The Ethics of Moral Justification of Corporate Outcomes - XLRI 2015

7/23/2019 The Ethics of Moral Justification of Corporate Outcomes - XLRI 2015

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andout 11 Managerial Ethics XLRI 2015

Mor l Justific t ion of Corp or te utco! es

Ozzie Mascarenhas, S.J., Ph.D.

JRD Tata Chair Professor of Business Ethics

October 27, 20!

"One of the Greatest Diseases is to be nobody to anybody, - Mother Teresa.

This chapter provides the ethical foundations for sound corporate moral justification of corporate decision-

outcomes by systematically applying major theories of moral reasoning and metaphors, such as deontology,

teleology, distributive and corrective justice theories and their sub-theories, for analyzing and assessing corporate

executive decisions in terms of their ethical inputs, process, and outputs. From earlier chapters we assume that

the corporate executive moral decision and moral act and actions are framed in their constitutive components of

ethical inputs, ethical process, and ethical outputs. Input and process elements are assumed to constitute the

executive decision or !T, while the output elements are understood to constitute the !"#$%&'%#!%$ under a

concrete decision action situation. (e present three cases to illustrate the contents of this !hapter) !ase **.*

deals with the recent +aggi controversy in India. !ase **. reviews the +aruthi plant massacre at +anesar, and

!ase **. reflects on the current list of Indias $uperrich. There are two parts to this chapter) /art I) +ajor#ormative %thical Theories for ssessing the +orality of !orporate "utcomes0 /art II) 1eriving +oral 2ules

from %thical Theories for ssessing +orality of !orporate "utcomes

Case 11"1# $he Maggi Contro%ers& and the '(()I

Response

For the nine years Sudha H C worked in the garment industry, sewing buttons, stitching labels and doing sundryother jobs, she often turned to Maggi, a foolproof timesaving meals aid. Several times a week, when her morningsgot consumed up filling water from the municipal tap outside her tiny home in alajinagara in southern angalore,she fed her husband and her school going son Maggi noodles for breakfast with minimal time and fuss in thekitchen. She herself relished the noodles and then bundled her son into the school auto before rushing off to make

the garment factory!s punch"in time. #n some days, she returned to find that her son had rustled up to snack onMaggi. #n other days, when she came back bone"tired from long factory hours, she gave herself respite fromcooking by preparing instant noodles for dinner $ sometimes adding a vegetable or two picked up on her way backfrom the factory.

%t has been two years since Sudha, &', (uit the garment industry and started working as a cook. ut old habitsdie hard. She chops, grinds and steams in the homes she cooks in. ut in her own, where she is always confrontedwith a pile of washing, a mound of dishes and house"mopping, she takes recourse to the Maggi (uick"fi). Her son,now a college student, eats it every other day too. *He loves the taste and % like the convenience,+ she said.raditional foods like idli, dosa, akki rotti -rice pancakes and ragi mudde -millet mounds are still part of theirintake but if the family had a food pyramid, it would be Maggi occupying the base. /uite naturally, the recentcontroversy over the high lead content in Maggi has upset Sudha. *How can % eat the noodles now0 hey say it ispoison,+ she said, adding that the stores near her home no longer stock Maggi.

he allure of the two"minute noodles has been the strongest for lower middle" and middle"class %ndian womenas they stormed into the urban labor force, working in factories, supermarkets and offices in the mid"12'3s. For thiscategory of women, who almost singlehandedly manage their kitchens and tend to their children whilesupplementing the family income by working outside the home, packaged instant noodles have eased the burden ofgrinding, prepping and cooking traditional %ndian foods. esides the convenience, the cost has been a draw. %nstantnoodles help busy working mothers save time outside the kitchen too, with elaborate %ndian meals consisting ofgrains and vegetables giving way to *one pot+ noodles meals. 4See more at5 http566indiane)press.com

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6article6opinion6columns6fifth"metro"without"maggi"its"absence"leaves"a"huge"hole"in"the"lives"of"middle"class"working"women67sthash8.

" Ti#e$ine of Ma%or Ma&&i E'ents

9une &, :31;5 he Food Safety and


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hane, Dasik, ?une, and Dagpur and are being tested in government labs in Mumbai and ?une. he samples arebeing tested for metallic lead content and the amount of ajinomoto salt which is used for flavoring the noodles.Maharashtra Food .S. Food and SF


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%ndia needs to initiate reforms in supply"chain operations so as to ensure farm produce is transported safely andat affordable prices to all, particularly in the urban areas. =dvanced technology will help moderni@e safety standardsand create a more transparent and efficient system to ensure food safety. ut for all this to happen, the FSS=% mustrise to the challenge and enforce food safety regulation to feed the growing and young population of %ndia.

#n 9uly :2, :31;, the Maharashtra Food and


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magistrate who remanded them to 1 days judicial custody. hey have been accused of various charges includingrioting with weapons, murder, attempt to murder, unlawful assembly, assault and trespass. he violence in whichseveral e)ecutives, managers and supervisors were attacked and office facilities, security office and fire safetysection gutted arose out of an alleged caste remarks by an official against a worker.

Maruti Su@uki %ndia Ptd. has been having a harrowing time since Gednesday -9uly 1B, :31 when about &,333workers rioted, leaving a senior manager dead, more than 133 people injured, and part of the premises charred.%ndia!s largest car maker by volume was wracked by labor unrest for much of last year at its plant at Manesar, in thenorthern state of Haryana. ut a nearby plant at urgaon, a suburb of Dew nderlying the tension at the Manesar plant has been a year of strained relations, especially between managersand the new Maruti union, whose leaders have been accused by the car maker of instigating Gednesday!s violence.he labor problems at the Manesar facility, located about ;3 kilometers from Dew


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*he relations were improving bit"by"bit. Ge learnt our lessons and established a communication channel thatnever broke down,+ Mr. hargava said on Saturday, 9uly :3, :31: at Dew


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last two years is seen as a sign of Maruti!s clout in urgaon and over the police and the judiciary in Haryana.Special prosecutor O. . S. ulsi says the prosecution hopes to complete e)amining of witnesses in =ugust :31.

he Manesar workers always claimed that they had been fond of =wanish, who they claim was sympathetic tothe workers! cause. Moreover, =wanish!s relations with Manesar plant workers were very cordialR they had noreason to kill him. So was it just an accident0 #r was there an ulterior motive to get rid of =wanish0 hese(uestions have not been raised nor answered by the Haryana police since 9uly 1', :31:. he final trial is yet tocommence and witnesses are yet to be e)amined -hat aitiona$ insi&hts o (ou &arner, an ho usefu$ in

reso$'in& this issue6

;. 5o ou$ (ou ha'e reso$'e the +rob$e# of Maruti


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2.?2.? = runaway rise in stock prices has catapulted a handful of promoters into the super"rich league in %ndia.

he share prices of a company often fluctuate wildly, often despite no growth in operations, earnings or profits.?oor and delayed disclosure and the inability on the part of the promoters to e)plain their business model makesome of these companies difficult for analysts and investors to understand. *Companies like lobus Constructors,rinity radelink, H?C io"Sciences, and steem io"#rganics have witnessed significant rise in promoter wealth,mainly because of une)plained stock market outperformance,! reports Business (or!dSuper Aich Survey :31 -see

Business (or!d, 9uly 1, :31, p. J:. %xhibit **..* lists ten high jumper companies with surprising marketcapitali@ation gains. #ften, rise in stock prices cannot be linked to fundamentals of a company. >ne)plained spurtis not very healthy, says =mbareesh aliga of delweiss Financial Services.

2.!2.!

2.A2.A Ehibit .;.) nia Su+er Rich) The 5i&h Ju#+ers

2.72.7 4See Menn, Shailesh -:31, *%ndia!s Super Aich5 >p, >p and Gay,+ Business (or!d, 9uly 1, p. J3"J:8.

2.@2.@?romoter Family Company Market Cap

in FQ :31:":31&

-As. Crore

Market Capin FQ :31&"

:31-As. Crore

=bsolute


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2.?2.? However, some promoters have really deserved the market cap gains. For instance, Secunderabad"based

Matra Oaushal nterprises promoted by Aamesh Chandra ?atrani Fly, reported profits of As B2 lakh on a turnoverof As B.1' crore. %ts share skyrocketed from As 11 to As ;;3 during FQ :31&":31, and the corresponding wealthimpact was market cap of As 1 crore in FQ :31& to As :'3 crore by FQ :31, an absolute jump of As :B2 crore or apercentage annual jump of :;,;B1. =ccording to ?atrani, the company underwent an amalgamation with a largercompany during fiscal year :31&":31 that increased its capital base from As & crore to As :: crore. he company

is well capitali@ed now and is well positioned for further e)panding its markets. heir sales and earnings numberslook even better since =pril 1, :31, and the company plans to do some diversification in its product range.

loomberg!s latest -9uly &1, :31; list of %ndia!s illionaire Club includes among the ten richest %ndians a newaddition5 Micky 9agtiani, a retail baron and owner of the unlisted hich Ru$e a++$ies

best, an h(6

;. 5o ou$ (ou #ora$$( %ustif( nia1s su+errich6 "++$( te$eo$o&ica$ #ora$ ru$es R0 to R 2. >hich Ru$e a++$ies

best, an h(6

?. 5o ou$ (ou #ora$$( %ustif( nia1s su+errich6 "++$( istributi'e %ustice #ora$ ru$es R; to R 2@. >hich Ru$e

a++$ies best, an h(6

!. " runaa( rise in stoc4 +rices has cata+u$te a hanfu$ of +ro#oters into the su+er


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A. >hat correcti'e %ustice +roceures o (ou su&&est such that innocent in'estors, both retai$ an institutiona$, are not

tra++e an har#e thereb(6

7. Rise in stoc4 +rices cannot be $in4e to funa#enta$s of a co#+an(. ne+$aine s+urt is not 'er( hea$th(, sa(s

"#bareesh Ba$i&a of Ee$eiss -inancia$ Ser'ices. E+$ain the ethica$ an #ora$ i#+$ications of su++ort in #ar4et

ca+ ith no rea$ co#+an( +ro&ress an +erfor#ance to account for it.

@. FCo#+anies $i4e G$obus Constructors, Trinit( Trae$in4, 5PC Bio


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The Ethics of Mora$ Justification of Cor+orate Outco#es

he search for a completely satisfactory ethical theory is an endless project -


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this complete set of relationships of meaning constitutes the real -formal object of e)ecutive moralchoice and e)ecutive moral action -Ponnergan 12B3R Melchin 1223.

%n the business conte)t, Figure **.*visuali@es a comprehensive set of relationships and meaningsthat business e)ecutive acts or decisions confront and generate. =ny business firm may be said to havethree basic environmental systems -mery and rist 12B&5

The internal environment system8#ae u+ of techno$o&(, +atents, RHD, +ersonne$, +rouction,

finance H accountin&, #ar4etin& an ser'ice9 hich efines a co#+an(I

The transactional environment of inustr( ri'ers 8cost, co#+etition, &o'ern#ents, custo#ers

an corres+onin& techno$o&( uner each9 as +ortra(e b( Porter 8=@!9 or the irect

sta4eho$ers 8su++$iers, creitors, stoc4ho$ers, consu#ers, co#+etitors, istributors,

e#+$o(ee unions, an &o'ern#ents9 that efine the $oca$ or nationa$ o#ain of co#+an(Ks

business transactions 8"nsoff =A!I -ree#an =@?9 an

The contextual environment of inirect eterna$ sta4eho$ers 8internationa$ an &$oba$

&o'ern#ent co##unities ith their +acts an a&ree#ents, re&u$ation structures, $as an orerI

&$oba$ su++$iersI &$oba$ +ro#oter< an in'estor shareho$ersI &$oba$ ban4s an financia$

#ar4etsI &$oba$ $abor #ar4ets an trae unionsI continenta$ an &$oba$ trae re&ionsI &$oba$

istributor netor4s an retai$ers, an &$oba$ co##unities, a'ocacies, cu$tures an

ci'i$izations9 hich the co#+an( scans, #onitors an res+ons to.

=ll three systems -internal, transactional, and conte)tual interact with each other as pointed out bythe multiplicity of arrows connecting them. Currently, the four major drivers of the company -cost,competition, customers and governments represent their impact by the technology that defines them-?orter 122J. hat is, whatever is offered in the market, a brand, product or service, what really definesthem and the firm is their uni(ue competitive technology and convenience its offers. hat is the fourdrivers should be characteri@ed as cost technology, customer technology, competition technology, andgovernmental technology. echnology is the central pivotal point or the innermost core of a businesssystem.


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cultural ideologies whose effects could be developmental or detrimental to the long"range future of oneLscivili@ation -Melchin 12235 &2'.

Characterizin& the Eecuti'e "ct

From earlier chapters we assume that the corporate e)ecutive moral decision and moral act andactions are framed in their constitutive components of ethical inputs, ethical process, and ethical outputs.%nput and process elements are assumed to constitute the e)ecutive decision or =C, while the outputelements are understood to constitute the C#DS/>DCS under a concrete decision action situation.

he e)ecutive decision and act, from a systems viewpoint, can be divided into corporate inputs,corporate process, and corporate outputs -see Figures 11.: and 11.& that are imported from Chapter 31.For the sake of simplicity, if we may combine corporate IinputsI and IprocessI into one major componentof business conduct designated as the e)ecutive a#t, and consider ethical IoutputsI and Iconse(uencesIunder one component designated as the corporate #onse1uen#es, then in general, the morality of a givendecision or act can be judged by5

a9 On$( the act0

b9 On$( its conse4uences0c9 Both the act an its conse4uences, an

9 /either the act nor its conse:uences.

his four"fold categori@ation provides the ta)onomy for a mutually e)clusive and collectivelye)haustive -MC typology of ethical"moral assessment of human conduct, in general, and corporateconduct, in particular. 1 he treatment of major ethical"moral theories applicable for assessing e)ecutiveconduct uses this four"fold ta)onomy. Table **.*details a ta)onomy of such ethical theories.

For reasons discussed later, we assume that5

Deonto$o&ica$ theories are best suite to assess eecuti'e conuct as an "CT co#+ose of

ri&hts an uties, anteceents, eter#inants, conco#itants, ecisions an actions. Te$eo$o&ica$ theories are #ost a++ro+riate for e'a$uatin& eecuti'e conuct in its

CO/SE*E/CES that a$so inc$ues conse:uences of conse:uences.

Distributi'e %ustice theories are best e+$o(e to %u&e the s+rea of ri&ht an uties, costs

an benefits of both the "CT an the CO/SE*E/CES of cor+orate conuct, an

/on


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Tab!e . lists specific ethical"moral theories that apply to specific components of corporateconduct or e)ecutive action. Tab!e .incorporates the non"cognitive system of logical positivism -seefootnote 2below and emotivism in moral assessment even though no concrete rules can be specifiedregarding oneLs emotions and feelings. motivism is a non"cognitive ethical system. hat is, it is notbased on knowledge, reason or theory in arriving at ethical"moral conclusions.& %t reduces all values ofIactsI and their Iconse(uencesI to subjective feelings or emotional attitudes about them -=yer 12&J. %t

judges the morality of an action by instinctive feelings about an act or its conse(uences, withoutnecessarily analy@ing either the act or its conse(uences. I% feel it should be rightI or Imy gut feelings tellme that this decision is wrongI are some emotivist e)pressions. motivism comes in different forms5indi*idua! emoti*ism as e)pressed by oneLs own strong emotions and feelingsR so#ia! emoti*ism asrevealed in strong ethnic or cultural stereotypes, and nationa! emoti*ismoften e)pressed by nationalopinion -e.g., gallop polls or patriotic sentiment.

Certainly, not all feelings are wrong, but neither can all feelings be trusted. elieving that thecommon, unsophisticated human being is close to nature implies real and genuine feelings that are right,and one often construes these feelings to be Icommon senseI or the basis of one!s national or ethnicculture and confidence. his is the justification of opinion polls. #ne assumes that what most =mericansIfeelI is right -via allup polls is probably right. =nalogously, what the e)ecutive instinctively and

genuinely feels to be good could probably be moral. However, as =ristotle maintained -12';, emotionsand feelings can be trusted only when they are refined, educated, and disciplined by virtue, or when theyemanate from men and women of IcharacterI -Hauerwas 12'1R Melchin 1223.

%t is conventional to distinguish between an a#t and theru!eapplication of ethical theories. =n a#ta!i#ationjudges the morality of a strategy or an institution by applying a given moral principle directlyto the act, strategy or institution without any intermediary rules, while the ru!e a!i#ation judgesmorality only after verifying if the act, strategy or institution conforms to firm and publicly advocatedmoral rules derived from moral principles.

%n this Chapter, we invoke both act and rule applications of ethical theories. Moreover, since thisChapter relates to ethical"moral reasoning for e)ecutives, and since by definition non"cognitive theories

do not emphasi@e reasoning, we will not deal with non"cognitive ethical theories. #n the other hand, thethrust of deontological, teleological and distributive justice theories is moral reasoning -oulmin 12;3,and we invoke these three theories regularly.

& he emotivist view is pioneered by =. 9. =yer -12&J and further e)panded by Stevenson -12. For a discussion onmotivism, see >rmson -12J2. C. O. #gden and %. =. Aichards first introduced the term Iemotive meaning+ in The Meanin& of

Meanin&4Pondon5 Aouteledge and Oegan ?aul, 12:18. =yer is more famous for his Pogical ?ositivism than for motivism, thelatter theory being based on the former. Pogical ?ositivism, originally e)pounded in =yerLs doctoral dissertation 43an&ua&e,Truth and 3o&i# -12&J8, maintains that only tautological sentences -e.g., : [ : \ and empirically verifiable propositions aremeaningful. =ll other sentences, such as theological -e.g., od is love, and ethical -e.g., to kill is immoral are Inon "senseIsince they are neither tautological nor empirically verifiable. Moral judgments are non"scientific statements that merely e)pressemotions5 one cannot prove or disprove them by the Iverification principle.I Moral judgment and analysis is beyond sense data,or is Inon"sense.I %f we do judge any ethical value, then it is based on our instinctive feelings about an act or its conse(uences,without necessarily analy@ing either the act -deontology or its conse(uences -teleology. However, some ethical judgments are

useful even though non"sense, for they e)press emotions and help to persuade others to act in desirable ways. his view hascome to be known asEmoti*ism,a non"cognitive ethic that opposes the classical view that ethics is based on reason. motivistshold that ethical statements are really e)pressions of emotions designed to influence peopleLs behavior. motivism reduces allethical values and propositions to subjective feelings or emotional attitudes about them -=yer 12&JR Stevenson 12. =nothernon"cognitive ethical theory is'res#riti*ismof A. M. Hare 4The 3an&ua&e of Mora!s, #)ford >niversity ?ress, 12;:8. #n theother hand, cognitive ethical theories that deny objectivity of moral values and rules are not, for that purpose, included in ourta)onomy. Such major theories include Meta-ethi#sof . . Moore 4'rin#iia Ethi#a, Cambridge >niversity ?ress, 123&8,

Mora! Sketi#ismof 9. P. Mackie 4Ethi#s4 5n*entin& 6i&ht and (ron&, ?enguin 12BB8, and Mora! 7ihi!ismof ilbert Harman4The 7ature of Mora!ity, #)ford >niversity ?ress, 12BB8.

14


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Co&niti'e Ethica$"3S "SO, BT /OT ">"3S O/3, eter#ine b(its conse:uences, but a$so eter#ine b( certain +rinci+$es, ru$es, ri&hts an uties of in'o$'e

sub%ects. This is eonto$o&( or situationa$is#, a #ora$ +hi$oso+hica$ theor( that %u&es an eecuti'e

act a$so b( its anteceents, i.e., intentions or #oti'ations that infor# the act, an b( the stanars,

ri&hts an uties that +recee an characterize the act.

c9 The #ora$ correctness of "T E"ST SOME "CTO/S is in no a( so$e$( eter#ine b( theirconse:uences. That is, hi$e te$eo$o&ica$$( an action #a( ha'e +ositi'e net benefits, an

eonto$o&ica$$( it #a( not 'io$ate an( 4non #ora$ +rinci+$e, stanar, ri&ht or ut(, (et in the

istribution of its costs an benefits, ri&hts an uties, the act #a( +ro#ote certain in%ustices.

5ence, the nee for a thir ethica$ s(ste# < that of istributi'e %ustice. The #ora$ +hi$oso+h( of

istributi'e %ustice $oo4s first at the act itse$f, hether b( its 'er( nature it is &eare to s+rea the net

costs or benefits e:uitab$( or +ro+ortionate$( across a$$ socia$ units affecte b( the act. /et, it $oo4s

at the actua$ s+rea of costs an benefits in ter#s of e:uit( an e:ua$it(.

he other ethical theories such as Aelativism, goism, Hedonism, >tilitarianism, udaimonism,Formalism, ?roportionalism, Situationalism and )istentialism discussed in ethics literature -e.g.,eauchamp and owie 122&R


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oth rules offer no actual ethical content but contain the form of pure disinterestedness oruniversali@ability that any moral rule must have in order to be truly moral -Frankena 12'3. =ccording toOant, an action is morally right for a person in a certain situation if and only if the personLs reason foracting is a reason the person would be willing to have every person act on in any similar situation.

oth rules, therefore, focus on a personLs reasons and interior motivations, and not on the

conse(uences of the action. he form -intentions or reasons of the act determines the morality of the act.his position may be designated asforma!ism-Feinberg 12B&, 12'3R Frankena 12'3.

Simpler and more practical versions of these two Oantian rules or categorical imperatives are5

Treat others as the( ou$ ha'e the# treat (ou the &o$en ru$e.

Res+ect the i&nit( of e'er( hu#an bein&.

Res+ect the funa#enta$ hu#an an #ora$ ri&hts of others.

Treat +eo+$e as autono#ous +ersons ith +ersona$ freeo#.

Treat a$$ +ersons as ens in the#se$'es an ne'er on$( as #eans to (our on ens.

Treat sub%ects as ca+ab$e of $i'in& their on $i'es an not as #ere ob%ects that eist for our

+ur+oses.

Cease treatin& e#+$o(ees as #ere factors of +rouction or #ere FresourcesN to be #ana&e.

OantLs formalist ethic in its original form is not practical. ?sychologists maintain that pure altruismdoes not e)ist, and hence, pure disinterestedness -?rinciples of >niversali@ability and Aeversibility ismore conceptual than real. he Oantian principles as stated are hardly applicable in real life. )ception"less absolute rules are theoretically possible but historically non"e)istent -Fuchs 12'.

hus, in determining human acts as right or wrong, deontologists invoke various principles such asintuition or common sense -e.g., Aoss 12&3, social contract -e.g., Aawls 12B1 or rights"based theory-e.g., Do@ick 12B, 12'1. AawlsL -12B1 version of Oantian formalism attempts to found morality on animplied contract by which human persons agree to protect each other!s rights. FrankenaLs -12'3 versionof Oantian ethic relies on the two principles of beneficence and justice to which all other moral rules can

be reduced.


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the e)istence of divine laws, revolted against the injustice of positive -State laws, and denied the powerof human reason to legislate for itself in advance of the uni(ue situations that every individual mustconfront -9eanson 12'3. Hence, he argued, the uni(ue set of situations that every human act confrontsdefines the morality of the act. %n this sense, action precedes rule, reaction precedes law, and e)istenceprecedes essence. his position is also calledsituationism.

A>P deontology, on the other hand, judges the morality of a given act by verifying if it upholds orviolates any derived moral rules. %t may be studied under Formalism, Pegalism, and ?arenesis. =llsystems are often invoked when intermediary or derived deontological moral rules conflict. hus, it isoften difficult to know which principles are right, which are wrong, which are universally true, and whichcan be applied right now for assessing the morality of a given action.

Aule deontological theories may be monisti# or!ura!isti#. = monistic theory holds that there is asingle principle or rule -e.g., the olden Aule5 treat others as you would like others treat you, or theIcategorical %mperativeI of Oant from which all other rules or judgments about right and wrong can bederived. hus


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radio or E when living in close neighborhoods, athletes -workout regularlyR obey the referee, students-do not plagiari@e or cheat, citi@ens -do vote, church"goers -do tithe, and the like. hese are parenetic.hey are our social contracts.

Te$eo$o&ica$ Mora$ Reasonin&) Base on Costs an Benefits

Te!eo!o&yas a moral philosophy advocates that a corporate act is considered morally right solely if itproduces some decidedly desired results such as5 pleasure over pain, benefits over costs, good over evil,justice over injustice, win"win over loss"loss, profits over losses, growth over decline, development overunderdevelopment, employment over unemployment, prosperity over poverty, concord over discord,harmony over disharmony, democracy over despotism, peace over war, life over death, and the like.

eleology, particularly its version of #onse1uentia!ist uti!itarianism, judges the morality of corporateconduct -e.g., hiring, firing, organi@ational downsi@ing, plant closings, massive labor layoffs, byconsidering the positive and negative effects of e)ecutive actions. %f positives clearly outbalance thenegatives, then the e)ecutive action is ethically justified by utilitarian considerations. ; Ghile teleology,and specifically utilitarian teleology, is future"oriented in terms of assessing conse(uences, deontologye)amines the past antecedents and the present circumstances defining the act. >tilitarianism adopts ateleological approach to ethics and claims that actions are best judged by their conse(uences. hus,according to this view, actions are not good or bad in themselves. =ctions subsume moral value onlywhen one considers their effects on all people -tilitarianism proposes that we should act in ways that produce better overall conse(uences than thealternatives we are considering. %n general, the *better+ conse(uences are those that promote human well"being such as happiness, health, dignity, integrity, freedom, and respect for all the people affected.eleology has spawned several versions depending upon the nature and scope of the utility value of theresults of the action. Major versions are5

%goism) So#e esire resu$ts are ec$usi'e$( +ersona$, an hen +ersona$ &oo ta4es +ri#ac( o'er

socia$ &oo, this etre#e te$eo$o&ica$ +osition is ca$$e e&ois#.

%nlightened %goism) hen +ersona$ &oo is sou&ht in con%unction ith $on&tilitarianism has its roots in 1' th and 12thcentury social and political philosophy. %t is usually credited to


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eleological enlightened goism primarily appears under three versions depending upon the specificrule applied5

5edonism) hen the socia$ &oo esire is +$easure an &ratification of the #ai#u# nu#ber, this

+osition is 5eonis#. n its cruest for#, it #aintains that hu#an actions #ust be %u&e fro# their

ca+acit( to arouse &ratification either ini'iua$$( or socia$$(. 5eonis# reuces a$$ uti$it( 'a$uesu$ti#ate$( to +$easure.

'tilitarianism) hen a te$eo$o&ist efines that action ri&ht that #ai#izes tota$ uti$it( 8+ersona$ an

socia$ &oo9 of the &reatest nu#ber, this +osition is ca$$e ti$itarianis#. ti$itarianis# ho$s that an

eecuti'e action is ri&ht if it +rouces, of if it tens to +rouce, the &reatest a#ount of &oo for the

&reatest nu#ber of +eo+$e affecte b( that action. Otherise, the action is ron&. "$ternate$(, an act

is ethica$ on$( if the su# tota$ of uti$ities &enerate b( this act is &reater than the su# tota$ of

co#+arab$e uti$ities +rouce b( an( other a$ternati'e to this act. "s far as the uti$it( concerne is

so$e$( re$ate to the conse:uences of an act an not the act itse$f, this uti$itarian +osition is a$so ca$$e

conse4uentialism.

%udemonism) hen the socia$ &oo sou&ht after is ha++iness an se$f


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usiness contracts and agreements are such commitments that we ought to honor even if theconse(uences turn out unfavorable. here are certain actions, such as slavery, child labor, torture,terrorism, unjust war, murder and the like that violate fundamental ethical principles of human dignity,human respect, e(uality, justice, and charity. Such actions cannot be justified no matter what theirbeneficial conse(uences. Some decisions must be based on deontological principles of rights and duties,regardless of conse(uences. =lternately, there are certain principles or rules we ought to follow, even if

doing so could prevent good conse(uences from happening or even it results in some bad conse(uences.%n other words, the ends do not a!+ays /ustify the means. For instance, the presumed ends of preventingattack on the >nited States may not justify using severe treatment bordering on torture to e)tractinformation from the prisoners captured in =fghanistan and %ra(. he presumed end of saving nron orSatyam cannot justify the corporate fraud its C# and CF# got embroiled in during 1222":331 -in thecase of nron or :33;":33' -in the case of Satyam.

Distributi'e Justice Base Mora$ Reasonin&)

9ustice is commonly defined as giving unto others what rightfully belongs to them -Aawls 12B1.9ustice, therefore, deals with the deontological aspects of oneLs rights and duties in society. Minimally,

*good behavior+ intends no harm and respects the rights of all affected and, accordingly, *bad behavior+is willfully or negligently trampling on the rights and interests of others -Aawls 12';5 ::&";1. he wayjustice is defined, determined and e)ecuted has certain teleological conse(uences on society. However,standards of justice are generally taken to be more important than purely teleological or utilitarianconsiderations -Aawls 12B15 &". For instance, slavery or child labor is unjust, even if it makes societymore productive. Moral rights of slaves and children to be free and e(ual cannot be sacrificed in order tosecure more benefits for the landowners or manufacturers.

=ccording to Aawls, given the presence of others and our need of these others both to survive and tothrive, ethics is elementally an ethic of justice, fair play, and e(uity. Hence, ethics has to do withdeveloping standards for judging the conduct of one party whose behavior affects another.

9ustice is based on individual and moral rights, and the moral right to be treated as a free and e(ualperson lies behind the theory of distributive justice that benefits and burdens should be distributed e(ually-Elastos 12J. hus, distributive 9ustice considers both deontological and teleological aspects of humanactions and conse(uences. Ghile deontological distributive justice reviews the IactI for its properdistribution of rights and duties among people affected by the act, teleological distributive justice looks atthe conse(uences of costs and burdens, to see if they are properly distributed among all people concerned.hus, distributive justice is construed as considering both the IactI and Iconse(uencesI of an -e)ecutiveact.

9ustice and fairness are interchangeable terms, even though some -e.g., Aawls 12;'5 JBR Hare 12B'5112 consider the concept of fairness as more fundamental. 9ustice is fairness. %t is giving each one oneLsdue. For instance, corporate e)ecutives act justly when they give customers and clients what they -ortheir monies deserve.

9ustice confers an entitlement " a claim based on justice is an entitlement right. %njustice involves awrong where one has been denied that to which one is entitled. Ghat persons are entitled to is based oncertain morally relevant properties they possess. hus, one could deserve a promotion based on oneLsestablished track record of loyalty, productivity and profitability. =nother could claim federal welfarebased on oneLs naturally disadvantaging disabilities or historical circumstances. oth fairness andentitlement -deserts are central to the understanding of justice -eauchamp and Childers 12'2.

20


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=ristotle -12';, ook E distinguishes between universal justice and particular justice. he formerrefers to the virtue of being a just or morally upright person who always does what is morally right andobeys the law. ?articular justice concerns specific situations, and =ristotle distinguished three such forms" distributive, compensatory, and retributive. hese three classic forms of particular justice or fairness aredistinguished, depending upon the specific moral rule or standard used5

1istributive justice that ea$s ith an e:uitab$e istribution of ri&hts an uties, benefits an

burens, an states that e:ua$s shou$ be treate e:ua$$( an une:ua$s, une:ua$$(.

2etributive justicethat #aintains that one shou$ ae:uate$( rear a +erson for ri&ht one an

+unish 8b$a#e9 a +erson for ron& +er+etrate.

!ompensatory justicethat affir#s that one shou$ co#+ensate the ron&e +erson for the ron&

one b( restorin& the +erson to hisher ori&ina$ +osition.

Compensatory justice corrects IinvoluntaryI wrongs such as those that result from accidents orharmful products, and compensation should at least restore the wronged person to his6her original

e(uilibrium. Aetributive justice corrects IvoluntaryI wrongs such as those resulting from assaults, se)ualharassment, crimes, and thefts. esides compensating the victims, retributive justice prescribes ade(uatepunishment for the evildoer.

he classic theory of distributive justice is based on the minimum principle of distributive justice,traditionally attributed to =ristotle. his principle states that e1ua!s must be treated e1ua!!y, andune1ua!s must be treated une1ua!!y.J %n so far as distributive justice applies the =ristotelian rule, it maybe designated as ru!e distributi*e /usti#e. =s an elementary principle of formal justice or formal e(uality,distributive justice applies to retributive and compensatory justice, and hence the latter two are consideredas subsets of rule distributive justice -see Tab!e .. =s defined, compensatory and retributive justiceare concerned with correcting wrongs -oatright 122&5 2:. asically, all wrongs are corrected using thedistributive justice rule.

he minimum principle of distributive justice is called IformalI justice -Feinberg 12B&R Dielsen12B' since it states no criteria for judging what can constitute or institute e(uality or ine(uality in a givensociety, nor does it furnish criteria by which people can be classified as e(uals versus une(uals. %t merelyasserts that, regardless of what aspects or criteria are considered, no person should be treated une(uallyamong e(uals. =bstract or formal principles of justice can provide only rough guidelines when specific

JMore precisely, the fundamental principle of distributive justice has been e)pressed as follows5 I%ndividuals who are similar inall respects relevant to the kind of treatment in (uestion should be given similar benefits and burdens, even if they are dissimilarin other irrelevant respectsR and individuals who are dissimilar in a relevant respect ought to be treated dissimilarly, in proportionto their dissimilarityI -Eelas(ue@, 122:5 21. his principle does not specify the Irelevant aspectsI. =re race, color, religion,gender, age, nationality and the like Irelevant aspectsI in distributing jobs, ta)es, health care, education, voting rights, holding

public office, property rights, and other resources among citi@ens0 = ImonisticI theory of distributive justice will invoke oneIrelevant aspectI -e.g., human nature as a guarantee for an e(ual treatment of all. ?luralistic theories of distributive justice willclaim multiple Irelevant aspects.I hus galitarianists 4e.g., =ke -12B;, Dielsen -12B', and Elastos -12J8 hold there are norelevant differences and that all should be given e)actly e(ual shares of societyLs benefits and burdens. #pponents ofegalitarianism 4e.g., ernard Gilliams -12J:, Feinberg -12B&, and owie -12B18 reject this as unjust and offer other IrelevantaspectsI as basis for distributive justice -e.g., libertarianism, utilitarianism. #thers arrange the relevant aspects in a serial orle)ical order based on Isocial justiceI -Ayan 12:, Iprinciple of legitimate claimsI -Aescher 12JJ or Iprinciple of fairopportunityI -Aawls 12B1.

21


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actions must be taken. Moral argument is needed to affi) the Irelevant propertiesI against each case sothat proper material justice principle could be generated and applied.

iving each one his or her due without any a riorimoral rule is a#t distributi*e /usti#e. %f onefollows just oneLs intuition in -giving distributing dues, this act distributive justice may be calledintuitionism-Aoss 12&3. %f one uses no other principle other than love or Iloving actionI to determine

what belongs to whom, how and when, then this position is similar tosituationismof Fletcher -12':.

he theory of distributive justice is particularly relevant when different people put forth conflictingclaims on societyLs rights and duties, benefits and burdens, and when not all claims can be satisfied. %nsuch cases, the standards of justice are generally taken more seriously than utilitarian considerations-Hare 12B'R Aawls 12;'. For instance, slavery may be more productive and hence, moral as perutilitarianism, but in as much as it violates the individual moral rights of slaves -to be free and e(ualpersons, it violates deontologist and distributive justice. he moral right to be treated as free and e(ualperson is the basic foundation of distributive justice -Elastos 12J:.

=ccording to Ayan -12:, distributive justice looks at two important factors5 a Ghat is distributedR bHow it is distributed. Ghat is distributed -e.g., healthcare, welfare, employment, unemployment

compensation must itself be generated by production, whether one produces agricultural products,manufactured goods and commodities, or information services -Ayan 12:5 1'1. #n the other hand,oneLs share of what is distributed would also depend upon oneLs differential claims and deserts -e.g.,efforts, abilities, contribution, need, and merit. hat is effort in a business contet6 5o o (ou assess efforts ofor4ers natura$$( isab$e, isa'anta&e or #enta$$( cha$$en&e6

Contribution Ca+ita$ist Justice Canon A of

Proucti'it(

>hat is +roucti'it(6 5o #easure6 >hat if one1s a&e, &ener,race, nationa$it(, histor( of o++ression an su++ression, chronic

+o'ert(, an the $i4e ha'e affecte contributi'e +roucti'it(6

Socia$ ti$it( Socia$

ibertarian

Justice

Canon 7 of

Co##on Goo

>hat is co##on &oo in an or&anization6 >hat is co##on, socia$or +ub$ic uti$it(6 >ho eter#ines it an ho6 >hat is co##on &oo

b( the octrine of E#inent Do#ain6

Mar4et

Echan&ea$ue

ni'iua$

ibertarianJustice

Canon @ of

Su++$(tilitarianism of the conse(uences is not always a safe rule to follow. Some things should -or cannot be doneno matter what the conse(uences. =t least we should minimi@e harm of the conse(uences to all innocentstakeholders

Two !orollaries follow)

C 0) t is unethica$ to se$ect an act that $eas to an inefficient use of resources.C 02) t is unethica$ to en&a&e in an act that $eas to +ersona$ &ain at the e+ense of the societ( in

&enera$ 8-erre$$ an Gresha# =@!9.

R2) "n eecuti'e act is ethicalto the etent that it #a4es the &reatest nu#ber ha++( or fu$fi$$e.

8%udemonism of ristotle9.

Such an act may not be necessarily moral since IhappinessI is relative to people e)periencing it.However, much would depend upon the definition and content of happiness. =s discussed earlier, ifhappiness is blessedness or prosperity of all human beings, then it becomes more ethical and moral-Mac%ntyre 12'5 1'. Cooper -12';5 '2, following =nscombe -12;', translated eudemonia using apostmodernist term *human flourishing.+ Human flourishing implies the possession, use and fulfillmentof one!s mature powers or natural capacities over a long period of time. %t maintains that the highestgood or ultimate end of a human being is happiness, fulfillment, beatitude, and human actions must bejudged ethical and moral according to their relationship to this end. =s long as the action is conducive tohappiness of all persons affected by it, it is ethical -9. S. Mill 12J25 &J.

Ru$es eri'e fro# "++$(in& Distributi'e Justice Princi+$es

Ge act justly when we give a person what he or she deserves. 9ustice confers an entitlement " a claimbased on justice is an entitlement right. %njustice involves a wrong where one has been denied that towhich one is entitled. Ghat persons are entitled to or can legitimately claim is based on certain morallyrelevant properties they posses. hus, one could claim a ?h.


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Princi+$es of Distributi'e Justice

Some well"reasoned principles of rule distributive justice -e.g., galitarianism, Pibertarianism,>tilitarianism, and Fair #pportunism have been advanced to determine how goods and services could bejustifiably distributed une(ually. hese principles help choosing between social arrangements thatdetermine a uniform or e(uitable distribution of rights and duties, benefits and burdens across allmembers of the society. hese principles Iprovide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basicinstitutions of society and they define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of socialcooperationI -Aawls 12B15 .

%n ?art %, we briefly reviewed some well"known principles, such as those of =ristotle -12';, Ayan-12:, Aescher -12JJ, and Aawls -12B1. here are problems associated with all modes or canons ofdistribution. he acceptability of any theory of justice would depend upon the (uality of its moralargument that some one or more selected material criteria or distributive principles ought to be givenpriority or e)clusive consideration over others.

he following eight material principles of distributive justice are presumptively valid based onentitlement and fairness -Ayan 12:R Aescher 12JJ5

"io# =) Distribute co##on &oo 8e.&., %obs, e$ectricit(, rin4in& ater, basic foo &roceries9)

=. To each +erson accorin& to oneKs e:ua$it( < e&a$itarianis#.

=.2 To each +erson accorin& to oneKs nee < socia$ist %ustice.

=.; To each +erson accorin& to oneKs #erit < e'a$uati'e %ustice.

=.? To each +erson accorin& to oneKs abi$it( < natura$ist %ustice.

=.! To each +erson accorin& to oneKs effort < retributi'e or +ersona$ist %ustice.

=.A To each +erson accorin& to oneKs contribution < ca+ita$ist %ustice.

=.7 To each +erson accorin& to oneKs socia$ uti$it( < socia$ $ibertarianis#.

=.@ To each +erson accorin& to oneKs free


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his moral rule based on the )anon of 8bi!ity or Meritinvokes the =ristotelian principle of naturalaristocracy or naturalist justice. his canon does not define what abilities are. hus, natural or innateabilities are more gifts than oneLs merits. %f natural ability or merit alone is a criterion, then this canonmay reward workers with great innate ability but who e)ert little effort, which violates the canon of effort.=c(uired or demonstrated abilities as determined by oneLs achievements may be merits, but if justice isdistributed according to oneLs demonstrated abilities or contribution, then this canon is reduced to that of

productivity.

RA) "n eecuti'e action is ethica$ if it treats a$$ sta4eho$ers at $east accorin& to each oneKs effort.

his moral rule is based on the )anon of Effortthat invokes the puritanical principle of work ethic5oneLs assets and ac(uisitions should be in proportion to oneLs labors. his canon does not define whatefforts are, whether they are fruitful or futile efforts, well"directed or misguided efforts, planned orunplanned efforts. Should efforts be rewarded regardless of their achievements0 his may imply labordisincentives. Should efforts be rewarded even though ill"willed or misguided0 his fails to make adistinction that makes a difference. he canon of effort may reward workers with less ability but who putmore efforts to make the same contribution as the more able, thus violating the canon of merit or ability.Ghat if one!s country or economy or job does not provide opportunity to stimulate one!s efforts, as itoften happens in the developing countries0

R7) "n eecuti'e action is ethica$ if it treats a$$ sta4eho$ers at $east accorin& to each oneKs

contribution.

his moral rule based on the )anon of 'rodu#ti*ityinvokes the economic principle of free"enterprisecapitalism. his system rewards services rendered, capital advanced, risks run, and profits generated. =swith other canons discussed earlier, this canon also does not define what productive contributions are.hus, productive contributions could be a function of chance, serendipity, or even oneLs physical power.For instance, two persons of differing physical strengths and stamina, but spending e(ual time on thesame job with the same technology, may produce variedly, one more than the other, and thus claimdifferential rewards. he higher reward is owed to oneLs superior strength -which may be genetic andundeserved, and not to oneLs level of productivity or personal efforts. Ghat if disabled, aging, or

unskilled persons cannot produce0 Ghat if one is not given an opportunity -e.g., gainful or meaningfulemployment to produce0

R@) "n eecuti'e action is ethica$ if it treats a$$ sta4eho$ers at $east accorin& to each oneKs

contribution to the co##on &oo.

his moral rule invokes the )anon of So#ia! ti!ity-common good that distributes surplus -e.g.,wages, profits, jobs, land, welfare according to oneLs value to society or the common good. Commongood may be either collective -Ipro bono publicoI or social utility or individual -personal utility. hiscanon does not define what common or individual social good is. Social good, even though common, isrelative5 it changes with technology, the economy, consumer lifestyles, cultures and sub"cultures. heprimacy debate between individual and social good is far from settled5 for instance, whether an individualcould be sacrificed for a public common good that one does not believe in, or has conscientious objection

to. #n the other hand, should society be sacrificed for one individualLs vision of common good as =dolfHitler did0 Moreover, oneLs best prospects for advancing common good or public welfare may often becircumstantial, situational, locational, inherited -aristocracy, or in general, undeserving.

R=) "n eecuti'e action is ethica$ if it at $east treats a$$ sta4eho$ers accorin& to each oneKs #ar4etnited States, unemployment compensation, welfare payments, and some health"caresubsidies -Medicare, Medicaid are distributed on the basis of need. Sometimes, unemploymentcompensation is pegged on oneLs contribution -e.g., previous length of employment, oneLs last salary.9obs and promotions are awarded or distributed on the basis of demonstrated achievement or merit.Corporate hierarchies and e)ecutive prerogatives are e)amples of distributive justice in practice -Ferrelland resham 12';. he high salaries of top e)ecutives are justified only on the basis of their freemarket"e)change value. Ghen rival material principles of distributive justice conflict, one should giveproper weight to each principle, given circumstances of the case in (uestion.

he ta)onomic approach proposed here makes no fi)ed assumptions regarding the organi@ationaldesign or structure -albraith 12BB of the corporation the e)ecutive functions in. %n the post"industrialcorporate world of information"intensive -la@er 1221 and turbulent -mery and rist 12J;R la@er and

Geiss 122& environments, the structure of the e)ecutive moral decision"act will basically remain thesame in terms of its antecedents, process and conse(uences. o the e)tent that e)ecutives react to,interact with, and are determined by situational and environmental factors in their decisions and actions,and to the e)tent that they act after much consultation and partnership with their superiors and fellowe)ecutives, the responsibility of unethical decisions may be considerably e)onerated -Mascarenhas 122;R:33B.

(uality is a more comple) concept, and historically has taken three major forms -=ristotle 12';Redau 12B1R Dielsen 12B2, 12';R Elastos 12J:5 a e(ual treatment for e(uals -A1&R b fundamentale(uality that states that all human beings are e(ual or of e(ual worth, and hence should be treateduniversali@ably and reversibly -A31, e(ually -A3:, or should share all goods e(ually -A::R c sociale(uality which states that within a democratic set up by social consensus all are politically e(ual

regardless of age, gender, race, color, nationality, and religion, and hence should be given basic socialrights, especially when naturally disadvantaged -A3;, should be given e(ual opportunity -A:1, andshould be treated in such a way that undeserved differences are nullified -A::.

(uity and e(uality, even though opposites at the e)treme ends, can be conceived as a continuum-


44/55

harm by proper structures and procedures -A:B, and if harmed, should be ade(uately compensated.More positively, one should do and promote good unto all -A:', by ma)imi@ing happiness of the greatestnumber -A1:, ma)imi@ing utility of the ma)imum number -A11, or by ma)imi@ing satisfaction of themost -A13.

oday, most management theorists and ethicists believe that corporate powers are held in trust not only

for the shareholders the corporation deals with, but also for the community the corporation operates in-


45/55

-i&ure .) nterna$, Transactiona$ an Contetua$ Re$ationshi+s

that Tri&&er Eecuti'e Decisions

45

The

-ir#

Cost

Co#+eorthI Ethics of Mora$ Reasonin&

Distributi'e Justice Princi+$es)Ethics of Distributi'e an Correcti'e Justice


47/55

-i&ure .;) Moe$in& the Business Eecuti'e Decision


48/55

Tab$e .) " Taono#( of Ethica$


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Tab$e .2) " Taono#( of Distributi'e Justice Princi+$es

-irst Basic

Di'ision

Secon Basic

Di'ision)

Sub theories ofJustice

Basic ner$(in&

Princi+$e

Ethica$ Juent b(

Ea#+$es

ni'iua$

Justice

8Correcti'eJustice9

Retributi'e or

+uniti'e %ustice

*ui +ro :uo) +rinci+$e of

reta$iation

Puniti'e a#a&esI Ca+ita$

+unish#ent

Co#+ensator( %ustice Restore the har#e +erson to one1s

ori&ina$ status

Co#+ensator( a#a&es in +rouct

$iabi$it( %uents

Co##utati'e Justice Distribute to each one b( one1s

eser'es

Distribution of %obs, a&es,

hea$thcare, or e$fare

Ri&htsDut( or

eonto$o&ica$

Justice

Distribute to each one b( one1s

ri&hts an fu$fi$$e uties

Distribution as hu#an bein&s, &oo

citizens

Entit$e#ent Justice /ozic41s Princi+$e) istribute to

each one b( one1s ori&ina$ +osition

or entit$e#ent

Distribution b( one1s #erits, efforts,

+erfor#ance

Cost


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Tab$e .;) " S(nthesis of Mora$ Ru$es Base on the Taono#( of

Deonto$o&ica$ an Te$eo$o&ica$ Ethica$ Theories

Mora$ Ru$e Ethica$ Theor( Mora$it( of the

cor+orate Eecuti'e"ct base on)

Mora$ Ru$e

"++$icab$e to theCor+orate Eecuti'e

1eontological 2ules

R0 antian -or#a$is# Princi+$es of ni'ersa$izabi$it(an Re'ersibi$it(

"ct inas#uch as (our act is

#oti'ate b( a $a that can

a++$( to a$$.

R02 antian -or#a$is# Princi+$es of ni'ersa$izabi$it(an Re'ersibi$it(

"ct inas#uch as (our act is

&roune on #ora$ reasons

that con'ince a$$.

R0; Deonto$o&ica$ Justice Deonto$o&ica$ ri&hts of a$$sta4eho$ers, es+ecia$$( the +oor.

"ct inas#uch as (our act

safe&uars +ersona$ an

socia$ ri&hts of a$$sta4eho$ers.

R0? Deonto$o&ica$ Justice Deonto$o&ica$ ri&hts of cor+orateEecuti'es

"ct inas#uch as (our act

u+ho$s the ri&hts an uties

of cor+orate eecuti'es

R0! Situationa$is# 8J. P.Sartre9

>hen ri&htsuties conf$ict, the

actua$ situation shou$

eter#ine the res+onsehen ri&htsuties conf$ict,

act free$( but on

res+onsibi$it( for the

conse:uences

R0A Eistentia$is# 8R./iebuhrI D.

Bonhoeffer9

>hen ri&ht or ron&, truth or

fa$sehoo, an &oo or e'i$ are

not c$ear$( istin&uishab$e, act in

the #ist of oubt.

"ct a#ist uncertaint(, ris4

an a#bi&uit(, but on the

conse:uences.

R07e&a$is# e&iti#ac( of &o'ern#ent $as

an inustr( orinances

Obe( $e&iti#ate $as an

orinances

R0@ Contractua$is# Binin& ca+acit( of free$( a&reeon contracts.

5onor #utua$$( a&ree u+on

contracts.

R0= Parenesis) " Coe ofethics that counse$s

an ehorts action.

Creibi$it( an 'a$iit( of

inustr( an cor+orate ethica$

coe of conuct

Co#+$( ith a&ree u+on

coes of conuct. The

ob$i&ation is hortator(.

Teleological 2ules

R0 5eonis# 8Jere#(Bentha#9

Satisfaction of the #a%orit( Mai#ize satisfaction of a$$.

Ra ti$itarianis# 8J. S.Mi$$9

ti$it( of the #ai#u# Mai#ize net benefits to a$$.

Rb Conse:uentia$is# 8E."nsco#be =20


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Tab$e .?) " S(nthesis of Mora$ Ru$es Base on the Taono#( of

Distributi'e Justice Ethica$ Theories

Distributi'e

Justice

Ru$es

Ethica$ Theor( Mora$it( of the cor+orate

Eecuti'e "ct base on)

Mora$ Ru$e for the

cor+orate Eecuti'e < "ct

in as #uch as (ou cantreat e'er(one b()

R; -or#a$ Justice)

E&a$itarianis#

"ristot$e1s Canon of E:ua$it( One1s $e'e$ of e:ua$it(

R? Socia$ist Justice The Canon of /ee One1s $e'e$ of nee

R! /atura$ist Justice The Canon of /atura$ "bi$it( One1s $e'e$ of innate #erit or

abi$it(

RA Retributi'e Justice The Canon of Effort One1s $e'e$ of effort

R7 Ca+ita$ist Justice The Canon of Proucti'it( One1s $e'e$ of contribution

R@ ibertarian Justice The Canon of Socia$ ti$it( One1s $e'e$ of socia$ 'a$ue

R= ibertarian Justice The Canon of Su++$(


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Tab$e .!) "ssessin& the Mora$it( of nia1s Su+errich >ea$th Mai#ization Outco#es b(

"++$(in& Mora$ Ru$es of Deonto$o&ica$ an Te$eo$o&ica$ Justice Ethica$ Theories

QSee !ase **.) nia1s Su+errich

Tab$e .!") "++$(in& Deonto$o&ica$ Justice Ru$es to Justif(in& >ea$th Mai#ization b( the Su+errich

Justice

Ru$es

Ethica$ Theor( of

Deonto$o&ica$ Justice

Ethica$ Ru$e base on the Ethica$ Theor( of Deonto$o&ica$ Justice)Di the /ationa$ or nternationa$Mar4ets treat nia1s Su+errich b()

Di >ea$th Mai#ization Outco#es ofnia1s Su+errich treat others b()

R0 antian -or#a$is#) "ctinas#uch as (our act is

#oti'ate b( a $a that can

a++$( to a$$.

Princi+$es of ni'ersa$izabi$it(6 3ES)

"s $on& as #ai#ization or

a&&re&ation of ea$th as a #ora$

+rinci+$e, ecision an strate&( can be

uni'ersa$ize.

Princi+$es of ni'ersa$izabi$it(6 /O)

Mai#ization or a&&re&ation of ea$th as a

#ora$ +rinci+$e, ecision an strate&( are not

uni'ersa$ize a#on& the nonhenri&htsuties conf$ict, the

actua$ situation shou$

eter#ine the ecision a

%uent but one #ust on

the act an its conse:uences.

Princi+$e of Eistentia$ Situationis#)

3ES) f #ai#ization of ea$th is

#ost$( situationa$ es+ite conf$icts of

ri&hts an uties conf$ict, an if the

su+errich ta4e res+onsibi$it( for the

conse:uences of ea$th #ai#ization.

Princi+$e of Eistentia$ Situationis#) /O) f

#ai#ization of ea$th is e$iberate$(

frauu$ent an situation


53/55

Tab$e .!B) "++$(in& Te$eo$o&ica$ Justice Ru$es to Justif(in& >ea$th

Mai#ization b( the Su+errich

Justice

Ru$es

Ethica$ Theor( of

Te$eo$o&ica$ JusticeEthica$ Ru$e base on the Ethica$ Theor( of Te$eo$o&ica$ Justice)

Di the /ationa$ or

nternationa$ Mar4ets treatnia1s Su+errich b()

Di >ea$th Mai#ization Outco#es

of nia1s Su+errich treat others b()

R0 5eonis#) Satisfactionan P$easure of a$$

8Jere#( Bentha#9

Princi+$e of ni'ersa$ 5eonis#)

Di ea$th #ai#ization +ro#ote

ha++iness an satisfaction of a$$6

/O) Most facts +ro'e the

contrar(.

Princi+$e of ni'ersa$ 5eonis#) Di

ea$th #ai#ization +ro#ote ha++iness

an satisfaction of a$$ others, es+ecia$$(

the +oor an isa'anta&e6 /O)

>ea$th #ai#ization often occurs at the

issatisfaction an $osses of the others,

es+ecia$$( the uninfor#e an Most facts

+ro'e the contrar(. ni'ersa$ heonis#

see4s to #ai#ize satisfaction of a$$.

Ra ti$itarianis# 8J. S.Mi$$9) Mai#ize uti$it( of

a$$

Princi+$e of uti$it(


54/55

Tab$e .A) "ssessin& the Mora$it( of nia1s Su+errich >ea$th Mai#ization Outco#es b(

"++$(in& Mora$ Ru$es Base on Distributi'e Justice Ethica$ Theories

QSee !ase **.) nia1s Su+errich

Distriea$th Mai#ization Outco#es

of nia1s Su+errich treat others b()

R; -or#a$ Justice)E&a$itarianis#

"ristot$e1s Canon of E:ua$it() The $e'e$ of

e:ua$it( a#on& the su+errich6 3ES.

The $e'e$ of e:ua$it( a#on& the others 8i.e.,

non su+errich6 /O) /ot as $on& ine:ua$it(continues.

R? Socia$ist Justice The Canon of /ee) The $e'e$ of nee a#on& thesu+errich6 3es, an #uch be(on nee.

Their $e'e$ of nee6 /o, as +o'ert( 8or non

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The Ethics of Moral Justification of Corporate Outcomes - XLRI 2015

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