THE FINAL COUNTDOWN - … FINAL COUNTDOWN 7 1 OVERVIEW Chapter summary • In July 2012, governments...

www.oxfam.org

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

A historic opportunity to deliver an arms trade treaty that saves lives

Oxfam is a member of

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

2

© Oxfam International July 2012

This paper was written by Deepayan Basu Ray, Martin Butcher and Ben Murphy. Oxfam acknowledges

the assistance of ATT Legal, Ed Cairns, Tom Fuller, Christian Gauthier, Daniel Gorevan, Libby Hayward,

Robert Lindner, Anna Macdonald, John Magrath, Jonathan Mazliah, Claire Mortimer, Chris Stevenson-

Drake, Nicolas Vercken and Helena Whall in its production. Primary research for Chapter 4 was conducted

by Holger Anders.

For further information on the issues raised in this paper, please e-mail [email protected]

This publication is copyright but the text may be used free of charge for the purposes of advocacy,

campaigning, education, and research, provided that the source is acknowledged in full. The copyright

holder requests that all such use be registered with them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in

any other circumstances, or for re-use in other publications, or for translation or adaptation, permission

must be secured and a fee may be charged. E-mail [email protected].

The information in this publication is correct at the time of going to press.

Published by Oxfam GB for Oxfam International under ISBN 978-1-78077-083-3 in July 2012.

Oxfam GB, Oxfam House, John Smith Drive, Cowley, Oxford, OX4 2JY, UK.

Oxfam

Oxfam is an international confederation of 17 organizations networked together in 92 countries, as part of

a global movement for change, to build a future free from the injustice of poverty. Please write to any of the

agencies for further information, or visit www.oxfam.org.

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.oxfam.org/

THE FINAL COUNDOWN

3

CONTENTS

Foreword ........................................................................................ 5

1 Overview ..................................................................................... 7

Grasping a historic opportunity .................................................................................. 7

Why this Treaty and why now? .................................................................................. 8

The solutions are right before our eyes ..................................................................... 9

A logical solution to a complex problem ..................................................................... 9

Call to action and recommendations for negotiators ................................................ 10

2 The Devil is in the detail ........................................................... 11

The case for regulation of the arms trade ................................................................ 12

Why is this important? ............................................................................................. 12

How could the ATT help? ........................................................................................ 13


3 Armed robbery .......................................................................... 17

The development costs of uncontrolled arms transfers ............................................ 18

The impact of corruption and lack of accountability ................................................. 19

A mutually reinforcing initiative: Embedding development in the ATT ...................... 20


4 Stop a bullet, stop a war .......................................................... 23

Silencing the guns: The importance of effective ammunition controls ...................... 24

Enhancing transparency and accountability ............................................................ 24

Strengthening existing controls................................................................................ 25

How can the arms trade treaty help? ....................................................................... 25


5 Piecing it all together ............................................................... 29

The case for global regulation of the trade in parts and components ....................... 30

Parts and components in small arms production ..................................................... 30

Closing potential loopholes in the Arms Trade Treaty .............................................. 31


Notes ............................................................................................ 35

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

4

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

5

FOREWORD

Conventional arms, and particularly small arms like pistols and rifles, have posed the greatest

threat to human security since the end of World War II. While there are a number of treaties

controlling the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, no similar

agreements exist for conventional arms.

It is not difficult to fathom that conventional arms have an incalculable destructive capacity – the

history of the 20th century is replete with examples of the chaos they can create. It is, however,

more difficult to reconcile that their international trade has little to no legally binding global rules.

This lack of comprehensive regulation remains an absurd reality of the 21st century.

This lack of comprehensive control has resulted in incalculable costs to lives and livelihoods

around the world. Irresponsible arms transfers have initiated or exacerbated armed violence

and armed conflict to epidemic levels in some communities, robbing families of futures, and

paralyzing communities.

A number of countries have resolved to deal with the problem of an unregulated arms trade

through the development of high national, sub-regional, or regional standards. Unfortunately,

they have too often fallen victim to the activities of those who operate outside their jurisdiction.

Without a set of global rules that binds everyone to a certain standard, it remains impossible to

make meaningful progress, particularly on arms control issues.

Following three years of heavy civil society lobbying, the UN General Assembly passed a reso-

lution in 2006 to begin discussions on what a global Arms Trade Treaty ought to look like. Three

years later, in 2009, the General Assembly passed a resolution to set in motion a formal proce-

dure that would culminate in July 2012 with a four-week long Diplomatic Conference for the Ne-

gotiation of an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

The Diplomatic Conference for an ATT therefore represents a historic opportunity to put in place

meaningful controls on the international sale and transfer of arms, including ammunition, parts,

and components. However, this negotiation will not be a straightforward process. Many fun-

damental challenges remain to be ironed out by negotiations.

This set of briefings outlines some of the key elements that must be in an ATT for it to protect

lives. That includes: (a) legally binding criteria to assess risks emerging from arms sales; (b)

the inclusion of items of control like ammunition; (c) the risk of irresponsible transfers of arms on

socio-economic development; and (d) the role that the international trade in parts and compo-

nents for weapons and military equipment now plays in the modern arms trade.

These are some of the key elements that the ATT must effectively address, along with other key

issues such as a comprehensive list of all conventional arms and ammunition, and risk assess-

ment criteria that not only includes development, but also human rights, humanitarian law, the

potential for armed violence – including gender based violence, corruption, and diversion of

arms to other groups.

There is a lot riding on these negotiations. But as the following briefings suggest, most of the

answers already exist. The challenge will be in not compromising, in staying ambitious, and

finding the political will to define and agree a treaty that will have a meaningful impact for gen-

erations to come.

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

6

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

7

1 OVERVIEW

Chapter summary

• In July 2012, governments have a historic opportunity to create a strong Arms Trade Treaty

that saves lives and livelihoods and builds a more secure future for all the world‟s citizens.

• Strong treaties gain new members and set international standards; weak treaties rarely get

stronger. Governments must not compromise during the final countdown for the sake of

securing universal agreement.

• The Treaty must cover all conventional arms, ammunition, parts and components, and all

types of arms transfers.

• It must include strong criteria that prevent arms being transferred where there is a

substantial risk that they will be used in violation of international human rights or

humanitarian law, or will undermine development.

• It must have strong measures for transparency and accountability, and an effective

implementation and enforcement mechanism. These must also assist countries to

effectively implement and monitor the Treaty.

Grasping a historic opportunity

The arms trade is out of control. The irresponsible trade of arms is devastating lives and

livelihoods around the world. In West Pokt, Kenya, Kiptela Tum's life has been irrevocably

affected by the easy access to weapons and ammunition, „Arms are a big problem because all

of my three brothers have died because of guns. Now I am the only one to take care of the

whole family and life is very hard‟.1 Nyang'ataing Yaratome, from the same community, must

come to terms with the loss of his son and eight other relatives because of armed raids on their

village.2 These terrible life experiences are replicated around the world on a daily basis, and the

world can no longer continue turning a blind eye.

The overwhelming majority of states have recognised this, and have agreed to negotiate an

Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).3 When governments convene in July 2012, they have a historic

opportunity to achieve a common objective – to bring the arms trade under control and reduce

human suffering. But they must exercise caution. Under no circumstances should countries

agree to a watered down Treaty that fails to achieve its objectives to reduce human suffering.

There are strong lessons to be learned from the past 20 years of arms control efforts.

Agreements like the Mine Ban Treaty (1997) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008)

were successful because they established strong, clear and unambiguous legal obligations on

all states parties, and helped to create new customary international standards.4

Unless there are unambiguous and comprehensive legal obligations that apply evenly across

the world, arms control mechanisms can be easily circumvented. Without a clear, strong set of

rules to control the arms trade, excessive military expenditure will continue unabated,

undermining global efforts to achieve development goals and reduce poverty. Without

obligations on transparency, the shadowy and secretive global trade in arms and ammunition

will continue unabated, fuelling corruption and hindering accountability. And without a

comprehensive scope, unscrupulous arms dealers will continue to make huge profits by trading

in parts and components – far more lucrative than the trade in complete weapons systems and

platforms. These challenges are considerable, but not insurmountable. To address them, the

ATT must have a clear and compelling humanitarian rationale, recall the rights and

responsibilities of all states to their citizens, and create a robust and comprehensive system to

control the international trade in arms. Decades from now, those looking back on the 21st

century should be able to judge the 2012 Treaty as a defining moment for global peace,

development and security.

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

8

Why this Treaty and why now?

The global arms trade is out of control

The absence of a global regulatory framework resulted in at least $2.2bn worth of arms and

ammunition being imported by countries under arms embargoes between 2000 and 2010.5

Regional embargoes or partial UN embargoes (especially those that are specific to certain

regions within countries) are destined for failure – as Syria horrifically, continues to

demonstrate. Despite mounting evidence of brutality and abuses, perpetrated by both sides,

Russia has actively blocked all attempts to impose a comprehensive UN embargo on the Assad

regime.6 The only mechanism in place so far is the EU embargo, which prevents all EU member

states from selling arms and ammunition to Syria. There is no such UN embargo. All non-EU

countries are therefore free to sell any quantity of arms and ammunition they like.

Arms are pouring into conflict-affected areas, increasing armed violence, fuelling

corruption, and destroying all hopes of development.

Military expenditure in fragile and conflict-affected countries around the world increased by 15

per cent between 2009 and 2010, while Official Development Assistance (ODA) to these

countries increased by only 9 per cent.7 A large share of the increase in ODA and humanitarian

aid was due to the Haiti earthquake in January 2010.8 Once the response to this earthquake

has been factored in, ODA to the remaining fragile and conflict-affected states grew by a mere

3.5 per cent. In 2010, this group of states accounted for less than 1 per cent of global wealth,9

but 7 per cent of all arms sales (around $1.7bn).10

Furthermore, Oxfam‟s research has shown a clear link between corruption and the arms trade.

All low-income and lower middle-income countries that allocated more than 10 per cent of their

central government expenditure to the military in 2009 scored poorly on global corruption

indices.11

Much of the international arms trade remains shrouded in secrecy, particularly the trade

in ammunition.

There is little publicly available evidence to help understand the size and scale of the

international trade in ammunition. Estimates suggest that the annual value of the trade in

ammunition for small arms and light weapons is $4.3bn – more valuable than the trade in

firearms.12

The international trade in ammunition is even less accountable and transparent than

the trade in arms.13

For example, there is no way of knowing just how much ammunition the

Syrian authorities have imported since the start of the uprising in 2011. In fact, the discovery of

a Russian shipment of several tonnes of ammunition bound for Syria in January 2012 was

purely accidental.14

There is little control or regulation of the global trade in parts and components.

The ATT must address this massive loophole. The ability to procure spare parts and other

critical replacement components is central to the arms trade. If the Treaty does not address this,

it will effectively allow countries to equip their entire armed forces outside of the Treaty.

Moreover, this trade is not insignificant – the overall value of global parts and components sales

was more than $9.7bn between 2008 and 2011.15

This vast stockpile of weapons parts ranges

from high-end components for aircraft, down to triggers, firing pins, and other parts for small

arms and light weapons. The lack of effective controls of this trade means there is no way of

knowing how much of it is being diverted into the black market. In turn, the flourishing of this

black market means that violators of international law and human rights can maintain their

destructive capabilities with relative ease.

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

9

The solutions are right before our eyes

Unless the Treaty establishes a set of strong and comprehensive global regulations, arms will

still find their way into the wrong hands. A useful starting point, therefore, are the national,

regional, and multilateral standards already in place.

Additionally, the ATT can build on existing regional and sub-regional initiatives; in 2012, 100

countries are already party to various regional agreements that include legally binding

obligations to control the trade of arms and ammunition.16

These regional initiatives are also a

good means of determining what can be effective in a range of different scenarios and contexts.

No globally negotiated standard should be lower than existing regional standards.

In the run-up to the July negotiations, some states have expressed concerns about the potential

cost and burden of implementing the ATT. The first and most obvious answer to this is that the

cost of not having effective global arms controls is much higher, both in terms of lives lost and

economics. Beyond this, there are a number of funding mechanisms already in place that could

help countries become ATT-compliant. For example, drawing on ODA funds earmarked for

security sector reform (SSR) could help to strengthen the capacity of police and customs

officials, while also building in strong accountability and transparency mechanisms. In 2010

alone, 101 countries received more than $832.5m worth of SSR-related assistance of direct

relevance to national implementation of the ATT.17

A logical solution to a complex problem

1. The ATT must have robust and legally binding criteria.

The ATT must be unambiguous in the obligations it places on member states. The Treaty must

use prohibitive language that prevents states transferring arms if there is a substantial risk that

these arms will:

• Be used to perpetrate serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law;

• Undermine socio-economic development or involve corrupt practices;

• Provoke or exacerbate armed conflict or armed violence, including gender-based armed

violence.18

2. The ATT must be comprehensive in the scope of weapons and types of transfers covered.

The ATT must include all weapons – that is, all military, security and police arms, related

equipment and ammunition, components, expertise, and production equipment. It must also

include all types of transfers: import, export, re-export, temporary transfer, and transhipment, in

the state-sanctioned and commercial trade, plus transfers of technology, loans, gifts, and aid.

And it must include all transactions, including those by dealers or brokers, and those providing

technical assistance, training, transport, storage, finance, and security.19

Precedents already exist in the form of a number of regional and multilateral instruments, such

as the ECOWAS Convention, the Best Practice Guidelines on the Implementation of the Nairobi

Protocol, the EU Common Position, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. These identify a broad

range of weapons, transfers, and transactions to apply controls over.

3. The ATT must include strong, effective international assistance and co-operation

mechanisms to help countries ratify and implement the Treaty.

For many states with limited national transfer control systems, well-defined mechanisms for

assistance and co-operation will be vital for effective implementation of the Treaty. The

international co-operation and assistance framework proposed under the Treaty will have a

critical bearing on its success. Therefore, the ATT must include effective mechanisms to identify

and match needs with resources. These mechanisms should be explicitly linked to

complementary and existing initiatives (such as bilateral and multilateral assistance

mechanisms, and thematic assistance like that of SSR) for maximum impact.20

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

10

4. The ATT must be ambitious but realistic in terms of national implementation obligations,

ratification, and dispute resolution.

The Treaty must set the minimum requirements for national implementation, which include

provisions for transparency, monitoring mechanisms, and evidence of capacity to enforce the

Treaty and thereby demonstrate compliance.21

Establishment of these mechanisms and

processes will place states in a much stronger position to control and monitor all movements of

arms and ammunition from, through, and to their national territory.

The Treaty should also outline a realistic mechanism for resolution of disputes, which may

include referral to external bodies, such as the International Court of Justice, if a state party is

confirmed to be in persistent and flagrant violation of the Treaty.

Finally, the Treaty must ensure that „entry into force‟ requirements are not dependent on any

one country or specific group of countries.

Call to action and recommendations for negotiators

Above all else, states must not forget the urgent humanitarian need to bring the 21st century

arms trade under control. The core humanitarian, human rights, and development rationale for

the ATT must not be compromised for universal agreement or profit.

Evidence about what happens when the arms trade is poorly regulated is there for all to see.

But the requirements for an effective arms control system are also clear to see. The ATT must

produce a system that is credible and fit for purpose. The cost of failure is simply too high.

A strong Treaty must include:

• A set of strong criteria that will stop the transfer of arms to those who abuse human rights,

violate humanitarian law, or seek to undermine development;

• A thorough risk assessment process to determine when transfers are likely to have serious

negative repercussions;

• All conventional arms and ammunition, as well as all parts and components, in its scope, so

that there are no loopholes;

• Effective mechanisms to help countries that will need assistance to comply with Treaty

requirements;

• Clear and unambiguous requirements on countries to comply, including obligations to

systematically report on all their arms transactions.

If this Treaty conference is to become a historic moment, and have a meaningful impact on the

lives of millions of vulnerable people around the world, governments must keep this simple

message in mind: there can be no compromise on the key elements needed for a strong Treaty.

To compromise would create a weak Treaty, full of loopholes and inconsistencies. A robust and

ambitious ATT, on the other hand, would oblige states to exert more scrutiny over arms exports

and limit the ability of unscrupulous arms dealers. It would prevent irresponsible arms transfers,

limit the ability of human rights abusers to obtain deadly weapons and ammunition, and reduce

the extent to which much-needed resources are diverted from essential services in order to buy

arms. It would strengthen democratic control and oversight on a deadly trade still fraught with

corrupt practices, which has a devastating impact on the peace and security of regions and

communities.

In short, states must remain ambitious, accept no compromise, and ultimately agree an Arms

Trade Treaty that will save lives. There can be no other rationale.

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN 2 The Devil is in the detail

11

2 THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAIL

The importance of comprehensive and legally binding criteria for arms transfers

Chapter summary

• The absence of comprehensive, international legal obligations to prevent irresponsible

transfers of arms has resulted in at least $2.2bn worth of arms and ammunition being

imported by countries under arms embargoes between 2000 and 2010;

• To have real impact, a prospective Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) must include legally

binding criteria that prevent arms transfers to abusers of human rights or into situations

where there is a substantial risk that they will undermine development or exacerbate

armed violence;

• The ATT can build on existing regional and sub-regional initiatives: as of 2012, 100

countries are already party to various regional agreements that include legally binding

obligations to control the trade of arms and ammunition.


12

The case for regulation of the arms trade

The global trade in most consumer goods is internationally regulated and carefully controlled. In

contrast, the global trade in arms and ammunition is not. Currently, there are no legally binding,

robust, and universally applicable criteria governing the transfer of weapons across borders.

This is despite the fact that more than 2,000 people are killed every day due to armed

violence.22

This lack of regulation has profound implications for the lives and livelihoods of

millions of women, men, and children throughout the world.

Between 2000 and 2010, and despite the 26 UN, regional, and multilateral arms embargoes in

force during this period,23

Oxfam estimates that at least $2.2bn worth of arms and ammunition

was imported by countries under arms embargoes.24

The arms trade urgently needs a set of

legally binding international rules to control the transfer of weapons. These rules, or criteria,

must be based on thresholds defined by legally binding obligations in international human rights

law, international humanitarian law, the UN Charter, and relevant UN conventions, covenants,

and treaties. Without this, some states have little incentive to prevent the irresponsible trade in

arms.

In order to have meaningful impact, arms embargoes and other prohibitions require a global

regime with clear, unambiguous legal obligations on states to refrain from certain types of

activities, such as „states shall not transfer arms…‟ The UN Diplomatic Conference on the Arms

Trade Treaty (ATT DipCon) will take place in July 2012. This offers member states of the UN a

historic opportunity to create a global, comprehensive, rules-based mechanism to control the

global trade in arms. For these negotiations to be successful and achieve real humanitarian

impact, states must agree a set of rules that prevent the transfer of arms where there is a

substantial risk that those arms would:

• Be used to perpetrate gross violations of international human rights law, or serious violations

of international humanitarian law;

• Undermine socio-economic development, or involve corrupt practices; or


violence.

Why is this important?

1. Stopping human rights abuses

The lack of robust and legally binding obligations governing the sale and transfers of arms

allows those perpetrating human rights abuses to continue to stock their arsenals. In 2010, for

example, Syria imported more than $1m25

worth of small arms and light weapons, ammunition,

and other munitions, as well as air defence systems and missiles worth an additional $167m.26

Some of these arms have played a central role in the Syrian government‟s crackdown on

protesters,27

in which the UN estimates that as many as 7,500 civilians were killed in 2011.28

A

report from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights outlined a litany of

government abuses, including apparent „shoot-to-kill‟ policies against protesters by snipers.29

The report further stated that, „Information provided to the commission illustrates the extensive

resources that the government and armed forces have devoted to efforts to control protests. In

addition to regular military units armed with automatic weapons, the military deployed snipers,

Special Forces units, tanks, armoured personnel carriers and intelligence units during

operations to end demonstrations.‟30


13

The humanitarian impact of the

arms transfers to Cote d‟Ivoire

while it was under an arms

embargo is stark. In 2006,

approximately 26,000 Ivoirians

sought refuge in other

countries, and 709,000

remained internally displaced.

Source:

UNHCR 2006 Statistical Yearbook

http://www.unhcr.org/478ce34a2.html;

UNHCR Global Report 2006

http://www.unhcr.org/4666d2340.html

2. The failure of embargoes and other instruments to prevent arms transfers

Oxfam‟s estimate, that $2.2bn worth of arms was

imported by states in contravention of embargoes, is

conservative; the actual amount is likely to be much

higher. There is a lack of data on arms transfers for

many of the relevant countries. In addition, Oxfam‟s

estimates do not capture the substantial volumes of

arms transfers into fragile situations just before arms

embargoes were imposed, as took place in Côte

d‟Ivoire, Iran, and Syria.31

They also do not include

cases where arms embargoes could not be agreed

multilaterally, despite the existence of a strong moral

and humanitarian case for doing so. The failure by the

UN Security Council in 2011-2012 to impose an arms

embargo on Syria – while the Syrian government

continues to import arms and ammunition freely – is

just the most recent illustration of this.

Furthermore, states must learn the lessons of previous

efforts at arms control – particularly the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light

Weapons (UNPoA). The UNPoA is not a legally binding mechanism, and so has not been able

to develop a globally applicable rules-based system. As a result, the UNPoA has generated little

or no meaningful humanitarian impact since its establishment in 2001.

3. Ensuring clear guidance on legal obligations

The ATT must include unambiguous legal obligations and clear guidance to member states.

This will minimise the scope that states have for interpretation of their responsibilities. Space for

interpretation can result in dangerous oversight or inaction. For example, the EU has imposed

an arms embargo on Syria, which all member states have been obliged to enforce since May

2011. However, lack of specific guidance on how to enforce this resulted in Cypriot authorities

failing to stop a cargo vessel containing arms and ammunition from Russia bound for Syria

when it transited through the port of Limassol in January 2012.32

4. Minimising opportunities for the misuse of arms

Unambiguous guidelines for governments making risk assessments when considering the

transfer of arms and ammunition are critical to the success of the ATT. Recent transfers of arms

to the Middle East and North Africa suggest that European arms exporters did not believe that

there was a significant likelihood of these heavy weapons being used against domestic civilian

populations.33

This assumption was used to justify arms sales to the governments of Libya as

recently as 2010, despite credible evidence to the contrary.34

Subsequently, some of these

weapons were used to deliberately target civilian protesters and were also used in

indiscriminate attacks in civilian areas.

How could the ATT help?

The ATT must create a legally binding instrument that includes a comprehensive set of risk-

assessment criteria for all future arms transfers. The criteria must be robust, covering the

potential consequences of arms transfers for human rights law, humanitarian law, socio-

economic development, corruption, and armed violence. But most importantly, these criteria

must be unambiguous and legally binding. Without this, the status quo will not change.

http://www.unhcr.org/478ce34a2.html

http://www.unhcr.org/4666d2340.html


14

If a robust and comprehensive mechanism controlling arms transfers had been in place, it would

have been very difficult for non-state armed actors like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

(LTTE) to acquire sophisticated Chinese weapons and ammunition during the 20-year conflict in

Sri Lanka. There is evidence that the LTTE purchased both small arms and ammunition for

heavier weapons (such as mortars and artillery) from China. One report stated that, „Recent

photographs of rebel troops available on pro-LTTE websites show a range of evidently new

Chinese weaponry including the modern 5.56 mm QBZ-95 bullpup-design assault rifle, which

cannot have been captured from government forces.‟35

This contributed to the escalation of the

conflict between the LTTE and government forces with devastating consequences for civilians

in Sri Lanka. The UN estimates that between 80,000 and 100,000 people have been killed and

more than 200,000 people displaced since the war in Sri Lanka began in the 1980s.36

The ATT represents a historic opportunity to bring together complementary, thematic, regional,

and parallel initiatives on arms transfer controls under one comprehensive framework. Legally

binding criteria enacting high standards are not an anomaly: 100 countries that are party to

various regional mechanisms have already agreed to robust, legally binding obligations to

control the trade of arms and ammunition.37

A further 35 countries are party to arms control

instruments that seek to create a common operational standard: the Wassenaar Arrangement

and the OSCE instrument on small arms and light weapons. Each of these mechanisms

articulate the key elements necessary to make the ATT effective – namely, prohibitive decision-

making processes if there is a risk that the arms would negatively impact on human rights and

development or contribute to corruption or armed violence. The ATT would harmonise these

initiatives into one comprehensive, legally binding, and universal instrument.


The UN preparatory process towards the ATT has revealed that there is a considerable appetite

amongst member states to agree a treaty. The challenge will be to ensure that the treaty is of

sufficient quality and substance. To be effective, the ATT must deliver a comprehensive, robust,

and legally binding global mechanism that is as unambiguous as possible.

This can be achieved in three ways.

1. Language of ‘shall not’

If the ATT is to have any significant humanitarian value it must emphasise prohibitive language.

It must use the terms „shall not‟, „should not‟, „must not‟, or „will not‟ – and their equivalents in all

other languages. Where this will matter most is in the wording of the criteria; the individual and

contextual considerations that allow or deny specific arms transfer requests.

2. Comprehensive criteria linked to ‘shall not’

Prospective arms transfers must be prohibited under the ATT where there are substantial risks

that they will:

• Be used to perpetrate gross violations of international human rights law, or serious violations

of international humanitarian law;

• Undermine socio-economic development or involve corrupt practices; or


violence.


15

3. Global standards must not be lower than existing regional and multilateral agreements

A global treaty must build on existing agreements to avoid any uncertainty about acceptable

thresholds for arms transfers. The criteria for arms transfers in the ATT must be wholly

consistent with – and no less ambitious than – existing mechanisms such as the EU Common

Position, the ECOWAS Convention, the Nairobi Protocol, and the OAS Model Legislation. All of

these regional agreements include comprehensive criteria and legally binding obligations built

on „shall not‟ language in their respective texts.

The 2012 ATT DipCon is an historic opportunity for UN member states to define acceptable

parameters for arms transfers, and to make these legally binding. To this end, negotiators must

not compromise on the robustness of the transfer criteria. In situations where there is a high risk

of negative consequences, arms transfers must be explicitly prohibited.

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

16

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN 3 Armed robbery

17

3 ARMED ROBBERY

How the poorly regulated arms trade is paralysing development

Chapter summary

• The poorly regulated global trade in arms and ammunition weakens the ability of

governments to sustain progress in development, both by fuelling and exacerbating

conflicts and armed violence, and by diverting resources away from poverty reduction

activities.

• Military expenditure in fragile and conflict-affected countries grew by 15 per cent

between 2009 and 2010, while Official Development Assistance (ODA) to these

countries grew by only 9 per cent.

• Irresponsible arms transfers fuel corruption, with knock on effects on development and

accountability. All low- and lower middle-income countries which allocated more than

10 per cent of their central government expenditure to the military in 2009 scored poorly

in corruption indices.

• Through a strong focus on development, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) can help prevent

serious impediments to development, consolidate regional initiatives to safeguard

development, and strengthen national capacity to become „treaty-compliant‟.

• Existing funding mechanisms are already in place which could help countries become

ATT-compliant. In 2010 alone, 101 countries received development assistance of direct

relevance to national implementation of the ATT.


18

The development costs of uncontrolled arms transfers

The irresponsible, excessive proliferation of arms and ammunition fuels and exacerbates

conflict and armed violence. This is why arms control initiatives have major implications for the

processes of socio-economic development. By implementing social and economic policies, as

well as those relating to poverty reduction, development, security sector and arms control,

governments can create the necessary environment to access essential services and enable

people to make the choices and decisions that affect their daily lives.

The poorly regulated trade in arms and ammunition weakens the ability and willingness of

governments to create these enabling environments. Development gains are reversed as

communities are paralysed; closing schools, placing immense strain on health systems,

discouraging investment, and undermining security.

The arms trade is big business – it is estimated that military spending around the world totalled

$1.6 trillion in 2010.38

Sales to fragile and conflict-affected states39

accounted for 7 per cent of

all arms sales (around $1.7bn) in 2010.40

In the same year, the global share of GDP for these

countries amounted to just 0.7 per cent of the total, and ODA amounted to $27bn.41

An

additional $4.8bn was provided in humanitarian aid that year to these countries.

According to the World Bank, 1.5 billion people live in areas affected by fragility, conflict, or

large-scale organised criminal violence, and no low-income fragile or conflict-affected country

has yet achieved a single UN Millennium Development Goal (MDG).42

On average, these states

„lag 40 to 60 per cent behind other low and middle-income countries in MDG achievement‟.43

The UN estimates that, in addition to current levels of ODA, a further $50–70bn is required to

meet the MDGs by 2015.44

It is therefore particularly worrying that military expenditure in fragile and conflict-affected

countries grew by 15 per cent between 2009 and 2010, while ODA to these countries grew by

only 9 per cent.45

The increase in ODA was grossly uneven, with the largest increases

concentrated in four countries and 12 countries experiencing reductions in ODA. In some cases,

military expenditure was nearly treble that of public expenditure on health or education. It is

worth recognising that the growth in military expenditure in these countries has happened

despite the global recession.

Between 1990 and 2006, Africa lost an estimated cumulative total of $284bn as a result of

armed conflict – on average $18bn per year. This was nearly the same as the total amount of

ODA that the continent received during this time.46

This has had dire impacts on socio-

economic progress. The World Bank estimates that the economic cost of lost production due to

conflict ranges from 2 per cent to 3 per cent of GDP. In addition, military spending increases

typically by 2.2 per cent during civil wars,47

drastically reducing the resources available to tackle

critical threats such as HIV/AIDS. To put this in context, in 2008 the MDG Africa Steering Group

identified an annual requirement of $14bn to scale up „effective HIV prevention and universal

access to AIDS treatment‟ across the continent.48

Armed violence has shrunk national economies in Africa by a staggering 15 per cent.49

Countries neighbouring those in conflict are also affected, losing up to 0.7 per cent of their

annual GDP for each neighbour involved in civil war.50

Furthermore, armed violence and conflict

place considerable strain on the delivery of public services, which means that governments and

public officials are forced to make difficult decisions on spending. In Zambia it costs $10–15 to

treat a patient with malaria, or to provide antiretroviral therapy and a month‟s course of anti-

tuberculosis medication in government health centres.51

At these rates, it would be possible to

scale up service delivery to meet the MDG targets on major diseases, given that Zambia‟s

annual per capita expenditure on health is $48.52

This investment is comprehensively degraded


19

when hospitals must instead treat patients injured by gunshot wounds or anti-personnel land

mines, at a cost of between $100 and $3,000 each.

In even relatively stable countries such as Zambia, evidence continues to suggest that paying

for the effects of armed violence undermines service delivery. As a result, the benefits of

stability and peace are slow to reach the most vulnerable members of society. This is more

evident still in fragile or conflict-affected states and in countries that have recently emerged from

conflict. This insecurity often creates conditions that drive demand for tools of violence, in turn

undermining the rule of law, diminishing security, and deepening poverty and suffering in a

vicious cycle.

The implications of military expenditure in Eritrea

Eritrea‟s military continues to be the largest recipient of central government resources.

Estimates for 2006 suggest that military expenditure was equivalent to 6.3 per cent of GDP

($163m in absolute figures) – the eighth highest share in the world that year. The armed

forces accounted for 9.3 per cent of the country‟s total labour force, the highest ratio in

Africa by far. Eritrea‟s arms imports were equivalent to nearly 35 per cent of total ODA

received between 2000 and 2006. This is significant, because ODA to Eritrea accounted

for an average of 36 per cent of the country‟s gross national income (GNI) in this period

The prioritisation of military expenditure has in many ways stifled socio-economic

development. For example, expenditure on health in 2011 was a mere 1.5 per cent of GDP

and education accounted for only 2 per cent, resulting in a literacy rate of just 58 per cent

for those aged above 15. Eritrea remains well behind the rest of Africa in its human

development scores and ranks globally at 177 out of 187 countries on the UNDP Human

Development Index. It has also scored poorly on transparency and corruption indices like

the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index.

Sources: CIA World Factbook 2011; OECD DAC (2008), p.41.; UNDP Human Development Index (2011)

The impact of corruption and lack of accountability

The notoriously secretive nature of the arms trade has allowed corruption to flourish. Many

governments continue to be secretive about the details of their defence budgets, and in some

cases military expenditure comes from off-budget sources, which have few or no public

oversight mechanisms.53

The unregulated arms trade has also facilitated irresponsible

procurement. All low- and lower middle-income countries which allocated more than 10 per cent

of central government expenditure to the military in 2009 scored poorly on corruption indices,

such as Transparency International‟s Corruption Perception Index, that year.54

This also held true when extended to include the data most recently available prior to 2009 for

the rest of the countries in these two classifications.

Without strong, accountable, and transparent governance structures, development processes

cannot take root and succeed in transforming lives.

In 2005, Transparency International estimated the global cost of corruption in the defence

sector to be a minimum of $20bn per year, based on data from the World Bank and SIPRI.55

This equates to the combined global ODA provided to Iraq, Afghanistan, the DRC, Congo,

Pakistan, and Bangladesh in 2008, or the total sum pledged by the G8 in L‟Aquila in 2009 to

fight world hunger.56


20

Corrupt arms deals not only affect the security of the recipient country, but also pose a

significant opportunity cost for countries to consider. In 1999, an arms deal between South

Africa and a number of European defence companies triggered numerous allegations of

corruption. The initial budget was estimated to be R9.2bn ($1.2bn), but by 2005 this had

increased to an estimated R66bn ($9.1bn).57

To put this into context, by 2008, for every R1

spent by the government of South Africa on providing assistance to South Africans living with

AIDS, an equivalent R7.63 was being spent on financing the arms deal.58

In a country where the

formal unemployment rate is around 30 per cent, the additional finances that were allocated for

this deal could have been invested into significant productive and socially beneficial initiatives.59

In summary, the irresponsible transfer of arms undermines development efforts when:

• The easy availability of and access to conventional arms and ammunition initiate, prolong,

and aggravate armed violence and conflict;

• Arms transfers affect prospects for peace, and undermine the rule of law and reconciliation

efforts in post-conflict environments;

• Expenditure on arms increases national debt and diverts vital and limited funds away from

public services such as education and health care;

• Expenditure on arms involves or encourages systemic corruption.

A mutually reinforcing initiative: Embedding development in the ATT

1. Preventing serious impediments to development

Although an ATT is not a panacea, it represents a key tool to impede irresponsible and

destabilising arms purchases. Firmly embedding development criteria for arms transfers in the

ATT would ensure that arms would not be transferred to places such as Myanmar, where in

2006 the value of arms imports was equivalent to a staggering 72 per cent of all ODA received

by the country.60

Other notable examples that year included Yemen (71 per cent) and Eritrea

(34 per cent).61

Another case in which an ATT could have prevented a transfer was the 2001 sale by a British

company of a military air control system for civilian purposes to Tanzania for £28m. At the time,

the UN International Civil Aviation Organisation reported that the system was „not adequate and

too expensive‟ for civil air control.62

A former industry official reportedly received £8m in bribes,

almost one-third the value of the entire deal.63

2. Consolidating regional initiatives to safeguard development

A number of regional instruments, such as the ECOWAS Convention, the Best Practice

Guidelines on the Implementation of the Nairobi Protocol, the EU Common Position, and the

Wassenaar Arrangement, commit states to assess the developmental impact of arms transfers

in recipient countries. The ATT must ensure that these regional thresholds on the implications

for socio-economic development are not undermined, and must create an architecture that

reinforces these minimum standards.


21

3. Strengthening national capacity to become ‘treaty-compliant’

Many states have suggested that the ATT must put in place mechanisms to curtail the diversion

of arms from the proper authorities and markets to illicit, terrorist, or clandestine groups. One

way to do this is to ensure that security sector officials are appropriately trained and incentivised

to do their jobs to the highest standards. Projects focusing on security sector reform aim to do

just that, and three areas of this are directly relevant to the ATT. These are:

• Monitoring, training, or retraining civil administrators and police forces in routine policing

functions;

• Training in customs and border control procedures;

• Civilian oversight and democratic control of security expenditure.

The international assistance and co-operation mechanisms for the ATT must link explicitly to

these complementary initiatives. This is primarily because the areas relevant for the ATT are

also eligible for existing funding mechanisms – through ODA budgets in particular. In fact,

statistics show that states are prepared to financially support these priorities. Cumulative

expenditure on ODA-eligible security sector activities by major donors in 2010 amounted to

$832.5m.64

Even after adjusting for Afghanistan ($124.3m), global ODA-eligible security sector

expenditure in 2010 amounted to over $708m. Including Afghanistan, 101 countries received

assistance in 2010, with Indonesia, Angola, Sudan, and Haiti each receiving in excess of $20m

in funds.65


A specific criteria on development, alongside other criteria on human rights and international

humanitarian law is the best way to ensure that arms sales do not have a negative impact on

socio-economic development. This criteria will not stop legitimate arms transfers, which can

help provide a secure space for development.66

There are five ways in which specific language in the treaty can protect development.

The preamble of the treaty must make reference to all relevant development-focused legal

obligations, as enshrined in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

relevant UN conventions and covenants, and other legally binding regional and sub-regional

treaties, such as the Arab Charter on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and

Peoples‟ Rights. It must recognise the symbiotic relationship between arms control, peace and

security, and socio-economic development. It must also recognise the implications of poor arms

control on armed violence, gender-based violence, corruption, poverty, serious violations of

human rights law and international humanitarian law, displacement of people, organised crime,

and the illicit trade in arms and narcotics.

The criteria of the ATT must stipulate that the transfer of conventional arms must be prohibited

if there is a substantial risk that those arms would seriously impair poverty reduction. Transfers

that negatively impact on efforts to achieve higher standards of living and on conditions of

economic and social progress and development, or which contravene the principle of least

diversion to armaments of human and economic resources, must also be prevented by the ATT.

The treaty must create a set of anti-corruption standards that states can use to assess specific

transfers on a case-by-case basis. These standards should focus on the types of arms to be

exported, the end-users, and the relevant controls already existing in the countries where the

end-users are based. These standards should also focus on brokers/agents/intermediaries and

the commissions they receive, as well as on the price/financial value of the deal in question.


22

The scope of the ATT must ensure that it is all-encompassing. It must include the tools of

violence that significantly undermine poverty reduction efforts – in particular small arms and

light weapons, and the ammunition that make these weapons lethal.

The co-operation and international assistance mechanisms outlined by the ATT must ensure

that states take proactive measures to realise the goals and objectives of the treaty. Practically,

this should include promoting or strengthening development programmes and co-operation at

the national, regional, and international levels. This means that assistance has to be about more

than technology transfers or bureaucratic assistance – the projects and programmes must help

to meet the development goals and priorities of partner countries.

Finally, to improve transparency and accountability, the implementation requirements of the

treaty must oblige States Parties to publish accurate and comprehensive, annual national

reports on international transfers of conventional arms.

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN 4 Stop a bullet, stop a war

23

4 STOP A BULLET, STOP A WAR

Why ammunition must be included in the Arms Trade Treaty

Chapter summary

• Guns are useless without bullets. An Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) that does not control

ammunition will not achieve its purposes.

• Ammunition is bigger business than weapons. Twelve billion bullets are produced each

year – nearly two bullets for every person in the world. The global trade in ammunition

for small arms and light weapons is worth more than the trade in firearms and light

weapons themselves: an estimated $4.3bn per annum.

• The international trade in ammunition is even less accountable and transparent than

the trade in arms. Ammunition flows are difficult to monitor, so the risk of diversion to

unauthorised or illicit users is increased.

• Several countries, including the USA, China, Egypt and Syria, are arguing that

ammunition should be excluded from the ATT. Some of these countries say the sheer

volume of trade makes it too difficult to monitor. This would be a colossal mistake.

There are now several reasonably simple and effective ways to track ammunition

transfers. Inclusion in the ATT would significantly strengthen these mechanisms and

the resolve to implement them. Failure would undermine what best practice already

exists.


24

Silencing the guns: The importance of effective ammunition controls

Wars cannot be fought without ammunition. When the principal targets of attack are civilians, as

has been the case in many recent conflicts, a lack of ammunition can even make a difference

between atrocities being carried out or not. For example, in June 2003, anti-government forces

attacking Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, were forced to retreat when they ran out of

ammunition. It was only when they received fresh – illegal – supplies from neighbouring Guinea

that they were able to resume their onslaught, which proved to be the longest and most

devastating attack on Monrovia‟s civilians.67

Countless lives were lost and a massive

humanitarian operation had to be undertaken by Oxfam and others.68

In 2007, a lack of ammunition forced warring pastoralists in South Sudan to resolve their

disputes peacefully.69

In 2010, the panel of experts monitoring the UN Security Council arms

embargo in Somalia reported that the absence of readily available ammunition for certain types

of weapons had limited their popularity and use by armed groups.70

An Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) that does not cover ammunition will fail to achieve what it has set

out to do – that is, to help prevent human suffering, armed conflict, and serious violations of

international humanitarian law and human rights. It is illogical to argue otherwise. Guns can be

almost endlessly recycled and re-used, moving from conflict to conflict.71

The phrase „when the

war ends, the guns remain‟ is often heard in parts of Africa, where it is estimated that more than

50 per cent of small arms and light weapons in circulation are used illegally, not only in conflicts

but in armed robbery, organised crime and terrorism.72

This self-perpetuating cycle of violence can only continue so long as it is fuelled by the

irresponsible transfer of ammunition. A global system of strong, legally binding controls on

ammunition transfers under an ATT would help stem the flow of ammunition to human rights

abusers, repressive regimes and illicit armed groups, rendering many of their weapons ineffective.

Enhancing transparency and accountability

The trade in ammunition is even less accountable and transparent than the trade in arms. Only

a small number of countries report on their ammunition exports and there are hardly any reports

by intergovernmental agencies covering this trade. Often data on ammunition is not categorised

separately and is just lumped in with data on arms exports,73

making it difficult to determine the

actual volume of international trade in ammunition and to monitor where it actually ends up.

However, it is certain that the trade in ammunition is very, very big business. An estimated 12

billion rounds of ammunition are produced each year74

– nearly two bullets for every person in

the world. Studies estimate that the trade in ammunition for small arms and light weapons is

worth $4.3bn per annum – more valuable than the trade in small arms and light weapons

themselves (an estimated $2.68bn).75

It is also growing at a faster rate.76

Oversight and documentation of ammunition transfers is all the more important because

ammunition is even more easily transferable than arms, and thus can be more easily diverted

from legitimate to illicit users. Some of the biggest gaps in information relate to undocumented

ammunition transfers to countries undergoing high-intensity conflicts, including Afghanistan and

Somalia,77

where, even if the initial transaction was legitimate, there are significant risks of

diversion. In 2009, 57 per cent of a sample of rifle magazines found on Taliban casualties in

Afghanistan contained cartridges or bullets identical to ammunition that the USA had provided

to its ally, the Afghan government forces.78

Similarly in Somalia, the UN Monitoring Group

estimated that, in 2008, as much as 80 per cent of the arms, ammunition and other material

supplied to support the Transitional Federal Government had been diverted to opposition

groups, the Somali arms market, or for private purposes.79


25

Strengthening existing controls

Several countries, including China, the Philippines, Vietnam and the USA, have argued that

including ammunition in the ATT would be too difficult to implement and manage – given the

sheer volume produced and exported, as well as the challenges faced in tracing individual

rounds.80

They say that having ammunition in the ATT would create a huge set of new

obligations that would be too difficult to monitor.

However, despite deficiencies in practice, the overwhelming majority of states that export

military equipment already have controls for ammunition through their arms export control

systems. Most countries assess licence applications for arms and ammunition transfers in the

same way and apply the same risk assessment thresholds. The USA does this and similar

explicit arrangements are in force in the EU and within countries participating in the Wassenaar

Arrangement.81

Several regional and multilateral instruments also explicitly seek to control the cross-border

trade in ammunition. These include the 2006 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light

Weapons and the 2005 Best Practice Guidelines on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Horn

and Eastern Africa.82

The problem, as is often the case, is not with the existing regulations per se, it is that they are

not always properly enforced or backed up with robust oversight and monitoring mechanisms.

This applies to the international arms trade more generally. On the one hand, transparency has

improved steadily over the past 20 years. On the other hand, reporting remains inconsistent and

incomplete.83

Few governments provide regular and comprehensive information about their

arms transfers; only 34 states have publicly reported on their arms exports at least once since

2006.84

It is important to note, however, that 28 of these 34 managed to include ammunition in

their reporting as a separate and discrete category.

The ATT is intended to change that by strengthening existing controls and enhancing

transparency and accountability in the arms trade generally. With regards to ammunition, the

least transparent aspect of that trade, the ATT should seek to replicate, widen, encourage and

strengthen the best practice that already exists, rather than ignore it and weaken or still further

undermine it. Just as it will not be necessary to monitor the transfer of every single firearm

individually, under the ATT an effective risk assessment system will not mean that the journey of

every individual bullet has to be monitored.

How can the arms trade treaty help?

1. Enhancing national control systems for ammunition

The ATT will set out a global regulatory framework for authorising and recording international

transfers of arms. To do this effectively countries will have to: establish a national system,

including clear legislation; develop and strengthen administrative capacity for processing all

aspects of transfers; and introduce mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing compliance.

Establishing these systems will have to be done regardless of whether ammunition is included,

but existing best practice illustrates that once in place, national export control systems are fully

capable of controlling ammunition transfers in the same way as arms.

2. Setting out risk assessment criteria for both arms and ammunition transfers

The ATT will set out a list of risk assessment criteria against which transfers of arms will be

assessed before approval. Using this system does not require monitoring each individual

firearm, or each individual bullet, in order to assess the risk of misuse or diversion of arms or


26

ammunition to unauthorised end users. Rather, under the ATT, transfer licensing authorities

would apply a systematic methodology that considers past trends or patterns, intelligence, and

credible information about prior misuse or diversion by the stated end-user. Such assessments

would also consider whether there is a substantial risk of ammunition being used to commit

serious human rights violations. Exporting states would be obliged to consider the track record

of the end user and bear a share of the responsibility if arms or ammunition were subsequently

diverted.

In fact, in some ways it should be easier to monitor end use and identify sources of diversion of

ammunition than of firearms. This is because ammunition used in conflicts typically originates

from state actors who were originally in legal possession of it, rather than from private

individuals. A job lot of small arms ammunition produced for state actors is typically only

transferred to a single, or a small number of, end users.

An Undeniable Risk: Tracing illicit ammunition in Côte d’Ivoire

In 2010, the UN Group of Experts on Côte d‟Ivoire were asked to trace several thousand

rounds of illicit ammunition found in the hands of civilians in the capital. The Group‟s work,

and subsequent follow-up investigations, established that the ammunition had been

manufactured in Serbia, sold to an agent in Israel, and then legally re-transferred to the

military in Burkina Faso. It had then disappeared and re-appeared on the streets of Abidjan

in neighbouring Cote d‟Ivoire.

While the exact details of the diversion could not be established, the Group maintained that,

based on credible evidence, the ammunition likely entered Côte d‟Ivoire via Burkina Faso,

revealing clear challenges to the capacity of the Government of Burkina Faso to ensure the

security of its national stockpile and prevent diversion. Further investigations, physical

evidence, and key informant reports verified that Burkina Faso was the primary conduit for

illicit supplies of both arms and ammunition to Côte d‟Ivoire, illustrating a high risk of arms

originating from the Security Forces of Burkina Faso being diverted for illicit use.

Source: UNSC (2011) „Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d‟Ivoire pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security

Council Resolution 1946 (2010)‟, UN document S/2011/272, paras 124, 127, pp.31-2; paras 129-30, pp.33-4

3. Transparency and reporting

Given that current levels of public reporting on the transfer of ammunition are so low, improved

reporting on such transfers, as a discrete category under an ATT, would greatly reduce the

significant gaps in information which currently blight the system. Improved public reporting on

authorised ammunition transfers would increase opportunities for citizens to scrutinise and hold their

governments to account for their arms transfer decisions. It would also provide a valuable source of

information for UN Groups monitoring implementation of UN Security Council embargoes.85

Existing best practice for reporting on ammunition transfers has not been shown to pose undue

logistical challenges. Despite claims that ammunition transfers are so large as to represent an

unmanageable part of the global arms trade, the number of licences that EU member states

granted for ammunition transfers in 2010 amounted to a mere 4.8 per cent of the number of

licences granted for all military equipment.86

Since the ATT will apply only to international transfers, reporting will not oblige states to divulge

sensitive information, such as existing stockpile quantities or domestic production.87

Additionally, as reporting will occur months, if not years, after a transfer has been authorized,

sensitive security information about military operations will not be jeopardised.


27


Supportive states must set out specific means to demonstrate how ammunition can be

practically and effectively controlled under an ATT. Existing best practice already provides a

concrete basis and has demonstrated that it does not require elaborate additional mechanisms

or infrastructure, or present undue logistical or reporting challenges. Supportive states should

argue for:

1. The explicit inclusion of ammunition within the scope of the ATT

The scope of the ATT should explicitly include ammunition and make clear that ammunition

transfers are subject to the same risk assessment criteria as transfers of arms, prior to

authorisation.

2. Clear definitions

Ammunition for use in all firearms covered by the ATT, including small arms and light weapons,

should be explicitly included in the Treaty. The definition used should ensure that all ammunition

calibres, as well as munitions, are covered by the ATT. Definitions found in existing international

arrangements such as the Wassenaar Arrangement and EU Common Position would provide a

useful basis.

3. Clear and practical reporting requirements

Reporting on ammunition transfers under an ATT should be consistent with regional and

national best practice. At a minimum they should include:

• The country of destination;

• The financial value of the transaction;

• An indication of the quantity – either lot numbers or overall quantity of individual rounds; and

• Whether the export is for a commercial or state actor market.

States should strongly consider including additional categories in reports that identify broad

ammunition types (e.g. small arms ammunition), sub-categories such as machine pistol or

assault rifle ammunition, or even calibre sizes. This more detailed information would be

consistent with the current reporting standards of many countries including the UK, Romania,

Germany, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro. Additionally, more

detailed information has proven highly useful to map and verify patterns of ammunition

acquisition in particular conflict situations or following a violent event, and could play an

instrumental role in preventing subsequent transfers where a risk of diversion or misuse is

high.88

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

28

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN 5 Piecing it all together

29

5 PIECING IT ALL TOGETHER

Why the Arms Trade Treaty must regulate parts and components for weapons and military equipment

Chapter summary

• Modern weapons and military equipment cannot be made or maintained without parts and

components. But these are traded around the world in a globalised market that is poorly

regulated.

• Between 2008 and 2011, the global trade in parts and components was worth at least

$9.7bn.

• Weapons are assembled from components sourced from all corners of the world –

frequently from countries without any effective arms transfer controls.

• The poorly regulated trade in spare parts allows irresponsible users to circumvent arms

embargoes.

• The Arms Trade Treaty provides a unique opportunity to regulate the specialised parts and

components used in the arms trade and, indeed, will be fatally flawed if it does not do so.


30

The case for global regulation of the trade in parts and components

Modern weapons and military equipment cannot be made or maintained without the parts and

components that are traded around the world in a globalised market. Without regulating this

trade alongside the trade in complete weapons, it will be impossible to reduce the impact of

irresponsible arms transfers on human rights, security, and development.

Between 2008 and 2011, the global trade in parts and components was worth at least $9.7bn.89

This vast stockpile of weapons parts ranged from high-end components for aircraft to parts for

small arms and light weapons (SALW). Without this huge movement of parts and components,

the arms trade as we know it could not exist.

Parts and components in small arms production

The vast majority of the weapons and ammunition used in conflicts in Africa, including rifles,

rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), mortars, machine guns, and similar SALW are imported

from outside the continent.90

There is, however, a burgeoning industry of SALW production in

several sub-Saharan African countries, which has been facilitated with the assistance of

countries outside the region. In many cases this trade is legitimate, but in others the weapons

are used to commit violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.

One of the products in widespread production and circulation across Africa is the Kalashnikov

(or the AK-47) rifle – dubbed by Oxfam in 2006 as the „world‟s favourite killing machine‟.91

The

effects of this rifle have been particularly devastating to Africa. Between 1990 and 2005, the

continent lost more than $18bn every year due to armed conflict.92

Today, some 50 to 70 million

rifles are in circulation, and have been used in nearly all the continent‟s wars and rebellions in

the past 70 years. This is in part due to multiple local production sources, and also the activities

of criminal brokers like Viktor Bout. Cheap and simple to maintain, the AK-47 is the weapon of

choice in many countries lacking in technological capacity.

Several Ethiopian companies produce Kalashnikov rifles, mortars, grenade launchers, and

small arms ammunition. The Gafat Armament Engineering Complex (GAEC) began producing

the Kalashnikov variant, the AK-103, in the 1990s, with assistance, parts, and raw material from

North Korea.93

Further parts were imported in 2006.94

This weapon was used in the Ethiopia–

Eritrea War of 1998–2006 and in the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2008.

Nigeria‟s Defence Industries Corporation also produces a version of the Kalashnikov rifle and its

ammunition, with assistance from China.95

The firm claims that it is able to assemble Belgian

mortars, Soviet-era rifles, and RPGs, as well as Belgian and Italian light machine guns.

Like other producers – in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Namibia, and Zimbabwe – none of these

companies could function without assistance, technology, and parts and components from

outside Africa – and many of these are transferred without effective controls that would ensure

that this trade supports security rather than undermines it.


31

Closing potential loopholes in the Arms Trade Treaty

At one end of the scale, there is a steady increase in „online retailers‟ selling components for

SALW around the world.96

At the other, global defence companies build tanks, aircraft, and

other major systems with parts and components from multiple sources and from many

countries. BAE, for example, sources major components from six countries for its Challenger 2

tank, which is built in the UK.97

Some less industrialised countries buy equipment such as tanks or aircraft in kit form; these are

transported as components to be put together in the buyer country, in „licensed production‟. In

2011, the Egyptian government signed an extension to a longstanding deal to assemble

American M1A1 Main Battle Tanks in Egypt. By the end of the contract, the government will

have bought 1,130 M1A1s for assembly in Egyptian factories.98

Chinese K-8E jet trainer

aircrafts are also being assembled in Egypt through a similar deal.99

The trade in parts and components is now a global business. Not regulating deals like these

under the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) will create a loophole large enough for nations to equip their

entire armed forces outside of the treaty.

The ability to procure spare parts is essential to maintain weapons and vehicles, and the weak

regulation of this trade has significantly blurred the lines between the licit and illicit markets –

resulting in a flourishing black market for military spare parts.

Without spare parts, weapons quickly become useless. This applies not only to weapons in the

hands of legitimate and responsible security forces, but also to those in the hands of groups

who may use them to violate human rights or fuel conflict. Because of such concerns, Libya and

Iran have been subject to a series of national, regional, and UN embargoes. The very different

ability of these two countries to acquire spare parts underlines the importance of regulating this

trade in order to uphold international law and avoid fuelling the illegal arms trade.


32

Libya and Iran

In 2011, Libya had a theoretical total of 374 combat aircraft, but most of these were

inoperable, limiting the Gaddafi regime‟s ability to attack its own civilians.100

As early as

2004, US military analyst Anthony Cordesman had described Libya as the „world‟s largest

military parking lot‟, as so few of its combat aircraft were in service, after international

sanctions had made spares largely unobtainable.101

Even before NATO introduced a no-fly

zone over the country, there had been few reports of attack helicopters or combat aircraft

actually being used. Pilots reported flying just a handful of missions, and one aircraft

actually crashed due to mechanical failure.102

However, the uncontrolled trade in parts has allowed other countries to undermine arms

embargoes. Iran has a network of dealers operating in both legal and illegal markets to

circumvent US and UN sanctions. It has a substantial air force, including around 300

combat aircraft,103

60 per cent of which are estimated to be operational at any one time.

These are kept operational by the trade in spare parts and by significant domestic

production of components through reverse engineering of equipment that Iran already

owns or has been able to obtain on the black market.104

In 2010, a French dealer was

imprisoned in the USA for attempting to export F-5 fighter jet engines and parts to Iran,105

and the Irish company Mac Aviation Group was charged with purchasing F-5 parts from

US firms and illegally exporting them to Iran.106

For all these reasons – particularly the globalised nature of the arms trade – it is vital that parts

and components are included in a legally binding international ATT. This does not mean that the

sale of every nut, bolt, or spring should be controlled. But it does mean regulating those parts

and components that are specifically designed, manufactured, or modified for military purposes,

and which are critical to functioning weapons and their ammunition.107

Without global regulation of the trade in parts and components, it will be impossible to

effectively regulate any part of the arms trade, as companies will be able to circumvent the rules

by shipping weapons in pieces from multiple countries around the globe. If the legitimate trade

in parts and components is globally regulated in a transparent manner by the ATT, then

identifying and shutting off the illicit trade will become much easier. The trade standards

contained in the ATT, incorporated into national law by all states party to the treaty, will be the

only way to know what is being traded and where, and thus to allow that trade to be controlled.


States that support a robust and effective ATT must advocate strongly for the inclusion of

specialised parts and components in the scope of the treaty. This would not include simple

items, but only those specifically designed and manufactured for the arms industry.

The global trade in parts and components is an integral part of the arms trade. Weapons and

military equipment are built from parts sourced from across the world, or can be shipped across

borders in pieces for assembly.

Parts and components are also an integral part of after-sales servicing to maintain or repair

equipment, including by irresponsible users. This is true for major items of equipment, such as

aircraft and tanks, and also for small arms and light weapons.


33

All governments should ensure that:

• The ATT includes in its scope all specialised parts and components designed and produced

for the arms industry or able to be used in defence equipment;

• Just like all completed weapons and systems, the transfer of parts and components is

subject to comprehensive risk assessments undertaken by exporting authorities –

particularly because exports of obscure components may well have a critical role in reviving

the full lethal capacity of a weapon or system;

• Transfers of such parts and components are fully included in ATT reporting requirements,

with reports made public to enhance transparency and accountability.

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

34

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

35

NOTES 1 Interviews with residents of West Pokot, Kenya in June 2012.

2 Ibid. 3

UN General Assembly Resolution 64/48 from 2009 outlined a timeline of discussions and consultations,

culminating in a four-week Diplomatic Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty to be held in July 2012.

4 It must be noted that both the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and

Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (colloquially referred to as the Mine Ban Treaty) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions are prohibitions/bans, which the ATT is not. Furthermore, both have been negotiated in forums outside the UN.

5 D. Basu Ray (2012) „The Devil is in the Detail: The importance of comprehensive and legally binding

criteria for arms transfers‟, Oxfam Briefing, Oxford: Oxfam International, May, p. 2

6 J. Irish (2012) „France to push Russia on Syria sanctions, expels envoy‟, Reuters, 29 May

7 D. Basu Ray (2012) „Armed Robbery: How a poorly regulated arms trade is paralysing development‟,

Oxford: Oxfam International, June, p. 2

8 In Haiti, between 2009 and 2010, development assistance increased threefold (from $1.1bn to $3.0bn),

and humanitarian assistance increased eleven-fold (from $142m to $1.56bn (OECD StatExtracts 2012)

9 The total cumulative gross domestic product (GDP) of this group of fragile and conflict-affected states

amounted to around 0.7 per cent of total global GDP for 2010. Source: OECD StatExtracts 2012; World Development Indicators

10 Composite of 2012 World Development Indicators data and OECD StatExtracts 2012

11 „Armed Robbery‟, op. cit., p. 4

12 B. Murphy and D. Basu Ray (2012) „Stop a Bullet, Stop a War: Why ammunition must be included in the

Arms Trade Treaty‟, Oxford: Oxfam International, May, p. 3

See also P. Dreyfus, N. Marsh, M. Schroeder (2009) „Sifting the Sources: Authorized small arms transfers‟, in Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 7; P. Herron, N. Marsh, M. Schroeder (2011) „Larger but Less Known: Authorized light weapons transfers‟, in Small Arms Survey 2011: States of Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 9

13 Ibid.

14 L. Harding (2012) „Cyprus stops Syria-bound Russian ammunition ship‟, the Guardian, 11 January,

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/11/cyprus-stops-syria-russian-ship

15 M. Butcher and D. Basu Ray (2012) „Piecing it Together: Why the Arms Trade Treaty must also regu-

late parts and components‟, Oxfam International, June, p. 2

16 „The Devil is in the Detail‟, op. cit., p. 4

17 OECD StatExtracts 2012

18 „The Devil is in the Detail‟, op. cit., p. 5

19 Control Arms Coalition (2009) „The Vital Components of an Arms Trade Treaty‟,

http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/ATT-one-pager_english.pdf 20

This could include, inter alia: (a) development or review of legislation and administrative procedures; (b) development or strengthening of states parties‟ international arms transfer control systems; (c) enhancing the capacity of law enforcement agencies; (d) development of international arms transfer data-management; (e) development of the capability to produce an annual report; (f) development of capacity to prevent diversion; (g) training of relevant personnel; and (h) victim assistance. See: Control Arms Coalition (2011) „Promoting Implementation of the ATT‟, Position Paper No. 4, June, http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Implementation.English.NEW_.final_.pdf

21 Ibid.

22 Whereas the headline figure from the 2011 Report of the Geneva Declaration Secretariat is 526,000

people who are directly killed by armed violence each year, the figure dramatically increases when the indirect conflict deaths are added to the figure, to give an estimate of 742,000 per year – averaging to about 2092 deaths per day. Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2011), „Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011: Lethal Encounters‟, Geneva, Geneva Declaration Secretariat, pg.70.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/11/cyprus-stops-syria-russian-ship

http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/ATT-one-pager_english.pdf

http://controlarms.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Implementation.English.NEW_.final_.pdf

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

36

23

SIPRI Arms Embargoes Database http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes

24 This figure is derived by an analysis of all arms embargoes that were in force between 2000 and 2010,

including UN, regional organisations, and multilateral initiatives. Only full embargoes on UN member states were considered, all partial embargoes or those placed on non-governmental forces were disregarded. Only full years when these embargoes were in effect were counted, disregarding partial years when embargoes were either imposed or lifted. Data from two sources was used: the UNCOMTRADE (http://comtrade.un.org/) and the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers), relying on figures from one or the other to determine imports and/or purchases. In the case of Zimbabwe, where the available data from COMTRADE and the SIPRI database were conflicting, the SIPRI data was used because it more accurately reflected the reality on the ground. The figure of $2.2bn is therefore a conservative estimate, based on the data available for four countries under UN embargoes, five countries under EU embargoes, and one country under an OSCE embargo. Data from a further eight countries under UN embargoes, two countries under EU embargoes, and six embargoes on non-government forces were not available at the time of research. Furthermore, import data from China is not included because China is not under a complete embargo by the EU. However, there is concrete evidence to suggest that EU members have consistently broken the terms of this partial embargo during the period in question. According to the SIPRI database, China has imported in excess of $22bn over the period in question.

25 United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN COMTRADE),

http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx. Customs codes referenced: [HS1996 code 930100] Military weapons, other than hand guns, swords, etc; [HS1996 code 930200] Revolvers and pistols; [HS1996 code 930510] Parts and accessories of revolvers or pistols; and [HS1996 code 930690] Munitions of war, ammunition/projectiles and parts.

26 SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, TIV (trend indicator value) tables of arms exports to Syria, 2006-2010‟,

http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php

27 United Nations (2011), „Top UN human rights body orders inquiry into Syrian violence‟, 23 August,

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39357&Cr=Syria&Cr1 (last accessed 2 April 2012).

28 UN Department of Public Information (2012), „Top UN Political Official tells Security Council Talks

Started between Israelis, Palestinians in Amman Have „Stalled‟, Time not on Side of Either Party: In Briefing, B. Lynn Pascoe also updates on “Rapidly Deteriorating” Syria Situation, Transfer of Power in Yemen, Impact of Syria Crisis on Lebanon‟, Security Council, 6725th Meeting (AM), 28 February, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10560.doc.htm (last accessed 2 April 2012).

29 Human Rights Council (2011), „Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian

Arab Republic‟, p.15, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/SpecialSession/Session18/A-HRC-S-17-2-Add1.pdf

30 Ibid., p.20.

31 According to COMTRADE data, Côte d‟Ivoire imported $36m of heavy weapons in 2004, just prior to the

establishment of the UN embargo on 15 November that year. SIPRI data show that Syria imported $167m worth of air defence systems and missiles in 2010, just prior to the start of the civilian protests in 2011 and the EU Embargo of 09 May 2011. Finally, according to SIPRI data, Iran imported $423m worth of aircraft, air defence systems, armoured vehicles, engines, and missiles in 2006, just prior to the UN embargo established on 06 December 2006.

32 T. Grove and M. Kambas (2012), „Russian-operated ship with bullets reaches Syria‟, Reuters, January 13.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/13/syria-russia-ship-idUSL6E8CD4DD20120113

33 A.Vranckx, Slijper, F., and R. Isbister (eds.) (2011), „Lessons from MENA: Appraising EU Transfers of

Military and Security Equipment to the Middle East and North Africa‟, Gent: Academia Press, pp.10-11, http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Lessons%20from%20MENA%20Nov%202011.pdf

34 See for example, the UK justification for the transfer of armoured personnel carriers to Libya in 2007:

Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2008), „United Kingdom Strategic Export Controls Report – 2008‟, London, pp.13-14.

35 A. Webb-Vidal and A. Davis (2008), „Lords of war - running the arms trafficking industry‟, Jane’s

Intelligence Review, May

36 Ibid.

37 EU Common Position (binding on 25 countries); CIFTA (binding on 35 countries); ECOWAS Convention

(binding on 15 countries); the Nairobi Protocol (binding on 12 countries); and the SADC Firearms and Ammunition Protocol (binding on 16 countries, three of which are also signatory to the Nairobi Protocol). The EU Common Position proposes a tiered system which must not be adopted in the ATT.

38 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2011) „Background Paper on SIPRI Military Expenditure Data, 2010‟, Sweden. http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/factsheet2010

39 The list of fragile and conflict-affected states is a composite of three indices on fragile states: the World Bank „Low-Income Countries Under Stress‟, the Foreign Policy „Fragile States Index‟, and the Carleton University „Failed and Fragile States project‟. The composite list includes 23 countries that are common

http://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes

http://comtrade.un.org/

http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx

http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=39357&Cr=Syria&Cr1

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10560.doc.htm

http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/SpecialSession/Session18/A-HRC-S-17-2-Add1.pdf

http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/SpecialSession/Session18/A-HRC-S-17-2-Add1.pdf

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/13/syria-russia-ship-idUSL6E8CD4DD20120113

http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Lessons%20from%20MENA%20Nov%202011.pdf

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/factsheet2010

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

37

across all three indices, and also includes Yemen (scoring high on the WB and FP indices, but not appearing on the Carleton index) and Syria (included due to the continued civil unrest that began in January 2010).

40 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (2010), „Trend Indicator Value table of Top 200 importers‟, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers

‘Low-income‟ and „lower middle-income‟ classifications are based on World Bank country classification systems. For more details, see: http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications

41 The amount for ODA does not include Humanitarian Assistance, and is the value of Net ODA as indicated in the OECD DAC Statistics database.

World Bank (2012), World Development Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD ; OECD DAC „Development Database on Aid from DAC Members‟, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE2A

42 World Bank (2011) „World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development‟, Washington, p.5.

43 Ibid., p.62.

44 This estimate is based on 2006 projections of ODA increasing to $152bn by 2010, and to $195bn by 2015. The OECD DAC database shows that ODA rose to $141bn in 2010, so these projections remain relevant. UN Millennium Campaign (2006) „Expanding the Financial Envelope to Achieve the Goals‟. http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/table_8.gif

45 All available comparable data on military expenditure and ODA to the composite list of fragile and conflict affected states were tallied, and a percentage change was determined in both sets of data between 2009 and 2010 – the most recently available years for the datasets for both categories. World Bank and OECD-DAC data shows that of the list of 25 fragile and conflict affected countries, 12 experienced a reduction in ODA between 2009 and 2010, nine experienced a moderate increase of between $3m-$107m, and 4 countries experienced massive increases of at least $900m or more. The ODA data does not include humanitarian assistance delivered in 2010 because humanitarian assistance figures were massively skewed by the Haiti earthquake in January 2010, which resulted in a huge increase to Haiti from 2009 ($142m) to 2010 ($1.56bn). In fact, if ODA and Humanitarian Assistance data were to be combined, and the effect for Haiti to be adjusted in the analysis, then total assistance to this list of fragile and conflict-affected states would have dropped between 2009 and 2010 by 3 per cent. The data for military expenditure is a conservative estimate because the analysis has excluded incomplete data series, where data for only one of the two years was available. This analysis has only used verified data from the SIPRI Military Expenditure database, and not the bracketed estimates provided for some countries and some years.

46 Oxfam, IANSA, and Saferworld (2007) „Africa‟s Missing Billions‟, p.9. http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/africas-missing-billions-international-arms-flows-and-the-cost-of-conflict-123908; OECD DAC, Development Database on Aid from DAC Members, op. cit.

47 World Bank (2011) op. cit., p.65.

48 M. Lawson et al. (2007) „The World is Still Waiting‟, Oxfam International, pp.27-28. http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/the-world-is-still-waiting-broken-g8-promises-are-costing-millions-of-lives-115041

49 Oxfam, IANSA, and Saferworld (2007), op. cit., p.9.

For a definition of „armed violence‟, see: UN, A/64/228 (2009) „Promoting Development through the Reduction and Prevention of Armed Violence‟. http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/UNSG-Report-Armed-Violence.pdf

50 World Bank (2011) op. cit., p.65.

51 M. Valenti, C.M. Ormhaug, R.E. Mtonga, and J. Loretz (2007) „Armed Violence: A Health Problem, a Public Health Approach‟, Journal of Public Health Policy (2007) 28, 389–400, http://www.ippnw.org/pdf/ValentiOrmhaugMtongaLoretz.pdf

52 Ibid.

53 Unpublished research commissioned by Oxfam GB in 2010.

54 World Bank classifications were used to determine the list of low-income and lower middle-income countries. Of the 91 countries classified in these two categories, there was no data from the past ten years for 41 countries. Of the 50 remaining countries, 2009 data was available for 29, and 2008 data for a further eight (with 2005 data for four countries and 2004 data for two countries, while 2003, 2002, 2001, and 2000 each provided data for one additional country). Eleven countries in 2009, an additional four in 2008, three more in 2005, two more in 2004, and one country in 2000 allocated over 10 per cent of central government expenditures to the military in these years, and on average scored 2.63 out of 10 in the Transparency International CPI rankings. Transparency International (2008) „Corruption Perceptions Index‟. http://bit.ly/auu41z

http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers

http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications

http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=TABLE2A

http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/table_8.gif

http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/africas-missing-billions-international-arms-flows-and-the-cost-of-conflict-123908



http://www.ippnw.org/pdf/ValentiOrmhaugMtongaLoretz.pdf

http://bit.ly/auu41z

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

38

55 See, for example: „UK Strategic Export Controls, Session 2010–11‟. Evidence submitted by Transpar-

ency International‟. http://bit.ly/dXnkh4

56 OECD DAC, „Development Database on Aid from DAC Members‟, op. cit.

57 Feinstein (2007) „After the Party. A Personal and Political Journey inside the ANC‟, pp.208-36; J. Cilliers

(1999) „Defence Acquisitions – Unpacking the Package Deals‟, ISS. http://bit.ly/h2NgSd

58 Feinstein (2007) op. cit.

59 Ibid.

60 K. Kotoglou, D. Basu Ray, and S. Jones (2008) „Monitoring Resource Flows to Fragile States 2007‟, OECD/DAC Fragile States Group, p.40. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/21/41680220.pdf

61 Ibid.

62 A. Hosken (2009) „BAE: The Tanzanian connection‟, BBC, http://bbc.in/4DWSco 63 R. Neate (2010) „BAE radar verdict‟, The Telegraph, http://bit.ly/ef6UqR

64 OECD Stats Extracts (2012)

65 It should be noted that the figure of $832.5m amounts to less than 1 per cent of overall ODA. While Oxfam believes that using limited ODA funds for security sector activities is acceptable and can have long-term benefits on socio-economic development, this expenditure must not become a priority over other critical sectors, such as health, education, or agriculture.

66 „Responsible, regulated transfers of military and security equipment can assist a state to fulfil its legitimate defence, military, and policing needs, which can help to provide the security and stability necessary for development.‟

K. Nightingale, (2008) „Shooting Down the MGDs‟, Oxfam International, p.4 http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp120%20Shooting%20down%20the%20MDGs_FINAL%201Oct08.pdf

67 Human Rights Watch (2003) „Weapons Sanctions, Military Supplies, and Human Suffering: Illegal Arms

Flows to Liberia and the June–July 2003 Shelling of Monrovia‟, Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, p.2. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/liberia_arms.pdf

68 As well as causing many direct casualties, the assault forced thousands of civilians to flee into the city

where they were vulnerable to disease. Oxfam was working in the capital throughout, providing clean water and sanitation.

69 P. Herron, N. Marsh, M. Schroeder, and J. Lazarevic (2010) „Emerging From Obscurity: The Global

Ammunition Trade‟, Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs, Groups and Guns, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.7. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2010/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2010-Chapter-01-EN.pdf

70 UN Security Council (2010) „Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008)‟, Document S/2010/91, p.74. http://somalitalkradio.com/2010/mar/un_report_somalia.pdf

71 UN Security Council (2010) „Small Arms: Report of the Secretary-General‟, Document S/2011/255, p.3.

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/2011/255&referer=/english/&Lang=E; and R. Stohl and D. Smith (1999) „Small Arms in Failed States: A Deadly Combination‟, Center for Defence Information. http://www.cdi.org/issues/failedstates/march99.html

72 F.L. Keili (2008) „Small Arms and light weapons transfer in West Africa: a stock-taking‟, Disarmament

Forum, United Nations, Number 4, p.9. http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2832.pdf

73 P. Herron, N. Marsh, M. Schroeder, and J. Lazarevic (2010) op. cit., p.10.

74 P. Batchelor (2003) „Workshops and Factories: Products and Producers.‟ Small Arms Survey 2003:

Development Denied, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 13.

75 Ibid., p.7, p.18; P. Dreyfus, N. Marsh, M. Schroeder, and J. Lazarevic (2009) „Sifting the Sources:

Authorized Small Arms Transfers‟, Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.7; P. Herron, N. Marsh, M. Schroeder (2011) “Larger but less Known: Authorized Light Weapons Transfers”, Small Arms Survey 2011: States of Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.9. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2011/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2011-Chapter-01-EN.pdf

76 P. Herron, N. Marsh, M. Schroeder, and J. Lazarevic (2010) op. cit., p.7, p.18; P. Dreyfus, N. Marsh, M.

Schroeder, and J. Lazarevic (2009), op cit., p. 7

77 P. Herron, N. Marsh, M. Schroeder, and J. Lazarevic (2010) op. cit., p. 27

78 C.J. Chivers (2009) „Arms sent by U.S. may be falling into Taliban hands‟, New York Times, 20 May

2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/20/world/asia/20ammo.html?_r=1&scp=13&sq=gun&st=nyt

http://bit.ly/dXnkh4

http://bit.ly/h2NgSd

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/21/41680220.pdf

http://bbc.in/4DWSco

http://bit.ly/ef6UqR

http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp120%20Shooting%20down%20the%20MDGs_FINAL%201Oct08.pdf

http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp120%20Shooting%20down%20the%20MDGs_FINAL%201Oct08.pdf

http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/liberia_arms.pdf

http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2010/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2010-Chapter-01-EN.pdf

http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2010/en/Small-Arms-Survey-2010-Chapter-01-EN.pdf

http://somalitalkradio.com/2010/mar/un_report_somalia.pdf

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=s/2011/255&referer=/english/&Lang=E

http://www.cdi.org/issues/failedstates/march99.html

http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2832.pdf

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/20/world/asia/20ammo.html?_r=1&scp=13&sq=gun&st=nyt

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

39

Acting General Rapporteur, Sven Mikser (Estonia) (2011) „Preparing the Afghan National Security Forces for Transition‟, NATO Parliamentary Assembly (211 DSC 10 E bis), http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2084

79 UN Security Council (2008) „Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council

Resolution 751 (1992), annex to S/2008/769‟, p.6; and UN Security Council (2010) op. cit., p.7.

80 See Positions for the United States in the upcoming Arms Trade Treat Conference Remarks by Thomas

Countryman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Stimson Center, Washington, DC, April 16, 2012. http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/188002.htm. statement delivered by the Philippine delegation to the 4th Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2012 United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, 15th February 2012. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/att/prepcom4/statements/15Feb_Philippines.pdf , and statement delivered by the Vietnamese delegation to the 2nd Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2012 United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, 1st March 2011

81 US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) places comprehensive export controls over transfers

of ammunition, ordnance, components, explosives and propellants for small arms and light weapons, export controls that not only include direct transfers, but also re-exports, licensed production and brokering activities. See U.S. Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (2009), International Traffic in Arms Regulations 2009. http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/itar_official.html

In the EU, ammunition is specifically included in the list of equipment covered by the EU Common Position and by participating countries of the Wassenaar Agreement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. The common military list of the EU and the munitions list of the Wassenaar Arrangement both contain precise and comprehensive definitions of equipment, which, in both instances, include almost all varieties of conventional ammunition. Both control lists cover ammunition in category ML3. Excluded materials include smooth-bore weapons used for hunting or sporting purposes if not designed for military use or fully automatic, as well as arms and weapons manufactured before 1938. See Council of the European Union (2010) „Common Military List of the European Union‟, Official Journal of the European Union, Volume C 69/19, March. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:069:0019:0051:EN:PDF; and Wassenaar Arrangement (2011) „Munitions List‟, updated list, http://www.wassenaar.org/controllists/index.html

82 Economic Community of Western African States (2006) „ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light

Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Material‟. http://www.iag-agi.org/bdf/docs/ecowas_convention_small_arms.pdf; and Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) (2005) „Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons‟, http://www.recsasec.org/pdf/Best%20Practice%20Guidlines%20Book.pdf

83 Amnesty International (2011) „Our Right to Know: Transparent Reporting Under an Arms Trade Treaty‟,

Amnesty International Publications, http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT30/116/2011/en/c6a0310e-81fa-47eb-be10-87e596823f16/act301162011en.pdf

84 The states are: Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia,

Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Macedonia, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States. Reports are available on the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) National Reports Database at: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/national_reports/

85 See UN Security Council (2011) „Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan, established pursuant to

resolution 1591 (2005)‟, Document S/2011/111, pg. 12. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/111 and Anders, H (2012), Ammunition controls, the ATT, and Africa challenges, requirements, and scope for action, Groupe de recherche et d'information sur la paix et la sécurité (GRIP)

86 European Union (2011) „Thirteenth Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position

2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment‟, 2011/C 382/01, pp. 435, 446. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:382:SOM:EN:HTML

87 H. Anders (2012) op. cit, p. 14.

The Syrian Arab Republic, for example, argued that the issue of ammunition is a purely security item and noted concerns around how national stockpiles might be regulated under an ATT. See statement delivered by the delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic to the 2

nd Session of the Preparatory

Committee of the 2012 United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, 28th

February 2011.

88 For example, data submitted to UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) in 2005

detailing an export of 8kg of small arms ammunition worth $41,300 was useful in tracking the original source of illicit ammunition found in Côte d‟Ivoire in 2010. See UN Comtrade database, category 930630 (Small arms ammunition). http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx

http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2084

http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2084

http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/188002.htm

http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/att/prepcom4/statements/15Feb_Philippines.pdf

http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/att/prepcom4/statements/15Feb_Philippines.pdf

http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/regulations_laws/itar_official.html

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:069:0019:0051:EN:PDF

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:069:0019:0051:EN:PDF

http://www.wassenaar.org/controllists/index.html

http://www.iag-agi.org/bdf/docs/ecowas_convention_small_arms.pdf

http://www.iag-agi.org/bdf/docs/ecowas_convention_small_arms.pdf

http://www.recsasec.org/pdf/Best%20Practice%20Guidlines%20Book.pdf

http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT30/116/2011/en/c6a0310e-81fa-47eb-be10-87e596823f16/act301162011en.pdf

http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ACT30/116/2011/en/c6a0310e-81fa-47eb-be10-87e596823f16/act301162011en.pdf

http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/national_reports/

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/111

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:382:SOM:EN:HTML

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:382:SOM:EN:HTML

http://comtrade.un.org/db/default.aspx

THE FINAL COUNTDOWN

40

89

UN Comtrade Database 2008–11, http://comtrade.un.org/db/

90 D. Hillier (2007) „Africa‟s Missing Billions‟, IANSA, Oxfam, and Saferworld, http://policy-

practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/download?Id=366084&dl=http://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/oxfam/bitstream/10546/123908/1/bp-africas-missing-billions-111007-en.pdf

91 O. Sprague (2006) „The AK-47: The World‟s Favourite Killing Machine‟, Oxfam International and Control

Arms Campaign.

92 „Africa‟s Missing Billions‟, op. cit., p. 21

93 P. Wezeman et al. (2011) „Arms Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa‟, SIPRI Policy Paper 30, December 2011,

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid, p.9. Note also that DICON itself states a partnership with Chinese defence manufacturer Poly-

Techonolgies China. See http://www.dicon.gov.ng/military1.html

96 See, for example: http://www.gunaccessories.com; http://www.gunspares.co.uk; and

http://www.armas.es. Such businesses make the global free market in components easily available to all, not just to governments.

97 See: http://www.army-technology.com/projects/challenger2/

98 Defense Industry Daily (2012) „Egypt orders more M1A1 tanks‟, 10 January 2012.

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/egypt-847m-request-for-125-m1a1-tanks-03684/

99 Defense Industry Daily (2010) „China‟s K-8 jets: a killer for Myanmar‟, 30 June 2010.

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Chinas-K-8-Jets-A-Killer-for-Myanmar-06457/

100 International Institute for Strategic Studies (2010) „Military Balance 2010‟, p.263.

101 A.H. Cordesman and R. Faith (2004) „Military Balance in the Middle East‟, CSIS, p.96. http://csis.org/publication/military-balance-middle-east-0

102 See: http://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=121151

103 A.H. Cordesman and A. Wilner (2012) „U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Conventional and Asymmetric Dimensions‟, CSIS, pp.33-38. http://csis.org/files/publication/120221_Iran_Gulf_MilBal_ConvAsym.pdf

104 Ibid., p.34.

105 U.S. Department of Justice (2011) „Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement and Embargo-Related Criminal Prosecutions: 2007 to the Present‟, September 2011. http://www.justice.gov/nsd/docs/summary-eaca.pdf

106 Ibid.

107 For example, Chips Investment Casting Inc of Taiwan supplies parts for a variety of different weapons and vehicles. It produces small, specialised parts for weapons, from pistols and shotguns to turbo-propellers for aero engines, and sells to defence companies in Asia, the Middle East, Australia, Europe, and the Americas. Details drawn from various websites, including: http://www.importgenius.com/suppliers/chips-investment-casting-inc; http://electronics.taiwantrade.com.tw/ORG/front/searchserv.do?method=listProductProductDetail&locale=2&MEMBER_TYPE=4&WEB_OPEN=0&DOMAIN_NAME=chips&DOMAIN_NAME_FLAG=0&company_id=7008&catalog_id=123944&come_soon=0; and http://en.chips-casting.com/profile.

http://comtrade.un.org/db/

http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/download?Id=366084&dl=http://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/oxfam/bitstream/10546/123908/1/bp-africas-missing-billions-111007-en.pdf



http://www.dicon.gov.ng/military1.html

http://www.gunaccessories.com/

http://www.gunspares.co.uk/

http://www.armas.es/

http://www.army-technology.com/projects/challenger2/

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/egypt-847m-request-for-125-m1a1-tanks-03684/

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Chinas-K-8-Jets-A-Killer-for-Myanmar-06457/

http://csis.org/publication/military-balance-middle-east-0

http://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=121151

http://csis.org/files/publication/120221_Iran_Gulf_MilBal_ConvAsym.pdf

http://www.justice.gov/nsd/docs/summary-eaca.pdf

http://www.importgenius.com/suppliers/chips-investment-casting-inc

http://electronics.taiwantrade.com.tw/ORG/front/searchserv.do?method=listProductProductDetail&locale=2&MEMBER_TYPE=4&WEB_OPEN=0&DOMAIN_NAME=chips&DOMAIN_NAME_FLAG=0&company_id=7008&catalog_id=123944&come_soon=0



http://en.chips-casting.com/profile

Date post:	13-Mar-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	vuquynh
View:	214 times
Download:	2 times