allots to each soul her due place.57 It is worth noting that 'Adrasteia' (the

Inescapable) is an epithet of Nemesis, namely the goddess of distributive justice. More strikingly, Plotinus identifies Adrasteia with this world-order itself: 'for this world-order is truly Adrasteia and truly Justice and wonderful Wisdom.'58

Related to this, Plotinus explicitly describes the justice governing the descent of souls as set in nature (en physei)59 or in the nature of beings (en tois oust).60 In this way, justice constitutes an essential aspect of nature. It is so to speak inscribed into 'the law of nature'. Providence, therefore, reveals not only the benevolence of nature, but also its justice.

III. Living according to the Law of Providence On the basis of his conception of Providence, Plotinus urges us to live according to 'the law of Providence'. To live by the law of Providence is to act as the divine reason commands.61 In this

respect, the law of Providence is 'prescriptive'. To clarify this

point, Plotinus draws a medical analogy.62 Providence is

compared to the prescription of a doctor. What a man might do to promote his health stands in accordance with the reason of his doctor, whereas whatever he does that is unhealthy, he acts thus against 'the providence of the doctor'. Likewise, the action of a dissolute man is done neither by Providence nor according to Providence, but what is done by a moderate man is not done

by Providence, because it is done by the man himself, but is

done according to Providence; for it is 'in tune with

(symphnon)' reason, namely right reason (orthos logos). From this viewpoint, man is responsible for his action, not Providence.

57 Enn. IV 8 [6] Ch. 5; IV 3 [27] 24, 6-11. 58 Enn. III 2 [47] 13, 16-17. 59 Enn. IV 3 [27] 13, 1-2. 60 Enn. IV 3 [27] 24, 8. 61 Enn. Ill 2 [47] 9, 6-8. 62 Enn. Ill 3 [48] 5, 46-56



Providence is anaitios.bi In this context, Providence figures as a moral law.

Now it should be emphasized that the observance of the law of providence is far from a blind subjection to divine authority. Rather, it encourages us to use our reason to find out what divine reason may find right. Consequently, it motivates us to

perfect our reason, namely to assimilate to the perfect reason of the cosmos. Virtue in the proper sense for Plotinus is nothing other than a 'perfection of reason'.64 Performing due actions alone is not enough for living virtuously. We act virtuously only when our due actions are based on practical wisdom and, therefore on reason.

Accordingly, Plotinus' conception of Providence does not lead to passive quietism. In his view, it is 'ridiculous [geloion)' for people to believe that they can be merely saved by the gods 'without even doing the things by means of which the gods command them to save themselves'.65 He claims that 'it is not lawful for those who have become wicked to demand others to be their saviours and to sacrifice themselves in answer to their

prayers, nor, furthermore, to require gods to direct their affairs in detail, laying aside their own life'.66

Providence in Plotinus is demanding. It expects us to save

ourselves, to perfect ourselves. Our self-perfection can be achieved only through the cultivation of virtue. No wonder that his ethics sets high standards of virtue. Indeed, Plotinus admits that the lower kinds of virtue exist without theoretical wisdom, but only incompletely and defectively {atels kai elleiponts). The lower kinds of virtue must be perfected by wisdom or 'grow

63 A fuller analysis of the relation between human responsibility and divine Providence cannot be undertaken in the framework of this paper. For an outline of the

problem see Euree Song, Aufitieg und Abstieg der Seele. Diesseitigkeit und Jenseitigkeit in Plotins Ethik der Sorge [Aufitieg und Abstieg] (Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), ch. 7. See also Peter Adamson, 'Plotinus on Astrology', in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. XXXV (2008), 283-288 (especially for Plotinus' use of the

Myth of Er in Plato's Republic X). 64 Enn. I 4 [46] 2, 42-43: T| TeXetwoi aTo [sc. Xoyo], jv perr]v

eivai. To be sure, the perfection of soul's reason is expressed not only in the practical wisdom, but also in the theoretical wisdom.

65 Enn. Ill 2 [47] 8, 42-46. 66 Enn. Ill 2 [47] 9, 10-13.


44 Euree Song

along with it (hama synauxetaiY ! Therefore, complete and

perfect virtue can be achieved only by the sage. In his discussion of the tripartite division of philosophy,

Plotinus claims that ethics as well as physics derive their

principles from dialectic.68 With this, he suggests that the

knowledge of how we are to live has its roots in theoretical

understanding of the intelligible principles, ultimately of the

Good itself which is the final object of dialectic. In this concept of ethics, a theoretical training is crucial for practical wisdom.

However, Plotinus' ethics is no purely theoretical discipline. It includes also the virtuous dispositions and the exercises (askseis) which produce them. In other words, ethical philosophy is constituted not only of a theoretical training, but also of a

practical training and a practical competence. From this, we can conclude that the sage as the fully virtuous person does not

neglect practical training. Indeed, Plotinus points out that 'virtue is always being

compelled (


Certainly, one can indulge in such wishful thinking. As a matter of fact, there can be no such choice in this world. Just as the medical skill is always needed, since illness is never lacking, so is practical virtue indispensible, since human life cannot do without actions. This is just the condition humaine. The virtuous man has no alternative but to act virtuously. Otherwise he would not be virtuous. Being perfectly virtuous, the Plotinian

sage is not, therefore, exempted from practical duties. In this

way, he is 'compelled' to act virtuously. However, practical duties are not merely imposed on him from outside, because the virtuous sage would not refuse to act, if he could see the

necessity of action. And he must see it by understanding the

given situation, in so far as he is not only theoretically, but also

practically wise. Hence, there must be a voluntary moment in his fulfilling practical duties. In this regard, he comes close to a doctor who willingly uses his skill, if anybody needs his help, although he prefers that there would be no need of his skill.

To be sure, there are few who are able to meet Plotinus' ethical ideal. As elitist as his ethics may be, he by no means maintains that the door to virtue is exclusively open to 'the chosen people of God' alone. He thinks instead that all people are invited to the contest of virtue, although only a few will

carry a laurel wreath. According to his picture, this world is a kind of moral school led by Providence as a rigorous teacher who aims to foster virtue in her students. Nonetheless, he holds a high opinion of the human race as a whole: Man is beautiful or noble (kalos), insofar as he is rational and participates in

justice. Plotinus says:

Mankind has not lost its character of being rational but is

participant, even if not to the highest degree, in wisdom and

intellect and art, and justice - each and all have a share at least in

the justice that governs their dealings with each other;71 and those

whom they wrong, they think that they wrong rightly, because they deserve it. In this way man is a beautiful creation (kalon poima), as

far as he can be beautiful, being woven into the All, has a part which

is better than that of other living things, of all, that is, which live on

the earth.72

71 Justice is here clearly a social virtue, which governs actions in social relations

among human beings. Enn. Ill 2 [47] 9, 24-31.


46 Euree Song

Against the background of this theory of Providence, it becomes clear why Plotinus mentions 'Providence' in his charge of immoralism and antinomianism against the Gnostics as follows:

But this doctrine censures the Lord of Providence and Providence

itself still more crudely, and despises all the laws of this world and

the virtue whose winning extends back through all time, and makes

temperance here something to laugh at, so that nothing beautiful

(,kalon)73 may be seen existing here below, and abolishes temperance and the justice which come to birth with men's characters and is

perfected by learning and training, and altogether everything by which a man could become virtuous (spoudaios).74

It is true that the link between the censure of Providence and the disrespect of moral norms of this world is not here made

explicit, but it can be easily established on account of the role of

Providence as a moral law. The eternal law of justice

promulgated by the Lord of Providence can provide the ground to justify the laws of this world, insofar as they represent it or are derived from it. In this light, the divine legislator and the divine law appear as the source or paradigm of the human legislator and the human law.

In this connection, it is also noteworthy that Plotinus detects the Gnostics' motive of immoralism and antinomianism in their extreme otherworldliness. He says that the Gnostics despise all the laws of this world and virtue, 'so that nothing beautiful may be seen existing here below (iva |ir|8v KaXov evTaOGa 8f] 6(j)9eLr| {mdpxov: 14-15)'. Besides, he points out a few lines later that 'nothing here is beautiful for them, but something else

is, which they will go after one day' (21-22). The rationale of his

diagnosis may be put as follows: So long as the Gnostics insist

that only the other world is beautiful, they cannot accept that

there can be something beautiful in this world. As a result, they refuse to acknowledge anything that belongs to this world to be

beautiful or valuable. Consequently, they disvalue also the moral

norms of this world, these all the more so considering that they

73 The Greek word 'kalos' is applied not merely to aesthetic beauty. In general, the term describes anything which deserves admiration. It can be thus translated as

'admirable', 'honorable', 'fine' and 'noble'. It is also connected with the sense of 'right' and 'correct'.

74 Enn. II 9 [33] 15, 10-18.



are usually regarded as valuable, which is from the Gnostic

viewpoint totally mistaken. According to Plotinus' diagnosis, Gnostic otherworldliness necessarily gives rise to

antinomianism.75 In contrast to the Gnostics, Plotinus attempts to offer an

ethical theory, according to which the search for the

otherworldly God would not exclude moral norms in this world, but, on the contrary, could found and further them. According to Plotinus, the practical or political virtues not only lead our soul to the things above, but also bring about beauty (to kals) here below. Additionally, he maintains that the practical virtues are not merely necessary, but preferable [progoumenon) ,76 Given his insistence that the sage is a perfectly virtuous person, he has reason to think that the sage is not indifferent to this world, but cares about it. In this regard, it would be wrong to align the Plotinian sage with Christian anchorites who have turned their back on the world.77

When, therefore, Plotinus criticizes the Gnostics who feel no need of virtue and show no concern for the community, he is

requiring his virtuous sage to undertake political activity and

this, in my view, in order to promote virtue and beauty in the human community. In doing so, the Plotinian sage is actually becoming like the divine reason of the world, a providential god who governs the cosmos by emulating the intelligible beauty and its source, namely the Good.

If we may press this likeness further, we can assume that the Plotinian sage as a politician charged with the care of the human

community ideally exerts a universal providence rather than a

75 Plotinus does not hold that otherworldliness per se amounts to immoralism. His comparison of two people in the same beautiful house, one of whom reviles the house and its builder, while the other does not revile them and waits quietly for the time in which he will leave (Enn. II 9 [33] 18, 4-14), implies that there possibly exists besides the Gnostic world-hatred another otherworldly attitude, a more peaceful version. In fact, his own platonic version of otherworldliness is reformative and has a

strong moral commitment. For further discussion of Plato's otherworldliness see Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being. A Study of the History of an Idea

(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971, 10th ed.) 24-66, esp. 31, 35,38.

76 Enn. VI 3 [44] 16, 27-31. 77 Pace Imgard Mnnlein-Robert, 'Biographie, Hagiographie, Autobiographie -

De Vita Plotini des Porphyrios', in Metaphysik und Religion. Zur Signatur des

sptantiken Denkens, ed. Theo Kobusch and Michael Erler (Munich and Leipzig: K. G. Sauer, 2002), 587-588.


48 Euree Song

particular one. Concerning the method of his kingship or

statesmanship, we can also suppose that he reigns or rules by means of laws grounded in the divine law of Providence. Or he

is involved in promulgating laws by means of which human

actions can be ordered to the common good. So we can imagine him as taking on the role of the legislator like the legendary king Minos as indicated in Enn. VI 9 [9] or acting as a guardian of

law like a member of the Nocturnal Council in Plato's Laws XII.

It seems, therefore, to be no accident that Plotinus himself, admired as an exemplum of the sage of late antiquity, planned to found a city named 'Platonopolis' and to live there according to Plato's laws7s

Euree Song Kyung Hee University at Seoul, Republic of Korea

78 Cf. Porphyry, Vita Plotini 12. It is uncertain that Plotinus refers with '

... tois Platonos' (6-7) to Plato's latest work Laws.


Article Contentsp. [27]p. 28p. 29p. 30p. 31p. 32p. 33p. 34p. 35p. 36p. 37p. 38p. 39p. 40p. 41p. 42p. 43p. 44p. 45p. 46p. 47p. 48

Issue Table of ContentsHermathena, No. 187 (Winter 2009), pp. 1-148Front Matter'The fox knoweth many things, the hedgehog one great thing': the relation of philosophical concepts and historical contexts in Plato's Dialogues [pp. 5-26]The ethics of descent in Plotinus [pp. 27-48]Dr Johnson and the Irish [pp. 49-64]Defining and displaying the human body: collectors and Classics during the British Enlightenment [pp. 65-97]Notes on a biography of C. M. Bowra [pp. 99-103]ReviewsReview: untitled [pp. 105-107]Review: untitled [pp. 107-109]Review: untitled [pp. 109-113]Review: untitled [pp. 113-116]Review: untitled [pp. 116-121]Review: untitled [pp. 121-124]Review: untitled [pp. 124-128]Review: untitled [pp. 128-130]Review: untitled [pp. 131-132]Review: untitled [pp. 133-139]Review: untitled [pp. 139-141]Review: untitled [pp. 141-144]Review: untitled [pp. 144-148]

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The Ethics of Descent in Plotinus

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