The Ethics of Sustainable Agricultural Intensification

8/14/2019 The Ethics of Sustainable Agricultural Intensification

1/37

ISSN 1609-0098


2/37

FOO D AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONSRome, 2004


3/37

Produced by theEditorial Production and Design Group

Publishing Management ServiceFAO

The designations employed and the presentation of material in thisinformation p rodu ct do not imp ly the expression of any opinionwhatsoever on th e part of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United N ations concerning the legal or development statu s of anycou nt ry, territory, city or area or of its auth orities, or concerning th edelimitation of its frontiers or boun da ries.

All rights reserved. Reprodu ction an d dissemination of material in th isinformation p rodu ct for edu cational or other n on-commercial purp oses areauthorized w ithout any p rior written p ermission from the copyright holdersprov ided th e source is fully acknowledged. Reprodu ction of material in thisinformation prod uct for resale or other commercial purp oses is prohibitedwithou t written p ermission of the copyright holders. Applications for such

perm ission shou ld be add ressed to the Chief, Publishing Management Service,Information Division, FAO, Viale delle Terme d i Caracalla, 00100 Rome, Italyor by e-ma il to copyrigh [email protected]

FAO 2004

ISBN 92-5-105067-8


4/37

Contents

iv

Foreword

1

Introduction

3

Agricultural in tensif ication

6An ethics framework

9

When is in tensification ethically good? A utilitarian model

12

When is intensif ication ethically good? A rights-based model

14

Utilitarianism and rights-based e thics: further issues

17

When is intensifi cation ethically good? A virtue-based model

22

How should burdens and bene fits be distributed?

25

Who is responsible for ensuring that intensification occurs?

28Conclusion


5/37

iv

Since the Neolithic Revolution, growing human populations have developeda var iety of strategies to intensify agriculture. Dur ing 10 000 years of intensification, human s have introduced d ifferent technological adaptations

of basic natura l resources in order to sustain growth in agricultural prod uction.Societies have in fact defined themselves by the w ay and degree in w hich they

have succeeded in increasing agricultural prod uction. While intensification hasmade it possible to support a world of 6 000 million people, it can result indegrad ation of the earths natu ral resource base. This pap er provides a definitionof intensification that allows for more open and informed d ialogue on the ethicaldimensions of sustainable agricultural intensification.

At the World Food Sum mit in 1996, countries comm itted them selves to halvethe nu mber of hu ngry in the world by no later than 2015. This goal was reaffirmedin the United Nations Millennium Declaration in 2000 and , in 2002, it was reiteratedby the World Food Sum mit: five years later .

The comm itment made is profoun dly ethical, and a related m oral imp erativeis to seek sustainable agricultural intensification in ways that d o not degrad e thenatu ral resource base, w hile also taking into accoun t the need to imp rove thelivelihoods of the millions of people who work the land , particularly in d evelopingcountries.

We have the skills to make the p olicy and technological choices to achieve thesustainable intensification that w ill be required over the next century, as the worldspop ulation size stabilizes. Nevertheless, these choices are d ifficult. Governmen tsand their policy planners, as well as produ cers and consum ers, must grapp le with

the ethical dimensions of intensification. How are we to identify and choose amongthe alternative paths forward to avoid m any of the negative effects associated withintensification?

In addition to the risk of degrading natural resources, intensification hasimportant socio-economic consequences, particularly in relation to rurallivelihoods. In m aking the relevant policy d ecisions, planners mu st identify andevaluate alternative strategies, in term s both of their imm ediate and longer-termimp acts and of their implications for the societies and com mu nities involved.Actors at the grassroots level deserve a fram ework enabling them to take decisions

and action that contribute to the common good . We must honour ou r commitmen tto provide viable prod uction a lternatives before we accuse p oor hou seholds of

Foreword


6/37

v

dam aging the environment in pu rsuit of mere subsistence. As Mahatma Gandh isaid, To the millions wh o have to go w ithout two meals in a dayGod can onlyappear as bread.

The ethics of sustainable agricultu ral intensification is the third stud y in the FAOEthics Series. It explores a systematic app roach to practical ethical analysis appliedto intensification, and aims at integrating ethical principles into the basket of policytools adop ted by planners w orking to achieve the World Food Sum mit goal.Hu man food needs provide the basis for a utilitarian argumen t for intensification,wh ile the m oral concept of virtue add resses peoples du ty to work for the good of society. A rights-based analysis then reveals how individuals pu rsuit of such goodcan be constrained by the rights of others. These three approaches can help u sarticulate, debate and ultimately assume eth ical responsibilities concerning th eintensification of agricultu re.

FAO intend s to continu e adv ancing the d ialogue on the ethics of food andagriculture, as it form s an ineluctable part of hum anitys core comm itment tofeeding the w orld.

Jacques DioufFAO Director-General


7/37

F A O / 2 1 0 2 8 / R .F A I D U T T I

F A O / 2 0 2 1 6 / L .D E MA T T E I S

F A O / 1 9 6 3 2 / G.B I Z Z A R R I


8/37


9/37

THE ETHICS OF SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURAL INTENSIFICATION2

concerning relationships among d ata has tend ed to pu sh aside explicit attention tounderlying normative concerns or assumptions. The ethical dimension of suchquestions can be obscured by imp licit and unquestioned assum ptions. Each of thesefactors complicates the articulation, defence and critique of ethical issues.

It is therefore useful to undertake p lanning and analytical exercises in which ethicalquestions are the primary focus. The goal here is to provide a basic conceptualframew ork in ethics that w ill aid in th e articulation an d justification of norm s forintensification, although this framew ork w ill also be ap plicable in other areas. Asalready stated, this paper does not end orse a particular set of answers to the ethicalquestions that arise from intensification. Instead , conceptu al tools that allow th esequestions to be articulated and discussed are presented and examples are given forillustrative pu rp oses. A short discussion on intensification is followed by thepresenta tion of a general framew ork for organizing and consider ing ethical issues.This framework is then used and developed in a series of discussions about the ethicalissues associated w ith agricultural intensification.


10/37

3

Agricultural intensification can betechnically defined as an increase inagricultural production per unit of

inpu ts (which may be labour, land, time, fertilizer,seed, feed or cash). For practical purposes,intensification occurs w hen there is an increasein the total volume of agricultural production thatresults from a higher p rodu ctivity of inp uts, or

agricultural p rodu ction is maintained w hile certain inpu ts are decreased (such as bymore effective d elivery of sm aller amou nts of fertilizer, better targeting of plan t oranimal protection, and m ixed or relay cropping on smaller fields). Intensification thattakes the form of increased prod uction is most critical when there is a need to expandthe food supply, for example during periods of rapid pop ulation growth . Intensificationthat m akes more efficient use of inp uts m ay be more critical wh en environm entalproblems or social issues are involved . In either case, changes caused by intensificationare to be und erstood conceptually in contrast to extensive adjustments, which involveincreases or decreases in the am oun t of inpu ts used . Historically, the m ost commonand effective extensive ad justment in agricultura l prod uction has been to increase ordecrease the area of land p lanted.

For the purposes of this discussion, the contrast between intensification andextensive adjustment is intended to ind icate the contrast between tw o broad strategiesthat hu man beings have had for affecting their food sup ply, rather than conceptsapplicable to econom ic or technical analysis of specific cases. The technical specificationsand measurement of intensification or extensive adjustment in any given case are actuallyquite complex. Changes in the produ ctivity of one input are likely to be accomp anied byadjustmen ts in the amount of other inpu ts. This complexity notwithstand ing, there islittle doubt that agricultural intensification has been a p rerequisite to hu man civilization.

The Neolithic technological revolution w asbuilt on collecting, concentra ting, selecting

and harvesting plant and an imal speciesin an organized fashion, with the aim of having more produ cts closer to hand andeasier to convert into nutrition. Thedom estication of farm animals and thedevelopment of crops, in the context of ever more p roductive farming systems,enabled the hu man p opu lation to growand tow ns and villages to develop, having

governments, laws, trade and economieswith specialized emp loyment.

Agricultural

intensification

Applying fertili zer to a ma ize crop

F A O / 1 4 5 1 9 / D .D E B E R T


11/37


As agricultural production became more efficient, so populations increased.Historians have argued w hether higher populations drove technological development,or whether technological development made higher populations possible.Nevertheless, throughout this development, most societies were chronicallymalnou rished, or prey to ep isodic famine. Relatively high transport costs mean t thatmost societies relied on local produ ction, except when w ater transport mad e importspossible. Classical Athens wa s largely fed from the Crim ea, and Rome from Egyp tand southern Spain. For more than 95 percent of the history of civilization, food hasbeen scarce for nearly a ll people. This has meant low life expectancy, susceptibility todisease and little capacity to face wars, droughts, floods and other human and natu ralcatastrophes. Food scarcity and social disorder brough t abou t m ajor m igrations of people and caused wars and massive cultural disrup tion.

Conversely, when scarcity w as relieved, m ajor cultural ad vances were m ade. About1 000 years ago, new varieties of rice were taken to southern Ch ina from the Champ aKingd om (now Viet Nam ). These were not sensitive to ph otoperiod , and p rodu cedtwo crops a year instead of only one. When these varieties were grown, the intensivetechniques that had developed slowly in China to increase produ ctivity per un it of land, although requ iring more labour, resulted in dra matic produ ction gains. Thesubsequent rice surp lus triggered chan ges across various sectors of Chinas economy,stimulating the construction of roads, canals, dams, ironworks, grain storage facilitiesand the production of weapons. For five centuries southern China experiencedsustained economic growth and had favourable trade terms for silk, spices andtechnology w ith late Mediaeval and early Renaissance Europ e.

The agricultural revolution in the early modern United Kingdom greatly increasedagricultural productivity. It relied heavily on techniques based on horse power, soil-supporting crop rotations, land d rainage and grazing systems, which were developedon the European continent in the very densely populated an d often scarcity-riddenLow Coun tries (the p resent-day Benelux). When th ese innovations were ap plied tolarger areas at lower hum an popu lation densities, a significant surplus was prod uced,

wh ich m ade th e Indu strial Revolution p ossible. At the sam e time, the harnessing of energy sources became more efficient. The late eighteenth century saw imp roved w atermills and w indm ills, the use of sea coals and th e developm ent of steam eng ines.Transport costs fell, making it economically viable, for example, to ship bones longdistances for use in fertilizer. Intern al comb ustion an d h yd ropow er later greatlyincreased retu rns to labour and the availability of products such as nitrogen fertilizers.

However, any technology exists within a social and political system. The way th atthis British agricultural surp lus was generated , controlled and d istributed u nder therestrictive Enclosure Acts forced most of the rural pop ulation off the land to serve as

indu strial labour. The result was high food insecurity and a structural form of urbanpoverty, wh ere families no longer had access to land or to trad itional rights such as


12/37

AGRICULTURAL INTENSIFICATION 5

commons and gleaning. Yet the grow ing surp luses allowed greater specialization,provided capital and cheap labour for industrialization in Europe and drove the long,violent Europ ean nineteen th centur y. They also resulted in much larger m arkets infood to supp ly a burgeoning popu lation, which p roduced m any m ore goods andservices than at any time in previous history. However, the costs paid in humansuffering by th ree or four generations of impoverished families were considerable.

An u nderstanding of the ethical issues involved in intensification can take both aprospective and a retrospective outlook, and ethical standards for evaluatingintensification can take either a broad ou tlook on the general trend of events or aspecific focus on th e par ticular responsibilities of key actors. There are three generalethical questions to be p osed. First, it is possible to ask w hether intensification in agiven situation is good or bad , all things considered, w ithout p ointing to specificdecisions or activities und ertaken by p articular peop le or organizations. Second,assuming that intensification is a good thing, how should the burd ens and benefits of intensification be distributed ? Third, who is responsible for seeing that intensificationoccurs and that it follows an eth ically acceptable path? Beyond these questions, it willbe critical to dep loy the resou rces of the natu ral and social sciences to ident ify theimp edim ents to intensification, as well as to iden tify factors that w ould ma ke anethically justified form of intensification become ethically problematic, but that task willnot be attempted in the present paper.


13/37

6

The w ord ethics refers to principles orstandard s that define behaviour, action orrules for action that is considered to be

right, good and proper. A framework for organizingthe enorm ous variety of ethical standard s thathave served in this role throughout human h istorycan be developed from a simple schema of humanaction. Ind ividuals, associations or the designated

agents of organizations can each be characterized as actors , represented by the shad owperson shown in Figure 1. Actors considering or initiating action do so under a set of constraints, represented by the rings encircling the shadow person . These constraintsdeterm ine wh ich action or behaviou r is possible, and are of three kinds. First, someconstraints d etermine the physical universe of possibility. Characters in science fictionnovels may be able to dematerialize and transport themselves to other places, but hu manbeings cannot. Constraints that determine the physical limits of possible actions representtechnology. Second, law and policy limit the universe of possible behaviour and action thatan actor will consider. Third, ind ividu als and associations constrain their behaviouraccording to customary norms that often lack any legal or official sanction, yet may functionvery effectively to limit the universe of possible alternat ives for action. For examp le,people from Western societies will spontaneously queu e for service, although in mostinstances this norm lacks legal reinforcement . Together, these three typ es of constra int

An ethics

framework

FIGURE 1Elements of human action

Conduct

Technology

Law and policy

Customs and norms

Consequences


14/37

A N ETHICS FRAMEWORK 7

make up the opportunity set , the class of actions or behaviours that are effectively availableto any potential actor.

Eventua lly, the actor will select one p ossible course of action from the op por tun ityset and w ill engage in conduct. Conduct ind icates the behaviour performed, includ ingboth ph ysical motions and symbolic or meaningful behaviour. Conduct may be qu itecomp lex, and it is not unu sual to characterize a long series of acts or behavioursperformed over time as a single action. Because condu ct is an active response to anactor s opportunity set, it is ind icated by an a rrow in Figure 1. Clearly, the significanceof behaviour and the interpretation of the relatedn ess of mu ltiple acts dep end heavilyon the broa der social context. There may be room for differences of opin ion abou twhat, exactly, constitutes conduct in a given instance. For the p resent pu rposes, conductis inclusive of all acts understood as components in an actors performance of an action.One p rimary goal in offering this definition of cond uct is to distingu ish conduct fromthe consequences of the agents behaviour, which can be u nd erstood to be th e effectsof the action on the natu ral world , particularly on other peop le and associations,represented by the oval in Figure 1. The term consequences here designatesespecially changes in the health, wealth an d w ell-being of affected p arties (includ ingthe person wh o acts) that are caused by the initial action. As with condu ct, there maybe differences of opinion about what these consequences are, especially whenconsequences are indirect or are remote in space and time. Notwithstand ing thesepossibilities for d ifference in interp retation, Figure 1 represents a very simple pictureof human action as conduct performed u nder constraints and p roducing consequencesor outcomes.

Three distinct ways in ethical principles can be developed to determ ine whether anaction is right, good and proper. First, it is possible to see the ethical validity orcorrectness of an action as a function of its consequences. Increases in the health, w ealthand well-being of people are generally characterized as benefits, whereas adverse effectson health, wealth and w ell-being are characterized as harms or costs. Right, good orproper actions will tend to be seen as those that have achieved the best balance of benefit

and harm relative to oth er p ossibilities in the actors opp ortun ity set. Second, it ispossible to see the ethical validity or correctness of an action in term s of its consistencywith an id eal set of constraints. These constraints may be articulated either as dutiesthat the actor mu st discharge, or as rights held by others, which the agent mu st respect.Rights and d uties are generally correlated, how ever, so that if one person has a right,others have a duty to respect it, while having a d uty m eans that others have a right toexpect that th e duty will be d ischarged . Finally, it is possible to see the ethical validityor correctness of an action in term s of conformity to certain typ es of conduct. Instancesor patterns of condu ct that are ethically right, good and p roper are virtues, while those

that are wrong, bad or improper are vices. This third pattern of ethical evaluation lendsitself particularly to expressions of ethical jud gement that em phasize the character of


15/37


the actor, so that not on ly is the act virtuou s, but also the person who reliably acts invirtuous ways.

In summary, a simple analysis of hum an action indicates three patterns of argum entor d iscourse for articulating, stipulating or defining actions as right, good and proper.Each pattern tend s to place the focus or emphasis of ethical inqu iry in a different placeand man y philosophers have developed entire moral systems based entirely on one of these three approaches. In m any instances ethical disagreements ar ise from one partystendency to formulate a rationale for the evaluation of an action in language and conceptsthat emp hasizes one of the three patterns, while another par ty emphasizes one or bothof the other tw o. Never theless, it is possible for there to be significant d ifferences inapp roach even within each of the three broad patterns, and man y of historys mostnotable moralists have tended to develop accounts of ethical evaluation that involveconsiderably detailed discussion of one framework. For simp licity, argum ents thatinterp ret the eth ics of an action as a function of benefits and harms (or costs) will becalled consequentialist . Argum ents or claims that u nd erstand w hat is right, good andproper as determ ined by rights or duties will be called rights-based and statements thatstress the conduct and character of the agent w ill be called virtue-based . It will proveuseful to d iscuss each genera l app roach in slightly more detail wh ile discussing themain topic of intensification.

FIGURE 2Types of ethical discourse

Conduct

Technology

Rights and duties

Virtues and vices

Benefits and harms

Law and policy

Customs and norms

Consequences


16/37

9

Agricultur al intensification is a processthat occurs when individual humanbeings, commu nities or organizations

take actions of one sort or anoth er. The ethicsframework previously discussed can be ap pliedto the actions of individ uals, associations andorganized corporate bodies. The framework illustrates three ways in which questions aboutthe justifiability and ethical acceptability of anyparticular course of condu ct might be posed andanalysed. App lied to agricultura l intensification,these become qu estions that m ight be pertinentto the acts of farmers, input supp liers, technologydevelopers, or to any number of public and

pr ivate agencies whose activities affect the produ ctivity of agricultura l inp uts. Suchquestions might be asked by a person or group evaluating their own options and mightalso be posed as part of a general discussion and debate abou t wh at actions shouldbe taken by gover nm ents, international agencies or, ind eed, any actor in the foodsystem. Since policies are, in fact, actions taken by governments or other organizations,it is possible to evaluate the institution of any p olicy tha t would affect intensificationin mu ch the same w ay as one evalua tes any ord inary act. The first ethical questionis to determine w hat it is about intensification tha t makes it a good thing, somethingto be encouraged or brought about in a particular set of circum stances and , correlatively,what circum stances might m ake intensification an ethically bad thing.

Consequentialist ethical approaches provide the most straightforward and obviousway to evaluate an entire system of food and fibre prod uction. The consequentialistund erstands w hat is right, good and proper to be determined by the imp act of the

action or policy on health, wealth andwell-being. Intensification is, in the

prototypical case, intended to increase thetotal amoun t of food available withoutincreasing the u se of inp uts. Since food ismaterial to human life and health, theprod uction of more food can be considereda ben eficial imp act, especially un der thecircum stances of food scarcity that h avebeen too typical of human history. Asnoted , intensification is associated w ith

periods of human population growth.Without a correlative growth in food

When is

intensificationethically good?A utilitarianmodel

Intensificat ion is associated w ith periods of human population growt h

F A O / 1 9 6 9 8 / G.B I Z Z A R R I


17/37


sup plies, food scarcity causes hu nger, disease and starvation. Using the framew ork previously described, many individuals and groups consider options and un dertakecondu ct that has th e outcome (consequence) of increased food su pp ly. The benefitsassociated with increased food availability provide the elemental argument forintensification, and this argumen t is consequ entialist in its moral logic. In the simplecase wh ere new technology or farming method s allow a farmer or landow ner toprod uce more food, consequential reasoning shows w hy th is is ethically a good thing.

As already stated , Europ ean agr icultura l intensification immed iately p rior to theIndustrial Revolution was accomplished not only by applying a package of newproduction technologies to farming, but also by the Enclosure Acts, whichdisestablished a system of rights and du ties that permitted commoners to live on andfarm land s as long as their crops were sha red according to an an cient formu la. Theframework app lies not only to the conduct of individu al farmers and landowners, butalso to the p olitical activity that led to this p olicy chan ge. Was enclosure ethically ju stifiable? The British p hilosopher John Locke (1632-1704) posited the followingargument to show that it was:

He that encloses land, and has a greater plenty of the conveniences of life from

ten acres, than he could have from an hund red left to nature, may tru ly be said to

give ninety acres to mankind; for his labour now supp lies him w ith provisions out

of ten acres, which were but the prod uct of an hund red lying in common.1

Here the d isestablishment of the old system of commoner rights and du ties ispor trayed as justified in light of the increased benefits (conven iences) accruing fromenclosure. Althou gh th is style of thinking is not typ ical of Locke, the passage impliesthat any system of rights and pr ivileges is justified, given the efficiency with w hich itsupplies human beings with provisions.

Efficiency is particularly impor tant in the m ost common form of consequentialism,utilitarianism . Utilitarians assume that the va lues associated with consequences can be

quan tified to p rodu ce a ranking system for all possible courses of action (or options)available to an agen t. They also assume that the value of benefits and harm s can beadd ed and subtracted. Such a ranking system prod uces a class of optima such that nooption in the opp ortunity set yields greater total value (although there may be m ore

1 J. Locke. 1690. Second treatise of Government . In C.B. McPherson, ed. 1980. Indianapolis, USA, Hackett Publishing.Lockes philosophy is not consequentialist, but contractarian. He believed that people had a natural right to appropriategoods (including land) found in nature, and that others had a duty to respect this property right, which was grounded bothin the nature of things and in the social contract forming the basis of civil society. It is thus likely that he understood thephrase give ninety acres to mankind in an almost literal sense, and saw the justification of enclosure in terms of a kind

of expansion of the commons, rather than in starkly utilitarian terms. Nevertheless, it is difficult to interpret this particularpassage as anything more than a consequentialist moral argument.


18/37

W HEN IS INTENSIFICATION ETHICALLY GOOD ? A UTILITARIAN MOD EL 11

than one option that is optimal). According to the utilitarian standard (e.g. theutilitarianmaxim), the right, best and prop er action or policy must be a mem ber of this class of optima. This is popularly stated as: Act so as to produce the greatest good for the greatestnumber of people. Thus, the most efficient app roach to producing benefits or avoidingharm s is the course of action most thoroughly justified by ethics. Utilitarianism has beenan implicit ethical ph ilosophy for agricultural science, which has sought to make twoblades of grass grow where one grew before.

One critical and often overlooked a spect of the utilitarian ap proach is the need fora complete accounting of costs and benefits. The green revolution involved new seedvarieties that were m ore responsive to n itrogen fertilizers, which are, in most settings,a pu rchased inpu t. Hence, a simple utilitarian approach weighs the benefits of increasedyields against th e costs of seeds and fertilizer. If benefits outw eigh costs, the greenrevolution is justified. Yet other shifts accompanied the n ew technology, and manycritiques of the green revolution can be ar ticulated entirely w ithin the framew ork of a utilitarian/ consequen tialist ethic. Within the first decade of the green revolution of the 1970s, which led to aggregate increases in r ice production across Asia, large-scaleinsect pest outbreaks and plant disease epidemics destabilized food production,supp lies and p rices.

Only after three boom an d bu st cycles and pest outbreaks did governm ents beginto move away from simplified, centralized pest control policies that relied oninsecticides and vertical host p lant resistance toward s d ecentralized integrated pestman agemen t that built on local ecological processes to realize p rodu ction p otential.With the concentr ation of farm animal processing facilities, the chances of large-scaleepizootics occurr ing (such as foot-and-mouth disease) increase exponentially becauseof the more extensive movements of animals between p asturage, feedlots and abattoirs,and contacts with animal offal and excrement. Feeding livestock with produ cts derivedfrom their ow n species creates routes for infection by diseases associated w ith pr ions.2

Short-rotation forest plantations increase wood (especially pulpwood) prod uction butat the sam e time increase vulnerability to specialized pests and diseases. Fast-growing

dw arf coconut varieties increase short-term yields bu t are m ore frequently at risk fromdiseases previously found in limited geographic areas. In fisheries and aquaticprod uction systems, exotic species are common ly introdu ced. These often initiallyincrease total produ ction, but can u nexpectedly change troph ic relationships an ddisrupt ecosystems, as did the Nile perch in Lake Victoria. Intensive salmon hatcherieshave been criticized for reducing the genetic adap tability of natu ral populations. Theseproblems testify to the need for comp leteness in thinking through the costs and benefitsof in tensification.

2 Prion-associated diseases include kuru, scrapie and bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). The infection route andaetiology of BSE and the variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease that has been linked to BSE are still a matter of investigation.


19/37

12

John Lockes rationale for enclosure m akesno m ention of rights, but the langu age of rights might be used to d evelop a rationale

for arguing that efficiency-seeking publicpolicies (such as enclosure) are ethically wrongin certain circum stances. Simp ly stated, policiesare unjustified if the changes they endorseviolate or override important rights. Among therights that might be violated are property oroccup ancy rights, if enclosure forces people whohold such rights off the land, or subsistencerights, if the effect of enclosure is to pu t somepeop le in a p osition w here their rights to foodand shelter are not met. Yet the ethical principlesbehind these rights are comp lex.

A rights-based app roach to ethics (sometimes referred to as deontology) proceedsby stipulating or der iving a set of basic rights and duties that agents mu st performwithou t regard to the consequences that might arise in any par ticular case. A rights-based ap proach to intensification is more concerned as to w hether th e actions thatresult in higher food p rodu ction are consistent with these rights and du ties than intheir eventual effect on hu man w elfare. Several methods have been pu t forward foridentifying these rights and du ties. The German philosopher Imm anu el Kant (1724-1804) developed complex ph ilosoph ical argum ents for a master pr inciple he calledthe categorical imperative : never act in a way that treats another person solely as a meansto an end . For a Kantian, rights and d uties can be traced back to this pr inciple, whichtells us always to respect other p eoples capacity for freely choosing their life plans.The problem that a Kantian w ould h ave with Lockes argum ent for enclosure is thatit seems to treat the commoners (whose rights are violated) simply as a m eans to thelarger end of increasing food prod uction.

Kants deontology came at the end of a longer trad ition of natural law theory , whichheld that the basic rights and du ties forming the m ain content of the (ideal) moral laware evident to an y rational person, and have hence invested great effort into rationalargum ent for certain app roaches to the configuration of rights. Kant argued that everyhu man being wants to be treated as a free, autonomou s agent, and that consistencyrequires peop le to treat others in the same way. For other ph ilosophers, going back toThomas Hobbes (1588-1679), rationa lity was un der stood simply as enlighten ed self-interest. The purpose of rights is to protect peoples ability to act on their ownenlightened self-interest. Hobbes believed that any ra tional person would ag ree to

live in accordan ce with certain righ ts and du ties, if only they cou ld ha ve a reliableexpectation that everyone else would do the same. This approach is sometimes

When is

intensificationethically good?A rights-basedmodel


20/37

W HEN IS INTENSIFICATION ETHICALLY GOOD ? A RIGHTS -BASED MODEL 13

characterized as contractualist in light of the way that r ights and du ties are describedas being grounded in an implicit agreement (or social contract) among all membersof society. 3

While a Kantian might argue that enclosure treated comm oners as a mere meansto a larger social goal, a contractu alist might say tha t enclosure violated th e socialcontract. In either case, the p roblem w ith enclosure from a rights-based p erspectivewas that commoners had a right to use these lands. As such, any plan to exclud e themfrom the land could not be justified un less it included some p rovision for obtainingtheir agreement. This wou ld require involvement of the commoners at some stage of the enclosure process, and their involvement wou ld need to be such that each rightsholder had the opp ortunity to give or withhold their agreement voluntarily to theplan. Perhaps they could be convinced that they w ould be better off, or perhaps theywou ld be enticed to accede to such u se of the land in exchan ge for comp ensation.These details might vary considerably on a case-by-case basis, but what is critical froma rights-based p erspective is that respect for the individu als affected by enclosurerequires that they be accorded a role in the intensification process that is fully consistentwith their rights. Either version of rights theory provides a starting-point forquestioning whether intensification is good simply because it produ ces more benefits(in th e form of greater food p rodu ction) than costs (in the form of losses for theminority).

Either ap proach to rights imp lies that th e exclusion of comm oners from decision-making is unacceptable, but a Kantian might in addition note that the effect of enclosure was radically to impoverish commoners an d their descend ants. For aKantian, such conditions of poverty make it impossible for a person to exercise rationalfree will; the circumstances of need are so great that people in dire poverty areeffectively coerced into enduring humiliation and dep rivation. As such, key subsistencerights, including the right to food, become m inimal cond itions that mu st be met if allpeople are to be treated with the m oral respect to which they are du e. Thus, anysituation in which peop le are so poor th at they cannot freely exercise their innately

human capacity to choose a life plan involves an ethical wrong. Methods of intensification th at p lace peop le in such circum stances cannot be end orsed from arights-based perspective.

3 Although similar in important respects, Kantian deontology and Hobbesian contractualism provide important differentrationales for justifying rights. In both versions of rights theory, the ethical significance of a right resides in the way that itprotects human freedom. For Kantians, an individuals freedom is an expression of the ability to plan and order ones ownthoughts and actions rationally, while for contractarians freedom means simply that others do not control or limit ones

action. In Kantian philosophies, preserving the entitlements owed under the system of rights is a form of showing respectfor anothers need to plan and order his or her own life, but rights can also be seen as being based on the social contract.


21/37

14

The basic tension betweenutilitarian consequentialism,on the one hand , and rights-

based eth ics, on the other, underliesmany issues associated w ith agricultural intensification. Fordecades, researchers from developed countries haveharvested germp lasm from farmers and local markets in thedeveloping world. These researchers have used thegermp lasm in breeding programm es to develop higher-yielding varieties as well assearching for other valuable genetic traits. Many of those who collected seeds w ereshocked when critics suggested that their w ork failed to respect the rights of peoplefrom the d eveloping w orld. From a u tilitarian viewpoint, the increased yields of newvarieties more than justified th e collection of germp lasm, and researchers saw n oethical issue in u sing seeds they had collected th is way. How ever, critics asserted tha tresearchers had failed to show prop er respect for the rights of indigenous farmerswh ose forebears had saved seed for centur ies. Purchasing seed in v illage markets,critics affirm, gives the buyer an implied right to u se the commodity good for food,

or possibly for replanting, but farmers could not be interpreted to have given up r ightsto further d evelopm ent of their germplasm w ithout a careful and explicit process toinform them of its true value an d to ensure that th ey had given consent. Some criticsargue that because of the collective and collaborative natu re of seed d evelopm ent intrad itional agriculture, only someone who represent s the collective interests of allgrowers would be in a p osition to und ertake such a negotiation.

Today, some opponents of genetically engineered crops argue that individualconsumers sh ould not be forced to eat these crops against their w ill. Adv ocates of genetically engineered crops see them as a safe and effective tool for increasing th e

efficiency of farm prod uction and believe that their opponents claims are an unjustifiedbarrier to adop ting them. While this debate often involves factual dispu tes about the

Utilitarianism

and rights-basedethics: furtherissues

F A O / 1 7 2 5 9 / L

. W I T H E R S

Local scientist s at a training session on the

collection of germplasm in v itro


22/37

U TILITARIANISM AND RIGHTS -BASED ETHICS : FURTHER ISSUES 15

safety of these crops, the underlying ethical structure of the debate p its the rights-based claims of the opponents against the utilitarian reasoning of the ad vocates. Why?Irrespective of the safety or r isks associated w ith genetically m odified (GM) crops,opponents are claiming that the comp anies promoting these technologies have placedfood consumers in a p osition where they have no op portu nity to reject them. Ratherthan rebu t the claim tha t consumer r ights are at stake on its merits, advocates haveoften argu ed th at if the crops are safe (as they claim), then consumers h ave no basisfor rejecting th em, since rejecting GM crops is an action with real costs but no realbenefit. Thu s, opp onents try to m eet a rights claim with a u tilitarian argum ent, andthe eth ical issues fail to be enjoined .

A similar point of tension arises in debates over the green revolution technologies.When h igher yields are associated with p urchased inpu ts, those with access to capitalwill have an ad vantage over those w ithout. One can interpret losses experienced bypoorer farmers as additional costs and weigh these, too, against benefits from higheryields. The stud y New seeds for poor people by Michael Lipton and Richard Longhu rst(1989) is a p articularly exhaustive an d theoretically soph isticated attem pt to assessthe green revolution varieties from a utilitarian stand point. The authors conclud e that,over time, these technologies have been, on balance, beneficial to poor people.How ever, these arguments d o not necessarily address concerns that rights may havebeen violated, or that cultural traditions may have been lost as a result of greenrevolution strategies. How might rights be affected? It is possible to see any transitionfrom a situation in which peop le can feed them selves and meet their needs to one inwh ich they cannot as a v iolation of their rights. Even if such transitions have benefitsthat ou tweigh th e cost, they w ould not be seen as justified if there are even a fewindividua ls whose rights to subsistence are jeopard ized as a result of the changes.

This is only a cursory introduction to the way that rights arguments should figurein an overall evaluation of the green revolution. Yet one of the problems tha t has ar isenin debates over the retrospective impact of green revolution varieties is that those w hodraw their ethical norm s from u tilitarian th inking seem to be ignoring ethical claims

that d raw up on the langu age of rights. In d oing this, peop le create an impression of,at best, insensitivity to the full range of ethical concerns r elevant to intensification(which shou ld also include v irtues, discussed later) and , at worst, arrogant d ismissalof arguments th at are inconvenient for the case they w ish to present. When p eoplewho hold influential positions for future attempts to meet food needs dismissalternative argumen ts in this way, they engage in a u se of power that is itself ethicallyquestionable. As such, it wou ld be valuable to launch retrospective stud ies that m akean explicit attempt to acknowledge the full range of concerns that have been or mightbe brought to bear on evaluating green revolution intensification, in part as preparation

for m ore open and informed debates on the questions that m ust be ad dressed if worldfood needs are to be met in the tw enty-first century.


23/37


These cases are comp lex and deserve a m ore careful analysis than th ese summ arystatements can provide. The point here is simply to note that, in both cases, autilitarian/ consequentialist rationale is met w ith counterclaims that assert rights.Someone assum ing that u tilitarian m odels are approp riate will respond to theseassertions with further arguments reciting the costs and benefits of alternativearrangements, but to the extent that these rights are though t to be moral rights, rightsprotecting the dignity of involved parties, recitation of fur ther costs and benefits willsimply miss the point. What is being claimed is that there is a need to respect affectedparties by involving them fully and non-coercively in the process of intensification.From the persp ective of rights-based ethics no recitation of costs and benefits will justify a failure to d o this; wh at is needed is a justification th at ad dresses how theprocess of intensification influences the freedom of all persons affected by it. If freedomis being constrained, it mu st be shown that this constraint is justified, perhaps becauseit is required in ord er to show prop er respect for the rights of less fortunate p eople,or perhaps because the peop le agree to the constraint of their own free will.


24/37

17

The u tilitarian/ consequentialist and rights-based ap proaches are both theoreticallywell-developed articulations of ideas

used every day by people who are attemp ting todetermine the correct or proper course of action.How ever, it may be m ore typical for people toassociate ethics with less systematic ways of thinking. For example, many people may add ressethical questions by asking them selves how someexemplary person w ould act in a given situation.This exemplary person might be a familymem ber, a revered and respected member of thecommu nity, a religious leader or p erhaps even aperson from legend or h istory wh o is not even

known as a real flesh-and-blood ind ividu al. In any case, one dra ws u pon a m entalimage of how a good person w ould act in the situation at h and . By d oing this, oneunderstand s the ethics of the situation in terms that refer directly to the cond uct thatis being performed (see Figure 2 on p. 8), rather than either the rights-based constra intsor the consequences of the action.

The ph ilosophical possibilities for developing this general ap proach to ethics arenu merou s. The Greek ph ilosoph er Aristotle (384-322 BC) did so by d eveloping acatalogue of both positive and negative exemplary typ es of condu ct, or virtues andvices, respectively. He theorized th at all hum an tend encies had app ropriate forms of expression in m oderation but could become vicious if not held in check. A good p ersonis one who strikes the mean position among these tendencies. Moderation (ortemp erance) itself thu s became the sovereign virtu e for Aristotle and m any of hisfollowers. Today, many typ es of ethical theory that emphasize cond uct, rather th anrights and du ties, on the one han d, or consequences, on the other, are referred to a sAristotelean or, more accurately, virtue th eories. Although some p hilosophers have

believed that virtues and comm un ity traditions are relatively und eveloped sourcesof ethical insight, better articulated by em phasizing rights and du ties on the one hand ,or consequences on the other, others have argu ed th at this dom ain of ethical ideas orsource of ethical insight cannot be eliminated .

Aristotle also believed that ones tend encies (as well as ones abilities to regu latethem) are a reflection of the sociocultural environm ent in which one lives and is raised.Thus an exemp lary Greek might have a mora l character qu ite different from that of someone w ho had not lived in what w as, in Aristotles day, a culture almost uniquein its egalitarianism, its emp hasis on ed ucation an d its ideals of citizensh ip. One

contemporary school of ethics that stresses the social roots of exemplary condu ct iscalled communitarianism . Here, the articulation of ethical norms and standards is likely

When is

intensificationethically good?A virtue-basedmodel


25/37


to call attention to the norms, practices, traditions and institutions that are particularlycharacteristic of and valued by a particular comm unity, rather than particular virtuesand vices. Like Aristotle, contemp orary comm unitarians emp hasize the need to havea social environment, a form of comm unity life, that w ill give rise to exemplary condu ctand that w ill allow peop le to app reciate the w ays of life that such forms exemp lify.

Agricultural w ays of life have figured p rominently in some of the m ost influentialarticulations of virtue and vice. The an cient Greeks themselves developed a form of agriculture based up on rough terrain, varying soil types and a Med iterranean climate.Their farm s were a diverse mixture of grain prod uction and pastoral livestock, butwith heavy reliance on tree and vine crops. The mix of crops and long grow ing seasonprovided steady w ork for fairly small households all year round , while the trees andvines involved lifetime investm ents for smallholders. Military h istorian Victor DavisHan son argues that this pattern of agriculture gave rise to unique form s of militaryorganization and tactics as w ell as the political cultu re of the city-state. The relativelylarge proportion of the popu lation controlling property and the natu re of their stakein the land m ade them both fierce defenders of egalitarian political forms and equallyfierce war riors who could be relied up on for pha lanx manoeuvres requiring disciplineand loyalty. These cha racter tr aits, so critical to the success of Greek city-states aspolitical and military entities, were thought to emerge naturally in a farmingpop ulation of sma llholder s. In contra st, the large-scale plantation-style irrigatedagriculture common am ong the Greeks military rivals relied on stratified societies of slaves and masters wh o did not develop the requisite virtues.

The idea th at forms of agricultu re were seminal sources for commun ity practiceand national culture reached its culmination in the intellectual cultures of seventeenthand eighteenth centu ry Europe. These ideas were especially influen tial for those whoframed the United States Declaration of Independence and Constitution. In his Noteson the State of Virginia (178184), Thomas Jefferson, third President of the Un ited Statesfamously wrote:

Those who labor in th e earth are the chosen p eople of God, if ever he had a

chosen people, whose breasts he has mad e his peculiar deposit for substantial

and genuine virtue. The mobs of great cities add just so mu ch to the supp ort

of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the hum an body.

Jeffersons key idea was th at smallholding farm ers wou ld have a greater stake inthe stability and success of the new nation than either m anufacturers or their labourers,since both of the latter could p ull up stakes and leave wh en d ifficulties arose. AsPresiden t, Jefferson w ent on to set a course for the d evelopm ent of the Un ited States

as an agrarian nation, negotiating the Louisiana Purchase to ensure am ple lands forfuture generations of American farmers and authorizing the (Meriwether) Lewis and


26/37

W HEN IS INTENSIFICATION ETHICALLY GOOD ? A VIRTUE -BASED MODEL 19

(William) Clark exped ition to determ ine the suitability of these land s for cultivationand transport.

Jeffersons plan w as not, of course, an episod e of intensification, as his strategycalled for extensive expansion of Am erican farm ing rather th an a tra nsformationdesigned to increase yields or u se resource inpu ts more efficiently. Nevertheless, hisview is important because it shows that ideas about how farming systems and m ethodsprod uce virtues such as citizenship and comm unity solidar ity have had a p rofoundinfluence on political developments in the past. Plans for intensification thatsubstantially alter the p attern of land ten ure, or that chan ge the basic practices of farming though t to be critical to the formation of exemplary pattern s of condu ct orcommu nity identity are almost certain to provoke m oral protest. Indeed, the m ostmem orable protests against British attemp ts at enclosure are n ot tracts arguing tha trights have been violated, but literary efforts such a s Oliver Goldsm iths poem , Thedeserted village, lamenting the loss of small village cultures thou ght to be pa rticularlycharacteristic of the British national character:

Ill fares the land , to hast'ning ills a prey,

Where wealth accum ulates, and men d ecay:

Princes and lords m ay flourish, or may fade;

A breath can make them, as a breath has made:

But a bold peasan try, their country's prid e,

When once destroy'd, can never be supplied.4

The Old O rder Amish commu nities established throughou t Europe and nowdispersed arou nd the globe provide another example of a ph ilosophy of agriculturethat relies heavily on v irtue ethics. The Amish emp hasize a very h igh degree of familyand comm unity integration together with independ ence from the outside world. Theyder ive mean ing from their ability to live together at a p articular place with a greatstability of practice over generations. Agriculture is important because Amish

commu nities see depend ence on outsiders as a p otential threat to their ties to oneanother. The Amish are notoriously suspicious of modern technologies, largely becausethey see their effects as weakening social relations am ong m ember s of the localcommunity. Nevertheless, Amish farmers are known for both high yields andecologically sustainable farming m ethods. From an Am ish perspective, intensificationwou ld not emerge as an ethically impor tant goal, and intensifying pr actices thatweakened commu nity bonds either by tempting m embers away from the hou seholdor by increasing depen den ce on the outside w orld would be resisted. How ever,

4 Oliver Goldsmith. 1770. The deserted village . Accessed online at: www.ucc.ie/celt/online/E750001-001/.


27/37


intensification wou ld not be seen as an evil in itself, and increases in yields tha t couldbe attained by m ore effective use of hou sehold labour m ight be deemed entirelyacceptable.

These few examples illustrate how thinking in term s of virtues provides an entirelydifferent point of view from wh ich to evaluate intensification. From the perspectiveof a virtue theorist, agricultures role in forming both personal and nationa l characterprov ides the basis for evalua ting policies and technologies that transform the foodsystem. Periods of intensification wou ld be justified only if they reinforce this role andwould be opposed if they tended to weaken it. The actual forms that a virtue

Intensification: implications for reservoirs and fisheries

The twen tieth and twen ty-first centuries have seen an unprecedented increase in the creation of

reservoirs throughout the w orld. The tw o major purposes of dams have b een the production of

hyd roele ctric pow er and storage o f w ater for irrigation. N evertheless, d ammin g a river to create a

reservoi r has a major imp act on w ater flo w, the aquatic envi ronm ent and l ife . From a util itarian

perspective, the costs associated w ith these i mpacts (as w ell as the actual direct costs of bui ldin g a

dam) are justif ied where the b enef its f rom hydroelectric pow er and irrigation are greater. Arrivin g at

the optimal relationship between costs and benefits g enerally involves compensatory me asures that

mitigate the costs associated with the impact on fisheries.

To the extent that hydroelectric pow er and i rrigation w ater address problems of poverty and need ,

there can be a strong rights-based argument for buildin g dams. Yet reservoirs often in volve the most

dramatic and irreversible transformations imaginable. From a rights perspective, the key i ssue is that

an effort to address human rights to basic energy and food n eeds m ay come into confli ct with existing

land use and riparian rights. Rights arguments might be raised agains t dam construction w hen i t seems

that affected parties either have not or cannot be feasibly brought into decision-making. Others might

argue that important traditions, communities and w ays of li fe are los t both w hen dams inv olve the

floodi ng of n ative hom elands for large communi ties, and w hen traditional fishing methods can no

longer be practised. These latter concerns appeal more to the ethics of virtue and vice; they suggest

that what is important is be ing able to live in a traditional w ay and to engage in traditional p ractices.

But dangers to fis h stocks can come from w ater pollution and from overexploitation b y fis hing

commun ities them selves. Here, an existing or traditional pattern of rights may be pe rmitting cond uct

that has significant adverse consequences.

An additional problem is that the dis tribution of b enefits from i ntensification, hyd roelectric

generation or irrigation may not reach those rural communities most affected by the increased

development. Fishers are usually from a poor sector of society and are often ignored in decision-making.


28/37

W HEN IS INTENSIFICATION ETHICALLY GOOD ? A VIRTUE -BASED MODEL 21

perspective might take will be highly variable and will depend upon cultural traditionsand history. Thus, while utilitarian/ consequen tialist and rights-based app roaches inethics point towards ethical standards that might be applied to virtually anyagricultu ral system, the specific content of a virtue ap proach is likely to be highlydep enden t on local culture and may vary from one cultural setting to another.


29/37

22

Utilitarian evaluation, as describedpreviously, is notoriously insensitive tothe d istribution of benefits and harm s

across society. As a result, the qu estion as to howburd ens and benefits are distributed is raised inacknowledgem ent of the widespread feeling thatimprovem ents in efficiency and general w elfarecan come about in a very unfair manner. Onepossible response is simply to argue that, inquestioning whether intensification is fair, we arecalling for the methods and processes to beevaluated in terms of their consistency with a

concern for hu man freedom (e.g. an appeal to human rights), or with respect to theirimpact on traditions and community integrity (e.g. an app eal to virtues). Thu s, onemight say that utilitarian th inking provides a basis for saying why, other factors beingequal, intensification is a good thing, while rights and virtue ap proaches sensitize u s tothe other issues that must be attended to in order for intensification to be fully justified.

However, it is also possible to address the question in more classically consequentialistterms. Doing so requires one to develop and defend criteria that can be ap plied to thewa y that costs (or burd ens) and ben efits that are the ou tcome (or consequence) of

intensification are distributed among those affected. The standard utilitarian viewsuggests that d istribution is not importan t because it is the net or average impact thatmatters. Yet one could argue that only outcomes in which no one is harmed are ethicallyacceptable. Another possibility is to minimize the chance of the worst possible outcome,an ap proach that m ay reflect the imp licit decision strategy of poor societies trying tofend off the risk of total starvation. Another view, adap ted from the philosopher JohnRawls (19212002), is to recommend the op tion tha t has the grea test expected va lue5

for the poorest group within society. Thisapproach allows one to develop ethical

justifications that favour the interests of poor or marginalized people over thosewh o are better off.

Although rights theory is sometimesoffered as an answer to questions of

How should

burdens andbenefits bedistributed?

Intensive livest ock farming provid es food for grow ing populations but raises food sa fety , equity and animal w elfare issues

F A O / 2 0 0 6 5 / C .

C A L P E

5 Consequentialism is frequently used in connection with analyticaltechniques that allow one to assign a probability to several differentpossible distributions of benefit and harm that might ensue afterthe selection of a given act or policy alternative; thus, an expected

value can be prospectively associated with each act or policy inthe opportunity set.


30/37

HOW SHOULD BURDENS AND BENEFITS BE DISTRIBUTED ? 23

distributive justice, difficulties also arise within the r ights-based app roach. In particular,rights-based thinking is occasionally confronted with situa tions where rights seem toconflict. For examp le, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights notes that all personshave a righ t to food. If one encounters a situation in wh ich the only way to secure thisright is to violate other r ights, such as property rights, which rights have p riority? As

Intensification: implications for livestock

Intensification in the lives tock se ctor could produce more food for growi ng p opulations, but there

are ethical issues relating to livestocks resource use, food safety and quality, equity and animal

wel fare. Pollution of land, water and air from i ntensive livestock production and processing in b oth

developed and developing countries has become a widespread phenomenon, often acting as a

vehicle for disease transmission. Moreover, there are direct issues associated with the transmission

of diseases and general food safety. Overconsumption of animal products also carries a number of

human health risks. While an increase in the consumption of animal products in developing

countries would be highly desirable in combating malnutrition, it would not necessarily be wise

for these countries to follo w the die tary p ractices of w ealthy nations. Livestock consume about one-

third of total grain production, with associated pressure on land and other natural resources, and

use of fossil fuel. It is possible to ask whether this grain should be fed to animals rather than

people. These env ironmental and f ood s afety risks represent a catalogue of the poss ible costs that

must be weighed against the benefits associated with the intensification of livestock production.

However, it is also possible to address these questions in terms of rights and virtues. Do people

have a right to eat what they w ant even if their diet is foun d to be risky? Do peopl e have rights to be

protected from environmental and food safety risks and, if so, should this protection stress

constraints on producer behaviour, or informing and educating consumers as to the nature of the

risks? Do traditional di etary practices thought central to pe oples cultural iden tity ever override the

risk/benefit comparisons conducted in a utilitarian manner?

There are, furthermore, ethical issues about the distribution of benefits. While growth in

demand for animal products seems to offer opportunities for the rural poor, to date the large

majority of these rural people have not been able to take advantage of such opportunities. Thus,

there are important ethical issues about the fairness of efforts to intensify livestock production, and

the effects that such efforts have on traditional rural communities. Intensification in the livestock

industry also involves a set of issues that concern animals themselves. If unregulated,

intensification of livestock production is associated wi th animal management practices that do not

allow the expression of natural behaviour. Should these issues be addressed in terms of welfare

trade-offs between human b eings and animals, or is it plausib le to argue, as som e have, that duties

and constraints on hum an behaviour should be recognized as amounting to animal rights?


31/37


in the case of establishing the validity of rights, resolving conflicts among r ights willrequire use of philosophical arguments that support rights-based v iews. Henry Shues Basic rights argues that rights have an internal principle of order that can be used toresolve conflict. Some rights (such as the righ t to edu cation or to vote) wou ld not bemean ingful unless more basic rights (such as the r ight to food and personal security)were already secure. Shue argues that basic rights should be secured for all before lessbasic rights are secured for a few. Shu es app roach d oes not rely on cost-benefitthinking as a tie-breaker, yet few w ould resist combining pr inciples from utilitarian/ consequentialist thinking with ap proaches from rights theory.6

Virtue-based approaches typically address distributive issues either throu gh theidea of comm unity so that commu nity solidarity comes into play w hen a fewindividu als may be put in a p osition w here unreasonable burd ens are placed u ponthem or as comp onents of a specific virtue, such as charity. In some settings, culturallysophisticated m echanisms for sharing burd ens can be imbed ded in social norm s thatwou ld be articulated in the stand ard term inology of cultural iden tity, community andpersonal virtue. However, some articulations of virtue have been particularlyinsensitive to social inequalities. Virtue-based thinking (often w ith religious backing)can be used to rationa lize enormous inequ alities in defense of a given social order. Itis no accident that the w ord aristocracy derives from Aristotle.

6 Indeed, one of the most sophisticated versions of utilitarian thinking (R.M. Hares two-level utilitarianism), argues that the traditionsof rights provide important sources of moral insight; only when we are very sure that the consequences of our actions are fairlynarrow and can be predicted accurately should cost-benefit considerations be allowed to override a traditional rights-based claim.

(See Henry Shue. 1980. Basic rights . Princeton University Press. 2nd ed. 1996.)


32/37

25

The 1996 World Food Summ it recognizedthat the then world population of 5.8thousand million had 15 percent more

food per capita than the global pop ulation of 4 thousand million only 20 years earlier. Theproductive potential of technological improvementwas d emonstrated in the green revolution of the1960s, wh ere imp roved varieties resulting fromscientific breeding, largely in the internationalpublic sector, coupled with investment inirrigation, mineral fertilizers and institutionalinfrastructures, raised food production andprod uctivity, particularly in rice and wh eat inAsia. But th e uneven success of green revolu tion

technologies, with little u ptak e in Africa p articularly, and its unforeseen socialconsequences, showed that sustainable intensification was not just a result of technological development bu t of governm ent p olicy, and social and economic forces.In the last decades, falling transpor t costs, together with the d evelopmen t of globalmarkets and growing trad e liberalization, have given new focuses to the challenge of ensuring a steady reduction in poverty through securing and m aintaining adequ ate

long-term prod uction levels as well as conditions of adequ ate access to food. Thereare major new factors to consider, including changes to the biosph ere resulting fromglobal warming, the as yet unproven potential of the new biotechnologies,unp recedented urbanization and the reality of a w orld economy without a globaleconomy or global society.

Utilitarian/ consequentialist and rights-based ap proaches in ethics have tend ed toportray responsibility in very general term s:everyonehas the responsibility for actingin ways tha t prod uce the greatest good for the greatest nu mber, or in accord withdu ties to respect other peop les rights. Thus, if intensification is considered to be a

good th ing, everyone is responsible for doing w hatever h e or she can to make surethat it is achieved. Australian ph ilosopher Peter Singer h as pu blished a num ber of essays in which he puts forward this argument exactly, at least with respect torespon sibility for end ing hu nger. However, this view has been th e subject of somecriticism. It seems to impose an overwhelming responsibility on ord inary people, as if one cannot d ivert ones time and resources to enjoy life while someone else is hungry.Furthermore, it creates a situation in which nothing is actually done: if something iseveryones responsibility in general, it tend s to be seen as no ones responsibility inparticular. Singer has acknowledged that this may in fact be a weakness of the

utilitarian ph ilosophy that h e has advocated.

Who is

responsible forensuring thatintensificationoccurs?


33/37


Ethical ideas that stipulate particular responsibilities for people who have specialroles such as teachers, holders of public office, techn ical experts and p arents havemore typ ically been articulated in the langu age of virtue and commu nity solidarity.Thus, commu nity leaders are people who have assumed or been appointed to apar ticular social station that entails special du ties. A virtuous leader therefore assumesdu ties that are not those of the ordinary person, and in traditional societies such leaderswou ld also have the authority to ensure that these duties are carried out. Consequently,in a trad itional society, leaders might be acting rightly even w hen they order people todo th ings that might not be consistent w ith a mod ern conception of rights. Military

Intensification: implications for forestry

At present, most wood production comes f rom natural and semi-natural forests, which cover 95 percent

of the worlds forest area. Human interventions in forests may aim at very different objectives, not

exclusively targeting increases in industrial wood production, but also non-w ood fo rest products and

the provision of cons ervation, protection, recreational and other environmen tal and social functions.

Total demand for wood products is increasing globally and the yiel d productivity of fo rest plantations

is h igher than that of natural forests. How ever, a major ethical question regarding the intensi fication

of fo rests is wh ether it is acceptable to clear natural forests to establis h forest plantations. According

to current estimates, about 50 percent of new ly established forest plantations relied upon the clearing

of n atural forests, particularly degraded and/or secondary natural forests. These decisi ons generally

stress criteria of optim ization typical of utilitarian ethical decisio n-making .

In the case of natural forests, intensification is not a common concept or priority. Some of the reasons

for this relate to ethi cal concerns. Natural fo rests are managed for a multitude of functions to provide

a large range of products and services (non-intervention, like absolute protection of a conservation

area, is a managemen t option). This m ultipurpose strategy lim its options for intensification and

specialization on largely utilitarian grounds, but different groups of people have different expectations

of n atural forests, freque ntly se eking to harvest di fferent products of the forest or trying to obtain

different services from it. The equation specialization + intensification often creates conflicts between

these groups. Such conflicts raise question s about who participates in decision -making and wh en

formal criteria for involving affected parties need to be specified. Furthermore, in natural and

semi-natural forests, managemen t cycles are mu ch longer than in agriculture and requi re a series o f

step-by-step, long-term practices. The purpose o f fo rest managemen t can change m arkedl y over time.

Changes in the way that forests contribute to lifestyles, community and cultural identity and the broad

patterns of social organization are di fficult to articulate in the traditional u tilitarian language of costs

and benefits.


34/37

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THAT INTENSIFICATION OCCURS ? 27

leaders, for examp le, can order citizens to sacrifice their lives for the greater good of thecomm unity, and one can easily imagine situations in wh ich changes in land use orfarming practice might be ordered as part of a leaders performance of specialresponsibilities.

In m odern societies, social roles are often h ighly rationalized so that particularagencies are formed to take over roles that might have been understood as componentsof a leader s virtue in trad itional societies. Thus organizations such as the Food andAgriculture Organ ization of the United Nations (FAO) have been assigned an explicitsocial mission that entails a responsibility to ensure that food needs are met. The repor tof the 1996 World Food Sum mit m akes the case for a new round of intensification, andplaces responsibilities on n ational governm ents, with org anizations such as FAOhaving m ajor respon sibilities for coordinating an d facilitating that w ork. How ever,officers within FAO have an ethical challenge in meeting this responsibility. On theone h and , trad itional m odels for interpreting the responsibilities these officers havebeen delegated to carry ou t stipulate ethics of virtue, and man y expect these peopleto act as virtuous and auth oritative leaders, especially wh en working in traditionalsocieties. These traditional ways of und erstanding ethical responsibilities provide animplicit basis for acting ethically to discharge official responsibilities. On the otherhand , the rationale for forming organizations such as the United N ations has largelybeen articulated in u tilitarian or rights-based terms, and th is langu age places significantconstraints on the au thority of officers who occup y p osts within these organ izations.Thus, the exercise of these role responsibilities requires ethical resources that ma yexceed those on w hich the man date of an organ izations author ity is based.


35/37

28

Population growth p rovides the basis for autilitarian argum ent for intensification,and traditional virtues of leadership might

provide an ethic for pur suing intensification forthe good of society. In modern societies, theauthority to pu rsue such good is constrained by

the rights of others. It is critical, therefore, to articulate the ethical rationale forundertaking p rojects of intensification in terms that d raw up on each of the trad itionsavailable for specifying and critically evaluating an ethical responsibility. Omitting anyone of these ways of framing eth ical issues results in a weakened capacity to articulate,debate and ultimately assume ethical responsibilities that m ay ar ise in connectionwith p opu lation growth and the attendant imp eratives for intensification.

Conclusion


36/37

F A O / 2 0 7 2 2 / A

. P R O T O

F A O / 1 0 9 9 5 / J . V A N A C K E R

F A O / 1 7 3 2 2 / N

. R U B E R Y


37/37

Agriculture will need to be further intensified in

order to meet a grow ing w orld populations dem ands

for food and agricultural products. Yet intensification

in i tself, if not properly m anaged, carries the risk of

degrading natural resources and le ading to decreased

food security. It can also have important socio-economic consequences, particularly in relation to

rural livelihoods. In making policy decisions with the

aim of achieving sustainable agricultural

intensi fication, planners mus t therefore identify and

evaluate alternative strategies, i n terms both of their

imme diate and lon ger-term im pacts and their

impli cations for all s ocial groups concerned.

There is therefore a clear ethical dimension

to such policy formulation.This i ssue of the FAO Ethics Series explo res three

possible approaches to an ethical analysis of

agricultural intens ification strategies. H uman food

needs provide the basis for a utilitarian argumen t for

intensification, while the moral concept of virtue

addresses peopl es duty to w ork for the good of

society. A rights-based analysis then reveals how

indiv iduals pursuit of such good can be constrained

by the rights o f others. Fostering debate around theseapproaches helps us to articulate and, ultimately, to

assume ethical responsibilities for the intensification

of agriculture.

Date post:	30-May-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	daisy
View:	222 times
Download:	0 times

The Ethics of Sustainable Agricultural Intensification

Documents