Tbe French dt

Effo,t t o Block Gmibddi the Strdit-., 1860

-%sad

RAYMOND CUMMINGS * NE of the principles which Napoleon 111 professed to embrace during the turbulent days of Garibaldi’s adven- ture in southern Italy in 1860 was the p r inc ip l e of nonintervention. Under the guidance of Prime Minister

Viscount Palmerston arid Foreign Minister Lord John Russell, the British had also come forward in favor of permitting the Italians to arrange their own affairs and, at the beginning of 1860, had evoked from the new French foreign minister, Edouard Thouvenel, the statement that “in our thoughts, it [noninterven- tion] forms one of the most essential elements for any serious and definitive settlement of the Italian question. . . . I have told Lord Cowley that His Majesty’s government adheres to it without reserve.“ *

The French government was especially anxious to have Austria adhere to this principle, if not formally, at least in practice. For quite different reasons from those of England, Austria did refrain from interfering in Italy in 1860. There is considerable contro- versy, however, concerning the role played by France. During the summer of 1860, Napoleon I11 not only exerted himself diplomatically to arrange an alliance between Sardinia and Naples (his famous “mediation” effort),2 but he also proposed to the English joint Anglo-French naval action at the Straits of Messina to block Garibaldi’s anticipated thrust from Sicily to the main- land. Then, incongruously, he despatched, close on the heels of this proposal, a letter to Jean Victor Fialin, the Duc de Persigny, the French ambassador at London, instructing him to inform the English leaders that he desired that Italy be pacified, “no matter how, provided that I am able to leave Rome and that all

0

* The author is Associate Professor of History at Villanova University. IThouvenel to Persigny, Paris, 30 Jan. 1860, France, “Annexion de l’ltalie

Centrale,” Documents diplomatiques {Liwes James) (hereafter cited as LJ), (Paris. 1861), I, 4. Lord Henry Cowley was the British ambassador at Paris.

*See Charles Pouthas, “La mediation de Napoleon 111 entre le roi de Naples, les Siciles, et le gouvernement pitmontais, mai-aoat, 1860,” Russegna sturica del Risorgimento, X M I X (1952), 772.

21 1

The Historian foreign intervention is avoided. . . .”a

A goodly number of historians have accepted at face value Napoleon’s proposal of 24 July for naval action at the Straits.4 Though it appeared to be a departure from nonintervention it was in harmony with the Emperor’s alleged opposition to Italian unity and with his sensitivity toward conservative and Catholic concern for the temporal power of the pope. Others, however, have looked upon the proposal as a ruse, a maneuver to throw dust in the eyes of those opposed to the Italian national move- ment. The Austrian ambassador at Paris, Prince Richard von Metternich, engaged in a ceaseless effort to plumb the mysteries of the imperial “sphinx,” immediately questioned the sincerity of the French proposal. He knew, he said, the “old tactic of the French cabinet, which consists in entrenching itself behind English opposition against every measure of repression in Italy.” The Neapolitan minister of the Interior, Liborio Romano, who was himself skilled in all the techniques of dissimulation, flatly asserts in his memoirs that the French offered their fleet, on condition that the English join in, with the knowledge that England was adverse to any intervention whatsoever. Romano’s statement is quoted approvingly by the Italian historian, Matteo Mazziotti, who thinks that Napoleon advanced the proposal simply to mollify the Russians, confident all the while that the English would turn it down.7 Maria Avetta, in an article in the Rasegnu storica deZ Risorgimento, argues that “at no moment did France and Naples have a foundation for deluding themselves that they could succeed in persuading it [England].” * More recently Jacques Godechot has cast doubt upon the sincerity of the French proposal.

*Napoleon to Penigny, copy, St. Cloud, 25 July 1860, London, Public Record Office MSS, Russell Papen (hereafter cited as PRO RP), 30/22/54.

‘George M. Trevelyan, Caribaldi and the Making of Italy (London, 1911), 1% William R. Thayer. The Life and Times of Cavour (Boston, 1911), 11, 338; Pierre de La Gorce. Histoire du Second Empire (Paris, 1894-1905), 111, 393; Arthur Whyte, The Political Life and Letters of Cavour, 1848-1861 (London, 1930), 412.

Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, 20 Aug. 1860, Vienna, Haus-, Hof-. und Staatsarchiv MSS (hereafter cited as HHSA), PA IX, Frankreich, VI-X, 366, no. 54B.

Liborio Romano, Memorie Politiche di Liborio Romano (Naples, 1873), 57. TMatteo Mazzioti, Napoleone I I f e l’ltalia (Milan, 1925), 202.

Maria Avetta, “Studi Cavouriani I: Una ‘vexata quaestio’ alle luce dei carteggi cavouriani,” Rasregna storica del Risorgimento, XXI (1) (1934), 53.

’Jaques Godechot. “La France et la kvknements italiens de 1860,” Atti del XXXIX congress0 di stmica del risorgn’mento italiano (1960), ed. Istituto Per Storia Del Risorgimento Italian0 (Rome, 1961), 567-409. Codechot’s provocative paper deals with the entire question of Napoleon’s attitude towards Italian unity. The discussion it sparked at the congress ie recorded directly after the article. Godechot.

212

The French, Garibaldi, and the Straits In re-examining this problem it is necessary to consider the

drift of Napoleon’s thinking during the month of July and the circumstances immediately preceding both the proposal of the 24th and the startling letter of the 25th. The starting point, indeed, must be the mediation effort already noted. Prodded by the French minister at Naples, Baron Alexandre Henri de Brenier, and beset by insistent Neapolitan pleas for help, Napoleon had informed the harried Bourbons that he could support an effort to end the hostilities in southern Italy only if they adopted a truly liberal and national policy. This would require the grant of separate constitutions for Naples and Sicily, at least autonomy for Sicily, and an alliance with Piedmont. After prolonged and painful soul-searching, Francis I1 of the Two Sicilies finally steeled himself to swallow this formidable dose. On 25 June, he literally transformed his regime and his foreign policy in accord with French advice. The imperial government thus entered the month of July with a heavy moral burden imposed upon it because of the truly dramatic change which had just taken place at Naples, the responsibility for which was largely French. Napoleon was now obligated to take some steps to support the new regime, if only for the sake of appearance.

Conservative alarm over events in Italy and conservative suspicion of France reinforced the French sense of obligation towards Francis 11. Indifference toward the fate of the Neapolitan king would be more than morally questionable; it would be materially dangerous, for it could lead to French isolation. The day after Francis I1 changed course, the Russian ambassador at Paris, Count Paul Kisselev, formally proposed that France and Russia take naval action to prevent further reinforcements from reaching Garibaldi. Metternich lent Austria’s support to this idea, while reports from Berlin informed the French that Prussia was seriously preoccupied by the threat Garibaldi posed in southern Italy. l1

in essence, argues that Napoleon would never have allowed the French press to demonstrate the pro-Garibaldian sentiments that it did, if he had been sincerely trying to stop him or sincerely opposed to Italian unity.

lo The first communication on the Russian suggestion came from the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, Napoleon Auguste Lannes, the Duc de Montebello, in a despatch dated I3 June (Montebello to Thouvenel, telegram, St. Petersburg, I3 June 1860, Paris, Archives du MinistCre des Affaires ttrangkres MSS, Correspon- dence politique [hereafter cited as AMAE CP], Russie, 221: 181 and ibid., despatch no, 47, fol. 185). See also extracts of a despatch from Prince Aleksander Gorchakov, the Russian foreign minister, to Kisselev, St. Petersburg, no date given, AMAE. Memoires et Documents, Papiers Thouvenel, XIV. 80. Kiaselev read these instruc- tions to Thouvenel on 26 June.

llCowley to Russell, 26 June, PRO RP 30/22/54; La Tour d’Auvergne to Thouvenel, 24 June 1860, AMAE CP, Prusse, 336: 189, no. 77.

213

The Historian Although the French government rejected Russia’s plan for

blocking reinforcements to Garibaldi, its efforts to induce Sardinia to control Garibaldi and to agree to an alliance with the reformed Bourbon regime reached a high level of intensity by mid-July. Thouvenel’s despatches to Turin were so sharply worded that Professor Charles Pouthas calls the French warnings “thinly veiled menaces” and asserts that French policy was now “clearly deter- mined and affirmed.”’* Officially it was, but the Emperor’s rather obvious indulgence toward the ultimate objectives of the Italian nationalists drew much of the sting from Thouvenel’s words. While expressing gratitude to Victor Emmanuel I1 for the cession of Nice and Savoy, Napoleon had advised in a letter written at the end of June: “For the moment it would be to your advantage to come to an understanding with the King of Naples while imposing your conditions upon him, which he is entirely ready to accept.”lS But far more important was his famous secret conversation at St. Cloud on 13 July with Count Costantino Nigra, Piedmont’s minister at Paris.

After chiding the Piedmontese severely and complaining that “I have to defend you constantly before the cabinets and . . . carry somewhat the burden of your mistakes,” Napoleon confessed:

I do not like the Bourbons of Naples. They have never listened to me. The pope, for his part, has lost my sympathies, if he ever had them. But no one must come to believe for an instant that we are working for the overthrow of the thrones of Naples and Rome. I do not think that the King of Naples is going to be able to preserve his kingdom for long. But it must fall and break down under the weight of opinion within the country itself. You must know how to wait.

The Emperor then revealed his innermost thought, which gave meaning and a certain underlying consistency to his entire Italian policy:

I am not opposed, in principle, to Italian unity. But I believe the task is beyond your forces. Munici a1 traditions have put

Florence, at Bologna there is a good deal of discontent against you and your txoops.14

“Pouthas. “La mkdiation de Napoleon 111,” 772. -Napoleon I11 to Victor Emmanuel, circa 30 June 1860, ZL carteggio Cavour-

Nigra dal I858 a1 1861 (Bologna, 1946) (hereafter cited as CCN), XV, 49, no. 934 (author’s italics).

I’Nigra to Cavour, Paris, 13 July 1860, CCN, IV, 75-76, no. 966 (no. 56). Throughout this article, when referring to printed correspondence, a despatch number enclosed in parenthesee refers to the number given to the despatch by the diplomat who wrote it.

214

down deep roots in your country. I K ear that at Milan, at

The French, Garibaldi, and the Straits Regardless of the maxim that a sovereign state never desires

that a great power arise along its frontiers, Napoleon’s words and actions do not warrant the conclusion that the prospect of a united Italy really frightened him. Whatever qualms he may have had on the subject were laid to rest by the Treaty of Turin, which, by enabling France to annex Nice and Savoy, gave it its natural frontier in the southeast. Napoleon did not oppose Italian unity, except for Rome, but he preferred unity in the form of a confederation, both because he believed i t far more practical than a centralized state, concerning the durability of which he had genuine misgivings, and because the process of creating a centralized state would stir up all sorts of inconveniences.

When questioned by Nigra about the concrete problem which was confronting the Piedmontese - what to reply to Neopolitan alliance overtures - Napoleon advised: “In the place of Count Cavour I would declare publicly that Piedmont, having the pro- tection of Italian independence at heart, accepts with pleasure the co-operation of the king of Naples to obtain this result.” There would be conditions. In the name of humanity there should be a truce, to endure until the Sicilians had decided their fate. The Neapolitan king should join with Piedmont to obtain reforms from the Pope, but there should be no mention of a vicariate over his territory, such as the Sardinean prime minister, Count Camillo di Cavour, desired. As a result, Napoleon asserted:

Either the King of Naples would act in good faith and you would work together to make Italy, or he would not accept your propositions, he would act in bad faith and you would be in a finer position. In sum, it is a question of puttin

believe almost impossible for him. But if by chance he acts with good faith and perseverance in favor of Italian indepen- dence, you must accept his co-operation in all good faith. It is neither Piedmont nor France which should depose the King of Naples but his own parliament and people. If the King of Naples falls under his own weight, if Sicily votes annexation, if Umbria and the Marches do the same, one will see. But know how to wait. Avoid being accused of covetousness and bad faith.15 Napoleon’s advice was in general the same as that of his foreign

minister, but, though most of the notes were the same, the tune was different. Both urged a truce as an essent ia l first step. Napoleon, like Thouvenel, denied the practicality of “Italy under Victor Emmanuel.” The tolerance and sympathy of the one, however, contrasted sharply with the insistent tone employed by

of Naples in the wrong by submitting him to pro0 P s the which king I

Ibid., 76-77.

215

The Historian the other in his despatches and conversation. It was evident from Napoleon’s words that, though he might lecture and fret, he was by no means unalterably opposed to the creation of a Sardinian dominated Italian kingdom and would not decisively break with Turin as long as appearances were saved.

Meanwhile Thouvenel’s efforts in behalf of the Neapolitan kingdom did not slacken. He showed considerable irritation towards the English for refusing to associate themselves with his policy.16 At the same time his pressure upon Turin led Cavour to complain that the foreign minister’s strictures were ricocheting off the French ambassador, Baron Charles de Talleyrand, and falling upon him. l7 Thouvenel’s action led many of the diplomats at Paris to conclude that the French were sincerely anxious to see a confederation established, a belief further encouraged by imperial interviews and by the official journals. I*

The Emperor spoke freely of his expectations that the split between the moderate and radical nationalists would plunge Italy into chaos and of his hope that a federal system would eventually emerge.l0 This was not in contradiction with what he had said to Nigra, but, when talking to others, he was more guarded in displaying his Italian sympathies and more emphatic in expressing his belief that Victor Emmanuel could not control the entire peninsula.

In the past the representatives of the conservative powers had had reason to complain that the pro-Italian line of a great part of the French press contradicted the soothing words of assurance which they heard from Napoleon and his ministers. They would have reason to complain again. As Godechot emphasizes, Napoleon apparently made no effort to muzzle pro-Garibaldian

mCowley to Russell, Paris, 17 July 1860. PRO FO 27/1342, no. 915. 17Thouvenel to Talleyrand, 18 July 1860, AMAE CP, Sardaigne, 350: 61, no.

350; Cavour to Nigra, Turin, 18 July 1860, CCN, IV, 86, no. 979. * Nicomede Bianchi, Storia documenta della diplomazia europea in Italia

dall’anno 1814-1861 (Turin, 1865-1872), VII, 419; Alfred0 Zazo, La politica estera del Regno delle Due Sicilie nel 1859-60 (Naples, 1940), 375, n. 2; Antonini to De Martino, Paris, 13 July 1860, La liberatione del Mezzogiorno e la formatione del Regno d’ltalia: carteggio di Camillo Cavour con Villamarina, Scialoji, Cardoua, Farini, ecc., ed. Commissione Reale Editrice (hereafter cited as Mezrogiorno} (Bologna, 1929)’ I, 287, n. 1 (no. 157); P. Pietri Pirri, Pi0 ZX e Vittorio Emmanuele ZZ dal lor0 carteggio privato: La Questione Romana, Part I (“Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae,” Vol. XVI, no. 49). (Rome, 1951), 280.

19 Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, 9 July 1860, HHSA PA IX. Frankreich, VI-X, 175-179, no. 45A; Pourtales to Schleinitz, 6 July 1860, Die auswurtige Politik Preufsens, 1858-1871 (hereaEter cited as APP}, ed. Historischen Reichskommission (Oldenburg, 1933-1939), I1 (l), 523, no. 211, n. 2; Cowley to Russell, Paris, 13 July 1860, PRO FO 519/227; 214-215; Bach to Rechberg, Rome. 13 July 1860, HHSA PA XI, Vatikan, I-IX, 604-605, no. 28; ibid., 20 July, fol. 630, no. 29D.

216

The French, Garibaldi, and the Straits sentiments in France. But during July, a noticeable shift, less favorable to Garibaldi, took place.20 No shift, it is true, took place in the French policy of selling arms to Sardinia, the orders for which had been placed in the spring and early summer. Yet if the conservatives could lament that French arms were strength- ening the national cause and French ships were helping to trans- port supplies to the Red Shirts, Garibaldi and his friends did not have far to look for causes of complaint either. Paris permitted the Neapolitans to rent an entire squadron of French transport ships. Indeed, in mid-July Thouvenel approved naval orders directing French warships in Sicilian waters to protect the leased vessels from attack. Both sides in the struggle were able to obtain indirect material support from France during most of 1860.

During the last two weeks of July the Italian situation rapidly moved toward a climax. On the 16th two special envoys of the liberal Neapolitan government, Giovanni Manno and Antonio Winspeare, arrived in Turin to negotiate an alliance with Pied- mont. They were prepared to accept almost any demand Cavour might make.23 Brenier, the French minister at Naples, wrote that the fate of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was in Cavour’s hands.24 The very day of their arrival in Turin, August0 La Greca, another special Neapolitan envoy, arrived in Paris to solicit support for the alliance negotiations which were about to begin. His appearance coincided with news of a reactionary disturbance in Naples, but this handicap quickly turned to La Greca’s advantage, for reports from home revealed that the rioting had

See Mariano Gabriele, Da Marsala allo Stretti: aspetti navali della campagna di Sicilia (Milan, 1961), 223, 225-226. On July 8 an article favoring a federal solution for Italy appeared in the Pays. On the 11th the Constitutionnel urged a confederation of Italian states. “Well informed sources” had it that the latter article was written in the private secretariat of the emperor (Pirri, Pi0 ZX e Vittorio Emmanuele II , 280).

Gabriele, Da Marsala allo Stretti, 223-225. The French government appeared disturbed by the pro-Garibaldian activity of various French ships, but though it interfered to stop it, it did not take strong enough action to bring it to a halt (Ferdinand Boyer, “La Marine franqaise et Garibaldi [mai-aoht],” Archivio stork0 messinese, series 9, IX-X [1957-591, 19-30). See also by Boyer, “Armes et munitions vendues en 1860 par Napoleon 111 B Victor Emmanuel 11,” Revue d‘histoirc moderne et contemporaine, IX (July-Sept. 1962). 21 1-218 and “Les activith pro-Garibaldiennes en Toscane (1860);’ Revue d‘histoire diplomatique, LXXV Uan.-Mar. 1961), 25-41.

=Admiral Le Barbier de Tinan to the minister of the marine, Naples, 24 July 1860, Paris, Archives Nationales, Fonds de la Marine MSS, BB4, 784: 40, no. 158. In this despatch the admiral refers to a note from Thouvenel, written around 17 July, supporting his (the admiral’s) orders to protect the ships.

P Brenier to Thouvenel, Naples, 14 July 1860, LJ, I, 152; Villamarina to Cavour. Naples, 16 July 1860, Meuogiorno, I, 337 (no. 24).

p4 Brenier to Thouvenel, Naples, 14 July 1860, AMAE CP, Naples, 193: 295-296, no. 64.

217

The Historian an encouraging aftermath. Francis I1 admonished the soldiers responsible for the incident, the ministry shifted in a more liberal direction, and the government organized a national guard which seemed to have a certain amount of popular support.26 Most dramatically of all, the Bourbon regime was soon to announce its intention to abandon Sicily. Even before this happened, however, Nigra, the Piedmontese minister at Paris, detected an altering in the attitude of the French leaders.

Nigra, who was quick to note every indication of indulgence for Sardinia , who had seen such indulgence overcome the Emperor’s irritation with Cavour’s policy in their conversation of only a week before, now perceived that the wind at Paris was blowing in a less favorable direction. On 20 July, he warned Cavour:

There is here at this moment a kind of very pronounced reaction . . . against us and in favor of the Neapolitans. Thouvenel’s language, without ceasing to be very proper and even friendly, at least with me, is very recise and very decided in favor of an entente with Naples. %he Marquis La Greca made a ood enough impression. They are dreaming [here]

Marches to the King of Naples under the form of a vicariate, would be in the middle. I know from Mocquard26 that this reaction really exists at the Tuileries and that the emperor, very embarrassed, not wanting to break with Russia and on the other hand not wanting to go against public opinion in Italy, flatters himself that the king of Naples will end up by ins iring

will be possible. La Greca appears pre-occupied with only one thing: Garibaldi. In effect that is the question. . . . The influence of Walewski at the Tuileries is visible.27

of two a H lied Italian kingdoms. The pope, having ceded the

confidence in his people and that thus an entente with Pie 1 mont

Three days after writing this despatch, Nigra was informing Cavour: “Thouvenel is more Neapo l i t an than ever at this moment. The entente with Austria no longer leaves anything to be desired.” 28

ss La Greca to De Martino, 20 July 1860, Meuogimno, V, 202 (no. 2); H. Ramsen Whitehouse, T h e Collapse of the Kingdom of Naples (N. Y., 1899), 253.

e‘ Jean Mocquard. an active propagandist for the imperial cause, became Napoleon’s private secretary in 1848. When Napoleon was elected president, Mocquard became his chief of bureau, a post which he retained under the Empire until his death in 1864.

“Nigra to Cavour, Paris, 20 July 1860, CCN, IV, 90, no. 984 (no. 60) (author’s italics). Count Alexander Walewski was associated with a pro-Austrian policy. Replaced as foreign minister of France by Thouvenel in Jan. 1860, he was to be appointed a minister of state in November.

“Nigra to Cavour, Paris, 25 July 1860. ibid., 101, no. 996 (no. 61).

218

The French, Garibaldi, and the Straits Nigra believed that Thouvenel had found out about his secret

conversation of 13 July with Napoleon and was angered by it. Despite the difficulties of the situation, the Italian diplomat remained confident that the national movement would triumph, but his confidence was not based upon anything concrete which he was then observing at Paris. Rather it was based upon intuition, faith, and experience. Nigra was relying in part upon the unexpected, the mistakes of Sardinia’s opponents. Thouvenel’s “Neapolitan sympathies,” he felt, would soon give way to others, because the French foreign minister was “too intelligent” for it to be otherwise.2s On 27 July, Nigra was still r epor t ing disturbing news - “the reaction in favor of Naples . . . is indeed real” - but was still able to find a silver lining - “it [the reaction] exists only in official circles.”30

The Sardinian envoy‘s warnings found their confirmation in the despatches which Thouvenel now sent out to Turin, London, and Naples. I t was obvious that the French foreign minister felt that the moment was critical. If the Neapolitan kingdom were to be saved, this was the time to act, now, while there was still the opportunity to do so, when the liberal regime was giving at least faint signs that it was really alive, not stillborn, and before Garibaldi crossed the Straits. The day on which he last saw La Greca, the 20th, Thouvenel wired Talleyrand:

The language of La Greca with regard to Italian national ideas leaves nothing to be desired and confirms that of Manna. Profit by his [Manna’s good impression upon Cavour to recommend

and Leghorn. That is essential. The pu lic spirit at Naples appears to be very good. 31

T h e French foreign minister also forwarded to Talleyrand a very important despatch which he had just written to Persigny at London. In addition to urging, as he had been, that the European states agree to favor the negotiations being attempted at Turin, Thouvenel advocated something pressed upon him by La Greca - a six months’ truce in Sicily guaranteed by the great powers. Persigny was instructed to “insist vigorously . . . upon the necessity of an entente whose immediate effect would be to halt the hostilities without compromising the future.’’ 32

Though La Greca undoubtedly played a role in stiffening

E a truce and to o b tain the suspension of de artures from Genoa

111 Ib id . =Nigra to Cavour, Paris, 27 July 1860, ibid., 109, no. 1008 (no. 62). si Thoucenel to Talleyrand, Paris, 20 July 1860. AMAE CP, Sardaigne, 350: 63. “Thouvenel to Persigny, Paris, 21 July 1860, AMAE CP, Angleterre, 717:

238-240, no. 115.

219

The Historian French opposition to the progress of revolution in Italy, it would be attributing too much to the Neapolitan envoy’s diplomatic skill to credit this exclusively to his efforts. The Prussians and the Russians had been nudging France in the same direction at the very time La Greca was carrying out his activities in Paris. Kisselev, the Russian ambassador at Paris, had handed the French minister a despatch from Foreign Minister Prince Aleksander Gorchakov vigorously urging great power pressure upon the Sardinian government in the interest of a truce and an alliance. 83

The crucial moment for action had arrived, for the alliance negotiations at Turin were just getting under way.

In view of the somewhat encouraging turn which the news from Naples had taken, there were grounds, if not for optimism, at least for less pessimism, concerning the possibility of the Neapolitan regime surviving and taking its place in a liberal Italian confederation. The greatest obstacle to this happy solution of the Italian question appeared to be Garibaldi. Napoleon and his ministers had additional cause for regarding Garibaldi’s glamorous exploits with dismay since the leader of the Red Shirts made no secret of his hostility towards Francesa4 If Turin could stop him it would save France, Europe, and, one could easily reason, Italy itself many headaches. Thouvenel gathered from the language of one of Garibaldi’s representatives in Paris that the Sicilians had little sympathy for their liberator and that they followed him only because they had no other leader.85

I t was just at the time when Paris was coming to take a dimmer view of Garibaldi, that news arrived of his success at Milazzo on 20 July. Once again a Neapolitan setback encouraged greater optimism, however, for news of Garibaldi’s victory was accompanied by Bourbon declarations that the royal troops were now to be evacuated from Sicily.86 Thouvenel welcomed these declarations, for he judged that successful negotiations between

“Thouvenel to Montebello, Paris, 18 July 1860. AMAE CP, Russie, 221: 240, no. 86; Montebello to Thouvenel, St. Petersburg, 19 July 1860, ibid., fol. 253, no. 57. See also Sauli to Cavour, St. Petersburg, 17 July 1860, Meuogiorno, I, 346.

IM Mazziotti, Napoleone XXX, 217. -Cowley to Russell, Paris, 19 July 1860, PRO RP, 30/22/55. aa These declarations were somewhat ambiguous, for whereas the Bourbon

government sometimes gave the impression it would order speedy evacuation without posing conditions, it also declared its intention to leave Sicily “provided Garibaldi be required to cease all hostilities against us” (author’s italics: see Elliot to Russell, Naples, 21 July 1860, PRO FO 20/318, no. 388; Szechenyi to Rechberg, telegram, Naples, 22 July 1860, HHSA PA XI, Neapel, 1-IX, 525, no. 22; De Martino to Brenier, Naples, 22 July 1860, Alfred0 Zazo, Ricerchc e storin’ [Benevento, 19331, 11, 283; Villamarina to Cavour, Naples, 21 July 1860, Mezzogiorno, I, 357).

220

The French, Garibaldi, and the Straits Turin and Naples were impossible as long as hostilities were taking place on the island. Now they were to cease by virtue of the fact that Garibaldi would have practically no enemy forces to fight.37 The most pressing and immediate problem, therefore, became the problem of preventing hostilities from spreading to the mainland. Garibaldi had to be persuaded or forced to stop at the Straits.

There was a slim possibility that Turin might control the obstinate leader of the Red Shirts. Francis 11’s sudden apparent willingness to give up an island to save the continental part of his kingdom intensified the problems of a much harrassed Cavour, who was now being pressed by all of the diplomats at Turin (save the English) to agree to a truce. The Sardinian prime minister particularly complained of Talleyrand - “Talleyrand has turned sour, he has passed to the state of strong On 22 July, just two days after Milazzo, the ministers of Victor Emmanuel advised him to write a letter to Garibaldi asking him not to attack the Neapolitan mainland.

Talleyrand had his doubts as to the sincerity of this move (as have historians) and was positive that it did not mean that Turin was now about to execute a volte-face and ally with the newly born liberal Neapolitan regime, 39 as France and the three Eastern powers had been urging. He did believe, however, that Cavour favored a guaranteed truce in the south, and for the very good reason that Cavour misled him into believing it.

On 23 July the French minister communicated to Cavour Thouvenel’s proposal to the English that they join France in guaranteeing a six month armistice in southern Italy. To take an open stand against a proposal upon which the French were energetically insisting would only add tension to the already strained relations between Paris and Turin. Cavour, therefore, determined to work against the proposal, while appearing to view it benignly.40 He informed Talleyrand that the idea of a six month armistice, guaranteed by the powers, was appealing to him, especially since the Neapolitan evacuation of Sicily. Still,

mCowley to Russell, Paris, 22 July 1860, PRO FO 27/1342, no. 942. Cavour to Emmanuel d’Azeglio, Turin, 22 July 1860, Camillo Benso di Cavour,

Cavour e l’lnghiltewa, carteggio con V . E. d’Azeglio (hereafter cited as CCZ), ed. Commissione Reale Editrice (Bologna: 1933), 11 (2). 102, no. 1185.

Talleyrand called Victor Emmanuel’s letter an “apparent” concession (Talley- rand to Thouvenel, Turin, 22 July 1860, AMAE CP, Sardaigne, 350: 67).

“Cavour to Nigra, 23 July 1860, CCN, IV. no. 995; Talleyrand to Cavour. 24 July 1860, ibid., 102, no. 999: Cavour to Talleyrand, 24 July 1860, ibid., no, 1ooO; Cavour to Azeglio, Turin, CCZ, I1 (2), 108, no. 1193; Cavour to Azeglio. Turin, CCZ, I1 (2), 106, no. 1189.

22 1

The Historian he said, he could not judge the merits of the proposal until Garibaldi, who was its principal stumbling block, had answered the king’s letter, In telegraphing this reply to Paris, Talleyrand, with rare (and mistaken) optimism, added at the bottom of his despatch: “I believe that Count Cavour would be pleased to see England rally frankly to your advice.” 41

Just two hours and five minutes after Talleyrand’s telegram had arrived at the Quai d’Orsay, Thouvenel wired back that, if Cavour favored a guaranteed truce, it was “completely necessary and urgent” that he say it clearly at London.42 London’s attitude was crucial, for the moment of decision seemed at hand. Brenier had just telegraphed that “if Piedmont does not conclude the alliance without delay, the final dhouement cannot be far away,’’43 The French envoy asked for instructions in case the king left Naples.44 At the same time the Neapolitan government was again formally asking for mediation46 - “positive mediation, not only in our interests, but to stop Garibaldi who represents revolu- tion throughout Italy, . . .” I6 This mediation, the Neapolitans insisted, would help to assure the success of the negotiations taking place at Turin. They made their request not only through Brenier, but also through the representative of the Two Sicilies at Paris, who submitted an appeal for French mediation to Thouvenel on 24

French efforts to stabilize the situation in Italy now reached their highest plateau. Thouvenel again sought English co-opera- tion with a telegram to Persigny stating: “The royal troops are evacuating Messina and at Naples they fear an immediate attack by Garibaldi. Referring to my last instructions insist again that England ascribe to the prompt establishment of a six month truce guaranteed by the powers. Cavozir appears to favor this corn binat ion.” 48

Yet all negotiations for an armistice would end in frustration if Garibaldi attacked immediately, as it seemed so likely he would. T o succeed the mediation would have to be armed. England

Talleyrand to Thouvenel, telegram, Turin, 23 July 1860, AMAE CP, Sardaigne, 350: 68.

UThouvenel to Talleyrand, telegram, Turin, 23 July 1860, ibid. “As cited in Pouthas, “La maiation de NapolQn 111,” 776. a Ibid. &Brenier to Thouvenel, telegram, 7:OO A.M., Naples, 23 July 1860, AMAE CP,

“De Martino to Brenier, Naples, 22 July 1869, Zazo, Ricerche, 11, 285-284

“Antonini to Thouvenel, Naples, 24 July 1860, AMAE CP, Naplcs, 193: 355. Thouvenel to Peraigny, Paris, 24 July 1860, ibid., Angleterre, 717: 255 (author’s

Naples, 193: 351.

(author’s italics).

italics).

222

The French, Garibaldi, and the Straits and France would have to attempt to end the hostilities as they had attempted to end them in Greece in 1827 -with naval power. Militarily the Straits of Messina and Garibaldi posed far fewer problems than Morea and the Turco-Egyptians.

It so happened that on the morning of 24 July the English foreign minister, Russell, furnished Thouvenel with an unex- pectedly opportune point of departure for a proposal for armed mediation in southern Italy. The English ambassador, Lord Henry CowIey, presented Thouvenel with a despatch from Russell containing a copy of a purported secret treaty between France and Sardinia. Once again London was obsessed with fear that Cavour had agreed to cede land to Napoleon I11 in return for permission to annex Neapolitan territory. Thouvenel solemnly assured Cowley that the treaty was a forgery and then listened with interest to an explanation of the English government’s atti- tude toward the Neapolitan problem. Russell admitted in his despatch that the expeditions launched from Sardinian territory against a neighboring state placed the Turin cabinet in an embarrassing position and that the “duties of amity” required their discontinuance. England, Russell continued, had “no wish to see the crown of the Two Sicilies on the head of the King of Sardinia.” Yet, despite their preference for the preservation of the Bourbon regime, it was not the prospect of a unitary Italy which really alarmed the English ministers. Their particular nightmare was that events in Italy might touch off a general European war. If the national movement triumphed in the south it might turn north against the Austrians in Venetia. The French could prevent this, Russell asserted, if they deprived Sardinia of all hope of French assistance. *13

Thouvenel later told La Greca that it was in consequence of this explanation of English fears that he wrote his famous letter of 24 July to Persigny.60 Indeed, he introduced the important proposal which he made in this despatch with a short recapitula- tion of English desires and concern regarding Italy as Russell had presented them. He agreed that the real danger of the situation was an Austro-Italian war but was not as sanguine as Russell that the national tide could be halted along the border of Venetia at the last moment simply by a declaration to the aroused Italians that they could expect no help from France.

‘*Russell to Cowley, FO, 25 July 1860, PRO FO 146/904, no. 719; Derek Beales, England and Italy, 1859-60 (London, 1961), 147, 152. See also Avetta, “Studi Cavouriani I,” 59-60.

WLa Greca to De Martino, Paris, 5 Aug. 1860, Mezwgiorno, V, Appendix IV, 216, no. 212 (no. 10).

223

The Historian The imperial government, he believed, had already dissociated itself from Sardinia’s policy.

The situation had deteriorated, Thouvenel declared, since the truce proposal had been made. Neapolitan troops were evacuating Sicily; a strike against the mainland was expected; alarm was rampant at Naples. The question was this:

Is it expedient for France and England to be entirely passive witnesses of events calculated to produce the most serious results on European order, to permit aggressions by an army composed of revolutionary and foreign elements, on a country with which we maintain regular relations, in a word, to allow the inter- vention of violence to make void the constitutional test to which King Francis I1 has loyally subjected himself? The Government of the Emperor thinks their passive attitude would benefit neither the interests nor the dignity of either France or England, and I have said to Lord Cowle that it would seem desirable to

our naval forces should be authorized to tell Garibaldi that they have received orders to prevent his crossing the straits.

The problem of the internal organization of Naples and Sicily would be reserved for the future, but England and France should proclaim that the debate between King Francis I1 and his subjects be settled without outs ide interference. til Thus, the French response to Russell’s suggestion that England and France disabuse Turin of any hope it might be harboring of assistance against Austria in Venetia was clear and logical - the time to act was before Naples fell; after would be too late.62

A highly significant aspect of Thouvenel’s proposal is the fact that he was advocating naval action, not lo Prohibit Italian unification, but to prevent its achievement through aggression. Thus, he told Cowley:

If an insurrection should take place against the King’s authority France would not wish to interfere. Let the people depose the King if they pleased, but let it be done by the Neapolitans themselves, and not by forei Sardinia also should be directed to abstain from any r irect interference in Sicily until the Sicilians should have declared their wishes. 68

This is the same position taken by Napoleon in his talk of 13 July with Nigra. Whether he thought the task of governing all

me in the present condition o Y things that the commanders of

“Thouvenel to Persigny, Paris, 24 July 1860, “Affaires de 1’Italie mkridionale.” L], I, 157-158. The above quotation from the despatch follows the translation found in Robert H. Edlestm, Napoleon III and Italy (Darlington, 1922), 178.

-This is the way Avetta aptly summarized Thouvenel’s argument (Avetta. “Studi Cavouriani I,” 60).

“Cowley to Russell, Paris, 1 Sept. 1860, PRO FO 27/1344, no. 1151.

224

The French, Garibaldi, and the Straits of Italy was beyond the forces of Victor Emmanuel or not, he was not opposed to unity in principle, and was unwilling to combat, in Italy at least, a clear cut expression of the principle of nationalities or the principle of popular sovereignty. In addi- tion to fearing for the loss of French influence in Italy, he believed that his government “should not combat principles, the invocation and application of which could become a necessity for him later on.”64 Garibaldi did not represent the principle of popular sovereignty, an expression of the will of the southern Italians, not to Napoleon and a fortiori not to the conservative powers. The movement led by the guerrilla chieftain represented rather revolution, radicalism, doctrinaire and fana tica 1 nationalism - even to Cavour. Garibaldi himself said of Napoleon’s Italian policy: “He does not like the Bourbons, but he likes the Revolu- tion still less.” 66

The French government learned the fate of its proposal on the afternoon of 25 July. Despite the energetic, even impudent, efforts of Persigny to get agreement, the English cabinet refused to go as far as military intervention in order to banish the specter of a war over Italy. They would not oppose unilateral action by France but neither would they approve it.56 Since the French had never seriously considered acting alone, no action was to be taken at all. The reformed Bourbon regime, conceived in the hope of French support, was doomed to die in infancy. Left to its own resources it could not survive.

An alarming display of suspicion, almost of hostility, accom- panied the English rejection. In addition to announcing England’s refusal to co-operate with France in Italy, Persigny had to report at the same time serious English misgivings concerning Napoleon’s plan to go to the assistance of the Christians who were being massacred in Syria. T o make matters worse, this news reached Paris on top of reports of a speech by Palmerston which bristled with reference to the grave threat to England posed by the French military establishment.

Palmerston had gone before the House of Commons on 23 July to fight for a measure dear to his heart, the strengthening of England’s mil i tary and naval - particularly her coastal -

MNigra to Cavour, Paris, 18 Aug. 1860, CCN, IV. 166, no. 1059 (no. 70). As cited in Cesar Vidal, “Studi francesi sul Risorgimento (1860-70); Russegna

storica del Risorgirnento, XL (1955), 374. MPersigny to Thonvenel, telegram, 4:OO P.M., London, 25 July 1860, AMAE

CP, Angleterre, 717: 268. Four hours and fifteen minutes later, Persigny sent a second telegram to Paris stating: “The cabinet highly recommends an armistice. but it absolutely refuses to intervene to prevent a landing by Garibaldi on the mainland” (ibid., fol. 269).

225

The Historian defenses. The moment was propitious, for the growing strength of the French navy, and especially French experiments with ironclad warships, had helped to bring on an invasion scare in England.67 The English public, convinced by the annexation of Nice and Savoy that Napoleon was a dangerous adventurer, was ready to believe the worst. To ustify increased expenditures on

betoken the possibility of a tempest.” He named France as a danger, “a great nation . . . whose glories have chiefly had relation to warlike operations.” Her military power exceeded her defense requirement according to Palmerston, who declared:

For the defense of France we may ronounce that vast army unnecessary. I do not mean to say t 1 at that army is raised for the deliberate purpose of aggression. I trust it is not, but the possession of power to aggress frequently gives the desire to do so.... Bedevilled by suspicion on all sides, that of the conservative

states and of the English, Napoleon suddenly determined to allay English fears. Neither he nor Thouvenel had ever really con- templated abandoning the English alliance, if it could still be called an alliance, to co-operate with Austria, Russia, and Prussia in Italy. Now, on the spur of the moment, upon hearing of Palmerston’s speech,59 in a dramatic move on the night of the 25th the Emperor sat down and wrote his soul-baring letter to Persigny. He did not consult his ministers, not even Thouvenel, for whom he even failed to keep a copy of what he wrote.60 Protesting his desire for friendship with London and defending his military and Syrian policies, he let the English know that he was most eager to come to an understanding with them con- cerning southern Italy, which he wanted to see pacified “no matter how.”@’

Even though Paris was to continue to give Naples its moral and diplomatic support, Napoleon now reverted to the laissez- faire attitude which had characterized his thinking during so much of the Italian crisis after Villafranca. Once again he was to let the Italians wander from what he considered the preferred course, the wise course. He did so with less grace and more

the military, Palmerston pointe d to clouds on the horizon “which

58

“Beales, England and Italy, 132. gHansard, CLX (1860), 20-23. SDNigra to Cavour, Paris, 29 July, CCN, IV, 112, no. 1012 (no. 71); Cowley to

Russell, Paris, 27 July 1860, PRO RP 90/22/55; Cowley to Russell, Paris. 2 Aug. 1860, PRO FO 7011343, no. 1024.

Cowley to Russell, Paris, 2 Aug. 1860, PRO FO 70/ 1243, no. 1024: Thouvenel to Persigny, telegram, Paris, 28 July 1860, AMAE CP, Anglcterre, 717: 279.

=Napoleon to Persigny, copy, St. Cloud, 25 July 1860, PRO RP 30/22/62.

226

The French, Garibaldi, and the Straits trepidation than did the English, but his position, both domes- tically and internationally, was, after all, not the same as that of the English.

The sudden French reversion to genuine nonintervention, the fact that “it took,” as Russell later wrote, “little effort on England’s part to prevent the French emperor from saving the Bourbons of Naples,” Napoleon’s well-known “revolutionary tendencies” and Italian sympathies naturally pose the question as to whether Napoleon really deviated at all from his permissive policy towards Italian nationalism. The proposal for naval intervention could have been a smoke screen to hide his disruptive pro-nationalist, anti-Congress of Vienna projects. Indeed one motive for the proposal undoubtedly was the desire to disengage France from responsibility for what was happening in the Italian peninsula and thus to ward off the hostility of the conservative states. Thouvenel wrote a private letter to the French ambassador at Vienna on the 24th to inform him of the effort which was then being made at London. In this letter he declared:

The rejection of our proposition will bring with it the fall of the Neapolitan monarchy. At least we will have done what depended upon us to prevent it and OUT responsibility will be covered. 62

The desire to cover French responsibility, however, does not mean that the proposal was made for no other reason.

Thouvenel’s repugnance for a Garibaldian penetration of the Italian peninsula is clear, unless one wants to credit him arbitrarily with being a master of deceit. Cowley wrote confidentially to Russell on 25 July that Thouvenel was “very anxious that you should consent to stop Garibaldi in the Straits.” When the English ambassador argued that the Neapolitans should stop Garibaldi if they did not want him, Thouvenel retorted that they were too weak and that once the Red Shirts landed the Neapolitans would have no other choice. @a The reports coming to the French minister indicated that Sicily, where Garibaldi prevailed, was chaotic and that central Italy, where Turin ruled, paid no a t t e n t i o n to Sardinian au thor i ty . There was disorder in the Neapolitan kingdom, where the revolutionists were busily at work. Thouvenel feared that an Italian republic was nigh.@ He transmitted evi- dence of Garibaldi’s unreliability to N i p , to whom he stated

BThouvenel to Lhnel Moustier, Paris, 24 July 1860, AMAE Ambassade de

=Cowley to Russell, Paris, 25 July 1860, PRO RP 30/!?2/55. “-Cowley to Russell, Paris, 27 July 1860, PRO FO 27/1342, nos. 991, 992;

Vienne (author’s italics).

Cowley to Russell, Paris, 27 July 1860, PRO 3 0 / Z / 5 5 .

227

The Historian a belief that the “Sicilian movement” was degenerating into revolutionary republicanism. 86 On 29 July, he lamented to Duc Antoine de Gramont, the French ambassador at Rome: “Every- thing which is happening at Naples is deplorable. If Garibaldi triumphs, which unfortunately appears to me scarcely doubtful, it is Sardinia which will be annexed.”ee Two weeks later, he was complaining to Persigny that the Italian situation was becoming more and more disturbing. “We regret greatly,” he said, “that our efforts to bring about a cession of hostilities and the conclusion of a truce have had no result.”e7

Napoleon was not as anxious as Thouvenel over Garibaldi’s impending victory, but he too expressed concern, showed himself disgruntled to Cowley and to his ardently pro-Italian cousin, Prince Napoleon, from whom he would be least inclined to hide any still lurking sympathies for the glamorous general.e* Cavour described the Emperor in mid-August as “silent and irritated.” There is no doubt but that, like Thouvenel, he saw Garibaldi’s enterprise embroiling France with all of the other powers.70 At the very time that the crisis in Italy was rushing toward its climax and Naples was asking for “positive mediation,” a meeting, disturbing for France, w a s about to take place. The prince regent of Prussia and the emperor of Austria, with their foreign ministers, were to come together at Teplitz on 26 July. The Prussians had assured Paris that they would recommend abstention to Franz Joseph as the best and only possible policy for Austria in Italy and would let him know that they would not support any Austrian aggression in Italy. 71 Despite this assurance, however, Napoleon was decidedly uneasy over the coming together of the two great German powers. T2 Was it not certain from the beginning that England would

reject the French overture? And does this not prove that Napoleon was making an insincere gesture to mollify the conservative

= N i p to Cavour, Paris, 29 July 1860, CCN, IV, 112, no. 1012 (no. 71). mThouvenel to Gramont, Paris, 29 July lSf30, L. Thouvenel, Lc secret dd

I’Em$&cur (1860-63) (Paris, 1889)‘ I, 161. “Thouvenel to Peraigny, Paris, 11 Aug. 1860, AMAE CP, Angletexre, 718: 85,

no. 127. a Nigra to Cavour, Paris, 5 Aug. 1860. CCN, IV, 115, no. 1031; Cowley to Russell,

Memorandum of a conversation with the Emperor, 20 Aug. 1860, PRO RP SO/W/55. aCavour to Cassink, 16 Aug. 1860, Mezwgiorno, 11, 90, no. 634. ‘Nigra to Cavour, Paris, 5 Aug. 1860, CCN, IV, 135, no. 1031. “La Tour to Thouvenel, 19 July 1860, AMAE CP, Prure, 336: 272, no. 90. =La Greca to De Martino, Paris, 31 July 1880, Mezzogiomo, V, Appendix

IV, 215, no. 211 (no. 9); Reusa to Schleinitz, 21 Aug. 1860, APP, I1 (I), 618, no. 246, n. 5.

228

The French, Garibaldi, and the Straits powers? As previously mentioned, this is the position taken by Maria Avetta in her article in the Rassegna storica del Risorgi- mento. Still, Naples, which certainly cannot be accused of insin- cerity in seeking English mediation, did in fact try to persuade Russell and Palmerston to intervene. The probability of an English refusal does not in itself demonstrate that the appeal was a mere tactic to deceive. It was possible, whether likely or not, that England would agree, despite its very emphatic past declarations. The situation had changed. Francis I1 was in the process of carrying out what was then assumed to be the total evacuation of Sicily. England had long announced that it was favorably disposed towards a truce, and now one of the biggest stumbling blocks, Sicily, appeared to be in the process of being shoved out of the way. Furthermore, Victor Emmanuel himself had sent a letter to Garibaldi asking that he not attack the continental portion of Francis 11’s kingdom, and Thouvenel had been able to inform London of what he thought was Cavour’s encouraging attitude toward the idea of a six months’ truce. This could have some influence upon English thinking, especially if confirmed by Emmanuel d’ Azeglio, the Sardinian representative at London, as Thouvenel hoped it would be. At the same time Thouvenel knew that Francis 11’s special agent, La Greca, who had shown himself highly persuasive in Paris, was then in London assuring Queen Victoria’s ministers of his government’s good intentions.

Russell’s despatch of 23 July must also be taken into account. It did not even hint at a desire to intervene in Italy, but it did express desires that could be realized and fears that could be banished only by a determined stand. If England preferred that Naples retain its independence, it should co-operate to protect Naples from aggression. If England feared that a victorious Garibaldi would lead Italy in an attack upon Venetia, let it stop Garibaldi in Sicily, rather than rely upon a French declaration halting him after he had overrun most of Italy.

In view of past experience, French hope of success in inducing the English to co-operate must have been weak indeed, but it is going too far to maintain that Thouvenel or the Emperor made their proposal certain in the knowledge that England would refuse. Traveling a bit far down the road in the opposite direction, Alfredo Zazo, an outstanding authority on the diplo- macy surrounding the problem of southern Italy during this period, writes that Thouvenel was able to consider “the adhesion of England near,’’ and describes the negative English reply as ‘‘unexpected.”T* The fact is that, despite deep sympathy for

Alfredo Zam, La polifica estera dcl regno delle Due Sidlie ncl 1859-60 (Naplea, 1940), 390-s91.

229

The Historian Garibaldi in England, the opinion of both Palmerston and Kussell as to what arrangement in Italy would be in the best interests of England and of the Italians themselves fluctuated with embarrassing frequency during the crucial month of July. The most recent study of England‘s Italian policy at this time has called its diplomacy “hesitant and confused, torn between diffident support for Naples, timid approbation of Garibaldi, and suspicious fear of France.”74 Palmerston confessed to Azeglio on 26 July that “if omnipotence were magically conferred upon him, he would not really know what to decide, or, to begin with, what to aim at.”“

Prince Metternich, ever suspicious of Napoleon’s motives, asked Cowley if he thought that France had frankly desired Anglo- French intervention. Cowley replied that “his conversations with Thouvenel had convinced him of the change in attitude which has been taking place here for some time with regard to the Neapolitan go~ernment.”7~ On 29 July, after learning that England had refused to adhere to the French plan, Baron Emiddio Antonini, the Neapolitan representative at Paris, who had con- sistently found fault with Napoleon’s policy, wrote: “The persua- sion has arisen among all the political figures [here] that the Emperor Napoleon, seeing Italy overcome by the revolution, has desired in good faith, as last year at Villafranca, to stop it, preserving the Kingdom of Naples and consequently the Papal States.”?7 A little later, La Greca advised the Nea olitan foreign

modify the attitude of the English government by taking advantage of “the very good dispositions of France.”T8

The French proposal of 24 July was neither a ruse nor a denial of the principle of self-determination or of the right of the Italians to unite, if they so desired. I t represented Napoleon’s opposition, not to the ultimate objectives of the nationalists, but to the tactics they were resorting to to reach them. It was one thing to achieve unity as a result of Neapolitan and papal misgovernment, by way of collapsing conservative regimes and popular uprisings (discreetly encouraged and supported), and quite another thing to impose it by military force, in flagrant

minister, Giacomo De Martino, that action shou P d be taken to

14 Beales, England and Italy, 150-151. “Azeglio to Cavour, London, 26 July 1860, CCZ, I1 (i), 113, no. 189. -Metternich to Rechberg, Paris, 20 Aug. 1860, HHSA PA IX, Frankreich,

“Antonhi to De Martino, Paris, 29 July 1860, Meuogiorno, V, Appendix IV,

”La Greca to De Martino, Paris, 29 July 1860, ibid, 218, no. 212 (no. 10).

VI-X, 367. no. 54 B (author’s italics).

214, no. 210 (no. 165).

230

The French, Garibaldi, and the Straits violation of international law and with cavalier disregard for the sensibilities and interests of the conservative powers. The latter course stirred up problems for Napoleon both within France and without. Catholic and conservative hostility was a danger not to be taken lightly. Furthermore there is every reason to believe that, while Napoleon sympathized with the idea of unity, he doubted its practicality.79 An Italy of two liberal kingdoms, with the pope in between, appeared wiser and safer.

After Milazzo, Francis I1 appeared ready to concede to every demand laid down by the Piedmontese as the price for their friendship and co-operation. As the French saw it there was at least a possibility of a truce if only Garibaldi could be halted. The situation in Italy might then be stabilized through some kind of accord between Turin and Naples. But time was running out. If the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies were to be saved, it was now or never. Military intervention was essential. Unless armed, or backed up by a credible threat of intervention, mediation, looking to a compromise solution, could not, can never, succeed against a winning military drive led by men who think only in terms of total victory.

Napoleon could block Garibaldi at the Straits without repudi- ating his principles and his past only if England cooperated. He was consistent in his preference for a confederation, but was unwillin? to resort to drastic measures to obtain it. Unilateral intervention, applauded by the conservatives and condemned by the English, could only appear reactionary and result in England’s winning whatever influence the French still had among the Italian nationalists, moderate as well as radical. Military co-operation with the Eastern powers against the Italians would have the same unhappy consequences, only worse. The fact that it “took little effort to prevent Napoleon from saving the Bourbons of Naples,” Napoleon’s letter of 25 July, shows that even joint intervention with England ran somewhat against the grain of imperial thinking. England’s refusal to co-operate in the only action left to take pushed Napoleon’s policy back to the laissez-faire groove into which it usually slipped in 1860 when confronted by resistance from London and Turin. If the Italians could unite Italy without provoking conservative intervention or attacking the pope, if Victor Emmanuel and Cavour could dominate the national movement, Napoleon was ready to acquiesce. The fact that he had let Cavour and others see his indulgence toward the unitary

?gAs late as Jan. 1861, when asked point blank by Cowley if he were opposed to Italian unity, Napoleon’s answer, as related by the English ambasador, was as follows:

28 1

The Historian concept is one of the reasons for the failure of his sporadic efforts to guide the Italians to the safer solution of a confederation. -

“He replied most positively in the negative, but added that he believed that unity to be an utter impossibility. He knew the ltalians well, he said - he had had some experience of their revolutionary doings, and he was quite certain that nothing [would] ever eradicate from Italy the individuality of the Great Towns. T h e cry might be for Unity now, but when Naples, Florence and other towns came to remember that they were seats of a court with its pecuniary and other advantages, the old leaven will break out. At all events without Rome, unity was an impossibility. It was for this reason that he had advised a confederation, and not for any abstract sentiment against Unity.”

(Cowley to Russell, Paris, 11 Jan. 1861, PRO RP 30/2!2/56).

232