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Doctrinal War: Religion and Ideology in International ConflictAuthor(s): Robert JacksonSource: The Monist, Vol. 89, No. 2, The Foundations of International Order (APRIL 2006), pp.274-300Published by: Hegeler InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27903980 .

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Doctrinal War: Religion and Ideology in International Conflict

Justifying War

Because war is more devastating than any other form of human

conflict, it begs for justification, which must be compelling if it is to be

generally persuasive. The exercise of armed force seeks legitimacy and

legality, and that is no less evident today than in the past.1 Martin Wight, a mid-20th-century British scholar of international society, drew a useful

distinction between three kinds of war evident from history: wars of gain, wars of fear, and wars of doctrine.2 These are not different causes of war.

Rather, they are discernible and recurrent inclinations to wage war, rooted

in distinctive justifications: the normative grounds that state actors and

also some non-state actors traverse from the sphere of peace to that of war: jus ad bellum. Wars of gain are wars of opportunity, wars of

conquest, wars of territorial expansion, wars of imperialism and colonial

ism. Such wars disclose an instrumental calculus: whoever engages in

them stands or at least expects to derive advantages from them. Wars of

fear are wars of necessity: defensive wars and pre-emptive wars.3

Necessity is arguably the most compelling justification of war, for it pre supposes a looming threat and an impending disaster unless met with

deterring coercion or countervailing and repelling force. Doctrinal war,

according to Wight, is "missionary or crusading war, war to assert princi

ples and advance a cause."4 Doctrinal wars are wars of righteousness and

conviction based on doctrines that are not only right for us; they are right for everybody, everywhere. They are wars to bring one's religion or one's

ideology to foreigners and ultimately all people around the world. They are wars to defend the faith.

Today lawful and legitimate war includes several other kinds, not

singled out by Wight, which should capture some of our attention. The first is war to uphold international peace and security. That is the purpose

"Doctrinal War: Religion and Ideology in International Conflict" by Robert Jackson, The Monist, vol. 89, no. 2, pp. 274-300. Copyright ? 2006, THE MONIST, Peru, Illinois 61354.



DOCTRINAL WAR: RELIGION AND IDEOLOGY 275

of the UN Security Council, which exists to deter or defeat aggression and any other armed acts that threaten or disturb the peace of the world. The

second is war of national liberation. In 1965 the UN General Assembly recognized the legitimacy of a resort to war by peoples under foreign domination (imperialism, colonialism), in order to exercise their right to

political independence. The third is war to protect human rights, in the sense of resorting to armed force to prevent or bring an end to a humani

tarian disaster, as in the 1999 war by NATO to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. That war justification is controversial at the present time, because

it conflicts with the core doctrine of non-intervention enshrined in the UN Charter (Article 2). It is nowhere mentioned in the Charter, which has been the international locus of the jus ad bellum since 1945.5

Two contrary images of international relations and corresponding war justifications, the image of a pluralist international society and that of a solidarist international community, are evident in the history of ideas.61

employ these expressions in their philosophical and jurisprudential rather than their sociological and political science meanings. "Pluralism" (or

"dualism") is a system of thought which recognizes no ultimate principle or determining value, and a system of law in which domestic law is

superior to international law at certain fundamental points. "Solidarism"

(or "monism") has the opposite meanings. These images are not literal

representations or descriptions of existential worlds. Rather, they are al

ternative conceivable worlds that are considered to be desirable and

realizable, to a greater or lesser degree, in historical practice. The first part of this essay will consider the place of religion and ideology in interna tional relations in terms of these two images. The second part will raise some questions, prompted by those reflections, about doctrinal justifica tions of war, including wars to make the world safe for democracy.

Pluralist International Society

The first image is of a world of co-existing states, linked by diplo matic practices and international laws and organizations that endorse and

express their independence. That is the pluralist framework of an interna

tional society. Pluralist international society is built on mundane and

pragmatic norms: mutual recognition, equal state sovereignty, territorial

integrity, non-intervention, reciprocity and?above all?co-existence.

Those norms are geared, by and large, to upholding international peace



276 ROBERT JACKSON

and security and ensuring the independence and survival of member states,

large and small, east and west, north and south. They are foundation practices of international relations, most evident in classical diplomacy and inter

national law, which proved to be indispensable for states of diverse civili

zations to recognize each other and to relate to each other free from any

pre-conditional and potentially disruptive value judgments?either positive or negative?about their domestic affairs.

Because they tolerate and accommodate national difference, these norms are widely regarded as not only desirable but necessary for inter

national order in a diverse world. Pluralism has long been understood as

a worldly response to "the many and deep differences which divide the in

ternational society, differences of race, language, tradition, economic

interest and the like."7 These long-established practices may be under

stood, correctly, as responding to, interfering with, and mitigating the "clash of civilizations" that otherwise might exist.8

That worldly image of international society is what one finds in the United Nations Charter (1945), and four centuries earlier at the Peace of Augsburg (1555). At Augsburg the principle of cujus regio, ejus religio (the ruler decides the religion of the people) was laid down as a basic norm to be respected by Lutherans and Catholics who previously had been

waging doctrinal war, each seeking to convert the other by force of arms.

International proselytizing by threats or acts of armed intervention was

forbidden.9 Rulers had no right to incite or stir up religious reformations or counter-reformations inside the territories of foreign sovereigns. That would trespass on the norm of non-intervention, would violate the target state's sovereignty, and would undercut the domestic legitimacy of its

government. That was a fundamental principle of the League of Nations

Covenant (Art. 10).10 Since 1945 that has been a foundation norm of the

United Nations Charter (Art. 2).11 International society and its worldly norms elevate pragmatic practices of classical diplomacy and mundane re

quirements of international law above religious faith and devotion, above

moral righteousness, above ideological rectitude and thus above the

greater community of the faithful, however that is defined, whether in terms of religion or ideology, and regardless of whose religion or ideology it might be. Such a society must be divorced from any particular belief system, if it is to gain general acceptance. That would of course include the democratic ideology of the West.




The development and expansion of the law of nations can be under

stood as an important part of the secularization of public life, first in the West and then beyond the West.12 It can also be understood, more

narrowly, as the general acceptance of positive international law, and the

abandonment or obsolescence of natural-law conceptions rooted in Chris

tianity.13 Such law can be agnostic in matters of religion and ideology. It

does not require converting people from their traditional or customary beliefs. Religion and ideology are a domestic affair under the recognition and protection of state sovereignty.

Modern international society arguably was the first and still is the

only mundane world order in history. All rival or previous international

orders, of which I am aware, involved religious or quasi-religious doctrines as a basis of law and legitimacy.14 That would include Confucian Chinese

civilization, the Moslem Ottoman Empire, Medieval Latin Christendom, Orthodox Christian Byzantium, the Roman Empire (both before and after its Christianization under Constantine), the city-state system of Hellas?

to mention the most important. The Italian city-state system of the late

Middle Ages and early Renaissance may seem to be an exception, but it is

the immediate direct ancestor of the state system we know today and is

scarcely distinguishable from it in conceptual terms.

The great transformation of the Christian Church?from transnation

al theocracy to state church and then to voluntary society?is an

indispensable change in the emergence of the modem society of states.15

In the West, religion was reduced in international law to largely a matter

of individual conscience and liberty, a human right to be protected. That

reflects the political theory of John Locke in his A Letter Concerning Tol eration (1689), which questioned the unforgiving and severe treatment of

Christian dissenters that resulted from enforcing the principle of cujus

regio, ejus religio in domestic policy.16 Later it reflects the First

Amendment of the United States Constitution (1787), which requires sep aration of church and state; "Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof':17 In

short, religion was domesticated by the state?in full awareness that

otherwise it would be provocative of conflict, disorder, and possibly war?as happened time after time in the Europe in 16th and 17th centuries.

A pluralist world of states accommodates religion as a domestic rather than an international institution. But it does not call for, nor does it



278 ROBERT JACKSON

require, domestic religious toleration or liberty. That is an issue reserved

for sovereign jurisdiction and domestic policy. Those same states that are

doctrinally neutral in their foreign policy may be dogmatic and intolerant at home. International society even contributes to making that possible, by

endorsing the norms of co-existence and non-intervention. That means

that any foreign judgment, positive or negative, about domestic relations

and ideologies must be suspended for the sake of international order.

Religious discrimination, to some degree, was practiced in most

European Christian states, Catholic and Protestant, between the sixteenth

and nineteenth centuries. In Protestant Britain, for example, Catholics

were not allowed to worship openly and freely until 1829.18 Yet domestic

discrimination did not prevent diplomatic relations and treaty arrange ments between Britain (England) and Catholic countries in previous centuries.

That was so even where the religious gulf was far wider, as between the

Moslem Ottoman Sultan and the Catholic French King who on separate occasions (1535,1740) entered into treaty arrangements, the King seeking to contain the Habsburg Empire, France's main enemy, and the Sultan

aiming to divide the major Christian powers of those days.19 Moslem religious monopolies likewise exist in some Middle-Eastern

and African countries today. But that has not prevented their membership and participation in pluralist international society. Neither Islamic religion nor democratic ideology has obstructed diplomatic relations between

Saudi Arabia (and other Moslem states) and the United States (and other Western democracies), at least not to date. (Such an obstruction is

precisely what some Islamic fundamentalists hope to establish.) History

provides evidence, over a lengthy period, that states of different religious or political doctrines can enjoy relations in a pluralistic international

society, without destabilizing consequences, as long as belief systems are

confined to the domestic sphere of each member state and are not allowed

to dictate to their foreign policies and activities.

A pluralist international society can tolerate religious or ideological

monopoly within member states, but it cannot accommodate an exclusive,

cosmopolitan religion or transnational ideology?unless it rests on general international consent of the society of states, which is impossible to obtain

in a world of diverse civilizations and ideologies. The law of nations cannot underwrite international order "if it becomes an ideology of half the world opposed by the other. It must be accepted by substantially all the




world."20 Writing in the early 1950s, Quincy Wright is referring to the ide ological divide between the Communist world and the Western world. The same observation can be made about the religious divide between

Catholics and Protestants at an earlier period and between democracies and non-democracies today. He expands on this vital point:

We may conclude that international law in principle recognizes the right of each state to deal with ideological problems within its territory and forbids other states to interfere, or to seek to propagate their own ideologies, in

foreign territory. International law is based on the supposition that diverse

religious, political and economic ideologies will co-exist in the world and that they should not be permitted to become subjects of international political controversy and war.21

In other words, legally there can be wars of necessity, wars of self-defense, and pre-emptive wars as well as wars in defense of international peace and

security. But there cannot be any wars of religion or wars for the Communist revolution or wars to make the world safe for democracy.

Pluralist international society has demonstrated noteworthy success, over a lengthy period, in partitioning and closeting religious and political doctrines in this way. Initial success was achieved at the expense of Latin Christendom (Respublica Christiana), which was carved into separate

kingdoms, republics, principalities, confederations, and similar territorial

jurisdictions in the early stages of the formation of the modern European state system. The second success was the imprisonment of both Protes

tantism and Catholicism within the domestic sphere of the sovereign states of Europe. Catholicism, in particular, was crippled and confined.

The third success, more qualified than the first two and not yet concluded, was the division and partition of the Islamic world into numerous

sovereign states during the era of Western imperialism. The fourth

success?closely related?was political accommodation of non-Western

peoples and their incorporation in the modern state system on a basis of

geography rather than civilization or doctrine, in the transformation of Western empires into numerous new states. The fifth success was to wear

down the Soviet Union's efforts at world communist revolution?the "communist international"?eventually obliging Moscow to conform to

the demands of classical diplomacy and international law in its foreign relations beyond the Soviet Bloc.22 That must immediately be qualified, however, because the outcome of the Cold War was construed in some



280 ROBERT JACKSON

quarters, particularly the United States, as a triumph of democracy and a

major step towards a world community of democracies.

Solidarist International Community

If we turn this argument on its head, we contemplate the contrary

image of an international community, a league of states that share a

transnational bond of solidarity, religious or ideological, geared to a joint normative purpose. Solidarist states are rather like sectarian or political movements that seek after adherents or converts to their cause. They see

themselves as struggling to bring about a world more like themselves, which is considered to be good or right. International communities, in this

way of thinking, are militant agencies organized for the pursuit of collec tive aims, not excluding war aims. International communities can be said to have a mission of some sort. They are on a journey to a better world

made in their own image.23 Member states of an international community do not merely deal

with each other out of self-interest and expediency, or out of reciprocity and regard for each other's sovereign rights, or concern to prevent the bellum omnium contra omnes and to maintain international order and a

balance of power. Those are the contrasting markers of an international

society. Rather, they seek each other out as co-religionists, as confr?res, as

confederates, as comrades, as fellow travelers, as true believers. Because

they require religious or ideological conformity, international communi ties are exclusive and have the effect of dividing the world along judgmental rather than prudential and tactful lines. Doctrine and diplomacy do not travel comfortably together?except within solidarist international com

munities. Doctrinal diplomacy includes fellow Christians or fellow

democrats, but it excludes those who travel a different way, whose route and destination may be viewed with doubt and misgivings, even suspicion if not hostility. Doctrinal diplomacy draws a sharp distinction between those who belong and those who follow a different way. The latter cannot

easily be tolerated and accommodated, if they are encountered, because

they travel a road that digresses from ours, and leads to a destination

marked by questionable beliefs. The values and virtues of a solidarist international community are

beyond controversy?for those who belong. The community can only exist,

qua community, if its beliefs are safe from questioning and disputing. In




Medieval Europe there could be no question concerning the superior merits of Christianity. In the Ottoman Empire there could be no question concerning the superior merits of Islam. In the Soviet Union there could be no question concerning the superior merits of Communism. In the

United States, Western Europe, and some other places today there can be no question concerning the superior merits of democracy. The acceptable question can be one of means but it cannot be one of ends. The community and its fundamental beliefs and values are not open to doubt and scrutiny.

The incontrovertible authority of our doctrines may raise questions about different belief systems concerning whether they should be tolerated or censured and possibly even proscribed. Herbert Butterfield once remarked: "The desire to eliminate heresy (if necessary by persecu

tion) seems to be a human, and not merely a Christian, failing ... the state

may become particularly dangerous when allied with a militant creed."24

This happened with the 18th century French revolutionary state. It also

happened with the 20th century Fascist, Nazi and Communist states.

Militancy need not stop at national borders. It may be projected and trans

ported?by subversion, by intervention, and at the extreme by armed

force?into neighboring or even distant states, with the aim of expanding the community of the faithful or eliminating false doctrines seen to be blasphemous or otherwise offensive to it.

Solidarist international community presents an image of the world in which foreign countries' domestic affairs are judged by the standards of one's own belief system. The boundary separating countries registers an

evaluative assessment between fidelity and blasphemy, enlightenment and

ignorance, right and wrong, good and evil, civilized and uncivilized, le

gitimacy and illegitimacy, all of which distinguishes us and our friends from them and their kind. If judgment of the other is favorable, those for

eigners could be looked upon as friends and adherents to the cause and welcomed into the community of the faithful. If judgment is unfavorable, then doubt, suspicion and possibly even hostility could be cast upon the international relationship, with the ultimate aim of overcoming the differ ences by eliminating the offending doctrine. This solidarist outlook is not confined to illiberal doctrines. John Rawls draws a similar distinction in terms of "liberal peoples" and "decent peoples," on the one hand, and "outlaw

states," "burdened societies," and "benevolent absolutisms," on the other

hand. An overarching normative purpose?one might be tempted to say



282 ROBERT JACKSON

mission?of his political and moral philosophy is to extend the just "law of peoples" to everybody on earth, and thereby to see the end of a world divided in the foregoing intolerable ways, by having all societies conform to his liberal principles of justice.25

In the late Middle Ages and early modern era, such insider/outsider

distinctions separated the world of Latin Christendom and the neighbor

ing non-Christian world of Moslems. The Christian West looked upon the

Moslem East as an alien world not deserving of recognition. That division was repeated and reinforced in the Moslem Dar ul-Islam (the inner sphere of Islam where Islamic law prevailed) and the Dar ul-Harb (the outer

sphere of war where infidels lived in contempt of God's law "and against whom holy war, jihad, must be waged until the universal idea became

reality").26 Subsequently, in what had been Latin Christendom, divisions

became evident between Reformation Protestantism (Lutheran, Anglican, and Calvinist) and Counter-reformation Catholicism. Each side saw itself as representing the true Christian religion, and for a time struggled not

merely to defeat but to erase the other. In that long-drawn-out episode, neither side could triumph, truce was arranged and intervention on

religious grounds forbidden. Peace eventually prevailed between the

Christian confessions. Much later their relations evolved into ecumenical

live-and-let-live, or in other words toleration and accommodation charac

teristic of pluralist international society. Mutual accommodation between different Christian confessions did

not alter the doctrine that international relations could only obtain between

Christian communities, which were confined almost entirely to Europe. Relations with non-Christian rulers in southeastern Europe?the Moslem

Ottoman Turks?and beyond Europe were not completely international, in that sovereign recognition and reciprocity was not fully practiced. The

exclusionary boundary gradually ceased being the Christian religion and

became the "[European cum Western] "standard of civilization," an es

sentially liberal-capitalist doctrine, which was applied to determine whether a state was entitled to full recognition as an international legal subject.27

Western states were included and non-Western societies were excluded.

The immediate ancestor of Western democracy?European liberal

ism?was not averse to inflicting its doctrinal will on foreign others by the

threat or use of armed force, those others being certain non-European

peoples whose beliefs and ways were seen as a barrier to international




trade and an obstacle to Western civilization: wars of gain but also wars

of doctrine. In a similar vein, contemporary democracies, including the

United States, have not been reluctant to intervene and wage war against obdurate authoritarian states with alleged links to terrorism, not only out

of fear and necessity but also with a view to reforming them and recon

structing them, making them conform to democratic standards in their

domestic life.

During the liberal era of imperialism, intervention in non-Western

societies was justified by imperial policy and international law which had Western superiority built in.28 In Turkey and in China, expanding Western

powers were confronted by solidarist legal systems operating with their own criteria of superiority and claiming universal validity, which ob structed military and commercial relations. The Sublime Porte expected the Christian infidel to bow down and kneel, and in so doing recognize its universal jurisdiction. The Son of Heaven expected the same of the

Western barbarian.29 The eventual Western response, imposed by military power and vindicated by international law, was "capitulation treaties,"

whereby the non-Western authority was coerced or forced into permitting a Western power to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over its own

nationals within the non-Western authority's borders. In that way both the

Ottoman Empire and the Chinese Empire were subjected to commercial

exploitation and military intervention by Western powers. An important assumption behind these episodes was the belief and

evident conviction not only that non-Western societies had to be aligned with those of the West for the sake of the latter's commercial and strategic interests, but also because it would bring about progress and a better life

for everyone, both East and West. The Western doctrine of progress displayed more than a hint of paternalism, once Western powers established their

unchallengeable military and commercial supremacy.30 The General Act

of the Berlin Conference (1884-85) which authorized the partition of Africa into numerous European "spheres of influence," which became

colonies, justified that continental Europeanization in part by "bringing home to them [the Africans] the blessings of [Western] civilization."31

In 1917, as he began to involve the United States in the First World War, President Woodrow Wilson promoted his vision of a "general and common family of nations" united by solidarist bonds that would displace and render obsolete the traditional norms and practices of pluralist inter



284 ROBERT JACKSON

national society, including classical diplomatic practices and the balance

of power.32 This went beyond the Monroe Doctrine (1823). "American prin

ciples" were not the principles of "a single continent" but were "the prin

ciples of a liberated mankind."33 Wilson hoped for an international community

composed of democracies. Today in the West, particularly the United States, there are some and perhaps many who would install democracy as the

exclusive basis of international legitimacy around the world.34

Some commentators may be inclined to draw a distinction between

religion and ideology, perhaps reasoning that ideology does not have the same disrupting and destabilizing consequences for conventional interna

tional relations that religion has. They may have in mind the religious wars of 16th and 17th century Europe between Protestants and Catholics.

Yet the republican and anti-monarchist doctrine of the French Revolution, and the Napoleonic wars it spawned, were hostile to the European inter

national order of the late 18th century, and sought to overthrow it by force, which set in motion one of the most turbulent eras of modern European

history. The subsequent international order of monarchism and dynasti cism, established after the defeat of Napoleon, was hostile to revolutionism

and republicanism, which it endeavored to suppress. That conservative, some would say reactionary effort was later repudiated in many parts of

Europe by the liberal revolution of 1848. Much the same can be said of solidarist ideologies, of both right and left, of the 20th century.

Others may agree with this argument?up to a point?but be inclined

to draw a distinction between communism and fascism, on the one hand, and democracy on the other. Democratic states see themselves as peace

loving?unless forced into war by belligerent states, wars of necessity and

fear, or wars to restore international peace and security. Democracies have

been militant and unyielding, when called upon to be that way, but usually

only with great reluctance after being provoked by infamous acts, such as

continental European conquests by Nazi Germany and Asian and Pacific

Island attacks, invasions and occupations by Imperialist Japan. Both Britain's

and America's entry into the Second World War was marked by reluctance

which was finally abandoned under the extreme provocation of acts of ag

gression by what came to be known as the Axis powers. When the enemies of democracy were finally defeated in a global

war to the finish, the Allies, led by the United States, seized the opportu nity to reconstruct the defeated Axis powers in their own image. They




demanded unconditional surrender. By refusing to respect the classical distinction between state and regime, they deprived the vanquished Axis powers of the traditional rights of a defeated enemy state, engaged in total military occupation, and decreed the shape of a new regime. In early 1945 the Allied leaders met at Yalta and released a joint "Declaration on

Liberated Europe" which proclaimed that "the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism" must be destroyed and replaced by "interim governmental au

thorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the

population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people."35 As it

happened, the Soviets turned their zone of East Germany into a satellite communist state. The rest of Germany (under American, British, and French

occupation), which became West Germany, and all of Japan (except the Kurile islands, which had been occupied by the Soviet Union) were trans formed into democracies. The doctrinal militancy of which democracy is

capable, its unease with the give-and-take practices of a pluralist interna tional society that accommodates non-democracies alongside democracies,

was clearly discernible in these momentous events. It is not difficult to reach the conclusion that when democracies wage war successfully, they expect, as a right of military victory, to shape the postwar political regime of defeated enemies in ways that conform to the victor's ideology.

Something like that appears to have happened after important wars of the 20th century, and now the 21st century, especially where the United States has been involved as the major victorious power and has found itself in a position to determine if not dictate the shape of the postwar era.

Those episodes, as Michael Howard makes clear, are but later stages of a

lengthy history of what he terms the "liberal conscience" in world affairs.

Arguably the most important bearer of that sentiment has been the United

States, which he likens to a "secular church" that could only become en

thusiastically and militantly involved in the international system "if it could remake that system in its own image."36 That involved America in

repeated attempts to create new world orders out of the ashes of their latest war. In the mind of an American public that was formed in a long history of Protestant pietism and evangelism, only that way could American sacrifices be fully justified.

If democracy were to become a normative requirement for member

ship in the international system, existing non-democratic states, of which



286 ROBERT JACKSON

there are many, would not satisfy the new standard. What to do about that? If one is committed to a world of democracies, their existence would be a

standing source of dismay and concern. Their independence might be

questioned and possibly rejected, for example by withdrawing interna tional recognition. If it went beyond that, they might conceivably be regarded as candidates for democratic conversion, and?if they still failed to conform?targeted for isolation, sanctions or even intervention.

An incremental mode of reasoning that could lead to revolutionary consequences for international society might be conceived to move, by stages, from viewing democracy as a preferred system of government, to

viewing the promotion of democracy in non-democratic countries as

desirable, to viewing the spread of democracy across the international society as in the interests of everyone, to viewing as a legitimate foreign policy the

goal of bringing democracy to people who are being denied or deprived of their democratic rights. One could end by viewing the resort to all necessary means to help bring that about, including the threat or use of

military force, as an international duty of democratic governments, espe cially the most powerful among them who are in a position to carry out that obligation.

Solidarist doctrines of international community have earmarks of that kind of thinking. One is struck by the strong conviction of democrats that our values and beliefs are good and right, not only for ourselves but for

everybody. There is no room for doubt or ambiguity in such a conviction. The values we hold dear are seen to be universal. Our democratic en

lightenment, like the French Enlightenment of the 18th century, is for all

people. It is our duty to ensure that everybody can have it. There is, as

well, a strong sense of truth and lightness: our road is the correct way. That registers as not only a lack of skepticism about ourselves and our

beliefs, but also as a weighty confidence that we, alone, are on the high road. That may be accompanied not only by a lack of knowledge of other

ways, and of the convictions with which they are pursued by other people, but also by a lack of curiosity or even much awareness concerning those

people and their ways. International solidarists are not inclined to possess an anthropological turn of mind.

One can of course be convinced of the universality of one's values and beliefs without feeling any obligation to make them universally available, on the assumption that it is up to other people to recognize true




enlightenment when they come into contact with it, and do what is

necessary to make it available to themselves. That appears to be the

doctrine of the American Declaration of Independence:

We hold these truths to be self-evident: That all men are created equal; that

they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that

among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of gov ernment becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.

One could step beyond Jefferson's doctrine, however, while still

believing that one is consistent with it, by taking on the burden of re

sponsibility to help other people abolish the destructive government under which they live, and institute a new government, more conducive to their

safety and happiness as seen from our shores. One could believe one had an obligation to help "all men" secure their "unalienable rights" if one had the

power. Such an internationally assisted abolition of a destructive government could be aimed at giving those people democracy, and it could be brought about by all necessary means, including the threat or use of armed force.

In the 20th century that sort of thinking entered into the minds of some

people in the West, particularly Americans, including leading government officials responsible for making foreign policy. It surfaced again in the

early 21st century. Americans had the power to carry out their obligations.

Doctrinal War

In a solidarist international community, war is justified, ultimately, by the religion or the ideology that one is seeking to defend or promote. In this conception, "war is the agent of history, it makes the world safe for

the doctrine."37 Doctrinal war registers as holy -wars Jihad, wars to correct

false religion and establish God's dominion on earth, as it is in heaven.

Doctrinal wars are wars waged for nobler, higher, goals which cannot be

compromised, or waged against false and menacing doctrines that cannot

be tolerated. They are crusading wars against others whose beliefs and

ways are regarded as a standing act of contempt for one's own values and

convictions.38 They are revolutionary wars to transform the world or



288 ROBERT JACKSON

counter-revolutionary wars to save the world. That is evident in the

lengthy Christian-Moslem confrontation. Making the world safe for

communism or democracy can also take the form of doctrinal war if it is

enforced by military power, as sometimes it has been.

Doctrinal war flourishes against a religious or ideological enemy. Christians and Moslems were traditionally instructed to wage war against the infidel, each other. In their militant efforts to spread the Catholic Counter-Reformation in Protestant lands, the Jesuits provoked a response in kind from their religious-political adversaries, equally militant

Anglicans, Lutherans, and Calvinists. Radical Jacobins made irregular war for "totalitarian democracy" against monarchical and clerical

authority and in the course of doing so registered the first instances of the word "terrorism" recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary39 Commu

nists declared war against capitalists and Fascists, democrats against authoritarians of all kinds, first Fascists and Nazis, later Communists, and most recently against militant Moslem fundamentalists and their authori

tarian state protectors. Some might argue that the long-standing Christian

Moslem confrontation has merely changed its color in recent times and, like a chameleon, now appears as a Democracy-Moslem conflict.

Some of the most intense doctrinal wars in modem history were between

different Christian confessions and sects. In his book The Revolution of the Saints, Michael Walzer captures English Puritan attitudes to war, which are almost identical to those of Moslem fundamentalists. For Puritans,

the life of the saint [was] ... a perpetual, almost military struggle with the devil. It was because of the devil . . . that the conscientious, reforming activity of religious men so often resulted in or required violence and warfare . . . the life of the godly was something like permanent warfare. ... To fight for God's glory on earth, for the advancement of the Gospel . . . these were

legitimate reasons for warfare urged in Puritan sermons. . . . They pointed toward the crusade, a struggle against external enemies as continuous and

unrelenting as was the saint's war against sin.40

It is perhaps for reasons such as these that crusades or holy wars or jihad, have always been among the least restrained and the most ferocious of all wars. Christianity, in the words of a leading historian, is "one of the great warrior religions of mankind."41 Islam is another. These two belief

systems mirror each other in many ways, including their not infrequent resort to war to defend the faith. If one is fighting against sin and for truth there can be no compromise, no half-measures.




Revolutionary warriors are impatient with classical diplomacy and

conventional international law. They are inclined to dismiss them or

disregard them or reform them if they stand in the way of their doctrines and convictions. Wight comments, in this connection, that "the striking

development in war in the past two hundred years is not its growing de

structiveness, but the way it has increasingly become the instrument of

doctrinal conviction." He writes: "the classic example of the doctrinal

motive is the French Revolutionary War, when France 'attacked Europe in

order to regenerate it'."42 Wight is here drawing on Burke, who argued that the Jacobin revolutionists "had violated the law of nations by a

decree, declaring war against all governments, and forcing those

countries, into which their armies should enter, to form a constitution

similar to their own."43 That was regime change, and it was against inter

national law. The revolutionary warrior, like the crusader, is not fighting to gain a benefit or advantage. Nor is the fight for security and survival.

The fight is an act of sacrifice, in answer to a higher command, to restore

or re-make the world in the image of whatever religion or ideology defines the great cause and crusade.

Doctrinal wars upset and dislocate the historically settled justifica tions of war?based on the sovereign state and the law of nations.

Religion or ideology may justify "irregular warfare"?infiltration,

guerrilla war, terrorism, and counter-insurgency war?carried on with

disregard and possibly with contempt for the legal and institutional controls placed on war by the international society of states. What should

also be emphasized is the way that terrorism and other forms of irregular warfare by non-state actors, justified by transnational belief systems,

provoke a response in kind?counter-insurgency warfare, wars against terrorists?by states and regular armed forces, who in combating their

irregular enemies, are tempted into the same methods of doctrinal warfare

and its justifications.44 The United States in Viet Nam is one case in point. The Soviet Union in Afghanistan is another. The French in Colonial

Algeria and the British in Colonial Kenya are others. Since they fight for a greater and nobler cause, doctrinal warriors are

inclined to place themselves outside the society of states and the law of

nations, if such interfere with their mission. Doctrinal war presupposes what Martin Wight terms "a horizontal division of mankind and interna tional society, overriding state-frontiers, into two classes, the good and the

bad."45 Christianity and Islam are universal monotheistic religions, which



290 ROBERT JACKSON

means their singular truth concerning how people ought to conduct their

lives should be spread to all corners of the world so that everyone shall be brought within the sole community of the faithful and be emancipated thereby. There have been Christians, Moslems, Communists, and democrats who see the world in that light. They conceive of a Christian world or a Moslem world or a Communist world or a world of democracy in which truth and not error should prevail. That horizontal image of

religious and political conflict has the effect of obscuring international borders. The community of the faithful should not be restricted or confined to certain territories. In this way of thinking, sovereign states,

including their authorities and laws, are at best secondary institutions in the service of a higher religion or ideology.

If they are true to their convictions, Christians no less than Moslems, democrats no less than Communists must be concerned that everybody, everywhere is in a position to learn there is a better way and to receive

guidance and assistance to go that way unobstructed by their own gov ernment or anyone else. Monotheistic religions and universalistic ideologies cannot be tolerant and non-interventionist as regards the domestic juris diction of states if those states harbor doctrines that are offensive and

protect people that are hostile to the one true religion or ideology. Eman

cipation and liberation are more important than self-determination and

sovereignty. Political duty, according to this way of thinking, is to spread the faith, to convert new members to the community of the faithful, and not to cease in those efforts until all people, everywhere are included.

Conversion, first of Europe and then the rest of the world, was the great historical mission of Christianity.46 Maybe it still is for some Christians. The same can be said of Islam. Not only Christianity and Islam, but also Communism and democracy have had similar missions.

A fundamental duty of the true believer is to defend the faith.

Religious or ideological exclusiveness must be enforced if it is to be sustained against determined opposition. Communism must exclude cap italism, and that must be enforced. Democracy must exclude authoritarianism, and that too must be enforced. In short, religious and political doctrines, of the kind explored in this essay, are monist and monopolist in character. If they are not enforced, they lose their discipline in the face of determined opposition, schism occurs, and they fall to pieces. If they then become ec umenical, monism is replaced by some form of pluralism, toleration, and




co-existence. As indicated, that happened to Christendom, particularly the

Protestant branch of Christianity under the influence of John Locke and the American Bill of Rights.47 For the doctrinal solidarist, that is regret table, and intolerable if something can be done about it.

With the advent of the Cold War, two ideological communities, the Communist world and the free world, later self-styled the democratic

world, came into a stark military confrontation poised on a hair trigger. For nearly half a century the two camps glared at each other in a tense and

sometimes violent encounter, and much of pluralist international

society?though never all of it?was abandoned. The Soviet Union's

efforts to foment communist revolutions in foreign countries, either by

open and legal or by secretive and covert means, were met with a coun

tervailing response from their adversaries. The American intervention to

bolster and sustain the anti-communist regime of South Vietnam is a well

known example. A protracted and dirty war was the result. Cold War

convictions were absolutist and unambiguous: free world or slave state; "Better Dead than Red." Whether the Americans triumphed or the

Russians abandoned the contest by turning away from Communism, is a

matter of continuing debate. What is clear is that the only remaining su

perpower, the United States, emerged without any obvious rival, leaving the way open for the global promotion of its ideology, namely democracy.

At about the same time, however, a shadowy doctrinal foe made its

presence known in the shape of militant Islamic terrorists and their sup

porters and financiers. Their numbers were small, indeed miniscule, but

their capacity to provoke widespread alarm was huge. Their doctrines are

derived, even if they may be distorted, from Islam's holy book. The Koran

speaks of jihad, commonly translated as "exertion" or "struggle" for true

faith: the believer's individual exertion to obey the Prophet's teachings; the community's collective struggle to defend the faith against all who

would defile it or go against it. Struggle of the individual may be entirely peaceful, struggle to live one's life as Allah commands. But struggle of the

community may involve seizing political control to establish a govern ment based on the principles of Islam, which may necessitate waging war

against those who disbelieve or otherwise act in contempt or defiance of

the Koran. Those apostates and infidels should be punished, severely, by believers: "when you meet in battle those who disbelieve, then smite their

necks until you have overcome them, then make them prisoners. ... Be



292 ROBERT JACKSON

not fainthearted; and invite not the infidels to peace when ye have the

upper hand: for God is with you."48 Islamic fundamentalist organizations, such as al-Qaeda, make

reference to Koranic teachings in mobilizing their followers. Here, then, is what devout Moslems of a militant and anti-Western inclination could

easily interpret as a command to rise up and slay the American infidels and their collaborators and drive them from the holy lands of Islam. State

ments attributed to Osama bin Laden are indicative:

. . . whoever supported the United States . . . those who approved their actions and followed them in this crusader war by fighting with them or

providing bases and administrative support, or any form of support, even by words, to kill the Muslims in Iraq, should know that they are apostates and outside the community of Muslims. It is permissible to spill their blood and take their property. "And he amongst you that turns to them is of them."

Keep this saying before your eyes: "It is not fitting for the Prophet that he should have prisoners of war until he hath thoroughly subdued the land." "Therefore, when ye meet the unbelievers, smite at their necks."49

This is not a call to spread the faith to the four corners of the world? as in the case of democracy. Instead, it is a call to drive the people of the

West?"crusaders"?out of the Islamic world and to keep them out, by whatever means necessary, including armed force. The war waged against Afghanistan's Marxist government and their Soviet backers, and later

against the United States military intervention, was viewed as a jihad by many Moslems in the Middle East. The same can be said of the American British invasion and occupation of Iraq. These acts of violent resistance could be read as part of a call to war against governments in the Middle East and their Western supporters, against pluralist international society, and against those people, Moslems and non-Moslems alike, who, accept or acquiesce in the territorial partition of Islam by European imperialism and the subsequent creation of secular states across the Islamic world.

That image of a horizontal division, overriding state-frontiers, between the righteous and the unrighteous, could also be viewed from the opposite side with the enemy and the righteous reversed. Democratic crusaders hold strong convictions about the lightness of their values and beliefs and show the same determination to defend them, which exposes them to the usual temptations of power. They wage war in the name of bringing peace, and in the hope of transforming the world. American governments have




proclaimed their mission to spread their values and beliefs around the world, in the conviction that people everywhere are seeking them, require them, can be emancipated by them, and that if they are emancipated, war

will diminish and peace will flourish. That thinking, or something like that, recurs on almost every occasion of a major foreign policy speech or

statement by President George W. Bush and other leading American officials. It expresses the American vision of a better world to come, a world made whole for democracy.

Freedom is on the march. Freedom is the birthright and deep desire of every human soul, and spreading freedom's blessings is the calling of our time. And when freedom and democracy take root in the Middle East,

America and the world will be safer and more peaceful50

_This strategy requires the same persistence and energy and idealism we have shown before. And it will yield the same results. As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace. The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our

country.51

Achieving this vision will be the work of many nations over time, requiring the same strength of will and confidence of purpose that propelled freedom to victory in the defining struggles of the last century. . . . We will succeed because when given a choice, people everywhere, from all walks of life, from all religions, prefer freedom to violence and terror. We will succeed because human beings are not made by the Almighty God to live in tyranny.

We will succeed because of who we are. . . . Americans always do what is

right.52

We've witnessed, in little over a generation, the swiftest advance of freedom in the 2,500 year story of democracy. ... It is no accident that the rise of so many democracies took place in a time when the world's most in fluential nation was itself a democracy.53

The 21st century must become the "Century of Democracy" ... the desire for justice, freedom, human rights, and accountable and representative government is universal.54

The foregoing is a tiny but representative selection of recent foreign policy statements emanating from the highest level of the government of the United States. These statements are not likely to be controversial for

many Americans. They proclaim a doctrine of democratic government as

the global standard for judging nations. They declare that democracy is what everyone requires and wants. They avow that it is what they should



294 ROBERT JACKSON

have. They affirm the United States is determined to see that they have it. The only question is how they shall get it and whether in spreading democracy the United States should be prepared, if necessary, to go to war. That question has been answered in the affirmative on several

occasions, in the past and recently. War for democracy is evident in

speeches by President George W. Bush. Immediately following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001 he declared: "Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not

yet have the distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil."55 The same

doctrine, clearly enunciated, was evident in U.S. justifications regarding the 2003 War against Iraq, fittingly named "Operation Iraqi Freedom."

America's cause is always larger than America's security. . . . America has made and kept this kind of commitment before.... After defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies; we left constitutions and parlia ments. We did not leave behind permanent foes; we found new friends and allies. There was a time when many said that the cultures of Japan and

Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values. They were wrong. Some say the same of Iraq today. They, too, are mistaken.56

These doctrinal-war justifications have not been made independent ly of other justifications, by far the most important of which have been national security and international peace and security. The response to

September 2001 was dictated by fear of terrorism. The war against Iraq was justified as necessary to remove weapons of mass destruction from the hands of the Iraqi tyranny, which was believed to harbor terrorists or

support them in other ways. But national security and international peace and security alone may not be sufficient justification for war, especially in the American mind, which seems to require, as well, a call to wage war

for higher values and a nobler cause. America, in its own way of thinking, long has been and continues to be John Winthrop's "City upon a Hill," beacon of liberty.57 This may only be a demand to set a good example for

the rest of the world to follow. But it may also be a conviction that one's own values and beliefs are best not only for oneself but for everyone, and a doctrine that justifies whatever action is necessary, including the threat or use of armed force under the right circumstances, to give them to the

rest of the world. This recognizably is a solidarist idea of a "horizontal division" of world politics "into two classes, the good and the bad."




Mundane Peace

Under contemporary as well as classical international law, no state or

international organization or private body has any right to wage war for

religious or ideological purposes. A fundamental utilitarian value of the

sovereign state is that it affords a controllable sphere of bordered territor

ial jurisdiction within which religions and ideologies can be confined and

kept out of foreign affairs. That is the great lesson of the Peace of

Augsberg (1555) and the Peace of San Francisco (1945). It has been

forgotten and relearned, repeatedly, since the 16th century. That lesson is

repudiated by Moslem terrorists of the Middle-East who cannot be recon

ciled to sovereign statehood divorced from Islam, and wage war against it. Making war in the name of democracy against those same terrorists and

their supporters is not without irony, for it repudiates the same lesson.

Many people would probably agree, as a general principle of world affairs, that foreign policies and relations of states should be insulated

from religion or ideology for the sake of peace. The difficulty arises when it is our most cherished values and beliefs that must be kept in harness,

especially if they come under attack. It is compounded when it is joined to convictions?as it might very well be?that our values and beliefs are

truer than any others, that they would be good for other people besides ourselves, that we have a responsibility to see that others shall have them, and that spreading them will result in a better world for everybody. Those convictions are provocative of international conflict when they call for re

alignment of values and beliefs of foreign countries with our own, and

they contemplate the threat or use of armed force for that benevolent purpose. The argument of this essay is not about the merits of democracy?or

any other political or religious doctrine. It is about the consequences for international society when political and religious doctrines are unchained and allowed to become justifications of war. Because of the self-right eousness that drives it, doctrinal war is provocative of morally aroused

and reactive indignation on the other side, which may be tempted into armed conflict. That danger has long been recognized and warned against. "Let me add, that the great inlet by which a colour for oppression has

entered into the world is by one man's pretending to determine concern

ing the happiness of another, and by claiming a right to use what means he thinks proper in order to bring him to a sense of it."58 "We cannot

authorize an imprudent zeal for making converts without endangering the



296 ROBERT JACKSON

peace of all Nations and placing the missionaries in the position of ag

gressors, at the very time when they think they are performing a meritorious work. . . . Now, there is no Nation which does not think that

its own form of religion is the only true and proper one."59 Those words

of Burke and Vattel are as valid today as they have ever been.

Doctrinal war, as contemplated by Western democracies, bears a

strong resemblance to what Michael Oakeshott refers to as "the politics of

faith," which is a conviction that men and women are redeemable in this

life and not only the hereafter, and which seeks to bring about a more

perfect world, defined by whatever beliefs and values are endorsed. "In

the politics of faith, the activity of governing is understood to be in the service of the perfection of mankind. . . . Perfection, or salvation, is

something to be achieved in this world: man is redeemable in history."60 In Christian theology, that doctrine often goes by the name of Pelagian ism, which is a repudiation of original sin and of God's Grace as the only source of redemption. Politically, it is a belief that arrangements of human

existence can be created on earth in which men and women can be

liberated from their worldly afflictions, whatever these may be. That

belief in progress is widespread in the Western world. When they are employed in international relations, most such

"pursuits of the ideal," to borrow a phrase from Isaiah Berlin, look upon the sovereign-state system as something to be regretted, and, if possible, corrected, because it serves as a barrier to projects for universal human

emancipation.61 On a skeptical view, however, that barrier is more than

justified in a diverse human world marked by some profound disagree ments over religions and ideologies. Such a world has long existed, still

exists, and gives no sign of being unified around any singular, universal belief system any time soon. In such a world, it is a political arrangement of immense social benefit to provide a territorial sphere in which people are in a position to express and experience their own values and beliefs free from outside interference. In the world that presently exists, where

there are so many different religions and ideologies, and to international

ly liberate any one of them might inflame others and risk bringing about doctrinal war, that same barrier is conducive to peace.

Given these characteristics and circumstances of global humanity, the most satisfactory international society arguably is mundane and

pluralist. That is not an image of a perfect world or the best world. It is an




image of the best world that anyone could reasonably hope for in the cir cumstances of human diversity and fundamental disagreement over the

question of how we ought to live.

Robert Jackson

Boston University

Notes

1. The main traditions of war justification, such as just-war theory in the thought of

Augustine and classical realism in that of Thucydides, reach back to antiquity. See Thucy dides, History of the Peloponnesian War, tr. by Rex Warner (London; Penguin Books, 1972), esp. Book V, 'The Melian Dialogue" and Augustine, "The City of God" in R. M.

Hutchins (ed.), Augustine, Great Books of the Western World (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), vol. 18, esp. book 19, ch. 7.

2. M. Wight, Power Politics, 2nd ed'n (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1986). 3. Ibid., p. 139.

4. Ibid., p. 139. 5. The national locus is of course the constitution and laws of individual sovereign

states that provide authority for declarations and acts of war by their governments. Sovereign states remain the primary holders of the right of war in world affairs.

6. On the legal usage of these words, see G. Schwarzenberger and E. D. Brown, A

Manual of International Law, 6th ed'n. (London: Professional Books, 1976), pp. 37-39. These categories are explored in international theory by H. Bull, The Anarchical Society, 2nd ed'n. (New York: Macmillan, 1995) and by Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

7. J. Brierly, The Law of Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 35. 8. There is scarcely any awareness of these deeply historical practices in Samuel Hunt

ington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York; Simon & Schuster, 1996).

9. "The terms ... provided, in essence, for sovereign princes and lords to follow either

the Augsburg (Lutheran) Confession or Catholicism, and thereby to determine the faith of their subjects, who could emigrate if dissatisfied." E. Cameron, The European Reforma tion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 348-49. Religious war in Germany did not end, but the Peace of Augsburg signposted a future in which religious doctrine would be abolished as a basis of international legitimacy.

10. "The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external

aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League."

11. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. . . . Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."

12. According to the dictionary, "secular" signifies "Belonging to the world and its affairs as distinguished from the church and religion; civil, lay, temporal_" See Oxford English Dictionary on-line http://dictionary.oed.com



298 ROBERT JACKSON

13. . Wilk, "International Law and Global Ideological Conflict," The American Journal of International Law, 45 (October 1951), p. 661.

14. See M. Wight, Systems of States, ed. by Hedley Bull (London; Leicester Universi ty Press, 1977).

15. E. Mortimer, "Christianity and Islam," International Affairs 67 (1991), p. 7. 16. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, tr. by William Popple www.constitu

tion.org/jl/tolerati 17. The United States Constitution, Bill of Rights. A much earlier American instance is

the Maryland Toleration Act (1649). 18. "An Act for the Relief of His Majesty's Roman Catholic Subjects' (13 April 1829).

www.historyhome.co.uk/peel/ireland/catheman.htm 19. M. Khadduri, "Islam and the Modem Law of Nations," American Journal of Inter

national law, 50 (1956), pp. 362-63. 20. Q. Right, "International Law and Ideologies," The American Journal of Interna

tional Law 48 (Oct. 1954), p. 620. 21. Ibid., p. 625.

22. See K. Wilk, "International Law and Global Ideological Conflict," The American Journal of International Law, vol. 45 (October 1951), pp. 648-70.

23. The conceptual differentiation drawn here is a version of Michael Oakeshott's dis tinction between societas and universitas, practice and purpose. See On Human Conduct

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). For uses of the distinction in international relations, see T. Nardin, Law, Morality and the Relations of States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983) and Jackson, The Global Covenant (cited in n.6, above).

24. He had in mind Russian Communism, Italian Fascism, and German Nazism. H.

Butterfield, "Reflections on Religion and Modem Individualism," Journal of the History of Ideas, 22 (1961), pp. 35, 37.

25. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). For an extended critique of Rawls along these lines see Robert Jackson, Classical and Modern Thought on International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), ch. 9.

26. T. Naff, "The Ottoman Empire and the European States System," in H. Bull and A. Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1984), p.

144.

27. G. W. Gong, The Standard of "Civilization" in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).

28. Even John Stuart Mill could not entirely escape from that inclination. See E. Sullivan, "Liberalism and Imperialism: J. S. Mill's Defense of the British Empire," Journal of the History of Ideas, 44 (Oct.-Dec. 1983), pp. 599-617.

29. See Bull and Watson, The Expansion of International Society, chs. 10 and 11. 30. W. Bain, Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 31. Chapter I, Article VI declared in part that "All the powers exercising sovereign

rights ... bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being and to help in suppressing slavery ... instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessings of civilization." http://web.jjay.cuny.edu/%7Ejobrien/reference/ob45.html

32. Quoted by Schwarzenberger, 'The Rule of Law and the Disintegration of the Inter national Society," p. 70.




33. "Second Inaugural Address of Woodrow Wilson," The Avalon Project at Yale Law School www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/inaug/wilson2.htrnl (March 5, 1917).

34. This point is expanded in the next section. 35. Quoted by J. Wheeler Bennet and A. J. Nicholls, The Sembfonce of Peace (London:

Oxford, 1972), p. 631. 36. M. Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1981), p. 116. 37. Wight, p. 224. 38. According to the dictionary, a crusade is "a military expedition undertaken by the

Christians of Europe in the 11th, 12th, and 13th centuries to recover the Holy Land from the Muslims." It is "any war instigated and blessed by the Church for alleged religious ends, a 'holy war'; applied esp. to expeditions undertaken under papal sanction against infidels or heretics." More generally, it is war against some definable and discernible

"public evil," which could be either religious or political. See Oxford English Dictionary on-line http://dictionary.oed.com

39. J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (New York: Praeger, 1960). 'Terrorism: Government by intimidation as directed and carried out by the party in power in France during the Revolution of 1789-94; the system of the 'Terror' (1793^)." OED on-line: http://dictionary.oed.com/

40. M. Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints, pp. 64-65, 282-83. Also see M. Walzer, "Puritanism as a Revolutionary Ideology," History and Theory, 3 (1963), pp. 59-90.

41. Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 13.

42. Wight, quoted Burke, Power Politics, pp. 139-40. 43. Burke as quoted by P. Stanlis, "Edmund Burke and the Law of Nations," The

American Journal of International Law, 47 (July 1953), p. 405. 44. A Norton, "Drawing the line on Opprobrious Violence," in J. Rosenthal (ed.), Ethics

& International Affairs: A Reader, 2nd ed'n. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Council and Georgetown University Press, 1999), pp. 356-69.

45. M. Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, ed. by G. Wight and B. Porter (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), p. 224.

46. R. Fletcher, The Conversion of Europe (London: HarperCollins, 1997). 47. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, The United States Constitution, Bill of

Rights, www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/rights 1 .html 48. Koran 5:033 Set 21, Count 54; Koran 47:004 Set 69, Count 136. Koran 47:035 Set

71, Count 138. 49. Koran 47:004 Set 69, Count 136. Audio message purported to be by al-Qaeda leader

Osama Bin Laden, broadcast on Arab TV station al-Jazeera, translated and reprinted by the

British Broadcasting Corporation. BBC 12 February 2003: http://news.bbc.co.uk/lhi/world/middle_east/2751019.stm

50. President G. W. Bush statement, White House press release:

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/print/20050329.html March 29, 2005. 51. President G. W. Bush statement, White House press release:

www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/achievement/chap3.html November 6, 2003.

52. President G. W. Bush, White House Press Release:

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/print/20040204-4.html February 4, 2004. 53. President G. W. Bush remarks,

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/ll/20031106-3.html November 6, 2003.



300 ROBERT JACKSON

54. Joint Statement by the United States and the European Union Working Together to Promote Democracy and Support Freedom, the Rule of Law and Human Rights Worldwide, White House Press Release: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050620-4.html July 20, 2005.

55. President George W. Bush, "President's Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance," The National Cathedral, September 14, 2001: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010914-2.html

56. President G. W. Bush, Radio Address: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030301.html March 1, 2003.

57. John Winthrop^ "City upon a Hill," 1630: www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/winthrop.html

58. Edmund Burke, 'Fragments of a Tract Relative to the Laws against Property in Ireland [1765]', Edmund Burke: Selected Writings and Speeches, Peter J. Stanlis, ed. (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing Co., 1963), pp. 264-65.

59. Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations (New York: Carnegie Council, 1950), Book II, Ch. 4, sections 60-61.

60. By "the politics of faith," Oakeshott is not referring to traditional religious faith, with its focus on human sin and the struggle of individuals against it. He is drawing attention to the doctrine that human beings can liberate themselves and perfect themselves, as a community, by political action via the instrumentality of the state, and specifically its agencies of power. It is clear, however, that some traditional religions, including both Christianity and Islam, have justified armed force to rid the world of infidels, heretics, pagans and others who held what were considered to be blasphemous beliefs. M. Oakeshott, The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Skepticism, ed. by T. Fuller (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 23.

61. I. Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), pp. 1-19.



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