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The French ArmyAfter Algeria

l ieutenant Colonel Wi l l iam L.

I N 1932, Colonel Charke de G8u~ewrote prophetically that:It ie a fact that the army finale itdificnlt to give unquestioning 8U~OTtto the CivU Powev. Shoe, however,discipline i8 Of d 8 e8 8 en ce , U?d hbecome ae it teeve a second nature,there ie never ang actual refueal toobey ordere, but there ic little happi-neee in ite subordination. . . .1In 1961, after an abortive Putcchstaged by military leaders to block apolitical eolution of the Algerian war,Preeident de Gauile couneeled the of-ficers of the army that:Once the State and the Nat& havechoeen their path, rnilitarg dutg isepelled owt onoe and f or all. Outcideits guideline there can be-there are-onlu loet eok%re. 1The events of 1961 were a longtime in the making. To understandthe process by whkh De GauUe re-estabiiehad civiliin supremacy overthe French ArmY, it is neeeasary toconsider, at lead brietly, the gradualprocess of politicisation that began inWorld War II.Au2mt1972

Hauser,Uni ted States Army

The army wsc once the proudeetinstitution of the French nation. How-ever incredible it may seem to modernminde, as late aa the 1S90s, it wee acriminal offenee to slander the armypublicly. Even the famous Dreyfuscaee and the terrible bloodletilngs andsoldier mutiniee of World War I dldnot significantly damage the profes-sional military in the public eye. Inthe post-World War I era, the armyessentially ret.ahvsd ite favored posi-tion in French society. Militarily, itwae widely regarded in the 19t10e eeone of the most formidable war ma-chinec in Europe.World War II ended all that. Ger-man armored speerhcade raced to theace, demolishing in a few weake thereputation of the French military forbath strategic planning and battle-field teetiea. Despite the feet thatmany army unite had fought bravely,that the %faginot line etretegy andthe failure to modernise forces werelargely the preduete of civilian policy,and that the national collapse wasby no means exclusively military, the

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ARMIES AND SOCIETIES-II

:~:L:%%xnwnoreover, the government whichsi~ed the humiliating armistice withNesi Germany wee headed byFrancee senior soldier, Marshal P6-tein, thereby inextricably linking themilitary establishment with the col-Ieborationist Vichy regime.The French Army split over the is-sue of collaboration, a portion of iteofficers following De GauUe into exileor later joining hlm in the FresFrench forces, while others remainedloyal to Vichy. Consequently, hbi sue.mea only patilally redeemed tArm&in the eyes of the French netion. Ad-ditionaUy, De GauUe had eet a prec~dent not lost on the rising generationof military leaders-that when thestate acta contrary to the interests ofthe nation, the army has the right,even the duty, to intervene. 8The military professions loss of a&tractiveness became apparent after

,the war. There had been 2462 qualifiedcandidates for entry into St. Cyr,Frances Weat Point in 1939; therewere 587in 1949 end only 860 in 1954.Among captains of artiUery, 11 per-cent in 1939 were graduates of theprestigious Keok Pol@ehmque; in1963, the proportion wee 5 percent, in1958, 1.5 percent. t Not only wee the- gettinf3 a smaller ehere ofYoungmen from the more highly educatedand higher social cleeaee, there wasalso a significant trend toward in-ternal recruitment end the concomi-tant factor of social isolation. Theproportion of soae of professionalmilitary men among St. Cyr entrantawas 30 percent in the years 1937-29,44 percent in 1954, end 47 percent in1958.0 Army captains commissionedfrom the ranks constituted 5.4 percentin 1949; in 1958, the Sgure was %.8percent.3The Indochina War was the secondmajor phase in the army% social isola-

Lieutenant Colonel Wil.lhzm L. Hau-8W ie a 1954 graduate of the USMA,holds an iM.A. in Hietoru f rom theUniversity o f Southern CaUfomia,and is a gra d u a t s of ths USACGSCand the Armu War CoUege. He ispresently in the EnUated PersonnelDirectorate, O~e of Personnal Op-erations, Washington, D. C. Thie arti-c.k woe mttenwhi.!a Colonel Hauserwas engaged in independent re.warchat the Johne Hopkins C%ntw of For-eign Poliog Relatione.

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tion. The contlict wee held to a fairlylow level until the early 1950s, butthen placed a heavy etrain on both thematerial and spiritual resources ofthe army.Bitterneee began to grow among of-ficers who had spent the bulk of theirpoet-World War II mrvice in Indo-china when they contrasted the aU.outeffort on the pert of the Vietminhwith the apparent leek of sacrifice bythe French people. 7 A sense of be-trayal grew toward irresprmeiblepress criticiem, unpatriotic politi-cinne and @ditieal generals. s Eventhe tecbnocrate of the oficer corps,involved not in colonial counterinsur-gency, but in the technological mod-emication of F r a n c e a Europeanforcee, resented the apparently fruit-leee diversion of resourcee from theirprograms. 0After its second defeat in two dec-adee, certain military leadere tookstock of their army and the nation itserved. Blame wae eesigned to both:to the army for its leek of the politicalsophietieation necessary in a counter-insurgency war; and to the nation fornot h a v i n g eupported ita fightingforces.0 A second precedent had beaneet in the minde of theee profeeeionaleoldiere-that when the nation doesnot recognize where ita intereste lie,it is etill the responsibility of thearmY to protect thoee interests.

Abnoet eimulteneouely with theFrench defeat in Indochin% the Alge-rian revolution began. The etraine ofboth ware, combined with other POE*icel and economic problems, broughtthe French Government to a etete ofparalyeie in May 1958. The politicaland military leederehip of the countryAcgest1972

turned to De Gaulle cc the only viablealternative to ehaoe.De GauUe wee not a totally populartlgure with the etlicer corpe. To cer-tain of the older generation, he re-tained hie World War II image se enupstart; to come of the younger men,he appeared like a wax dummy fromcome hietorierd mueeum. The dynemieColonel Trinquier, author of a famouswork on revolutionary warfare,1 iereputed to have offered a toast on theoccaaion of De GauUee taking ottice:Naguib ie in power; long 7ive Nae-Sel. y MA third precedent appeared to havebeen eet in the minds of this mUi-t.cnt echool-that when the netioneinterests are endangered, but theetate ie unable to act thb army heenot only the responsibility but thecapability of placing state power inother hands.By 1959, De Gaulle had earned theenmity of the militenta. The turningpoint wee probably hie Septemberspeech promising Algerian eelfdeter-mination which these military leadereconsidered a betrayal of the mandatethey had given him the previoueyear. Aleo, the apparent ambiguity ofhis Algerian policy-which appeare inretrospect to have been a briUiantexhibition of political footworkcreated an impreeeion of indeeieionand indirection. IJDe GauUe had recognised the inevi-tability of this antagonism and hadmoved tQ divide h]e potential opposi-tion. To the err@e technoorate, he

emphasized the nuclear deterrent pre-gram; to miUtary units in Franceand Germany, their growing autm-omy and crucial role in the defense ofthe Weet. 14 Tow a r d righbwinggroups aeeociated with the army, hereieed the epeeter of a Communisttakeover ehould hie government faU. is

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ASMIES AND SOCIETIES-S

As a result, military participants inthe January 1960 revolt of the bar-ricades in Algeria found themselvessupported by only part of a dividedofficer corps. 16After some indecision, G e n e r a 1Maurice Challe, Supreme Commanderin Algeria, called on hle forces tosupport the president and therebyhold the army together:The French Army is anxwua to

preserve ite unity. It is the Army of,the State, the Army of Fmnce, Zt onlghas meaning bV ite discipline, its obe-dience to the Government mad itsdevotion to the Natiew.7De Gaulle then moved swiftly toconsolidate his power over the army.Premier Michel Debr& ordered a re-drawing of lines of authority at thetop of the defense structure to in-crease his own control over the army.B

,The armye psychological warfarebureaue, established in 195? to rectifythe lack of political sophisticationwhich wea felt to have contributed tothe Indochina defeat, were broken upand their functions redistributed toother sections of the general staff andh the civilian administration in Alge-ria. This effectively dispersed thearmys most militant hotbeds of potit-ical activity, many of the leaders ofwhich had played an energetic role inthe January 1960 revolt, laThe militant ideology remained,however, in certain of the troop uniteof the forcee oversees. At the Decem-ber 1960 trial of Colonel Gardes,former Chief of Psychological ActionServices in Algiers, one of the defensewitneesae was the former paratroopc o m m a n d e r in Algeria, GeneralJacques Massu. In eemidefiance of De

Gaulles emerging policies, Massu tes-tified: This war that we didntchoose must be ;ought and won.Thats what were paid for. 10In another reorganisation in March1961, the intelligence function wee re-moved from its association with op-erations in the general staff andplaced in the Ministry of the ArmedForces. Army forces, and those of thenavy and air force, were plsced underfunctionally organized j o i n t com-mands. ~o These reforms, similar toc o n c u r r e n t restructuring in theUnited States by Secretary of DefenseMcNamara, were apparently under-taken for reasons of efficiency. Theirbonus effects in dividing potentialfoci of opposition, h o w e v e r, canhardly have been overlooked.The Putach of April 1961 was, un-like the civilian-initiated disorders of196S end 1960, truly a military re-bellion. The leaders of the f%%chpurported to speak for the army ifiself, en aspect thoroughly discussed

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in subsequent histories of the event.Whet ie parhape not well understoodis that the revolte failure wes due toessentially social factors, end to DeGaullee skillful manipulation of thosefactors.Almost every vested interest in thearmy ostensibly militated in favor ofthe rebels: career opportunities forofficere, an important role for groundforces, a belief that world commu-nism was bebind the native Algerianindependence movement the honorof France, protection of pro-FrenchAlgeriane a n d Europeen settlers(many of them the relatives of Frenchmilitary leaders), the prestige of thearmy, and a teat bad of counterin-surgency theory. z?Against these interests, De Gaulleplayed two trump cards. First, herecognised that the army wee notmonolithi~ but divided among tradi-tiondista, teehnocrate end militate,social groupings roughly correspond-ing to the organizational interests ofthe conventional, nuclear end overseesforcee. z He appealed to the historicsense of duty of the trtiltionalista,offered a vision of the future to thetechnocrats, end-having previouslybroken up certain of their power basesisolated the militante. 2sDe Gaulles second trump wee to ap-peal to the conscript soldiers, whomade up the bulk of most troop unita,over the heads of their lazdere. Therefusal of certain unite to do theircommanders bidding was fatal to thesuccess of the l%%ch , even in Al-giere. 2 4One observer in the tleld of Frenchcivil-military relatione has commente41that a general political lesson can bedrawn from these events: ~. . . t h e modern aide, given a rea-aomibl-s degree of mvilian k.edsrahip

and aoneensus, * in a relatively stroa9

$.position to impose an unpopular mili-ta~ polioy upon even a disaffectedarmy of profeseionda. *6On the contrary, the evidence ap-

peare to indicate that the French caseis unique. Cherlea de Gaulle, under-atending the military mind batterthsp could any other French politician+r any other professional soldier-aaw that the officer corps wee deeplydivided socially, but deaparat.dy enx-ious to preserve ita profeaaional unity.At first accentuating thoee divisiona,he than led the army, se he had per-suaded the entire nation in 1958, torecognize him se ita savior end healer.

When the 1961 Putech wee over, buta year before the wara end, theFrench Government inetitutcd broadmeasures to end tbo armys eocial iao-letion. As fighting wound down, manyunite were brought back to metropoli-tan France, and a number were in-activated. Unita which were consid-ered politically untrustworthy wereselectively removed from the rolls andtheir members reassigned, all withoutpublic announcement. The armys re-maining paratroop regiments weredeghunorized.Among the many Foreign Legionunite inactivated was the elitaat ofthe elite, the First Foreign LegionParachutist Regimentwhose troopehad sung Edith Piafe fmnoue Je neregrette men (1 Regret Nothing) sethey were trucked from Algiers afterthe collapse of the rebellion. eThere was individual, ae well es col-lective, punishment. A High MilitaryTribunal wee firet set up under theBfinietry of Juetice to try rebel o111-cere. When tbie court proved toolenient, as in semtencin.g General

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ARMIESMD SOCIETIES-SRaoul Sakm (who ter escaped end

>headed the terrorist rgeniaetion ofthe Secret Army) ly to life im-prisonment, De Gaul e replaced it witha Military Court of Justice. Thislatter body functioned under the juris-diction of the Minister of the ArmedForces, and ita membere were bend-picked by De Gaulle himself. 27In the end, surprisingly few easeswere tried, reportedly becauee DeGaulle did not wish to sacrifice thearmye beet military talent on thealtar of political justice. 2sThe entire army wee reduced insise from about 700,000 to 450,000, anatural result of diaengagement fromAlgeria. ~ A policy wee announced tQhold the defense budget at about 6.5percent of the gross national productfor the foreseeable future. This pre-saged further cute in ground forces,considering the increased empbeeia onthe etrategic nuclear program and therisiqg. cost of military material ingeneral. mSo large a reduction in manpowerneceeeitated the release of a number

/of career officers end NCOS. Somequit the service in disgust over thegovernments Algerian policy, otberewere let go in lieu of punisbmen~ endstill others were selectively dischargedor retired in a program of quali@uPmedin8. Some retirements were in.spired by special laws to induce of-ficers into early retirement throughextra advantages end offers of posi-tions in the national school eyetem.The propofilon of officers in thearmy rose only from 6,5 percent to6.8 percent, of NCOe (corptwal andbigher) from 80.6 percent to S3 per-C+ 8 1 a low er differential then onenught expect from so large a reduc-tion in forces. The ratio of drafteeato enlisteee in the ranksweeeetoallyraised, a decision dictated by budg-etary eeneiderations end the need toincorporate continued universal con-scription into reduced force levels. Italso had tbe by-product effect of re-minding unreconstructed militanta oftbe role played by conscript in theabortive Putsch. asThe smaller site of the army andthe bigher proportion of conscriptstogether lowered the need for enlist-ments. Nonetheless, out of a require-ment for qualiw enlisteee to handlemodern equipmenk end for reasons ofmorale end equity, the armed forceslaunched a vigorous program of in-creasing eervice attractiveness.soldiers were given higher pay,better barraelw and more free time.Club activities end ePOrtS pm~810Swere expanded es were educational op-portunities end vocational trehing.New restrictions were eat on theauthority of commanders to imposeamnmary punishment. Finally, en at-tempt wee madej albeit Uneuc.cwfulfor leek of funds, to reduce petty fa-tigue details by the increased hiringof civilian workers. m

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As mentioned earlier, military unitehad heen regrouped in 1961 into joint-service functional commande. Thesewere three in number: the StrategicNuclear Force: the Fo~ce of Inter-vention and the Force for the Op-erational Defense of the Territory. 84The organisation and doctrine of thelest were adapted from h gu.errerevolutionnaive of Indochina and Al-geria, but the bu7k of active armyunita was allocated to the second ofthe three commands. 36The eubject of French nuclear pol-icy, an aspect of the post-Algerianperiod which hae received a great dealof a$tention in the United States, canbe viewed in eeveral different ways.The first ie a popular version that the

AuKst1972

force de frappe (and presumably tac-tical nuclear weapone as well) waedeveloped in response to the US ehiftto flexible responee. 36An opposing and equally simplisticview ie that De Gaulle gave the sol-diers a new toy to divide their loy-alties, distract them from their ob-eeeeion with Algeria, and stir theirchauvinistic pride. The fact thatFrench nuclear weapons developmentpreceded US flexible responee castedoubt on the former, and the latterargument must be regarded aa exag-geration. ~7 But there ie en elementof truth in both viewe, in that theFrench, De Gaulle particularly, hadlong deeired a nuclear deterrent inde-pendent of reliance on US power; end,in that, De Gaulle clearly recognizedand exploited the opportunity to main-tain the morale of the army. se

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ARMIES AND SOCIETIES-SA survey made in late 1961 at St.Cyr, the i%ole Pol@echniqwe and theltco.!e NavaU revealed that the servicemotivation of s t u d e n ts was still

largely traditional and nonideological.To increase their palitieel sophistica-tion-but in en acceptable directioncurricula were revised to include moresocial sciences, but 1sss on psycholog-ical warfare. au The curricula werealso expendsd to permit greeter spe-cialization by etudente in reapmse towhet wee called the civilianiaationof officer career patterns. ioIn 1966, a revised cade of militarydiscipline was published. The time-honored injunction to carry out ordereliterally and without hesitation ormurmur was deleted. In its placewee the soldiers obligation to refuseen order illegal under French law orthe Geneva Convention. It was re-ported that the regulation had beanedited by De Gaulle personally. iiThe final chapter in the etory ofDe GauUee relatione with the armyoccurred in May 1968. At the heightof that period of turmoil, Presidentde Gaulle dropped out of eight pre-sumably retreating to his countryeatete. Later, it wee l-mad that hehad gone to the Beden-Oos heedquar-tere of General Jacques Meeeu, thecame whose relief by De Gaulle bedprecipitated the 1960 Algiers revolt,to ascertain the loyalty of army lead-ere in the current crisis. It is rewrtedthat they swore to etand by him sethe constitutional CWlef of State. MArmy trcaps were not needed toeupprese rioting workers and etu-dente, for the national polica werecoping with the eituation and publicopinion was beginnhg to turn againstthe radicals. Whether or not conscripttreape could have bem reliably ueedfor tbie purpose was, therefore, nevert4wted. 4s10

One might infer from the foregoingthat adaptation to eecial change weeimposed upon a grudging army by adomineering leader.. That euch weenot the case may be eeen in a sam-pling of the opinion expressed in pra-feseional military jourmda.There appear to be three broadareze of social concern in Frenchmilitary writing. The first is that ofspecialization in the otticer corps.Writers in the mid-1960s appear tourge the civilian-type training ofmore officers in technical specialties,and even career-long concentration incertain areas of aapertiee. The he-roic leader image is not deprecatedit is, in fec~etiidediced-but thepoint ie made that the bulk of the of-ficer corps is essdiaUy managerialend technical. ~In more r e c e n t years, eeveralwritere (not in sutiicient numbers toconstitute a valid eemple) have ex-pressed a reaction against bureaucra-tization and push-button warfare.One author calls for a return to theold professional solidarity, saying:Militarp unitu is not a fuctoru. Nomore is it an agglomeration of epe-

ciuliste which onc can divide at wiU.It h a col-lcctive being which hue it88 0U1 , i t 8 .!&W8 , ~h k WC8 , a d ~t ehatreds, which one cannot amputatewthew? nur.king it sick. 46The next topic of concern is recruit-ment. Some writers deplore the indi-vidualistic nature of contemporaryyouth, but consider it a proper cbel-Ienge for the prafsaeional soldier tolend end train such young men. *Several etate that the army must rec-ognize that conscription serves pur-PCSSS in addition to recruitment-it

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also edueatee young men for citizen-ship and teachee trades to those whomight not otherwiee be capable ofcompeting in the civilian labor mar-ket. 4 7Of couree, the armY ehould not ad-mit just anyone. Incorrigible delin-quents ehould be semt to come otherform of national eervice, eucb 8s cor-rectional inetitutiona, thue keepingtheir bad influence from types who,although weak, can be helped throughwholesome activity. 4sThe 5al aubjeet area is disciplineand motivation, or, more broadly, thearrnye degree of isolation from eivil-ian social norms. Most military au-thors agree that arbitrary discipline isa thing of the peat and that the re-sulting need for superior leadershipis on balance a good thing for tlieAugcst1072

army. 40But, 8s in the case of apwial-ization, a conservative trend appearsin more recent atilclee. These writerscall for the return of a more automaticform of obedience and view the Armyes the guardian of virtues which eo-ciety has let decay. co One quotaNapoleon: I do not demand blindobedience-except from a soldier. 61So the French Army, like the Ger-man, ahowa a healthy difference ofopinion on the militerya proper de-gree of closeness to its national eo-ciety. Also, like the German Army, itdemonatratee a general willingneee tobe the nations mirror es well es itaservant. But all the while it seeks topreserve those professional attributesof discipline end expertiee which willenable it to defead the nation in timeof peril.

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ARMIES MD Somms-11lCbu lr s A.de Gm Ak .Tde6 dm ot f h e Sword .m be r & m Lt d ., LOldO? I,m a., 1 4 4 0 .E 8 s .*b dfond6, 24 Novembe r lsb i quot ed fnWmmeA. K.AIP, L@. Sdd iuw: Tfw Ik cb An n SfldEm vk n d ) Cr4a iG ZM7-141?9,T h e lS a m u bm uMaIIEJ 4 i4m tad T eeh nok m ~ 4 7m nh ?Miw ,Nan . ,

lees , p 8 6 1 .

,. ~o~ X=* ~ .qd p~ :Fr6n& ~nclear Arsumenf in 4 h 8 Con t a z t ofN a t 4ma t Pd ieu , z#6&.w , Fder & Faber Ltd.,Im n d on , En s ., 1 9 ? 0 .DD 106 -7 ., s ~ ~. ~~~ ArmYand Pcd{tica.

Fran%.hnrnd of Pok$ia,Me.?1 9 6 1 ,D 2 6 6 -7 0 .,* FIu n tm 0 p. m h ,DP 10s-4.%,~~~a~ .. &e&,,, r~ Nm r~kTia8w,ZllJanuary1000,D 8 .,. p&r p a&, F-h h d=~~ Wwfm a

Frcm In doc hin a t o Alge ria . Pm e ge r Pnblinbem.,N. Y., 1964,DP 76 -79 .M Kelly , 0 9 . c i t . , p 2 8 6 .,, p i - M==, 1 7 1 ehwch Mi lt t a r s E s fa b .1 1 .gbm e t itf Tom .a mw. Or bb , Sn mm e r 1 9 6 2 , 92 0 6 .** F7 m lt w , OF. i t ., DD 4 9 -6 7 .,, ~t i ~en w -m e Imckgrouudot F=m.bNIIcIeuPollcY,l.titimal Aflair#,3smsry1 9 6 6 , DD 8 ~~6 .~ WalterKerr,%e FrenchAnuP{n1%.ble,ForeignAfl.im October961 ,r .DS 9 -94 .m p bu ip M. w n lh m and ? dm t t n Ifm fs on .Pd 4t ies a nd Soekt#6nDe Gd&a R ewbl ic, Lm m -m u , London , Ens., 1071,D 16 6.s . ~~~ D. Cm m e r , +r em b ArUIY: ~m

obedIenm t o Imumeetion: Wm fd Pd i t iu , JdY1 96 7,P 6 90 .S *Kd lP, OF . c it ., D 8 26 ., , W- -d ffr+r rk n , OP. t i t . , PB Z6&66 .** fim t i, Og. -.4 . , pp 2 9 4 .9 s .** M-ep , op . + pp 2 0 s -1 6 .*OIbkL , pp 297 . 9 .*, f b4 i, DD 2 0 S.1 6 .* NonrAd. S4 m X %Nlit a r# s Ideo lodu l Cbs I-Ie n se t o Civ iUm Au t fIo ri t ? in Post-WorldWarIIFrame,Orti, SummerIU08,m 601-%12

3SFWIIfM, W. ek, W 166-?% !S4%W F. Obr fd, T4u,?FMisat lo I I o f GM Fm meb,Arm ed Fon xs , MUNW 9 R5 d6 m s Na p 1 94 7. 9D;06 -70 .

- Medl, Ddm rmw ad Pem usd an , OF. cit .,DD 110 -16.*$ Fw rd w , Gv. IA% Q9 1 72 -7 7 .. . J ob= s. t ibk . !p& FTEUCA Amw i . Pdi t 4a,

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.4 @~~ & ~~, .Mf4 6 t i fill% ek! f &m rzw L Arm 4e. N um ber s4, J UYJ UY 1064, P 4%Gen d L . J . L e Pn k b, .Am ir & i Arm4e &T# mw m6 An #d &b Nu mber 8 8 , WY 1 S 84 ED 1 4 -*,A WOFM & In ,6bm w dud vica m 44i toim ,, l tm w & D6 fm s e Na t km a k ,F ebr ur m 1 9 64 ,P 1 9 8 .*S blo nd Pr cm d hm n . An fhm y Io d, LArm 68,N um ber 8S , J u n e 1 99 9,D 4 1. A sim i lar v iew isexmessd by Ch ef d. Kation E. Ws lt e r, No t reEntiti: R- daD6 fm Ndm ak . bfw1 97 0 , R 7 98 .

*.BI=, OIL ON-, D6 % Insmcteur @?~* del-Adm i n iIt I=t km J e an P iz u t d , J m i n e u o t n n d a Pt 4 ac : D4@8.+;, R am w & D6fm w N a t4m d% No-V-k 1 9 6 d , DP 1 s0 6 -8 .,0 ~ fl~, op . c it ., BP 4 8-4 5.Ch ef d ,IMm dm n sz . ~ p~n . , ,L,A* fm m a&, * & r .-

F4WU. 9 : L Arm 68, N um ber 62, N owm ber l%$b,9X! ~~ x .x .% h . ld f .

mtwy Iwvlew