MARTIN-LUTHER-UNIVERSITY
HALLE-WITTENBERG
LEIBNIZ INSTITUTE OF
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
The Ethics of Financial Speculation in Futures
Markets
Ingo Pies*, Matthias Georg Will*, Thomas Glauben** Sören Prehn**
* Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg (MLU), Chair in Economic
Ethics
** Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern
Europe (IAMO), Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World
Agricultural Trade
Innovation for Financial Services
Montréal, October 17, 2014
2
Worldwide Protests after Price Increases for Food Commodities
(2004-2012)
Quellen von links oben an: http://standeyo.com/C2C_090218/India.food.riot.jpg, http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/audio/video/2011/11/22/1321962056421/A-protester-throws-a-tear-010.jpg, http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-DzgCnBcBMTY/TbY7TxAbZtI/AAAAAAAAEe8/Gj8b3sVd_68/s1600/high-food-prices-spark-protests-in-india-where-food-inflation-was-1832-percent-last-month.jpg, http://griid.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/44045095_416_4floods_ap.jpg, http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-
c7B1pIgzP3w/TvviRvBhvjI/AAAAAAAAAqI/etgS6gpgU44/s1600/Mohamed+Bouazizi+in+flames.jpg, http://media.treehugger.com/assets/images/2011/10/food20protest20mexico.jpg, http://e-newschannel.de/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Mohammed-Bouazizi-in-sidi-bouzid-fire.jpg, http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_AIkWSJ039r8/TIMc3fvjNMI/AAAAAAAADRA/Wmn0GDMibjI/s1600/food3.jpg, http://www.3quarksdaily.com/.a/6a00d8341c562c53ef016303964459970d-800wi,
http://cdn.mg.co.za/crop/content/images/2011/10/01/300Xtahrirxap.jpg/300x300/
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
100,0
120,0
140,0
160,0
180,0
200,0
220,0
240,0
260,0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
3
Price Developments with Dramatic Consequences
Development of the FAO Food Price Index from 2004 till August 2012. Price increases
correlate with food riots.
Burundi Somalia, India, Mauretania,
Mozambique, Yemen,
Cameroon, Sudan, Côte
d'Ivoire, Haiti, Egypt,
Tunisia
Mozambique, Tunisia, Lybia,
Egypt, Mauretania, Algeria, Saudi
Arabian, Sudan, Yemen, Oman,
Maroco, Iraq, Bahrain, Syria,
Uganda
Food Riots
2004
–
2012
80,0
130,0
180,0
230,0
280,0
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
Source: Lagi,, Marco Karen Bertrand and Yaneer Bar-Yam (2011) The Food Crises and Political Instability in North Africa and the Middle East und FAO-Food Price Index
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
4
Campaigning after the Food Riots in Germany
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
http://www.oxfam.de/sites/www.oxfam.de/files/imagecache/mainimage_
node/mainimage/_dsc7973.jpg http://www.erlassjahr.de/cms/upload/bilder/Startseite/mitessenspielmannic
ht.jpg
https://d1p42fqrbwqdsw.cloudfront.net/campaigns/background
_images/000/002/048/web/Oxfam_Spekulanten-in-die-
Schranken_580x270px.jpg?1366984874
http://m3.paperblog.com/i/66/666548/mit-essen-spielt-man-
nicht-L-q1EDoM.jpeg
http://garbersgazette.de/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Banner-
Ackermann_422_startseite_ger.jpg
5
Overview of the Argumentation
1. Moralizing ≠ Ethics
2. Economics for a Reconstruction of Moral Concerns
3. Using Economic Insights for Dealing with Moral Concerns
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
A Bias within the Field of Ethics: The Individual Level
6
On the individual level, scholars argue that speculation may lead to an addictive and self-
destructive behavior.
• "The mental qualities that are most frequently called into play among professional
speculators are those that characterize the activities of the professional gambler."
(Ryan, 1902, p. 345)
• "Gamblers who have lost money may be tempted to ‘‘double down’’ and increase
their bets in attempts to win back their losses. This increases their losses, with
potentially devastating consequences to themselves, their employers, and the
community around them." (Angel and McCabe, 2009, p. 284)
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
A Bias within the Field of Ethics: The Societal Level
7
Scholars in the field of ethics assume that speculation has negative societal effects.
• "Compulsive gambling disguised as speculation ... can be particularly injurious to
markets because gamblers may be trading based on their compulsion, not their
information. Their trades may distort prices away from their fundamental economic
values and send false price signals to producers and consumers." (Angel and
McCabe, 2009, p. 284)
• "The wagers that underlie futures and options imply a zero-sum game: what the
option buyer gains, the option seller loses, minus the amount retained in option
fees. Such zero-sum games on a grand scale, resulting from the proliferation of
wagers on the same underlying asset, make no sense in macro-economic terms.
Given the fees incurred, only the banks get rich, while no macro-economic value is
added. A zero-sum game after the deduction of fees becomes a negative-sum
game from which everybody ends up losing." (Koslowski, 2009, 2011, p. 123)
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
The Societal Discourse about (Passive) Index Funds
8
NGOs that criticize passive index funds have gone one step further than the academic
debate and differentiate between “good” and “bad” speculators.
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
http://www1.pictures.gi.zimbio.com/Elections+Subcommittee+Holds+Hearing+Voter+CEY2k97dx6yl.jpg
„Index Speculators’ trading strategies amount
to virtual hoarding via the commodities futures
markets. Institutional Investors are buying up
essential items that exist in limited quantities for
the sole purpose of reaping speculative profits.“Masters, Michael (2008; S. 6)
„Index Speculators provide no benefit to the
futures markets and they inflict a tremendous
cost upon society.“Masters, Michael (2010): Testimony before the Committee on Commodities Futures Trading Commission
http://www1.pictures.gi.zimbio.com/Elections+Subcommittee+Holds+Hearing+Voter+CEY2k97dx6yl.jpg
„Active and passive speculators are two
very different animals, and to understand
the distinctions between the two is to
appreciate the extent of the threat posed
by passive speculators. Active speculators
add beneficial liquidity to the market by
buying and selling futures contracts with
the goal of turning a profit. In contrast,
passive speculators drain liquidity by
buying and holding large quantities of
futures contracts – basically acting as
consumers who never actually take
delivery of goods.“Masters, Michael (2008): Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs United States Senate.
Are We Asking the Right Questions?
9
There are empirical and conceptual doubts that the “speculation-is-bad”-storyline really fits
both for the individual and societal level.
• Today, the most relevant speculators are not individuals. They are big organizations.
Thus, traditional approaches of the field of ethics may be not appropriate.
• The field of economic theory develops its explanatory power not only from analyzing
individual motives but also from the “situational logic” of markets.
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
• This "situational logic" of markets calls for a moral assessment of the (systematic)
consequences of market activities.
• Concentrating on the empirical output rather than on the intentional input of market
activities requires a shift from asking psycho-logical questions to asking socio-logical
questions.
10
Overview of the Argumentation
1. Moralizing ≠ Ethics
2. Economics for a Reconstruction of Moral Concerns
3. Using Economic Insights for Dealing with Moral Concerns
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
Non-Commercials
• Long and short
• Discretionary (active)
• Partly collaterized
• Information function
• Liquidity function
• Insurance function
(Traditional) Speculation
Index Funds
• Long-only
• Not discretionary (passive)
• Fully collaterized
• No information function
• Liquidity function
• Insurance function
No (Traditional) Speculation
11
Passive Index Funds are Different
Index funds apply a specific trading strategy: They trace the market trend. To receive a
certain risk profile, they mix their index portfolios with constant weights of different
commodities. Therefore, they have to steadily re-balance their portfolios.
During the last years, the investment volume of passive index funds has
enormously increased. However, we neither find theoretical nor empirical
arguments that index funds increase prices or volatility. Furthermore, index
funds have a price stabilizing effect because of their specific trading strategy
(Prehn et al., 2013).
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
23
1211
21 1 1 1
18
5
1 1 1 1
0
5
10
15
20
25 Results of 35 Econometrical Studies
6 studies that find an
impact on volatility
9 studies that find an
impact on price levels
Results of the studies researching
volatility:
Results of the studies researching
price levels:
12
15 15
10
12
6
32
32 2
0
5
10
15
20
25
Implication of the 35 Studies Regarding the Regulation of Agricultural
Future Markets
Implications of the studies
that warn against
overregulation
13
Passive Index Funds: Transforming Risk in a Productive Factor
14
Passive index funds have developed an interesting business model: They hedge the
inflation risks of their investors by bearing the price risks of traders within the commodity
markets.
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
„Index Speculators’ trading strategies amount
to virtual hoarding via the commodities futures
markets. Institutional Investors are buying up
essential items that exist in limited quantities for
the sole purpose of reaping speculative profits.“Masters, Michael (2008; S. 6)
„Index Speculators provide no benefit to the
futures markets and they inflict a tremendous
cost upon society.“Masters, Michael (2010): Testimony before the Committee on Commodities Futures Trading Commission
Risk σ
Expected
Income μ
A
Gross Risk
Net Risk
(with Guarantees)
B
1.
μA
=μB
σAσB
C
D
2.
2.
σC σD
3.
μC
=μD
• Passive index funds add liquidity to the
future markets.
• Especially, when traditional speculators
leave the future markets, it is attractive for
passive index funds to get into the market.
• Thus, farmers (and other producers of
commodities) get additional possibilities
for insuring their price risks.
• In the end, farmers (and other producers
of commodities) have an incentive to
increase their productivity because they
have to bear less (price) risks.
15
Overview of the Argumentation
1. Moralizing ≠ Ethics
2. Economics for a Reconstruction of Moral Concerns
3. Using Economic Insights for Dealing with Moral Concerns
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
Ethics can Learn from Economics
16
• Competitive markets can lead private action to promote public welfare.
• In scrutinizing the potential sources of malfunctions in the business sector,
economists have become aware that the institutional framework plays a decisive
role in shaping competitive forces towards good or bad results.
• Thus, economists came to the conclusion that many market problems have their
origin in political problems, especially where politics is responsible for deficits in
the institutional framework of competitive markets.
• The core insight here is that market failure might result from political failure.
Hunger and malnutrition are often not the consequence of poorly working markets.
Moreover, political failures in developing countries often cause hunger and
malnutrition.
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
Economics can also Learn from Ethics
17
• Ethics can help by pointing to a quite different source of political failure.
• If false beliefs dominate the public perception of a problem or the perception of
possible solutions, this might lead to a "discourse failure" (Pincione/Tesón 2006)
that pressures political actors to take certain measures even if these in fact defy
the common good.
• Claims by civil society organizations to drastically reduce or even prohibit index
fund activity in commodity futures markets, intended to protect agricultural
production against shocks, might instead un-intentionally and even strictly
counter-intentionally! be detrimental to the moral aim of improving global food
security.
• Therefore ethics, specialized in criticizing (erroneous) moral criticisms on moral
grounds, can complement economics. Ethics can provide arguments that guard
against "discourse failures"
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
18
Back-Up
1. Moralizing ≠ Ethics
2. Economics for a Reconstruction of Moral Concerns
3. Using Economic Insights for Dealing with Moral Concerns
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
Real Economy Triggers for Recent Agricultural Crises
19
The dramatic price increases experienced in recent years were caused by shocks and
structural developments in the real economy. They were intensified by political coordination
failures.
• Global population growth combined with a global increase in per capita income
boosted the consumption of meat, which in turn increased the demand for
agricultural commodities, especially animal feedstuff
• The promotion of bio energy led to competition between the use of commodities
as a fuel as opposed to as a food (food vs. fuel dilemma).
• In 2007 and 2010/2011, adverse meteorological events caused significant price
increases that were exacerbated by low stock inventories.
• Many countries reacted to these price increases by initiating policies that, in
retrospect, contradicted the expectation formation of market participants, causing
severe difficulties for the price discovery process. These highly controversial
policies were taken by both exporting and importing countries.
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
20
Overview of Policy Recommendations
Field 1: Empower Futures Markets
Better transparency (EMIR); avoid overregulation (MiFID)
Field 2: Measures to Increase Global Food Supply
Support R&D and encourage both private and public investment
Field 3: Measures to Solve the Food vs. Fuel Dilemma
Reconsider “greening” strategy in times of hunger
Field 4: Prevent Policy Coordination Failure that Endangers Food Security:
Reform the WTO Uruguay Round Green Box Agreement (Annex 2) that
allows governments to implement protectionism – one important reason
for price explosions!
Field 5: Prevent Market Intervention that Endangers Food Security
Improve Risk Management and Social Security in Developing Countries
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
Prices for Crude Oil, Debasement of the US-$
Bio fuels
Economic and population growth, increasing
consumption of meat per capita
Weather
Politics
High
production,
global
recession
Weather
Global Economic
Growth
Politics and
declining stocks
Increasing Stocks
Declining global Stocks
Index: January 2002=100
The Impact of the Real Economy on Agricultural Prices
21
The figure summarizes important causes for crises by the real economy. We find: (1) macro
economical shocks, (2) structural trends of an increasing demand, (3) competition in the usage
because of a promotion of bio fuels, (4) decreasing stocks, (5) adverse meteorological events, (6)
political mistakes.
Price index for weighted prices according to the amount of
traded wheat, rice, corn and soya
Source: Trostle et al. (2011; p. 9).Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
The Consumption of Meat Increases
22
Source: IFAD WFP FAO (2012; S. 19).
Nigeria
Bangladesh
Indonesia
nChina, Mainland
India
Japan
Brasilia
Mexico
Pakistan
Spain
Italy
Germany
France
USA
Share of animalistic food for diet (in %)
Increasing per capita income changes the diet of former poor peoble. The consumption of meat
increases. That causes an overproportional increase of the demand for agricultural commodities.
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
23
Exporting countries reduce supply
(beginning in autumn 2007)
Importing countries increase deman
(beginning in January 2008)
China withdraws subventions for export.
China, Argentina, Russia, Kazakhstan, and
Malaysia increase export tariffs.
Argentina, Ukraine, India and Vietnam
introduce quantitative export restrictions for
wheat and rice.
Ukraine, Serbia and India forbid exports of
wheat.
Egypt, Cambodia, Vietnam and Indonesia forbid
exports of rice.
India forbids exports of rice (except Basmati).
These countries reduced import tariffs:
India (for wheat flour)
Indonesia (soya and wheat)
Serbia (wheat)
Thailand (pork)
EU (grain)
These countries increased their stocks for rice
by means of public purchases:
Philippines
Malaysia
Source: Own figure, referring to Trostle (2008; pp. 23-24) and – especially for the rice market – the detailled overview of Dawe and
Slayton (2011; Figure 9.2, p. 175).
Political Reactions during the Crisis in 2007/8
Producing countries applied exceptions of the WTO rules and tried by means of export limitations or
even bans that aimed on holding food commodities within the home countries. That caused panic on
the markets. Furthermore, importing countries tried to react with public policies. These policies
additionally increased the prices.
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
24
Two years later, politics repeated the same mistakes. This holds especially for importing countries.
Political Reactions on the Crisis in 2010/11
Exporting countries reduce supply
(beginning in August 2010)
Importing countries increase demand
(beginning in December 2010 till March 2011)
Russia bans export of wheat.
Belarus incurs a crop failure of 30% for
canola oil and bans exports.
Turkey suspends tariffs on wheat imports
for the public sector.
China, Jordan and Algeria tremendously
increase their imports of wheat.
Bangladesh, Taiwan and Russia reduce
tariffs for imports of some agricultural
commodities.
Afghanistan, Indonesia, Agypt, Iraq and
Tunesia tremendously increase their
imports of wheat.
The European Union suspends tariffs for
importing barley and wheat for feed.
Turkey suspends tariffs on wheat imports
of the private sector.
Source: Own figure, reffering to Trostle et al. (2011; Table 3, p. 20).
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
25Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
Afr Asi Lat Sum
Countries 33 26 22 81
Foreign Trade Policy
Restrictions on exports (up to prohibition of exports)
Relaxation of import restrictions (Suspense of customs duty)
8
18
13
13
4
12
25
43
Internal Trade Policy
Targeted tax reductions (e.g. reduced VAT rate)
Sale of stocks for low prices
Price ceilings (including prohibition of hoarding)
14
13
10
5
15
6
4
7
5
23
35
21
Support for Supply Side
Input Subsidies (e.g. cheap-rate loans, fuel subsidies)
Subsidies for fertilizers and seeds
Interventions (e.g. state programs for regrating farm produce)
Market support (e.g. public price information)
12
4
6
4
11
2
4
9
12
3
5
2
35
9
15
15
Support for Demand Side
Income policies (public employment programs)
Ear-marked money transfers to poor people
Direct food supply for people in need
4
6
5
8
8
9
4
9
5
19
23
16
Policy Measures in 81 States in Reaction to the Crisis in 2006-2008
Source: Demeke et al. (2009).
If due to low stocks shocks cannot be buffered, even small supply shocks can
cause extreme price increases.
26
Relevance of Stocks for Buffering Shocks
Because of low stocks, quantity adjustments result in extreme price reactions: An inelastic demand
interacts with an inelastic supply.
Source: Own figure referring toWright (2011; Figure 7, p. 38).
Price
Consumption demand
Total demand,
including stock keeping
Quantity
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
Stock-to-Use-Ratio as an Indicator for Crises (Wheat)
27
The Stock-to-Use-Ratio is an indicator for food crises. If the ratio falls below a critical value (near
20%), massive price increases can emerge (grey areas).
We find high price increases within the periods that are marked grey. Before
these periods (especially before 2008), stocks went down, not up. This indicates
that the food crisis was not caused by speculation.
Worldwide
Worldwide without China
0,15
0,20
0,25
0,30
0,35
0,40
0,45
0,50
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
Weltweit
Weltweit ohne China
Source: USDA Foreign Agricultural Service–Production Supply and Distribution Online
World
World without China
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
The Level of Speculation and Index Fund Investments have Increased
28
The amount of capital employed (Total Commodity Assets under Management in Mrd. US$) has
strongly increased in the period 2003 till 2011.
Barclays Capital (2011) The Commodity Refiner (Autumn 2011)
9,1 1930
45
60 44
65
9499
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Energie
Agrarrohstoffe
Industriemetalle
Edelmetalle
The aggregate value of all commodities has increased just as the value of
agrigultural commodities.
Energy
Agricultural commodities
Industry metals
Precious metals
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
Time Lags between Speculation and Price Rises
29
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
0
25000
50000
75000
100000
125000
150000
175000
200000
225000
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Long-Positions (Anzahl)
Preis (Cent/Scheffel)
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
350000
400000
450000
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Long-Positions
(Anzahl)
Preis (Cent/Scheffel)
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
180000
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Long-Positions (Anzahl)
Preis (Cent/Scheffel)
Wheat Soya
Corn
We can find higher prices. However, there are huge time lags between the increase of speculation
volume and price rises. These lags cause doubts if there is causality.
Source: Sanders and Irwin (2011; Table 1, p. 525).
Price (Cent/Bushel) Price (Cent/Bushel)
(Quantity)(Quantity)
Price (Cent/Bushel)
(Quantity)
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
Real Food Prices Decreased Since 1900 Despite of an Increasing Global
Population
30
Fuglie and Wang (2012; p. 2).
Food-Price-Index 1977-79 = 100
Food-Price-Index
-0,9% p. a.
Global Population
Global Population in Billions
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
Sources of Growth for the Global Food Production, 1960-2009
31
Fuglie and Wang (2012; Figure 3, p. 4).
Growth p. a. (in %)
Sources of Growth:
Total Factor Productivity Input-Intensification Irrigation Bigger Cropland
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade
What We can Learn from Onions about Speculation
32
The monthly volatility for onions (in percent) is in general higher than the volatility of crude oil
because there is no future market for onions.
Mark Perry (2012): http://www.dailymarkets.com/economy/2012/04/22/what-can-onions-teach-us-about-oil-speculators/
The USA banned a future market for onions in 1958. Therefore, market
participants have no possibilites for inter-temporal balances. That increases
tremendously volatility. Without speculation, volatility increases!
-80%
-40%
0%
40%
80%
120%
160%
200%
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Onions: Mean 7,0%, SD 59,4%
Crude Oil: Mean 1,3%, SD 8,6%
Martin-Luther-University, Chair in Economic Ethics and
IAMO, Agricultural Markets, Marketing and World Agricultural Trade