The Formation of Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar YearsAuthor(s): C. Ernest DawnReviewed work(s):Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Feb., 1988), pp. 67-91Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/163586 .Accessed: 08/06/2012 14:58

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 20 (1988), 67-91. Printed in the United States of America

C. Ernest Dawn

THE FORMATION OF PAN-ARAB IDEOLOGY

IN THE INTERWAR YEARS

Arab nationalism arose as an opposition movement in Ottoman Syria, Palestine, and Iraq around the turn of the century. It remained a minority movement until the Ottoman collapse in 1918, but after the Ottoman defeat it became the overwhelmingly dominant movement in these territories where, except for some Lebanese, all successful politicians were Arab nationalists during the interwar years.' Just what Arab nationalism meant to its proponents at the time, however, has been difficult to determine. The period only dimly figures in studies of Arab nationalism. Full studies have been devoted to survivors from the past, Rashid Rida' and Shakib Arslan, to Satic al-Husri (al-Husari), a relative newcomer whose greatest prominence was to be in the 1940s and 1950s, and to the Muslim Brothers, who arrived on the scene even later, whose influence was to lie in the future, and who, like Rida', were not considered to be primarily Arab nation- alists. Otherwise, hardly a scant handful of pre-World War II Arab nationalist writers, and these from the late 1930s, receive even casual mention.2 This situa- tion undoubtedly results partly from the recent origin of modern Arab studies, which has naturally influenced students to concentrate on the post-World War II period to the neglect of the interwar years. Furthermore, major politicians of that time apparently rarely wrote systematically on politics. Collections of their speeches seem to be few, and newspaper accounts of their speeches only infre- quently contain much beyond the generalities of praising the Arab nation and exhorting it to fulfill its mission. Despite the reticence of the political leaders, in the interwar years as in the prewar years there were people who wrote articles and books devoted to defining the Arab nation and its place in the world. Quite a few of these authors were associated with major politicians who sought and, at times, held office in the governments of the region. They attracted little notice in the West, however, even from the small body of Orientalists, whose concerns were limited to classical texts and the writings of major literary figures. Con- sequently, their publications, while in the mainstream of Arab political thought in the 1920s and 1930s, have been largely overlooked and are rarely to be found in Western libraries.

Given the present state of scholarship, a representative sample of Arab politi- cal publications of the interwar years would be extremely difficult to construct. But those authors who took part in Arab nationalist political organizations and activities provide a reasonable starting point. Their publications and the works

? 1988 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/88 $5.00 +.00

68 C. Ernest Dawn

they refer to are prima facie expressions of Arab nationalist thought. Prominent among them are such survivors from the prewar years as Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, and Shakib Arslan. One readily available publication is the journal of the Arab Academy at Damascus, edited by Kurd CAli, which published many pertinent articles and reviews of books. Finally, the most impor- tant publications for the present purpose are a number of history textbooks that were designed for use in the schools of Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. All that were accessible to me have been included in this essay. The earliest was Ta'rikh filastin, by 'Umar Salih al-Barghuthi and Khalil Tuta (Totah).3 Next appeared an elementary school text by Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, Mukhtasar ta'rikh al-'arab wa-al-islam.4 This was replaced by the same author's Durus al-ta'rikh al-'arabi min aqdam al-asmina ila alan.5 Darwaza followed with other elemen- tary school textbooks: Durus al-ta'rikh al-mutawassit wa-al-hadith6 and Durus al-ta'rikh al-qadim.7 By the end of the 1920s, a more or less standard formula- tion of the Arab self-view had appeared and received comprehensive statement in a textbook for the intermediate schools, Ta'rikh al-umma al-'arabiyya, by Darwish al-Miqdadi.8

These publications are important expressions of Pan-Arab thought. The authors had long and active careers in association with major Arab nationalist politicians. Their publications, appearing across the full range of the print media, from elementary and secondary school texts through trade books to the journal of the most important Arab learned society outside Egypt, were open to the notice of the entire literate public. The textbooks exposed many successive academic classes to Pan-Arab concepts. Barghuthi and Tuta's book was written for the Palestine schools but, according to A. L. Tibawi, was banned at the instance of Sir Herbert Samuel. However, the educational system described by Tibawi and by Humphrey Bowman permitted considerable freedom in the pro- duction and adoption of history textbooks to Arab officials and teachers, who were nationalists to a man. Darwaza's textbooks, in view of their favorable reviews, their number and many editions, and their author's prominent associa- tion with major Palestinian, Syrian, and Iraqi politicians throughout the inter- war years, most likely were widely used in Palestine and Syria. According to Reeva Simon, some of them were used as teaching aids in the Iraqi schools. Miqdadi's textbook was officially adopted in Iraq. Its prime importance is attested to by Nabih Amin Faris and Nicola Ziadeh, two prominent Arab historians and educators who were students during the period. According to Faris, Miqdadi's text "was selected as the text for the teaching of history in the secondary schools of Palestine, Syria, and Iraq, where it continued to be the standard text of Arab youth for several student generations." In the judgment of Ziadeh, it was "the first history to deal with Arab history on national grounds."9

The publications express a distinct doctrine, with the same thought elements recurring in author after author. The present state of scholarship does not permit ascription of first-authorship, tracing of influences, or attribution of sources. The full statement of the Pan-Arab self-view is found in Miqdadi's textbook. No other single work and perhaps no other one author includes all elements of the self-view, but none explicitly rejects any element. The Arab nationalist self-view

Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years 69

expounded by these writers contains all the elements of the later Ba'thist and Nasserist self-views, and some avenues of transmission of those elements can be discerned.

The Arab self-view that emerged in the interwar years was a development of the Islamic modernist doctrine as expounded by CAbd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, who was the acknowledged master.'1 Works by his ideological relatives, the Damascene Tahir al-Jaza'iri and the Iraqi Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi, were published and praised. The necessity to modernize and revivify Islam by return- ing to the true Islam of the Arab ancestors was their central concern, but this doctrine was merged with a historical view that incorporated the ancient peoples of the Near East into the Arab nation.

The Arab nation possessed its own peculiar territory comprising many coun- tries, distinct geographical entities, of which the most important were Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Arabia. These four lands were the nucleus of the Arab home- land. Syria included the mandated territories of Palestine (and Transjordan), Lebanon, and Syria, always depicted as an indivisible unity, and sometimes called Greater Syria. Iraq, (Greater) Syria, and Arabia were especially closely connected. Barghuthi and Tuta remarked on the Prophet's desire to conquer Syria and Palestine and "add them to the Jazira, because they are its wing and its foot is Iraq," and Darwaza noted that Syria and Palestine, bilad al-sha9m, are connected by a desert to Najd and Iraq. The notion of a nuclear Arab home- land east of Suez was influenced by the American Egyptologist, James Henry Breasted. In a 1925 publication by Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, Muhammad al- Shurayqi cited Breasted in connection with the movement of Semites from "the eastern crescent plain." After the publication of an Arabic translation of Breasted's textbook in 1926, the concept of the Fertile Crescent, a natural geographical entity comprising Iraq and Greater Syria, became more popular. The final stage was reached in the concept of the "Arab Island," which was used in Miqdadi's textbook. "A living body," of which "the head" is the Fertile Crescent, "the heart," central Arabia, and "the extremities," the Arabian coast- lands from the Gulf of Aqaba to "the Gulf of Basra," the "Island" is "a geographical unit . . . the cradle of the Arabs and their fortress.""

The Arab homeland was a natural geographical unit, but geography was of secondary importance. People, not territory, were the decisive element. The people created the homeland. All lands inhabited by Arabs were Arab. In Darwaza's words, "The lands of Syria, Iraq, and Palestine were always Arab because they were filled with Arabs." Territory was made Arab by the expansion of the Arabs. "The Arab nation spread in different regions of the world."'2 Miqdadi also conceived of the Arab homeland as the territory inhabited by Arabs, expanding as the Arabs expanded into Asia, Africa, and Europe.13 The Arab nation's occupation of its homeland was achieved in remote antiquity. All authors highlighted the movement of Arabs such as the Ghassanids, Lakhmids, and Nabataeans into the Fertile Crescent long before Islam. They pushed the Arab migration back as early as possible to the times of Narim Sin, Hammurabi, the Amalikites, and the Hyksos, all of whom were considered, definitely or probably, to be Arabs. Darwaza's ancient history text, evidently influenced by

70 C. Ernest Dawn

Breasted's Ancient Times, withdrew the identification of Hammurabi as an Arab, but Miqdadi retained the probability.14

The ancient pre-Islamic Arabs were only a small part of the glorious history of the Arabs. The Semitic-wave theory was adapted to push the Arab occupation of the national territory back to the most ancient times.'5 Muhammad al-Shurayqi attributed to Breasted a succinct statement of the common view of the interwar years: Immense Semitic bands migrated in prehistoric times from the eastern crescent plain and marched westward until they descended into Egypt by way of Sinai and Suez, and some of them remained in this region and populated it. They were the root of the ancient Egyptian people and the founders of the Egyptian civilization. Another section of them [went] to Ethiopia and settled in it. Another section remained wandering in North Africa for a number of centuries until many bands settled in various localities, and some of them reached the shores of the Atlantic. The movement of the Arabs at the coming of Islam was nothing but the last manifestation of those migrations which produced the unification of the Semitic homelands (mawatin) and resurrected them in a new Arab homeland (watan).

Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib's essay developed this theme in detail. According to him, Arabic was the most advanced and thus the most ancient of the Semitic languages. The ancient Semitic languages, he asserted, were much like the modern Arabic dialects, and thus Abraham could wander throughout the Semi- tic sea. As each Semitic wave moved into a new region, it easily united with the existing population, including the settlers from preceding waves. The Semites created the great civilizations of antiquity in their expanded homeland in Asia and Africa. The Arab wave, the latest, restored the original unity of the Semites.16 Miqdadi explicated the intention of this universal vision of the past by making the Arabs the national and cultural "heirs of the Semites."'7 The primacy of language over race in the mingling of populations and the production of the Arab nation was adopted by all, under the influence, at least in part, of Satic al-Husri.18

The Arab nation, the culmination and heir of the Semites, established its rights to the national territories. This achievement was not accomplished without meet- ing the aggressions of determined enemies. Throughout history, other peoples, Aryans and Turco-Mongols, had intruded into the Semito-Arab homeland. The common view of Semito-Arab history implicitly divided it into two periods of greatness, the ancient Semitic and the Islamic, each followed by two periods of decline in which the alien dominated. Miqdadi explicitly adopted this approach and utilized it to explain the Arab predicament in his time and to forecast the Arab future. "Fourteen centuries ago our ancestors in the regions of the Arab island experienced what we feel today and suffered pains as we suffer pains today. The ordeal of imperialism hit them, and enemies surrounded them on all sides." Thus, Miqdadi equated his own times to the Jahiliyya. In both ages, imperialism reduced the Arab nation to subjugation, humiliation, and abase- ment. This emphasis on the identity of the contemporary Arab predicament to the Jahiliyya led the editor of a play by Miqdadi to give the play the title "Between Two Jahiliyyas."'9 The title is apt, and it is convenient to refer to the two periods as the first and second Jahiliyyas.

Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years 71

Imperialism was economic in motivation. This was a point on which all Arab nationalists agreed. International commerce was taken to be a chief motivating force in world history. The rise and decline of cities and peoples was commonly explained as resulting from the fluctuations of trade, especially international trade, and the control of the trade routes. The ancient Arabs, in Palmyra, Petra, the Hijaz, the Yaman, etc., are depicted as becoming rich and famous from their share in international commerce. This happy situation was radically changed by the advance of the two great imperialist powers, the Persians and the Romano- Byzantines, who seized the Fertile Crescent and southern Arabia in order to control the trade routes. The Arabs did not benefit from this trade, except for those few who received bribes and customs in return for providing protection for the caravans.2

Western European imperialism from the Crusades onward, according to the unanimous opinion, was economic in motivation. The nobles' desire for booty and land and the merchants' quest for trade were the underlying causes for which religion was a cover. The Franks gained more from the Crusades than they lost, the Muslims lost more than they gained.21 Miqdadi portrayed the new trade routes to India as weakening the Arabs so that Syria and Egypt fell to the Turks. All agreed that modern European imperialism, of which British and French imperialism was the usual example, was motivated by the quest for raw materials and markets. European imperialist rivalry resulted in war, most notably World War I, which, Miqdadi asserted, had nothing to do with democracy and free- dom. The imperialists exploited the Ottoman and Arab territories by means of the special privileges for foreigners. The horror stories about foreign contractors in Egypt were very popular.22 The analysis reached a more sophisticated level in journal articles and in Miqdadi's textbook. Foreign investment and economic activity was exploitative per se in that the wealth went to foreigners. Economic nationalism was the goal.23

The Semito-Arab nation had been gravely injured twice by the two imperi- alisms. The motivation of both imperialisms, ancient and modern, was eco- nomic, but economics was not the beginning and end of imperialism. The Arab confrontation with imperialism was a clash of peoples and cultures. Throughout the long conflict, the Arabs' dangerous enemy was one, the Aryans, i.e., the Persians in the East and the Greeks, Romans, and Franks in the West. The probable inspiration for this schematization was Breasted's Ancient Times, which distinguished two eternal conflicts, the East-West, or Asia-Europe, and the Aryan-Semite.24 The East-West struggle was the dominant theme in Barghuthi and Tuta's book. In their treatment, this conflict began with Alexander's con- quests, which could not "be compared to previous conquests, because the Assyrian, Babylonian, and Egyptian governments were satisfied with no more than the levying of taxes and political obedience, [whereas the] Greek govern- ment aimed at a higher and greater goal, the spreading of its civilization in the East and the impregnation of the world with Greek ideas and the principles of Hellenism." In this, the Greeks were succeeded by the Romans, the Crusaders, the British, and the French. In the long run, the East and the West were equal, but "the drama of the nineteenth century concluded with the East the slave of the West politically, intellectually, and economically." The Persians were

72 C. Ernest Dawn

assigned to the East, as in Breasted, but they were also distinguished from the ancient Semites, classed with the Aryans, and, uniquely among Eastern peoples, likened to the Europeans.25 Moreover, Barghuthi and Tuta, like Darwaza, em- ployed the Aryan-Semitic conflict and made Persian hostility to the Arabs a major factor in early Islamic history.26 European derogatory contrasts of Semites with Aryans, e.g., Renan's, were strongly resented.27 The East-West and Aryan- Semite conflicts were fused. Muhammad al-Shurayqi, in a poem and its annota- tion published in Khatib's book, equated the aggressions of the Aryans against the Semitic homeland with the struggle between the East and the West, which had continued for five thousand years until his day.28 Miqdadi applied Shurayqi's formula explicitly and thoroughly by treating Semito-Arab history as an unend- ing conflict between the Semites and the Aryans. But in the 1939 edition, Miqdadi abandoned the explicit mention of the Semitic-Aryan contradiction. He did not, however, give up the identification of the Arabs as the culmination and heirs of the Semitic peoples, which was left in the same important position that it had held in the first three editions.29

The Semito-Arab nation had been reduced to humiliation twice by Aryan (Persian and European) imperialism. The goals of the imperialists were eco- nomic, and the result was economic exploitation of the Semito-Arabs. But the successes of the imperialists arose from their ability to subvert Arab culture.

The ancient Arabs were a people with outstanding qualities. The people of the first Jahiliyya were not barbarians, a description that applied only to the bed- ouin. Even the bedouin had great intrinsic qualities. When natural conditions permitted, as among the settled Arabs in Arabia, especially south Arabia, and the Arabs who migrated periodically into Iraq and Syria, the Arabs created civilized life. All Arabs, including the bedouin, had noble qualities. Women enjoyed equality with men. Arabs loved freedom and equality, they possessed "great excitability, intensity of sensation, and sharpness of intellect." The great success of the Arabs after the coming of Islam was aided by their natural qualities.30

The great Arab weakness, which was the source of their abasement, was the intensity of tribal solidarity ('asabiyya) at the expense of national sentiment, which led to the raiding and warfare of the pre-Islamic age. Divided against each other, the ancient Arabs came under foreign influence. The Arab Ghassanids and Mundhirids fought each other for the sake of the Romans and the Persians.31 Miqdadi especially expounded these themes in detail, highlighting the imperi- alists' economic exploitation of the Arabs and the associated corruption of family and social life and the fettering of the people's minds with superstitions.32 These corruptions, in his view, resulted from the exploitation of the common people by Arab capitalist collaborators with the imperialists.

When Miqdadi wrote his textbook, the condition of the masses and class relationships had been receiving attention from Arab intellectuals for some time. Kawakibi discoursed on the oppressions of the rich and the evil of usury, and he declared that Islam brought to the world socialism, a way of life yearned for by the major part of the civilized European world, and established its principles.33 One of the most eminent Muslim Arab intellectuals, Shakib Arslan, in a brief

Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years 73

comment entitled "Socialist Principles in Islam," said, "In the Islamic Shari'a there are socialist principles, splendid, firm, which differ from the socialist principles known in Europe because the Islamic socialist principles are stronger, firmer, more meritorious, since the Muslim must act in accordance with them; in Europe they are mutually agreed to human regulations, while their existence in Islam is as divine commands whose execution the Muslim cannot avoid if he wishes to remain a Muslim." Islamic socialism consisted in the duty of the zakat, which, Arslan said, if performed would abolish poverty among the Muslims.34 Darwaza did not use the term "socialism," but he stressed the complete equality of the rich and poor, the lack of class distinction, in early Islam and detailed how the Prophet established brotherhood in Medina, whereby the Muslims shared the wealth.35 Kurd 'Ali and others in the journal of the Arab Academy of Damascus from time to time expressed approval of socialism and "resistance to the greed of the capitalists."36

Some writers also employed Marxist dialectic. One early suggestion of class conflict appeared in an article in al-Muqtataf, 5 (May 1910), 427-28. The famous confrontation of a respected companion of the Prophet, Abu Dharr, with 'Uthman and Mu'awiyya, was depicted as a conflict over "his socialist opinions with respect to depriving the rich of sole control of their wealth to the exclusion of the poor." In 1928, an explicitly Marxist interpretation of Islamic history by Bandali Jawzi appeared, with Khalil Sakakini identified as being responsible for its publication.37 The author, Arab in origin, was a professor at the University of Baku. Kurd 'Ali summarized the book, accurately, in the following words: "The first of the principles at which Islam aimed, he [Jawzi] claims, was the spreading of the spirit of solidarity among its individual members and paying attention to the wretched classes of the Arabs in the manner of socialism. This is the meaning which was dominant in the Islamic society in every age, . . . and most of those who rebelled against the states had socialist aims." Then Kurd 'Ali points out the book's partisan intent, but he cautiously indicates its merits: "Thus, he appar- ently serves surreptitiously the Communist regime in the lands whose civilization has influenced him, and he alleges things about Islam which have never entered the mind of any Muslim until now. If he has excelled in citing examples which show his knowledge of Arab and Western speculations, he is weak in his investigations and his conclusions, mediocre in his elucidation. Whatever the manner in which he is at variance with the true way of the Muhammadan religion, and there is some forgiveness for him in it, in his research there is room for thought. Perhaps researchers will succeed in achieving the results of meticu- lous investigation in novel subjects such as these."38 In 1931 a collection of essays attributed to Jamal al-Din al-Afghani was published by Muhammad al- Makhzumi. One essay expounded the superiority of Islamic socialism to Western socialism and recounted in some detail the efforts of Abu Dharr, explicitly depicted as mobilizing the poor against the exploitations of the rich and the Umayyads.39

This emerging semi-Marxism culminated in Miqdadi's textbook, which cited Jawzi's work. Miqdadi explicitly stressed proletarian opposition to the capitalist collaborators with foreign imperialism in the Hijaz and he depicted Muhammad

74 C. Ernest Dawn

as a proletarian revolutionary. He also illustrated the socialist character of early Islam with accounts of Muhammad's "Brotherhood" in Medina and of Abu Dharr, called "a socialist institution" and "the socialist," respectively, in the first two editions. The socialist element was softened by omitting the term "socialist" from the last two editions and eliminating the story of Abu Dharr from the 1939 edition, but otherwise class conflict and social reform remained as important elements of the coming of Islam.40 The story of Abu Dharr evidently became popular. Shakib Arslan retold the 1910 Muqtataf version of it in 1933.41 In the 1950s and 1960s, according to Henri Laoust, Abu Dharr "inspired a very abundant literature on 'Islamic socialism."'42 Yet Miqdadi and the others who held similar views were not dialectical materialists. In their writings, it is clear that culture is the chief determining element.

The capitalist-proletarian contradiction had played its part in the first Arab awakening. But a proletarian revolution and a communist reconstruction of society was neither necessary nor desirable. The better solution was the first Arab awakening, the Islamic awakening, as Barghuthi and Tuta (p. 83) called it and, in the words of Miqdadi (p. 312), "The Arabs' greatest awakening."

The doctrines of Islamic modernism and revivalism were without challenge. The first Arab awakening was the result of the action of one man, Muhammad, who was the great hero in all treatments, but notably in Miqdadi's. All paid homage to his noble character, but his mission and accomplishment was a divine miracle. The words of the Muslim Barghuthi and the Quaker Tuta summed up the universal opinion: The Prophet's "teachings unified the Arabs and ended the dissension among them with a new bond, i.e., Islam, which was not merely religious in character but a national, political, social bond which united them and hurled them into the inhabited world, which they infused with the seed kernel of its [Islam's] spirit and the seedling of its action." In all the histories, Islam and Arabness, Muslim and Arab, are constantly conjoined, synonyms. The Muslim Arab nation, united and reformed, inspired and informed, by Islam, conquered the civilized world, regaining the historic Arab fatherland. Guided by the pure reason of Islam, motivated by its love, the Arabs created the just society, far superior to any other, past, present, or future. They purified the ancient civilization of its defective elements and carried it to new heights so that Arab civilization became the wonder of the world. Islam brought power and glory to the Arab nation.43 The Franks, greatly inferior to the Arabs in civiliza- tion, borrowed the essential bases of modern civilizations from the Arabs.44

Islam had brought the Arab nation to greatness, but it did not eradicate the Arabs' principal defect, which was their great virtue carried to excess, i.e., individualism, egoism, and tribal 'asabiyya. Under these influences, Arab Islamic unity weakened, the desire for wealth gained the upper hand. The caliphs and leading men in their competition with each other stimulated tribal antagonisms and warfare and then, more ominously, began to rely on foreigners. Persians notably, but also Turks and, in Spain, Slavs, became dominant elements. Under Persian influence, the position of women, the family, Arab culture and society were corrupted. As the Franks became stronger, first in Spain, then in the East,

Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years 75

amirs and rulers, competing with each other, began to rely on them and then became their puppets. Total debasement of Arab culture was the result.45 Thus the noble Arab nation sank into what we may call the second Jahiliyya.

The second Jahiliyya, like the first, resulted from the use of false religion by the upper classes to shackle the minds of the masses with ignorance and super- stition in order to exploit them economically. The misdeeds of large landowners and notables and the defects of the "feudal regime," as it was designated by all, were stressed in the textbooks and in reviews or articles by Kurd 'Ali and Mustafa al-Shihabi.46 That the upper classes had used religious superstition, including Sufism, to keep the masses ignorant in order to exploit them was the common doctrine that Barghuthi and Tuta and Darwaza expressed cautiously in their textbooks. Arslan gave it eloquent expression. Miqdadi expounded the doctrine explicitly and in detail. False religion provided the means for the upper classes to exploit and utilize the populace. The rulers, the usurers, and the ulama collaborated to extirpate religion and fetter the masses with superstition. To Miqdadi this was especially tragic, for the masses "are the ones who represent to us the essence of the nation and its mentality."47

The decline of the Arab nation to the state where its populace was bound by ignorance and religious superstition had begun when the rivalries of the Arab rulers had led them to rely on foreigners. Reliance on the alien began the contamination of Arab culture, thus precipitating the painful decline. Barghuthi and Tuta drew the conclusion from the Arab experience with Persians and Turks that "any nation which does not attend to its future and preserve its essence is destined for destruction" (pp. 148-49). Cultural borrowing was a problem for the Arab nationalist intellectual. Darwaza perhaps emphasized that it was natural and necessary, although he also pointed to the weakening of the Arab character that resulted from imitation of the alien. He seems to suggest that cultural borrowing was beneficial when good things were borrowed in moderation and when, as had happened in the early centuries of Islam, the Arabs also preserved their "homely customs" and impressed their language and some of their traits on the non-Arab cultural lenders.48

In the case of two cultural lenders, the Persians and the West, the unanimous opinion was that borrowing from them was nearly fatal. Salim al-Jundi ex- pounded the common belief when, arguing for the purification of the Arabic language, he asserted that Arab decline was due to both Persian and European cultural influences.49 The Persians and the Europeans, both called Aryans by Miqdadi and others, were bitterly and adamantly hostile to the Arabs, and they possessed a quality that made them unique among peoples, namely, intense national solidarity, 'asabiyya, as opposed to tribal solidarity and egoistic individualism.

The Persians were commonly portrayed as having been filled with hatred of the Arabs and a fanatical desire for revenge for the loss of sovereignty and glory. Thus the Persians took advantage of Arab dissension; indeed they instigated and nourished it, in order to return power and glory to the Persians. Implicitly, the Persians are moved by national sentiment.50 Miqdadi was explicit concerning the

76 C. Ernest Dawn

Persian desire for revenge on the Arabs and their sowing of discord among them. He also contrasts the intense national solidarity of the Persians with the individ- ualism and egoism of the Arabs. The Persian weapon was insidious. As a result of Persian enticement, the Arabs "adopted Persian culture, which weakened their personality, [while] ... the Persians preserved their customs and their language."51 Other Eastern peoples, e.g., Turks, Circassions, or Mongols, are not represented in similar terms, even though much is made of the damage suffered by the Arabs when in their strife they relied on these aliens. Only the Europeans are described in similar fashion.

An innate meanness was ascribed to the Europeans. Barghuthi and Tuta contrasted Westerners and Easterners. "We Eastern peoples are simple-hearted, sincere, generous, indulgent; warning of destruction does not arouse us." There- fore, Easterners treated servants as members of the family and were often, like the caliphs and the amirs of the past, displaced by the latter. In contrast, Westerners treated servants like servants, dismissing them for the most trifling mistakes or misdeeds. The Crusaders dishonored the Christian religion and ignored its teachings, while the Muslims were true to their religion and the welfare of humanity. The Crusaders were filled with religious fanaticism and kindled the fire of religious fanaticism between the Muslim and Christian Arabs. They corrupted the native Christians' creed and infected them with beauti- ful dreams, which turned out to be mirages. They weakened the Arab national spirit of Eastern Christians, who became devoted to foreign coreligionists. The Spaniards were similarly portrayed as stirring up fanaticism against the Arabs, as moved by hatred for them, and ultimately extirpating them. The Spanish character was portrayed as surviving Arabization and Islamization, as was also the case of the Persians. The Crusaders, the Spanish, and the European coloni- alists always maintained a united front of fanatics in the face of the Arabs, who unfortunately were so divided that some made alliances with the enemy.52 "The Europeans," Mustafa al-Shihabi wrote, "in their schools, books and associations instill the most extreme kinds of fanatical loyalty to nationalism in their sons." According to As'ad al-Hakim racialism, apparently to be found only among Europeans, was the product of European society and culture.53 The Europeans' fanatical national solidarity was the source of their power and might. Nation- alism made Germany, Italy, and America great. Japan showed that non-European nations could follow the European lead.54

The Europeans, like the Persians, used cultural influence as a weapon. Accordingly, Western missionaries, Western schools, and Western Orientalism were dangerous. This was the view even of ardent modernizers who admired Western civilization, such as Salim al-Jundi, Muhammad Kurd 'Ali, and Sami al-Kayyali. Darwaza and Miqdadi had a similar opinion. After the Franks failed in war during the Crusades, Miqdadi believed, they began the missionary move- ment, "the advance guard for their success in the colonization of the East in the modern ages." He asserted that missionary schools produced "scorn for the national culture and affection for the foreigners and their customs, good and bad." In the opinion of this graduate of the American University of Beirut, "The American schools are less damaging than others because America has not been

Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years 77

covetous of colonizing the Near East. Despite that, their effect is obvious in bringing up doubting, materialistic students."55 Mustafa al-Shihabi said, "The call to kill the national sentiment in the East by means of the schools and books of the missionaries and to replace it with the sentiment of the great human community is the greatest danger to us."56

Except for their fanatical national sentiment and their science, the Europeans had nothing to offer the Arabs. The enormities of Napoleon's campaign in the East and of World War I, the duplicity and hypocrisy of Britain, France, and America received due attention.57 There was no deviation from the Islamic modernist dogma that modern European civilization was merely the outgrowth of basic knowledge and, more important, the scientific attitude, rationality, which the Arabs had bestowed on Europe.58 Some Arabs were anticipating the collapse of the West. One such was Sami al-Kayyali: "Today, it [the Arab mind] looks at the world with watchful eyes. It sees combat, it sees conflict, it sees bloody tragedies and painful calamities-and it sees-unfortunately-that might is the origin of right and that weakness is a fable of fables-And must the Arab mind develop on these principles and draw on these precepts?" Kayyali cited Max Nordau, Maurice Maeterling, Oswald Spengler, Andre Gide, and Bertrand Russell as believing that the materialism of the West had brought it to the brink of collapse. The way was open for the Arabs to assume the role they had played in the past, to create "the culture of the future which will save the world from its pain and suffering, from the conflict after conflict which it suffers."59

The great enemy and threat to the Arabs was the West. Membership in the West belonged unmistakably to Britain and France, but also to America, which, in contrast to the two great colonial powers, received little attention but did not escape critical comment. The United States was placed in the same category as all the other participants in World War I, i.e., an imperialist power going to war for its commerce and industry, guilty of the same deceit and hypocrisy as the other imperialist powers. The American missionary schools held the same danger to Arab culture as the other foreign schools. Darwaza's medieval and modern history textbook for elementary schools concluded an account of Lincoln's emancipation of the slaves as follows: "But they continue until now to be despised in some states and cities of America to the degree that they cannot dwell or live with the 'white' Europeans."60

Germany, Italy, and Tsarist Russia were imperialist powers, but they received relatively little attention. Soviet Russia, however, was viewed differently from its imperialist predecessor. Some Arabs regarded the Soviet Union as an ally of the Arabs and the Muslims. Among them were Muhammad Rashid Rida' and Shakib Arslan. They, and Miqdadi, insisted that Islam and communism were antithetical.6' In the words of Arslan, "[I]f Islam has socialist principles, it has no connections with communism and therefore cannot be Bolshevized in the meaning known in Russia." But both Rida', writing in 1919, and Arslan, in 1925, agreed that Muslims and Bolsheviks could cooperate. As Arslan put it, "The Bolsheviks appear as the enemy of the states of imperialism who are hostile states to all the Islamic world . . ., and it is obvious that the Muslims yearn for the victory of the Bolsheviks." Islam, he said, "approves of allying with the

78 C. Ernest Dawn

Bolsheviks, seeking help from them against an enemy which is more dangerous and more injurious...." Turks, Persians, and Afghans had cooperated with the Soviet Union without catching the fire of Bolshevism.62

The Soviet Union was more than just a partner of convenience in the eyes of some Arabs who accepted Bolshevism's claim to be the movement of the world's toilers, the enemy of the basis of imperialism, capitalism. "Bolshevism is the essence of socialism," Rashid Rida' asserted. "Its intention is the extinction of the greedy power of the capitalists and their servants, the protecting govern- ments, which promulgate their materialistic laws on the basis of devouring the rights of the workers in their countries. ... Its intention is that the true govern- ment of every people should belong to its majority, i.e., to the workers in industry, agriculture, etc., when the power of the capitalists and the magnates who are their partisans is overthrown. They did that in Russia after the fall of the oppressive and unjust state of the Tsars." Rida' declared his partisanship: "The Muslims wish for the success of the socialists, success which would abolish the slavery of peoples-all of them are workers-even as they rebuke them as they rebuke others for all that is contrary to the Islamic law."63 Darwaza also wrote favorably of the results of the Bolshevik revolution: "They made a gov- ernment from the people.... No one possesses private wealth or private prop- erty or private factories or lands. Property, land, factories, and wealth all belong to all the nation under the control of the government, and the government is the employer of the people, so there are no rich and no poor, no amir and no pauper, but all are equal in everything, each takes according to his ability and merit."64

Arslan and Kurd 'Ali went beyond asserting that socialism and communism shared some of Islam's qualities and goals. Arslan praised the socialists' and communists' internationalism and racial tolerance. He called attention to the

support that the French Socialists and Communists gave to the workers and

peasants in Algeria and Tunisia. Arslan saw Islam, socialism, and communism as

sharing the same goal, a goal not shared by the Christian West. He explained the conversion of the Moslems of Russia to Bolshevism with the words, "Hatred of Bolshevism has not reached the same degree in the Islamic world that it has in the Christian world, because among Muslims the Bolsheviks have an intercessor, namely the call to liberate the weak." By "the call to liberate the weak," Arslan meant more than the liberation of the Muslim countries from the hands of Western imperialism. He had in mind also the liberation of the Muslim poor from the Muslim rich. He pointed to the Communist Party's appeal to the poor of Algeria and Tunisia and the Muslim rich's disregard of their wretched condi- tion and to the Bolshevik revolution by the Muslim proletariat "against the men of religion, the owners of wealth, the landlords, and the members of the ruling families" in Turkistan, Azerbayjan, and Kazan. He warned the upper classes with the words, "We say with intense sorrow that the Muslims, except for a rare one, have forgotten the zakat, and they have neglected the duties of their

religion. Thus they have prepared the day for the danger of [Western] socialism and communism, whose principles inevitably will penetrate among them what- ever they and the states of imperialism try to do in order to oppose their

Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years 79

diffusion in the East."65 Arslan joined the Muslim upper class to the imperialist states as opponents of socialism and communism. He had little hope that the Muslim upper class would check the progress and triumph of Western socialism or communism by the only existing method, the return to true Islamic socialism. These judgments were singled out with approval by Kurd 'Ali in his review of Arslan's book. A year later, reviewing a book on Italian Fascism, he wrote, "The subject of this book is important... in that Fascism saved Italy from falling into Bolshevism, i.e., extreme socialism, despite the extreme readiness of the people for it. It includes the life of Monsignore Mussolini . . and how he succeeded and influenced his nation ... to lead it to [the goal] which he desired, despite the strength of the strong old parties."66

In the Pan-Arab self-view elaborated in the interwar years, imperialism was a key concept, used to join the struggle with Western imperialism to the fight for true Islamic principles in the Arab countries. The Semito-Arabs had developed in their natural homeland, occupied in a series of waves from the heartland, and achieved greatness. But the nation had been locked in unending combat with Aryan imperialism, which was motivated by materialistic greed. Twice the impe- rialists, utilizing Arab discord, had intruded into the Arab homeland and nation, subverted Arab culture, and debased the nation, fettering it with ignorance and superstition. Arab rulers, capitalists, and feudal landlords collaborated with the imperialists to exploit the Arab country and people. From this predicament in the first Jahiliyya, Islam rescued the Arab nation and propelled it to its greatest achievement. But egoism and tribalism had opened the way for European im- perialism to push the Arabs into a new Jahiliyya, in which the upper classes for their selfish profit collaborated with the aliens, enslaving and exploiting the masses and thereby weakening the nation. In the struggle with imperialism and the Arab ruling classes, Bolshevism and European socialism were allies against imperialism and were closer to true Islam than was Western materialism. But Western socialism and Bolshevism were also, in the long run, threats, for they were atheistic and incompatible with Islam. The ruling classes' departure from true Islam in time would lead to class warfare and possibly the victory of Bolshevism. The only road to salvation was to return to the true Islam of the ancestors, which included a divinely ordained socialism. The rich and the rulers were exhorted to take to the path of true Islam, but little hope was expressed that the call would be answered. Thus, it was strongly implied, the fight against imperialism and the revitalization of the Arab nation could succeed only through the overthrow of the backsliders among the Arab rich and rulers who exploited the nation as the tools of the imperialists, but, instead of proletarian revolution, the preferred method was the rule of a strong man like Mussolini, who would overthrow the establishment and save the nation from Bolshevism.

In the years between the wars, Arab nationalist intellectuals added to the Islamic modernist Arabism of the prewar years the Semito-Arab version of history and a semi-Marxism, which included concepts of capitalist imperialism and class conflict. Although the first of the two elements has no prima facie connection with class interest, the semi-Marxism might suggest a proletarian movement. Expressions of concern for the poor and censure of the rich and

80 C. Ernest Dawn

forecasts of class warfare need not be and most often have not been evidence of proletarian status and purpose. The Arab nationalist intellectuals of the interwar years, who included many survivors from before the war and a number of newcomers, were, like the prewar Arabists, of solid upper status, from land- owning, official, merchant, scholarly families. Just as they were not revolutionary workers, so they were not of a rising middle class created by changes in the mode of production that was wresting control from the ruling class of a superseded mode of production. But the pre- and postwar Arab nationalists were decidedly engaged in a contest for power, and nationalist doctrine was indisputably a weapon in this struggle.

Arab nationalism had originated before the war as an opposition movement in the Ottoman Arab Fertile Crescent. The prewar Arabists were Ottoman Arabs opposing fellow Arabs who held office in the Ottoman state. The prewar Arabists were unsuccessful in the contest with the Ottomanist Arabs before the war. Ottoman collapse in World War I, the British and French Mandates, and Kemalist abandonment of Ottomanism did not destroy the political dominance of the Ottomanist Arabs, but these events did leave them with no alternative to Arabism. Arab nationalism became the creed of all political activists everywhere in the Fertile Crescent except Lebanon, but the political superiority of the prewar Ottomanists survived. The Arab nationalist movements against the Man- dates and nationalist governments, when such existed, were dominated by pre- War Ottomanists lately converted to Arabism. The surviving prewar Arabists continued to be out of power, in the opposition.67 They were joined by others, some surviving prewar Ottomanists, some younger newcomers to politics. Through the 1920s and into the 1930s, they formed a loose network in the Arab Indepen- dence Party (the "Istiqlalists") and Syrian-Palestinian Congress Executive Committee, whose overlapping membership had informal ties with the "opposi- tionists" in Iraq (Yasin al-Hashimi) and Amin al-Husayni in Palestine.68 This was the political affiliation of most of the Arabist intellectuals, especially of those who made most use of semi-Marxism. The Iraqi state schools provided employ- ment for some of them, and Baghdad became a center for developing and dispersing their ideas.69

In Egypt, too, the political opposition was the first to adopt Arab nationalism. Because the subject is controversial and has received relatively little scholarly investigation, it is advisable to treat it in some detail.70 Egypt had provided a

friendly environment for the Syrian intellectuals who developed Arabism from 'Abduh's Islamic modernism. The earliest advocates of Arabism received pa- tronage and support from an eminent Egyptian, Ahmad Taymur.71 After the war, Egypt continued to be the base for some of the Syrian Arab nationalist opposi- tion. Rashid Rida' continued his activities. Most important, Muhibb al-Din al- Khatib expanded his. His Salafiyya Press and Bookstore and his journals, the monthly al-Zahra' and the weekly al-Fath, became perhaps the most important disseminators of Islamic modernist and Pan-Arab publications. His activities received vital support from Ahmad Taymur. Khatib and Taymur then went on to found the Young Men's Muslim Association,72 in 1927, and they were major influences on, and probably indispensable patrons of, Hasan al-Banna and the

Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years 81

Muslim Brothers.73 These individuals and organizations, the constituents of the Egyptian Salafiyya revival, were the chief disseminators of the Arab ideology that the Fertile Crescent intellectuals had developed from 'Abduh's Islamic modernism. The derivation of Egyptian Pan-Arab thought from that of the eastern compatriots is obvious.74

A few mainstream Egyptian politicians began to advocate Arabism in the late 1920s. All such were members of the Egyptian opposition, i.e., those opposed to the Zaghlul-Nahhas connection, which dominated the Wafd and electoral poli- tics throughout the interwar period. The founders and directors of the YMMA included such prominent Egyptian politicians as 'Abd al-Hamid Sa'id, its presi- dent, 'Abd al-'Aziz Jawish (Shawish), and Yahya al-Dardiri, all members of the National Party.75 They were then followed in the advocacy of Arabism by politicians and intellectuals affiliated with the more important political parties.76

Muhammad 'Ali 'Aluba, perhaps the first of these to embrace Pan-Arabism, was a prewar Nationalist who joined the Liberal Constitutionalists. A somewhat later convert, Muhammad Husayn Haykal, was also a Liberal Constitutionalist, and the organs of that party were the leading outlets for Arab nationalist articles among party-affiliated publications. The other leading early advocates of Arab- ism who were affiliated with major parties were also oppositionists. Mahmud 'Azmi, one of the very first, was an early member of the Liberal Constitutional Party. He was employed on the editorial staff of the Party organs from their foundation until 1928, when he defected. After a checkered career, which in- cluded association with 'Abbas II, he joined the Wafdist-affiliated journal al- Jihad and then, in 1935, al-Ruz al-Yusuf al-Yawmiyya, which, beginning as a Wafdist paper, soon became anti-Wafdist as a result of Wafdist internal con- flicts.77 Ibrahim 'Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini, perhaps the most prominent among the first political literati to embrace Arabism, was a member of the editorial staff of the Liberal Constitutionalist al-Siyasa during the early 1930s; he wrote articles against the Wafd and, with Haykal, against missionaries, but he lost his position to a friend of Muhammad Mahmud. He then began writing for al-Balagh, a journal that was Wafdist-leaning through most of its life, although at the time Mazini was writing, the publisher and editor, CAbd al-Qadir Hamza, had broken with the Wafd. Mazini later wrote political articles for both al-Balagh and al- Asas, but he was never a Wafdist, although he was a friend of al-Nuqrashi and inclined toward the Sa'dists.78 A political intellectual who became a prominent advocate of Pan-Arabism somewhat later, in the 1930s, Zaki Mubarak, began his political activity as a devotee of the National Party, a loyalty he kept when he wrote regularly for al-Balagh at times when it was Wafdist.79 The two earliest and most prominent Wafdist politicians to advocate Arabism, 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam and Hamad al-Basil, were among the Wafdists who opposed Nahhas at least as early as 1930, finally seceding in 1932.80 Their Pan-Arab activities began in late 1931.

The concentration of Arabism in the political opposition is obvious. None of the major Wafdist or Sa'dist leaders were early advocates of Arabism, and none were prominent in its advocacy even after it became established in the mid- 1930s, except for the least secure of them, the Wafdist Makram 'Ubayd.8l

82 C. Ernest Dawn

By 1936, however, Arabism had become sufficiently popular to require the attention of practically all major politicians. Youth organizations that drew their ideology from Salafiyya sources received patronage and assistance from political leaders. National Party politicians provided the leadership of the YMMA from the beginning. 'Aluba, a prewar Nationalist, a founder and long-time member of the Liberal Constitutionalists, and, finally, a Nationalist once more, at least as early as 1934 gave support to a new youth organization founded in October 1933, Young Egypt.82 The organization combined elements drawn from the Arab Islamic modernist ideology of the Salafiyya movement with an Egypt-first doc- trine, much as the pre-1918 Nationalists had combined Egyptianism with Ottomanism and Islam.83 The organization had some association with both the Liberal Constitutionalists and the Nationalists.84 King Fu'ad appears to have provided patronage to Young Egypt as early as 1934.85 But the foremost patron of Arabism among cabinet-level politicians was 'Ali Mahir, chief of the royal cabinet from July 1, 1935, and prime minister from January to May 1936. He apparently became a patron of both Young Egypt and the Muslim Brothers in 1935, a practice he continued from that time forward while he held his position as either prime minister or chief of the royal cabinet.86 As prime minister in 1936, Mahir included the Arab nationalist CAluba as minister of education. Mahir also courted two eminent Arab nationalist journalists, Zaki Mubarak and Mahmud 'Azmi.87 Meanwhile, Egyptian popular sympathy for the Palestinian Arabs was increasingly manifested. From the outbreak of the Arab rebellion in Palestine in the spring of 1936 on, every Egyptian cabinet found it necessary to make public statements of support for the Palestinians and to take diplomatic action on their behalf.88

The Arab nationalists as agents of opposition and dissent had to identify ills, fix blame, and offer remedy. Prewar Arab nationalism, like its parent, Islamic modernist Ottomanism, had done this by comparing the Arab present, the Arab past, and the West. The Arab present was shown to be shameful and humiliating. Deviation from the Arab past was the cause, return to it the cure. Arab rulers and obscurantist religious leaders who collaborated with Western imperialism in corrupting Arab Islam in order to exploit the Arab nation received the blame. Their displacement by true patriots was necessary to bring about the restoration of true Islam and the defeat of the hostile West. This prewar Arabist diagnosis of and prescription for Arab illness formed the heart of postwar Arab nationalist ideology. Some seem not to have gone beyond it, but others expanded the ideology by adding the Semito-Arab version of history or by giving a new emphasis to the socialist element in the genuine original Islam, the sins of the rich, and the potentially imminent class conflict, or by both. Whatever the mix, the thrust was the urgency of chastizing and displacing the erring members of the Arab establishment.

Arab nationalist ideology had obvious utility for the political opposition. Furthermore, in the Arab polity, as in others, competition for position and its rewards very often preceded ideological contradiction. Much of the political cleavage among the Arabs existed over several generations in the form of continuing rivalries between families and factions. The prewar division between

Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years 83

Ottomanists and Arabists continued without much change after the war, but the former, still dominant, adopted the ideology of their unsuccessful opponents. Manifestly, ideological contradiction was to some extent, as yet indeterminable, produced by competition for place and its remuneration.89 But Arab nationalist ideology was concerned with more than the sins of the advantaged Arabs. In the view of the Arab nationalists, these sins were of unequaled importance because they had caused the Arabs and Islam to fall dangerously behind the Christian West. In addition to place and its rewards, the Arab nationalists were competing for the leadership of a human collectivity with its problems and responsibilities.

The Arab nationalists presented themselves as the saviors of the Arabs in a time of deadly peril. This peril had been discovered and diagnosed by means of an invidious comparison of the Islamic Arab nation's present with its past and with the modern Christian West. Such a comparison of the present self, the past self, and the other was shared by postwar Arabism with its ancestors, prewar Arabism and modernist Ottomanism, each of which centered on the emotionally charged expression of the perception that the Islamic Ottoman or Arab self had been deprived and threatened with extinction by the hostile West. The perceived failure of the Islamic Ottoman or Arab nation to keep pace with the West inflicted painful injury on the self-view for which every political contender had to offer treatment. The appeal to the past for proof that the Ottomans or the Arabs would once again surpass the West salved the wounds and gave hope for the future.90 But the salve proved to be ineffective, and the hopes were not fulfilled. Ottoman or Arab military and political relations with the West continued to be unsatisfactory, and the perception of Eastern backwardness was not dimmed. So the Western problem remained the hub of Arab politics, the insolvable problem that demanded solution. In a society or community with such a problem, opposition and dissent will probably be greater in incidence and intensity than the degree that is intrinsic to any social interaction and will certainly produce little cognitive dissonance. The impotence of an establishment in the face of a universally perceived danger causes some to oppose and dissent and legitimizes opposition and dissent whatever the cause.

The cleavage between government and opposition among the Arabs survived the replacement of Ottomanism by Arabism, which the First World War pro- duced, as did the injured Arab self-view, perhaps now intensified by the actual presence and greater visibility of the West. Thus the internal conflict and the external relations of the Arabs required further development of Arabist ideology. The Arab-West conflict had to be conceived in a way that sharpened the notion of irreconcilable contradiction between the Arabs and the West and strengthened the assignment of blame for the Arabs' humiliation to Arab collaborators with the West. It happened that just at this time material for this purpose could be borrowed from the West. The emerging popular semi-Marxism of Western historians and political theorists provided material that more sharply delineated earlier notions of Western imperialism and economic exploitation. The Bol- shevik revolution raised hopes in a broad political spectrum of a strong ally against Western imperialism. The concept of class conflict and collaboration between propertied Arabs and Western capitalists utilizing corrupted Islam to

84 C. Ernest Dawn

exploit the Arab masses offered new grist for the mill of the opposition. The Semito-Arab concept, the other main addition, material for which was just then succinctly stated by Breasted, by expanding the Arab-West conflict into the Semito-Aryan conflict, heightened the sense of Arab-European antagonism and strengthened the Arabs' claim to be the most important nation in history. The new concept also responded to the Zionist threat by asserting Arab priority in Palestine and by repudiating the appeal that some Zionists were making to a common Semitic bond between Arabs and Jews.91

In no human collectivity does agreement on some elements of an ideology guarantee universal acceptance of all elements. Among Arab nationalists, Islamic socialism was treated in diverse ways. Some appear to have passed over it, but there does not appear to have been any overt attack on the concept itself. There were differences in interpretation, however. The Egyptians appear to have paid less attention to Islamic socialism than the Fertile Crescent intellectuals did and to have been more restrained in criticism of the established order. One major Egyptian intellectual, Haykal, espoused a version radically different from that of Ahmad Husayn, which Haykal denounced as advocacy of class warfare.92 In the successive editions of Miqdadi's textbook, the concept of class conflict under- went a gradual attenuation. The failure of the Kilani movement in Iraq excluded most of the Iraqi radicals from prominence in Iraqi politics. In the 1940s, when the Arab League charter member governments officially espoused Pan-Arabism, Islamic socialism received little attention from government partisans, even in Syria under Shukri al-Quwatli, who had in prepresidential years been the prin- cipal Syrian patron of the radical Islamic socialists.

But the semi-Marxism survived. Not only was it prominent in history text- books and journals until 1939, but successful political organizations also espoused it. It remained a fundamental element in the ideology of the Muslim Brother- hood. In the 1930s, the Nawras al-Kilani-Tawfiq al-Shishakli-Akram al-Hawrani group in Hama stressed the socialistic element, as did other groups connected with older established oppositionist leaders.93 In the Fertile Crescent, the most important group was the CAsabat al-'Amal al-Qawmi, ostensibly a Pan-Arab youth organization formed in reaction to the failures and betrayals of the older generation, but in fact virtually the followings of Yasin al-Hashimi, Shukri al- Quwatli, and Amin al-Husayni in Iraq, Syria, and Palestine. Some Iraqi mem- bers established close ties with young officers of the developing Iraqi Army.94 In Egypt, Ahmad Husayn's Young Egypt adopted many elements of the full ideol- ogy. Iraq continued to be the patron. Educators from Egypt joined Syrians and Palestinians in the higher schools of Baghdad. The Iraqi capital became the center of a wide network of radical Arab nationalists, which reached its greatest extent in the days of the Rashid Ali al-Kilani government. Syrians, Palestinians, and Egyptians found asylum, employment, and inspiration there. Among them were Akram al-Hawrani and Zaki al-Arsuzi, a one-time member of the 'Asabat al-'Amal al-Qawmi and one of the founders of the Ba'th Party, from Syria, and Mustafa al-Wakil, the Vice-President of Young Egypt.95 From Hawrani's fol- lowing and the Bacth came the leadership of Syria and Iraq from the 1950s onward, and many of the Nasserist Free Officers, including Gamal Abdel Nasser

Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years 85

himself, had been members of Young Egypt in the 1930s.96 The other Egyptian exponent of socialism, the Muslim Brothers, also had many ties with the Free Officers.97 Not surprisingly, the semi-Marxist version of Pan-Arab ideology formed in the 1920s provided the basis for both Ba'thist and Nasserist ideology from the 1950s onward.98

HISTORY DEPARTMENT

UNIVERISTY OF ILLINOIS

NOTES

Author's note: This paper is based in part on research done while the author was a fellow of the Institute for Advanced Studies of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The author alone is respon- sible for its contents. Bruce D. Craig of the University of Chicago Library located and provided a

copy of the important essay by Rashid Rida' cited in n. 60. An earlier version of this paper was

presented to the annual meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, San Francisco, November 29, 1984.

'C. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973) (these essays were first published in 1957-1962). The views of George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1937) and Hans Kohn, A History of Nationalism in the East, Margaret M. Green, trans. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939), are still to be found, in whole or in part, and often combined. Zeine N. Zeine, Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut: Khayat's, 1958) (new edition: The Emergence of Arab Nationalism: With a Background Study of Arab- Turkish Relations in the Near East, Beirut: Khayat's, 1966), departs radically from Antonius with respect to the nineteenth century, but like him regards Arab separatism as a reaction to the Committee of Union and Progress Turkification and Turkism. A more subtle version of the same interpretation is given by A. L. Tibawi, A Modern History of Syria, including Lebanon and Palestine (London: Macmillan and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969). Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry, Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, ed. and trans. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981; the German original was published in 1971) includes Dawn's findings in a model of rampant eclecticism, which combines the Antonius and Kohn theses (see esp. pp. 87-89). Dawn's conclusions are ambiguously accepted by Rashid Ismail Khalidi, British Policy Towards Syria and Palestine, 1906- 1914: A Study of the Antecedents of the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and the Balfour Declaration (London: Ithaca Press for the Middle East Center, St. Anthony's College, Oxford, 1980) and "Social Factors in the Rise of the Arab Movement in Syria," From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, Said Amir Arjomand, ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), pp. 53-70; and by Albert Hourani, "'The Arab Awakening' Forty Years After," The Emergence of the Modern Middle East (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 201-3, but both seem to believe that the Arab nationalists had become a majority or a near majority by 1914 as a result of Arab reaction to CUP policies and to Zionism. William L. Cleveland, The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Satic al-Husri (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971) and Islam Against the West: Shakib Arslan and the Campaign for Islamic Nationalism (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), examines in detail the careers of two prominent pre-1918 Ottomanist who converted to Arabism after the War. Philip S. Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus 1860-1920 (Cambridge, London, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983) develops and expands on Dawn's conclusions with much new material. Elie Kedourie in various articles collected in The Chatham House Version and Other Middle-Eastern Studies, 1st ed. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), esp. pp. 206, 213-19, 287-90, 302-3, 306, 319-20, 324, 330, 333, 338, 342, 369, 378-79, 381, and in Arabic Political Memoirs and other Studies (London: Frank Cass, 1974), esp. pp. 125, 136, 165-66, 168, 178, believes that Arab nationalism was created by the spread

86 C. Ernest Dawn

of European theological and political doctrines, which weakened the hold of Islam and Christianity, and was established by military officers installed in power by the British after World War I, and spread by them and the British and by King Faruq and his entourage. Arab nationalism is a post- World War I phenomenon. Much the same view is set forth by Sylvia G. Haim, "Introduction," Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), esp. pp. 10, 15, 18-19, 27, 35, 49, 56-61, 70 n. 148, 72 at n. 156. Hisham Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Formative Years, 1875-1914 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), makes no reference to Dawn's essays but in similar fashion depicts the prewar Arab nationalist political movement as a minority movement composed of privileged persons pursuing office, interest, and privilege and little different in these respects from their opponents (see esp. 88-89, 115, 116-17, 122, 123).

2Malcolm Kerr, Islamic Reform: The Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); Cleveland, al-Husri; idem., Arslan; Tibi; Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, Middle Eastern Monographs, 9 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); Haim, Arab Nationalism; Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh, The Ideas of Arab Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1956).

3(Jerusalem: Matbaca Bayt al-Muqaddis, 1923.) 41st ed., 2 vols. (Cairo: Matba'a al-Salafiyya, [1924]), 2d ed. (1343H/1924-1344H/1925), 3d ed.

(1344H/ 1925). The first edition has not been available. It is reviewed in Majalla al-Majmac al-Illmi al- A rabi bi-Dimashq (MMIAD), 4 (1924), 428.

51st ed. (Cairo: Matbca al-Salafiyya, 1348/[1929]), 2d ed. (1350/[1931]), 5th ed. (Haifa: al-Maktaba al-'Arabiyya al-Wataniyya, [1353]/[1934]), 6th ed. (Damascus: Maktaba al-'Irfa, 1357/1938).

61st ed. (Cairo: al-Matba'a al-Salafiyya, 1349/[1930]), 2d ed. (Haifa: al-Maktaba al-Wataniyya al-'Arabiyya and Damascus: Matbaca al-Sadaqa, 1352/[1933]), 3d ed. (Damascus: Maktaba al-CIrfa, 1357H/AD1938).

71st ed. (Cairo: Matba'a al-Salafiyya, 1350/[1931]), 2d ed. (Jerusalem: Matba a Dar al-Aytam al-Islami al-Sana'iyya, 1355/1936).

81st ed. (Baghdad: Matbaca al-Ma'arif, 1350/1931), 2d ed. (1351/1932), 3d ed. (1353/[1934]), 4th ed. (Baghdad: Dar al-Haditha, 1355/[1936]), rev. ed. (Baghdad: Government Press, 1939). The fourth edition has not been accessible. Information concerning it has been provided by Dr. Reeva Simon.

9Abdul Latif Tibawi, Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine: A Study of Three Decades of British Administration (London: Luzac, 1956), pp. 28-38, 95-97, 193-99; Humphrey Ernest Bowman, Middle-East Window (London, New York, and Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1942), pp. 310-14; MMIAD, 4 (1924), 428-29; 11 (1931), 704; Reeva S. Simon, "The Teaching of History in Iraq before the Rashid Ali Coup of 1941," Middle Eastern Studies, 22 (1986), 42; Nabih Amin Faris, "The Arabs and Their History," The Middle East Journal (MEJ), 8 (1954), 156-57; Nicola A. Ziadeh, "Recent Arabic Literature on Arabism," MEJ, 6 (1952), 471.

'?Haim points to 'Abduh's "implicit" "glorification of Arab Islam and . . . depreciation of Ottoman Islam" (p. 21), and calls Kawakibi "the first true intellectual precursor of modern secular Pan- Arabism" (p. 27), but apparently does not derive Arab nationalism from their thought. Their main influence was, like that of Afghani and others, to "increase skepticism concerning Islam" among Muslims (p. 16). Haim believes that real Arab nationalism was an importation from the West at the time of World War I and that there was no "serious attempt to define [its] meaning" until the late 1930s (p. 35). In order to survive, the newly imported secular Arabism had to become "consonant with" Islam (p. 54). Sharabi divides the Islamic modernists of most students into reformists (e.g., cAbduh) and secularists (e.g., Kawakibi) and assigns to the secularists the position of leading the Arab nationalist movement before 1914 until the end of the interwar period, when it finally collapsed in the face of secular Arab nationalism, which had been created by the Lebanese Christians (see esp. pp. 64, 76-77, 91, 102-3, 107 n. 4, 108-9, 111-12, 118, 122, 123, 128, 131-32, 133). Tibi (pp. 64-68) holds that Islamic modernism contributed to the formation of Arab nationalism, that Kawakibi was an "important pioneer of Arab nationalism" (p. 67), but that Arab nationalism was a secular movement, originating with the Lebanese Christians, "which was eventually to destroy the Islamic revitalization movement" (p. 68), even though Islam was not abandoned by the Arab nationalists.

Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years 87

"Barghuthi and Tuta, pp. 2-3, 87 (quotation), 261; Darwaza, Mukhtasar, 2d ed., I, 70; idem, al-Ta'rikh al-carabi, 1st ed., pp. 308, 927 (hereafter, when the first edition is cited, all editions have the text unless otherwise noted; when subsequent editions are cited, the text occurs in all subsequent editions unless otherwise noted); James Henry Breasted, Ancient Times, A History of the Early World: An Introduction to the Study of Ancient History and the Career of Early Man (Boston, New York, etc.: Ginn, 1916); Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, Ittijah al-mawjat al-bashariyyafi-jazira al-carab (Cairo: al-Matba'a al-Salafiyya, 1344/1925), pp. 63-64 (n. 1 to p. 63); Jayms Hanri Birastid, al- 'Usur al-qadima was huwa tamhid li-dars al-ta'rikh al-qadim wa acmal al-insan al-awwal, Da'ud Qurban, trans. (Beirut: al-Matba'a al-Amayrikaniyya, 1926), 2d ed. (1930); Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 1, 4, 6, 7, 451. When all editions have the same text, only the second edition is cited. I have dealt more extensively with Miqdadi in "An Arab Nationalist View of World Politics and History in the Inter- War Period-Darwish al-Miqdadi," to appear in The Great Powers in the Middle East: 1919-1939, Uriel Dann, ed. (London: Holmes and Meier).

'2Al-Ta'rikh al-Carabi, 1st ed., pp. 35, 86, 317, 318, 2d ed., pp. 90, 360, 6th ed., pp. 315, 317. '3Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 1, 451. 14Barghuthi and Tuta, pp. 15, 17-18, 82-83; Darwaza, Mukhtasar, 2d ed., I, 67-68, 71, 73, 76-77;

idem, al-Ta'rikh al-'arabi, 1st ed., pp. 10-13; idem, al-Ta'rikh al-qadim, 1st ed., pp. 70-76; Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 12-13, 16-19, 1939 ed., p. 7, is certain that Hammurabi was Arab.

'5Barghuthi and Tuta, pp. 3, 7-8, 10-12. 6Khatib, passim, esp. pp. 4-6, 32-35, 46-50, 63-64 (n. 1 to p. 63; quotation from Shurayqi).

'7Darwaza, Mukhtasar, 2d ed., I, 4-5, 11-13, 17-18, 61-72; idem, al-Ta'rikh al-'arabi, 1st ed., pp. 3-9; idem, al-Ta'rikh al-qadim, 1st ed., pp. 35-40; Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 10-13, 451.

'8Barghuthi and Tuta, pp. 6, 14, 106; Darwaza, Mukhtasar, 2d ed., I, 4-5, 11-14 (Husri's direct influence is acknowledged, p. 5 n. 1); idem, al-Ta'rikh al-'arabi, 1st ed., p. 7; idem, al-Ta'rikh al- qadim, 1st ed., p. 39; Miqdadi, p. 451.

'9Miqdadi, p. 59; 'Abd al-Malik al-Nashif, ed., Bayna jahiliyyatayn: masrahiyya, by Darwish al- Miqdadi (Beirut: Dar al-'Ilm li-al-Malayin, 1967), p. 7.

20Barghuthi and Tuta, pp. 11-13, 17-18; Darwaza, Mukhtasar, 2d ed., 1, 23-24, 61-62, 73-75; idem, al-Ta rikh al-'arabi, 1st ed., pp. 15-16, 19, 20, 27-31, 45-46, 51; Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 16-21, 31-35; MMIAD, 3 (1923), 186, 317-18; 17 (1942), 311-18, 392-407, 487-500.

2"Barghuthi and Tuta, pp. 172-75, 209; Darwaza, Mukhtasar, 2d ed., 11, 80-81; idem, al-Ta'rikh al-'arabi, 1st ed., pp. 211, 236; Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 332-33, 336.

22Barghuthi and Tuta, pp. 257-60; Darwaza, al-Ta'rikh al-'arabi, 1st ed., pp. 255-57, 285, 287-89; Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 460, 462-63, 488, 503-4; Tiyudur Arunuwitsch Rudhstayn, Ta9rikh misr qabla al-ihtilal al-britani wa-bacdahu, 'Ali Ahmad Shukri, trans. (Cairo, 1345/1927), a translation of Fedor Aronovich (Theodore) Rothstein, Egypt's Ruin: A Financial and Administrative Record (London: A. C. Fifield, 1910); Shakib Arslan, ed., Hadir al-'alam al-islami, by Luthruf Situdard, cAjjaj Nuwayhid, trans., 2 vols. (Cairo: Matba'a 'Isa al-Babi al-Halibi, 1343/1925), II, 276 n. 1, 2d ed., 4 vols. (1352/1933); IV, 244 n. 1; MMIAD, 4 (1924), 423-24; 8 (1928), 245; 9 (1929), 574-75; 10 (1930), 507-8.

23Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 461-62, 511, 519-20; MMIAD, 7 (1927), 177; 8 (1928), 724-25, 730-39; 9 (1929), 407-8; 12 (1932), 719.

24Breasted, pp. 172-74, 177, 181-82, 217-18. 25Barghuthi and Tuta, pp. 49-52, 76-77, 104-5, 190 (quotations, pp. 49, 77). 26Barghuthi and Tuta, pp. 6, 13, 144, 147, 148, 168-69; Darwaza, Mukhtasar, 2d ed., I, 14; idem,

al-Ta'rikh al-qadim, Ist ed., pp. 126, 131, 146, 200; 2d ed., pp. 18-20, 95, 107, 113. 27E.g., the Marxist writer, Bandali Jawzi, Min ta'rikh al-harakat al-fikriyya fi al-islam, Vol. I:

Min taDrikh al-haraka al-ijtima'iyya (Jerusalem, 1928), pp. 6-7; MMIAD, 9 (1929), 402, 403. 28Khatib, pp. 64-65. 29Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 11, 312, 332, 483-84; 2d ed., pp. 5-8, 252, 362. 30Darwaza, Mukhtasar, 2d ed., 1, 47, 48-49, 51, 56, 83-84; Miqdadi, 2d ed., 37-38. 3"Darwaza, Mukhtasar, 2d ed., I, 47, 56-57, 70, 84; idem, al-Ta'rikh al-Carabi, 1st ed., pp. 23-25,

37-39, 41-42. 32Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 22, 27-28, 37, 59-60, 64; Darwaza, Mukhtasar, 2d ed., I, 111-13.

88 C. Ernest Dawn

33Kitib tabai' al-istibdad wa-sari' al-istib'ad, in al-A'mal al-kamila, Muhammad 'Imara, ed., (Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Misriyya li-al-Ta'lif wa-al-Nashr, 1970), pp. 374-84, esp. p. 378; for a transla- tion, see Sami A. Hanna and George H. Gardner, Arab Socialism: A Documentary Survey (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1969), pp. 217-24, esp. p. 219.

34Hadir al-'alam al-islami, 1st ed., II, 377; 2d ed., IV, 362--63. 35Mukhtasar, 2d ed., I, 137-38 (n. I to p. 137); al-Ta'rikh al-'arabi, 1st ed., pp. 64, 121. 36MMIAD, 5 (1925), 393-94; 11 (1931), 190-91; 13 (1933), 253-54; 15 (1937), 456-65; 16 (1941),

381. 37See note 27 above. 38MMIAD, 9 (1929), 125. 39Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, al-A'mal al-kamila, Muhammad 'Imara, ed. (Cairo: al-Mu'assasa al-

Misriyya al-'Amma li al-Ta'lif wa-al-Nashr, 1968), pp. 414-23 (for Abu Dharr, pp. 421-23); a translation is given in Hanna and Gardner, pp. 267-74 (Abu Dharr, pp. 273-74).

40Miqdadi, 1st ed., p. 249, 2d ed., pp. 31-32, 60-65, 93, 188, 3d ed., pp. 22, 188, 1939 ed., pp. 37-41, 48-49, 75, 159.

4'Hadir al-'alam al-islami, 2d ed., I, 187. 42Les schisimes dans 'lIslam: Introduction ai une etude de la religion musulmane (Paris: Payot,

1965), p. 6 n. 13. 43Barghuthi and Tuta, pp. 83-88, 100-101, 102-4, 108, 113; Darwaza, Mukhtasar, 2d ed., I, 41, 47,

56, 67, 110, 112-14, 115, 131, 141, 164, 196; idem, al-Ta'rikh al-'arabi, 1st ed., pp. 59, 63, 65, 70, 80-81, 85, 86, 90, 102, 113, 116, 138, 140, 147, 152, 186, 230, 233-34, 280, 317; Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 1, 64-65, 130-33, 142, 173-74, 451; Arslan, 2d ed., I, 28-31.

44Darwaza, Mukhtasar, 2d ed., II, 106-7, 164, 168; idem, al-Ta'rikh al-'arabi, 1st ed., pp. 181-82; Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 358-60, 368-71, 376, 424, 445; Arslan, 2d ed., 1, 117-27.

45Barghuthi and Tuta, pp. 134-35, 144, 146-49, 216-17; Darwaza, Mukhtasar, 2d ed., II, 26-29, 39-40, 78-79; I, 134, 152-53, 156-58, 160-62, 168-70, 184-85, 187, 196, 210; idem, al-Ta'rikh al-'arabi, 1st ed., pp. 186, 193-94, 289; Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 138-39, 243, 256-57, 318, 320, 327, 330, 339, 348-50, 472.

46Barghuthi and Tuta, pp. 234-37, 252-54, 261-68; MMIAD, 5 (1925), 104; 7 (1927), 177-78, 182; 9 (1929), 80-94; Darwaza, al-Ta'rikh al-'arabi, 1st ed., pp. 212, 259, 297-98, 2d ed., pp. 325-26; Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 472-92.

47Barghuthi and Tuta, p. 257; Darwaza, al-Ta'rikh al-'arabi, 1st ed., pp. 266-67, 292, 297-98; Arslan, 1st ed., II, 27-29, 51-52; Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 315, 331, 354, 360, 362, 374, 417-18, 472-74, 482-83,492.

48Darwaza, Mukhtasar, 2d ed., 1, 35, 162, 164; idem, al-Ta'rikh al-Carabi, 1st ed., pp. 103, 132, 160-61,219-20.

49MMIAD, 8 (1928), 720, 721, 723. 5'Arslan, 1st ed., I, 8-9 (n. I to p. 8), 2d ed., 1, 162-63; Darwaza, Mukhtasar, 2d ed., 1, 128, 206,

II, 3-4, 10, 18-19, 21--24; idem, al-Ta'rikh al-'arahi, Ist ed., pp. 119, 156-57, 171-72, 200-201, 205; Barghuthi and Tuta, pp. 104-5, 144.

51Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 243, 245 -46, 312. 52Barghuthi and Tuta, pp. 209-10, 217 (quotation, p. 217); Arslan, 1st ed., I, 21--23 (n. 1 to p. 21),

151-52 (n. I to p. 151); 2d ed., 1, 168, 186-87, 238-39, 329-31; III, 208-342 (esp. 341-42); Darwaza, Mukhtasar, 2d ed., II, 148: idem, al-Ta-rikh al-'arabi, 1st ed., pp. 151, 184, 219, 229-30, 237, 246-50, 270; Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 332, 420-22, 433, 438-39.

53MMIAD, 4 (1924), 330-32, 9 (1929), 254-55. 54Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 451, 493, 520; 3d ed., pp. 509, 521. 55MMIAD, 7 (1927), 433, 436, 438; 8 (1928), 720; 12 (1932), 126; Sami al-Kayyali, al-Fikr al-'arabi

bayna madihi wa-hadirihi (Cairo: Matba'a al-Ma'arif, 1943), pp. 43-44; Darwaza, al-Ta&rikh al- 'arabi, 1st ed., p. 299; Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 337, 494-95.

56MMIAD, 9 (1929), 254-55. 57Barghuthi and Tuta, pp. 47, 98, 242-43, 286-87; Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 42, 508-11, 514-17;

Darwaza, al-Ta'rikh al-'arabi, 1st ed., p. 252; 2d ed., II, p. 187.

Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years 89

58Darwaza, Mukhtasar, 2d ed., II, 106, 107, 164, 187-88; idem, al-Ta'rikh al-Carabi, 1st ed., pp. 181, 182; Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 386-71; Arslan, 2d ed., I, 117-27.

59Kayyali, pp. 10-11, 83-88, 94-95 (quotations p. 84). 60Darwaza, al- Tarikh al-Carabi, 1st ed., p. 255; idem, al-Ta'rikh al-mutawassit wa-al-hadith, 1st

ed., p. 184 (quotation), pp. 288-89; Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 503-4, 510, 517. 61Miqdadi, 2d ed., pp. 144, 322-24; for Arslan and Rida', see below. 62Arslan, 1st ed., II, 321 n. 2, 401-2. 63Al-Manar, 21, 5 (Aug. 1919), 252-56 (quotations, pp. 253-54); translation in La penske poli-

tique arabe contemporaine, Anouar Abdel-Malek, ed. (Paris: Seuil, 1970), pp. 230-35 (quotations, pp. 231, 232).

64al- Ta'rikh al-mutawassit wa-al-hadith, 1st ed., p. 296. 65Arslan, II, 1st ed., 299 n. 2, 377, 401. 66MMIAD, 5 (1925), 393-94; 6 (1926), 190-91. 67Dawn, Ottomanism to Arabism, pp. 157-59, 167, 170-74. 68Shakib Arslan, al-Sayyid Rashid Rida' aw-ikha' arba'un sana (Damascus: Maktaba Ibn-Zaydun,

1356/1937), pp. 633-38, 642, 645, 647-49, 652-56, 665-66, 670-71, 677-79, 688, 693-94, 697-98, 708; Oriente Moderno (OM) 9 (1929), 413; 10 (1930), 372; 12 (1932), 370-71, 427, 437-38, 487, 497; 13 (1933), 34-55, 127, 183, 340, 570; Y. Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement, 2 vols. (London: Frank Cass, 1974-1977), I, 77-79, 88, 191, 204, 218, 222, 234, 245, 269, 277, 302, II, 32, 36, 51-52, 60, 71, 120, 123, 124, 137, 138, 170, 193, 224, 235, 242, 243, 258, 275, 282, 292, 317 n. 31, 344 n. 71, 334 n. 116, 336 n. 176; Philip S. Khoury, "Factionalism among Syrian Nationalists during the French Mandate," IJMES, 13 (1981), 441-69.

69SatiC al-Husri, Mudhakkiratifi al-'iraq, 1921-1941, 2 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1967-68), I, 557; Talib Mushtaq, Awraq ayyami, 2 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1968-69), I, 201-2; Simon, pp. 36, 39, 40, 42-43.

70For the best statements of the most sharply opposing views, see Kedourie, Chatham House Version, pp. 215-18, and Ralph M. Coury, "Who 'Invented' Egyptian Arab Nationalism?" IJMES, 14 (1982), 249-81, 459-79.

7"Anwar al-Jundi, AClam wa-ashab aqlam (Cairo: Dar Nahda Misr li-Tabc wa-al-Nashr, n.d.), pp. 17-24, esp. 18, 24; Michelangelo Guidi in OM, 11 (1931), 424-27.

72Anwar al-Jundi, AClam al-qarn al-rabic cashr al-hijri (Cairo: Maktaba al-Anjilu al-Misri, 1981), I, 381-96, esp. 381, 384.

73Mitchell, Muslim Brothers, pp. 5, 322-23. 74The most extensive treatment of early Egyptian Pan-Arab thought is by Israel Gershoni; see his

"Arabization of Islam: The Egyptian Salafiyya and the Rise of Arabism in Pre-Revolutionary Egypt," Asian and African Studies (AAS), 13 (1979), 25-57; "The Emergence of Pan-Nationalism in Egypt: Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism in the 1930s," AAS, 16 (1982), 59-94; The Emergence of Pan-Arabism in Egypt (Tel-Aviv: Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel-Aviv University, 1981). Important material is contained in Charles D. Smith, Islam and the Search for Social Order in Egypt: A Biography of Muhammad Husayn Haykal (New York: State University of New York Press, 1983). On the Muslim Brothers, see also Mitchell, pp. 209-94, and on the YMMA, see Georg Kampffmeyer, "Egypt and Western Asia," Whither Islam, H. A. R. Gibb, ed. (London: Victor Gollancz, 1932; reprint New York: AMS Inc., 1973), pp. 103-4, 114-37.

75For the founders, see Kampffmeyer, pp. 104-5. For the political affiliations and activities of those specified here, see Jundi, A'lam wa-ashab aqlam, pp. 212-25, 242-52, 450-57.

76The earliest Egyptian advocates of Pan-Arabism have been identified by means of the informa- tion given in Gershoni, "Arabization of Islam," p. 26 n. 8, p. 27 n. 9, p. 30 n. 19, p. 34 n. 35, p. 41 n. 57; "Emergence of Pan-Nationalism," pp. 61-62 at nn. 2-5, pp. 82-88; Emergence of Pan- Arabism, pp. 38-41, pp. 48-59 at n. 70, p. 53 at n. 86, pp. 56-57 at n. 97, p. 58 at n. 103, p. 75 at nn. 163-64, p. 107 n. 70, p. 109 n. 86, p. 111 nn. 97, 103, p. 120 nn. 163-64.

77Muhammad Husayn Haykal, Mudhakkirat fi al-siyasa al-misriyya, 2 vols. (Cairo: Maktaba al- Nahda al-Misriyya, 1951-53), I, 186, 190, 291, 292, 293; Fatima al-Yusuf, Dhikrayat, 3d ed. (Cairo: Ruz al-Yusuf, 1976), pp. 166-78, 186, 202, 219; OM, 13 (1933), 24, 398-400; 14 (1934), 300-301, 462;

90 C. Ernest Dawn

Marius Deeb, Party Politics in Egypt: The Wafd and Its Rivals, 1919-1939 (London: Ithaca Press, 1979), p. 113 n. 299.

78Haykal, I, 327, 348, 357; Yusuf, pp. 143, 173; OM, 10 (1930), 93; 15 (1935), 472; 16 (1936), 211-12, 239. Ni'mat Ahmad Fu'ad, Adab al-Mazini, 2d ed. (Cairo: Mu'assassa al-Khaniji, 1961), pp. 165-67.

79Muhammad Mahmud Radwan, Safhat majhula min hayat Zaki Mubarak (Cairo: Dar al-Hilal, [1974]), pp. 39-51.

80OM, 8 (1928), 238; 10 (1930), 319; 11 (1931), 581; 12 (1932), 25; 13 (1933), 275; cf. Coury, "Egypt. Arab Nationalism," pp. 252-53, 254, 264-65. For somewhat oblique brief notices of the intra-Wafd conflict, see Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt's Liberal Experiment (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 134-36, 148-49, 150-55, 159-61; Deeb, pp. 149 nn. 129 and 130, 173-74, 245-48; Janice J. Terry, Cornerstone of Egyptian Political Power: The Wafd, 1919- 1952 (London: Third World Center for Research and Publishing, 1982), pp. 224-26.

8'Gershoni, Emergence of Pan-Arabism, pp. 47, 51, 73; Coury, pp. 253-54. 82James P. Jankowski, Egypt's Young Rebels: "Young Egypt," 1933-1952 (Stanford, Calif.:

Hoover Institution, 1975), p. 19; Deeb, p. 413 n. 377. 83On Young Egypt's early ideology, see Jankowski, pp. 13, 44-78; on Ottomanism and Islamism in

pre-1918 Egypt, see idem, "Ottomanism and Arabism in Egypt, 1860-1914," The Muslim World, 70 (1980), 226-59, and Israel Gershoni, "Between Ottomanism and Egyptianism: The Evolution of 'National Sentiment' in the Cairene Middle Class as Reflected in Najib Mahfuz's Bayn al-Qasrayn," AAS, 17 (1983), 227-63.

84Jankowski, Egypt's Young Rebels, pp. 9-10, 19-20. 85Ibid., pp. 18-19. 86Deeb, pp. 339-40, 377, 401 nn. 165-66, 413 nn. 377-78; James Heyworthe-Dunne, Religious and

Political Trends in Modern Egypt, Near and Middle East Monographs, 1 (Washington, D.C.: the author, 1950), pp. 14, 23, 24, 27; Mitchell, pp. 16, 23; Jankowski, Egypt's Young Rebels, pp. 19, 22-23, 32, 35-36, 39-40; P. J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), pp. 78-81.

87Jacques Berque, L'Egypte: imperialisme et revolution (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), pp. 480-81; Mahmud 'Azmi, al-Ayyam al-mi'a: wizara Ali Mahir Basha, 30 January-9 May 1936 (Cairo: Maktaba al-Nahda al-Misriyya, [1939]).

88James Jankowski, "Egyptian Responses to the Palestine Problem in the Interwar Period," IJMES, 12 (1980), 1-38; idem, "The Government of Egypt and the Palestine Question, 1936-1939," Middle Eastern Studies, 17 (1981), 427-53; Coury, "Egypt. Arab Nationalism," pp. 254-55, 462-63.

89For examples of apparently opportunistic use of Palestine, see Coury, pp. 255-56. 90To regard the multitudinous expressions of these thoughts by Arab nationalists, including

'Azzam, as "the reflection and reinforcement of a kind of bourgeois self-exultation, [and] a testi- mony ... to the rising fortunes and potentials of a ruling class," as Coury (p. 470) does, is to ignore the basing of hopes for the future on visions of the past and the encompassing expression of anguish over the present. Coury is correct in pointing out the importance of such themes in many nationalist ideologies. Dawn has never regarded Islamic modernism or Arabism as only or even primarily the defense of an injured self-view. Of at least equal importance is the competition for office, status, and influence.

91For Zionist use of the Semitic concept, see Neil Caplan, Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question, 1917-1925 (London and Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass, 1978), pp. 124, 180; Simha Flapan, Zionism and the Palestinians (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p. 155.

92Smith, Haykal, pp. 56-57, 120-21, 153-54. 93C. Ernest Dawn, "Ottoman Affinities of 20th Century Regimes in Syria," Palestine in the Late

Ottoman Period: Political, Social and Economic Transformation, David Kushner, ed. (Jerusalem: Yad lzhak Ben-Zvi and Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), pp. 181-82.

94Dawn, "Ottoman Affinities," p. 183; Khayri al-'Umari, Yunus al-Sabcawi: sira siyasi 'isami (Baghdad: Wizara al-Thaqafa wa-al-Funun, 1978), pp. 48, 61, 63, 64-66; Mushtaq, I, 109 at n. 1, 157, 210-12; Taha al-Hashimi, Mudhakkirat, 1919-1943, Khaldun Sati' al-Husri, ed. (Beirut: Dar al- Talica, 1967), pp. 184, 188, 254, 255-62, 272; Mahmud al-Durra, Hayat 'iraqiyya min wara' al- bawwaba al-sawda' ([Cairo]: al-Hay'a al-Misriyya al-'Amma li al-Kuttab, 1976), pp. 69-71, 100;

Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years 91

Munir al-Rayyis, al-Kitab al-dhahabi li al-thawrat al-wataniyya fi al-mashriq al-'arabi, 3 vols. (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a and Damascus: Alif-Ba', 1969-77), II, 103-9, 199-202, 227-28, 292; III, 29-30, 32, 34.

95Al-Rayyis, III, 47, 53-55, 60-61, 65-66, 71-72, 74-77, 80-81, 83-84, 100, 101, 105-6, 143, 155, 158-62; al-'Umari, pp. 67-83; al-Hashimi, pp. 283-85, 289-90, 292-93, 299-300, 311, 312-13, 315, 316, 341-42, 353, 356, 358, 363-64, 369, 377, 378, 382-85, 391, 393-94, 398-403, 409; Husri, II, 316; Mushtaq, I, 401 n. 2; Zaki al-Arsuzi, al-Mu'allifat al-Kamila (Damascus: Matabi' al-Idarah al- Siyasiyah li al-Jaysh wa-al-Quwat al-Musallahah, 1972), I, 17; Jankowski, Egypt's Young Rebels, p. 84; Gershoni, Emergence of Pan-Arabism, pp. 45, 75-76.

96Jankowski, Egypt's Young Rebels, p. 121; Vatikiotis, pp. 67, 74. 97Vatikiotis, pp. 85-87, 93-94. 98For a model thorough and systematic examination of Ba'thist and Nasserist ideology, see Olivier

Carre, La legitimation islamique des socialismes arabes: analyse conceptuelle combinatoire de man- uels scholaires egyptiens, syriens et irakiens (Paris: Presses de la Foundation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1979); see also by the same author, Enseignement islamique et ideal socialiste: analyse conceptuelle des manuels d'instruction musulmane en Egypte (Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq-Librairie Orientale, 1974), and "L'Islam politique dans l'Orient arabe," Futuribles, 18 (Nov.-Dec. 1978), 747-63.