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The functioning and Funding of Political Parties (in the SADC Region)

Prof Lloyd Schikonye

Acronyms

AFORD Alliance for DemocracyANC African National CongressBCP Basutoland Congress PartyBDP Botswana Democratic PartyBNF Botswana National FrontCCM Chama Cha MapinduziCoD Congress of DemocratsCSOs Civil Society OrganisationsDTA Democratic Turnhalle AllianceEISA Electoral Institute of Southern AfricaFrelimo Front for Liberation of MozambiqueIDEA International Institute for Democracy and Electoral AssistanceIFP Inkatha Freedom PartyLCD Lesotho Congress of DemocratsMCP Malawi Congress PartyMDC Movement for Democratic ChangeMMD Movement for Multi-Party DemocracyMPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of AngolaNGOs Non-Governmental OrganisationsPAC Pan-African CongressPR Proportional RepresentationRENAMO Mozambique Resistance MovementSADC RHDR Southern Africa Development Community –

Regional Human Development ReportSMD Single Member DistrictSWAPO South West Africa People’s OrganisationTANU Tanganyika African National CouncilUANC United African National CouncilUDF United Democratic FrontUNIP United National Independence PartyUNITA National Union for the Total Independence of AngolaZDC Zambian Democratic CongressZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic FrontZAPU Zimbabwe African People’s UnionZUM Zimbabwe Unity MovementZUD Zimbabwe Union of Democrats

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International IDEA Conference -Towards Sustainable Democratic

Institutions in Southern Africa

Executive Summary

This study was commissioned by the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) as a contribution towards its consultation with partner institutions and political organisations in Southern Africa on the building of sustainable democratic institutions in the region. Specifically, the study examines the contribution of political parties to sustainable democracy in the region.

Parties in Comparative Perspective

The paper explores the role of political parties in Southern Africa and pays particular attention to their functions and funding. It begins by arguing the need to contextualise the examination of parties in a historical and comparative perspective. Political parties have historically played a pivotal role in the founding and consolidating democratic systems of governance. They aggregate diverse demands into coherent political programmes, and translate these programmes into effective collective action through electorally legitimated control of political office. Parties are typically major vehicles for the recruitment of political leadership, the structuring of electoral choice and peaceable political competition, and the framing of policy alternatives (Dix, 1992). In turn, parties communicate and legitimate the system’s political processes back to the local level. Opposition parties insist on the accountability of those in power and provide choice to citizens.

Institutionalised party-systems are relatively more stable; they are systems in which parties have strong roots and legitimacy in society. In such systems, both the political elites and citizens believe in parties as fundamental, necessary and desirable institutions of democratic politics. Unlike in weakly-institutionalised party-systems, parties are not subordinated to the interests of a few ambitious leaders but possess an independent status and value of their own. In general, however, party-systems are still fragile in most countries in Southern Africa. The weak institutionalisation of the parties partly relates to the historical background of their formation, and partly to the framework of party competition in the post-independence period.

The paper makes several observations about the party-systems that were instituted at independence or liberation. Firstly, they were heavily dominated by the principal nationalist or liberation movement which consisted of a broad membership – often cutting across class lines – whose common goal was majority rule. Second, the opposition parties which contested the principal nationalist liberation movement in the independence elections and lost found it extremely difficult to recover any political ground later. Thirdly, (until the early 1990s), the installation of one-party state systems in some of the countries (Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) had legislated out of existence opposition parties thereby further undermining the party-system. Fourth, the advantages of incumbency have been considerable to the ruling parties resulting in a trend towards de facto dominant-party systems (as in Namibia, Botswana, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and lately in South Africa). Against the background of weak institutionalisation of party-systems and the staking of political and electoral “rules of the game”

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including access to funding against opposition parties, the concept and practice of “loyal opposition” have not been taken seriously.

Role and Record of Parties

The paper then considered the various aspects of the role played by parties – both ruling and opposition parties – in the political process in the region. In Southern Africa, as elsewhere, parties have been important instruments in encouraging participation in the political process. However, the level of membership in parties varies greatly within and between countries. In general, party membership reached a climax at independence or liberation but has gradually been declining since then. It was observed that parties have, however, played an increasing role in the dispensing of patronage in form of material incentives to selected groups and members. Examples of patronage include job and contracts in government departments and parastatal corporations, the construction of roads, dams, schools and schools in favoured urban and rural districts amongst others. Of course, the levels of patronage vary between parties and countries depending on the standards of accountability and transparency in the system of governance followed. The patronage system is invariably attacked as “corruption” by opposition parties in almost all the countries. None of the ruling parties from the ANC (in South Africa), BDP (in Botswana), Frelimo (in Mozambique) to the CCM (in Tanzania), MMD (in Zambia), Zanu-PF (in Zimbabwe) and Swapo (in Namibia) has been spared this criticism.

With a few exceptions, the trend has been towards weak opposition parties across the Southern Africa region. While some of the parties have existed since even before independence, others are of a more recent vintage (formed in the early 1990s on the wave of democratisation which swept across the continent). Such parties as the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) (in Namibia), UANC (in Zimbabwe), PAC (in South Africa) and BNF (in Botswana) have survived but have not grown to pose a serious challenge to the dominant parties in these countries. The paper identified major structural constraints encountered by opposition parties; these included resource constraints as well as electoral systems staked against them, sparse organizational skills and narrow political base. While some of these constraints also affect the ruling parties to some degree, the difference lies in that the latter can strategically draw upon state resources at election time to enhance their electoral advantage. A major determinant factor on the electoral performance of a party was the character of the electoral system. While the “first past the post” system appeared to present disadvantages to opposition parties, the proportional representation (PR) system reflected a fairer relationship between the number of votes and quantity of seats secured by each party during elections.

Party Funding

The paper observed that the issue of party funding has not been given the adequate attention which it deserves in the Southern Africa region. How much funding a party can mobilize at election time is of decisive importance. For the size of funding determines the number of campaign staff it can employ, the number of vehicles it can use to reach voters in urban and rural areas, the amount of advertising it can

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deploy on radio, television and in the press, and the range of equipment (from telephones to computers to stationery etc.) which it needs to communicate with the electorate.

In Southern Africa, different countries have taken different positions on party funding. While some countries have provisions for public funding of parties, a few do not. The countries which provide state funding of parties are Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Those which do not provide public or state funding are Botswana, Lesotho and Zambia. However, the type and scale of funding also varies; whereas in some countries, funding is limited to election campaign activities, in others it extends to other activities between and beyond elections. Much contested, however, are the different formulae for such public funding. Opposition parties have challenged the different formulae in Malawi, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Most public funding is pegged to the number of seats held or number of votes cast per party and this favours the dominant parties. A kind of catch-22 situation existed for many parties: without seats or a certain threshold of votes, a party was excluded access to funding, but in order for it to mobilize membership widely, it required resources! In general, incumbent parties had enormous advantages of access to both public and private funding sources as the examples given of ANC, Frelimo and Zanu PF resources in recent elections showed.

Wider Issues in Political Party Development

The broad factors issues which negatively impinge upon the development of parties include a relatively steady decline in membership, growing apathy, consolidation of the dominant-party system (with a few exceptions), and limited internal democracy in parties. For instance, one survey had established that whereas active membership amongst blacks had declined from 24 per cent in 1994 to 12 per cent in 1998 in South Africa, the decline had been steeper amongst whites from 17 per cent in 1994 to about 4 per cent. Decline in party membership had also been reported in Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The notable trend in disengagement from active party membership appeared to be accompanied by increased apathy amongst voters in the region. Examples of such deepening apathy were drawn from Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. However, a notable exception was Mozambique where voter registration and election turn-out was impressive in both the 1994 and 1999 elections.

The paper also observed that there appeared, with a few exceptions, to be a trend towards the spread of a dominant-party system which more or less resembles a latter-day version of a de facto one-party state system. Examples of parties which have wittingly or unwittingly established such a dominant-party system are the ANC (in South Africa), BDP (in Botswana), Swapo (in Namibia), CCM (in Tanzania), MMD (in Zambia) and Zanu-PF (in Zimbabwe). Exceptions to this dominant-party system are the formerly one-party systems of Malawi and Mozambique.

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In some countries, dominant parties actively and systematically blocked attempts by opposition parties to attain viability or gain equitable access to voters through publicly-owned media.However, the structural and regulatory conditions under which the opposition parties operated were not the sole factor contributing to their mediocre performance. It was observed that internal democracy in opposition parties was often in deficit with a tendency towards fragmentation. Self-destructive splits in opposition parties had occurred in such countries as Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Parties in the Wider Social Context

The paper then considered a number of salient issues relating to the experiences of parties regarding the participation of women and minority groups in the political process, the linkages between parties and civil society organizations (CSOs), relations with the media and finally the question of leadership in parties. While all countries in the region have pledged themselves to enhance the political empowerment of women, most of them had yet to implement this commitment and policy at the national level. Although women turn out in considerable numbers as voters during elections as the experiences of Malawi and Zimbabwe highlighted, few women occupy leadership positions which are a monopoly of male politicians. However, there were exceptions to the general trend of marginalisation of women. Quota systems in Mozambique (by Frelimo), in South Africa (by the ANC) and in Tanzania had provided for more active participation by women in parliament and in party structures. A pledge to set a quota system for women in Zanu-PF structures had been made at its December 1999 party congress.

Linkages between parties and CSOs were also explored. Relations between ruling parties and CSOs were conditioned by whether there was a transparent democratic political culture or not. Where such a culture is absent, the CSOs often pit their weight behind opposition parties which campaign to restore democracy. To that extent, civil society groups sometimes develop partisan sympathies (as they did during independence and anti-apartheid struggles) to the annoyance of the ruling party and incumbent government. Yet tension between a critical civil society and a ruling party is healthy; it contributes to checking certain excesses of a dominant- party system.

Although the circulation of newspapers and magazines, and ownership radio and television sets varies widely between countries in the region, their key importance in disseminating political messages is obvious. Control of this media is therefore a contested issue between political parties. While some countries have a more liberal policy of access to public radio and television by parties, most tend to have restrictive regulations which are biased in the favour of the ruling party. Not surprisingly, it is during election campaigns that controversies about access to the media become more heated.

Finally, the question of leadership in both ruling and opposition parties is a central issue. With a few exceptions, there tends to be strong streak of one `dominant personality’ of almost cult status, as leader, in most of the parties. The founding father (or more rarely mother) of the party has a unique status. In the region, the general trend has been for these leaders to treat their parties as their “firms” or “possessions”, and the trends has been as widespread in opposition as in ruling parties. The few exceptions have been

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the older and more stable parties with internal procedures which facilitate a smooth change-over of leadership (as in Botswana and South Africa).

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The last quarter for the 20th century witnessed significant political transformations in Southern Africa. Independence and liberation struggles were protracted in those countries that constituted the last group to emerge from the yoke of colonialism and apartheid. Mozambique and Angola (in 1975), Zimbabwe and Namibia (in 1980 and 1990 respectively) and South Africa (in 1994) joined those other countries in the region which had earlier undergone peaceful decolonisation between 1960 and 1968. The opening months of this new century therefore provides a good vantagepoint to appraise the outcome of those political transformations with particular reference to the role of parties in governance systems in these countries. To what extent have democratic systems of governance taken root in the region? What specific roles have political parties played in those transformations, and what constraints do they encounter? How can those roles be further enhanced in order to strengthen and consolidate democratic political systems and better governance in the Southern Africa region? These questions will be addressed with specific reference to developments in the region in the past 10 years.

However, the paper begins by providing a brief sketch of the significance of political parties (henceforth parties) from a historical perspective. It then proceeds to provide an overview of the contemporary role(s) of parties in the SADC region. The later sections of the paper examine the patterns and outcomes of the funding of parties, and pertinent issues relating to the development of parties in the wider social context. The paper concludes with a section on recommendations which draw from our comparative analysis of the development, role and funding of parties in the region.

2. POLITICAL PARTIES IN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE

PERSPECTIVE

Historically, parties have played a pivotal role in the founding and consolidating of democratic systems of governance. Parties aggregate diverse demands into coherent political programmes and translate these programmes into effective collective action through electorally legitimated control of political office (Glaser, 1997). Parties facilitate the peaceful transfer of government power from one party to another in a multi-party system. In the early democracies (in Western Europe and North America), parties were created to articulate and protect specific social interests. This development was linked to the creation of political trust within the political class [Hall, 1992]. The opposition was allowed largely because those in power felt that it would not threaten their interests. In the case of Britain, for instance, what mattered above all was the creation of a loyal opposition, i.e. an opposition which did not entertain plans to change the system and to exterminate its rivals . The institutionalisation of a loyal opposition was vital for the consolidation of democracy. Interestingly, the concept of a loyal opposition in time led to state salaries for those who opposed what the party in power was trying to achieve!

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Elsewhere, it was observed, strong parties were necessary to mobilise pressures from subordinate classes for democratisation; however, if their programmes were too radical, they stiffened resistance among the dominant classes against democracy [Rueschemeyer et.al., 1992]. In such regions as Latin America and the Caribbean, democracy could be consolidated only where there were two or more strong competing parties at least one of which effectively protected dominant class interests, or where the party system allowed for direct access of the dominant classes to the state apparatus. If some parties represented wealthy classes, others spearheaded the interests of the working classes (hence labour parties) and peasant classes (hence agrarian or peasant parties). Yet other parties represented religious interests (hence Christian or Islamic parties). Some parties were more `national’ in their coverage and membership, while others were `regional’ in outlook and composition. We will observe shortly that it is useful to have a historical perspective of parties in the Southern Africa region.

The historical development of parties is linked to the issue of the institutionalisation of party systems, in particular the multi-party system. Institutionalisation relates to the process by which a practice or organization becomes well established and widely known [Mainwaring, 1998). In particular, party-system institutionalisation means that actors entertain clear and stable expectations about the behaviour of other actors, and hence about the fundamental contours and rules of party competition and behaviour. As Mainwaring observed, in an institutionalised party system, there is stability in who the main parties are, and in how they behave. Party systems in newly-independent countries which constitute most “third-wave” democracies are markedly less institutionalised than those in most long-established democarcies, notwithstanding that parties in the latter are facing new challenges and experiencing some erosion .

Four dimensions of party-system institutionalisation may be identified drawing on Mainwaring. These are the following:

More institutionalised party systems enjoy considerable stability; patterns of party competition manifest regularity. A system in which major parties regularly appear and then disappear or become minor parties is weakly institutionalised.

More institutionalised systems are those in which parties have strong roots in society. The ties that bind parties and citizens are firmer’, and links between organised interests and parties are generally more developed.

In more institutionalised systems, the major political actors accord legitimacy to parties. Elites and the citizenry in general believe in parties as fundamental, necessary and desirable institutions of democratic politics.

In more institutionalised systems, party organisations matter; parties are not subordinated to the interests of a few ambitious leaders, but possess an independent status and value of their own [Mainwaring, 1998].

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The gist of these propositions is that institutionalised party-systems are conducive to stability of the political system. Conversely, where the party-systems are weakly institutionalised, the political system may be prone to endemic instability.

This brings us closer to the experiences in the Southern African region where party-systems are still fragile in most countries. The weak institutionalisation of the parties partly relates to the historical background of their formation and partly to the framework of party competition in the post-independence period. The ruling parties in most countries evolved from nationalist movements which mobilised citizens for independence. Such parties as TANU, now Chama Chamapinduzi (CCM) in Tanzania, Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) in Botswana, South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia, Frelimo in Mozambique, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the MPLA in Angola and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) in Zimbabwe began as broad independence movements whose main objective was self-rule. Other ruling parties which began as independence movements and governed for nearly 30 years before being toppled from power are the United National Independence Party (UNIP) in Zambia and the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) in Malawi. In Lesotho, the ruling party annulled elections in 1970 to forestall the taking of office by the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) which eventually won in 1993.

Several observations may be made about the party-systems that were instituted at independence or liberation. Firstly, they were heavily dominated by the principal nationalist or liberation movement which consisted of a broad membership- often cutting across class lines – whose common goal was majority rule. Secondly, the opposition parties which contested the principal nationalist or liberation movement in the independence elections and lost, found it extremely difficult to recover any political ground later. Thirdly, the installation of one-party state systems in some of the countries (Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) legislated out of existence the existing opposition parties thereby further undermining the party-system. Fourthly, the advantages of incumbency have been considerable to the ruling parties resulting in a trend towards de facto dominant-party systems (as in Namibia, Botswana, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and lately in South Africa). Finally, the institutionalisation of party-systems has been weak; the political `rules of the game” as enshrined in electoral regulations and access to funding have been staked against opposition parties, as we will observe in later section of this paper. The concept and practice of “loyal opposition” has not been taken seriously. Although the problem of the viability of non-governing parties, and thus of an opposition capable of providing a healthy democratic dialogue is a world-wide one, the current trend in the SADC region raises serious questions about the long-term sustainability of democracy [IDEA, 1998].

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3. CONTEMPORARY ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Parties play a vital role in the market place of political ideas and programmes. They are the principal players in electoral contests. To that extent, they are indispensable to democracy. In a global and regional context, in which multi-party systems have become the norm, parties provide citizens with an opportunity to choose from different “menus” of programmes. However, not all parties are committed to democracy or democratic practices; not every party has a coherent and alternative programme. In Southern Africa, there is spectrum of parties at different stages of development, and varying levels of commitment to national democracy.

However, let us begin by broadly outlining the role of contemporary parties in the Southern African region. First, parties are important instruments in encouraging participation in the political process. The level of membership in parties varies greatly within and between countries but it remains an important barometer of political participation. This participation may relate to choice in local government or community concerns, or to central government programmes. In general, party membership reached a climax at independence or liberation but has gradually declined since then. Second, parties are the central players during elections. They advertise competing platforms or programmes and seek to convince potential voters that they were the most eligible party to govern the country. Most citizens in the region associate parties with “elections”; parties are basically viewed as contestants for power through elections. It is around election time that more newer parties are formed explicitly to contest them. The formation of “election-time” parties is a general trend in countries in the region. An “entrepreneurial” and “opportunistic” approach appears to underlie the formation of such parties. However, even well-established parties have a tendency to be “dormant” between elections, springing to intense activity towards the next electoral contest. Thus, a certain amount of “electoralism” appears to pervade the outlook and strategic thinking of both ruling and opposition parties, old and new.

Third, parties have played an increasing role in the dispensing of patronage often in the form of material incentives to selected groups and members. Access to government power and resources ensures that only the ruling party possesses significant means for patronage. Examples of patronage would include jobs and contracts in government departments and parastatal corporations, the construction of roads, dams, schools and clinics in favoured rural and urban districts, access to credit sources and diplomatic postings. Of course, the levels of patronage vary between parties and countries. The levels also depend on the standards of accountability and transparency in the system of governance in a particular party and country. The patronage system is invariably attacked as “corruption” by opposition parties in almost all the countries. None of the ruling parties from the ANC (in South Africa), BDP (in Botswana), Frelimo (in Mozambique), to the CCM (in Tanzania), ZANU-PF (in Zimbabwe) and Swapo (in Namibia) has been spared this criticism [SADC RHDR 1998; Bratton, 1998; Moyo, 1992]. Neither have newer parties such as the MMD in Zambia. As we will observe, the powers accruing from incumbency in government

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provide a major temptation to these ruling parties. In the absence of shared values and agreement on electoral rules and regulations, and limits on patronage, the opposition parties tend to be significantly disadvantaged in political contests like elections. An analyst has observed that:

“the more dominant the elected ruling party and the more secure its legislative majority, the greater its latitude in using executive power to rig the rules against their opponents.After a period of turbulent transition, African politics is returning to an institutional legacy of “big man” rule, and the electoral alternation of leaders is again becoming abnormal” [Bratton, 1998].

Of course, there are discernible variations between countries; in some countries, there is a strong commitment to those constitutional provisions which seek to ensure “free and fair elections” and “good governance”. Nevertheless, the temptation to monopolise the advantages of incumbency often proves too strong to resist!

The broad context of the monopoly of advantages and power is the historical legacy briefly mentioned above. The struggles for the liberation had been long-drawn-out and often painful as well as expensive in cost to human lives. Parties such as Swapo ( in Namibia), ANC (in South Africa), Frelimo (in Mozambique), PF- Zapu and Zanu-PF (in Zimbabwe) and MPLA (in Angola) draw upon that legacy of national struggles as a powerful symbol as well as justification for their dominant status and patronage systems. Even in those countries where decolonisation was relatively peaceful (as in Botswana and Tanzania), the ruling parties still draw upon their role as mid-wives of independence. This political capital and goodwill earned in the popular mobilisations for independence or liberation has often provided a basis for undemocratic tendencies including authoritarianism.

Most opposition parties have criticised such authoritarianism. But what has been the broad character of opposition parties within the Southern Africa region? Here is may be useful to make a distinction between (a) traditionally multi-party systems (b) formerly one-party state system and (c) formerly military regime systems.

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Table 1 : Party Systems is Southern Africa

Traditionally Multi- Party Systems

Formerly One Party Systems

Traditional Monarchy

Formerly Military Rule

Military Rule

Botswana Malawi Swaziland Lesotho Democratic Namibia Mozambique Republic of the Mauritius Tanzania CongoSeychelles ZambiaSouth Africa AngolaZimbabwe

Thus while opposition parties have been legally entitled to play a role in some countries, they were not allowed in others under the one-party system until the political transformation of the early 1990s. Interestingly, the distinction between multi-party and one-party systems has little bearing on the strength of opposition parties in contemporary Southern Africa. Some of the stronger parties, for example, Renamo in Mozambique and AFORD in Malawi, thrive in formerly one-party state systems while some of the weaker parties, UANC and ZUM (in Zimbabwe) and BNF (in Botswana) exist in traditionally multi-party state systems.

With a few exceptions, however, the trend has been towards the weak opposition parties across the region. While some of the parties have existed since even before independence, others are of a more recent vintage (formed in the early 1990s on the wave of democratisation that swept across the continent), and during the more recent elections held in the period after 1995. Such parties as the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) (in Namibia), UANC (in Zimbabwe), PAC (in South Africa) and BNF (in Botswana) have survived but have not grown to pose a challenge to the dominant parties in these countries. There have been forthright critiques of opposition parties which view them as not serious political entities. One such critique observed that:

“many of Africa’s new opposition parties are fragile creations born out of the need to compete in the electoral process Quite often a party is little more than a platform for a single individual, a structure whose rules can readily be changed to suit its founder, whose charisma and money are its main engines. As the vehicle of its leader, the party’s life expectancy and prospects are tied to its founder’s fate” [Monga, 1997].

Another analyst, drawing on his research on the Zambian political system, broadly concurred:

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“many political parties are referred to as `briefcase parties’ or `press conference parties’. They may have resources and present themselves vociferously to the public, but that does not imply that they have a real membership or electoral support” [van Donge, 1998].

Thus, so far the observations stress the factor of lack of substantive seriousness of purpose amongst opposition parties, and the tendency towards a personality cult status for the founder or leader. But even these critics acknowledge that there are major structural constraints encountered by opposition parties. These include resource constraints as well as electoral systems staked against them. In its wide-ranging survey of governance conditions in Southern Africa, the SADC Regional Human Development Report pointed out that:

“opposition parties in the different SADC countries are weak and poorly funded. This limits their ability to mobilise support and reach out to all constituencies in their respective countries. Difficulties in raising finances to support campaigns and the inability to reach voters through educational material and media channels seem to be the major obstacles in the functioning of effective opposition parties across the region” [SADC RHDR, 1998].

Other constraints bedevilling opposition parties include sparse organisational skills and narrow ethnic base. More generally, some of these constraints also affect the ruling parties but with the difference that they can strategically draw upon state resources at election time to enhance their electoral advantage.

Indeed, the type of electoral system used in a country largely determines the fortunes of contesting opposition parties. The two main electoral systems are the “first-past-the-post” (FPTP) system or single-member district (SMD) system, and the proportional representation (PR) system. A variant is a mixture of the two systems (as in Namibia). Compared to the PR system, the SMD system appears to be heavily staked against opposition parties. This is demonstrated by the number of parliamentary seats held by opposition parties in Mozambique, South Africa and Namibia – countries which operate the PR system.

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Table 2: 1999 Election Results for Legislative Assemblies in Countries Operating the PR System

Ruling Party Main Opposition Party

Mozambique 133 117

Namibia 61 7

South Africa 266 38

Elections based on the PR system have resulted in the enhancement of their legitimacy through allowing parties with at least a 5 per cent of the vote to obtain parliamentary seats. In formerly turbulent conditions of civil unrest, opposition parties such as Renamo (in Mozambique) and the Inkantha Freedom Party (IFP) in South Africa have secured a respectable number of legislative assembly seats. In the 1994 and 1999 elections, Renamo and Frelimo have literally run “neck and neck” in presidential and legislative elections. In Namibia, even the new opposition party, the Congress of Democrats (Co) was able to secure several seats in the 1999 elections. In sum, the PR system would appear to reflect a fairer relationship between the number of votes and quantity of seats secured by each party during elections; and that it has a greater capacity to accommodate diverse interests and attracts and allegiance because the different parties gain something from the system. It is viewed as fairer than the “winner-takes-all” SMD system.

Contrast with the SMD system in which the total vote obtained by parties counts for little in terms of constituency seats. In Zimbabwe, the opposition parties polled 20 per cent of the votes but obtained only 3 parliamentary seats [Moyo, 1992; Nkiwane, 1998]. Similarly, in the 1996 Zambian elections, the opposition won about 40 per cent of the total vote but which translated into 19 seats out of a total of 150 [Baylies and Szeftel, 1997]. In the 1995 Tanzanian elections, the ruling CCM party obtained 78 per cent of the seats on the basis of the 59 per cent of votes it received [Richey and Stefano, 1996]. The ruling coalition in Mauritius swept 60 of the 66 parliamentary seats on the basis of a 65 per cent of the total vote. Although the BNF and BCP opposition parties in Botswana polled nearly 29 percent of the total votes between them, they obtained a total of only 7 seats in a 40-member legislative [Ntau and Sebudubu, 1999]. A more dramatic result was that of the Lesotho elections in 1998 which resulted in the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) capturing 79 seats out of 80 on the basis of obtaining 60 per cent of the total vote [Matlosa, 1998]. Although the opposition parties had a combined tally of about 40 per cent, they could only gain 1 seat! A political explosion soon followed to shake Lesotho triggering foreign intervention.

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Table 3: Legislatures Characterised by the Dominant Party System

Country Last Election Date

Total Elected Seats

No of Ruling Party Seats

% of Ruling Party Seats

Angola 1994 220 129 58Botswana 1999 40 33 57Lesotho 1998 80 79 60Namibia 1999 78 61 76Seychelles 1998 34 30 88South Africa 1999 400 266 66Tanzania 1995 232 186 80Zambia 1996 156 131 84Zimbabwe 1995 120 117 97

Source: SARIPS/SAPES Databank 1998 and own update

In this section, we have sought to provide a broad overview of the role of both ruling and opposition parties. Structural factors which impinge on the operations and capacity in electoral contests were specified. The differential impact of electoral systems on the performance of parties was then reviewed.

Table 4: Election Results for Legislative Assemblies in Countries Operating the SMD System

Country Ruling Party Seats

% of Total Vote

Opposition Parties Seats

% of Total Seats

Botswana 33 54,2 7 45,8Lesotho 79 99 1 1Malawi 93 48,5 99 51,5Tanzania 186 81,3 44 18,7Zambia 131 87,7 17 12,3Zimbabwe 147 98 3 2

4. POLITICAL PARTY FUNDING

Although access to resources is a decisive factor in electoral contests and party existence, the issue of party funding has not been given adequate attention which it deserves in the Southern Africa region. For even in long-established democracies such as the United States of America and Germany, political campaign finance remains an extremely contentious issue particularly at election campaign time. How much funding a party can mobilise is of a decisive importance in an election. The size of funding determines the number of campaign staff it can employ, the number of vehicles and other transport it can use to reach to voters in urban and rural areas, the amount of advertising it can deploy on radio, television and in the press, and the range of equipment (from telephones to computers and to stationery etc.) which it needs to communicate with the electorate. Political campaigns do not come cheap.

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Similarly, maintaining a party between elections is not inexpensive.

In Southern Africa, different countries have taken different positions on political party funding. While a few countries have no provisions for public funding of parties, a few of them do. The type of funding also varies: in some countries, the funding is limited to election campaign activities while in others, it extends to other activities between elections. Countries which do not provide funding are Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius and Zambia.

Table 5: Public Funding for PartiesCountries which do not have Public Funding of Parties

Countries which have Public Funding for Parties

Botswana Namibia (since 1997)Lesotho MalawiZambia MozambiqueMauritius Seychelles

South AfricaZimbabwe

As table 5 shows, there is a growing trend towards the provision of state funding for parties. However, a caveat is necessary. Not every party has access to this funding; most countries confine funding to those parties represented in the national and provincial legislatures. This formula has the effect of rendering state funding inaccessible to a myriad of smaller parties which did not gain a toe-hold in the legislature. In some countries (such as Zimbabwe), this formula has been challenged in court. In the Zimbabwean case, the threshold for access to state funding was subsequently lowered (in 1998) from 15 seats in Parliament to 5 per cent of votes cast in an election. No other party except ZANU-PF currently draws from state funding which amounted to Z$65 million in 1999.

In Malawi, the three parties represented in Parliament – the United Democratic Front (UDF), the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) and the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) receive public funding. Even so, out of these three parties, only two agree on the present formula [Patel, 1999]. The nine parties which are not represented in Parliament are excluded from public funding. In Mozambique, parties are provided with state funds for their electoral campaigns according to criteria defined by the national electoral commission (CNE). During the 1999 elections, for example, parties which ran a full slate of candidates in all the provinces received 238 million meticais each [EU, 1999]. In reality, the major parties, Frelimo and Renamo, each received a third of this funding for electoral campaigning. In addition, state funds amounting to US$610,000 were utilised in voter education and party political broadcasts. In South

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Africa, Section 74 of the Electoral Act provides for public funding of parties; like elsewhere in the region, this funding is now confined to parties represented in Parliament [Pottie, 1999]. Funds are thus allocated on the basis of proportionality, and parties are required to account for the use of the funds to the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). In the 1999 elections, eight parties drew from an allocation of R53 million while 35 other parties could not get access to it. A similar formula of confining public funding to parliamentary parties applies in Namibia [Totemeyer, 1999]. Not surprisingly, the exclusion of a considerable number of parties from public funding has generated a great deal of heated political debate.

How do those parties in countries without a provision for public funding manage during and between elections? They necessarily have to seek private sources of funding. Even so, the ruling parties often have a head start and greater access to such private sources but also public resources (by virtue of incumbency, as we saw above). In Mauritius, for example, parties rely on their own resources and donations to cover election expenses for such needs as transport and advertising. However, there are no limits on the amounts which a party can accept from any source [Dahoo, 1999]. The advantages of unbroken incumbency are visible in the case of the BDP in Botswana. It was observed that:

“the incumbent party always enjoyed a very healthy situation, which is primarily based on contributions from the business community and other organisations. The opposition parties have to rely first and foremost on membership dues, which is a much more unreliable source of income, besides being less rewarding” [EISA, 1999].

The regulations on party funding stipulate that parties can spend unlimited amounts. In 1999, there was speculation that the ruling BDP party received a considerable donation of about 2,4 million pula from outside the country [Ibid]. In Zambia, a major constraint on parties during elections is limited resources. Even so, the wide disparity in access to resources was demonstrated in one instance: whereas each MMD candidate obtained 20 million kwacha for campaign expenses, the Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC) set aside 60 million kwacha for its entire party campaign [Kaela, 1999]. On the other hand, like ruling parties elsewhere in the region, the MMD had an advantage over opposition parties by virtue of its access to public resources (such as relief food and sale of publicly-owned houses to tenants at `give-away’ prices to entice electoral support) apart from use of state resources such as transport for party campaigns [Kaela, 1999]. However, the exploitation of public resources for electoral capital by ruling parties is not confined to countries without provisions for the public funding of parties. Their extensive capacity for patronage is a considerable incentive for both domestic and external donors to contribute funds to ruling parties. For instance, in its fund-raising campaign for the 1999 elections, Frelimo raised an estimated US$700 000 as well as election equipment from two dinners for business representatives [EU, 1999]. During the 1995 elections, a private business donor based in England contributed £1 million to the ruling ZANU-PF’s campaign. More recently, the party received a donation of vehicles and computers worth Z$7 million from an external fraternal party in China [Herald, 9 October 1999]. Comparatively speaking,

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the ANC in South Africa has been quite successful in raising both domestic and external resources for election campaigns. For the 1994 election, it received funding from diverse sources in Sweden (US$20m), Russia (US$24m), Taiwan (R20m) and from Indonesia (R20m) (Pottie, 1999). In South Africa, as in Zimbabwe, private and foreign donations to parties are not subject to any regulation. Amongst the substantial foreign donations which the ANC received for the 1999 elections were US$10 million each from the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia [Pottie, 1999b]. It would follow that it would be difficult to over-estimate the material advantages which ruling parties enjoy in access to both domestic and foreign donations for election purposes. At the same time, it cannot be over-emphasized that opposition parties find it more difficult, if not impossible, to raise comparable levels of election funding.

This is the context in which opposition parties have been critical of the current formulae for party and election funding. The formulae are viewed as discriminating against small and new parties that are not represented in parliament. An example of such criticism was made by the 33 parties denied funding in South Africa:

“is it really fair? Can seven parties democratically decide the future for 33 parties in a multi-party democracy? Voters are not being given the opportunity to exercise their democratic right of choice. Seven parties cannot decide who gets funded and who does not get funded” [Quoted in Pottie, 1999a].

In Zimbabwe, opposition parties have lambasted ZANU-PF’s sole monopoly of state funding as well as its extensive use of patronage for election purposes [The Mirror, 8 October 1999]. ZANU-PF is currently mobilising election funding with a target Z$75 million (or about US$2 million]. In order to introduce some fairness into campaign financing, opposition parties in Botswana have advocated public funding for contesting parties since the 1990s. Unless this was done, “the playing field will continue to favour the ruling party” [Somolekae, 1999]. This conclusion can be extended to the situation elsewhere in Southern Africa; opposition parties encounter enormous constraints in mobilising sufficient funds for election campaigns.

With a few exceptions (as in 1991 in Zambia) and (Malawi in 1994) where incumbent ruling parties were toppled, elsewhere ruling parties have reaped the advantages of incumbency as well as restrictive party funding provisions. The scope of growth and visibility of small and new parties has therefore been restricted. Similarly, voters have not been beneficiaries of funding regulations which discriminate against parties without parliamentary seats. A kind of Catch-22 situation exists : without seats or a certain threshold of votes a party is excluded access to funding, but in order for it to mobilise membership widely, it requires resources!

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Of course, it is difficult to estimate what precise difference access to funding would have to the fortunes of opposition parties. If the funds were utilised for voter mobilization, they would expand the scope of political choice available to citizens, and thus broadly contribute to democracy. The material base of opposition parties needs to improve. Incumbent parties should not place obstacles to opposition parties raising domestic funding and foreign funding (where regulations allow such). The widespread criticism of current formulae for public funding of parties would need their review to take into account the conjunctural conditions of fragile democratisation in the region.

In sum, the issue of funding will remain a contested one in most countries. We saw that there are different regulations in different countries relating to the funding of broad party activities and of election campaigns. There are also different rules concerning the raising of donations from domestic and foreign sources. Finally, the question of who should have access to public funding will also remain contested even though there will always be need for a formula that uses some selective criteria so that not every party that is formed gets entitled to funding. The legislation on accounting for the utilisation of public funds varies between countries but it is imperative that it ensures that receipients of such funding should use it in a transparent manner.

5. WIDER ISSUES IN POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENT

Our discussion above of the contemporary role of parties and limitations of the funding regulations and resources persuade one to take a sober rather than a sanguine view towards parties in the Southern Africa region. The trends relating to membership levels in parties and growing voter apathy could have a negative long-term effect on the prospects of consolidation of sustainable democracy. For example, one survey concluded that membership in parties in South Africa appeared to be on the wane (EISA, 1999). Whereas a previous survey had observed that just before the 1994 elections, one in five of eligible voters had been active members of a party, a recent survey suggested that the proportion had declined to 1 in 10. While active membership amongst blacks had declined from 24 percent in 1994 to 12 percent in 1999, the decline was steeper amongst whites from 17 percent in 1994 to about 4 percent in 1998 (EISA, 1999). The survey thus suggested a substantial disengagement from active party politics since the democratic transition in 1994. In the case of Zambia, the ruling MMD publicly admitted the weak state of its party; more generally, the weakness of the organisational capacity of parties in Zambia has impaired their capacity to mobilise voters (Chikulo, 1996). A similar tend in the decline of party membership has been discerned in Zimbabwe. However, it is not possible to have precise data on membership trends in both ruling and opposition parties, nor is it possible to establish whether a decline in ruling party membership is accompanied by an increase in opposition party membership!

The notable trend in disengagement from active party membership appears to be accompanied, with a few exceptions, by increasing apathy amongst voters in the region. For example, it was observed that in Botswana about 30 percent of the population which was eligible to vote did not bother to register (SADC

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RHDR, 1998). Furthermore, up to 25 percent of registered voters did not cast their ballots. In Zimbabwe, voter apathy has become more and more pronounced. Whereas an estimated 94 percent of eligible voters turned to vote in the 1980 independence elections, by 1996 the proportion had significantly shrunk to 32 percent in 1996 (Sachikonye, 1999). Even though the MMD is a relatively new party, it has not stemmed the tide of growing voter apathy in Zambia. Comparing the elections of 1991 and 1996 on the basis of the proportion of the estimated potential electorate who participated suggests a decline from 39 percent in 1991 to 30 percent in 1996 (Baylies and Szeftel, 1997). There are a few exceptions to deepening voter apathy. Both voter registration and turn-out during the 1994 and 1999 elections in Mozambique have been impressive. The proportion of registered voters to eligible ones was 78 percent in 1994 and 85 percent in 1999; participation in actual voting was high at about 70 percent of registered voters in the 1999 elections. Factors such as a competitive PR system and the active mobilising role of national electoral commission largely explain the absence of voter apathy in Mozambique. The challenge to political systems in Southern Africa is to address the root causes of voter alienation where it exists. Such alienation expresses itself in apathy which is unhealthy for democracy. The alienation is expressed in the attitude of voters that their votes would not make any difference in electoral outcomes.

Another major trend in the political systems in Southern Africa is the phenomenon of dominant-party system. This is latter-day version of a de facto one-party state. Thus although all the states in region (with the exception of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Swaziland) are nominally multi-party states, the majority of them have a creeping dominant-party system. Examples of parties that have the basis of dominant party systems in their respective countries are the ANC (in South Africa), BDP (in Botswana), Swapo (in Namibia), CCM (in Tanzania), MMD (in Zambia), ZANU-PF (in Zimbabwe) and until the 1998 results were suspended the LCD (in Lesotho), Mauritius Labour Party (in Mauritius). However, bucking the trend are the formerly one-party systems of Malawi and Mozambique.

What is the significance and implications of dominant-party systems in Southern Africa? It is a system which is not healthy for competitive party politics (and by extension) for democracy. As it was observed:

"in nine SADC countries, the ruling party controls on average 82 percent of the elected seats in the legislative assembly ... Basically these results show the exclusion of many political players from the countries' law-making machinery and thereby jeopardising the chances of consensus. This is a serious problem, especially in what are generally gender, ethnic and racially divided societies in the region. These results further explain the weak characteristics of legislatures in most countries in the region ... Without an effective opposition entrenched in parliament, large majority party regimes share some of the weaknesses of one-party state systems" (SADC RHDR, 1998).

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The 1999 elections in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa resulted in a substantial increase in the number of parliamentary seats of the dominant parties. In Tanzania and Zambia, by-elections have seen seats originally held by opposition parties pass to the dominant parties namely CCM and MMD. The entrenchment of the dominant-party system and the crisis engulfing opposition parties in such countries as Botswana, Lesotho, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe point to major problems with the political party as an institution in the region (IDEA, 1998).

We have already identified some of the problems which beset opposition parties including limited resources. In some countries, dominant parties actively and systematically block attempts by opposition parties to attain viability or to reach voters through publicly-owned media. In others, we saw that the formula for the public funding of parties is stacked out against opposition parties. Instructively, most dominant parties do not see anything particularly unfortunate or contradictory in this state of affairs. A constant refrain is that it was not their responsibility to "strengthen" opposition parties. In effect, they disclaim any responsibility towards contributing to the structural conditions which undermine the growth and consolidation of opposition parties. Those structural conditions have partly contributed to the incapacity of most opposition parties to win any parliamentary seats. Indeed, it is instructive that the majority of opposition parties in the region are non-parliamentary parties, and so remain on the fringes of parliamentary politics.

However, the structural and regulatory conditions under which opposition parties operate are not the sole factor contributing to their poor performance. Internal democracy in the parties is often in deficit, and there is a tendency for fragmentation into factions. The temptation for self-destructiveness has resulted in interminable splits within opposition parties in such countries as Zimbabwe, Botswana and Zambia (Swatuk, 1999). The incentives for internal cohesion and stability are weak within opposition parties. To compound the problems of opposition parties, the dominant parties sometimes smuggle agents provocateurs into them "to cause disruptions for them from within and, thus, limit the actual and potential challenges which they pose to the incumbent government" (Olukoshi, 1998). In sum, the political systemic conditions are not very favourable for opposition parties because these deny them an opportunity to participate in parliamentary politics.

Finally, it needs to be pointed out that there is a significant proliferation of new parties in countries in the region. Most of them were founded in the 1990s and more tend to be formed each time an election is held. In general, the installation of the multi-party system in formerly one-party state systems has created propitious conditions for the proliferation. For instance, the number of new parties in such countries as Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, the formerly one-party states. Consider the following: Zambia had about 34 parties by December 1999 out of which 5 were represented in Parliament; Angola had 13 parties out of which 7 had representatives in Parliament while Tanzania had also 13 parties out of which 5 had representatives in Parliament. Mozambique boasted of about 18 parties with 10 of them grouped under the Renamo electoral alliance. However, the proliferation of parties has

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also been a feature of countries that never went through the one-party state phase. There are about 33 parties in South Africa, more than 25 in Zimbabwe and 7 parties in Mauritius.Undoubtedly, the process of democratisation has created space for a plethora of parties with different programmes and platforms. However, the quantitative explosion in the formation of parties does not appear to be matched by a qualitative growth within the parties themselves, and we have discussed the factors contributing to their stunting elsewhere in the paper. In some countries, it has become necessary for some parties to form broad alliances especially at election time. Such has been the case in Mozambique, Mauritius, Zambia and Tanzania and more currently in Zimbabwe.

6. POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE WIDER SOCIAL CONTEXT

So far this paper has mainly assessed the role of parties and inter-party competition in relation to electoral contests and power struggles. There is need to extend the analysis to the issues of representation in the parties themselves as well as their broader relationships with civil society. These issues have a direct bearing on the depth of democratisation within political institutions including parties, and within civil society. In particular, to what degree do parties in the region make efforts to mobilise membership amongst women and minority groups? To what extent, have they removed obstacles so that these groups can have access to positions of influence and leadership? The record of the different parties varies across the Southern Africa region. With one or two exceptions, the top leadership of parties is dominated by male politicians; indeed all the ruling parties are led by males. This may not be particularly unusual in view of the trends even in older democracies. However, the marginalisation of women in parties translates into a meagre presence of women in both parliament and cabinet in the majority of countries. While all the states have pledged to enhance the political empowerment of women, most have yet to implement this commitment and policy at the national level (Meena, 1998). Yet women tend to turn out in considerable numbers as voters at elections, and even play a more active role in the mobilising party membership as experiences in Malawi and Zimbabwe have shown. In general, however, while male members occupy the top echelons of parties, few women enter leadership positions.

However, there are several exceptions to this general trend. In South Africa, about 25 percent of the new parliamentarians in the post-apartheid legislature consisted of women. In Mozambique, there were in 1998 some 63 women parliamentarians in a house of 250 members, and Frelimo has adopted a quota of at least one-third for women on their candidacy lists. Tanzania has set aside a quota of 15 percent of its parliamentary seats for women in a house of 274 members. More recently, the quota for women party members in the ZANU-PF central committee was increased, and the pressure for a bigger allocation for positions for women in parliament and cabinet continues to grow.

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Perhaps, the more notable progress in the role of a party in consciously encouraging women empowerment in party and parliamentary politics is that achieved by the ANC in South Africa. After substantial debate in its ranks, the ANC agreed on the need for a quota observing that the systematic barriers to the political participation should be actively addressed (Hassim, 1999). The use of the quota system was facilitated by the PR list system which greatly improved women's chances of being elected. The system enabled the party leadership to overcome traditional resistance to women's election including in rural communities where the resistance of chiefs to women's empowerment has been particularly difficult to challenge. During the 1999 elections, the proportion of women parliamentarians increased further to 29,7 percent (EISA, 1999). As a party, the ANC itself sponsored 36 percent of women members for parliamentary seats. However, for women's concerns to remain on the political agenda, it is important that women position themselves as a serious constituency to be targeted by political parties.

Data concerning the representation of minorities in parties is more sparse. Nevertheless, the marginalisation of ethnic and racial minorities in parties and decision-making institutions dilutes the content of democracy in the region. Some of the minorities, such as whites, formerly constituted a privileged political class while others may be smaller ethnic groups whose 'voices' need to be listened to. While the SMD system makes it harder for these minority interests to have a good chance in electoral contest, the PR system has a greater capacity to improve their endeavours for representation in parliament and government. Political parties should make special efforts to encourage the participation of these minority interests. Their experiences in deliberate efforts at women empowerment could be drawn upon.

Several other major issues impinge on the broader role of parties in societies in the region. These relate to linkages between parties and civil society (including the media). The linkages have historical dimensions which should not be ignored. The nationalist movements often consisted of diverse social groups including civil society organisations such as labour unions, student unions, church-affiliated organisations and rural organisations to name a few. To that extent, there was a symbiotic relationship between movements (for independence or liberation) and civil society organisations. Their one unifying objective was the overthrow of colonialism and apartheid. However, this symbiotic relationship did not last. Authoritarianism under one-party state rule or under the dominant-party system provoked criticism and campaigns from the same civil society organisations such as human rights groups, women's and student organisations and sections of the media. While civil society organisations have tended to be assertive about their autonomy and conscious of the need to stem the erosion of democracy, ruling parties have often trampled on basic human and political rights. At least this was the scenario before the 'third wave' of democratisation swept across the region in the 1990s. There is now a great deal of variation in relations between parties and civil society organisations (CSOs), ranging from cordial to strained relations. The more authoritarian and repressive a state is, the more strained its relations with CSOs tend to be. In such a context of polarization, human rights organisations, the independent media, various non-governmental organisations (NGOs), student and labour unions are often in the forefront of campaigns for the restoration of basic civil and political rights.

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Thus relations between governments (and ruling parties) and CSOs are conditioned by whether there is a transparent democratic political culture or not. Where such a culture is absent, the CSOs often pit their weight behind opposition parties which promise to restore democracy. To that extent, CSOs sometimes develop partisan sympathies (as they did during independence and anti-apartheid struggles) to the annoyance of the ruling party and incumbent government. Hence the frequent heated exchanges between ruling parties and those NGOs, media and other groups in civil society which criticise their ideologies and programmes. There is a strong temptation for ruling parties to display an arrogance based on the considerable powers which they wield. Yet tension between a critical civil society and ruling party is healthy; it can check certain excesses of the dominant party system. Government and ruling party attacks on both domestic and foreign NGOs, on the independent media and human rights which question aspects of their governance are attempts to stifle what should be healthy tension between the incumbent elite and the 'watchdog' institutions in civil society.

While the relationship between the ruling parties and CSOs may be strained, that between opposition parties and CSOs may be cosy. Strategic alliances between parties and CSOs have been forged to practical effect in such instances as the MMD campaign for power in 1991 in Zambia, and in the ANC ascendancy to office in 1994 in South Africa. In the build-up to the 2000 elections in Zimbabwe, the CSOs are working closely with the opposition parties in the campaign against ZANU- PF. The larger question is whether CSOs should compromise on their autonomy and throw their weight behind opposition parties. This is a grey area. Once CSOs intervene directly in politics on a partisan basis, they lay themselves open to partisan attacks from the incumbent parties. The debate on this issue ought to continue.

More generally, a strong civil society has been an important insurance for democracy. Well-organised CSOs provide continuous and sufficient pressure on incumbent governments to be responsive to their interests. A dense civil society "has an importance for democracy ... because it establishes a counterweight to state power" (Rueschemeyer et.al., 1992). It could also be added that a vibrant civil society provides a counterweight to dominant-party hegemony. In Southern Africa, the strength of civil society varies considerably between countries. Its strength is more marked in the relatively more industrialised countries such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and to some degree in Botswana and Namibia. The formation of civil society institutions in predominantly agrarian sectors has been relatively slow. In sum, the constructive potential of CSOs in contributing to an enabling environment for democracy exists (SADC RHDR, 1998). The already play a useful in civic education for voters in most countries in the region. As it has been observed:

"the comparative advantage of CSOs is their proximity to the grassroots. They are close to their membership, their needs and interests. They play the role of mobilizing the people. In that way, they

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instil a greater civic consciousness besides contributing to the social capital and material development of a particular society" (SADC RHDR, 1998).

Both parties and CSOs have their respective strengths which they can marshall to enrich the democratic culture and practice in society. Fruitful areas of mutual understanding and cooperation ought to be explored by both sets of partners.

In assessing the role of parties in the wider social context, some consideration need to be firstly made of their relations with the media, and secondly the centrality of the leadership factor. We begin by briefly examining relations with the media. In political campaigns and elections, the media is a powerful instrument. Although the circulation of newspapers and magazines varies widely between countries in the region, their key importance in disseminating political messages in obvious. Radio has even a much wider audience while television is reaching more and more citizens especially in urban centres. Control of this media is therefore a contested issue between political parties. The degree and fairness in access to this media by parties is a perennially controversial matter. Of course, the content of regulations concerning access to the media, especially to public radio and television varies widely between countries. While some countries have a more liberal access to public radio and television to parties, most tend to have restrictive regulations which are biased in favour of the ruling party. It is during election campaigns that controversies about access to the media become more heated.

Incumbent parties have an enormous advantage in getting more press coverage and air time than opposition parties. This relates to coverage in "news" as well as in political advertising. Opposition parties in Botswana, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe have criticised the "hogging" of public media by the ruling party at election times (Lodge, 1999; Moyo, 1992; ESC, 1996). Ruling parties have not been eager to review regulations concerning party broadcasts to ensure equity in access to public media to disseminate their political messages. Where states have an ownership stake in some of the press (as in Zambia and Zimbabwe), the advantage to the ruling party is even greater. In addition, some ruling parties have their own newspapers as in Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe amongst others. Very few, if any, opposition parties own their own media. There are a few exceptional cases where regulations are not to the disadvantage of opposition parties, even though such regulations apply mainly to coverage of election campaigns. In Namibia and South Africa, for instance, the public broadcasting corporations discuss with parties on how broadcasting time should be allocated between them. Public funding is made available to political parties to participate in broadcasting their messages. Nevertheless, there is a vast scope for improvement as far as equitable access to the media by all parties is concerned. It is undesirable that ruling parties monopolise the media. This is unhealthy for political pluralism. There should be rules for both the public and private media to ensure that, as far as possible, there was balanced and equitable coverage of the activities and messages of all parties. Political choice for citizens is broadened when they are exposed to competing party agendas and programmes. There is little gain from "blacking out" opposition parties from the media, but where this was effective in

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reducing their chances of electoral inroads, such practice would amount to "rigging" the political proces

Finally, let us now turn to the question of leadership in both ruling and opposition parties. Leadership is a critical factor in the development and outlook of a party. Leadership styles vary widely between parties within the region. However, as we observed, there is, with few exceptions, a strong streak of one 'dominant personality' of almost cult status in most of the parties. The founding father of the party has a unique status. It has been observed that:

"as the vehicle of its leader, the party's life expectancy and prospects are tied to its founder's fate. Its programme will often be limited in scope, and may not show much philosophic consistency" (Monga, 1997).

In other words, parties need to outgrow their founding and present leaders eventually. A institutionalised party-system requires commitment to an organisation and to some minimal collective goals, equally importantly "requires loyalty beyond allegiance to a single leader" (Mainwaring, 1998). In the Southern Africa, the general trend has been for leaders to treat parties as their "firms" or "possessions". This trend has been as widespread in opposition as in ruling parties. The few exceptions have been the older and more stable parties with internal procedures which facilitate a smooth change of leadership (as in Botswana and South Africa). In general, the tendency has been for the founder party leader to stay on for many years (as in the cases of leadership of the CCM, MCP, UNIP, SWAPO and ZANU PF). Equally amongst opposition, the leadership of BNF, LCD and Renamo has not undergone change. Thus tied up with the leadership issue is that of internal party democracy. To what degree are parties open in their mechanisms for allowing "fresh blood" to assume leadership positions? Of course, party leaders would seek to defend their re-election to leadership positions even in advanced age on the basis of their popularity amongst party members. This does not necessarily diminish the issue of internal democracy, especially the rigging against potential younger leaders. This is a matter which parties have to discuss frankly within themselves. In some instances, the tenacious hold onto power has sometimes sparked bitter factional struggles (as in the case of the BNF in Botswana) (Swatuk, 1999; Ntau and Sebudubudu, 1999). Whereas there may be a greater incentive for ruling parties to stick by their long-serving leader, there may be less in the opposition parties marginalised from power. It is scarcely surprising that some of the more embarassing faction and power struggles occur in opposition leading to deleterious splits. Although the leadership question is not the sole cause of such setbacks in opposition parties, it often looms large in determining how internal party squabbles are settled or mishandled. In the next section,we try to tie together the salient issues that have emerged from this study and develop some recommendations.

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7. RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Institutionalisation of Parties

Political parties are potentially the most active and legitimate instruments for mobilizing broad participation in the political process. They are therefore an indispensable foundation-stone for participatory democracy. Ways and means should therefore be sought to strengthen parties as important national institutions. This is even more imperative in the Southern Africa region where most parties are weak and dormant except during election campaigns. There is clear need for the institutionalisation of party systems in which parties have strong roots in society, in which ties between citizens and parties are firmer, and the links between organised interests and parties are more developed. In particular, the concept of `loyal opposition’ should be broadly accepted by both ruling and opposition parties in order to replace the adversarial perceptions and practices which bedevil relations between the two sides in most countries. Indeed, the value of a strong and credible opposition party or parties should be imbibed as a central and vital feature of sustainable democracy. To that extent, leaders of opposition parties, especially of the official opposition party should be accorded the respect and privileges which such a position deserves in a democratic system.

7.2 Funding of Parties

The study observed that public funding of parties was not applied in all countries and to all registered parties in the region, and the disadvantages of this unevenness in coverage were enumerated. In general, however, incumbent parties had a greater leverage in access to funding, whether public or private, than opposition parties. The material base of opposition parties should be improved. Incumbent parties should not place obstacles against opposition parties seeking to raise domestic resources and foreign funding (where regulations allow such). The widespread criticism of most current formulae for public funding of parties suggests that they should be reviewed to take into account the conjunctural conditions of fragile democratisation process in the region. Funds used for such activities as voter education and mobilisation would expand the scope of political choice available to citizens, and thus broadly contribute to democracy. There should be mechanisms to ensure that such funds as are channeled to parties are accounted for in a transparent manner. Some selective criteria will continue to be needed so that not every party formed can claim a right to public funding.

7.3 National Civic Education

This study observed that there was a discernible trend towards a decline in membership in most parties, and that voter apathy during elections was another worrying development. The challenge to political systems in Southern Africa is to reverse the substantial disengagement from active participation in party

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membership and activities, and to address the root causes of voter alienation. Such alienation expresses itself in apathy which is unhealthy for democracy. Often the alienation is expressed in the fatalistic attitude of voters that their votes would not make any difference in electoral outcomes. This trend appears to be pronounced in those countries with dominant-party systems. There should be developed national civic education programmes to educate citizens about their rights and responsibility to participate in the political process. Such programmes should seek to create awareness of the need for participation in community, local and Central Government activities and should be incorporated into the school curriculum. Public funding should be sought for these civic education programmes which should encourage increased participation rather than apathy towards the political process.

7.4 Representation of Group Interests in Parties

The record of different parties in enhancing the representation of key groups such as women and minorities varies across the Southern Africa region. With a few exceptions, the top leadership of parties is dominated by males. The marginalisation of women translates into a meagre presence of women in both parliament and cabinet in the majority of countries. The use of a quota system for women representation in party leadership positions and in parliament appears to be an innovative approach in several countries which have adopted it. The experiences of these countries in fostering increased women participation should be distilled, and more sustained efforts made to broaden that participation.

Although data concerning the representation of minorities in parties is more sparse, their marginalisation in parties and decision-making institutions stands out. Some of the minorities, such as whites formerly constituted a privileged political class while others may consist of smaller ethnic groups whose `voices’ need to be listened to. The electoral system should have a greater capacity to improve their chances of representation in parliament and government. In particular, political parties should make special efforts to encourage the participation of these minority interests.

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7.5 Civil Society Organisations and Political Parties

Relations between parties and civil society organisations (CSOs) are partly conditioned by whether there exists a transparent democratic political culture or not in a particular society. Where such a culture is absent, the CSOs sometimes develop partisan sympathies (as they did during independence an anti-apartheid struggles) to the annoyance of ruling party and government. While the relationship between the ruling parties and CSOs may be strained, that between opposition parties and CSOs may be cosier. Strategic alliances between parties and CSOs have been forged to practical effect (in Zambia in 1991) and in South Africa (in 1994). The larger question is whether CSOs should compromise their autonomy and throw their weight behind parties of their choice. The debate on this issue ought to continue. In sum, however, both parties and CSOs have their respective strengths which they can marshal to enrich democratic culture and practice in society. Fruitful areas of mutual cooperation ought to be explored by both sets of partners.

7.6 Parties and Access to the Media

The issue of equitable access to the media is a contentious one between political parties. The content of regulations governing access to the media, especially to public radio and television, varies between countries. While some countries ensure a more liberal access to public radio and television to parties, most tend to have restrictive regulations which are biased in favour of the ruling party. It is during election campaigns that controversies about access to the media become more heated amongst parties.

There is a vast scope for improvement as far as equitable access to the media by all parties is concerned. It is undesirable that ruling parties monopolise the media. There should be acceptable rules for both the public and private media to ensure that, as far as possible, there was balanced and equitable coverage of the activities and messages of all parties. Political choice for citizens is broadened when they are exposed to competing party agendas and programmes.

7.7 Leadership of Parties

Leadership is a critical factor in the development and outlook of a party. The study observed that, with few exceptions, there was a strong tendency towards one `dominant personality’, of an almost cult status in most parties. A strong and sustainable party needs to outgrow its founding and present leaders; it requires commitment to an organisation and minimal collective goals.

29



Party institutionalisation requires loyalty beyond allegiance to a single leader. There is need for both opposition and ruling parties to outgrow the tendency of leaders to treat parties as their “firms” or “possessions”. Internal party democracy needs deepening to prevent rigging against potential younger leaders rising to the top.

30


8. REFERENCES

C. Baylies and M. Szeftel (1997) "The 1996 Zambian Elections: Still Awaiting Democratic Consolidation", Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 24 No. 71.

M. Bratton (1998) “Second Elections in Africa" Journal of Democracy Vol. 9 No. 3.

B. Chikulo (1996) "Parliamentary By-Elections in Zambia: Implications for the 1996 Poll". Review of African Political Economy, No. 69 Vol. 23.

M.A. Dahoo (1999) "Electoral Country Audit on Election Management in Mauritius". Paper presented to an EISA workshop, Johannesburg, March 1999.

J.K. van Donge (1998) "Reflections on Donors, Opposition and Popular Will in the 1996 Zambian General Elections". Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 36 No. 1.

EISA (Electoral Institute of

Southern Africa) (1999) Election Update 99 on South Africa, Johannesburg.

_______________ (1999b) Election Talk, September 1999.

ESC (Electoral Supervisory Report of the Electoral Supervisory Commission

Commission) (1996) on the Presidential Elections, Harare.

EU (European Union) (1999) Information on Mozambique and Elections 1999, Mimeo Maputo.

31



D. Glaser (1997) "South Africa and the Limits of Civil Society". Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 23 No. 1.

J.A. Hall (1992) 'Consolidations of Democracy' in D. Held (ed) Prospects for Democracy, London: Polity Press.

S. Hassim (1999) "Gendering Parliament" Southern Africa Report, May 1999.

IDEA (International Institute of

Democracy and Electoral

Assistance) (1999) Terms of Reference, Stockholm.

L.C.W. Kaela (1999) "Zambia: Electoral Profile". Paper to an EISA workshop, Johannesburg, March 1999.

T. Lodge (1999) "An Electoral Profile of South Africa", Paper presented to an EISA workshop, Johannesburg, March 1999.

S. Mainwaring (1998) "Party Systems in the Third Wave" Journal of Democracy, Vol. 9 No. 3.

K. Matlosa (1998) "Governance in Southern Africa: the Lesotho Case Study", Paper presented to a SARIPs workshop, September 1998, Harare.

R. Meena (1998) "Conceptual Issues of Gender in Southern Africa", Paper presented to a SARIPS workshop, June 1998, Windhoek.

P. McFadden (1998) "Race, Ethnicity and the Issues of Citizenship in Southern Africa". Paper presented to a SARIPs workshop, June 1998, Windhoek.

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C. Monga (1997) "Eight Problems with African Politics". Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8 No. 3.

J. Moyo (1992) Voting for Democracy. Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications

T.C. Nkiwane (1998) 'Opposition Politics in Zimbabwe: The Struggle Within the Struggle' in A. Olukoshi (ed). The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa. Uppsala: NAI

C. Ntau and D. Sebudubudu (1999) "Botswana: BDP Sails Through in the 1999 Elections". Southern Africa Political and Economic Monthly, December 1999, Vol. 13 No. 3.

A. Olukoshi (1998) 'Economic Crisis, Multipartiyism and Opposition Politics in Contemporary Africa' in A. Olukoshi (ed). The Politics of Opposition in Contemporary Africa, Uppsala: NAI.

N. Patel (1999) "An Electoral Profile of Malawi". Paper presented to an EISA workshop, March 1999, Johannesburg.

D. Pottie (1999a) "The Politics of Money: Funding Political parties". Election Update 99 on South Africa, EISA, Johannesburg.

____________ (1999b) "Normalisation? The South African Election". Southern Africa Report. August 1999.

D. Rueschemeyer et. al. (1992) Capitalist Development and Democracy. Chicago : University of Chicago Press.

L. Richey and S. Ponte (1996) "The 1995 Tanzania Union Elections". Review of African Political Economy. Vol. 67 No. 3.

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L.M. Sachikonye (1999) "An Audit of the Zimbabwe Electoral System". Paper presented to an EISA workshop, March 1999, Johannesburg.

______ and I. Mandaza (eds) (1991) The One-Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate. Harare: Sapes.

SADC-RHDR (1998) Regional Human Development Report. Harare: Sapes.

D. Simon (1995) "Namibia: SWAPO wins two thirds majority". Review of African Political Economy, No. 63.

G. Somolekae (1999) "An Electoral Audit of Botswana". Paper presented to an EISA workshop, March 1999, Johannesburg.

L. Swatuk (1999) "Botswana: The Opposition Implodes". Southern African Report, May 1999.

G. Totemeyer (1999) "Country Electoral Audit: Namibia". Paper presented to an ELSA workshop, Johannesburg, March 1999.

NEWSPAPERS

The Mirror, Harare.

The Herald, Harare.

Mail and Guardian, Johannesburg.

The Star, Johannesburg.

34


APPENDIXES

1. RESULTS OF THE 1999 BOTSWANA PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Party % of Votes Seats %

Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) 57 33 82Botswana National Front (BNF) 26 6 15Botswana Congress Party (BCP) 12 1 2.5Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM) 4 - -Social Democratic Party (SDP) - - -Mels Movement of Botswana - - -

Source:Ntau and Sebudubudu, 1999

2. RESULTS OF THE 1998 LESOTHO PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Party % of Votes Seats

Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) 60,7 79Basutoland National Party (BNP) 24,5 1Bosutoland Congress Party (BCP) 10,6 0Marema-tlou Party (MTP) 1,3 0Other Parties 2,0 0

Source: Matlosa, 1998

35



3. RESULTS OF THE 1996 ZAMBIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS


Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) 60 131 87Zambia Democratic Congress 14 2 1,3National Party 7 5 3,3National Lima Party 6,5 0 0Agenda for Zambia 1,5 2 1,3United National Independence Party (UNIP) 0,03 0 0Liberal Progressive Front 0,06 0 0Movement for Democratic Process 0,05 0 0National Congress 0,18 0 0Progressive Party 0,02 0 0Real Democratic Party 0,01 0 0Independents 10,21 10 6,6

Source: Baylies and Szeftel, 1997

4. RESULTS OF THE 1995 ZIMBABWEAN PARLIAMENTARY

ELECTIONS


ZANU-PF 81,4 117ZANU-NDONGA 6,7 2Forum Party of Zimbabwe 6,3 0Zimbabwe Congress Party 0,3 0Independents 5,1 1

Source: Sithole and Makumbe, 1997.

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5. RESULTS OF THE 1995 TANZANIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS


CCM 59,2 214 78CHADEMA 6,1 3 1,1CUF 5,0 28 10,2NCCR- Magenzi 21,8 19 6,9UDP 3,3 4 1,5

Source: Richey and Ponte, 1996

6. RESULTS OF THE 1999 MALAWIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS


United Democratic Front (UDF) 47,3 93Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) 10,6 29Malawi Congress Party (MCP) 33,8 66Congress for the Second Republic (CSR) - -Malawi Democratic Party (MDP) - -Malawi Democratic Union (MDU) - -Malawi National Democratic Party (MNDP) - -United Front for Multiparty Democracy (UFMD) - -Independents 7,1 4

7. RESULTS OF THE 1999 MOZAMBICAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS


Frelimo 48,5 133Renamo 38,8 117Partido Trabalista 2,7 -PALMO 2,5 -PSLD 2,0 -UMO 1,6 -UD 1,5 -

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8. RESULTS OF THE 1999 NAMIBIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Party Seats

SWAPO 61DTA 7COD 7UDF 2MAG 1

9. RESULTS OF THE 1999 SOUTH AFRICAN PARLIAMENTARY

ELECTIONS


ANC 66,3 266UDF 3,4 14IFP 8,5 38DP 6,8 28NNP 0,7 3PAC 0,7 3

38

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