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THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY. REDUCING THE SIZE OF “BIG GOVERNMENT”...

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THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY
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THE EXECUTIVE BRANCHTHE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY

REDUCING THE SIZE OF “BIG REDUCING THE SIZE OF “BIG GOVERNMENT”GOVERNMENT”

• REAGAN’S QUEST TO ELIMINATE THE DEPARTMENTS OF ENERGY AND EDUCATION

• THE SIZE OF THE BUREAUCRACY ACTUALLY INCREASED.

• ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE MET WITH THE SAME RESISTANCE. WHY?

THE BUREAUCRATIC THE BUREAUCRATIC PHENOMENONPHENOMENON

• MAINTAINING ORDER IN A LARGE SOCIETY IS IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT A LARGE GOVERNMENTAL APPARATUS.

• APPROVAL OF A GOVERNMENT AGENCY IS NAMED ADMINISTRATION.• ADMINISTRATION: THE WAYS HUMAN BEINGS MIGHT

RATIONALLY COORDINATE THEIR EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A COMMON GOAL

• DISAPPROVAL IS NAMED BUREAUCRACY• BUREAUCRACY: THE ACTUAL OFFICES, TASKS AND

PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION EMPLOYED IN A FORMAL AND SUSTAINED ADMINISTRATION.

BUREAUCRATIC BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATIONORGANIZATION

• THE SIX PRIMARY CHARACTERISTICS OF BUREAUCRACY( TABLE 7.1 p. 275)• DIVISION OF LABOR• ALLOCATION OF FUNCTIONS• ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY• SUPERVISION• PURCHASE OF FULL-TIME

EMPLOYMENT• IDENTIFICATION OF CAREER WITHIN

THE ORGANIZATION

THE SIZE OF THE FEDERAL THE SIZE OF THE FEDERAL SERVICESERVICE

• BIG GOVERNMENT MEANS BIG BUREAUCRACY• CAMPAIGN APPEALS ARE FREQUENTLY FILLED WITH

PROMISES TO, “CUT OUT THE FAT”, MEANING REDUCE THE SIZE OF THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY.

• CLINTON’S NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW• IN REALITY OVER THE PAST 50 YEARS THE SIZE OF THE

FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY HAS REMAINED ABOUT THE SAME, OR SLIGHTLY REDUCED IN SIZE.

• EVEN THOUGH THE DOLLAR OUTLAY FOR THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY HAS INCREASED, THE % OF THE GNP HAS REMAINED STEADY.

(CON.)(CON.)• THE SIZE OF THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE GENERALLY HAS

FLUCTUATED ACCORDING TO OUR MILITARY INVOLVEMENT OVERSEAS. (WWII, VIETNAM, ETC..)

• THE SIZE OF STATE, COUNTY AND LOCAL BUREAUCRACIES HAS INCREASED OVER THIS TIME SINCE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN TURNING OVER MANY PROGRAMS TO THE STATES.

• “BUREAUCRACY KEEPS PACE WITH OUR SOCIETY, DESPITE OUR SEEMING DISLIKE FOR IT, BECAUSE WE CAN’T OPERATE PRISONS, SOCIAL SECURITY AND OTHER ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS WITHOUT BUREAUCRACY.”

(CON.) 2(CON.) 2

• BUREAUCRACIES ARE COMMONPLACE BECAUSE THEY TOUCH SO MANY ASPECTS OF DAILY LIFE.• THEY ASSURE REGULAR DELIVERY OF

SERVICES• INSURE THAT AGENCIES FULFILL THEIR

MANDATES• BUREAUCRACIES CAN BE A THREAT TO

FREEDOM BECAUSE OF THEIR SIZE, THEIR MOMENTUM AND THE INTERESTS OF THE CIVIL SERVANTS IN KEEPING THEIR JOBS.

• THIS IMPELS BUREAUCRACIES TO RESIST ANY CHANGE OF DIRECTION

BUREAUCRATSBUREAUCRATS

• “AS BUREAUCRACIES HAVE GROWN, THE TERM BUREAUCRAT NOW CONNOTATES SLUGGISHNESS AND INEFFICIENCY”.

MOTIVATIONAL MOTIVATIONAL CONSIDERATIONSCONSIDERATIONS

• “A DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT IS ANALAGOUS TO A DIVISION OF A PRIVATE FIRM.” WILLIAM NISKANEN

• CONCEIVE THE BUREAUCRAT AS WE WOULD THE MANAGER WHO RUNS A DIVISION.

• BUDGET-MAXIMIZATION • COMPENSATION MAXIMATION• PERSONNAL GRATIFICATION• BOSS OVER A LARGE STAFF

(CON.)(CON.)• ALTRUISTIC: INDIVIDUALS ACTUALLY CARE ABOUT THEIR JOB

• PEOPLE TRY TO SECURE AS LARGE A BUDGET AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO SUCCEED IN ACHIEVING THEIR MISSION.

• BUREAUCRATS ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE LEGISLATORS AND TAXPAYERS, TO PROVIDE THEM WITH AS MANY RESOURCES AS POSSIBLE. (BUDGET MAXIMAZATION)

• CRITICS SUGGEST THAT THIS IS SIMILAR TO THE CONSUMER TELLING THE BUSINESS HOW MUCH THEY ARE WILLING TO PAY.

• IN ACTUALITY, LEGISLATURES ARE MUCH MORE ACTIVE THAN SOME CRITICS CONTEND. UTILIZATION OF OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES IS JUST ONE METHOD OF MAINTAINING CONTROL OVER THE BUREAUCRACY.

WHAT DO BUREAUCRATS DO?WHAT DO BUREAUCRATS DO?

• PRIMARY TASK OF A BUREAUCRACY: IMPLEMENTATION

• ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH COMMUNICATION IN ORDER TO COORDINATE ALL THE SPECIALIZATION WITHIN THEIR ORGANIZATION.

• PRINCIPLE: LEGISLATURE, PRESIDENT• AGENTS: BUREAUCRACIES TO

IMPLEMENT THE POLICIES PROMULAGATED BY CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT.

(CON.)(CON.)• WHAT IF AN AGENT SERVES MULTIPLE PRINCIPALS WHO

OFTEN DISAGREE?• INTERPREATION: A FORM OF IMPLEMENTATION

WHEREIN THE BUREAUCRATS STILL CARRY OUT WHAT THEY BELIEVE TO BE THE INTENTIONS OF THEIR SUPERIORS.

• HOWEVER, WHEN BUREAUCRATS HAVE TO INTERPRET A LAW BEFORE IMPLEMENTING IT, THEY ARE IN EFFECT LAWMAKING.

• IN SITUATIONS LIKE THIS THE CONGRESS DELEGATES TO THE APPROPRIATE AGENCY A BROAD AUTHORITY THROUGH PROCEDURES OF RULEMAKING AND ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION.

RULEMAKING AND RULEMAKING AND ADMINISTRATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATIONADJUDICATION

• ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION:APPLYING RULES AND PRECEDENTS TO SPECIFIC CASES IN ORDER TO SETTLE DISPUTES.• THE AGENCY CHARGES THE PERSON OR BUSINESS

SUSPECTED OF VIOLATING THE LAW. THE RULING ONLY APPLIES TO THE SPECIFIC CASE BEING CONSIDERED.

• RULEMAKING: QUASI-LEGISLATION• ONCE RULES ARE PRINTED IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER

THEY BECOME LAW.• PRODUCT GUIDELINES, BASED ON THE RULINGS, HAVE

THE FORCE OF LAW. PRODUCT RECALLS ARE OFTEN THE RESULT OF ADJUDICATION.

AGENCIES AND THEIR AGENCIES AND THEIR POLITICSPOLITICS

• FOUR TYPES

• CABINET DEPARTMENTS

• INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

• GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS

• INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS

TYPICAL AGENCY OPERATING TYPICAL AGENCY OPERATING STRUCTURESTRUCTURE

• FIGURE 7.3 p. 284• SECRETARY AT THE TOP

• ASSISTED BY THE UNDER SECRETARIES AND ASSISTANT SECRETARIES

• NEXT IS THE BUREAU LEVEL: RESPONSIBLE FOR SPECIALIZED PROGRAMS (FBI, FOREST SERVICE, ETC…)

• WITHIN BUREAUS THERE ARE DIVISIONS, OFFICES, SERVICES AND UNITS

INDEPENDENT AGENCIESINDEPENDENT AGENCIES

• SET UP BY CONGRESS OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENTAL STRUCTURE

• PRESIDENT APPOINTS AND DIRECTS THE HEADS OF THE AGENCIES

• USUALLY HAVE THE BROAD POWER TO PROVIDE PUBLIC SERVICES THAT ARE EITHER TOO EXPENSIVE OR TOO IMPORTANT TO BE LEFT TO PRIVATE INITIATIVES.• NASA• CIA• EPA

GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONSCORPORATIONS

• LIKE PRIVATE BUSINESSES• PERFORM AND CHARGE FOR A

MARKET SERVICE

• POSTAL SERVICE

• AMTRAK

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONCOMMISSION

• GIVEN BROAD DISCRESSION TO MAKE RULES• ACT AS MINILEGISLATURES WHOSE RULES ARE EXACTLY

THE SAME AS LEGISLATION BUT REQUIRE FULL-TIME ATTENTION BEYOND THE CAPACITY OF CONGRESS.• ICC• FTC• FCC

• *SINCE 1970 NO NEW REGULATORY COMMISSIONS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED.

• NOW AGENCIES ARE CLASSIFIED BY THE MISSION OF EACH AGENCY AS DEFINED BY ITS JURISDICTION.

• I.E. REGULATORY AGENCIES, REDISTRIBUTIVE AGENCIES

THE CLIENTELE AGENCIES: THE CLIENTELE AGENCIES: STRUCTURES AND POLITICSSTRUCTURES AND POLITICS

• CERTAIN AGENCIES ARE SINGLED OUT AND CALLED BY A PARTICULAR NAME BECAUSE THEY ARE DIRECTED BY LAW TO FOSTER AND PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF A PARTICULAR CLIENTELE.

• LARGE PROTIONS OF THEIR PERSONNEL WORK IN THE FIELD AS “EXTENSION AGENTS”.

• SERVE AS “FUNCTIONAL REPRESENTATION”-A TYPE OF LOBBY FOR THEIR CLIENTS.

• CLIENTS THEREFORE SUPPORT THEIR AGENCY WHEN IT IS THREATENED WITH BEING ABOLISHED. (NEA AND THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION)• AGRICULTURE, COMMERCE, LABOR, ENERGY, ETC…

(CON.)(CON.)

• IRON TRIANGLE• A PATTERN OF STABLE RELATIONSHIPS

BETWEEN: • AN AGENCY IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH• A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE OR

SUBCOMMITTEE• AND ONE OR MORE ORGANIZED GROUPS OF

AGENCY CLIENTELE• IRON RECTANGLE:

• FEDERAL COURTS ARE ADDED TO THE MIX

THE EFFECT OF POWER THE EFFECT OF POWER RESISTANCE OF CLIENTELE RESISTANCE OF CLIENTELE

AGENCIESAGENCIES

• CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT, WHEN MEETING RESISTANCE FROM CLIENTELE AGENCIES TO IMPLEMENT PROGRAMS IT OPPOSES, HAVE CREATED NEW CLIENTELE AGENCIES.• THIS HAS LED TOWARD DUPLICATION,

WASTE AND COLLUSION.

AGENCIES FOR AGENCIES FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE UNIONMAINTENANCE OF THE UNION

• REVENUE AGENCIES• AGENCIES FOR INTERNAL SECURITY• AGENCIES FOR EXTERNAL NATIONAL SECURITY

• PUBLIC ORDER AGENCIES• CONTROL SOURCES OF GOVERNMENT

REVENUE• CONTROL OF CONDUCT DEFINED AS A

THREAT TO INTERNAL NATIONAL SECURITY

• CONTROL OF CONDUCT THREATENING TO EXTERNAL SECURITY

REVENUE AGENCIESREVENUE AGENCIES• INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (IRS)

• PERSONS ACCUSED IN TAX CASES BEAR THE BURDEN OF PROVING THEIR OWN INNOCENCE

• THIS REFLECTS THE FINE LINE BETWEEN FREEDOM AND POWER

• THE POWER TO TAX IS VERY CLOSE TO THE POLICE POWER• IT CAN UNDERMINE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE TAX

SYSTEM AND INSTILL FEAR IN ORDINARY CITIZENS THAT THEIR PRIVACY COULD BE IN DANGER.

• AT TIMES IT SEEMS AT SORTS WITH THE DEFFINITION OF A CLIENTELE AGENCY

• “TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS” IN THE 1990Ss REVERSED THE BURDEN OF PROOF. IRS AGENTS WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF GUILT.

• IRS IS NOT BUREAUCRATIC ENOUGH

AGENCIES FOR INTERNAL AGENCIES FOR INTERNAL SECURITYSECURITY

• DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAS THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY UNLESS THE COUNTRY IS IN A STATE OF INSURRECTION

• CONNECTION BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF JUSTICE AND TREASURY• CASES ARISING OUT OF DELINQUENCY, FRAUD AND

INTERPRETATION OF IRS CODE• CIVIL DIVISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HANDLES

ALL CASES WHEREIN THE UNITED STATES IS THE DEFENDANT.

• JUSTICE DEPARTMENT HANDLES ALL CASES WHERE THE UNITED STATES IS THE PLAINTIFF: FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS CASES, ANTITRUST, CIVIL RIGHTS AND INTERNAL SECURITY.

• FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI): INFORMATION GATHERING AGENCY FOR ALL OTHER DIVISIONS

• TAKES 40% OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT BUDGET

AGENCIES FOR EXTERNAL AGENCIES FOR EXTERNAL NATIONAL SECURITYNATIONAL SECURITY

• DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE• STATE

• DIPLOMACY, REGIONAL BUREAUS (EMBASSIES), INTELLIGENCE, RESEARCH

• FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS ARE JUST BELOW THE RANK OF AMBASSADORS

• DEFENSE• LARGEST NUMBER OF CAREER PROFESSIONALS• CREATED FROM 1947-49• STAFF AGENCIES SERVE EACH MILITARY BRANCH

• LOGISTICS, INTELLIGENCE, PERSONNEL, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, QUARTERMASTER AND ENGINEERING.

• CHIEF-OF –STAFF AT THE TOP=EX OFFICIO MEMBER OF THE JOINT-CHIEFS-OF-STAFF

• PROBLEM WITH THE MILITARY IS PORK BARRELL ISSUES OF BASE REDUCTIONS TO REDUCE THE DEFENSE BUDGET

• BASE CLOSING COMMISSION CREATED IN LATE 1980s

THE REGULATORY AGENCIESTHE REGULATORY AGENCIES

• REGULATORY IF CONGRESS DELEGATES TO IT RELATIVELY BROAD POWERS OVER A SECTOR OF THE ECONOMY OR COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY, AND AUTHORIZES IT TO MAKE RULES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF PEOPLE OR BUSINESSES WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION

• UNTIL THE LATE 19TH CENTURY, THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DID NOT INVOLVE ITSELF IN REGULATORY MATTERS.

• THE UNITED STATE HAS NO DEPARTMENT OF REGULATION. HOWEVER IT HAS MANY REGULATORY AGENCIES.• FDA (FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION)• OSHA (OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

ADMINISTRATION)

(CON.)(CON.)• RULES MADE BY THESE AGENCIES HAVE THE FORCE AND

EFFECT OF LEGISLATION=ADMINISTRATIVE LEGISLATION.• WHEN THEY RENDER DECISIONS THEY HAVE THE SAME

EFFECT AS DECISIONS OF COURTS.• INITIALLY, MOST REGULATORY AGENCIES WERE

INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS WITH DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY TO CONGRESS RATHER THAN TO THE WHITE HOUSE.

• IN MORE RECENT TIMES, REGULATORY AGENCIES ARE RARELY INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS.

THEIR POLITICAL PATTERNS ARISE FROM THEIR ABILITY TO PLAY PRESIDENT AGAINST CONGRESS

REDISTRIBUTIVE REDISTRIBUTIVE ADMINISTRATIONADMINISTRATION

• WELFARE AND MONETARY AGENCIES ARE PART OF THIS SYSTEM BECAUSE THEY ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TRANSFER OF BILLIONS OF DOLLARS BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND THE PRIVATE SECTORS, WHICH INFLUENCE HOW PEOPLE AND CORPORATIONS SPEND AND INVEST TRILLIONS OF DOLLARS ANNUALLY.

FISCAL AND MONETARY FISCAL AND MONETARY AGENCIESAGENCIES

• FISCAL POLICY: GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY RELATING TO MONEY• FISCAL: HANDLED BY THE TREASURY

DEPARTMENT• TAXING AND SPENDING POLICIES, BUDGET,

DEBT, CURRENCY• MONETARY:FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

• POLICIES HAVING TO DO WITH BANKS, CREDIT AND CURRENCY, CREDIT RATINGS OF BANKS, “BANKERS BANK”

• WELFARE• REDISTRIBUTION OF MONEY

WELFARE AGENCIESWELFARE AGENCIES• ARE NOT CLIENTELE AGENCIES• ONLY THOSE WHO WITHIN SOME LEGALLY DEFINED CATEGORY

• SOCIAL SECURITY• TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE TO NEEDY FAMILIES• SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME• IN-KIND BENEFITS

• FOOD STAMPS, MEDICAID• WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY, THESE

PROGRAMS ARE MEANS-TESTED.• IN 1996, PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK

OPPORTUNITY ACT, MANY OF THESE PROGRAMS WERE DEVOLVED TO THE STATES.

• THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS STILL INVOLVED BECAUSE OF LARGE DISCRETIONARY BLOCKS GRANTED TO EACH STATE.

CONTROLLING THE CONTROLLING THE BUREAUCRACYBUREAUCRACY

• THE DILEMMA FOR AMERICANS IS NOT TO RETREAT FROM BUREAUCRACY BUT TO TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ITS STRENGTHS WHILE TRYING TO MAKE IT MORE ACCOUNTABLE TO THE DEMANDS MADE UPON IT BY DEMOCRATIC POLITICS AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT.

(CON.)(CON.)

• THE PROBLEM TODAY IS OUR INABILITY TO KEEP BUREAUCRACY ACCOUNTABLE TO ELECTED POLITICAL AUTHORITIES.

PRESIDENT AS CHIEF PRESIDENT AS CHIEF EXECUTIVEEXECUTIVE

• MAKING THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY• CONGRESS AND THE PEOPLE HAVE DISPLAYED A WILLINGNESS OT

DELEGATE THE PRESIDENT ALMOST ANY POWERS HE SEEKS.• “PRESIDENTS HAVE GREAT POWER TO COMMIT BUT MUCH LESS

POWER TO GUIDE.”• OVERSIGHT CAN BE DIFFICULT WHICH LEADS TO AGENCIES

GOING THEIR OWN WAY UNTIL A SCANDAL COMES TO LIGHT.• EACH EXPANSION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT WAS

ACCOMPANIED BY A PARALLEL EXPANSION OF PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY.

• EXP: THE BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING ACT OF 1921• EXP.: CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF 1978• EXP: REAGAN, “CENTRALIZATION IN THE SERVICE OF

DECENTRALIZATION”• EXP: CLINTON’S NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW

THE PROBLEM OF THE PROBLEM OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL BY MANAGEMENT CONTROL BY

THE WHITE HOUSE STAFFTHE WHITE HOUSE STAFF• THE HISTORICAL FAILURE OF THE CABINET TO ACT AS A

BOARD OF DIRECTORS HAS LEFT A VACUUM.• THE OMB HAS PARTIALLY FILLED THIS VACUUM.• THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF HAS ALSO PARTIALLY FILLED

THIS VACUUM NOT ONLY BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN GIVEN SPECIAL JURISDICTION OVER ONE OR MORE DEPARTMENTS OR ISSUES, THEY ALSO HAVE ACCESS TO CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.• THIS CAN ALSO FAIL: EXP. IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1985-

86)• TOWER COMMISSION: “AT NO TIME DID PRESIDENT

REAGAN INSIST UPON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PERFORMANCE REVIEW.”

CONGRESS AND CONGRESS AND RESPONSIBLE RESPONSIBLE

BUREAUCRACYBUREAUCRACY• OVERSIGHT: THE MORE LEGISLATIVE POWER

CONGRESS HAS DELEGATED TO THE EXECUTIVE, THE MORE IT HAS SOUGHT TO GET IT BACK THROUGH COMMITTEE AND SUBCOMMITTEE OVERSIGHT OF THE AGENCIES.

• APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES AS WELL AS AUTHORIZATION COMMITTEES HAVE OVERSIGHT POWERS.

• COMMITTEES ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS IS NOT LIMITED BY JURISDICTION.

CONTROL OF THE CONTROL OF THE BUREAUCRACY AS A BUREAUCRACY AS A

PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMPRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM• A PRINCIPAL MAY GUARD AGAINST

AGENT MISBEHAVIOR BY:• BEFORE-THE-FACT PROTECTION. THIS

RELIES UPON THE AGENT’S REPUTATION.

• AFTER-THE-FACT : REFUSAL TO PAY UNTIL INSPECTION IS MADE OF THE COMPLETED WORK.

• N.B. THE CONCEPT OF BUREAUCRATIC DRIFT (p. 306)

BEFORE-THE-FACT-BEFORE-THE-FACT-CONTROLSCONTROLS

• APPOINTMENT PROCESS• PROCEDURAL CONTROLS

CONGRESSIONAL CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: ABDICATION OR OVERSIGHT: ABDICATION OR

STRATEGIC DELEGATION?STRATEGIC DELEGATION?• ONGOING CRITICISM IS THAT CONGRESS

HAS ALLOWED TOO MUCH DISCRETION TO UNELECTED EXECUTIVE BRANCH BUREAUCRACIES, AS WELL AS TOO MUCH POLICY-MAKING AUTHORITY. THIS HAS LED TO A “RUNAWAY BUREAUCRACY”, IN WHICH UNELECTED OFFICIALS ARE ACCOUNTABLE NEITHER TO THE ELECTORATE NOR TO CONGRESS.

• THE RESULT IS THAT THE CONGRESS HAS BECOME WEAK AND INEFFECTIVE.

(CON.)(CON.)

• METHODS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT ACCORDING TO McCUBBINS AND SCHWARTZ: POLICE PATROL AND FIRE ALARM

• BUREAUCRATIC DRIFT COULD BE BETTER PREVENTED IF CONGRESS SPENT MORE TIME CLARIFYING ITS LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND LESS OF ITS TIME ON OVERSIGHT ACTIVITY

COALITION DRIFT AS A COALITION DRIFT AS A COLLECTIVE ACTION COLLECTIVE ACTION

PROBLEMPROBLEM• POLITICIANS WANT THEIR LEGISLATIVE DEALS NOT ONLY

IMPLEMENTED BUT ALSO TO ENDURE.• LEGISLATIVE FORMULATED AND BUREAUCRATICALLY

IMPLEMENTED OUTPUT IS SUBJECT TO COALITION DRIFT.• POLITICAL INSULATION FOR LEGISLATION MAY BE

PROVIDED BY GIVING BUREAUCRATIC AGENCIES LONG LIVES, THEIR POLITICAL HEADS LONG TERMS AND WIDE-RANGING ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY.

• THIS INSULATION COMES AT A PRICE: THE POLITICAL APPOINTEES ARE THEREBY EMPOWERED TO PURSUE INDEPENDENT COURSES OF ACTION.

• PROTECTION FROM COALITIONAL DRIFT COMES AT THE PRICE OF AN INCREASED POTENTIAL FOR BUREAUCRATIC DRIFT.

DOWNSIZING GOVERNMENTDOWNSIZING GOVERNMENT

• SHORT OF ELIMINATING PROGRAMS, THE ONLY PROVEN METHODS OF DOWNSIZING THE BUREAUCRACY HAS BEEN:

• DEREGULATION

• PRIVATIZATION


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