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TheExistenceofGod

RobertC.KoonsTheso-called“cosmologicalargument”(asitwasfirstlabeledbyImmanuelKant)hasplayedacentralrolewithinAristotelianphilosophyfromtheverybeginning.Infact,wefindfirst-causeargumentsbeforeAristotle:mostimportantly,inPlato’sTheLaws,BookX.TheinferencetotheexistenceofagodorgodsiscentraltoAristotle’stwomostimportantworksinmetaphysics,PhysicsandMetaphysics.TheNeo-Platonists(includingPlotinusandProclus),whosawthemselvesasbuildingonAristotle’sfoundations,madethisargumentfundamentaltotheirunderstandingofreality.ManyoftheancientcriticsofAristotle,suchasJohnPhiloponus,theKalaamtradition(al-Kindi,al-Ghazzali),andBonaventure,drewheavilyfromAristotleintheirphilosophizing,andheretoothecosmologicalargumenttookcentralstage.Finally,thisargumentcontinuedtoinfluencemodernphilosophy,inbothitsrationalist(Descartes,Spinoza,Leibniz,thepre-criticalKant)andempiricist(Locke,SamuelClarke)varieties.ThiscontinuitydemonstratesthatmodernphilosophyretainedmoreAristotelianelementsthanisoftenrecognized.NorevivaloftheAristoteliantraditioninmetaphysicscanaffordtoignorethequestionoftheviabilityoffirst-causearguments.Infact,therehasbeenaflourishingoffirst-causeargumentationwithinanalyticmetaphysicsinthelastfifteenyears,adevelopmentwithparallelsinotherbranchesofthefield.Inthefirstsectionbelow,Idealwithsomepreliminaryissuesabouttheformoftheargument.Itakeonthemostimportantquestion,thatofjustifyingsomeformofacausalprincipleor‘principleofsufficientreason’,insectionII.Next,Iconsider(insectionIII)thedualproblemsofavoidinganinfiniteregressandprovidingaprincipledgroundforstoppingthatregresswithGodandnotbefore.Thissectioncomprisessixdifferentapproaches:theKalaamargument,al-Farabi’saggregationargument,aversionformulatedintermsofGeorgeBoolos’splurallogic,Aquinas’sappealtopersecausation,andLeibniz’suseofinfinitaryconjunction.IturninsectionIVtoavarietyofargumentsforasupernaturalcauseoftheuniversethatdonotrelyonaglobalcausalprincipletoreachtheirconclusionbutinsteadappealtoinferencetothebestexplanation.TheseargumentsincludeaninterpretationofAquinas’sFirstWay(seekinganexplanationoftheperpetuationoftime),aNeo-Platonicargumentfromthespatialorspatiotemporalunityoftheworld,aMaimonideanargument(Aquinas’sThirdWay)fortheneedforanecessaryexplanationforaninfinitepast,andKant’spre-criticalargumentforGodasthegroundofnecessity.Finally,sectionVaddressestheproblemofmovingfromafirstcausetoGod(asclassicallyconceived).

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I.PreliminaryissuesHereisthegeneralformofthecosmologicalorfirst-causeargument:1.TherearethingsofacertainkindFsuchthateverythingofthatkindhasacauseorexplanation.2.Theremustbeanultimatecauseorexplanationofeachofthesethings.3.SuchanultimatecausemustbeGod.4.Therefore,Godexists.Theargumenthasjustthreepremises.Adefenseoftheargumentmustthereforetacklethreeproblems:1.TheJustificationProblem.Whatjustifiesthecausalorexplanatoryprincipleappealedtoinpremise1?2.TheRegressProblem.Whymustthechainofexplanationsterminate?3.TheGapProblem.WhatjustifiesidentifyingafirstcausewithGod?IwilltakeuptheJustificationProbleminthenextsection(II),theRegressProbleminsectionIII,andtheGapProbleminsectionV,afterconsideringsomevariationsthatdonotfitthegeneraltemplateinsectionIV.Beforeproceedingwiththisthree-partdefense,thereareanumberofpreliminaryquestionstoaskaboutthisargument.First,wecanaskwhatsortofcausalorexplanatoryrelationisinvolved.Thisquestionisinseparablefromthequestionofwhatkindof‘things’areinquestionhere:whataretherelataofthecausalorexplanatoryrelation?Second,wecanaskabouttherelationbetweencausationandtime:arethecausesandexplanationssupposedtoprecedetheireffectsintime,orarewelookingforsomekindofsynchronicortimelessexplanation?Third,whatsortofkindisF?Inparticular,shouldweidentifyFwiththepropertyofexistingcontingently?Cannecessarybeingsbecausedorexplained?Finally,Iwillturninthissectiontothequestionofthelogicofargument:isitsupposedtobedeductiveorinductive?Ifinductive,whatsort:defeasibleinference,inferencetothebestexplanation?A.TheExplanatoryRelationanditsRelataThroughoutthelatterpartofthetwentiethcentury,philosophershavebeenarguingaboutwhetherthefundamentalcausalrelationisbetweenthings(events,conditions,existingentities)ortruths(propositions,facts).Inthe1960’sand70’s,theconsensusfavoredtheprimacyoftruths.Causalexplanationwassupposedtobe

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somekindofrelationbetweentruepropositions,analogoustologicalconnectiveslike‘or’or‘not’.Thefundamentalcausalfactsweresupposedtotaketheform:q,becausep.Thispropositional-connectivemodelfitsbestwithcosmologicalargumentsthatappealtoLeibniz’s“PrincipleofSufficientReason”:theprinciplethateverycontingenttruthhassomeadequateexplanationintermsofother,morefundamentaltruths,bottomingoutinafoundationofnecessarytruths.However,thelatterpartofthetwentiethcenturyhasseenaresurgenceofthecompetingmodel:causationasfundamentallyaconnectionortiebetweenthings(likeevents,states,orotherspatiotemporallylocatedentities).Thismodelcorrespondstocosmologicalargumentsthatappealtoacausalprincipleoftheform:contingent(orwhollycontingent)thingsmustbecausedbyother,separatethings,withsomenecessarilyexistingthingsprovidingtheultimatecauses.Thetwomodelsarenotcompletelyunrelated.Ifwestartwiththereal-connectionmodel,wecansaywhatitistoexplaincertainkindsofcontingenttruth.IfCwasthecauseofE,thenthetruththatEexistedoroccurredisexplainedbythetruththatCexistedoroccurred.Alternatively,ifwestartwiththepropositional-connectivemodel,thenwecanusethatmodeltobuildanaccountofcausalconnections,solongwaswesupposethateachcontingenttruthis‘madetrue’bysomeconcreteentityorarrangementofentities.Ifitisthecasethatqbecausep,andife(p)ande(q)arethe‘truthmakers’ofpandq,respectively,thenitshouldfollowthate(p)isacauseofe(q).Inthecaseinwhichpandqareeachoftheform:‘xexists’,forsomex,thistruthmakeraccountisquiteplausible.Atruthoftheform‘xexists’isalwaysmadetruebyxitself.Theprincipaldifferencebetweenthetwomodelswillemergewhenweconsiderhowtoblocktheregress.Forthoseadoptingthepropositional-connectivemodelandLeibniz’sPrincipleofSufficientReason,themostattractiveapproachwillbethatfollowedbyRichardGaleandAlexanderPruss:usingthelogicaloperationofconjunctiontoformtheOneBigConjunctiveTruth,andthenapplythePSRtothat,resultinginanecessarytruthasitsexplanation.Thoseadoptingthereal-connectionmodelandaglobalCausalPrinciple,haveanumberofalternativewaysofachievingthesameresult,includingaggregation,pluralquantification,andmoredirectargumentsagainstthepossibilityofinfiniteregresses.TheAristoteliantraditioncontributesseveralcrucialinsightstothisproblem,withoutfinallydecidingtheissue.First,wecansaythatonlytheactualcanbeacauseorgroundacausalexplanation.Themerelypossibleorpotential(assuch)causesnothing.Second,theprimaryorfocalsenseofcausationappliestocausesandeffectsthatarepositive:totheexistenceofthings,ortotheirbeingacertainway(their“accidents”).Ifprivationsornegationshavecausesatall,itisinonlyaderivativesense.Third,acausemusttaketheformofapowerfulparticular:aparticular,concretesubstancewithanappropriateactivepower.Theeffectisconstitutedbytheexerciseofthisactivepower.Whetheranactivepowerexistsand

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canbeexercisedonaparticularoccasiondependsupontheintrinsicnatureoftheagentandonitsexternalcircumstances.Inthecaseofrationalagents,thepotentialexerciseofanactivepowerdependsontheagent’shavingsomereasonfordoingso.Ifthereareadequatereasonsforcontraryactionsonagivenoccasion,rationalagencycanintroduceanelementofcontingency.B.Diachronicvs.SynchronicCausationAnothercrucialissueconcernstherelationbetweencausationandtime.Insomecases,itseemsthatthecausemustprecedeitseffectintime.Thiswouldholdineverycaseofcontinuouscausation.Whereasubstanceorgroupofsubstancesisundergoingsomecontinuousprocessoractivity(suchaslocomotion,e.g.,therevolutionoftheeartharoundthesun),theearlierphasesoftheactivityareinsomesensecausesofthelaterphases.Inothercases,causationwouldseemtobesimultaneous.Whenonesubstanceactsuponanother,thecauseandeffectaresimultaneous,sincetheeffectisidenticalwiththeexerciseoftheagent’sactivepower,andapowercanbeexercisedonlywhileitexists.Thetwomodesofcausationareintertwined:itiscontinuouscausationthatexplainswhyinstancesofdiscretecausationoccurwhentheydo.Consider,forexample,thecontinuousmotionoftwobilliardballstowardoneanother,culminatinginthediscreteinteractionthatoccurswhentheycollide.Thecollision,inturn,givesrisetonewprocessesoflocomotion.Adiachronicchainofsuchalternatingcontinuousanddiscretecausationcouldregressarbitrarilyfarintothepast.Thistwofoldaccountofcausationgivesrisetothreedifferentkindsofcosmologicalargument:(1)thosethatarguethatsuchadiachronicregresscannotextendinfinitelyfarintothepast,(2)thosethatarguethatnoactofdiscretecausationcanbefullyexplainedbycontinuousactioninthepast,butrequiressomefurthersynchroniccauseinthemomentofaction,and(3)thosethatseektodisentanglecausationfromtimealtogether,movingultimatelytoatimelesscauseofthewholecosmosoffinitethings,regardlessofwhetheritspastisfiniteorinfiniteinextent.C.Necessaryvs.UncausedWhatsortsofthingscallfororrequireacause?Onetraditionalansweris:contingentthings,thingsthatcouldhavefailedtoexistoroccur.SuccessfulcosmologicalargumentsofthiskindreachoneormorenecessarybeingastheFirstCause.However,onemightargue(asdoesThomasAquinasintheThirdWay)thatsuchanargumentisnotsufficientlyambitious.Arguably,proponentsofsuchargumentoverlookthepossibilitythatsomenecessarybeingsmightalsorequireacause.Somenecessarybeingsmightbenecessaryinadependentway:throughorbythe

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necessityofsomethingelse.Forexample,supposethatGodgivesrisetouniversalideasthroughaprocessofthinking.IfbothGodandGod’sthinkingarenecessarybeings,thentheideaswouldalsobenecessaryandyetcausallydependent.Itwon’tdotoadoptasourprincipletherulethatalldependentthingshavecauses,if‘dependent’isunderstoodasmeaningsimply‘caused’,sincesuchaprinciplewouldbeameretautology.Morepromisingwouldbethis:toproposethateverythingthatcouldpossiblyhaveacauseactuallydoso.Onlyathingnecessaryinitselfwouldbeabsolutelyuncausable.D.Deductivevs.InductiveFinally,weneedtoconsidertheformofthecosmologicalargument:isitsupposedtobedeductivelyvalid,orisitsomeformofinductive?Ifinductive,whatkindofargument:abductive(inferencetothebestexplanation),Bayesian,orappealtoadefeasiblegeneralization?SincethetimeoftheContinentalRationalists,ithasbeentakenforgrantedthatthecosmologicalargumentissupposedtobedeductiveinform,relyingonanexceptionlesscausalprinciple.Thisreflectedtheobsessionwithcertaintythatcharacterizedtheearlymodernperiod.However,weshouldbeonguardagainstanachronisticallyreadingthisepistemologicalanxietybackintotheearliertradition.IftheinferencetotheFirstCauseistakentobeaninferencetothebestexplanation,ortobetheresultofapplyingadefeasible,ceterisparibusor“ceterisabsentibus”(otherthingsbeingabsent)kindofprinciple,thentheburdenofjustifyingthecasualprincipleorcausalinferenceisconsiderablylightened.Althoughanagnosticmightlegitimatelyobjecttoaprincipleofuniversalcausality,itismuchhardertodenythatitisreasonabletoinfer(non-deductivelyanddefeasibly)acausewheneverconfrontedbyacontingentorobviouslycausablecondition.Thisgainisonlypartiallycanceledbythegreatervulnerabilityofsuchnon-deductiveargumentstosuccessfulrebuttalsordefeaters.Itisnotatallclearthatthereareanyconsiderationsthatwouldplausiblydefeattheinferencetoacauseoftheworld.Probablythestrongestobjectionofthiskind(whichIdiscussedinKoons1997and2001)takesthisform:itisordinarilythecasethatwhollycontingentthingshavewhollycontingentcauses(notnecessaryones).However,thecauseoftheworld,ifithasone,wouldhavetobenecessary.Thus,eithertheworldisexceptionalbylackingacausealtogether,orbyhavinganecessarybeingasitscause.Thereisnoreasontoprefertheonegeneralizationtotheother,andsotheinferencetoafirstcauseisdefeated.Thebestresponsetothisobjectionistoarguethatthefirstcausewouldnotbeexceptionalinanyrespectbutwouldinfactfullyconformtothegeneralpattern.Eachcauseisinasensemorenearlynecessarythanitseffects,sincetheparticularcauseexistsinworldinwhichitseffectsaremissing,butnotviceversa(seeKoons

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2000,116-118).1Theonlythingthatcouldbemorenearlynecessarythanthecosmos(giventhatitincludesallwhollycontingentthings)wouldbeanabsolutelynecessarybeing.Thus,itisnotallsurprisingorexceptionalthatthecosmosshouldhaveanabsolutelynecessarycause.RichardSwinburne(Swinburne1979)hasdeployedBayesianreasoningonbehalfofthecosmologicalargument,suggestingthattheexistenceofasinglefirstcauseisthesimplestexplanatoryhypothesisoftheexistenceofalargeandcomplexcosmos.Iwillalsoconsider(insectionIV)severalversionsofthecosmologicalargumentthatseektoinfertheexistenceofGodasthebestpossibleexplanationforcertainspecifickindsofphenomena.II.TheJustificationProblemThefirstproblemtoaddressisthatofjustifyingaglobalcausalorexplanatoryprinciple.Whyassumethatanythinghasacauseorcausalexplanation?Thesimplestmoveistoappealtoself-evidence.Itissimplyconstitutiveofperfectrationalitythatonelookforandexpecttofindacausewheneverpossible.AsImentionedabove,itishardtodenythereasonablenessofadefeasibleprincipleofcausation,attheveryleast.However,thereareseveralstrategiesavailablefordefendingthetruthofexceptionlesscausalprinciples.A.EmpiricalInferencetotheBestExplanationAlexanderPrusshasarguedthataglobalcausalprincipleorPrincipleofSufficientReasonisthebestexplanationforthefactthatwedon’tseebricksandprotoncloudsappearingexnihilo.(Pruss2009,p.9)Aglobalcausalprincipleprovidesthesimplestexplanationforthisfact.B.EpistemologicalArgumentsThefirstsuchstrategyappealstoepistemologicalconsiderations.Ifuncausedfactsarepossible,wecannotassignanyobjectiveprobabilitytotheirobtainingornotobtaining.Itisonlywhensomethingiscausedthatwecanappealtothedispositionsandpropensitiesofitspotentialcausestogroundafactaboutobjectiveprobabilities.Ifuncausedeventswerepossible,thereoccurrencewouldhavenowell-definedprobability.Thus,wecouldnevergoodgroundsforsupposingthatanyeventwaslikelytohavebeencausedatall,muchlesscausedinanyspecificway.1Thereareatleasttworeasonsforthinkingthisisso.First,thefixityofthepastandtheopennessofthefutureindicatethatparticulareffectsnecessitate(dere)theircauses,butnotviceversa.Second,thefactthatthings’originsaretypicallyessentialtothemalsosupportsthegeneralnecessitationofcausesbyeffects.

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Thisgeneratesadefeaterofallempiricalclaims,sinceallempiricalclaimstoknowledgedependonthesuppositionthatourexperiencesandmemorieshavecausesoftheappropriatekind(veridicalandnon-deviant).Inaworldinwhichuncausedstatesarepossible,akindofcounter-causalCartesiandemonwouldlurkbehindeveryevent,andwewouldneverbeinapositiontojudgewithanyreliabilitythatsuchademonwereunlikelyinanygivencase.Couldthelawsofnature(contingently)ruleoutthepossibilityofuncausedandspatiotemporallyboundedeventsinourworld?No,sincethelawsofnatureonlyspecifywhatcanhappenintheabsenceofexternalinfluences.Ifuncausedeventsandentitiesweremetaphysicallypossible,thelawsofnaturecouldnotrulethemoutinourworldeither,sincetheycouldnot,bythemselves,ruleoutthespontaneousgenerationofnewphysicalobjectswithnewforces.Theapplicationofthelawsofnaturetoexcludecertainkindsofeventsalwayspresupposesaglobalprincipleofcausality.Whatsortofcausalprincipleisjustifiedbytheseconsiderations?Theprinciplemustbestrongenoughtoencompassanypossiblepieceofempiricalevidence,withoutrequiringanyempiricalknowledgetojustifyitsapplication(toavoidaviciouscircularity).Inotherwords,theprinciplemusttaketheform:anyFhasacause,wherethedescription‘F’isbroadenoughtoincludeanypossibleempiricaldata,andsuchthattheapplicationof‘F’toitsinstancesisalwayscertainonpurelyapriorigrounds.Therequirementofaprioriapplicabilitymeansthat‘F’musttaketheformofsomethinglike‘appearstobeG’or‘cancoherentlybethoughttobeG’.TherequirementofscopemeansthatGshouldincludeeverythingthatiscausable.Puttingthesefactstogether,wereachtheconclusionthattheremustbeanaprioriknowableprincipleoftheform:whateverisconceivablycausablehasacause.Thefactthatsuchaprincipleexcludesthatwhichisinconceivablycausableposesnothreatofincipientskepticism,sinceifoneisjustifiedinbelievingthatsomethingexistswhichisinconceivablycausable,thatjustificationcannotdependonthesuppositionthatthethingwasinfactcausedinsomeway.C.AModalArgumentfortheCausalPrincipleBuildingonSullivan1994,Prusshasalsoarguedforaglobalcausalprinciplefromcertainprinciplesofmodality.ThecausalprinciplethatPrussarguesfortakesthefollowingform:ifEisanactualstateofaffairsandEcouldpossiblyhaveacause,thenEdoeshaveacause.Itseemsplausibletosupposethataneffectwouldnothaveoccurredwithoutthecause.Many,followingHumeandDavidLewis,havearguedthatthisfactcouldbethebasisforananalysisofcausation.However,evenifwesupposesuch

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counterfactualanalysesofcausationtobeunsuccessful,itstillseemsthatsuchcounterfactualdependencyisanecessaryconditionforcausation.Prussarguesthatwecanassumesomethingevenweaker:ifCcausedE,thenitshouldbethecasethatifnothinghadcausedE,thenEwouldnothaveoccurred.ThisweakerassumptionworksevenincasesinwhichEisover-determinedtohappen.(1)(CcausesE)�→(¬∃D(DcausesE)�→Edidnotoccur)Theso-calledBrouweraxiomofmodallogicstatesthatifsomepropositionpisactuallytrue,thenitisnecessarilypossible.Thiscorrespondstoasymmetryconditionontheaccessibilityrelationsbetweenworlds:ifanyworldwispossiblerelativetoouractualworld,thentheactualworldmustalsobepossiblerelativetow.TheBrouweraxiomisentailedbybutisweakerthanthestandardmodallogicformetaphysicalnecessity,S5.IfweapplytheprinciplebehindtheBrouweraxiomtocounterfactualconditionals,weshouldgetthefollowingrule:ifpisactuallythecase,thenifpwerenotthecase,thensomeworldwwouldhavebeenactual,suchthat,inw:ifpwerethecase,theactualworldmighthavebeenactual.Thisrulecouldbecapturedbythefollowingaxiom:(2)(q&p&◊¬p)→(¬p�→(p◊→q))Asitturnsout,Pruss’saxiom(2)isnotvalidinthestandardsemanticsforcounterfactualconditionalsasdevelopedbyDavidLewisandRobertStalnaker,butPrussarguespersuasivelythatthispointstoaflawinthatsemantics,nottoanygroundsfordoubting(2).Inaddition,Pruss’sproofrequirestwomoreobviousaxiomsinvolvingconditionals(axiomsthatarevalidinallstandardtheories):(3)(p⇒q)⇒(p�→q)(4)((p�→q)&(p�→¬q))⇒¬◊pIntheseaxioms,‘⇒’representslogicalentailment.SupposethatqisthetruepropositionthatsomestateofaffairsEoccurs,andsupposethatEcanhaveacausedoesnotinfacthaveone.LetpbethepropositionthatnothingcausesE.Thus,bothpandqaretrueintheactualworld.SinceEcanhaveacause,wehave◊¬p.By(2),weknowthatif¬pwerethecase,thenifphadbeenthecase,thenqmighthavebeenthecase.Letwbeaworldinwhich¬pistrue,inwhichEhasacause.

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Let’scallthispossiblecauseC.Applying(1)toworldw,wegettheresultthatitistrueatwthathadEhadnotcauses,i.e.,hadpbeentrue,Ewouldnothaveoccurred.Butthismeansthatwere¬ptrue,itwouldhavebeenthecaseboththat(p�→¬q)and(p◊→q),whichisimpossible.So,¬pisimpossible,contrarytoourhypothesis.Consequently,anystateofaffairsthatcanpossiblyhaveacausemusthaveacauseinfact.Prussgoesontoargue(Pruss2009,pp.44ff)thatallwhollycontingent,positivestatesofaffairscanhaveacause.IfastateofaffairsSiswhollycontingent,thenwecanconceiveofaworldinwhichsomethingexistswhichhasthepowertobringthatstateofaffairsintoexistence,andwhichexercisesthatpowerinthatworld,resultinginthestateofaffairsS.Thus,anywhollycontingent,positivestateofaffairswouldseemtobecausable.Thereisonlyonereasonfordoubtingthisconclusion:SmightincludesomeentityEforwhichessentialityoforiginsholds.Thatis,EmightbethekindofthingsuchthatifanyduplicateofEweretocomeintoexistenceinanyotherway,itwouldhavetobenumericallyfromE.Thus,ifShasnocauseintheactualworld,Ecouldnotexistinaworldinwhichitsexistence(andthusSitself)hadanycauseatall.Consequently,Prussproposesaweakerprinciple,(5),whichexplicitlyexcludesthiscase:(5)Everywhollycontingent,positivestateofaffairsthatdoesnotdereinvolvecontingententitiesforwhichessentialityoforiginsholdscanhaveacause.Principle(5)encompassesallstatesofaffairsthatarecharacterizedinpurelyqualitativeterms.ItseemsplausiblethatifastateofaffairsS’isthepurelyqualitativecounterpartofS,andS’hasacause,somustS.Consequently,wecanendorse(6):(6)Ifallwhollycontingent,positivestatesofaffairsthatdonotdereinvolveentitiesforwhichessentialityoforiginsholdshavecauses,thenallwhollycontingent,positivestatesofaffairshavecauses.Prussarguesthat(6)willbetrueinany‘nice’world:onelackingindiscerniblebutdistinctentities.Ourworldappearstobe‘nice’.Putting(5)and(6)togetherwithPruss’sglobalcausalprinciple,wereachtheresultthateverywhollycontingent,positivestateofaffairshasacause.D.TheProblemofGroundingModalityAsAlexanderPrusshasargued(Pruss2011),narrowlylogical,Lewisian,Platonic(RobertM.Adams,AlvinPlantinga),andnon-causalAristotelianessentialistaccountsareallproblematic.ThebestalternativeisAristotelian:possibilitiesandnecessitiesareallgrounded(madetrueby)factsaboutthepowersofactualthings.

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ImmanuelKantdevelopedasimilarargumentinhispre-criticalphase(Kant1763/1994).Suppose,forreductio,thattherewereafactpthatobtainswithoutcausalexplanation.Letqbethefactthatpobtainswithoutexplanation.Consideraworldwinwhichpisfalse.GiventheBroweraxiomB,ifpwerefalse,qwouldstillbepossible.However,nothinginworldwcouldgroundthepossibilityofq.Hence,thegroundingofmodalityrequiresaglobalprincipleofcausation.Prussalsoprovidesanargumentthatdoesn’tdependonaxiomB:(7)Ifthecausalprincipleistrueinallpossibleworldswiththepossibleexceptionoftheactualworld,thenitistrueinallpossibleworlds.If(7)istrue,theneitherthecausalprincipleistrueintheactualworldorthereissomenon-actualworldwinwhichthecausalprincipleisfalse.Wecangenerateacontradictionfromtheseconddisjunct.Letpbesomefactthatobtainsinwwithoutexplanation.Letrbesomecontingentfactthatobtainsinwbutnotintheactualworld(ifpdoesnotobtainintheactualworld,justletr=p).Then(r&p)isacontingentfactthatobtainsinwwithoutexplanationanddoesnotobtainintheactualworld.Butthismeans(onthecausal-Aristotelianaccount)thatthereissomeentitywithsomecausalpowerintheactualworldcapableofbringingitaboutthat(r&p)betruewithoutcausalexplanation,anobviousabsurdity.(Pruss2009,p.21)E.RelyingonaWeakPrincipleofSufficientRichardGaleandAlexanderPrussshowed(GaleandPruss1999)thatavalidcosmologicalargumentcanbebuildbymeansofaweakprincipleofsufficientreason:WeakPSR:itispossiblethateverycontingentstateofaffairshaveasufficientexplanation.FromtheWeakPSRwecangettheresultthatitispossiblethatapowerfulnecessarybeingexists.WecanthenuseS5(includingtheprinciplethatwhateverispossiblynecessaryisnecessarysimpliciter)togettheresultthatsuchabeingactuallyexists.TherearetwogeneralworrieswiththeGale-Prussmove:1.DowehaveanygroundsforbelievingtheweakversionsoftheCPthataren’tequallygoodgroundsforbelievingthestrongversions?2.IsS5tostrong?Argumentwon’tworkwithS4,oranythingweaker.

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Inaseriesofrecentarticles,JoshuaRasmussenhascreatedseveralvariationsontheGale-Prusstheme.InRasmussen2010,heassumesthefollowing:(8)Ifxisanintrinsictypeofconcreteparticular,thenitispossiblethatthefactthatthereisatleastonememberofxhasacausalexplanation.Considerthetypeofbeingacontingentlyexistingconcreteparticular.By(8),itmustbepossibleforsomethingtocausethistypetohaveatleastonemember.Suchacausemustbeanecessarilyexistingconcreteparticular.ByS5,wecaninferthatthisnecessarilyexistingbeingexistsalsointheactualworld.Inhis2011paper(Rasmussen2011),Rasmussenassumesinstead:(9)Anyintrinsicpropertyπthat(i)possiblybeginstobeinstantiated,and(ii)ispossiblyinstantiatedbysomethingthathasacauseissuchthatitispossiblethatthereisacauseofπ’sbeginningtobeinstantiated.Itisplausibletosupposethatthepropertyofbeingacontingentconcreteparticular(callitpropertyc)isanintrinsicpropertythatpossiblybeginstobeinstantiatedandispossiblyinstantiatedbysomethingthathasacause.Therefore,itispossiblethatthispropertyciscausedtobegintobeinstantiated.Thiscausecouldnotitselfinstantiatec,onpainofaviciouscircularity:somethingthatinstantiatesapropertyπcannotbethecauseofπ‘sbeginningtobeinstantiated.So,itispossiblethatthereexistsomepowerfulnecessarybeing(andifpowerful,thenconcrete).ByS5,thisnecessarybeingexistsintheactualworld.JohnTurri(Turri2011)raisedthefollowingworryaboutRasmussen’sarguments:isthenecessarybeingpowerfulineverypossibleworld,includingtheactualone?Inresponsetothisworry,weconsiderthepropertyofbeingeitheracontingentconcreteparticularoranecessarybeingwithsomecontingentpower.Thisseemstobeanintrinsicpropertythatcouldbegintobeinstantiated.Consequently,itmustbepossibleforthispropertytobecausedtobegintobeinstantiated.Thus,theremustbesomenecessarybeingwithsomeessentialpowerinsomepossibleworldthatcausesthispropertytobegintobeinstantiatedinthatworld.Thisenablesustoinfer(inS5)theactualexistenceofanecessarybeingwithessentialpowers.AnotherworryaboutRasmussen’sargumentconcernshisassumptionthatthepropertyofbeingacontingentparticularapropertythatisonlycontingentlyinstantiated,oronethatcouldbegintobeinstantiated.Supposethatthepastisinfinitelylong,andthattherealwayshaveexistedcontingentlyexistingparticulars.Wemightarguethat,underthoseassumptions,itismetaphysicallynecessarythatthepropertybeinstantiated,andmetaphysicallyimpossiblethatitshouldbegintobeinstantiated.ThiswouldfollowifweacceptedsomethinglikeSydneyShoemaker’sBranchPrinciple(Shoemaker1980):

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BranchPrinciple:Foreverypossibleworldw,thereisatimetsuchthatwagreeswiththehistoryoftheactualworldateverytimebeforet.AccordingtotheBranchPrinciple,ifthepasthasalwaysexisted,thenanythingthathasalwaysbeentrueisnecessarilytrue,sinceanypossibleworldmust‘branchoff’fromtheactualworldsomefiniteamountoftimeago.TheBranchPrincipleshouldbeattractivetoAristotelians,sinceitaccordswiththeideathatallmerepossibilitiesaregroundedinthepowersofthingsintheactualworld.F.ObjectionstotheGlobalPrincipleofSufficientReason/CausalPrinciple1.Hume’simaginationargument.DavidHumeprovidesthesourceforanargumentagainstthenecessityofanexceptionlesscausalprinciple:wecanimaginesomeeventoccurringuncaused,andwhateverwecanimagineispossible.However,itisnotatallobviousthatwereallycanimaginesomeeventoccurringwithoutanycauseatall.Istheabsenceoftheimaginationofacausenecessarilytheimaginationofitsabsence?2.Theinconsistencyofasufficientreasonforcontingencies.PetervanInwagen(1983,pp.202-4),JamesRoss(1969,pp.295-304),andWilliamRowe(1975,1984)haveallarguedthatitisinconsistenttoholdboth(i)thattherearecontingentfacts,and(ii)thatthereisasufficientreasonforeverycontingentfact.Thesufficientreasonforthesumtotalofallcontingentfactsmustbeanecessaryfact.Ifthatnecessaryfactistrulyasufficientreasonforanyotherfact,thesecondfactmustalsobenecessary,sincewhateverisnecessitatedbyanecessarytruthmustbenecessaryitself.Hence,thePrincipleofSufficientReasonentailsthatalltruthsarenecessary,andsothereisnothingforthesupposedFirstCausetocause.Thisobjectiondependsontwocrucialassumptions:(1)nonecessarypropositionexplainsacontingentproposition,and(2)nocontingentpropositionexplainsitself.Botharedisputable.First,asAlexanderPrusshaspointedout(Pruss2009),thereisagoodadhominemobjectionto(1):evenifthePSRwerefalse,itwouldstillbeagoodexplanationofthenon-occurrenceofsomeeventtocitethenon-occurrenceofanypossiblecauseofaneventofthatsort.However,giventhefalsityofthePSR,thenon-occurrenceofpossiblecausesdoesnotnecessitatethenon-occurrenceoftheevent.Second,statisticalexplanationsseemfine,eventhoughinthosecasestheexplanansdoesnotnecessitatetheexplanandum.Ifitisverylikelyforaradiumatomtodecay

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inagivenperiodoftime,thenthatfactisaperfectlygoodexplanation(a“sufficientreason”,intherelevantsense)oftheatom’sactualdecay.Inaddition,anyonewhoacceptslibertarianfreedomandwhorejectstherandomnessobjection(theso-calledMindargument)musttaketheagenttobeanon-necessitatingcauseofanyofhisfreeactionsandsomusteitherdeny(1)or(2).Forexample,onecouldtakeafreeactionofacontingentlyexistingbeingtobeaself-explanatoryfact,givenexplanationsfortheexistence,freedom,knowledgeandpoweroftheagent.Thedefenderofthecosmologicalargumentwhorejects(1)mustdenythateveryadequateorsufficientexplanationisacontrastiveexplanation--inthestrongsenseofbeinglogicallyincompatiblewiththeexplanationofanycontraryfact.Indenying(1),oneneednotsupposethateachofthecontrarychoiceswouldhavebeenexplainedbytheverysamefactsastheactualchoicewas.However,eachactualchoicehastobeexplainedbyasetofactualfacts(concerningthebeliefsandvaluesoftheagent)despitetheco-obtainingofcertainotherfactsabouttheagent’sbeliefsandvaluesthatwouldhaveequallywellexplainedthecontrarychoices.3.RestrictingthescopeofthecausalprincipleItispossibletoblockthecosmologicalargumentbyreplacingabroadcausalprinciplewithamuchnarrowerone.Forexample,GrahamOppyhasproposedtheprinciplethatall“non-firstevents”havecauses(Oppy2001).A“non-first”eventisonethatbeganatacertaintimeandwasprecededintimebyotherevents.ApplyingOppy’sprincipleleadstotheconclusionthatthefirstcausesconsistentirelyoffirstevents:eventsthateitherstretchbackinfinitelyfarintothepastorthatoccuratthefirstmomentoftime.Ineithercase,suchfirsteventsarenotlikelytoleadtointerestingtheologicalconclusions.However,Oppy’sproposalstillleavesusvulnerabletotheepistemologicalargumentconsideredabove.HowdoIknowapriorithatmycurrentsetofbeliefsorexperiencesisnotafirstevent?HowdoIknowthattheuniversedidn’tjustbeginamomentago?IfIhavetotakethisseriouslyasarealpossibility,onewhoseprobabilityIcannotjudgetobelow,thenIhaveaneffectivedefeaterforanyclaimtoempiricalknowledge.Here’sanalternativeproposalthatmightbemoresuccessful:alleventswithafinitetemporalboundinthepasthavecauses.Onceagain,however,thisgeneratesskepticalpossibilities:perhapsmypresentmentalstatehasexistedchangelesslyforaninfiniteamountoftime.Athirdpossibility:alleventsthatdonotincludeaninfiniteregressofcauseshaveacause.Thisstillfailstheepistemologicaltest.ForallIcouldknowapriori,my

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presentstateofconsciousnesscouldincludesuchaninfiniteregress:aninfiniteseriesofmentalstates,eachcausedbyandindistinguishablefromitspredecessors.Layingasidetheseepistemologicalconsiderations,theskepticmightsupposethatwehavegoodreasontotakebeginninglesseventswithinfinitedurationtobeplausibleexceptionstoanycausalprinciple,onthegroundsthatitisobviousthatsucheventscouldn’tbecaused.Thereareatleastthreereasonsfordoubtingthis:(a)Pastunboundedandpastboundedintervalsaremathematicallyisomorphic.Givenrelativity,whetheranintervalhasaninfinitedurationornotcanbeframe-relative.It’sunlikelythatsuchframe-relativefeaturescouldhavemetaphysicalimplications.(b)It’snotobviousthatapast-unboundedintervalcouldn’tbeprecededintimebyafurthersetofevents,eachinfinitelyfarinthepast–justasthefinitenaturalnumbersaresucceededbyinfinitelylargenumbersinnon-standardmodelsofarithmetic.(c)It’snotobviousthatcausesmustprecedetheireffectsintime.Bothsimultaneouscausationandcausationbyatemporalentitiesseemspossible.4.CausingthecausingJamesRossobjectedtothecosmologicalargumentonthegroundsthatthecausalprincipleleadstoaninfiniteregress.ThepropositionthatGodcausedtheactualuniverse(U)isacontingentlytruestateofaffairs,callitC(U).So,C(U)needstobecausedbyGod,andthiscausingisafurtherstateofaffairs,C(C(U)).Thisneedstobecaused,adinfinitum.Onemightargue,asIdidin1997,thatC(U)isn’tsomefurtherstateofaffairs,butisjustthesumofGodandtheexistenceoftheuniverse.Or,onemightdenythatitisawhollycontingentstateofaffairs,sinceitseemstoincludeGod’sexistence.ItswhollycontingentpartC*mightnotbedistinctfromE.FollowingThomasAquinas,wemightsupposethatC(U)issimplyidenticaltoUitself,since“theactualityofthecausequacauseistheeffect.”Inaddition,asPrusshasargued(Pruss2009,p.50),theregressmightberealbutnotvicious.C’scausingEisnotacauseofEitself.C’scausingEisnotmorefundamentalcausallyorexplanatorilythanCitself.Thesefurthercausalfactsare‘epiphenomenal’,notpartofthecausalexplanationoftheevent.Finally,wecouldidentifyGod’scausingtheuniversewithGod’scausalactivity,whichisidenticaltoGodhimself,anecessarybeing.Tothinkthatthismakestheuniverseitselfnecessaryistocommitthedere/dedictofallacy.(Pruss2009,51)

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III.TheRegressProblemIfwesupposethatthereissomeversionofaglobalCausalPrincipleorPrincipleofSufficientReasonthatcanbeknowntotrue,thenthenextproblemtofaceisthatoftheRegressProblem:whydoesn’ttheprincipleentailaninfiniteregressofcauses,withnostoppingpoint?Therearetwobasicapproachestosolvingtheproblem:arguingthatinfiniteregressesareimpossible,andarguingthattheywouldbeirrelevant,eveniftheywerepossible.Thesecondstrategyinvolvessomekindofaggregationorconjunctionofallofthewhollycontingentorcausablefactsintoonegiganticwhole.Ifitcanbeshownthatthiswhole,whetherornotitcontainsoneormoreinfiniteregresswithinit,isitselfwhollycontingent(orcausable),thentherelevantPrinciplecanbeappliedtothewhole,resultinginaFirstCausethatisnecessaryanduncausable.I’lllookattwoversionsofthefirststrategy(theKalaamandtheThomisticargument)insectionsAandB,followedbyfourversionsofthesecondstrategy(aggregation,plurallogic,settheoretic,andLeibnizianconjunction).A.TheKalaamArgumentTheKalaamargumentattemptstoruleoutadiachronicinfiniteregressbydemonstratingthatthepastisfinite.Theargumentreceivesitsnamefromthe“Kalaam”traditionofmedievalIslamicphilosophy(includingal-Kindiandal-Ghazzali),butithasrootsinPlato’sTimaeusandinJohnPhiloponus’scritiqueofAristotleinthe5thcenturyA.D.IwillpresentbrieflyaversionoftheargumentinKoons2012,buildingonsomeworkofJoseBenardeteandAlexanderPruss.Let’ssupposeforreductiothatitispossiblethattherebeaninfiniteregressoftemporalperiods,withalatestmemberbutnoearliest.Ifthatregressispossible,thenitshouldalsobepossibletopopulateeachperiodwithatelegraphist,numberedfrom1(thelastinthesequence)toinfinity.Weassigneachtelegraphistauniquetimeforaction:telegraphist1atnoononJanuary1st,1BC,telegraphist2onthesamedateandtimein2BC,andsoon.Eachtelegraphistactsaccordingtothefollowing,simplescript:ifhereceivesasignalonJanuary1stoftheyearprecedinghisassignedyear,thenhesimplytransmitsthatsamesignaltohissuccessoronJanuary1stofhisownyear.Ifhereceivesnosignalonthedayassignedtohispredecessor,thenhetransmitstohissuccessorhisownnumber(‘1’ifheistelegraphist#1,‘2’ifheis#2andsoon).Wecanprove,giventheseassumptions,boththatsometelegraphistmusttransmithisownnumber,andthatnotelegraphistcandoso.Wecanprovethatsometelegraphistmusttransmithisnumbersince,ifnonehasdoneso,thennonebefore#1hasdoneso,andinthatcasetelegraphist#1wouldhavetransmittedhisownnumber.However,ifsometelegraphist,say#n,hastransmittedhisnumber,thenthisentailsthatnotelegraphistwithalargernumberhasdoneso.However,thisis

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impossible,sinceifnotelegraphistwithnumbergreaterthann+1haddoneso,thentelegraphistn+1wouldhave,andsonwouldnothave.Sincewegetacontradictionfromtheassumptions,atleastonemustbefalse.Theonlyassumptionsrequiredarethefollowing(Koons2012):1.Thepossibleexistenceofaninfiniteregressoftemporalperiods.2.Theexistenceofasingletelegraphistwiththerequiredabilitiesanddispositionsispossible,andthistypeofsituationcanbecharacterizedintermsthatareintrinsictoaspatiotemporallyboundedsituation.3.DavidLewis’sPatchworkprinciple:ifacertainspatiotemporalstructureispossible,andacertainevent-structure(characterizedintermsintrinsictoaspatiotemporallyboundedsituation)ispossible,thenitisalsopossibletopopulatethespatiotemporalstructurewithexactcopiesoftheevent-structure.ThePatchworkPrincipleisso-namedbecauseitenablesustoconstructanewpossibleworld(the‘quilt’)fromafinitecollectionofisolatedpossibilities(the‘patches’),givenanadequatespatiotemporalstructure(the‘frame’).ThePPplaysanimportant,arguableindispensable,roleinourknowledgeofunactualizedpossibilities.Assumptions1-3cannotallbetrue,sincetheyjointlyentailtheimpossibleinfinitetelegraphicregressstory.Since2and3arequiteplausible,theweaklinkwouldseemtobe1.Rejecting1entailsthatthepastisfinite,andconsequentlyanydiachronicchainofcausationwouldhavetohaveafirstelement,anuncausedfirstcause.CriticsofthisargumentmustfocusonthePatchworkPrinciple.Asthefirstobjection,onecoulddenythatthePPappliesinthiscase,onthegroundsthatthedescriptionofeachtelegraphistisnottrulyintrinsictotheboundedanddiscretespatio-temporalregionassignedtothattelegraphistinthestory.Forexample,wecouldnotapplythePPtoascenarioinwhicheachtelegraphististhetallesttelegraphistinhistory,resultingintheabsurdconclusionthatinfinitelymanytelegraphistscouldallbethetallesttelegraphistinhistory,sincebeingthetallesttelegraphistinhistoryisnotintrinsictoeachtelegraphist’slife-span.ThisobjectiontotheargumentwouldmakesensefromaHumeanperspective,accordingtowhichthepowersanddispositionsofathingarenotintrinsictothatthingbutinsteaddependuponthewholehistoryoftheworld(includingthepatternsof‘constantsuccession’).Aristotelians,however,cannottakethisobjectionseriously,sincethefundamentalpowersanddispositionsofathingduringaperiodoftimeare,fortheAristotelian,paradigmaticallyintrinsictoitatthattime.

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AsecondobjectionwouldconsistinpointingoutthetensionbetweenthePPandaglobalcausalprinciple.ThePPwouldallowustoputtogetheraseriesofscenarios,noneofwhichisprecededbyanypossiblecauseofit.However,thisobjectioncouldalsobesettledbyweakeningthePatchworkPrincipleinordertomakeitconsistentwithaglobalcausalprinciple.TherevisedPPwouldaddtheprovisothateachsituation(asdescribed)haveanadequatecauseinthehypothesizedstory.ThisrevisedPPwouldstillbeadequateforthereductionofassumption1,sinceitwouldbeeasyenoughtoaddtotheinfiniteregressstoryanadequatecausalexplanationfortheexistenceandpowersofeachofthetelegraphist.ThethirdobjectioninvolvesanappealtoShoemaker’sBranchPrinciple(mentionedabove).IfweaccepttheBranchPrinciple,thenanyapplicationofthePatchworkPrinciplemustbeboundedinthepast:theremustbesometimeinthepastsuchthat,atallearliertimes,thepossibleworldagreeswiththeactualworld.Undertheseconstraints,wehavegroundsforrejectingthepossibilityoftheinfiniteregresswhileacknowledgingnotonlythepossibilitybuttheactualityofaninfinitepast.Moreover,theBranchPrincipleisattractive,fromanAristotelianperspective,sinceitgroundsallpossibilityintheactualpowers(atsometimeinthepast)ofactualsubstances.ThereareseveralresponsestothisBranch-PrincipleobjectionavailabletothedefendersoftheKalaamargument.1.First,ifwecombinetheBranchPrinciplewithaninfinitepast,thenwemustdenythecontingencyofanyofthefeaturesoftheworldthatarenecessarilyconservedfromonemomenttothenext,suchastheexactquantityofmass-energyorcharge,ortheexactnumberofbaryons.2.LeadstoanA-theoryoftime,whichsupportsanewargument(seenextsection).3.Requiresanexplanationoftheperpetuationoftimethroughaninfinitepast:Aquinas’sThirdWay(Maimonides).B.Aquinas’sAppealtoPerSeCausationWhycouldn’ttherebeaninfiniteregressofcauses?Again,wemustrememberthatAquinasisdenyingtheexistenceofaninfinitechainofessentialcauses,notofmerelyaccidentalones.Aquinaswouldarguethatachainofcausesgoingbackwardintimecouldbeinfinite,sinceitwouldbeachainofmerelyaccidentalcauses.TherealcauseoftheexistenceofeachthinginthechainwouldbethetimelessGod:thepreviousmembersofthechainwouldbemerelyinstrumentsusedbyGod.Aquinasclarifieswhathemeansherebymeansofhishammerillustration.Considerashoemakerwhohasmadeapairofshoes.Theshoemakerandhiscraftistheessentialefficientcauseoftheexistenceofthepairofshoes.Let’ssupposethattheuseofahammerisanindispensablepartoftheshoemaker’scraft.Thenthe

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involvementofatleastonehammerwouldbepartoftheessentialcause.However,thenumberofhammerswouldnotbe.Supposethattheshoemakerusedseveralhammersinmakingthispair,becausethefirsthammerworeout,thesecondwaslost,thethirdborrowedbyaneighbor,andsoon.Thenumberofhammersinvolvedmakesnodifferencetotheoriginoftheshoes.Similarly,thenumberofancestorsthatapersonhasisonlyanaccidentalfeatureofhiscause,sincehumanparentsareonlyinstrumentsGodusesincausingtheexistenceofparticularmen.Godcouldhavecreatedaninfinitelyolduniverse,usinginfinitelymanyancestorsasinstrumentsinthecreationofeachhumanbeingwithoutviolatingtheprincipleinpremise7,sincethechainofessentialcausationwouldineachcaseterminateinGod.Supposetheskepticbelievesthatmypresentexistenceisessentiallycausedbymyownpastexistence,and,moreremotely,bythepastexistenceofmyancestors.Inthiscase,Aquinaswoulddenythatthecausalchaincouldbeinfinite,evenifitdoesgobackintime.Thus,theimportantdistinctionisbetweenessentialcausationandaccidentalcausation,notbetweensimultaneouscausationandcausationthroughtime.Aquinasassumesthatcausationthroughtimeisalwaysaccidentalcausation,sincehecan’tacceptthatapasteventcouldbetheessentialcauseofapresentevent(likemypresentexistence).However,ifaskepticdeniesthisandarguesthatwedoreceiveourpresentexistencefromthepast(byakindof“inertiaofexistence”principle:whateverexiststendstogoonexisting),thenAquinaswilldenythatthischainofexistence-receptionscangobacktoinfinity,againbecausesuchachainwouldfailtoexplainwhyanythinginthechain(andthechainasawhole)hascometoexist.TheSecondWayarguesthattheremustbeanfirstcausewhoseessenceisexistence,onthegroundsthateveryfinitething(thingwhoseessenceisnotidenticaltoexistenceitself)hasapersecause,andnopersecausalregresscanbeinfinite.Apersecausalseriescannotbeinfinite,sincethiswouldentailthattheessenceofeachmemberoftheseriesisinfinitelydeepandsounintelligible.Whyarepersecausesneededatall?Otherwise,theexistenceofathingwouldbeunintelligible.So,atacitappealtoaversionofthePSR.Thesecondway:focusonthecauseoftheexistenceofsubstances.Toexist,asubstancemustbeactive.Asubstancethatisn’tpureact,purebeing,isnotself-sufficient.Itrequiresexternalfactorstoenableittoperpetuateitself.Thesefactorsmustbeincorporatedintoitsdefinitions.Definitionsmustbefinite–somustbeafirstcause.(Moscowpaper)Notjusttheperpetuationoftime,buttheperpetuationofenduringexistenceofsubstancesintime.Also,mypaperonMiller’scosmologicalargument.C.TheAggregationMove.(Al-Farabi)

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My1997APQpaper.Theproblemofinfiniteregresssolved:al-Farabi’saggregationprinciple.Theargumentcanbetakeneithersynchronically(simultaneouscausation)ortimelessly(thereisatimelesscauseoftheexistenceoftheentireBlockUniverseofB-Theory).Avariant(suggestedbyPruss,2009,p.62):limittheprincipletowhollycontingent,whollypositivestatesofaffairs.Taxicab:distinctionbetweennecessaryandwhollycontingent.Theoryaboutcausalpriority:asymmetrictokennecessitation.Extrapolation.ThreereasonsforASN.RealismRegained,pp.116-7.(i)Originsessentialism,(ii)Probabilisticscreeningoff(Salmon1984,Suppes1984,PearlandVerma1992,Spirtesetal.1993),(iii)fixityofpastvs.opennessoffuture.WesleySalmon,1984.PatrickSuppes,1984.JudeaPearlandT.S.Verma,1991.P.Spirtes,C.Glymour,andR.Scheines,1993.Generalizingtonecessarystatesofaffairs.xismorefundamentallynecessarythanyiffthenecessityofydependsonthenecessityofx.Aquinas’sargument(inThirdWay)forthinkingthattherecannotbeaninfiniteregressofsuchdependencies.Givesussomethingthatisindependentlynecessary,necessaryofitself.Supposeforcontradictionthatthereweresuchaninfiniteregressofaccidentallynecessarybeings.Tobeaccidentallynecessary,itmustbethecasethat,perimpossibile,ifthebeing’scausehadbeenabsent,itwouldnothavebeennecessaryitself(it,too,couldhavefailedtoexist).Ifso,itseemsobviousthattheexistenceofthewholeregressmustthenbecontingent,sincewecanconceiveofeachbeingasnotexistingbecausewearesimultaneouslyconceivingofitscauseasalsonotexisting.Butifthewholeseriesiscontingent,theneachmemberoftheseriesmust

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becontingent.Thiscontradictsourassumptionthateachwas(accidentally)necessary.So,suchaninfiniteregressofaccidentalnecessitymustbeimpossible.Ifso,anyaccidentallynecessarybeingmustderiveitsnecessityultimatelyfromsomebeingthatisnecessaryinitself.D.PluralizingtheArgumentAvoidingmereologicaluniversalismE.Meyer’sSet-TheoreticArgumentRobertK.Meyer(1987).CPforchains:ifSisacausalchainofcontingentitems,thenthereisacauseofeveryiteminthechain.Assumethatcausationistransitiveandirreflexive.Meyer’sTheorem:AssumeCPforChains,andthatcausationistransitiveandirreflexive,andassumethatAxiomofChoice.SupposethatthereisasetUofallitems.Then,foranycontingentiteme,thereisanecessarybeingGsuchthatGcausese.F.LeibnizianConjunctionSimpleversion1.Everycontingentfacthasanexplanation2.Thereisacontingentfactthatincludesallothercontingentfacts.3.Therefore,thereisanexplanationofthisfact.4.Theexplanationmustinvolveanecessarybeing.5.ThisnecessarybeingisGod.Whyrestrictittocontingenttruths?Wedon’tunderstandwellhownecessarytruthscanbeexplained.Byderivationfromaxioms?Butwhataboutalternateaxiomatizations?Whatwouldmakecertainnecessarytruthsobjectivelyaxiomatic?Whynotrestrictittotruthsthatarepossibleexplainable?Onemightarguethatallinexplicabletruthsarenecessary(thetruthsthatarenecessaryperse),butnotviceversa.CanweformtheBigConjunctiveContingentFact?Worriesaboutsettheory,raisedbyDaveyandClifton(2001).

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Letpbetheconjunctionofalltruepropositionsthatdonotcontainthemselvesaspropersub-formulae.Letqbethepropositionthatpistrue.Isqasub-formulaofp?Eitherwayacontradictionensues.Pruss’sRestrictedPSR.Everypropositionthatcanhaveanexplanationdoeshaveanexplanation.Atechnicalassumption:(1)ThereisasetQofkindssuchthat:(a)fornoxdoesx’sbeingofK,whereKisinQ,dependonanythingwithessentialorigins,and(b)everycontingentobjectxisamemberofatleastonekindfromQ.(p.64)LetpbethepropositionthatatleastoneofthekindsinQhasatleastonecontingentlyexistingmember.Thisclearlycanhaveanexplanation:theexistenceofsomethingofanaturalkindnotinQthatcausestheexistenceofsomememberofQ.Assumethatthekindsarenaturalkinds:thatnomemberofakindisamemberofthatkindasaresultofitsowncausalactivity.G.IsaFirstCausecompatiblewiththepossibilityofaninfiniteregress?Tensionbetweenafirstcauseandthepossibilityofaninfinitecausalregress.Howcanthefirstcausecausetheentireregress?ThiswouldseemtorequiremassivecausalOverdetermination,asIargueinRR.Options:(1)thefirstcauseargumentdoesgiveusreason(afterall)torejectthepossibilityofinfiniteregresses,(2)thefirstcausesomehowcausestheexistenceoftheentire,causallyandtemporallystructuredwhole,bymeansofsomekindofholistichigher-ordercausation,(3)thefirstcausecauseseachmemberoftheseriestocauseitssuccessor(bymeansofanatomistichigher-ordercausation).Option(3)seemsproblematic,sinceitdoesn’tmakeclearhowthefirstcausecanbeatotalcauseofthewholeregress,asopposedtoamerelypartialcauseofeachlink.Twoseemspromising,ifonecanimportsomesortofAristoteliandistinctionbetweenperseandperaccidenscausation:thelinksintheregressareeachperaccidenscausesoftheirsuccessors,butonlytheFirstCauseisapersecauseofeachmember.Onemightusesomenotionofinstrumentalityhere:theFCcreateseachmemberoftheregress,usingtheinfinitelylargeclassofpredecessorsasaninstrumentalcause.It’sstillhardtoseehowthisworks–inwhatsenseistheinstrumentalcauseacauseatall?Perhapsinthesenseofasinequanon–anecessarycontextwithinwhichGod’screativeactoccurs?IV.FirstCauseArgumentswithoutaGlobalPrincipleofCausalExplanationA.ThePerpetuationofTime(Aquinas’sFirstWay)ThefirstwayandtheAtheory.Acauseoftheperpetuationoftimeitself.

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Hypothesisofinertiaofmovementorofexistencedoesnotsolvetheproblem.Inertiapresupposestheperpetuationoftime–itcannotexplainit.Noactionoveratemporalgap.AnAristotelianargumentforA-Theory.Movingspotlightorfallingbranchespicture.A-Theoryimpliesthepurepassageoftime.Hence,therearerealeventsconstitutingthearrivalofeachnewmoment.Ifeveryeventmusthaveacause,somusttheseevents.(Theyarecontingentsinceonlyonecanbeactualatonce–eachwasmerelypotentialinadvance.)Thecauseofthearrivalofthepresentcannotbe‘intime’:itcannotactaccordingtosometime-parameterizedlawofnature.Inaddition,thecauseoftheactualizationoftimetcannotoccuratanytimeotherthant(doingsowouldinvolveactionatacausaldistance–andbesides,nothingexistingatthosetimescanbeactualatt).Norcanitcomeintoexistenceatt,withoutgeneratinganinfiniteregress.Itmustbetimeless,anditsmodeofcausationmustbenon-physical,non-mechanical.Somethinglikeanintentionalvolition.Thecausemustbenotonlyunchangingbutabsolutelyunchangeable.Pureact.B.ANeo-PlatonicargumentfromtheUnityoftheWorldAssumeaB-theory.Whatunifiestheworld’sspatiotemporalstructure?Theproblemofthecoordinationofrelations.Spacetimeconsistsofmorethantwoentities.IfAandBarespatiotemporallyrelated,andBandCarespatiotemporallyrelated,thenAandCmustalsobe.Whatcouldtheexplanationofthiscoordinationbe?Trianglelaw:thedistancebetweenanytwoeventsmustbelessthanthesumofthedistancesoftheothertwopairs.Whydoesitneedanexplanation?Massiveunexplainedcoincidence.B-theory.Theproblemoftheunityofthespatiotemporaldomain.APlotinianargument:requiresanon-spatiotemporal,spatiallyandtemporallysimpleentity.Whatcouldthemodeofcausationbe?Somethinglikeintention.Needtheexplanationbecausalatall?C.Maimonides’sArgument(Aquinas’sThirdWay)Supposethereisaninfiniteperaccidensregress,andeachthingintheserieshasnopersecause.Now,justastherecanbenoperseinfinitecausalregress,therealsocannotbeaperseinfinitecausalprogress.Thatis,itcannotbethecasethateachthingissuchthatitessentiallyhasacertaineffect,andthateffectessentiallyhasafurthereffect,andsoonadinfinitum.Suchaninfiniteprogresswouldalsorequire

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eachthingtohaveanessencethat’sinfinitelydeepandsounintelligible.Thus,intheworldwe’reimagining,noeffecthasanycauseessentially,andnocausehasanyeffectessentially.Allofthecausalconnectionsareaccidentalinbothdirections.(Let’scallthisadoublyaccidentalseries.)ThisiswheretheThirdWaycomesinagain.Therearetwocasestoconsider:(A)atsomepointinthecausalregress,wereachacausethatexistsnecessarily,or(B)everycauseintheregressiscontingent.a.Whymusttherebeanecessarybeing?(WhynotcaseB?)ThefirstpartoftheThirdWayisdesignedtoruleoutcase(B).Everythingthatexists,we’renowassuming,isbothcontingentanddependentonathoroughlyaccidentalinfinitecausalseries.Thereis,byhypothesis,noexplanationofwhyallofthecausesinthatseriesweresuccessfulintheactualworldinproducingtheireffects.Itis,therefore,aninfinitelylargecoincidencethateachserieshasreacheditscurrentposition.MaimonidesandAquinasmakethispointbymeansofaveryvividpicture:theysuggestthatatsomepointintheinfinitepastitisverylikelythatallcausallineswouldhave‘peteredout’simultaneously,resultinginanemptyworldfromwhichtherecouldbenorecovery.Asmanycriticshavepointedout,thisseemstocommitthefallacyofcomposition:ifit’spossibleforeachthingtoceasetoexist,thenit’salsopossibleforallofthemtoceasetoexistsimultaneously.However,argumentdoesn’tdependonthisextremehypothesis.AllthatAquinasneededtopointoutwastheinfinitelylargecoincidenceinvolvedintheeternal,accidentalperpetuationofeachdoublyaccidentalcausalseries,takenindividually.WhenwereconstructtheMaimonides/Aquinasargumentintermsofmodernprobabilitytheory,theargumentdoesrequiretwoadditionalassumptions:(i)thattherehavebeen(throughouthistory)onlyfinitelymanycausalchains,and(ii)thattherebeafinite,nonzeroprobabilityforeachchaintoexpireateachlink,withtheprobabilityofexpirationofanylinkbeingindependentoftheprobabilitiesofexpirationforanyofthelaterlinks.Iftherehadbeenaninfinitenumberofchains,thentheremightbeafinite,non-zeroprobabilitythatafinitenumberofcausalchainssurviveaninfiniteseriesofopportunitiestoexpire.Thiswouldalsobethecaseofallbutfinitelymanyofthelinksinthechainhadeitherazeroorinfinitesimalchanceofnotoccurring.Formally,hereistheargument:1.Necessarily,anyinfinitecausalchainiscontingentinbothdirections(fromcausetoeffectandeffecttocause).2.Necessarily,ifaninfinitecausalchainiscontingentinthecause-to-effectdirection,thenthereis,foreachlinkinthechainafinite,nonzeroprobabilityofthecause’sfailingtoproducetheeffect,andtheseprobabilitiesaremutuallyindependent.

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3.Thesetofallinfinitecausalchainsthathaveeverexistedinthehistoryoftheworldisfiniteinnumber.Therefore,theprobabilityoftheexistenceatanytimeofanyinfinitecausalchainthatiscontingentineitherdirectioniseitherzeroorinfinitelyclosetozero.ItmightbethoughtthatAristotelianslikeMaimonidesandAquinaswouldhaveanargumentforpremise3,giventheirrejectionofthepossibilityofactualinfinities.However,thefalsityofpremise3wouldnotrequirethatinfinitelymanychainsshouldexistatanyonetime.Imagine,forexample,aworldinwhichthenumberofchainsincreasesexponentiallyastimerecedesintothepast.Insuchaworld,thenumberofchainsthatexistatsometimeorotherisinfinite,eventhoughtherearenevermorethanafinitenumberinexistence.Moreover,evenifweassumethattheuniversehasafiniteboundonitssize,thiswouldnotentailafiniteboundonthenumberofsimultaneouscausalchainsunlesstherewasalsoafiniteboundonthesmallestpossiblesizeforacausalagent.Wecould,forexample,imagineaworldoffixedandfinitesize,inwhichthecausalagentsgetsmallerandsmallerthefartherbackintimeonegoes.So,premise3willhavetostandasanindependentassumptionoftheproof,andapotentialweakpoint.V.FromFirstCausetoGodSecondstage:discussGellman,O’Connor,Kretzmann(MetaphysicsofTheism)Aquinas’sargumentfromdivinesimplicity.ToprovethatGodhasall‘perfections’,Aquinasmustassumethatanyperfectioninaneffectmustbepresentinthecause,eitheraccordingtothesamenature,orina‘moreeminentmode’.(I.4.2)Howtoprovethis?Ifweacceptit,andifwesupposethattheFirstCauseisthefirstcauseofallcontingentbeingsinallpossibleworlds,itfollowsthatGodhasallpossibleperfectionsessentially.Argumentforonenessandomnipotence.NisacreatorinwiffNisanecessarybeingthatexplainsallthecontingenttruthsofw.Iterativeprinciple:ifxhasthepowertogainthepowertodoA,thenxalreadyhasthepowertodoA.FromIP,itfollowsthatifNisacreatorinanyworld,thenallofN’spowersareessentialtoit.

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GellmanprovesthatifN1isacreatorinworldw1,andN2inworldw2,thenN1=N2.Pruss’sargument(p.71-2):“Whatexplainsinw1,wemayask,whyitisthatN2exercisednoneofitspowerstopreventN1fromengaginginthekindofactivityitengagesininw1?ItmustbethattheexplanationliesintheexerciseofsomepowerPbyN1inw1.ButthenN1alsohadthispowerinw2anddidnotexerciseit,anditsfailuretoexerciseitmustbeexplainedbyN2’sexerciseofsomepreventativepowerQ.ButQisoneofthepowersthatenablesN2topreventsomethingN1doesinw1,andsoPincludesthepowertopreventN2fromexercisingQ.Repeatingtheargumentwiththetwoentitiesandworldsswapped,weconcludethateachofN1andN2hasthepowertopreventtheotherfromitspreventingtheother.Butthatis,surely,absurd!”Thomisticargumentfromsimplicity.1.Ifxisanactuallyexistingconcretum,thenthereisanactuallytruepropositionpofsuchaformthatpisthepropositionthatxactuallyexists(anactualexistencepropositionforx).2.Ifxisanactuallyexistingconcretumotherthananactofpureexistence,thenx’sactualexistencepropositionisnotmadetruesimplybyxbutbysomethingcontainingaconcretumthatisontologicallypriortox.3.Ontologicalpriorityistransitiveandwell-founded.4.Hence,thetruthmakerforeveryactualexistencepropositioncontainsanactofpureexistence.5.Necessarily,anytwoactsofpureexistenceareidentical.6.Necessarily,thereactuallyexistsatleastoneconcretum.7.Therefore,thereisauniqueactofpureexistencethatexistsnecessarily.Callthisact“God”.8.Definition:xisapersecauseofyiffthetruthmakerfory’sactualexistencepropositioncontainsx,xisontologicallypriortoy,andxisaconcretum.9.Anactofpureexistenceisaconcretum.10.Therefore,Godisnecessarilythecauseofeveryotherconcretum.

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Mostcriticalassumptionsare2and3.Ifxisnotanactofpureexistence,thentheactualexistencepropositionforxiscomposite,containingboththeconceptofthenatureofxandaconceptsignifyingactualexistence.Suchapropositionrequiresacompositetruthmaker,onecontainingsometiebetweenthenatureofxandanactofexistence.Thistiecanbeeitherdirectorindirect.Ineithercase,somepureactofexistencewillbetheultimatecauseofx’sexistence:anontologicallynecessaryandpriorconditionofx’sactualexistence.Absoluteexistencehascertainpropertiesbydefault,intheabsenceofasufficientreasontothecontrary.Thesemustbethepositiveproperties,thoseunderlyingactivepowers,iftheabsolutelyexistingthingistobepotentiallyactive.Definesimplypositiveandsimplynegativeproperties.IfUisuniversal,thentheinstantiationofUisasimplypositiveproperty,andthenon-instantiationofUissimplynegative.Theconjunctionordisjunction(includinginfiniteconjunctionsanddisjunctions)ofsimplypositivepropertiesissimplypositive,andsimilarlyforsimplynegativeproperties.Thepartialexistentialgeneralizationofasimplypositiverelationissimplypositive,asistheuniversalgeneralizationofasimplypositiverelation.Similarlyfornegativerelations.Relationalpropertiesofindividualsthatarefoundedonsimplypositiverelationsaresimplypositive,andsimilarlyfornegativerelationalproperties.Thepossibilificationandnecessitationofasimplypositivepropertyissimplypositive,andsimilarlyfornegativeproperties.Thenegationofasimplypositivepropertyissimplynegative,andthenegationofasimplynegativepropertyissimplypositive.Apropertyispurelypositiveifandonlyifexemplifyingitdoesnotentail(eitherstrictlyorbydefault)exemplifyinganysimplynegativeproperty.Apropertythatisnotpurelypositiveisimplicitlynegative.Claim:existenceispurelypositive.Definition:xexiststoagreaterdegreethanyiffx’sessenceincludesstrictlymorepurelypositivepropertiesthandoesy’s.Claim:ifx’sessenceistoexist,thenxexiststoamaximumdegree(toagreaterdegreethananypossiblethingdistinctfromx).

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Theessenceofsuchathingmusteitherexisttoamaximumortoaminimumdegree.Itcan’texisttoaminimumdegree,sinceinthatcaseitwouldbepowerless.Consequently,theessenceofsuchathingmustincludeeverypurelypositiveproperty.BibliographyAquinas,St.Thomas(1964),SummaTheologica(NewYork:McGraw-Hill).Clarke,Samuel(1803),ADiscourseConcerningtheBeingandAttributesofGod,the

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