The F111 in SE Asia Pt1

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R iPORT

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The ] 111 in Southeast AsiaSepteolber 1972 January 1973

21 Feb. 1974

HQP C F

Directorate of Operations AnalysisCHECO/CORONA Harvest Division

Prepared by:HQIP ACAFIXOAD

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The F -111 in Southeast AsiaISBN 0-923135-56-1

Repriuted byDalley Book Service

90 Kimball aneChristiansburg, VA 24073United States of America

703) 382-8949

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UNCLASSIFIEDDEP RTMENT O F THE IR FORCE

I ~ E A D O U A R T E R SPACIFIC AIR , . O R e E S

A P O S A N F R A N C I S C O e e S 5

PROJECT CHECO REPORTS

The counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare environment ofSoutheast Asia has resulted in USAF airpower being employed to meet amultitude of r e q u i r e m ~ n t sThese varied applications have involved thefull spectrum of USAF aerospace vehicles, s u p p o ~ tequipment, and manpower.As a resul t , operaticlnal data and experiences have accumulated which shouldbe collected, documented, and analyzed for current and future impact uponUSAF pol i c i es , c o n c e ~ l t sand doctrine.

Fortunately, thE value of collecting and documenting our SEA experiences was recognizild a t an early date. In 1962, Hq USAF directedCINCPACAF to establi ;h an act iv i ty which would provide timely and analyt i ca l studies' of USAF combat operations in SEA and would be primarilyresponsive to Air St,lff requirements and direction.

Project CHECO, iln acronym for Contemporary Historical Examinationof Current Operations, was established to meet the Air Staff directive.Based on the policy guidance of the Office of Air Force History andmanaged by IIq PACAF, with elements in Southeast Asia, Project CHECOprovides a scholarly on-going historical examination, documentation,and reporting on USAF pol1cies, concepts, and doctrine in PACOM ThisCHECO report is part of the overall documentation and examination whichis being acconlp11shed. t is an authentic source for an assessment ofthe effectiveness of USAF airpower in PACOM when used in proper context.The reader must v i e ~ 1the study in relat ion to the events' and circumstancesa t the time of i t s preparation--recognizing that i t was prepared on acontemporary basis ~ h i c hres t r ic ted perspective and that the author 'sresearch was limited to records available within his local headquartersarea.

~ I £/ L A ~ROBERT E. HILLERChief. Operations AI1alysisDCS/Plans and Operations

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LIST OF FIGURES •

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

UNCL SSIFIED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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• • •

FOREWORD • • • • •

CHAPTER I PACAF CONCEPT FOR F 111 OPERATIONS

CHAPTER I I. DEPLOYMENT ' • •

A Deployment Preparation •

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1. Nellis AFB Nevada • • • • •2. Takh1i RTAFB Thailand • •

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3. Target Preparation and Selection • • • • • •B Dep1oyment • • • • • • • •

CHAPTER II 1. O P E R AT I O N S •• • • • •

A Init ial Operations and First Loss • •B. Suspension of Operations • • • • • • •C. Resumption of Operations

~ Loss 2•

E. Reappraisal of Operations • • • •

F. Cessation of Strikes in Northern NVIl • • • • •1. Air Defense Activities Preceding the Bombing Halt •2. Shift to Route Package I and Laos • • • •

G. LINEBACKER II • • • • • • •H Pre-Ceasefire • • •

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Special Orderins Service: New Books

m n l l p ~ o o ki eruice

90 Kimball LaneChristiansburg, Va. 24073

703·382-8949

Search Service: OutoQ ·PrintBooks

PRINTING NOTE

Used Books Bousht and Sold

For r e a s o n s o f N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y, pages 26 27 38 39 40and 41 rema in c l a s s i f i e d .

George W. D a l l e y, P r e s i d e n t o f D a l l e yBook S e r v i c e

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C H I N

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T O N K I N

NORTH VIETNAM

RTrail

0'i:-.. .':;'; =7,;----;i' ,O==,:75 MilE sI _ _\.o 25 5 is KIlometers

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PageCHAPTER IV. ANALYSIS OF LOSSES . . . 38

. Possible Contributing Factors39

B. Losses . • 46C. Conclusion 54

CHAPTER V. EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS . • 56A. Sumnary of Operations 56B. Operational Factors 58• •C. Destruction, Harassment Presence 60D. Logistics and r1aintenance . . . . 61E. Abi lity to Perform in Intended Role 63

APPENDICES

l Ilorth Vietnam Operating Areas 662. Laos Operati ng Areas 67FOOTNOTES 68GLOSSARY

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UNCLASSIFIED

LIST OF FIGURES

figure No.

1. F l l l in SE x i i

2. Scheduled Oeployment/RedeploymentSummary 49th and7 th T Ws . ' • • • • • 6

3. Actual Deployment/Redeployment Summary 49th and 474thT Ws • • 20

4. Reaction Time Remaining f System Failure Occurs During

Letdown • • • • • • • • 455. Targets of Lost F lllAs • .... ..... 8

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BOUT THE UTHORS

This report was written as a special project by the personnel of the

CltECO/CORONA H RVEST l ivision, DCS/Plans and Operations, Uq PACAF. The

primary authors were Colonel A. A. Picinich, Division Chief who also

in i t ia ted the report and supervised i t s preparation , and Captains J . C.

ethea R. F. Burnham, J r. , T. D. DesBrisay and K. C. Simonin. Captain

D. T. Radzykewycz served as project coordinator and editor.

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CONFIDENTI L

FOREWORD

Ie The F-lll saw service twice in Southeast ASia. Its f irst limited

use in combat occurred in 1968 but the aircraft was w i t h d r ~ nfrom SE

that same year. Yet the F-lll possessed capabilities that were considered

Significant in the military and political situation which evolved following

the massive North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam in the Spring of

1972. To capitalize upon these capabilities the aircraft was reintroduced

into the theater of operations. This report discusses the reintroduction

of the F-lll into SEA, analyzes its operations and effectiveness and

examines i ts losses.

xi

CONFIDENTI L

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CHAPTEr. I

PIICAF CONCEPTFOR F 111 OPERATIONS

(S) The concept of operations developed in 1972 for the combat

employment of the F-lll weapon system in Southeast Asia SEA) was designed

to take full advantage )f the capabilities of the F-lll in the night,

adverse weather strike role. Historical ly, the North Vietnamese NVN*)

had used the hours of darkness and periods of inclement weather to move

units into positions for an attack, to resupply and regroup, and to rein-

. force their lines of communication LOCs) because of the limits in tacticalair TAC AIR) capabilities to continuously engage the enemy. Because of

i ts range, weapon load, navigational precision, and weapons delivery accu

racy, the F-lll was planned to complement other SEA strike aircraft in1 .providing an expanded spectrum of tactica air capability.

S) I t was envisiclned that the F-lll in SEA operations would assist

in reducing the V wa, -supporti ng capabil ity by conducti nq sustai ned

deep interdiction combilt operations. The aircraft s radius of action

and terrain following radar TFR) provided the capability for a low

altitude approach to e lther a fixed or time-sensitive target.

S) As delineated in the PACAF concept, the F-lll would be selectively

committed against only high priority radar-significant targets.** Its uti l i

zation was postulated as an independent weapon system. I t would be used

at very low altitudes, 200-1,000 feet above ground level AGL), depending

*llVN--used for both Ilorth Vietnam and lIorth Vietnamese.

**Although included in the concept, the actual early deployment deviatedfrom this plan. See p. 13 ff, below.

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on terrain and defenses, on single aircraft penetrations into high threat

areas of INN. Flight profiles were structured to maximize the element

of surprise dnd to ensure the highest possible degree of aircraft and

crew survivabi'lity. Accordin


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mi 1 tary power except when 1 mited by munitions carriage and release restric

tions. (The mil itary power setting would be used to avoid the highly vis

ible afterburner plume which resulted when maximum power was used.) Egressfrom the t r ~ e tarea was also to be at full nlil itary power and at the selected

TFR altitude.

(5) When configured with low-drag weapons, a change in tactics was

planned in that a stabilized climb would be used in the weapons release

maneuver. This mode M munition delivery was required to ensure safe

separation time and clearance from the bomb fragmentation envelope. As

in high-drag munition tactics, the approach to the target was to be flown

on TFR at 200-500 feet AGL. However, at 15-20 seconds prior to the com

puted weapons release time the aircraft was maneuvered to a 10-degree

stabilizer climb with bomb release initiated by the Ballistic Computer Unit.

After the aircraft was established on the desired egress track, military

power was to be used and the TFR was to 'be engaged.

(5) The primary weapons load for F-lll operations in SEA was con

ceived as: (1) 12 MK 82 bombs with either retarded (preferred) or conical

fins, or (2) four MK 84 bombs. (The F-lllA was certified to carry both

the MK 82 and MK 84 bomb.) The maximum load envisioned for combat opera

tions was 24 MK-82si however, that load seriously degraded aircraft man

euverability and range characteristics due to an increased drag index

and a consequent reduction in obtainable military power airspeed. Theairspeed limitation could be overcome by the use of the afterburner, but

this in turn would reduce the desired element of surprise and would increase

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s u s c e p ti b i l i t y to damage or lo ss from enemy d e fe n se s . In co rp o ra tin g a requ irem ent fo r a f te rb u rn e r use on a r1anned b a s is would a ls o r e s t r i c t the range c a p a b i l i ty o f the a i r c r a f t Furtherm ore in o rd e r to c a r ry

the m axim um bomb lo ad a reduced i n i ti a l fuel load would be necessary to meet ta k e o f f gross w eight l im i t a t i o n s . These f a c to r s a l s o impacted on th e o b ta in a b le unrefue1ed rad iu s o f a c t io n .

S) The m ission p r o f i l e s p,lanned fo r F-111 use from T akhli RoyalThai A ir Force Base RTAFB) enabled th e F-111 to s t r i k e a ll t a rg e t a r e a s o f North Vietnam w ithout a i r r e f u e l in g . The p r o f i l e s were h igh-low -h igh w ith d e scen t to low leve l TFR timed to perm i

t th e a i r c r a f t to remain below t h r e a t ra d a r coverage and to minimize th e r i s k o f encou n terin g a irb o rn e enemy i n t e r c e p t o r s . The low -level p o rtio n s o f the p r o f i l e s . were ro u ted through mountainous a re a s whenever p o ss ib le to tak e advantage o f t e rr a i n masking to conceal ex ac t f l ig h t ro u tin g and a c tu a l t a rg e t a r e a s . Sample p r o f i l e s g e n e ra lly route d the a i r c r a f t th rough no rth ern Laos w ith planned d escen t to TFR a l ti tu d e s vary ing from the T hailand/L aos border fo r c lo s e t a r g e t s to th e Laos/NVN border fo r deep t a r g e t s Egress ro u te s were gene r a l ly planned to p reven t ex ten s iv e t r a v e r s in g o f th e high t h re a t ed R iver d e l t a a r e a and t e r r a i n masking was to be e x p lo ite d both p r io r to and fo llo wing weapons r e l e a s e . E xceptions to th e se procedures were l im ite d to those in s ta n c e s in which c o a s ta l t a r g e t s were to be s tru c k and t was deemed

4 advantageous to e i t h e r e n te r o r e x i t over th e G ulf o f Tonkin GOT).

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CHAPTER I I

DEPLOYI IEtlT

A. S) U) Deployment_Preparation

S) The introduction of the F lll added a new capability to the USAF

air interdiction campaign, night/all-weather operations. Around-the-clock

pressure against [lorth Vietnam was nOli possible. The F lll had the ability

to penetrate to the Vrr heartland without using tankers or any other support

aircraft. Ilighly sophisticated avionics packages, such as terrain following

radar and terrain mapping attack radar, made low altitude/high speed ingress

to the target area possible and provided autor:latic bomb release without visual

acquisition of the target.

S) Takhli RTAFB was selected as the beddown base for the F lll . The

474th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) from flellis AFB, Nevada, was designated to

deploy two squadrons of 24 F-l11 aircraft each to Takh1i. Coinciding with

the arrival of the 474th, the 49th TFW with i ts 72 F-4s), then at Takh1i,was to return to Holloman AFB. New Mexico. This deployment/redeployment,

nicknamed CONSTANTGUARD V, was carried out simultaneously to minimize

disruption of combat operations in SEA. To ensure an orderly switchover5

at Takh1i. preparations were initiated well in advance of the move.

1. S) U) Nellis AFB, Nevada

S) Preparation for the CONSTANTGUARD V deployment began at

Nellis AFB approximately 30 days prior to the move. For deployment per

sonnel these preparations included indoctrination briefings conducted by

PACAF and 474th TFW intelligence personnel on a myriad of subjects. Air

crews were briefed on Rules of Engagement for all countries in SEA with

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~ p a r t i c u l a r emphasis on NVN, which would be th e F - ll l s major area o f respons i b i li t y . [nelllY t h r e a t and c a p a b i l i t i e s were a ls o b r i e f e d , v i z . , th e NVN A ir Order o f I la t t l e AOIl), S u rfa c e - to -A ir M iss ile SAM) t h r e a t , and A n ti

a i r c r a f t A r t i l l e ry AAA) th r e a t. nemy DB b r ie f in g s inc luded MIG s t r e n g th and l o c a t io n , a i r defense ground ra d a r , and MIG warning pro cedu res. Both the SAM and MA t h r e a t b r i e f in g s covered lo c a t io n , s i z e , and number o f 6 weaflons.

S) Since th e F - l l l s were to be used p r im a r ily fo r n ig h t , TFR m issio n s , t r a in in g toward t h a t end was em phasized. Most o f the t r a i n in g m is sions fo r the two s e le c te d squadrons were flown over the

mountainous t e r r a i n o f Nevada. The m issions were flown a t n ig h t using TFR procedures and term ina ted w ith weapons d e l iv e ry p r a c t ic e a t the Indian S prings Range 5 bombing complex and th e F allon Naval A ir S ta t io n EW/bombing range. Empha-s i s was placed on d e l i very tech n i ques and escape maneuvers fo r both hi g h

7 and low drag general purpose bombs d e liv e red from low a l t i t u d e . * S) T rain ing in th e use o f Radar Homing and Warning RHAW) d ev ice s

and E le c tro n ic Countermeasures ECM) equipment was a ls o s t r e s s e d to ensure t h a t the t r a in in g environm ent sim ula ted the ac tu a l c o n d itio n s a irc rew s would encoun ter in SEA. RHAW provided the air crel1s w ith v isu a l c o c k p it

* S) Ilowever, t should be noted th a t s i g n i f i c a n t d if f e r e n c e s e x is te d between the t r a in in g and deployment environm ents. While t r a i n in g was conducted in the a r id and barren southw estern United S ta te s where th e F sev e re ly c u r t a i l e d m is sion p r o f il e s , t h deployment environm ent was hot and humid, and the v eg e ta tio n in SEA was very dense in many a re a s . In a d d i tio n , l e s s than h a l f the crews had p rev io u sly dropped anything o th e r than p r a c t i c e bombs.

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presentations indicatinq tracking or lock-on of various enemy fire con

trol radars, as well as indications of an actual SA-2 SAM launch. The

system was designed to provide warning to the aircrews so that evasive8

action could be taken.*

S) 11aintenance preparation of each aircraft to be ceployed was

intensified and every system was brought to the peak of efficiency. All

phase inspections were performed and outstanding Time Compliance Technical

Orders TCTOs) were accomplished prior to the designated aircraft departing

Nellis. In addition, equipment which was to be deployed was also checked9

and discrepancies were repaired prior to shipment.

U) Since the F-lll night mission required extensive film processing

support for preparation of radar prediction target materials and processing

of mission radar scope film, t was decided to deploy part of the ES-85 Mobile

Film Processing Facility from Nellis to support the 474th TFW in SEA. The

ES-85 is a modular, eight-van, air-transportable complex capable of pro

cessing black and white and/or color film. Five vans, providing the black10and white capability, were deployed to Takhli.

2. S) U) Takhli RTAFB Thailand

S) Readying Takhli RTAFB for the arrival of the F-llls was com

plex since such things as maintenance facilities, ramp space, logistics

support, personnel billeting, and equipment requirements, to name but a

* S) All aircraft were equipped with both the ALQ-94 and the ALQ-87 ECMPods. In some cases, however, lack of replacement parts degraded the ALQ-94 capability and permitted usage of the aircraft in a low threat environment only.

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few, had to be c:arefully considered. Preparation began in June 1972 with

the arrival of a logistics team from PACAF and an F-lll team from Nellis

AFB The teams reviewed all operational intelligence and logistics con

s idera ti ons; t h ~ yidentified problem areas and made recol1lllendations forthe phase-in of the F-lll . Among the problems:

a. S) U) Ramp Space and Revetments

S) The ramp space requirement for any je t aircraft is a

function of the physical size of the aircraft as well as i ts exhaust velo-

city and je t blast temperatures. The characteristics of the F-l l l s jet

blast dictated that no more than two rows of aircraft could be parked at

Takhli i f they were unrevetted. As a result of i ts dimensions the F-lll

required more side-by-side parking space and larger revetments than

required by the F-4. Several alternat ives were proposed which suggested

that space could be saved if the F-llls were parked with wings swept.

Since most major maintenance on the F-lll in addition to pre- and post

flight inspections must be performed with wings extended however, these

proposals were considered unworkable.

S) Seventy-seven revetments for F-4 aircraft were in place

at Takhl i when the USAF vacated that base in 1971. The Royal Thai Air

Force had dismantled 33 of these revetments on the north end of the parking

ramp prior to the USAF reoccupation of that base in May 1972. With the

influx of F-4s from DaNang and the continental U.S. CONUS), approximately

75 F-4s were parked unrevetted. The risk to the exposed F-4s was consideredacceptable in view of the cost of constructing additional revetments;

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however, the risk of exposing the more costly F-llls became unacceptable.

PACAF therefore allocated resources for the construction of 46 F-lll revet-12

ments and the enlargement of existing F-4 revetments.b. S) U) Power Supply

S) Observations by the teams visiting Takhli disclosed that

facilities for F-lll materiel and maintenance were adequate for co-utilization

with the F-4, but with some exceptions. One of these exceptions was in the

area of 60 cycle C power. All facilities were operational on an austere

basis since only limited 60 HZ power was available. Additional genera-

tion equipment for 60 HZ power was programmed but not fully insta11ed.**

(Since the commercial AC power which was available to the base was 50 HZ

rather than 60 HZ, t was not useable for F-l11 avionics test purposes.)

Adequate 400 cycle C power was available from MO-4 generators which were13

deployed from Nellis.

c. (S)(U) Avionics Faci li ty Cooling

S) The existing avionics facility for F-4 operations wasconsidered adequate with the exception of the air conditioning. Although

a cursory survey of the facility revealed three 60-ton units permanently

installed they had been partially cannibalized and were not in operation.

Rehabilitation of these units (at an estimated cost of $18,000) would

provide adequate cooling for both F-4 and F-111 avionics equipment. As

an interim fix portable window units were used for cooling the building

below the maximum temperature permitted for operation of F-111 avionics14

aerospace ground equipment AGE).

*IIZ--former1y referred to as cycles.**Documentat1on about the resolution of thisthis report was being completed. [Ed.]

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d. S) U) A rre s tin g Gear

S) S ince th e F-111 was s u b s t a n t i a l l y h e a v ie r th an th e F -4 , i t s requ irem en t fo r runway a r r e s t i n g g e a r was d if f e r e n t . The F-4 u t il i z e d th e s ta n d a rd -ru n o u t BAK 12 a r r e s t i n g system , w hile th e only system a b le to s a f e l y d e c e le ra te th e F-111 was th e 10 ng-run ou t BAK-12. On 5 August 1972, w ell in advance o f th e deplo ym ent, 13AF re q u e ste d t h a t T a c ti c a l A ir Command TAC) supply th e n ec e ssa ry equipm ent to modify th e e x i s t i n g BAK 12 system s. A ction on t h i s r e q u e s t was po stp on ed , and th e n e c e ssa ry equipm ent did not a r r i v e a t Takh1i u n t i l 2 O ctober 1972. Upon i t s a r r i v a l i t was

found th a t much o f the equipm ent was in o p e ra t iv e and had to be r e p a ire d o r re p la c e d . Due to th e se problem s, i n s t a l l a t i o n and checkout o f th e b a r r i e r system s a c tu a l ly re q u ire d 25 hours in s te a d o f th e more ty p ic a l 12 to 14 h ours

e . S) U ) M isce lla neous M aintenance and M ateri e l Problems S) There were se v e ra l o th e r m ainte nance and m a te rie l pro b

lems a t Takh1i which were minor in n a tu re and e a s i ly c o r r e c ta b l e . F ie ld fa b r ic a t i o n shops, i . e . s h e e t m etal and w elding shops , were equip ped fo r s h o r t -t e rm o p e ra t io n o n ly ; to en ab le them to p ro v id e fu l l shop o p e ra t io n fo r F-111 m aintenance re q u ire d th e i n s t a l l a t i o n o f more s ta n d a rd iz e d shop eq uipm ent. Dock sp ace fo r phase in s p e c ti o n s and heavy m ain tenance wasc r i t i c a l a t Takh1i and could accommodate on ly 10 F-4 or s i x F-111 a i r c r a f t . Yet a n o th e r problem was th e absence o f a P re c i s io n Measuring Equipment L aborato ry PMEL) on b a se . C a l ib r a ti o n su p p o rt fo r P re c is io n Measuring

Equipment PME) was provided by T ra n s p o r ta b le F ie ld C a l ib r a t io n U n its

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TFCUs). However, only some 40 percent of PME requirements were support-

able within TFCU capability, and the remainder had to be sent to backup16

PMELs at Korat and other Thailand bases.f. S) U) Housing

S) Billeting for both officers and airmen at Takh1i was

inadequate for the number of personnel there. A scant two weeks prior

to CONST NT GU RD V execution, the 366th TFW reported that housing for

all personnel was completely inadequate and that approved projects would

only partially alleviate the problem. In order to provide some shelter

for personnel at Takhli, an extensive tent city was constructed to house

up to 1,800 personnel. ·Support personnel were identified for movement

into the tents while those personnel essential for flight operation at

night were given priority for more permanent living facilities. The

shortage of adequate living quarters was attributed to Thai personnel

occupying barracks which had previously been occupied by US F enlisted

personnel. Priority for.air conditioned quarters was naturally given7

to aircrews, with the night flying crews receiving the highest priority.

3. S) U) Target Preparation and Selection

U) Target preparation was an essential part of all F-lll pre-

strike planning activities. When new targets were selected, several steps

were normally taken to ensure that aircrews had complete knowledge of the

target. The first step in this process was a letter of intent whichwas published weekly and outlined targets for each day. Each target was

processed to obtain pertinent target data. The data were then analyzed

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to determ ine t a r g e t c o m p a t ib i l i ty w ith F - ll l ca p a b i li t ie s . Once com pati -b il i t y was e s ta b l i s h e d , s u f fi c ie n t t a r g e t m a te r ia ls (recce p h o to s , c h a r ts , e tc . ) were gath l red to support the s tr i k e , and rad a r aim pOint and a x is o f a t t a c k were s e le c te d . A m ission p r o f i l e was then prepa

red to in c lu d e in g re ss and eg re ss ro u te s , a l t i t u d e s , and update p o in ts . The com pletion o f a l l phases o f t a r g e t a n a ly s is norm ally took from 14 to 24 ho urs. T ar-g e ts which had p rev io u sly been s tru c k req u ired s h o r te r p re p a ra tio n tim es

18 s in ce m a te r ia ls on th ese t a r g e t s were a lread y assem bled.

S) The F - l l l was capab le o f s t r i k i n g any t ar g e t then on the v a lid a te d ta r g e t l i s t . Since p lan n ers d e s ired to take advantage o f th e

unique n av ig a tio n a l and bombing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f th e F - l ll , PACAF/DOXQ 19

recommended t h a t the t a r g e t s : 1) be p o in t t a r g e t s o r p o in t e lem ents w ith in an area t a r g e t ; (2) be rad a r s i g n i f i c a n t t a r g e t s o r be w ith in range o f a rad a r s i g n i f i c a n t o f f s e t aiming p o in t OAP); 3) have ta rget/O A P co or-d in a te s which had been p r e c i s e ly mensurated v ia SENTINEL LOCK/DATE.

S) Adhering as m u h as p o ss ib le to th e se c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , a j o i n t

TAC/PACAF team s e le c te d 144 t a r g e t s . Most were l u c r a t i v e , p o in t t a r g e t s lo ca ted w ith in th e high t h r e a t a rea o f Route Package RP) VI A which included H anoi). S ix ty - fo u r b ridg es were in c lu ded . P rep ara tio n was begun on ta r -g e t fo ld e rs and m ensuration o f t a r g e t c o o rd in a te s . A number o f t a r g e t s

*(S) SENTINEL DATE i s a non-deployable da ta base lo ca ted a t DM C (S t . L o u is ); t i s used fo r p o s it io n in g t a r g e t s and the d e te rm in a tio n o f th e geod e t i c co n tro l i . e . , c o r r e c t l y superim posing photography over th e map g r id ) to produce th e SENTINEL LOCK d a ta base. The SENTINEL LOCK d ata base wasdeveloped fo r f i e l d use. I t prov ides a method fo r p r e c i s e ly determ in ing l a t i t u d e , lo n g itu d e , and e le v a t io n o f n av ig a tio n a l f i x - p o i n t s , o f f s e t aim p o in t s , and ta r g e ts . Two s e t s o f t h i s data base a re p r e s e n t ly in SEA; one a t T ak h li , th e o th e r a t NKP SENTINEL LOCK/DATE a re p h o to -p o s itio n in g d a ta b ase s . [E d .]

12

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rrr

f

[

r

on this l i s t were identified to the 474th TFW prior to their departure20

from Ne11 is.

(S) /Is a direct result of conversations between PACAF and TACt was felt that all initial strikes would be flown against targets derived

from the letter of intent listing of 32 primary targets. This, however

p r o v e d l ~ ~be the case; only approximately 10 percent of the pre-planned

targets,were struck during the f irst month of operation. The f irst targets

were carefully screened to avoid high threat areas and s t i l l provide an

estimate of the weapon system's combat capability. Seventh Air Force intended

for the F-111 crews to shift gradually from targets in relatively low threat

areas to those located in higher threat areas as crew confidence and experience

increased. To meet the target requirements, 7AF nominated 56 additional

targets, which were subsequently approved by TAC/PACAF in the lower threat

areas of the northern route packages. The target folders were passed to

the 474th TFW at Nellis. All mission profiles were high-low-high with

the descent point being determined by enemy defenses. The low-level route

was to be flown at 1,000 feet utilizing TFR procedures, while the attack21

run-in was to be flown at 500 feet.

U) Since the prep1anning stage for F-111 strikes required time

to piece together mission folders, target planners were concerned over

) frag lead time; that is, how much time was available from frag reception

to mission launch. To ensure that target coordinates and other necessarymaterials were available in time for target planning and aircrew study,

frag lead times would have to be at least 24 hours when materials and

13

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coordinates were to be obtained from sources outside SEA. Thorough coor-22

dination between the 474th TFW, PACAF, and 1AF alleviated this concern.

(S) Included in mission preparation was weaponeering. * In order

to obtain the maximum benefit from any strike using any weapon system,

the proper weapons must be utilized. This was especially true when attack

ing point targets e.g. bridges; dams, and buildings. Targets to be struck

by the F-lll were analyzed to determine the most significant and vulnerable

element of the target. This analysis led to the best weapon/fuzing combina-

tion to provide the desired weapons effect (bearing in mind tactics and

delivery parameters and limitations). Predeployment weaponeering was accom-plished by Headquarters PACAF. However, after the arrival of the F-llls

in SEA, the pre-strike weaponeering responsibility was transferred to 7AF.

A Hq PACAF weaponeer was detailed to augment the 7AF Targets Frag Shop

beginning in early October 1972. Headquarters PACAF continued to provide23

supplemental weaponeering support when requested by 7AF.

(S) Pr ob1em areas anticipated by the 474th TFW in locating and secur

ing target materials for mission preparation were resolved prior to the

deployment. Arrangements were made by Hq PACAF and the Defense Mapping

Agency Aerospac:e Center DMAAC) Flight Information Office-Pacific to have

all required maps and charts of target areas in NVN in place at Takhli

*Weaponeering--the process whereby targets are examined for their peculiarities and the pr oper weapon and fuzing combination is selected to inflictmaximum damage on the target. For example, the weapon to be used on thetarget is selected and then the fuzing (instantaneous, delayed) is selectedfor that weapon.

14


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when the unit deployed. Initial stereo photo coverage of the Hanoi-

( Haiphong area was completed by the 548th Reconnaissance Tactical Group

[

[

I

l

RTG) for use in early target planning. Additional coverage was provided24

by the 12th Reconnaissance Intelligence Technical Squadron (RITS).

(S) Automated Tactical Target Graphics ATTG) and other miscellaneous

materials for NVN targets were provided by PACAF, while 12th RITS furnished25

a complete set of Master Target Folders to the unit. SENTINELDATE coor-

dinates for LINEBACKER*targets were obtained from DM C by PACAF and

provided to the 474th TFW. SENTINEL LOCK coordinates, needed for mensuration of OAPs, were obtained from a DM CSENTINEL LOCK support package

deployed to Takh1i. A problem in the use of the mensurated coordinates

resulted when the mensurated aim point was included in the frag but not

annotated on the 474th TFW target photography. Crew members had difficulty

in plotting the aim point on the photography while preparing for the mission.

A partial solution was obtained when an aim point description was added to

the frag information.

B. (S)(U) Deployment

(S) The deployment schedule for the 474th TFW and the redeployment

schedule for the 49th TFW were outlined in PACAF Programmed Action Direc

tive PAD) 73-4. This PAD provided for a closely integrated deployment

redeployment which would not hinder operations at Takh1i and would also26

avoid overcrowding. This schedule is reflected in Figure 2.

*LINEBACKER,which started on 10 ~ l y1972, was a coordinated air and navalcampaign aimed at the destruction of the enemy s war materiel and the disruption of his logistics system throughout NVN.

15

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FIGURE 2

SCHEDULED D E P L O Y H E N T R E D E P L O Y i ~ m TS U ~ Y- 49TH AND 474

28 Sep I 29 SepI

nit 27 Sep 30 Sep I 1 Oct 2 Oct 3 OctMove D-Day 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 D 5 0 6

49 TFW

417 TFS Takhli- Andersen- Hickam-Andersen Hickam Holloman

8 TFS Takh1i- Andersen-Andersen Hickam

' 9 TFS Takh1 i- Andersen- Hickam-Andersen Hickam Holloma

434 TFS Takhl i- AndersenAndersen Hickam

474 TFW

429 TFS Ne1lis- H1ckam- Clark-Hickam Clark Takhl i

430 TFS Nellis- Hickam- Cl ark-Hickam Clark Takhli

-

SOURCE: Tactical Air Augmentation in Thailand l3AF Study December 72.

~ - -G ; ; ;U U v

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rr (S) As indicated in Figure 2, the f irst squadron of F-111s (429thr Tactical Fighter Squadron) was due to arrive at Takh1i on 30 Sep 72 (0+3),

while the second squadron was to arrive on 2 Oct 72 (0+5). This schedule[

f

\

Il

dovetailed nicely with the scheduled redeployment of the 49th TFW. The

first squadron of 18 F-4s was to leave Takhli on 29 Sep 72, one day before

the arrival of the 429th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS). The 8th TFS

was scheduled to depart Takhli on 30 Sep 72. This schedule removed 36

F-4s from Takhli prior to the arrival of the f irst 24 F-ll1s. A similar

schedule existed for the departure of the 9th and 434th TFSs (F-4) and the27

arrival of the 430th TFS F-lll).

U) In actuality, however, the first contingent of 12 F-l11s arrived

at Takh1 j on 28 Sep 72, creating an overlap of 12 F-ll1s and 18 F-4s for

a period of 36 hours. This occurred as a result of a last minute change

to the F··111 deployment schedule. The first 12 aircraft proceeded directly

to Andersen, and, with prepositioned crews, on to Takh1i (rather than going

via Hickam and Clark as originally scheduled). The 474th Advanced Echelon.... _ . _ --.

(ADVON)-and parts of the support group also arrived earlier than planned,

further adding to the overcrowding at Takhli and causing a corresponding

overlap of the inbound and outbound air l i f t of the two wings. The second28

half of the 429th TFS (12 F-111s) arrived as scheduled.

(S) All personnel of the 474th ADVON did not arrive as one unit. Some

elements were mixed with turnaround crews, which were to fly the f irst combat sorties, while other elements of the ADVON arrived at a later date.

This splitting of the ADVON did have one detrimental effect on the launch

17

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30/50

o f the ·f i r s t combat s o r t i e s : th e s p l i t DVON re s u l te d in a reduced num-ber o f rad a r p re d ic to rs a v a i la b le to aid in p re -p lan n in g s t ri k e s on compl e t e l y unfamil i a r t a r g e t s . Although t h i s did in c re a se the work-load on the a v a i la b le p erso nn e l ample time e x is te d and was u ti l i z e d to com ple te the req u ired t a r g e t s tu dy . Personnel from the 366th TFW a ls o s ta t io n e d a t T ak h li drew upon t h e ir exper1ence and d iscu ssed w ith th e F - l ll crews m atte rs o f o p era tio n a l concern such as enemy Order o f B a t t l e d i s p o s i t i o n . In a d d i t io n th e 366th made a v a i l a b le to the F - l l l crews f a c i l it i e s fo r t a r g e t s tu d ie s and b r ie f s . E a r li e r , ex ten s iv e p rep a ra to ry

ac tio n s were accomplished by the Wing p r io r to th e i r deploym ent. These a c tio n s included b r i e f in g by both PACAF and ing i n t e l l i g e n c e personnel on ru le s o f engagement, the enemy th r e a t, and enemy c a p a b i l i ti e s . When the advanced crews a r r iv e d a t T a k h li t a r g e t m a te r ia ls were in p lace fo r th e f i r s t s ix t a rg e t s and ro u te fo ld e rs and p re d ic tio n s were prep ared . T arg e t stu dy was accomplished plus approx im ately e ig h t hours o f b r ie f in g s on ru le s o f engagement, a ir o rd er o f b a tt le , i n t e l l i g e n

c e , search and 29 re sc u e and procedures fo r command and c o n t r o l .

(U) Deployment/redeployment o f l a t e r ele m ents in CONSTANT GU RD V a ls o d i f f e r e d from the schedule due to a t r o p ic a l sto rm which appeared ap p ro x im ately 600 m iles e a s t - n o r th e a s t o f Guam on 1 Oct 72 d i r e c t l y on the f li g h t path between Hickam and Andersen. This storm caused a d elay 1n th e d e p a rtu re o f the 8 th TFW from Andersen, which 1n tu rn r e s u l te d 1n ramp parking congest io n a t th a t b a se fo rc in g postponement o f the 9 th T S d ep a r tu re from Takhli which was scheduled fo r the same day. Adding to th e domino e f f e c t , th e

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rr 430th TFS was at Clark AS waiting for the above movements to take place toI free ramp space at Takh1i, which could at that time accept no more incoming

[

r

l

I

aircraft without an equivalent outflow. Actual deployment/redeployment times30are shown in Figure 3.

S) Difficulties were also encountered in air to air refueling opera

tions during CONSTANT GUARD V Although these difficulties were not insur-31

mountable, they were matters of concern. The refueling problems included:

1. An unusual number of altitudes required for rendezvousbetween refue1er and receivers.

2. The clearance request for tanker operations was submitted much too late in the mission to allow sufficienttime for altitude reservations planning.

3. Tanker coordinators were not properly briefed prior totheir arrival at Clark; they did not appear to have aclear idea of their requirements and were unsure of whatair traffic control services they would require.

4. There was no single point of contact for coordinationfor the tanker task force; i t was often impossible tolocate anyone with decision-making authority.

5. All cells of the f irst contingent of twelve F-l1laircraft arrived over Jamalig (Philippines) for refueling within five minutes of each other; accomplishingseparation for sequencing in the radar and traffic pattern was impossible.

6. The second contingent of F-11l aircraft had beenbriefed to separate into flights of six fighters andtwo tankers each under Instrument Flight Rules IFR)conditions; the f irst flight complied with the brief-ing, but the second wave arrived in straggling groupsof twos and threes from a variety of directions.

Another fuel-related problem which could have had serious consequences

occurred during the recovery of F lll aircraft at Clark AB. Some aircraft

19

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- - - -

No

FIGURE 3

ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT/REDEPLOYI1ENTSUr-lMARY -; 49TH AND 47

I 2 Oct IUnit 27 Sep 28 Sep 29 Sep 30 Sep i 1 Oct 3 OctMove D-Day 0 1 0+2 0+3 I 0+4 I 0+5 I 0+6

I

I49 TFW I,417 TFW h"akhl i - Andersen- Hickam-

Andersen Hickam Holloman

8 TFS Takhli- Andersen-ft, .... 'sen Hickam

9 TFS Takh.1i- AndersenAndersen Hickam

434 TFS Takhli-Anderse

474 TFW

29 TFS Nell is- Andersen-Andersen Takhl i

(12 acft

'429 TFS Nellis- Hickam- Clark-ickam Clark Takhli(12 acft

Nell i s- Hickam-430 TFSHickam Clark ,

SOURCE: Tactical Air Augmentation in Thailand, 13AF Study. December 72.

C-

" " G ) ) )u u


33/50

rr arrived over the base with low fuel reserves. Fortunately, fair weatherI permitted expeditious recovery of the fighters.

[

(S) Initiation ofllilitary Airlift Command (rlAC) air l i f t for CONSTANT

GUARDV coincided with the deployment of the f irst contingent of F-lll

fi ghters. The fi rs t C-141 depa rted Ne11 i s AFB on 27 Sep 72, and all

necessary air l i f t ~ a s completed on 1 Oct 72, shortly after the closure

of the 429th TFS. As a consequence, deploying support equipment was in

place at Takhli well ahead of the arrival of the second F-ll1 squadron.

T I ~ e n t y n i n e

C-14l and six commercial passenger aircraft were employed inCONSTANTGUARDV These aircraft transported a total of 494.7 tons of cargo

and equipment and 1,487 passengers to Takh1i. In addition, five C-130 air-32

craft were used to carry enroute support team equipment and personnel.

e) All equipment of the 49th TFW which was suitable for F-1ll opera

tions and requirements was left in place at Takh1i. This procedure pre

vented shipment of duplicate AGE and i(ept transportation costs to a mini

mum As a result, some 225 tons and 48,744 cubic feet of equipment, which33

would have required 11 C-141s for transport, was not moved.

(U) One minor problem concerning CONSTANTGUARDV air l i f t occurred

when the Thai government refused to allow M C commercial contract flights

*Fo110wing their pre-publication review of this report, Hq 474th TFW/DOWnoted that: Hazards related to the arrival at Clark AFB are somewhat underemphasized. Manila approach control radar was inoperative. The Clark AFBRapcon was incapable of maintaining an orderly traffic flow. They attemptedto vector flights directly into thunderstorms and often refused to communicate, apparently due to traffic saturation. This forced some flights toproceed visually to avoid a minimum fuel situation.

21

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34/50

to land a t any base other than Don ~ u a n gor U-Tapao. Consequently these

f i ghts landed at ei ther U-Tapao or Don Muang and thei r loads were t rans-

fer red to C-141 s for the t r ip to Takh 1 . However t.he C-141 s were not

equipped to tr ansfer al l personal baggage arriving on the contract f l ights

carrying personnel. Thus men arrived a t Takh1i ahead of their baggage;

when t arrived by la ter f l ight , there was confusion in matching men to34

thei r belongings.

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rrr

[

.....CHAPTER III

OPERATIONS

A. S) U) Initial Operations and First Loss

S) F-lll operations against North Vietnam began on the evening of 28

September 1972, just hours after the f irst deploying aircraft landed at Takhli

RTAFB. The frag for that evening called for six F-llls to strike six targets

in Route Package V.* In accordance with the F-lll employment concept, these

initial night sorties were fragged to penetrate V r ~as single flights at low

alti tude** 1,000 feet AGL with TFR engaged) and high speed [480 Knots True

Air Speed KTAS)], utilizing low-altitude 500 feet AGL radar deliveries tostrike the target. The missions were to be flown by aircrews already in place

at Takhli, deployed from Nellis on 24 September by C-14l, and in place at 2200

local time on 26 September. Prior to the arrival of the aircraft these crews

had sturiied detailed target folders and had been briefed on rules of engage

ment, intelliqence the air order of battle search and rescue SAR), cOl1111and35

and control arrangements, and safety aspects of the missions.

S) Of the six aircraft scheduled to participate in the mission, only

five were launched. Of these, one aircraft took off jettisoned fuel and

returned to base. The first night of combat operations for the F-lll follow

ing i ts redeployment to SEA was marred by the loss of one aircraft. Ranger 23,

the second aircraft to depart Takhli RTAFB, was last heard from about 40 min-

utes after launch. At that time the mission was proceeding normally, although

the aircraft was deviating somewhat from i ts planned course in order to avoid

*See Appendix 1.

**The descent point was determined by the enemy threat.

23

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36/50

thunderstorms a 1on9 the route through Laos. (Such devi ati ons also occurred

for other F-ll1s that night. ) Shortly aftermidnight, more than two hours

after the last radio contact, Ranger 23 was declared missing. Neither the36

location nor the cause of .the loss was known at this writing.B. (S)(U) Suspension of Operations

(S) Immediately following the loss of Ranger 23, F 111 combat opera

tions were temporarily suspended and a S R effort was initiated. During

the S R effort, approximately 3,500 square miles of North Vietnamese and

Laotian territory was photographed, and another 4,900 square mile area in

northern Laos was searched visually. Additionally, all-source intelligence

data I Jere carefully screenell in the hope that some bi t of information m i g h t

shed light on the location or cause of the loss. By 10 Octo,ber, however,37

every available lead had been exhausted, and the search was terminated.

(S) At the time that the search for the missing aircraft was under-

way, an intensified orientation program was initiated and a reevaluation

of the concept of employment of the F-lll was begun. All aircrews were

given ground training briefings reemphasizing those specific areas directly

concerned with combat operations in SEA. Area orientation flights were

flown to familiarize the aircrews with the terrain that they would be

encountering. Missions were flown in Thailand to check out aircraft systems

and to give the crews an opportunity to visually orient themselves in their

new environment. Subsequent night flights over the same areas were also

made to validate the performance of the terrain following radar system.

*Times given hereafter, unless otherwise specified, are local times atTakh1i.

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ote

For reasons of National Security, pages 25 26 27 38 39 40 and 41 remain classified.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ . -


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seemed normal. However, at 0153, 17 October, Coach 33 was declared over-42

due and missing.

(S) Shortly after Coach 33 was declared missing, an infrared-equippedRF-4 was launched to fly the planned profile in an attempt to detect anything

that would pinpoint the crash site. As was the case with the loss of Ranger

23, an extensive S R effort was conducted in the hope that the missing aircraft

could be found, the cause of i ts loss determined, and surviving crewmembers

rescued. Unfortunately, visual and photographic searches failed to uncover

either the location or the cause of the loss, and no contact·was ever made

with any survivors. All-source information, however, did offer more clues

than had been the case for Ranger 23. There was evidence that Coach 33 might

have gone down in, or near, the target. Also, the V did claim the shoot

down of the F-lll in the general target area and published photos of the

wreckage of an F-lll and identification cards of the two crewmembers. There43

was, however, no firm evidence as to the cause of the loss.

E. (S)(U) Reappraisal of Operations

(S) Following the loss of the second F-lll , the concept of employment

was again completely reappraised. Since Coach 33 was probably lost in or

near the target area, analysis of the tactics in the target area received

particular attention. The missing aircraft had been. configured with low

drag weapons four I1K-84s) which required a stabilized climb from low level

TFR flight to approximately 1,000 feet GL prior to weapons release. (Conver

sely, high drag weapons could be delivered at or below 500 feet AGL.) Althoug\

the delivery of low drag weapons had been included in the employment concept,

27

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40/50

the higher altitudes at which such bombs were released increased the vul

nerability of the aircraft to enemy defenses • As a result of this loss

7AF prohibited the further use of low drag weapons unless specifically

fragged on an individual case basis. This impacted on targeting since hard

poi nt targets requi ri ng s tri ke by tlK-84 low-drag ordnance, could no longer

be fragged because of the release parameters. The standard MK 82 high

drag weapons were not effective against hard point targets such as bridges

and storage facilities.

S) Additionally, a change to improve command and control of the F-lll

force was implemented as a result of the second loss. To assist 7AF TacticalAir Control Center TACC), Airborne Battlefield Commandand Control Center

ABCCC), and Ground-Controlled Intercept GCI) controllers each crew was

required to submit a flight plan which included estimated times of arrival

ETAs) at each turn point along the flight route. During the flight as

was the case previously, each aircraft was under positive radar contact

until its descent to MEA or TFR altitude. At that point, and at every

turn point thereafter the crew would broadcast position reports to the

ABCCC pver high frequency HF) radio. This procedure, while t did not

enhance the safety of a particular mission, did provide a means of posi-44

tive flight monitoring.

F. S) U) Cessation of Strikes in Northern NVII

1. S) U) Air Defense Activities Preceding the Bombing Halt

5) Effective 23 October 1972, the President directed a cessation of the bombing above the 20th Parallel in NVN. In the last days

28


41/50

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[

preceding the 23 October bombing halt however, F-111 strikes in the heavily

defended Route Packages and VI reflected some interesting trends in the

enemy s air defense reaction to the strikes. The enemy threat as manifested during low-level F-111 strikes against targets in these areas,

consisted primarily of anti-aircraft artillery and small arms f ire and

surface-to-air missile activity. (Of these threats planners considered

AM the most serious.) rUGs, another potential threat were not a sig

nificant factor during the period of this report. Although r ~ I swere

occasionally airborne at night in the general vicinity of F-111 targets

there was no indication that the flights were anything other than routine45

training.

(5) The enemy s AAA reactions normally occurred just after weapons

release. For the f irst two or three weeks of F-111 strikes. enemy gunners

were apparently unable to determine the correct F-111 altitude. Aircrews

believed that barrage AAA fire was directed towards the sound of the air

craft rather than at or ahead of i ts actual position since detonations

were occurring above and behind the aircraft. As F-111 operations con

tinued. however. the AAA worked down to the actual SOO-feet AGL altitude

of the aircraft. but detonations were st i l l occurring behind the aircraft.

The F-111s countered this development by flying at 300 feet or 200 feet

AGL during release. On the last night of Route Packages V and VI opera

tions one F-111 did have barrage fire detonating at his altitude. ahead

of his aircraft. at the one and o clock positions. In the latter days

of Route Packages V and VI strikes. the enemy also fired flares to help

29

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42/50

mark th e f l i g h t paths o f the a ir c r a ft . Although the accuracy o f AM fi r e was im provin g, o F 11 1 a i r c r a f t su s ta in e d damage due to AM by th e 23 O cto-ber standdown. t appeared th a t in a d d it io n to th e obvious p o s s ib i l i t y o f shoo ting do wn an a i r c r a f t , however, th e enemy employed AAA b a rrag es in an a ttem p t to d r iv e th e F -l11 s up to an a l t i t u d e where m is s i l e s i t e s

46 could acq u ire and t ra c k them.

S) O espite th e low a lt i tu d e s flown by F-111s, i t became app are n t t h a t th e S M b a t te r i e s rep re sen ted a t h r e a t to th e a i r c r a f t , and, in f a c t , were in so m e in s tan ces capab le o f tra c k in g and f i r i n g on a i r c r a f t

as low as 500 f e e t AGL. By O ctober, F-111s had been i llu m in a te d and track ed i . e . , received Radar Homing and Warning [RHAW] in d ic a t io n s ) on more than 70 o ccas io n s ; in e i g h t encou n ters a t o t a l o f 16 SAMs had been f ir e d . Although th e re were no kn own l o s s e s , one a i r c r a f t had su s ta in ed

47 minor damage w hile o th e rs rep o rted near m isses .

S) F -ll1 anti-SAM t a c t i c s employed a com bination o f c h a f f , maneu v erin g , and ECM pod u ti l i z a t i o n . For example, in one in c id

e n t two SAMs were launched in rap id su ccession a t an F - ll 1 . The f i r s t was negated by twO bundles o f c h a f f p lus a 30 degree banked tu rn and a d e scen t from 500 to 300 f e e t AGL; but as soon as th e f i r s t m is s i le was negated, a second launch o ccurred . Pods were a c t iv a te d and th e bank an g le was in c rea sed long enough to tu rn away from th e launch a r e a . A fte r th e a i r c r a f t ro l le d back ou t to lev e l f l i g h t , th e pods appeared to d e f e a t th e m i s s i l e gu idance.

In view of th e ab i l it y o f SAMs to a cq u ire and t ra c k a i r c r a f t eve n a t low a l t i t u d e s , ant'i SAM t a c t i c s and ECM procedures were s u b je c t to co n ti nui ng 48 review and ref'inem ent.

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2. S) U) S h i f t to Route Package I and Laos

5) In the two-month perio d follow ing c essa tio n o f ai r s tr i k e s

above the 20th P a ra lle l and preceding the i n i t i a ti o n of LINEBA CKER II 4 9 n l a te e c e~ b e r 1972, F - l l l s t r ik e s sh if te d to Route Package I and Laos.

( 5 ) The F - l ll t a c t i c s employment in R I remained e s s e n t ia l l y the same as had been the case fo r Route Packages V and VI. The F-111 contin ued to be employed in a n ig h t, low a l ti t u d e high speed, sing1e-sh ip p e n e tra tio n , radar d e li v e ry ro le . Throughout la t e October and the f i r s t ha lf o f November a t e ~ s t 20 F

-111 s o r t i e s per n ig h t were ro u tin e ly fragged a g a in s t l o g i s t i c s and a i r defe nse ta rg e ts thro ughout RP I . During November the preponderance of the e f f o rt (n early 70 percen t of t o t a l F-111 RP I s o r t i e s ) w as d ire c te d a g a in s t truck pa rk /su p p ly /s to ra g e area type t a r -g e ts . A s iz ea b le number of s o r t i e s s tru ck enemy defenses and troop concent r a t i o n s while a sm aller number stru ck road s, fo rd s , and in te r d ic t io n 50 p o in ts .

( 5 ) During the l a t t e r h a lf o f November th e re was a s h i f t of F -ll 1 s o r t le s from the in te rd ic ti o n ro le in Route Package I to support of f r ie n d ly fo rc es in Northern Laos. D espite the s h i ft however, a s iz e a b le s t r i k e e f f o r t did contin ue in R I with an average o f 10 F-111 s o r t i e s scheduled th e re per day.

combat s o r t ie s

During the month of November F-11ls flew a to t a l 5

in RP I . o f 402

5) During these RP I s t r i k e s in November the th i rd and fou rth F-111 lo sses occurred , both due to unknow n causes. Loss number th re e occurred on 7 November during a m ission a g a in s t the Luat Son Highway

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Ferry/Ford Complex onRoute 101B, some 6.5 N southeast of Bat Lake. The

aircraft last made radio contact with the ABCCC approximately 45 minutes

after takeoff. The second loss occ.urred on 20 November, on a mi ss i on

against Co Giang Transshipment Point on Route 101, about R 5 N southwestof Quang Khe. I\gain, no information was uncovered revealing the exact loca-

tion or cause of the loss. In the case of this loss, however, pieces of

wreckage from the aircraft were later discovered washed ashore north of

Da Nang, indicating that the crash probably occurred during egress over the )52

Gulf of Tonkin.

(5) In November, a new dimension was added to F-lll operations. The

use of the F-lll with a radar beacon for offset bombing from medium al titudes*

in support of friendly forces in Laos represented a major departure from the

initial concept of employment for the aircraft. The beacon bombing program

was concel ved as the optimum employment of the F-lll weapons system in t h e

defense of Long Tieng, an area of critical importance to the war in Laos.

Radar beacons deployed at key locations on the ground were used as offset

aiming points for medium altitude radar bombing by the F-ll1s. This tech-

nique, which could be employed within a 30-mile radius** of a given beacon,

enabled the F-lll to strike time-sensitive targets developed by Raven Forward

Air Controllers (FACs), Laotian Forward Air Guides (FAGs), or ground com-

manders. Of particular importance was the fact that these strikes were53

carried out regardless of weather conditions.

*(u) Above 13,000 feet AGL**(5) I t should be noted that while the beacon s effect ive range was approximately 30 miles, the F-lll system had a 16 N (99,999 feet) ranging limitation with offset beacons.

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S) Two distinct types of targets were struck during the F-lll

beacon bombing program--preplanned targets and targets of opportunity.

In the case of preplanned targets the beacon position and target coordinates were known and fragged in advance. Flexibility was provided by

the practice of diverting aircraft from preplanned targets to time-sensitive

targets when such diversions were requested by a FAG. In the case of

targets of opportunity, the offset distance, bearing, and target eleva-

tion from a particular beacon were provided by the ground controller

FAG). For both types of targets the axis of attack was normally planned

to vary from 10 to 40 degrees from the offset bearing. Also in both cases,

until accurate Circular Error Probable CEP) data could be determined for

the F-lll beacon bombing technique, only targets more than three kilo-54

meters from friendly positions were struck.

5) The f irst successful F-lll beacon bombing mission in support

of friendly Laotian forces was flown on 11 November 1972. By 30 November,

221 such missions had successfully delivered ordnance against targets in

northern Laos. During the month of November, F-llls flew 455 combat sor

ties in Laos, all but 84 of these in the northern part of that country.

As confidence in and experience \ ~ i t h the radar beacon bombing program

grew, the number of F-111 sorties in Laos steadily increased, with more55

than 500 sorties flown there during December.

G. S) U) LINEBACKERIIS) Beginning on 18 December 1972 and continuing through 29 December,

a maximum tactical air TAC AIR) and B-52 air strike effort was directed

a9ainst selected targets in Route Packages VI A and VI B, with the greatest

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emphasis placed on targets in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong. This

concentrated bombing program, known as LINEBACKER II, included by far

the heaviest B-52 strikes ever directed against targets in NVN, and a

TAC AIR effort which easily surpassed the level of strikes directed

against the northern RPs in the.earlier LINEBACKER I program. F-llls

represented a significant element of the strike effort, providing the

USAF with the capability to strike targets 24 hours a day in all weather56

conditions and with minimal support requirements. During LINEBACKER

II operations 154 F-lll strike sorties were directed against a wide

variety of enemy targets including airfields,S M

sites, rail targets,storage areas and communications facilities.

S) During the initial days of LINEBACKER II, some 50 percent of

F-ll1 sorties i .e., about seven per day) were directed against enemy

airfields. In many cases the strikes were scheduled to precede B-52

arrivals over NVN and were designed to reduce the MIG threat to the sub

sequent B-52 strikes. While the number of sorties involved was modest

the strikes were a definite harassment to the enemy. In fact, consid

ering the small number of sorties employed, the F-1ll showed promise

against the radar-signif icant large-area targets provided by airfields.

Perhaps the best example of F-lll potential was provided when a single

F-ll1 sortie succeeded in temporarily placing Yen Bai airfield in a non

operational status after 44 A-7/F-4s striking under LORAN conditions had

been unable to inflict any serious damage. This was the only period

*LORAN--long range aerial navigation.

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in LINEB/ICKERII during which Yen Bai was considered to be in a non-57

operational status.

S) During the last days of LINEBACKERII a small number of F-lll

sorties were targeted against S M sites which would be a threat to ensuing

attacks by high altitude B-52s. While some secondary explosions were

reported, the impact of these and other strikes against SAM sites was

not fully known due to the small number of strikes involved and the lack

of complete and accurate information. A sudden reduction in SAM launches

prompted the Strategic Air Command to specifically request F-1l1 prestrikes.

However, a PACAF analysis did indicate that scheduling F-1l1 strikes againstairfields and SAr1 defenses in advance of B-52 strikes should be done with

caution, since stereotyping of F-1l1 operations could result in a subse-58

quent increase in the -threat to these operations.

5) Storage areas and rail facilities were two other types of tar

gets struck by F-111s during LINEBACKERII. With a limited number of

sorties F-11ls achieved Significant damage against large-area storage

targets and were successful in keeping pressure on the enemy in areas

where significant damage had already been inflicted by other weapons

systems. With regard to rail yards, the F-111 strike effort was light.

Nevertheless, Bomb Damage Assessment BOA) revealed that damage was

inflicted on all of the F-l11 targets establishing a definite military59

impact in addition to the obvious psychological/harassment effect.S) In some cases, F-111 sorties were also used to strike pinpoint

targets ~ u c has radio communications facilities and bridges. Such strikes

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were generally in the target area, but, due to the nature of the targets

and unsuitable high drag ordnance, only limited damage was attained. For

example, radio cOlTvllunications facilities had a single essential element,

the transmitter /recei ver control bui 1di ng, generally protected by a con

crete blast wall requiring a direct hit to ensure destruction. Guided

ordnance, when weather conditions permitted its employment, offered by60

far the most efficient means of destroying such targets.

5) During LINEB CKER II operations, enemy reactions against F-llls

consisted primarily of moderate firings, with very few pilots reporting

accurate fire. Four aircraft were known to have sustained minor battledamage due to ground fire. Also, at least six S Ms were fired.at the

F-l11s, all observed on the f irst two nights of the operation. Whether

or not these or S M defenses directly caused the loss of F-111 air

craft is not known; however, two F-111s were lost due to unspecified causes61

during LINEB CKER II operations.

5) The f irst LINEB CKER II F-ll1 loss occurred on the f irst night

of operations, 18 December. The second loss occurred on 22 December.

In both instances, last contact was made with the aircraft while i t was·

egressing the target area. On 23 December, the day after the second

loss, contact was made with the two crewmembers who were down in an area

approximately 53 NM west of Hanoi. Contact with the aircraft commander

ceased on 24 December. n attempt to. pick up the Weapons System Officer

HSO) on 27 December was unsuccessful due to heavy ground fire. The

following day, survival supplies were dropped and the WSOwas told to

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mov west to a less hostile area. Last radio contact was made with him62on 1 9 iJecember. (Iloth crewmembers were among the prisoners of war

returned from N V i ~following the Vietnam ceasefire.II. (S)(U) ~ C e a s e f i r e

(S) ~ t hthe termination of LINERACKERII on 29 December. F-lll strikes

again shifted tl) Route Package and Laos. where on 3 January 1973 they

were f i r s t fraIJged to serve as PATHFItIDER for A-7 strikes in BARRELROLL.

During the f i r s t two weeks of January. F-l l ls flew 126 sorties 1n southern

NVN. Then. on ;15 January 1973. all U.S. Offensive operations and tacticalreconna i ssance over NVN ceased. For the remainder of the month all F-ll l

combat sorties ~ e r eflown in Laos. By the end of January that month s63

total of F-ll l sorties flown in -Laos stood a t 698.

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The F111 in SE Asia Pt1

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