THE FRENCH AND ITALIAN COMMUNISTS AND THE COMMON

MARKET : THE REQUESTS FOR REPRESENTATION IN THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS

BY WERNER FELD

BETWEBN 1957, when the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community was signed, and 1967, the attitudes and policies of the French and Italian Communist parties and labour unions towards the Common Market have undergone substantial changes. Following generally the example of the Soviet Union’s leadership, they regarded the Common Market at first as a tool of Western imperialism, doomed eventually to failure, but nevertheless a weapon against Communism that was to be opposed and whose activities were to be spumed. By 1962 the Common Market had become recognized as an ‘objective reality’ with which the Communist world had to come to grips. And then, in 1966, the French and Italian Communist parties and labour unions abandoned their practice of largely ignoring the institutional life of the Community and clamoured determinedly to participate in the activities of the Common Market through representation in the European parliament, the Economic and Social Committee (ESC), and other consultative bodies.

What is the meaning of this shift of policy towards the Common Market by the French and Italian communist or anizations? Does it signifj., as some observers have asserted,’ a ‘re 8 reshing change’ in- volving major concessions on the part of the Communists? Or is it merely a tactical manoeuvre in the pursuit of old objectives? This article will discuss the reactions of the Community leadership and non- communist groups to this policy shift and seek to assess its objectives2 and possible implications for the EEC. Since the shift in policy is

‘Communists in the Communities?’. Common Market, vol. 6, no. 6(June 1966). pp. 111-13; Ra

%s assessment is based in part on the conversations which the author had in the summer of 1967 with officials of the I&an Communist party, the Italian Trade Union Federation (CGIL), and the French Confederation of Labor (CGT). Their kindness in making themselves available for these convemtions is highly ap reciated. I am atC0 deeply indebted to Mme. Anna Kriegel and Professor Altiero Spinelli for invayuable assistance in the research for this article and would like to thank Mr. Franqois Pejto and Mr. Serge Mallet for providing valuable suggestions and insights into the subject matter.

250

ond Barillon in Le Monde, September 25,1965.

COMMUNISTS AND THE COMMON MARKET 251

closely tied to the changing attitudes of the French and Italian Com- munists toward the Common Market over the last ten years, the article will commence with a brief review of these changes.

I

Ever since 1948 when the Soviet Union refused to participate in the Marshall Plan and prevented the East European countries &om availing themselves of its benefits, the Communists have attacked every aspect of every step the West European countries have taken towards economic integration and perhaps political unity. The Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the European Payments Union, NATO and the European Coal and Steel Community were attacked as manifestations of American imperialism, as conspiracies of the big monopolies against the smaller producers and farmers, as the efforts of the capitalists for more effective exploitation of the working class, and as aggressive organizations directed against the Socialist countries.

Prior to and for some time after its establishment, the Common Market was subjected to attacks similar to those hurled against the other Euro ean organizations. In 1957 the Institute of World Eco-

research institution, published Seventeen Theses Regarding the Common Market which emphasized that the EEC si ified the strengthening of

the latter’s situation, and the appearance of neo-colonialism manifested by the association of the colonies of the six member states to the Common Market. Although recognizin that the EEC might lead to the establishment of a larger market fespite frictions and conflicts inherent in ‘capitalistic’ integration, the theses expressed pessimism that a unified economic system could be achieved even if all the steps sti ulated by the EEC Treaty were taken, something that was con-

to fight the EEC was the mobilization of patriotic forces in the member states against the reduction of national sovereignty as foreseen by the EEC Treaty. As an alternative solution to the Common Market, the theses advocated all-European economic co-operation in accordance with the concepts of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) which excluded all consideration of supranational organization?

In 1959, a change in Soviet attitudes became visible when during a meeting of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations a participant, E. Khmelnizkaia, expressed the opinion that the

nomics an B International Relations in Moscow, a toplevel Soviet

the monopolies vis-ct-vis the workers, res r tmg in the deterioration of

si B ered highly improbable. Among the countermeasures recommended

Cf. Gerda Wentin, DieKommunisten unddieEinigungEuropar(Frankfurt am Main: Athenaeum Vcrlag, 1964), pp. 73-4 and Stefan Heikbcrg, ‘Die Europ%sche Einigung in der Sicht dcr inter- nationalen kommunistischen Bewegung’. Europa-Idmationen (12/67), pp. 101-10.

252 JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES

Common Market was developing into a serious factor in international economic and political relations. Fears were voiced that the advantages afforded intra-Community trade through the gradual abolition of internal duties in the Common Market could create unfavourable conditions for the export of oods from the Communist bloc countries to the EEC member states. Three years later, in 1962, the Institute became again the mouthpiece for announcing further changes in Soviet views of the Common Market. Its director, A. Arjumanyan, published an article in May of that year in Ruvdu in which he stated inter uliu that ‘in the Common Market one can observe a real technical and scientific revolution which carries with it a powerful regeneration of the industrial structure of capitalism. . . . The EEC has a remarkable vitality and has created objective situations whose elimination will not be possible without grave consequence^'.^ These concepts, which seemed to have found Khrushchev’s general approval,6 became later part of 32 theses that were published in Pravdu on August 26 under the title ‘Concerning Imperialist Integration” in Western Europe (The Common Market)-Theses” on the occasion of the Moscow Con- ference on Contemporary Capitalism. Although these theses con- tinued to describe the Common Market as a ‘weapon of the imperialist cold war” policy’, and contained gloomy predictions about its

ultimate fate as the result of the sharpening contradictions between the capitalistic countries, they acknowledged that the EEC had stimblated production on a greater scale and resulted in ‘certain increases of wages’ for the labouring class. Representin a clear shift in Soviet thinking, the

ference, which had brought together Communist economists- scientists as well as politicians-and were to serve as guidance for Communist olicy and action in Europe.

espoused the Soviet ideolo ical line uis-h-vis the Common Market from 1957 to 1960 and used tfl eir own information media and political influence in support of it? But in November of 1960, during the Conference of 81 Communist parties in Moscow, the PCI began to show signs of deviation from this line by seeming to adopt a more

F

4 4

4‘

theses were intended to present a (K efinite ideological line to the Con-

The Frenc x and Italian Communist parties (PCF and PCI) f d y

4RoE Sannwald, ‘Die europ3iihe Wirtschftsgemeinschaft im S icgel dcr sowjetischen Ideologie and Praxis’, OJteurope Wrtsch&, vol. 7, no. 4 (December 19627. pp. 241-54, on p. 245.

Cited in Zellentin, op. fit., p. 76. hid., pp. 76-7. Translated in Current Digesf ofthe Soviet Pre5s, vol. 14, no. 34. pp. 9-16.

aCf. F. Nicolon, ‘Perspectives economiques du March6 Commun’. Economic el Poliffque (MakAmil1959, Num6ro special), pp. 3-19. (Thic is the main French Communist economic and political publication.) Also ‘Sul Mercato comune europeo’, a communication of the PCI head- quarters dated March 24,1957, and PCI resolution of June 8, 1959, entitled ‘Il PCI chiama & lotta per la soipensione del MEC e indica l’alternative di una nuova politica economics', published in Rocurnenti dd IX a1 X Congress0 del El, pp. 44-9 and 413-22 respectively.

COMMUNISTS AND THE COMMON MARKET 253

positive attitude toward the Common Market and integration. This change became fully evident in 1962 when Luigi Longo, the Deputy Secretary-General of the PCI, acknowledged in an article published on April 27 in L' Unitu, that his party had not properly understood how to assess the consequences of European integration measures on the Italian economy and that it was a fact that: 'Euro ean integration was an essential element in the Italian economic leap orward.' He added that: 'We must recognize that the economic integration process rests on the objective momentum of productive forces; but we must criticize the wa in which this objective necessity was translated into institutional

In view of the changed attitudes of the PCI it was not surprising that the Common Market theses presented by the Soviet Institute of World Economics and International Relations at the Moscow Conference on Contemporary Capitalism in August and September 1962 were welcomed and in part accepted by the Italians. However, the Italian delegates went considerably beyond the Soviet position and declared that the vitality demonstrated by the EEC was caused by the fact that it was satisfjmg the needs of economic development and therefore the Communist parties could no lon er limit themselves to demanding the

Rather, since the tendency towards economic integration and trans- cendence of national barriers had to be viewed as an objective and progressive rocess, it was in fact advisable to encourage the Common

discriminatory features with respect to the Socialist and African countries.' O The representatives of the PFC did not share these views. They sought to defend the notion that the Common Market was merely an instrument for strengthening the American monopolies in Europe which would increase the dependence of the European countries on the United States and the dependence of France on a revanchist and reactionary Germany." The Russians were not prepared either to accept fully the sweeping concepts of the PCI and continued to attack the Common Market in order to destroy its internal cohesion and to prevent its enlargement, especially as far as Britain's membership was concerned. Nevertheless, the debate in the Conference showed that the PFC views could muster only minority support, reflecting a clear

P

an B political term^.'^

dissolution of the EEC and the ! enunciation of the underlying treaty.

Market's e J argement while at the same time working to overcome its

Cited in F'm~ois %to. 2% French Communist Purty und the Crisis oflnfemufionuf Communism (Cambridge. Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963, p. 140. See also Giono Galli. 'Italian Communism', in William E. Griffith, Commrrnim in Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 301-84,

lo Cf. Sezione Economia, PCI, L'fntepzione economic europcu ed il movimenfo operuio, Nota di documentazione, no. 21. dated September 1962.

l1 Fejto, op. cit., 140. Cf. also H. Jourdain 'Sur la rencontre de Moscow'.Economie ef Polifique (NovembK-Decemtre 1962). pp. 418.

cspccially 342-3.

254 JOURNAL OF COMMON.MARKET STUDXES

victory of the Italian Communists over their French comrades. The position of the PCI illustrates the need of Communist parties to

stay in touch with political reality. The PCI, for example, could not pursue the doctrinaire viewpoint as was done by the other Communist parties that the situation of the workers was deteriorating as the cons uence of the Common Market’s operation. To follow th is line

of its members and voters since it was quite evident that the Italian workers had received considerable direct and indirect benefits Gom the progress of the EEC. For this reason the PCI had to seek new methods to deal with the phenomenon of capitalist economic integration as represented by the Common Market and in early 1963 it began advocating a ‘democratic’ alternative to the capitalist integration process through the revision of the EEC Treaty,” a subject to which we will return later in detail.

While the PCI followed initially the policy of opposition and disdain v i s - h i s the EEC as laid down by the Soviet and French Communist leadership, the Communist-led Italian Trade Union Federation (CGIL) was from the start interested in working with the Common Market institutions. However, the governments of the six member states had already agreed prior to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 on the exclusion of Communist-dominated labour federations from pamci ation in its

Confederation of Labour (CGT) in 1958 and early in 1959 for representa- tion on the Economic and Social Council of the Common Market were ignored.” Later, in 1962, the CGIL urged the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) to open an office in Brussels to deal with Common Market matters. This project was frustrated by the subtle opposition of the CGT and members of the WFTU secretariat, and the CGIL finally established its own office. When it became clear that the WFTU could not prevent this action, it specified that the Brussels office of the CGIL was to act ‘in accordance with the other organiza- tions of the WFTU’.14 The main task of the ofice, staffed by only a Communist and a Socialist CGIL official, was to break down the barriers between the Communist and non-Communist unions and establish a common Gont in EEC labour affairs. However, the non- Communist labour organizations in Brussels, the European Secretariats

woul 7 have saddled the PCI with a serious loss of credibility in the eyes

consultative organs. Therefore, pleas of the CGIL an B the French

12 ‘Par uaa iniziativa democratia europea c uaa revisione dei trattati del MEC’. Documenti dai X a1 XI Congress0 del PCZ, pp. 35-43.

l3 Gcrda Wentin. Der Wirtschafrs- und Sozialauuchuss der EWG undEurafom (Lciden: A. W. Sythoff, 1962), pp. 623, and Livo Mascardlo, ‘Les Syndicaa et le march6 commun’, EEonomie et Pofifique (March-Avril 1959), p. 3S9.

Fejto, op. dt., p. 140 anfGalli, op. at., pp. 365-8.

COMMUNISTS A N D THE COMMON MARKET 255

of the Free and Christian Trade Union Federations (ICFTU and IFCTU) rejected all overtures of the Communist-dominated organizations and opposed any kind of collaboration within the Gamework of the EEC institutions.

II

Early in 1966 the CGIL and CGT launched a new offensive to gain the right to be represented on the Community institutions. This offensive was much more determined and better organized than the earlier pleas for representation. It began in November 1965 with the establishment of a joint Standing Committee which was to act as a stimulus and co-ordinating body for trade union action in Western Europe. This Committee appealed to the ICFTU and IFCTU to form a united front with the CGIL and CGT pointing out that: ‘In view of the increasingly close understanding between the monopolies at the expense of the interests of the worker, and in view of the measures to coordinate government economic policies, it is essential for the union organizations in the six EEC states to form a common Gont. Under present conditions.. . the CGT and CGIL are being discriminated against in a prejudicial way. . . at the level of the EEC institutions. The workers in France and Italy are not all represented on them.’” At the same time the Committee made it clear that the CGT and CGIL, while retaining the right to their own opinions on everything con- nected with the Common Market, recognized the right of the other union organizations that might participate in the common endeavour to do likewise.

In continuation of its efforts to obtain Community representation for the CGT and CGIL, the Standing Committee addressed, on April 5, 1966, a memorandum to the EEC and Euratom Commissions and the Community Council of Ministers. The memorandum also attacked the discrimination against the workers whbse unions belong to the CGT and CGIL. ‘Such discrimination is not only inconsistent with the legiti- mate rights of the CGIL and CGT to assume their rightf;l place in the institutions of the Common Market, it is also rejudicial to the interests

vitiates the overall re resentation of the working man.’ The memoran- dum argued that Ls under-representation of labour resulted in ‘increased power of the monopolies to manipulate the economic policy of the member states’, while the social objectives of the Treaty of Rome, so im ortant to the worker, had not been attained with

of the worker in France, Italy, and the ot K er EEC states in that it

respect to a num 1 er of points.16 Seeking widespread publicity for the l5 European parliament. European Documentation, vol. 8, no. 1 (January 1966), pp. 21-2. I6 European parliament, European Documentation, vol. 8, no. 5 (May 1966), pp. 9, 10.

256 JOURNAL OP COMMON MARKET STUDIES

memorandum, the Secretaries-general of the CGIL and CGT, Mr. Novella and Mr. Benoit-Frachon, held a news conference during which they elaborated on the content of the memorandum and rea&med their hope for representation.

The Council of Ministers answered the memorandum on April 13 and stated that under the provisions of the EEC Treaty it was for the individual member governments to submit to the EEC Council the names of candidates for the post assigned to each country on the Eco- nomic and Social Council." A letter urging such action for the CGIL had already been sent on January 15 to Mr. Aldo Moro, the President of the Council of the Italian government, and personal calls in support of t h i s letter had been paid to Mr. Pietro Nenni, the Vicepresident of the Council, and Mr. Delle Fave, the Minister of Labour. Another letter to Mr. Moro was dispatched on April 16 which referred to the communication of the EEC Council of Ministers and drew attention to the absence of any opposition on the part of the EEC Council to changes in the composition of the Italian trade union delegations to the Community bodies. The letter stressed that the exclusion of delegates from CGIL, the largest Italian trade union organization, representing three million workers, violated the EEC Treaty since it constituted an unjustifiable discrimination.18 At about the same time, the CGT also requested the French government to submit appropriate proposals to the Community institutions for assuring CGT participation in Community life.

What have been the reactions of the free and Christian trade union organizations to this determined offensive for Community representa- tion on the part of the CGIL and CGT? In March 1966, the Executive Committee of the European Trades Union Secretariat, embracing the ICFTU organizations in the EEC countries, reaffirmed the position adopted in 1964 by the General Assembly of the Free Trade Unions, which rejected any contact with organizations affiliated with the WFTU ind hence sympathetic to Communism.l Basing itself on hs position, the Italian member of the ICFTU, the Confderuzione Italiana Sinducuti Luvorutori (CISL) strongly opposed the memprandum of the CGIL and CGT Standing Committee. In a letter addressed to Mr. Moro, Foreign Minister Fanfani, and the Italian Minister of Labour it argued forcefilly against the inclusion of CGIL and CGT represen- tatives to serve on Community institutions. The CISL felt that any organization that was hostile to European integration as laid down in the Community treaties and that was mainly concerned with the

Ibid., pp. 10,ll. Ibid., pp. 10,ll.

l9 Agence Europe, March 19, 1966.

COMMUNISTS A N D THE C O M M O N MARKET 257

strategy to promote a Communist society in Western Europe was not qualified to sit in the committees of the Community. Only if the CGIL severed its connection with the WFTU and pledged fLll support for the Treaties of Rome and Paris, could it be considered qualified to send representatives to the Community institutiom2 O

The Christian trade union organizations seem to have been less categorical in their opposition to CGT and CGIL representation than the ICFTU and appear to have adopted a 'wait-and-see' position regarding co-operation with the Communist-dominated labour organizations. During the Fourth European Conference of the IFCTU held in October 1966, the president of its European organization acknowledged a change in the attitudes of the Communists towards the Common Market, but maintained the principle that a Christian labour union normally could not seek co-operation with the WFTU. How- ever, he suggested awaiting the concrete actions of the WFTU member organizations in the field of European integration and then making a judgment regarding the utility of eventual, co-operative actions.21 The greater relaxation of the IFCTU towards possible co-operation with the Communist-controlled unions may stem from the conviction that its control over its member unions in such an event would be much safer than that of the ICFTU whose member unions often are politically quite close to the CGIL. and CGT unions. Of course, the attitudes of national non-Communist unions are not uniform and vary from country to country. While the Socialist unions in France strongly refuse all co-operation with the CGT, the Belgian associate of the ICFTU, the FtUrution G'nirule de5 Trauailleurs Belges (FGTB) and some of the Socialist unions in Italy have not been adverse to collaboration with the Communist-dominated labour federations and the FCTB in fact has voiced support for their representation in the ESC.

Whatever the effect of the opposition by the ICFTU and IFTCU to CGT and CGIL representation in the Community institutions may have been, the French and Italian overnments have so far not proposed

Social Committeeor any other consultative EECcommittee. Although it was thought in some quarters that General de Gaulle might have wanted to make a fiiendly gesture towards the Soviet Union by submitting the names of some CGT representatives on the French list of candidates, the list submitted early in 1966 for the four-year term ending in 1970 did not contain any CGT representative. Possibly France did not want to

Communist trade union leaders H or membership in the Economic and

2o European parliament, European Documentation, vol. 8, no. 1 (January 1966), p. 21 and vol. 8. no. 5 (May 1966). p. 11.

21 Quatri&me ConfZrena Europ&ene des Syndicats Chretiens (Amsterdam. Octobre 6-8, 1966), Orietitation de5 structures et de f'uction du Mouvement Syndical darts la dimmsion earopiene. Rapport present6 par A. Coal, Brussels, n.d.

E

258 JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES

annoy her EEC partners at a time when negotiations on the financial regulations for agriculture were entering the critical stage. The Italian government followed the French example as far as Communist trade union leaders were concerned, but since the CGIL also contains some Socialist union leaders, two officials affiliated with the CGIL were proposed under the Socialist label and were appointed by the EEC Council of Ministers. They are Dr. Pier0 Boni, Secretary-General of the Federation of Metalworkers (FICM), an affiliate of the CGL, and Fernando Montagnani, a national secretary of the CGIL. Through these nominations the Italian government robably sought to accommodate

CGIL.. Boni and Montagnani are said to have remained large y in the background during the deliberations in the ESC and seem to have refrained from polemics along the Communist line of the CGIL..

Concurrently with the drives of the CGIL and CGT to gain rights of representation in the Community institutions, the Italian and French Communist parties exerted efforts to be represented in the Euro ean

January 25 to 31, 1966, Party Secretary Luigi Longo declared that the Party ought to discontinue its wholesale rejection of the European integration process and in fact take part in it. For this reason he reasserted the claim to the right for the Communists not only in Italy, but also in other EEC countries, to be adequately represented in the European parliamentF2 During the San Remo Conference of the PCI and PFC in May 1966, a joint statement was issued which declared inter alia ‘that it was imperative that those . . . [the two parties] elect be finally given their rightful place as representatives of the great national, democratic workers’ parties in the Community institutions’?

For the PCI the time seemed ripe in the spring of 1966 to press its demand for re resentation in the European parliament because upon

mission had been appointed to inquire into the credentials of its Italian members. Some Italian Christian-Democrats and Liberals had long ago ceased to be members of their national parliament-some had died in the meantime-yet the Italian parliament had time and again failed to renew its delegation to the European parliament. As a con- sequence the Socialist groups, counting only two Italian members, and neither of them Nenni Socialists, were under-represented while the Christian-Democrats and Liberals were over-represented in the Euro- pean parliament, a situation which had obvious political disadvantages

P the claims of the large and politica P ly influential membershi of the

parliament. During the PCI’s Eleventh Congress held in Rome 4 rom

the urging of tR e Socialist delegates of that body an investigating com-

22 European parliament, European Documenfarion, vol. 8, no. 2 (February 1966). pp. 2-4. CE also ‘Solitude in Europe for the Communistc’, Lo Spettatore Znternarionale, vol. 1, no. 2 (March- April 1966), pp. 25-9.

23 European parliament, European Donmentation, vol. 8, no. 6(June 1966). pp. 4, 5.

COMMUNISTS AND THE COMMON MARKET 259

for the Socialists. Nevertheless, although the Italian parliament tried to renew its delegation in May of 1966, it failed again and a decision was put off sine die.’4 The Italian Communists were extremely angry and disappointed with this new failure to obtain representation, particularly since Giuseppe Sarragat, now President of the Republic, had expressed himself during a news conference in November 1964-he was then Foreign Minister-in favour of Communist representation. The prospects are now that no opportunity for such representation will become available until after the elections of 1968 although PCI officials have not given up hope for an earlier change in the Italian delegation to the European parliament.

The opportunity for the French Communists to be included in the French delegation to the European parliament presented itself after the parliamentary elections in France in the spring of 1967. By tacit agree- ment between the Gaullists and the Federation of the Left which included the PCF, the Federation was to have six of the twenty-four seats allotted to France in the European parliament. The PCF put forward four candidates for election by the French assembly on May 24. The Communist candidates were not successful in obtaining the majority of votes necessary for election, which in fact would have required not only the support of the Communist and Socialist members of the Assembly, but also votes from the Christian-Democrats and even fiom some Gaullists, Since only five of the six seats allotted to the Federation were filled by its members-Mr. Maurice Faure was un- successful in obtaining a majority of votes and therefore the sixth seat went to a Gaullist-all five Federation members resigned as a gesture of solidarity with Mr. Faure. As a consequence a supplementary ballot will have to be held but this is not likely to brighten the prospects of Communist success in the subsequent election.’

III

Turning now to an assessment of the 1966-67 efforts of the French and Italian Communists to obtain representation in the Community institutions, we return to the questions posed in the introduction to this article. Do these efforts suggest a fundamental change of attitude and objectives towards the Common Market and espousal, though perhaps very gradual, of the spirit and letter of the Community Treaties? Are they merely tactical moves to attain long-standing objectives from inside the EEC institutions rather than by frontal attacks on the Common Market? If the latter interpretation should prove to be the correct one,

2* Ct ‘Communists in the Communities?’, op. cit., pp. 111-13. 2 S Le Morrde, May 25, 26, 27, 1967.

260 JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES

another question may be raised. Finally, would it be useful to accom- modate the Communist demands for participation in the Community activities in the hope that their involvement in the decision-making process of the EEC institutions may slowly engender changes in Communist attitudes culminating in enuine co-operation?

Communist publications that have accompanied the request for representation and compares them with earlier policy statements dating back to the time the Communities were established, the impression emerges that the recent demands for representation are primarily tactical moves. The statement of Italian CP Secretary Longo made on January 25, 1966, to which we have referred earlier, declared frankly: ‘We Communists consider that action should be taken within the Common Market to obtain a revision of all those decisions that may hamper the growth of trade between all the countries of Europe (both Capitalist and Socialist) or which involve a subjection to monopolist interests.’26 Striking a similar tone, Franqois Thoraval, a French Communist, stated at an international conference held at Choisy-Le-Roi in May 1966, that the existence and intervention of ‘democratic’ forces on all levels, national and Community, ‘could contribute to the elimination of discriminatory Common Market regulations which are imposed on the trade with third countries, notably the socialist ones, and to the initia- tion of moves favouring the development of commercial relations with all states without discrimination which would enhance peaceful co-existence and di~arrnarnent’.~’

These statements reflect the continuing apprehension of the Soviet Union and her East European satellites about the effects which the gradual elimination of internal tariffs within the Common Market and the establishment of common external tariffs may have on their exports to the EEC countries. When the EEC was established, the East bloc countries demanded to be accorded, on the basis of the most-favoured- nation clause, the same tariff reductions which the Common Market members ranted each other. The Community organs rejected these demands, % ut of course enlargement of the Common Market toward the East as advocated especially by the Communists in Italy would have the same effect. In this connection a comment by Chairman Kosygin during a news conference in February 1967 deserves mentioning. Asked whether British membership in the EEC would be good or bad for European development and security, he replied: ‘The very name Common Market is a drawback in that it is not “common” because not

If one looks at the statements ma c f e by Communist leaders and in

z6 European parliament, European Donrmetrtatiort, vol. 8, no. 2 (February 1966), p. 3. 27 Confkrncc Intwnufiona/e sur Lc Capitalisme Monopo/iste d’Etat (Choisy-le-Roy, 26/29 Mai.

1966), pp. 181, 182. Special issue of Erortomie ~t Politique.

COMMUNISTS A N D THE COMMON MARKET 261

all countries are free to join. Markets of this kind should be open to co- operation of all the nations of Europe on an equal footing.’” Sig- nificantly, the suggested enlargement of the Common Market could also have beneficial side effects for the Soviet goals of a European security pact, the dismantlement of NATO, and the exclusion of American influence from Europe, goals mentioned again and again in the Communist outpourings on the EEC since its inception.

The enlargement of the Common Market as proposed by the Communists must not be taken to mean that a politically integrated structure is envisaged. Rather, as the French and Italian Communist parties declared during their meeting in San Remo in May 1966, the objective is European economic co-operation ‘that would be based on the principles of sovereignty, equal rights and mutual interests of the states concerned and culminate in agreements in the field of production and of ~cience’.’~ Subsequent statements stress the urgent need for scientific and technological co-operation and a common programme of investments among the participating countries in order to eliminate territorial and sector disparities and imbalances. According to their authors, this signifies that the aim is more than merely a large free trade But these co-operative programmes, from which un- doubtedly the Communist countries would derive the main benefits, must not be imposed by a supranational authority, but need to be elaborated in multilateral agreements between the member countries that safeguard the autonomy of individual states and the authority of their own representative institutions.

In all Communist statements supranationality is the great enemy which must be overcome from within the Common Market. PCI Party Secretary Longo declared early in 1966: ‘It is our view that action should be taken now against any consolidation of a supranational authority which could limit the independence of national parliaments in the decisions they take.’31 The leader of the PCF, Waldeck Rochet, stated in a news conference on September 7, 1967: ‘We are hostile to the installation of a supranational government for the “Little Europe” of the six because it would have the result of depriving us of our national independence and place West Europe under German hegemony and American t~telage.’~’ In San Remo the PCF and PCI announced: The Communists intend to conduct their struggle within the European institutions in order that they may prevent. . , integration blocking the kmd of democratic reform

The Times, February 10,1967. 29 European parliament, European Documnrrution. vol. 8, no. 6 (June 1966), p. 5. 30 ‘n PCI e la Comunita Economics Europea’. Boflelino CESPE, vol. 2. no. 8 (July 1963,

31 European parliament, European Documentufiorr, vol. 8, no. 2 (February 1966), p. 3. 32 L‘Aurore, September 7, 1967.

pp. 3-9.

262 JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES

such as nationalization that individual countries may wish to put through. They intend to strive for a different policy from that of the cartels and trusts, so that the Common Market institutions may lose their technocratic character, through the active participa- tion of re resentatives of trade unions and national parliaments vested with real power ancfagainst whom there is no discriminati~n.~~

The complete elimination of all supranational features from Com- munity institutions through a revision of the Community Treaties thus has the highest priority in the plans of the French and Italian Com- munists for the Common Market. Other important aims to be achieved through Treaty revision are the suppression of all rules that may restrict the admission of Communist states, the establishment of criteria for full multilateral economic co-operation with strict assurance of the autonomy of the participating countries and subject to the approval of the national parliaments, the revision of the Common Agricultural Policy particularly as far as the protectionistic levy system is concerned, and new forms of relations with the associated countries in Africa, safeguarding them against outside economic hegemony and political influence, i.e. European or American, while at the same time furnishing financial aid and technical assistance without any strings attached. If such a revision of the Community Treaties could be achieved, the Communist benefits are obvious. The Communist bloc countries would receive financial aid and technical know-how from the West. Their agricultural and industrial exports to Western Europe could be en- larged without fear of a supranational common commercial policy that might stop simultaneously the imports or exports of all six EEC c0untries.3~ The expanding economic and olitical influence of the

continue to wield their considerable national political power for their own ends without fear of interference by the Common Market institutions as far as EEC agricultural regulations and industrial policy under the EEC Treaty is concerned.

Although there is a great deal of talk about the ‘democratization’ of the EEC and about achieving a ‘democratically styled integration process’ and although the composition and duties of the European parliament are amon the items listed to be covered in a revision of the Community treaties!’ it is surprising that while direct elections of the members of parliament are advocated, there is little genuine support for strengthening parliamentary powers.36 The professed rationale of the Communists is again their faith in the nation state. In their opinion

EEC over its associates would be halted. An ! the PCF and PCI could

” European parliament, European Documeritcrtioii. vol. 8, no. 6(June 1966), p. 5. 34 We should note that for a variety of reasons a common commercial policy toward Commu-

35 ‘11 PCI e la Comunita Economica Europea’, op. cit., p. 8. 36 In the conversation with Italian CP leaders only a few seemed to favour such changes with

nist countries is far from becoming a reality.

sincerity.

COMMUNISTS AND THE COMMON MARKET 263

the working class can better achieve its objectives within the framework of national policies, and regional problems within a country can be solved more effectively on the national level. For example, as one of the Italian CP officials pointed out, why should Germans be interested in solving the problems of the Mezzogiorno if major decisions on this subject were made on a supranational level.” But perhaps an equally strong motivation for not fully supporting direct suffrage and strength- ened powers of the European parliament may be the fkar that the political powers available to the French and Italian Communists in their own countries could be diluted on the European level because Com- munist strength in the Benelux countries is relatively weak and the Communist party in West Germany has been declared illegal. Finally, support for a strong European parliament would be incompatible with Communist demands for elimination of the supranational features of other Community institutions, especially those of the Commission. ‘Democratization’ of the EEC, then, signifies for the Communists primarily retention of their powers in the national parliaments and the elimination of supranational authority which might blunt the achieve- ments of Communist objectives in Europe. It has nothing to do with the installation of strong representative and responsible institutions on the European level.

The motivations for the CGT and CGIL to press for representation rights in the Community institutions flow less from Communist high politics or recent changes in ideology3* than from pragmatic trade union considerations. Competing with non-Communist labour organizations for the allegiance of workers in France and Italy, the CGT and CGIL must show that they are in a position to defend effectively the interests of the workers in all fora that may be used for the making of labour policy, and this includes the Community institutions. Their programme concerning the social-economic policy of the Community is not very different from action programmes of other trade unions in Western Europe and includes the usual demands such as higher wages, better occupational training and protection against unemployment.

The short-range objective of the quest for Community representa- tion by the CGT and CGIL thus appears to be an entirely practical one, namely to produce optimum results for their members and to fight threatened encroachment by non-Communist unions as the result of the representational deficiencies on the European level. Since it is an

57 The gingerly application of the EEC anti-trust regulations was also mentioned as evidence that only through the use of national policies can the monopolies and oligopolies be combated effcavely.

38 As we have noted, the Communists had generally recognized the ‘objective reality’ of the Common Market by 1962.

264 JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES

acknowledged fact that so far labour has not enjoyed the same influence in the Community institutions as has agriculture and industry, the two Communist-dominated labour federations can underscore the justifica- tion of their demands by pointing out that the addition of the two largest trade union organizations to the consultative organs of the EEC may well expand the lobbying power of labour in general. A second, long-range CGT-CGIL objective, more Machiavellian in nature, may be the propagation of Marxist ideology and more or less subtle support for domestic and international Communist strategies. This could also serve the purpose of subverting the nature of the EEC institutions and sapping whatever strength they may possess. We should emphasize again, however, that up to now the two CGIL representatives on the Economic and Social Committee have refrained Gom such activity, but once an increased number of CGIL and CGT delegates should have been appointed, the tactics may change.

oints to the

tion in the Community bodies must indeed be regarded mainly as a tactical manaeuvre to achieve longstanding Communist goals although for the CGT and CGIL. practical considerations also play a part. No fundamental changes in concepts or major objectives seem to be involved. Would it be conceivable, however, that involvement of Communist delegates in Community activities might engender more positive attitudes towards the development of the Common Market as envisaged in the Community treaties? While it may well be true that some political extremists, when faced with the realities of governmental administration, shed part of their extremism, that has not always been the case, as Hitler, Mussolini and perhaps Gottwald of Czechoslovakia have proved. Firmness of convictions, perceptions of vested interests and subsurface predispositions are likely to play a role in effecting such metamorphosis. To seek to determine the existence of such personality traits among the Communist leadership in France and Italy would be obviously a most difficult undertaking. In view of the much greater rigidity of the French Communists-as least so far-and the apparent greater flexibility of the Italian Communists, one could speculate that such a metamorphosis in attitudes would be more likely among the latter. Certainly it is the PCI which has led the fight for a more positive view of the Common Market and the integration process. And among the PCI officials concerned with the problems of the EEC seem to be a number of ‘revisionists’-in contrast to Stalinists or Maoists-who, although professing commitment to the current policy concepts agreed upon by the PCF and PCI, may be inclined towards greater acceptance of the philosophy of the Community treaties as they stand now.

The evidence emerging from our inquiry clearly assumption that the demands of the French and Italians P or representa-

COMMUNISTS A N D THE C O M M O N MARKET 265

PCI officials are pleased that they have assumed the leadership in the reinterpretation of the economic nature of the Common Market and that the PCF has accepted, though grudgingly, many of the revised notions which we discussed in the earlier part of t h i s article. If the Italian Communists were to adopt additional conceptual changes con- cerning the Common Market, pressures would most likely be exerted on the PCF to gradually accept these changes as well. Other pressures for a change in attitude of the PCF towards the Common Market may also come from its participation in the Federation of the Left. Although the PCF has stressed that it would pursue its own policy towards the Common Market despite its association with the French Socialists who strongly support European political integration, its leaders have declared that the Common Market problem would not be an obstacle to the elaboration of a common plan of action within the Federation. Referring to this question, Waldeck Rochet stated in his news conference referred to earlier: ‘We do not present our programme as a take-or-leave proposition; rather we consider that we must move toward a frank confrontation in order to find a basis for agreement.’39 The anticipation of governmental power may be an added inducement for the PCF leaders to smooth over policy differences with their Federation partners and to ignore ideological differences.

Despite the possible predisposition of Italian Communists towards a further change in their attitudes and the possible pressures on the French Communists emanating both from the PCI and from their participation in the Federation of the Left, this observer considers it very doubtful that the ‘learning process’ through involvement in the activities of the Community would engender significant attitude changes in Communist delegates to the Community institutions. And even if as the result of a fairly protracted ‘learning process’ such changes did occur, and, in addition, the PCF would temporarily alter its position for domestic political reasons, these modifications are not likely to have any appre- ciable effect on the basic policy lines of the French and Italian Com- munists. The main reason is that although the PCF and PCI are not docile tools of Moscow and suffer from internal differences, the link between their objectives and the foreign policy goals of the Soviet Union and its satellites remains operative. If nothing else, this has become evident from the various statements by the French and Italian Communists quoted in t h s article. Soviet goals regarding the conclu- sion of a European security pact, the dismantlement of NATO, repression of a ‘revanche-seeking’ Germany, the exclusion of American influence in Europe, the reduction of West European influence in AGica, greater trade between Communist East Europe and the countries 39 See note 31 supra. and Thoraval, op. cit., p. 181.

266 JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES

of West Europe, and the need for technical know-how and investments from the West are again and again su ported explicitly or implicitly.

revision make it clear that an important objective for seeking representa- tion in the Community institutions is to destroy them as they are constituted now.

Nevertheless, although it seems evident that the quest for representa- tion on the part of the French and Italian Communists is largely a tactical manmuvre, their efforts may eventually be crowned with success. Constant pressures by the CGIL unions, the failure of the Italian Assembly to renew its delegation, and the forthcoming elections in 1968 may gradually induce the Italian Government to add CGIL delegates to the two already appointed to the ESC. Many in Italy and elsewhere would applaud this action as satisfymg the requirements of justice. Moreover, depending on the outcome of the elections, the Italian Assembly may not be able to resist the PCI demands any longer. The trend toward the Left emerging in France may also have favourable consequences for the aspirations of the French Communists. Since so much of the Communist rogramme-opposition to supranationality

that the General may want to reward the CPF or the CGT with a number of delegates to the Community institutions on a quid p ~ o quo basis, which could also be interpreted as an act of genuflection towards M0scow.4~ If the Gaullists should be forced to relinquish control of the French government and a government of the Left including the Communists should be installed (something that is predicted in many quarters in France), Communist delegates in the Economic and Social Committee and the European Parliament would be almost a certainty.

In addition, and equally important, t K e Communist aims for treaty

and foreign policy-resem t: les de Gaulle’s policy, it is not inconceivable

40Nine Communist members of the French Assembly’s defence committee were treated recently to a visit to secret French nuclear installations, something that would not have been possible before the 1967 parliamentary elections. Cf. Sanche de Gramont, ‘French Commu- nism 1967’. Interplay, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 29-32.