The Future Cant Wait

“Government agencies are not normally known for thinking outside the box. This book is the rare and welcome exception, a genuine breath of fresh air. It is the kind of project that should become the norm in Washington, challenging all of us to look beyond what one participant describes as the tyrannies of the in-box, the demand for immediate results, the focus on a single sector, and reliance on uni-dimensional measures of success. It should become an annual exercise.”

Anne-Marie SlaughterBert G. Kerstetter ‘66 University Professor of Politics and International Affairs Princeton University Former Director of Policy Planning, United States Department of State

“Perhaps the most embarrassing failure of international development agencies has been their excessive focus on programming for past problems instead of anticipating the challenges of the future. Black swans have derailed many a development budget by forcing the reallocation of scarce resources to address game-changing events no one anticipated. This thoughtful and timely book remedies this failure and provides some useful guidance to policymaking on how to catch the next black swan before it catches us.”

Andrew S. NatsiosExecutive ProfessorGeorge H. W. Bush School of Government and Public ServiceFormer USAID Administrator

“Development assistance is one of our most powerful and cost-effective tools of national power to promote global democracy and economic growth. Yet, it is often behind the curve, focused only on today’s challenges, or last month’s crisis. Development practitioners must be in the vanguard, not the rear-guard, when it comes to trends in population, migration, urbanization, natural resource depletion, and science and technology or become obsolete. Today’s world is moving too fast, is too complex, and inaction too detrimental not to make futures analysis the leading edge of development thinking.”

E. William ColglazierScience and Technology Adviser to the Secretary of State

This book is the rare and welcome exception, a genuine breath of fresh air.– Anne-Marie SlaughterFormer Director of Policy Planning, United States Department of State

Over-the-Horizon Views on Development

Edited by Steven Gale and Sarah Jackson

The Future C

an’t Wait

Futures Cover.indd 1 8/12/13 3:18 PM

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The Future Can’t Wait

Futures text.indd 1 8/12/13 11:54 AM

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U.S. Department of State

U.S. Agency for International Development

National Defense University

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

First printing, September 2013


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iv

vi Acknowledgements

Part 1: Introduction

2 Foreword Donald Steinberg

4 Chapter 1 AbouttheUSAIDSymposiumandBookRoadmapSarah Jackson

10 Chapter 2 GoingLongandShortTooSteven Gale

Part 2: The Four Symposium “Tracks”

22 Populations Panel Synopsis

24 Chapter 3 TheFutureoutto2030:AccordingtoDemographyRichard Cincotta

42 Science and Technology Panel Synopsis

44 Chapter 4 TechnologicalChangeandSustainableDevelopmentLinton Wells

52 Chapter 5 FutureTrends:Science,Technology,andEngineeringforDevelopment Andrew Reynolds

64 Politics and Economies Panel Synopsis

66 Chapter 6 BeyondTraditionalForeignAssistance:USAID’sFutureRolewithMiddle-IncomeCountriesDaniel Runde

76 Chapter 7 TheUnitedStates,LatinAmerica,andtheCaribbean:SecuringRecoveryandProsperitythroughDeeperEconomicPartnershipLeonardo Martinez-Diaz

86 Environment Panel Synopsis

88 Chapter 8 ThePeripheryIsn’tPeripheral:AddressingFutureTrendsThroughIntegratedAnalysisandDevelopmentGeoffrey Dabelko

Contents


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Part 3: Conclusion

96 Chapter 9 StrategicVision:ForesightResearchforDevelopmentLeon Fuerth

104 Chapter 10 CanGlobalDevelopmentProgressContinue?ThreeFutureScenariosandWhatTheyDependOnSteven Radelet

113 AbouttheContributors


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ThisbookwasdevelopedbytheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)underaninitiativeoftheOfficeofScienceandTechnology(OST)andbasedontheAgency’sfirst-everSymposiumonFutureDevelopmentChallengesheldinWashingtonD.C.onNov.4,2011.Thesymposiumwasco-hostedbytheU.S.DepartmentofState,theNationalDefenseUniversity,andtheWoodrowWilsonCenterforInternationalScholars.Thisbookwasthenaturaloutcomeofthesymposium,butitalsoreflectsalargerinterestamongthesponsoringorganizationsandtheindividualchapterauthorstogobeyondtheeventitselfandlookfurtheraheadtoaddressfuturedevelopmentchallenges. WewouldliketothankDr.AlexDehgan,ScienceAdvisertotheUSAIDAdministrator,forhiscontinuedsupportforthesymposium,andforhissteadfastencouragementtomakefuturesanalysisanintegralpartoftheAgency’sevidenced-basedanalyticefforts.WearealsoindebtedtoTallieFaircloth,nowatStanfordUniversity,forconceivingthesymposiumformat,recruitingworld-classspeakers,andforperformingmanyessentialbehind-the-scenesactivitiestomakethesymposiumasuccess.ThisworkwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthecontinuedfeedbackprovidedbySusanReichle,AssistanttotheAdministratorfortheBureauofPolicy,PlanningandLearning(PPL)andLarryGarber,PPLDeputyAssistantAdministrator.SpecialrecognitionalsogoestoahandfulofverytalentedanalystsincludingDr.MichaelCrosswell,TishButler,Dr.TjipWalker,andKennethLanzawhoencouragedfuturesanalysisthinkingfromtheverystartandwhoservedonthesymposiumsteeringcommittee.WeowesincerethankstoStevenFondriestwhoco-managedthesymposiumandprovidedvaluableinsightateverystep.Finally,theeditorsacknowledgetheoutstandingtechnicalsupportreceivedfromNatanaelleOrismaatUSAID’sKnowledgeServicesCenter. Webenefittedimmeasurablyfromtheguidanceandexperienceofoursymposiumco-hostsattheU.S.StateDepartment,notablyDr.SusanNelson,DirectorofOutreachattheBureauofIntelligenceandResearchandDr.AnneCheever,alongwithoutstandingintellectualsupportfromDr.LinWells,NeylaArnas,andLouElinDwyerattheNationalDefenseUniversity.TheWilsonCenter’sDr.GeoffDabelko,nowatOhioUniversity,andKaylyOber,nowastudentattheLondonSchoolofEconomics,wereinstrumentalinbringingforwardtheverybestideasaboutfuturesanalysisaswellasvitallogisticalsupporttoourpartnership. ThebookwaseditedbyDr.StevenGaleofUSAID’SOfficeofScienceandTechnologyandSarahJacksonofUSAID’sKnowledgeServiceCenter.

Acknowledgments


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Video clips of the symposium and interviews with speakers and participants can be found at: http://kdid.org/events/symposium-future-development-challenges

To provide feedback, comments or for questions on futures analysis at USAID, please contact Dr. Steven Gale, USAID Office of Science and Technology at [email protected]

DisclaimerThe opinions expressed herein are those of the Author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Department of State, the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, or the National Defense University.

This publication was made possible through support provided by the Office of Science and Technology (OST), U.S. Agency for International Development, under the terms of Purchase Order No. AID-OAA-O-12-00079.


Part 1


Introduction


OnNovember4,2011,theU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)hostedthefirst-ever“SymposiumontheFutureofDevelopmentChallenges”inWashington,D.C.AlongwithourpartnersattheDepartmentofState,theWoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterforScholars,andtheNationalDefenseUniversity,webroughttogetherdevelopmenttheoristsandpractitioners,economistsanddemographers,scientistsandfuturiststoexploreanddiscussemergingdevelopmenttrendsthatwillshapeourcollectivepoliciesandprogramslongintothefuture. Itwasaninspiringday.Thesymposium’sgoalwastousefuturesanalysistohelpUSAIDandotherdevelopmentorganizationsturnourvisionfromourcurrentportfolioofprojectsandprograms,andextendourgazeoutoverdecadestocome.Insodoing,wewereseekingtocatchupwithourcounterpartsintheprivatesector,theintelligencecommunity,andthemilitary,whohavebeenengaginginfuturesanalysisforyears.Abriefviewofdevelopmenttrendsoverthepasttwodecadessuggestshowimportantthisexercisecanbe. Today,thetechnologyavailabletoeverypersonontheplanetinapersonaldigitalassistantismoreadvancedthansuper-computersin1990.Breakthroughsinscienceandinnovationapplicabletoglobalhealth,foodsecurity,andclimatechangeadaptationandremediationoccurdaily.Theflowofcapitaltodevelopingcountries—about$1trillioneachyear—nowdwarfsdevelopmentassistance,makingpublic-privatepartnershipsevermoreimportant.Childmortalityratesareplummetingthroughoutthedevelopingworldatrateseventhemostoptimisticexpertscouldnothaveanticipated,producingaso-called“demographicdividend.”Thewaveofdemocraticgovernancehasaccelerated:whentheBerlinWallfell,onlytwoofourdevelopmentpartnersinAfricaweredemocracies;today,morethan20enjoythatstatus. Manyofthesepasttrendswillcontinueintothefuture,butasweknowfrominvestmentprospectuses,pastperformanceisnotnecessarilyanindicatoroffuturedevelopments.ThemanyoutstandingpresentersanddiscussantsattheNovember2011symposiumstretchedourimaginationsandforcedustoreassessourdevelopmental,demographicandforeignaffairsassumptions. AsIlaunchedthesymposium,IcouldnothelpbutthinkbacktotheworkofIsaacAsimov,theAmericanbiochemistryprofessorandrenownedsciencefictionauthor.In1951,AsimovpublishedthenovelFoundation,thefirstofsevenvolumesreleasedaspartofhisFoundation Series.Inthesebooks,Asimovintroducedtheconceptsof“mathematicalsociology”and“psycho-history.”Hesuggestedthatstudyingthecollectiveactionsandtendenciesofsocieties—

2

Foreword


filteredthroughprobabilitytheory—canhelppredictthefuture.Inhisseries,agroupoftheworld’sgreatestscientistsandthinkerscametogethertoformtheFoundation,aninstitutionthatseeksnotjusttoforeseethefuture,buttogentlyguideitintomoreprosperous,peaceful,anddemocraticdirections. AttheUSAIDsymposium,attendeesexplorednewdevelopmentfrontiersusingfuturesanalysisandturnedtheeventintoavirtualrealityofAsimov’sFoundation.True,ourtime-framewasabitshorterthanthatoftheFoundation,whichlooked30millenniainadvance,butthelessonisthesame.Traditionalshort-termdevelopmentplansarenolongersufficient,andlonger-termplansmustbegroundedinthoughtfulanalysesoffuturetrends.Thismessageisparticularlyimportantasweconsidernewdevelopmentgoalsforthenextgenerationinthefollow-upontheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals. IamimmenselyproudofUSAID’sstatusasapre-eminentlearninginstitutionandathoughtleaderinfuturesanalysisfordevelopment.Workingwithourdevelopmentpartnersingovernments,multilateralinstitutions,theprivatesectorandcivilsociety,USAIDseekstoelevatetheimportanceanddrawfromthelessonsoffuturesanalysis.Ihopeyouwillfindinspirationinthethought-provokingchaptersinthisbooktoworkwithustomakeAsimov’svisionofaFoundationnotjustafantasy,butareality.

Donald Steinberg Former USAID Deputy Administrator

3


Thefirst-everUSAID Symposium on Future Development ChallengeswasheldNov.4,2011inWashington,D.C.andbroughttogetherexpertsfromanumberofdifferentdisciplinestofocusonanintegrative,multidisciplinaryapproachtofuturesanalysis.Thesymposiumwasdividedintothreesessions:Evolutions,Revolutions,andVision2025.Thesethreesessionsweredistinguishedbytheiroutlook.Evolutionsfocusedongradual“evolutionary”changesconsistentwithtraditionaltrendsandfuturesanalysis.Revolutionslookedatunexpected“revolutionary”eventsandtheshockstothesystemthatproducegame-changingeffects,oftenjump-startedbynewtechnologicaladvances.Thethirdsession,Vision2025,builtonthefirsttwosessionsandexploredacombined“vision”ofwhatdevelopmentwilllooklikein2025andbeyond.EachofthesethreesessionspromptedheateddiscussionsaboutthefutureofdevelopmentagenciessuchasUSAIDandsparkeddebateaboutthestepsdevelopmentpractitionerswillneedtotakeinordertoadapttheirperspectivesandadjusttheirpoliciesandprogramstomeetachangingandevolvingworld.Thesymposiumwasnotaboutpredictingthefuture,butratheraboutlookingsystematicallyatalternativefuturescenariostofacilitatebetterplanningandprojectimplementationforglobaldevelopment. Withineachofthesethreesessions,fourcross-cuttingtrackswereusedtohelporganizeandfocustheday’sdiscussions.Thesetrackswere:populations,scienceandtechnology,politicsandeconomies,andenvironment.Populationsexaminedthechangingdemographicsofdevelopingcountriesandtheimplicationsofthischange.Scienceandtechnologyfocusedontherapidly

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About the USAID Symposium and Book Roadmap

C H A P T E R 1


changingtechnologicaladvancesinsocietyandtheirimpactondevelopment.Politicsandeconomiesaddressedissuessuchasregionalintegration,theshiftingdonorlandscape,andachangingglobaleconomy.Theenvironmenttrackaddressedissuessuchasclimatechange,resourcescarcity,andrisingenergyneeds. Thesymposium’s“3x4”formatencourageddiscussiononpresenttrends,near-futurepossibilities,andfarreachingfuturescenarios.

Inthefollowingchapter,Going Long and Short Too,StevenGale,thesymposiumorganizerandco-editor,makesacompellingcaseforwhyfuturesanalysismustbecomeanintegralpartofhowUSAIDoperatesandshouldinformeverything—fromprojectdesigntoprogramplanningtopolicyformulationanddecision-making.Futuresanalysis,atermusedthroughoutthisbook,isthesystematicassessmentofupcomingevents,trends,anddataprojectionsthatenableaninstitutionlikeUSAIDtohavemoreimpactfulandresilientdevelopmentprograms.Futuresanalysisisonlyworthdoingifpolicymakersarewillingtotakeaction.Futuresanalysiscombinedwithactionablenextsteps,Galeargues,canenableAgencyleadershiptouncoveremergingtrends,envisionalternativescenarios,andachievebetterdevelopmentresults. Part2ofthisbookiscomprisedofsixchaptersauthoredbysixdifferentsubjectmatterexpertsfromthesymposium.Eachwasakeynotespeakeronapaneloraleaddiscussant.Weaskedtheauthorstousethesymposiumdiscussionsasastartingpointfortheirchapters,butgavethemtheflexibilitytoeitherexpanduponorbuildouttheideasthatwereraisedduringtheevent. Thesixchaptersaredividedintofoursectionsthatmodelthefourtracksofthesymposiumdescribedabove.Eachsectionisprefacedbyasynopsisthathighlightsmainideasandkeythemesthataroseduringthesymposiumpanels.Thesesynopsesweregleanedfromthenotesandaudiorecordingsofthesymposiumandthusdonotincludecitations. Chaptersbeginwithhighlightsoftheissuesthataroseduringthesymposium,buttheyeachgoontocovernewgroundandnewdevelopmentsthathavetakenplacesincetheevent.RichardCincottacoversthepopulationstrack;LinWellsandAndrewReynoldsaddressthescienceandtechnologytrack;DanRundeandLeonardoMartinez-Diaztacklethepoliticsandeconomiestrack;andGeoffDabelkoexploresenvironmentalissues. RichardCincottadiscusseshowpopulationage-structureanddemographicprojectionscanbeusedtoexaminefuturescenariosaswellashowthesepredictionscanandoughttoshapeU.S.policy.Inparticular,heexploreshowfourdifferenttypesofcountryage-structurecategories(youthful,intermediate,mature,andpost-mature)impactdevelopmentinitiatives,arguingthatsomeofthesecategoriesappeartobemore“favorable”formanagingamodernstatethanothers.Healsohighlightssomeoftheshortcomingsofinterpretingage-relateddatainisolationandnotestheimportanceofotherfactorsatplaysuchas

5


6

ethno-religiousdemographicshifts. LinWellsandAndrewReynoldsprovideimportantinsightsintohowtheadvancementofscienceandtechnology(S&T)hasalreadychanged,andwillcontinuetochangethefutureofdevelopment.Wells’chapteremphasizesthatadvancementsinS&TarespurringunprecedentedinnovationandthatinvestmentsintechnologicaldevelopmentareinthebestinterestoftheAmericanpeopleandtheglobalcommunity.Hediscussesaselectnumberofspecifictechnologicaladvancementsthatarelikelytoshapethenearfuture,emphasizingthattheuseoftechnologyismoreimportantthanitsexistence,andnotesthatanunderstandingofthevalueofS&Tmustbeleveragedtoimprovepolicymakingandgovernance. Reynolds’chapterdiscussesS&Tfromalesstechnical,butmoredevelopment-orientedviewpoint.HefocusesonexploringhowthedevelopmentassistancelandscapemustchangeastheS&Trevolution—particularlyinregardstoinformationcommunicationstechnology(ICT)—increasesglobalconnectivity.Thechaptercloselyprofilesthekeyideasthatemergedatthesymposiumandemphasizeshowtraditionalassistanceorganizationsmustadapttothenewcollaborativeenvironmentandleveragethepowerful21stcentury“aidscape”partnershipsthatuniversitiesandthemillennialsaretrailblazing.Wells’chapter,likeReynolds’,alsoemphasizestheimportanceofICT.ButhegoesontocategorizethelargertechnologicaltransformationstakingplacegloballyintermsofwhathereferstoasBRINE:Biotechnology,Robotics,Information,Nanotechnology,andEnergy.Wellsisquicktopointoutthatbuildingsocialnetworksandenhancingtrustwithlocalpopulationsisjustasimportantasanytechnologicalbreakthroughtoachievedevelopmentsuccess. DanielRundeandLeonardoMartinez-Diazbothdelivertwogreatchaptersconcerninghowtheworld’sshiftingpoliticalandeconomiclandscapewillimpactfuturedevelopment.BothchaptersfocusonthenewroletheUnitedStatesmustassumeinthecomingyears,butthethemesdiscussedarecertainlyapplicabletoothergovernmentsandgovernmentagenciesthroughouttheworld.Runde’schapterarticulateshowUSAIDmustchangethewayitprovidesassistance,particularlytomiddle-incomecountries.InlightofbudgetcutsandtheriseofBrazil,Russia,India,andChina,otherwiseknownastheBRICs,USAIDandotherdevelopmentagenciesmustfindawaytotransformthetraditionaldonor-recipientrelationshipintomoreofapartnershipmodel.Rundeemphasizesthepotentialroleofincreasedtrade,legacymechanisms,scenarioplanning,triangularcooperation,andnewcollaborationasthesepartnerrelationshipsbegintotakeshape.Martinez-Diaz’schapterisuniqueinthatitoffersaregionallenstothetopicoffuturesanalysis.HehighlightstheimportanceofregionalcooperationbetweenLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean(LAC)andtheUnitedStates,suggestingthatcloseeconomiclinksarecriticalforU.S.growthandjobcreationaswellasforLAC’seconomicpotential.


7

Advocatingdeepereconomicengagement,Martinez-DiazdescribesanumberoffactorsthatmaketheLACregionagoodfutureeconomicpartnerfortheUnitedStatesandbrieflytouchesonthestepsthattheU.S.Treasuryistakingtomakebettercooperationareality. GeoffDabelkotacklesenvironmentalissuesandcutsrighttothecoreoftoday’sshortcomingsindevelopmentthinkingandapproaches.Unrealisticexpectationsandanalyticinadequacieshinderdevelopmenteffortsaroundtheglobe.Dabelkofocusesontheneedtouseintegratedanalysis,notsingle-sectorapproaches,inordertounderstandandsolvetoday’scomplexandintertwiningdevelopmentchallenges.Heidentifies“fourtyrannies”thatimpedemoreeffectivedevelopmentoutcomes,notjustintheenvironmentalspace.The“tyrannyoftheinbox”overwhelmsaidpractitionersbydemandingtheirimmediateattentionandhindersin-depthanalysis.The“tyrannyofimmediateresults”demandsoutcomesbeforemeaningfulresultscanbeachieved.Dabelko’s“tyrannyofthesinglesector”highlightstheneedforcomplex,integrativeanalysis.Asafollow-up,Dabelkopointstothe“tyrannyoftheuni-dimensionalmeasurementofsuccess”whichcancauseprogramimplementerstoinadequatelymeasureimpact.Thegoodnews,accordingtoDabelko,isthatthesetyranniesarelosingground.Inthechapter,hepointsoutsomesuccessstoriesinAsiaandAfricathatspeaktothisgrowingshift. InPart3,LeonFuerthandStevenRadeletcontributevital,forward-thinkinginsightintheconcludingsectionofthebook.Fuerthdefinesanddiscussesthesignificanceofforesightresearchfordevelopment.Forpolicymakers,heargues,linearmodelsofcausalrelationshipsarenolongersufficient.Today’schallengesrequireUSAIDandothergovernmententitiestobepreparedtodealwithpoliciesandconsequencesthatareinteractiveandconcurrent.Inotherwords,forward-thinkingcomplexanalysisisvitaltothesuccessoffuturedevelopmentinitiatives.ThesecondhalfofFuerth’schapterjudiciouslyandarticulatelyoutlinesthebasiclexiconrelatedtofuturesanalysissothatreadersareclearaboutconceptsthatareoftenconfusedandconfusing. StevenRadelet’sconcludingpiecehighlightsthemomentousprogressglobaldevelopmenthasmadeoverthepast20years.Heoutlinessixkeydimensionsofchangethathaveandwillcontinuetoimpactthefutureofdevelopment.Hethendetailsthreeforward-thinkingscenariosthatdescribewhattheworldmightlooklikeinthenearfuture.Thesethreescenarios:thecontinuationofrapidglobaldevelopment,thederailmentofdevelopmentbyconflict,andincreasingpressureontheplanet,arecompellingandplausible.Radeletclosesbydescribingseveralfactorsthatwillcomeintoplayaspolicymakersattempttosteertheworldtowardstheleastdestructiveofthesescenariosandtowardsabetterfutureforall. Overall,thisbookaimstostimulatefurtherlearninganddiscussionaboutthefutureofdevelopment.Futuresanalysishasthepotentialtogreatlyfacilitate


8

internationaldevelopment;academicsandpractitionersalikemustgraspthisopportunitytoimprovetheplanning,implementation,impact,andassessmentofdevelopmentinterventions.USAIDandotherdevelopmentactorsmuststartplanningaheadtoidentifyemergingtrends—furtheraheadthaneverbefore.Thegoalsandaimsofthedevelopmentcommunityaremuchmorelikelytobeachievedifstrategies,programs,andpoliciestakethesefuturetrendsintoconsideration.Wemustbegintothinkandplanaboutalternativefuturesnowsothatgreater,moresustainable,andmoreresilientdevelopmentimpactsarewitnessedinthefuture.

Sarah Jackson U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)


9


Going Long

Lessthan10yearsago,mostenergyspecialists,alongwiththenation’stopeconomists,sawthefutureofU.S.energyconsumptionasbeingalmostentirelydependentonimportinghydrocarbonsfromtheusualplacesaroundtheglobe—notathomeorfromourneighbors.Anotherlong-heldviewwasthattheUnitedStateswouldexperienceonlyamodestincreaseindomesticoilandgasproductionoverthenextdecade.Consequently,domesticandglobalenergycompanieswerebuildingon-shorestoragefacilitiesforliquefiednaturalgas(LNG),constructingoff-loadinglittoralLNGplatforms,signingmulti-yearshippingcontractstotransportfuelstoU.S.andclose-byports,andaratchetingbackinhydrocarbon-relatedindustriesandthemanufacturingofenergy-relatedequipmentfordomesticuse.Thefuture,10yearsout,lookedclear. Aswenowknow,thefutureenergypicturelookssharplydifferenttoday.Thereisanalternativeworldviewinthemakingonenergyproduction.HydraulicfrackingandotherdrillinginnovationsarelikelytomaketheUnitedStatesanetexporterofliquefiednaturalgasoverthenextfivetosevenyearsorpossiblysooner,anddomesticoilproductiondatarevealsa25percentspikesince1980.1InNorthDakota,legendaryforitsexpansivefarmlandsandrich

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C H A P T E R 2

Going Long and Short TooSteven Gale, Symposium on Future Development Challenges organizer and book co-editor, makes a compelling case for why futures analysis must become essential to how USAID operates. By constantly monitoring emerging trends and re-calibrating programming, the Agency can stay ahead of the development curve.

1 DanielYergin,“TheRealStimulus:Low-CostNaturalGas,”The Wall Street Journal,October23,2012,availableat<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444734804578062331199029850.html>.


agriculturalbounty,oil-productionandpetroleum-relatedindustriesarelookingmorelikethestate’seconomicdestiny,notsoybeans,corn,orwheatproduction.Keepingwiththisenergythemeforjustabitlonger,itappearsthatthelargestsourceofU.S.oilimportstoday,Canadianoilsands,didnotevenexistonacommercialbasispriortothe1970s.2WhetherornotoilsandswilltoptheU.S.importlistisstillbeingdebated,butthereislittledoubtaboutaU.S.energyrenaissance.Accordingtoforward-thinkingglobalanalystsonWallStreet,inParisattheOrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment(OECD),andattheOrganizationofPetroleumExportingCountries(OPEC)inVienna,itisgenerallyagreedthatinlessthanadecadetheUnitedStateswillbecomethelargestglobaloilproducer—overtakingSaudiArabiabythemid2020sandbecominganetoilexporterby2030.3Itisfairtosaythatmanymainstreamthinkersweresimplycaughtoffguardbytheseemergingenergytrends.Theseenergysurpluses,andtheirinherentopportunities,werenotanunforeseenblackswanortheconsequenceofsomeentirelyunpredictableorevenstartlingmixofwhirlwindevents. Aretherelessonsdevelopmentpractitionerscanlearnfromourcolleaguesintheenergyworldabouttheneedtoalwaysbelookingatalternativefutures?Twoobviouspointscometomind.Thefirstisthatthingschangeatlightningspeedintoday’sfast-pacedglobalizedworldand“lookingdown”attoday’schallengesratherthan“lookingahead”atemergingtrendsisabadinvestment.Second,outcomesofinterestareoftenunanticipatedandrarelystraightforward,butseriousevidence-based,future-orientedanalysescanhelpdetecttrendseveniftheyarefaintandinconclusive.Developmentinterventionsmaynotbesubjecttoasabruptorasdramaticaswitchasthecurrentenergyrevolutionportends,yetnotfocusingonfuturedevelopmenttrendsisariskyandbadpolicy.Lookingattrendsandalternativefuturescanonlybeignoredatourperiland,moreimportantly,attheexpenseofthosewearetryingtoempoweraroundtheglobetohavebetterandmoreproductivelives. Thequestiondevelopmentprofessionalsshouldbeaddressingis,whatifsomeofthehottestdevelopmentenhancinginterventionsandtechnologiestoday—likee-readers, bed nets, micro grid technology, and smart phones4—werefoundnottomeettherapidlychangingneedsofintendedbeneficiaries?Whatifdevelopment-solvingproductsmanufacturedoutsidehostcountrieswereentirelysupplantedbyendogenoushome-growninnovationsoverthenext7to10years?

11

2 DanielYergin,The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World(NewYork:PenguinPress,2011).

3 World Energy Outlook 2012,InternationalEnergyAssociation,November12,2012,availableat<www.worldenergyoutlook.org>.

4 Thesmartphonestransformationisalreadyunderway.SeeStevenGaleandJamesEhlert,“ToolsforPeace:TheEmergingRoleofScienceandTechnology,”inStrategic Realities in Irregular Conflict,169–190,ed.FranklinD.KramerandMelanneCivic(Washington,DC:CenterforNavalAnalyses,January10,2013),availableat<www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Irregular_Conflict.pdf>.


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5 ThomasCampbell,ChristopherWilliams,OlgaIvanova,BanningGarrett,Could 3D Printing Change the World? Technologies, Potential, and Implications of Additive Manufacturing,StrategicForesightReport(Washington,DC:TheAtlanticCouncil,October2011);ConnorM.McNulty,NeylaArnas,andThomasA.Campbell,Toward the Printed World: Additive manufacturing and Implications for National Security,DefenseHorizon73(Washington,DC:CenterforTechnologyandNationalSecurityPolicy,September2012).

6 AndrewShepherdet.al.“AReconciledEstimateofIce-SheetMassBalance,”Science338,no.6111(November30,2012),1183–1189.

7 Against the Grain: Land Grabbing and Food Sovereignty in West and Central Africa(Barcelona,Spain:GRAIN,August2012),availableat<www.grain.org/article/entries/4575-land-grabbing-and-food-sovereignty-in-west-and-central-africa>.

8 LauraPappano,”TheYearoftheMOOC,”The New York Times,November2,2012,availableat<www.nytimes.com/2012/11/04/education/edlife/massive-open-online-courses-are-multiplying-at-a-rapid-pace.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>.

9 MihailC.Roco,ChadA.Mirkin,MarkC.Hersam,Nanotechnology Research Directions for Societal Needs in 2020: Retrospective and Outlook Summary,WorldTechnologyEvaluationCenter,December2010,availableat<www.wtec.org/nano2>.

Couldanyofthosetrendshavebeenforeseen?Whataboutupcomingnewtechnologieslike“3D-Printing”—whichsomesaywillrevolutionizemanufacturinginsmall-to-mediumsizeenterprisesorSMEs5—sooftenthetargetofdonoreconomicgrowthstrategies?Onthenaturalresourceleger,environmentalistsandothershavelongpointedtofutureharmfulimpactsonbiodiversity,degradedforests,andsealevelrises,alongwithothernegativeglobalimpactsonagricultureandfoodproductionresultingfromglobalclimatechange.Fluctuationsinprecipitationpatternsattributedtoclimatechangehavealsobeenlinkedtoincreasedrisks,especiallyinthedevelopingworld,resultingindroughts,floods,storms,andtsunamisthatcanseriouslyundercutthesustainabilityandresilienceofdevelopmentprojects.Forexample,thelatestcomprehensivescientificdatashowthatpolaricesheetsaremeltingatacceleratedrates,raisingsealevelbyalmostahalfinchsince1992.6 Theseandotheremergingtrendsarealreadychangingtheshapeofdevelopmentinterventions.Butmuchlessattention,ifany,hasbeenfocusedonotherimminenttrends,rangingwidelyfromthemassiveprivatesectorandgovernmentpurchaseorleaseoffarmlandsinAfrica,7tounparalleledchangesinhighereducationinvolvingfree,massivelyopenonlinecourses(MOOCs),availabletomillionsofstudentsglobally,whoonlyneedInternetaccess,8nottraditionalbrickandmortarbuildingsandresidenton-sitefacultyandinstructors. Similarlyonthetechnologyfront,developmentprofessionalsfocusedonpromotinginterventionsrevolvingaroundoff-gridenergy,climatechange,andwaterscarcitywillneedtopaymuchcloserattentiontoongoingandfutureadvancesinnanotechnologyforexample.Thoseinnovations,somesay,willrevolutionizewaterpurification,hydrogenstorage,carboncapture,andagriculturalsystemswithpredictionsthatsolarenergyconversionwillbecostcompetitiveby2015andwaterdesalinizationby2020.9Nanotechnologyproductsandapplicationsarequicklycomingofageandcouldhaveprofound


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nearandmid-terminfluencesonsustainabledevelopmentinterventionsproducingcheaper,better,andmorescalablesolutions.Forexample,arecentlabexperimentsuggeststhatusingspecificlight-absorbingnanoparticles—combinedwithjustsunlight—cangeneratesteam,whichinturn,couldfuelportablecompactgeneratoranywhereinthedevelopingworldtodesalinatewater,sterilizemedicalequipment,andincreasefoodsafety.10

Today versus Tomorrow

Focusingonfuturetrendsisjustasmuchachallengefortheeconomicelitesoftheindustrializedworldasitisfordeveloped,developingandemergingdonors.Focusingonlyonproximalchallengesisnecessary,butshortsighted.Let’slookatAfricatodayasanexample.DespitetheemergenceofnewdemandsarisinginAfrica,manydevelopmentpractitionersessentiallyseebigchallengesrevolvingaroundendingmalaria,preventingHIV/AIDStransmission,andcurbingotherinfectiousdiseasesliketuberculosis,avianinfluenza,andneglectedtropicaldiseases.Theseareindeedsomeoftoday’smostdauntinghealthproblems,butwhatabouttomorrow’s?Overthenextdecade,non-communicablediseaseslikeobesity,diabetes,andcardiovasculardiseasewilllikelybecomethecontinent’snextgreathealthchallenges.Whatotheralternativefuturesshouldwebeexaminingrightnow? Ontheeconomicfrontoverthepastdecade,Africahasrecordedthesecond fastestregionalgrowthintheworld,justbehindemergingcountriesinAsia,with42percentoftheworkforcealready engagedoutsidecommonlyviewedtraditionallow-wageagriculturaljobs.11Governancetooischangingacrossthecontinentwherethereisaremarkableupswingwithmorethan20democraciestodayinsub-SaharanAfricaalone,fromalowpointofjustthreein1989.12Africaischangingfast,andtokeepupwithfuturescenarios,donorsandpublicandprivatepartnersmustnotonlybeontopofemergingdevelopmenttrends,butalsobecontributingsubstantivelytotheongoingdiscussion.Thereisageneralconsensus,forexample,thatmanyoftomorrow’smegacitieswillbeinAfrica.Thismeanswemustrethinkhowweenvisionfuturecities,notjustinAfrica.Aretheyjusthubsfortraditionaleconomicgrowthstrategies?Whatnewinfrastructurewillbeneededandhowwilleducation,water,power,andotheressentialgovernmentservicesbeprovidedforthesenewmegacities?Togetasenseoftherapidglobalpopulationriseinurbanareas,thinkaboutaddingthe

10 OaraNeumann,AlexUrban,JaredDay,SurbhiLal,PeterNordlander,andNaomiJ.Halas,“SolarVaporGenerationEnabledbyNanoparticles,”ACS Nano22,no.1(January22,2013),42–29.

11 DavidFineet.al.,Africa at Work: Job Creation and Inclusive Growth,McKinseyGlobalInstitute,August2012,availableat<www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/Insights%20and%20pubs/MGI/Research/Labor%20Markets/Africa%20at%20work/MGI_Africa_at_work_August_2012_Full_Report.ashx>

12 StevenRadelet,Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries are Leading the Way(Washington,DC:CenterforGlobalDevelopment,2010).


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equivalentofsevencitiesthesizeofChicago,orfivethesizeofLondon,annuallyoverthenextdozenyears.13Whatfuturebelow-the-radarimplicationsneedtobeaddressednowandoverthenext10to15yearswhenthinkingaboutthesenewcities?Forexample,today’sglobalforecastsofurbanexpansionshowdramaticimplicationsforlandusethatthreatenbiodiversityandotherecosystems.14Ifweexpandtheuseofdevelopment-focusedfuturesanalysis,anditsrelatedtoolssuchback-casting,gaming,horizonscanning,etc.,wecanhelpconnectemergingtrendsandtheirdevelopmentrequirementswiththepresent.15Usingthesuiteoffuturestools,movinganalysestopolicy,andmovingpolicytoactionwillensurethattheprojectsandprogramsbeingdesignedtodaywillhelpaddressfuturecriticalneeds,notobsoleteones.

Major Players

Whichbiginstitutionsandorganizationsarereallyfocusedontomorrow’sover-the-horizontrends?SomewouldsaythatfuturesanalysiswasbornafterWorldWarIIattherequestoftheU.S.military.Itwasquicklyadoptedandadvancedbytheprivatesector,mainlytheoilindustry16andovertime,futuresanalysisbecameacentralfeatureoftoday’sU.S.intelligencecommunityreporting.17OutsidetheUnitedStates,aremarkableexceptiontopromotingandusingfuturesanalysisresideswithintheGovernmentofSingapore.18Thiscountryhasbeenaleaderinutilizinganalytictools,visualizationtechniques,andscenarioplanningto“scanthehorizon”totrackemergingnationalsecurityissuesanddistillingthefindingsforpolicymakers.19 Regardlessoftheexactgenesisoffuturesanalysis,itisclearthatothersoutsidethedevelopmentcommunityhaveintentlyandconsistentlyfocusedonidentifyingemergingtrendsthatimpacttheirstrategies,budgets,clients,and

13 Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds,NationalIntelligenceCouncil,NIC2012-001,December2012,availableat<www.dni.gov/nic_2030>.

14 KarenC.Seto,BurakGuneralp,andLucyR.Hutyra,“GlobalForecastsofUrbanExpansionto2030andDirectImpactsonBiodiversityandCarbonPools,”Proceedings of the National Academy of Science109,no.40(October2,2012)16083–16088.

15 StevenGale,Connecting the Future with the Present,USAID,June/July2011,availableat<www.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl_jun11/FL_jun11_FUTURES.html>.

16 BenRamalingamandHarryJones,Strategic Futures Planning: A Guide for Public Organizations,theOverseasDevelopmentInstitute,September2007,availableat<www.odi.org.uk/publications/216-strategic-futures-planning-public-sector-organisations>.

17 Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,NationalIntelligenceCouncil,NIC2008-003,November20,2008,availableat<www.acus.org/publication/global-trends-2025-transformed-world>.

18 OtherforeigngovernmentsusingfuturesanalysisincludeFinland,France,SouthAfricaandSouthKorea.SeeJeromeC.Glenn,TheodoreGordon,andElizabethFlorescu,2011:StateoftheFuture,TheMillenniumProject,Washington,DC,availableat<www.millennium-project.org/millennium/2011SOF.html>.

19 The International Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Symposium Report 2011,GovernmentofSingapore,October18,2011,availableat<http://app.rahs.gov.sg/public/www/home.aspx>.


15

nationalinterests.Thedevelopmentcommunityhasonlyjustbeguntotakefuturesanalysisseriously.USAIDmustbecomeawiserstewardoftaxpayers’foreignassistancedollars.TheAgency’sprogramsmustbemoreimpactful,andmoreresilient.Toachievethesegoals,futuresanalysismustbecomeanindispensablepartofouranalyticalapproachfordevelopmentineveryphaseofourplanningcycle,policyformulation,andon-the-groundprogramming.Thisrecognition,alongwithsupportfromtopUSAIDleadership,wasthedrivingforcebehindtheSymposiumonFutureDevelopmentChallengesheldinWashingtoninlate2011.

Early but Limited Success

Tobeaccurate,thereweresomenotableearlyattemptsatfuturesanalysisinthecivilianworld.Backin2005,theU.S.StateDepartmentandUSAID,alongwithovertwodozenciviliancounterpartFederalagencies,dovehead-firstintofuturesanalysisbyaskingaboutdifferentalternative“worldscenarios”suchasgrowingandwidespreadfoodinsecurity,emergingpandemics,mountingclimatechangethreats,andotherglobalcircumstanceslikelytofacetheU.S.Governmentoverthenext10to20years.ProjectHorizon,asitwascalled,alsofocusedonexamininginteragencycapabilitiestodealwithalternativefutureworlds,buildinginternalanalysiscapacitybyconductingscenario-planningexercises,andstrengtheninginteragencycoordinationtodealwith2025globalpossibilities.20ProjectHorizonwaswayaheadofitstimebyrecognizingthatwhileaccuratelyforecastingthefuturewasnotalwayspossible,developingplansforarangeofalternativefutureswasabsolutelyvital. Intheend,ProjectHorizonwasshortlived.Itfoundlittletractionafteritsinitialtwo-year-longsetofmeetingsandjointexercises.Itismore“natural”insideciviliangovernmentagenciestofocusonhere-and-nowrealitieslikebudgetthreats,staffingissues,andtheinevitableconsequencesofchangesinadministrationsandleadershipdirection.Regrettably,thetyrannyoftoday’sissuesishardtosuccessfullyandconsistentlybuckinmostinstitutions.TwootherfactorswhichdealtProjectHorizonashort“half-life”wasnotbeingthreadedfromthestartintothepoliticalagendaoftopagencyleadershipnorconnectedtoongoingbusinessprocesses. Ittakesaconcertedramp-upefforttobuildfuturesanalysiscapabilitiesandassignresponsibilityforwhowilltakeiton,yearafteryearafteryear.And,ittakesanevengreaterefforttosustainandgrowfuturesanalysiscapabilitiestowithstandtheperennialorganizationalre-makes.Forfuturesanalysistohaveachanceofsucceeding,buy-inisneededfromtop-levelagencypoliticalleadershipandfrombottom-levelcareerpractitioners.Evenwhenfuturesanalysesare

20 Project Horizon Progress Report(Washington,DC:InteragencyStrategicPlanningCoordinatingConference,2006).


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conductedandmadeavailabletodecision-makersatalllevels,thereisnoguaranteetheywilluseit.PartofthesolutionatUSAIDthereforemustbetocommunicatethesignificanceofthetrends,theperilsavertedifwetakethemintoconsideration,andthenincentivizinguseoftheinformationbythoseinWashingtonandamongour80-plusfieldmissions. ItisworthnotingthatanumberofthefuturescenariospositedbyProjectHorizonaretoday’srealities,suchasadiminishedproblem-solvingrolefortheUnitedStatesglobally,thesometimeschaoticandunexpectedpathsofnewdemocracies(doesthissoundfamiliar?),andanupswinginnon-stateactors(bothgoodandbad)ontheglobalscene.BeforelettingProjectHorizongo,onefinal“BigIdea”thatemerged,andwasapplicableacrossallthescenarios,wastheoutsizedrolethatFederally-fundedscience,technology,andengineeringinvestmentscouldplayinaddressinglong-termglobalchallengescombinedwithacademicandprivatesectorpartnerships.Thisnotionofleveragingthescientificknow-howofFederallabslikethoseattheNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(NASA),NationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration(NOAA),NationalScienceFoundation(NSF),NationalInstitutesofHealth(NIH),andDepartmentofDefense(DOD)todayhasfoundapermanenthometodayatUSAID,becominganessentialpillaroftheOfficeofScienceandTechnology.21

Emerging Development Trends

ThegoaloftheSymposiumonFutureDevelopmentChallengeswastowrestlewithemergingtrendsandunknownchallengesnoteasilypredictedbypastevents,un-hitchedfromtraditionallinearthinking,andfreedfromlookingatjustlow-risk,incremental—ratherthanhigh-riskbutgame-changing—developmentsolutions.Intheverybroadestterms,USAIDhadpreviouslyidentifiedsixkeylikelytrendsthatarequicklyreshaping—andwillcontinuetoshape—theglobaldevelopmentlandscape.

• Economicspurts:Theglobaleconomyisgrowingatmultiplespeeds;

• Populationshifts:Demographictrendsarecomplicatingdevelopmentchallenges;

• Knowledgeentree:Knowledgeaccessisgrowingexponentiallyasconnectivityexplodesglobally;

• Eventspeed-up:Shocksarereverberatingmorequicklyandmorewidelythaneverbefore;

• Escalatinggoodgovernance:Democraticgovernanceisexpanding

21 SeeUSAIDOfficeofScienceandTechnology,Homepage,availableat<http://transition.usaid.gov/scitech/>.


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globally,buthaltingly;and,

• Changingdevelopmentecosystem:Anew“aidscape”isbrisklyemergingwithnewpartners,newapproaches,andnewmodels.22

Thesedevelopment-focusedtrendslaidthefoundationforthesymposiumonwhichthisbookisanchored.WealsoborrowedunabashedlyfromthefindingsoftheU.S.NationalIntelligenceCouncil’s(NIC)in-depthtrendsanalysistoexpandthesymposiumandstimulatediscussionsonissuessuchastheunprecedentedriseofemergingpoliticalplayersandeconomicpowerhouseslikeBrazil,Russia,India,China,andIndonesia,andthechanceformajoreconomicdownswingsinsub-SaharanAfricawhereUSAIDisheavilyengaged.23TheNICreportalsopointedtosizabledemographicshiftsoverthenext20years,withvirtuallyallrealpopulationgrowthoccurringinAfrica,AsiaandLatinAmericaandyouthbulgesinsub-SaharanAfricaandtheMiddle-East.Again,thesetrendsraisedconcernsasmanycountrieswithinthesegeographicalregionsarecurrentrecipientsofsignificantUSAIDdevelopmentassistance.Beyondtheseeconomicanddemographictrends,theNICreporthighlightedanumberoffutureclimatechangetrendsinthedevelopmentspacethatUSAIDhasbeenengagedinformanyyears,includingwatermanagement,agriculturalproduction,andnaturalresourcemanagementpractices. Fromapurelydevelopmentalperspective,theNICreportunderscoredtheexceptionalspeedatwhichtechnologywasadvancinginthedevelopingworld.USAID’sownfuturetrendsanalyses,combinedwiththeNIC’sassessment,ledtobuildingthesymposiumaroundfourdistincttracks:population; science, technology, and society; politics and economies;andenvironmentalissues. WhiletheNIC’sreportfocuswaspredominantlyonnationalsecurityissues,theiranalyseshaveprovedtobeahighlyvaluableguideposttofuturedevelopmenttrends.Thisisnotasurpriseastheoncehardedgesbetweendefense,diplomacy,developmentandintelligencehavebecomelessclearcut.FindingsfromthelatestNICreporthighlightsuchissuesasarapidlyagingpopulationforsomecountriesversusanincreasingyouthfulpopulationforothers;arisingconsumingclassinmostcountrieswithattendantdemandsforpoliticalchange;andtheemergenceofmorethanadozen“disruptivetechnologies”—fromprecisionfarmingtodistributedpower—aimedataddressinggrowingglobalchallengesfromrapidurbanization,energyshortfalls,waterandfoodscarcity,amongotherstressors.24

22 USAID Policy Framework 2011–2015(Washington,DC:USAID,2011),availableat<http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/USAID_PolicyFramework.PDF>.

23 Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,NationalIntelligenceCouncil,NIC2008-003,November20,2008,availableat<http://www.acus.org/publication/global-trends-2025-transformed-world>.

24 Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds,NationalIntelligenceCouncil,NIC2012-001,December2012,availableat<www.dni.gov/nic_2030>.


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Going Short

Buildingfuturesanalysiscapabilitiesandsimultaneouslycreatingincentivesfordecision-makerstouseisvitalforimpactfuldevelopmentassistanceaimedatfightingpoverty,reducinghunger,increasinglivelihoodsandadvancinggoodgovernance.Thusfar,theintentionofthischapterhasbeentomakeastrongcasethatmorefocusandattentionneedstobedevotedtoaddressingemergingdevelopmenttrendsliketheyouthdividend,urbanization,theseniorbulge,andloomingthreatstobiodiversity.Adjustingprogramsaccordinglyisequallyimportant;otherwisethedevelopmentinterventionsweareoperationalizingtodaywillbewayoutofsynchwiththefutureneedsofthoseinthedevelopingworld.Atthesametime,ifwedonotalsofocusouranalyticcapabilitiesonbetterdigestingthereamsofexistingdevelopmentdatanowincreasinglyavailable,so-calledBigData,wewilllikewisefallshortofourrealgoal.“GoingShort”referstotheneedtohavereliableandaccuratereal-time feedbackfornewlyimplementedandongoingdevelopmentprojectscombinedwithdeep-diveanalysesofcurrentdatafrommultiplesourcestohelpunderstandthecurrentdevelopmentchallenges. BigData,onewayoranother,hasbeenaroundforsometimebutthedigitalagehasbroughtwithitaquantumleapinthevolumeandcomplexityofwhatisavailabletosupportdevelopmentanalysisanddecision-making.Itisnotonlythesheervolumeofdevelopmentandrelateddatathatisavailable,butthegrowingdiversityofdatagenerators.Fromanexpandingcircleofindividualdatausersviamobilephones,Tweets,andblogstotraditionalinstitutionaldata,theseresourcesarenowbeingmadeopenlyandwidelyavailablebytheWorldBankandU.N.agencies.ThatincludesdatafromUSAIDtosupporttheagencies“opendevelopment”initiative.Addtothatinformationreservoir,volumesoffigures,facts,trendsandstatisticsfromremotesensingviasatellites,computermapping,geographicinformationsystems,andquantitativemodelingandyoubegintogetaninklingofwhatBigDataisallabout.25Mostofthisdataisfrompublicsources,buttherealgoldmineistheyetuntappeddatastreamsintheprivatesector.Forexample,ithasbeenreportedthatWalmarttransmitsmorethan1milliontransactionsanhourintoitscorporatedatabasesestimatedatmorethan2.5petabytes.26“GoingShort”willallowdevelopmentplannerstocarefullyanalyzecurrentdataflowsthatarealreadychangingreality.27

25 ForadiscussionofsweepingchangesinhowbigdatafordevelopmentisbeingoptimizedseeAniketBhushan,“BigData”inUSAID Frontiers in Development,RajivShahandStevenRadelet,ed,152–156(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofState,May2012).

26 DanBrody,Big Data: Harnessing a Game-Changing Asset,EconomistIntelligenceUnit,September,2011,availableat<www.sas.com/reg/gen/corp/1583148>.

27 EmmanuelLetouze,Big Data for Development: Challenges and Opportunities,UnitedNationsGlobalPulse(NewYork:UnitedNations,May2012).


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Two Final Thoughts

Optimaloutcomessoughtbythedevelopmentcommunityandourpartnersintheprivatesector,philanthropic,andfoundationalworldswillbenefitfromfreshthinkingandsubsequentactionsthatbetterrecognizetheimportanceofemergingtrendstoachievelonglastingimpacts,buildresilientcommunities,andempowergovernmentsateveryleveltoimprovethequalityoflifeforalltheircitizens.Futuresanalysisshouldnotbea“day”yousetasideforasymposium,butrathersomethingthatdevelopmentprofessionalsdoevery day.Futuresanalysisshouldbeattheveryheartofthedisciplineandscienceofdevelopment.Intheend,“GoingLong”mustbeaccompaniedby“GoingShort”inthatlong-termthinkingmustcomplementnewbreakthroughanalyticsemergingfromBigData.Developmentprofessionalshaveincreasingaccesstomoreandhighlysophisticateddatathaneverbefore,butthetrickisturningitintousefulandactionableinsights.Bothlongandshortapproachesrelyontheincreasingneedfordevelopmentplanningtobemoreevidenced-basedandanticipatory. Thedevelopmentcommunitymustalsocontinuetobreakfreefromthenear-linearthinkingthathasdominatedourpast.Futureworldswillsurelybemorecomplicatedandproblematic.Today’ssolutionstosolvetoughdevelopmentproblemswerebornofamoreordered,structured,logicalandstableworld.Thefuturewillhavemoreplayers,eventswillbemoreintertwined,thespeedofchangemoreswift,andtheproblemsmore“wicked”tosolve.Greaterfocusonfuturesanalysiswillgiveusaleg-uptohavemoreimpactfulandresilientdevelopmentprogramsnowandoverthehorizon.

Steven Gale Senior Advisor for Strategic Opportunities, Office of Science and Technology, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)


Part 2


The Four Symposium ‘‘Tracks’’

Populations

Science and Technology

Politics and Economies

Environment


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The Population Reference Bureau projects that by 2025, 27 megacities will exist. Twenty-one of these will be in less developed countries, mainly in Africa and Asia. It is clear that current and future demographic trends will have a profound impact on development today and into the next decade. During the popula-tions panels, issues concerning changing demographics, transna-tional networks, urbanization, governance mechanisms and strategies needed to cope with these changes received consider-able attention.

Much of the day’s discussion focused on the demands created by growing resource scarcity. Population growth coupled with urbanization and climate change will, according to the panelists, put significant stress on water, food, and energy. A rising middle class in many developing coun-tries will mean increased demand for more goods and services. Participants emphasized the importance of anticipating these shortages using futures analysis tools and other methods and of developing policies and plans to meet these challenges. Planning

for food security, disaster resilience, and adaptation, for example, will be imperative in order to synchronize develop-ment aid and population needs. A related theme that domi-nated discussion was that of migration both within countries and beyond national borders, from which two trends emerged. First, people are moving to cities in record numbers. As cities expand, so do the informal settle-ments that surround them. Seventy-two percent of the urban population of Africa lives in slums. This creates both challenges and opportunities for development work. On the one hand, populations living in informal settlements can be difficult to track and monitor. Improving sanitation, clean water, and educational services presents major challenges for urban planners. At the same time, information dissemination campaigns and family planning initiatives can be extremely successful because organizations can reach so many people

Populations

There are now 7 billion people on the planet, and more than half of them live in urban areas.


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S Y M P O S I U M PA N E L S Y N O P S I S

without having to travel miles and miles. The second trend of migra-tion that was highlighted involves people moving away from their homelands. Natural disaster, conflict, and economic gain are all drivers of human migration. As climate change continues to impact the globe, there will be continued drought in the Sahel and increased flooding in Southeast Asia. Coastal cities are particularly vulnerable because of their proximity to rising sea levels as well as high population density. In the wake of natural disasters, will these people relocate or will they rebuild? And if they rebuild, what guidance and advice can development agencies provide to increase resiliency? Another theme discussed was what many refer to as the “youth bulge.” One in five people are between the ages of 15 and 24. The vast majority of these youth live in less developed countries. While some argue this “youth bulge” poses a threat to stability, many of the panelists highlighted

the importance of leveraging the “demographic dividend.” The key, they argued, is to empower these youth to become agents of positive social change. In order to do this, development initiatives need to focus on requisite education, creating better job opportunities, and widespread economic growth. Speakers went beyond discussing future megatrends like population growth and their associated perils. One area of concern revolved around the need for aid organizations to develop or refine existing policies to accommodate and even anticipate these changes. There was also major discussion about how develop-ment organizations like USAID might place increasing emphasis on programs and projects that involve the latest urban planning tools, youth employment strategies, and the wider distribu-tion of public services. Geograph-ic information systems (GIS) tools, for example, can provide new ways to map and analyze

population movements and other demographic shifts. It was also noted that public-private partnerships are more important than ever as they can work to address these challenges. Transnational networks resulting from human migration were also discussed. New ideas on the issue of resettlement are needed now. For example, are there alternatives to traditional refugee camps? Other issues that surfaced included growing donor fatigue, an aging population with declining tax revenue but increased medical and health demands, and the potential for population and migration-induced ethnic and religious conflict.


ItcameasnosurprisethatthementionofdemographygeneratedlivelydiscussionsduringallthreethemesattheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment’s(USAID’s)FuturesSymposium.Demographyarosenotonlyinthesessionfocusedonpopulationsassomemightexpect,butalsoindiscussionsofthefutureofscience and technology,thesessiononpolitics and economies,andthroughoutdiscussionsoffuturethreatstotheenvironment.Thesediscussionshighlightedthecross-cuttingnatureofthedemographictransitionfromhightolowratesofbirthanddeath,politicalstability,socialandeducationalprogress,institutionalcapacity,andurbanizationpatterns. Becausetheeffectsofthedemographictransitionareenmesheddeeplyinsuchabroadrangeofdevelopmentissues,publishedprojections—datageneratedbytheoriststoquantifythedemographicfuture—offeravaluabletoolfordevelopment-centeredfuturesanalysis.UpdatedbienniallybytheUnitedNationsPopulationDivisionandlessregularlybytheU.S.CensusBureau’sInternationalProgramCenter,demographicprojectionsperformwithreasonableaccuracyoveratleasttwodecades.Giventhesteadilyimprovingtrackrecordofthesetwosourcesofdemographicprojectionssince1980,28USAID’spolicyanalystsandforesightresearchersmayfinditworthwhiletoconsiderthedemographicmethodsusedinthischapterastoolstosupportimprovedprogramplanningandcountry-levelstrategizing.

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C H A P T E R 3

The Future out to 2030: According to DemographyRichard Cincotta expertly lays out how population age-structures and demographic projections are vital, yet rarely examined, indicators for future development-focused programming and decision-making.

28 NicoKeilman,“HowAccurateAretheUnitedNationsWorldPopulationProjections?”Population and Development Review24,supplemental(1998)15–41.


Thechapterbeginswithanoverviewofthemostsalientconclusionsofrecentresearchinpoliticalandeconomicdemography.Itthenoutlinesaframeworkthatshouldhelppolicymakersapplytheseconclusions,describesindetailtheframework’sfourdiscreteage-structural“stages,”andmapstheglobaldistributionofthesestages,bothin2010andin2030.Thechapterhighlightsfactorsarisingwithineachage-structuralstagethatcontributefavorablyto,orbearunfavorablyon,themanagementofstatesandtheirinstitutions.Thedynamicsofethno-religiousagestructuresatthesub-nationallevelarealsodiscussed.Thechapterendswithabriefdiscussionofthebroaderimplicationsofdemographicresearchforfuturesanalysis.

Major Conclusions

Recentresearchinpoliticalandeconomicdemographyindicatethatthedegreeofagestructural“maturity”(therelativedistributionofchildren,adolescents,working-ageadultsandseniorsinacountry’spopulation,whichisreflectedbythemedianage)hassignificanteffectsonacountry’spolitical,economicandsocialconditions,andfuturetrends.Age-structuralmaturation,advancesinthemedianage,haslargelybeentheproductofdeclinesinwomen’sfertility.Thetrendtowardlongerlifeexpectanciesatoldagehasalsocontributedtoshiftstowardmorematureagestructures. Someconfigurationsthatevolveduringthetransitionfromyoungertomorematureagestructures,theagestructuraltransition,appeartobemore“unfavorable”thanothers.Inotherwords,someagestructuresareassociatedwithconditionsthatmakegovernanceanddevelopmentdifficult,whileothermore“favorable”agestructuresmakeeconomicandsocialprogresslessofachallenge.Empiricalevidenceindicatesthatthemostchallengingagestructurespredominateduringtheearliest(youthful)stageoftheage-structuraltransition,wheremorethanhalfofthepopulationisat,orbelow,25yearsofage.29Overthepastfourdecades,stateswithayouthfulagestructurehaveproventobethemostvulnerabletooutbreaksofintra-stateconflictandpoliticalinstability.30Theoreticiansexpectage-relatedchallengestogovernancetoalsosurfaceinthe

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29 Theselectionofthemedianageof25.0yearsastheborderforthemostyouthfulage-structuralstageisaconversionfromotherhighlycorrelated“youth-bulgemeasures”isdrawnfromHenrikUrdal.“AClashofGenerations?YouthBulgesandPoliticalViolence,”International Studies Quarterly50,no.3(September2006),607–629;RichardP.CincottaandElizabethLeahy,Population Age Structure and Its Relation to Civil Conflict: A Metric,Report12(Washington,DC:EnvironmentalChangeandSecurityProgram,2006–2007),55–58;ChristianG.Mesquida,andNeilI.Wiener,“MaleAgeCompositionandtheSeverityofConflicts,”Politics in the Life Sciences 18,no.2(2001),181–189.Alsosee:Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds,NationalIntelligenceCouncil,NIC2012-001,December2012,availableat<www.dni.gov/nic_2030>.

30 HenrikUrdal.“AClashofGenerations?YouthBulgesandPoliticalViolence,”International Studies Quarterly50,no.3(September2006),607–629;RichardP.CincottaandElizabethLeahy,Population Age Structure and Its Relation to Civil Conflict: A Metric,Report12(Washington,DC:EnvironmentalChangeandSecurityProgram,2006–2007),55–58;alsoseeRichardCincotta,RobertEngelmanandDanieleAnastasion,The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict After the Cold War(Washington,DC:PopulationActionInternational,2003).


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latest(post-mature)stage,andfortheseeconomicandadministrativedifficultiestobelinked,invariousways,totheextraordinaryfiscaldemandsandprogramconstraintsposedbytheemergenceoflargeproportionsofseniorsandelderly,characteristicofthisstageoftheage-structuraltransition(amedianagegreaterthan45years).31 Currentdemographicprojectionssuggestthatthecomingtwodecadeswillbeaperiodofsubstantial,ifnotunprecedented,age-structuralchange.Projectedoutcomeswillpressuresomestatesandinternationalinstitutionstousetheirpoliticalpowerandfinancialresourcestoavoid,reduce,mediateandreacttodetrimentaldemographicconditions—specifically,thoseprecipitatedbyanunfavorableagestructureandthosewithashiftingethno-religiouscomposition.Thus,manyofthemethodsusedinthischaptershouldbeofinteresttodevelopmentanalystsandpolicymakersalike.Manyofthedemographicconditionsdiscussedinthischaptercanbeforecastedusingdemographicprojections,givinganalystsandpolicymakersanobjectiveviewofafuturetwodecadeshence. Severalnoteworthyforecastscanalsobedrawnfromage-structuralpoliticaldemography:

Instability

By2030,youthfulage-structuralconditionswilllikelycontinuetocontributetoinstabilityintheMiddleEast(Yemen,Iraq,WestBankandGaza),SouthAsia(Afghanistan,intheperipheralregionsofPakistanandperhapsinseveralstatesinnorth-centralIndia),acrossthetropicalmid-sectionofsub-SaharanAfrica(West,CentralandEastAfrica),andintheislandstatesofTimor-Leste(EastTimor),PapuaNewGuineaandtheSolomonIslandsalongthePacificRim.Forthevastmajorityofthosestatesthatretainyouthfulpopulationsintothefuture,thereisalowprobabilityofariseto,ormaintenanceof,highlevelsofdemocracy.Forthosethatsucceed,therearelikelytobehighcostsingovernmentresources,livesandproperty.

Democracy

Currentage-structuralprojectionssuggestthatsomecountriesofNorthAfrica,specificallythoseoftheMaghreb(Tunisia,Algeria,andMorocco),arelikelytocontinuetotrendtowarddemocracy.Intheearlyandmid-2020s,analystsshouldexpectfurtherpoliticalchangesinMuslim-majoritystatesintheMiddleEast(theMashreq)andCentralAsia(theex-SovietAsiaticrepublics)astheiragestructuresmature.Duringthe2020s,analystsshouldalsoexpecttowitnessthe

31 RichardJackson,andNeilHowe,The Graying of the Great Powers: Demography and Geopolitics in the 21st Century(Washington,DC:CenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies,2008).NicholasEberstadtandHansGroth,Demography and Public Debt: Time for a “Demographic Stress Test” for the Western Economies. What Does It Mean for Switzerland?(St.Gallen,Switzerland:UniversityofSt.Gallen,2010);Alsosee:RichardCincotta,“Demography:ADevelopmentPerspective,”inSecurity and Development in Global Politics: A Critical Comparison,ed.JoannaSpearandPaulD.Williams,291–310,(Washington,DC:GeorgetownUniversityPress2011).


27

devolutionofmonarchicalpoweramongtheremainingMiddleEasternmonarchies.

Latin America

Theprojectedpaceofage-structuralmaturationinLatinAmericaindicatesthatmanyoftheregion’sstatesshouldbeexpectedtotrendtowardincreasingeconomicstabilityanddemocratization.Forthelargerstatesoftheregion—includingBrazil,Mexico,andColombia—thistrendshouldtranslatetogreatergeopoliticalpower.Inthisregion,developmentislikelytobeslowestinGuatemala,whichisprojectedtoremainyouthfulthrough2030.Haiti,HondurasandBolivia,althoughslowlymaturing,willlikelylagbehindtherestofLatinAmericainassessmentsofsocial,economic,andpoliticalprogressoverthenexttwodecades.

Aging Populations

ForadvancedagingpopulationsinJapanandEurope,oneshouldexpectrisingpoliticalclamortriggeredbypensionandtaxreforms,andrealignmentsofgovernment-providedservicesasstatesmaneuverthroughthefiscalpinchcausedbyrisingold-agedependency.Thatsaid,evenastheirworkforcesizedeclines,thesehuman-capital-richnationsmaywitnessnovelinstitutionalandtechnologicaladaptationsthatcouldshiftfutureeconomictrajectories.Aseconomicgrowthbecomesincreasinglydecoupledfromjobgrowth,slowdeclinesinworkforcesizecouldhavefewernegativeimpactsthancurrentlyassumed.

Ethno-Religious Patterns

Whenstrategistslooktotheworldof2030,theyshouldconsidertheimplicationsofongoingethno-religiousshifts,particularlyintheCentralAndes,inpartsoftheMiddleEast,andinWesternEurope.Theseshiftsmayultimatelyhavenationalandeveninternationalpoliticalsignificance.

Age-Structural Transitions

Countriesthataretransitioningfromhightolowlevelsoffertilityandlongeradultlifeexpectanciesare,asaresult,beingdriventhroughanage-structuraltransition—asuccessionofagedistributionsofincreasingmedianage.Whiletheleveloffertilityandthepaceofitsdeclinearetheprincipaldriversofchangesinpopulationagedistribution,otherdemographicforces—childhoodmortality,inter-countrymigration,andprematureadultmortality,suchasthroughAIDS-relateddeath,exertmoresubtleeffects.Theseandthepassageoftimeinfluencethepositionofcountriesalongthepathoftheage-structuraltransition(Figure1). WhenUSAIDbeganitsbilateralassistanceprogramsinthemid-1960s,roughly80percentofallindependentstates—virtuallyallofthedeveloping


28

Country-level population age structures

0 10 20 30 40 500

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Percent 65 years and older

Per

cen

t yo

un

ger

tha

n 3

0 y

ears

Year 2010

Brazil

0246810 0000000000 2 4 6 8 10

0246810 0000000000 2 4 6 8 10

0246810 0000000000 2 4 6 8 10

0246810 0000000000 2 4 6 8 10

Percent of Total Population

Males Females

10 1088 6 644 22 0

Age

100+95–9990–9485–8980–8475–7970–7465–6960–6455–5950–5445–4940–4435–3930–3425–2920–2415–1910–145–90–4

Hungary

NigeriaAfghanistan

Japan


29

world—experiencedagestructureswithmorethan60percentoftheirpopulationunderage30.Atthattime,notasinglestatehadaccumulatedaproportionofseniors(over65yearsold)thatwasgreaterthan15percentofthetotalpopulation.By2010,justover40percent(80states)remainedinthatyouthfulcondition,whereas23stateshadmaturedbeyondthepointwhereseniorscomprisedmorethan15percentofthepopulation. Althoughtheage-structuraltransitionisacontinuousprocess,thedifferencesinstatebehaviorsthatoccuratvariouspositionsalongthislengthycontinuumcanbebetterunderstoodbybreakingthetransitionintofour“stages”(Figure2).Eachstagespansa10-yearintervalofmedian age(theageofthepersonforwhom50percentoftheremainingpopulationisolder,and50percentisyounger).33Thefourdiscretestagesofthiscategoricalsystem,andtheirrangeofmedianagesare:youthful(withamedianageequalto,orlessthan25years),intermediate(greaterthan25andequalto,orlessthan35years),mature(greaterthan35andequalto,orlessthan45),andpost-mature (greaterthan45years). Formostindependentstates,theuseofthecountry-levelmedianageworkssufficientlywelltoindicatethematurityofacountry’sagestructure.ValuesforthisindicatorareestimatesandprojectionspublishedbytheU.N.PopulationDivision(foranalternativesource,seetheU.S.CensusBureau’sInternationalDataBase(IDB)).34ForthesixstatesoftheGulfCooperationCouncil(Bahrain,Kuwait,Oman,Qatar,SaudiArabia,andtheUnitedArabEmirates)theanalysisdiscussedinthischapterusesthemedianageofcitizenresidentsonly,ratherthan

Figure 1The distribution of country-level age structures in 2010, graphed by the proportion below age 30, and the proportion 65 years and older. The principal direction of movement along this path has been down and to the right, driven by fertility decline and longer life spans. As the graph suggests, some country-level populations have moved, at various instances, in other directions — to the left, to the right, or even upwards, driven by the forces of migration, increasing adult mortality, and decreasing infant mortality. Data are estimates from the United Nations (UN) Population Division’s 2010 Revision.32

Country-level population age structures

0 10 20 30 40 500

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Percent 65 years and older

Per

cen

t yo

un

ger

tha

n 3

0 y

ears

Year 2010

Brazil

0246810 0000000000 2 4 6 8 10

0246810 0000000000 2 4 6 8 10

0246810 0000000000 2 4 6 8 10

0246810 0000000000 2 4 6 8 10

Percent of Total Population

Males Females

10 1088 6 644 22 0

Age

100+95–9990–9485–8980–8475–7970–7465–6960–6455–5950–5445–4940–4435–3930–3425–2920–2415–1910–145–90–4

Hungary

NigeriaAfghanistan

Japan32 World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision(NewYork:UnitedNations,2011),availableat

<http://esa.un.org/wpp/>.33 RichardP.CincottaandLaurelHummel,“Africa’sYouthfulAgeStructureandItsSecurity

Implications,”inAfrica’s Strategic Geography,ed.AmyRichmondKrackowaandLaurelHummel,257–282(Carlisle,PA:U.S.ArmyWarCollegeandU.S.MilitaryAcademy,2009);foralterativesystemsseeElizabethLeahy,RobertEngelman,CarolynG.Vogel,SarahHaddock,andTodPreston,The Shape of Things to Come: Why Age Structure Matters to a Safer, More Equitable World (Washington,DC:PopulationActionInternational,2007);BoMalmbergandLenaSommestad,“TheHiddenPulseofHistory:AgeTransitionandEconomicChangeinSweden,1820–2000”Scandinavian Journal of History25,no.1,(2000),131–146;MonicaBuvinic,MonicaD.Gupta,andUrsalaCasabonne,“Gender,PovertyandDemography:AnOverview,”World Bank Economic Review23,no.3(2009),347–369.

34 Populationdata,byageandsex,publishedbytheUnitedNationsareavailableonlineandinCDformat.SeeWorld Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision(NewYork:UnitedNations,2011),availableat<http://esa.un.org/wpp/>;SimilarlystructureddataareavailableonlinefromtheU.S.CensusBureauviatheInternationalProgramCenter’sInternationalDataBase,availableat<www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php>.


30

themixtureofcitizenandnon-citizenresidentsthatareaggregatedintheU.N.andU.S.CensusBureauestimatesandprojections.35 Beforedescribingthesespecificsofeachofthefourstages,itisusefultodiscussthegeneralpatternthatemergesfromtheresultsofpoliticalandeconomicresearchcomparingcountriesatdifferentpositionsalongtheage-structuraltransition.Thistransitionisa“badnews,goodnews,badnewsstory.”Virtuallyalloftoday’sindependentstateswerefirstestablishedwithage-structurallyunfavorableconditions—atmedianagesbelow20years,andwithhighlevelsoffertilityandlowlevelsofeducationalattainment.Byandlarge,thearrivalofstatesintotheintermediateandmaturestagesoftheage-structuraltransitionhasgenerallybeenassociatedwithincreasinglyfavorableeconomic,socialandpoliticalconditions.Mostanalystsforeseetheagingofpopulationsintothepost-maturecategoryasashifttogenerallyunfavorableeconomicandpoliticalconditions.Howunfavorablewilltheseagestructuresbecomeinthefuture,andhowwellcantheybemanaged?Thatremainstobeseen.

Youthful Age Structures

Sustainedhighfertility(typicallyfivechildrenperwomanandabove)wasasocial

1935 Youthful

Percent of total population

Age

100+95–9990–9485–8980–8475–7970–7465–6960–6455–5950–5445–4940–4435–3930–3425–2920–2415–1910–145–90–4

810 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10

Males Females

1970 Intermediate


Age

100+95–9990–9485–8980–8475–7970–7465–6960–6455–5950–5445–4940–4435–3930–3425–2920–2415–1910–145–90–4

810 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10

Males Females

Figure 2 Japan’s age-structural transition, 1935 (estimates) to 2025 (projections, UN medium fertility variant). Whereas the age-structural transition is a continuous process, this figure uses Japan’s transition to illustrate the four discrete age-structural stages that are employed in the analysis.

35 Thecitizen-residentmedianageforeachoftheGulfCooperationCenterstateswascalculatedfromunpublisheddisaggregateddatausedbytheU.S.CensusBureau’sInternationalProgramCentertoproducecountry-levelestimatesandprojectionsforthesesixstates.


31

fixtureofallhumanhistory.Duetostate-financedimprovementsinwaterqualityandsanitation,declinesininfantmortalitybegantotakeholdinEuropeinthelatterdecadesofthe18thcenturyandspreadworldwideinthetwocenturiesthereafter.Theresult:evenmoreyouthfulagestructuresthaneverbefore.Duringthe20thcentury,themedianageofsomecountriesdroppedtoamedianageof15(forexample,Kenyainthe1980s)orbelow(Yemeninthe1990s).Evennow,thatyouthfulness—anditsassociatedchallenges—prevailalongthetropicalmidriffofsub-SaharanAfrica,inpartsoftheMiddleEastandSouthandCentralAsia,andamongtheIslandsinthesouthernPacific.Someofitisprojectedtopersistpast2030(Figure3). Fordevelopingstates,youthfulagestructurespresentunparalleledchallenges.Theirhighproportionsofchildren,adolescents,andyoungadultsandtherapidrateofthesegroups’advancementintoschoolingandjobmarkets,undermineeducationandhealthinfrastructure,constraingovernmentalandparentalinvestments,andoutpacethesupplyofnewjobs.Recentethnographicliteraturehighlightsmutualreinforcingrelationshipsbetweenlargefamilysize(highfertility),risk-averseextendedfamilynetworks,andclan-basedandfactionalpatron-clientarrangements.36Othershavelinkedthesearrangementstonepotisticcorruption37andtothepowerofpoliticalentrepreneurswhocandestabilizestates.38 Thosewhohavefocusedonthepoliticsofyouthfulage-structural

2025 Post-Mature projected


Age

100+95–9990–9485–8980–8475–7970–7465–6960–6455–5950–5445–4940–4435–3930–3425–2920–2415–1910–145–90–4

810 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10

Males Females

1990 Mature


Age

100+95–9990–9485–8980–8475–7970–7465–6960–6455–5950–5445–4940–4435–3930–3425–2920–2415–1910–145–90–4

810 6 4 2 0 2 4 6 8 10

Males Females

36 OnipedeWusuandUcheC.Isiugo-Abanihe,“InterconnectionsAmongChangingFamilyStructure,ChildrearingandFertilityBehaviourAmongtheOgu,SouthwesternNigeria:AQualitativeStudy,”Demographic Research14,no.8(2006),139–156;DanielJ.Smith,“ContradictionsinNigeria’sFertilityTransition:TheBurdensandBenefitsofHavingPeople,”Population and Development Review30,no.2(2004),221–239.

37 BenjaminC.MbakwemandDanielJ.Smith,“ReturnedtoSender’:CorruptioninInternationalHealth,”inThe Practice of International Health: A Case-Based Orientation,ed.DanielPerlmanandAnanyaRoy,217–230(Oxford:OxfordUniversity,2008).


32

conditionsassumethatthesurgeofyoungadultmalesdepressesthecostsofpoliticalmobilization.39Thisdynamicsetsuparecruitment contest—competitionbetweenstateandnon-stateactorswho,byappealingtoidentityandideology,vietomobilizeyoung-adultmalestoadvancetheirpoliticalandmilitarygoals.Statistically,youth-bulgestatessufferanelevatedriskofaviolentoutbreakofintrastateconflict40and,asagroup,experiencereducedoddsofattainingandmaintainingastableliberaldemocracywhencomparedtomoredemographicallymaturestates.41 The“25-and-younger”criterionservesasausefulmarkerforstatesatriskofvariousformsofinternalviolenceandpoliticalinstability,nowandoverthecomingdecade.Since1970,stateswithayouthfulpopulationhavecomprisedabout80percentofeachdecade’snewlyemergedintrastateconflicts.42Notably,revolutionsduringthistransitionalstagecanbeextraordinarilyviolentand,ifsuccessful,mayendwiththenear-completedispossessionofthepolitical,commercial,andmilitaryelites.Afterstateshavesurpassedthemedianageof25years,analystsshouldexpectthemtobelesslikelytoinitiateanewintrastateconflict,morelikelytoexperiencethewindingdownofanongoingcivilorethnicwar,andmorelikelytoexperiencesustainabledemocratization.

Intermediate Age Structures

Shouldfertilitycontinuetofall,youthfulcountriesentertheintermediatestageoftheage-structuraltransition,amoreeconomicallyandpolitically“favorable”seriesofintermediateagestructures(amedianagefrom25to35years)thatareproportionallydominatedbyrelativelyyoungworking-ageadults,andfiscallyencumberedbyrelativelyfewchildhooddependentsorelderly.Thesearetheage

38 RoelVanDerVeen,What Went Wrong With Africa: A Contemporary History(Amsterdam:KIT,2004);Fatton,Robert,“BringingtheRulingClassBackIn.ComparativePolitics,”20,no.3(1988),253–264;JamesC.Scott,“Patron-ClientPoliticsandPoliticalChangeinSoutheastAsia,”American Political Science Review66,no.1(1972),91–113.

39 HenrikUrdal,“AClashofGenerations?YouthBulgesandPoliticalViolence,”International Studies Quarterly50,no.3(2006),607–629;RichardP.Cincotta,“DemographicChallengestotheState,”in Security and Development: Searching for Critical Connections,eds.NeclaTschirigi,MichaelS.Lund,andFrancescoMancini,77–98(NewYork:LynneReinner,2009);HannesWeber,“DemographyandDemocracy:theImpactofYouthCohortSizeonDemocraticStabilityintheWorld.”Democratization20¸no.2(2013),335–357.

40 HenrikUrdal,“AClashofGenerations?YouthBulgesandPoliticalViolence.”41 RichardP.Cincotta,“HowDemocraciesGrowUp,”Foreign Policy(March/April2009),80–82;

RichardP.Cincotta,“HalfaChance:YouthBulgesandTransitionstoLiberalDemocracy,”Environmental Change and Security Program Report13,(2008/2009),10–18,availableat<www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/half-chance-youth-bulges-and-transitions-to-liberal-democracy>;RichardP.CincottaandJohnDoces,“TheAge-StructuralMaturityThesis:TheYouthBulge’sInfluenceontheAdventandStabilityofLiberalDemocracy,”inPolitical Demography: How Population Changes Are Reshaping International Security and National Politics,ed.JackA.Goldstone,EricKaufmannandMonicaDuffyToft,98–116(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Weber,2012);TimothyDyson,On the Democratic and Demographic Transitions,(London:LondonSchoolofEconomics,2012),19.

42 RichardP.CincottaandElizabethLeahy,“PopulationAgeStructureandItsRelationtoCivilConflict:AMetric,”Environmental Change and Security Project Report12(2006/07),55–58.


33

structuresthatmanyidentifywithademographicbonus.Countriesinthisstagetypicallyexperiencetherapidaccumulationofeducatedandskilledyoungworkers(humancapital)andsomealsobenefitfromhighratesofhouseholdandgovernmentsavings.43 Withincountriesmovingthroughtheintermediatecategory,themajorityofnewlyestablishedhouseholdsareconvergingonasmallfamilysize,affordinggreaterparentalandgovernmentinvestmentsineducationandhealthperchild,andopportunitiesforwomentoengageinemployment.Suchchangesarelikelytostrainextended-familynetworksandcouldweakenclanandpatron-clientsystems.44 Amongtheexport-orientedEastandSoutheastAsianstates,entryintothisstageofthetransitionledultimatelytogrowthinwages,totheentranceofalargeproportionofwomenintotheworkforce,45andtothebroadeningofthemiddleclass.BecauseLatinAmerica’sfertilitydeclinelaggedbehindEastAsia’s,andtheregion’sgovernments,onthewhole,wereslowertoinvestbroadlyinpubliceducation,46economistshaveraisedquestionsabouthowmuchofaneconomicboostorademographicdividendtheirintermediateagestructureswillultimatelydeliver.47Whilesomeanalystsseesignsofanimpendingeconomictake-off,itisstillearly—muchofLatinAmerica,particularlyMexicoandotherCentralAmericanstates,areintheearlyportionsoftheintermediatestageoftheage-structuraltransition.48 Whileyouthfulintrastateconflictsoftenpersistintotheintermediatecategory,insurgenciesfacedwithwitheringrecruitmenttendtowithdrawfromtroop-intensiveoperations—asinthecaseoftheProvos49inNorthernIrelandinthelate-1980s,50theTamilTigersinSriLankainthe2000s,51andnowtheFARCinColombia.52Asrecruitmentandretentionbecomesmorecostly,the

43 RonaldLeeandAndrewMason.“WhatistheDemographicDividend?”Finance and Development43,3(2006),16–17;DavidE.Bloom,DavidCanning,andJ.P.Sevilla,The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population Change(SantaMonica:RAND,2002).

44 DanielJ.Smith,“ContradictionsinNigeria’sFertilityTransition:TheBurdensandBenefitsofHavingPeople,”Population and Development Review30,no.2(2004),221–239.

45 JohnG.Bauer,“DemographicChange,Development,andtheEconomicStatusofWomeninEastAsia,”inPopulation Change and Economic Development in East Asia: Challenges Met, Opportunities Seized,ed.AndrewMason,359–384(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,2001).

46 NancyBirdsall,DavidRoss,andRichardSabot,“Education,GrowthandInequality,”inPathways to Growth: Comparing East Asia and Latin America,ed.byBirdsall,NancyandFrederickJaspersen,93–130(Washington,DC:Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBank,1998).

47 NancyBirdsall,DavidRoss,andRichardSabot,“Education,GrowthandInequality,”inPathways to Growth: Comparing East Asia and Latin America,ed.byBirdsall,NancyandFrederickJaspersen,93–130(Washington,DC:Inter-AmericanDevelopmentBank,1998).

48 SeeGlobal Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds,NationalIntelligenceCouncil,NIC2012-001,December2012,availableat<www.dni.gov/nic_2030>.

49 TheProvisionalIrishRepublicanArmy,whichwasactiveinNorthernIrelandfrom1969to1997.50 JonathanTonge,Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change(NewYork,Longman,1996).51 AntonBalasingham,War and Peace: Armed Struggle and Peace Efforts of Liberation Tigers(London:

Fairmax,2004).


34

movement’ssmallerreintegration-resistanthardcoretendstoshifttolethallydisruptivetechnologiestoplyagainstthestate,ordriftsintothemorelucrativesphereoforganizedcrime.53

Mature Age Structures

Invariably,withthepassageoftime,intermediateagestructurestransitiontotheirmaturestage(medianagefrom35to45years).MostWesternEuropean

2010

Figure 3Maps showing the global distribution of the four age-structural stages in 2010 (estimates). Median age data are from the UN Population Division’s 2010 Revision, with the exception of the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Median ages of the Council states are drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau’s unpublished estimates and projections of citizen-resi-dent populations

■ Youthful 25.0 or younger

■ Intermediate 25.1 to 35

■ Mature 35.1 to 45.0

■ Post-mature Greater than 45.0

Category MedianAge

52 JeremyMcDermott,“Columbia’sRebels:AFadingForce?”BBC News,February1,2008,availableat<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/7217817.stm>

53 Onedemographicnoteonintermediateagestructures:theyareinherentlyinstable.Whilekeepingoneofthiscategoriesagestructureswouldbeideal,itisdifficulttodo.Givenmanydevelopingstates’propensitytogettoreplacementfertilitylevelsandthencontinuelower,andtheglobaltrendtowardlongerlives,manycountriesthathaveenjoyedtheeconomicbenefitsofintermediateagestructureshavedonesoforaratherbriefperiod—27yearsforJapan,22yearsforChina,lessthan20yearsforbothSouthKoreaandTaiwan(Iraniscurrentlyprojectedtospeedthroughinlessthan20years,aswell).


35

stateshavedweltinthisdemographicrangeforthepastthreedecades.Althoughtheyhavebeenabletoachievemodestratesofeconomicgrowthandmaintainpoliticalstability,theyhavealsohadtoadjusttothefiscalliabilitiesofasteadilyincreasingproportionofseniorsandagradualdeclineinthesizeoftheprimeworking-agepopulation—thosebetweenages25and45;asub-populationthattypicallydemonstratesthesharpestmentalandphysicalskills.54SomeEuropeanstateshaveadjustedmoresuccessfullythanothers. Recentresearchsuggeststhat,forthosestatesthatinvestedintenselyinhumancapital,moderateratesofsavingsandworkerproductivitygrowtharelikelytolingeron—whathasbeencalledasecond bonus.55Butastheworking-

54 VegardSkirbekk,“AgeandProductivityPotential:ANewApproachBasedonAbilityLevelsandIndustry-WideTaskDemand,”Population and Development Review34supplemental(2008),191–207.


36

agepopulationages,andtheprime-agepopulationbeginstodecline,institutionsarelikelytoassumemoreexpansiverolesintheeconomy,particularlyself-financinginstitutionslikethoseintheprivatesector. Perceivinganapproachingfiscalcrunchastherollsofretireesswell,age-structurallymaturestatesarebrisklyturningtoreformingunder-fundedstateretirementsystems,setting-backtheretirementageandcurbingno-longer-affordablepatternsofstatespending.InWesternEuropeancapitals,politicaldebatesincreasinglyfocuson“ifandwhen”toacceptimmigrants,andwhomtoencourage.BothEuropeanandEastAsianeffortstoboostfertilityfromsub-replacementlevelshaverecentlypickeduppace.

2030

Figure 4Maps showing the global distribution of the four age-structural stages in 2030 (projections). Median age data are from the UN Population Division’s 2010 Revision, with the exception of the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Median ages of the Council states are drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau’s unpublished estimates and projections of citizen- resident populations

■ Youthful 25.0 or younger

■ Intermediate 25.1 to 35

■ Mature 35.1 to 45.0

■ Post-mature Greater than 45.0in 2030 map

Category MedianAge

55 RonaldLeeandAndrewMason.Fertility, Human Capital, and Economic Growth over the Demographic Transition,NationalTransferAccountsWorkingPapers(Washington,DC:NationalInstitutesofHealth,2010)


37

Post-Mature Age Structures

EuropeanandEastAsianpopulationsthathavesustainedexceptionallylowlevelsoffertility(below1.6childrenperwoman)areadvancingrapidlytowardthepost-maturestageoftheage-structuraltransition(medianagegreaterthan45).Thissetofagestructuresisonlynowevolvinganditsimplications,therefore,arenotfullyunderstood.56Analystswillsoonshedtheirignorance.Asof2012,JapanandGermanyareprobablypastthe45-yearmark.Italy,Portugal,andAustriacouldenterthepost-maturecategorybefore2020. MostanalystswhohavestudiedthepreparednessofEuropeanandEastAsiansystemsforoncomingpopulationagingforeseeafutureoffiscal,economicandpoliticalchallengesforthesestates.Thegreatestthreatistopensionandhealthcaresystemsthatarefundedprincipallybycurrentpayrollcontributions

56 World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision(NewYork:UnitedNations,2011).


38

(pay-as-you-go).Theseareboundtobecomeunviableastheproportionofseniorsgrowslargeandtheworkforceshiftstoasmallerprofile.Nonetheless,mostEuropeangovernmentshavebeenslowtoorganizeandimplementneededreforms,andtheircitizenshavebeenreluctanttosupportthem.57 Geriatrichealthcarecostsappeartobethemostdifficulttocontrol.Asthesecostsrise,seniors’obligationswillincreasinglycompeteforscarcetaxdollarswithyoungergenerations’demandsforqualityeducationandinfrastructure.Whileitisnothardtoforeseethedaywhen,insomeliberaldemocracies,organizedretireesandworkersholdtheirgovernment’s“feettothefire”overbrokenpensionandhealthcarepromises,thechancesthatagingwilllead,onitsown,topoliticalturmoilseemsslim.Severalthoughtfulanalysespredictthat,withaging,Europeanpowerswillretreatfromtheirinternationalrolesindevelopmentassistanceandregionaldefense.58 Themostnoteworthycharacteristicofpost-maturecountrieswilllikelybetheirdemandfor,andattractivenessto,labormigrants,andtheirchronicsusceptibilitytoshiftsinethnicandreligiouscomposition.Whiledemographicaging,byitself,producesonlyscantopportunitiesfordivisivepoliticalentrepreneurs,manymorepossibilitiesaboundwhenimmigrantcommunitiesfinditdifficulttointegrateorwhentheyresistintegrationthemselves,andwhennativistgroupserectsocialandeconomicbarrierstointegration.IntensenativistpoliticshavealreadymadesignificantinroadsintothepoliticalspectrumofWesternEurope’smature-categorystates,whereethno-religiousresidentialsegregationandculturaltensionshavebecome,overonlyafewdecades,establishedfeaturesofurbanlife.59 Somedifficult-to-answerquestionsaresurfacingasEuropeanmedianagesapproachandpasstheentrancetopost-maturity.Whileagingeconomiesareassumedtosufferfromashortageofworkers,justtheoppositeishappening:someagingEuropeanstatesareexperiencinghighratesofunemploymentatallprofessionalandtechnicallevels.Itjustmaybethattheindustrialera,duringwhichanincreasingorstablelaborforcewasneededforeconomicprosperity,isslippingaway.Thecomingrealityisverydifferent:state-subsidizedsalariesareincreasinglydeemedunaffordable;andworkers,assistedbyvariousmicroprocessor-controlleddevicesandsuppliedwithanInternet-fullofinformation,areexpectedtoaccomplishandproducemoreontheirown—andwithoutconcomitantrewards.Astheirmedianageincreases,advancedeconomiesseeminglyrequirefewerworkerswithmoreskills,andthereiseveryreasontobelievethatthistrendwillcontinue.

57 RichardJacksonandNeilHowe,The Graying of the Great Powers: Demography and Geopolitics in the 21st Century(Washington,DC:CenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies,2008).

58 JackGoldstone“TheNewPopulationBomb:theFourMegatrendsThatWillShapetheGlobalFuture,”Foreign Affairs89,no.1(2010),31–43;MarkL.Haas,“AGeriatricPeace?TheFutureofU.S.PowerinaWorldofAgingPopulations,”International Security32,no.1(2007),112–147.

59 EricKaufmann,Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?(London:ProfileBooks,2010).


39

Ethno-Demographic Shifts

Whilethereisnoshortageoftheoriesthatevokeademographiccauseforpoliticalturmoilandstateweakness,atthisdateonlytwohavegatheredasignificantamountofsupportingevidence:thecaseofyouthfulagestructures,discussedearlier,andshiftsinethno-religiouscomposition.Understandingwhereandwhytheseethno-religiousshiftsareoccurring,andwhatimpactsonstatecapacitytheymaygeneratewillclearlybeimportanttodevelopmentplannersandforesightresearchers.Threemodelsprovideatheoreticalbackdropfordiscussingthistypeofdemographiccontradictioninindividualstates:

Ethno-Religious Subpopulations

Incountrieswithpopulationscomposedofsociallyandreproductivelydistinctethno-religioussubpopulations,declinefromhightolowlevelsoffertilityandinfantmortalitymostoftenoccursfirstamongthemosturbanizedandeducatedethnicgroups,particularlyamonggroupswithrisingincomesandwherewomenexercisesignificantautonomy.60Thesestaggeredtransitionshaveledtodifferencesinfertility,producingdivergingratesofpopulationgrowth.

Women

InsomepartsofEuropeandEastAsia,changesinmaritalbehaviorsandtheliberalizationofwomen’sroleshavebeenassociatedwithdeclinesinfertilitytolevelsthatarenowwellbelowreplacement.61Instateswherethegovernmentandprivatesectorencourageimmigrationtoovercomeperceivedshortagesinworkersandreducewageinflation,shiftsinethno-religiouscompositioncanbeexpected.62

Dissonant Minorities

Theminority demographic security dilemma63—apoliticalhypothesisthatisnotinconsistentwitheitheroftheothertwomodels—contendsthattheeconomicandsocialmarginalizationofdissonantminoritiestendstopromotesocialandreproductivesegregationanddelaytheminority’stransitiontolowfertility.Thismodelpredictsthatwhengovernmentsareunwilling,orunable,tobreakdownbarriersthatobstructthefulleconomicandpoliticalparticipationofminorities,rapidminoritypopulationgrowthratchetsupmajority-minoritytensionsandstrengthensthesebarriers. Somecurrentstateandregionalcasesofongoingshiftsinethno-religiouscompositionwhereUSAIDisactiveprovideexamplesofseveraltypesofpolitical

60 JosephChamie,Religion and Fertility: Arab Christian-Muslim Differentials(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1981).

61 RonLesthaeghe,“TheUnfoldingStoryoftheSecondDemographicTransition,”Population and Development Review36,no.2(2010),211–251.

62 DavidColeman,“ProjectionsoftheEthnicMinorityPopulationsoftheUnitedKingdom2006–2056,”Population and Development Review36,no.3(2010),441–486.

63 ChristianLeuprecht,“TheDemographicSecurityDilemma,”Yale Journal of International Affairs5,no.2(2010).


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tensionsthatcanbeassociatedwiththisphenomenon.InthecentralAndesRegion(Ecuador,Peru,Bolivia)andParaguay,andthecentralisthmusofCentralAmerica(Guatemala,Honduras,Nicaragua),regionspopulatedprincipallybyNativeAmericans(Indios)remainsathigherlevelsoffertilitythanmoreurbanizedareaspopulatedbytheEuro-Latinoswhofoundedthesestates,andhavesincedominatedpoliticsandtheeconomy.AnalystsshouldexpectthegrowthandpoliticalmobilizationofIndioscommunities,inthesecountries,tofavortheelectionofleftistgovernments. InIsrael,theproportionalsizeofthepoliticalcenter—aheterogeneousgroupofsecularandtraditionallyreligiousJews—isslowlybeingerodedbythegrowthofIsraeliArabsandUltra-OrthodoxJews.64InthecaseofIsrael’sUltra-OrthodoxJewishcommunities,clericalleaderspursuemarginalization,65optingforsocialandlocationalsegregationandalowerstandardofliving,which—whencoupledwiththecircumscriptionofwomen’sroles—hasmaintainedahighfertilitynorm,abovesixchildrenperwoman.66 Duetoadelayedfertilitydecline,Lebanon’syouthfulruralShiitepopulationhaseclipsedthelower-fertilityChristians,Sunnis,andDruze.67WhileadriftfrompoliticalextremismtomoderationandintegrationshouldoccurastheShiitepopulationmatures,thepaceofthisalmostinevitablepoliticaltransitionwillbemediatedbythefundingofHezbollah’sforeignpatrons,aswellasthestrengthofLebanon’seconomicrecovery. InIndia,whereUSAIDiscurrentlyactive,thepopulationisbetterthoughtofastwopopulationsofverydifferentdemographicconditionsandtrends.EachofthefourDravidian-language-speakingsouthernstatesisnearorsomewhatbelowreplacement-levelfertility,asareIndia’smajorurbancenters.However,theslowfertilitydeclinethatoccurredinthecentralnorthernstatesofUttarPradeshandBiharhasstallednearfourchildrenperwoman.68Theresultantgrowthshouldraiseconcernsaboutthescaleofinfluxofpoorandsemi-literatemigrantstoIndia’scitiesandtoSouthIndia.NotonlyareunskillednorthernersamismatchforthelabordemandsoftheIndianindustrialandservicesectors,inlargenumberstheymightalsobeunwelcomeinpartsofthesouthernstates.

64 RichardP.CincottaandEricKaufmann,Uncompromising Demography in a Promised Land,NationalIntelligenceCouncil,NIC2010-05,Washington,DC,2010,availableat<www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4956>.

65 NoahJ.EfronReal Jews: Secular vs. Orthodox and the Struggle for Jewish Identity in Israel(NewYork:BasicBooks,2003).

66 SergioDellaPergola,“Jerusalem’sPopulation,1995–2020:Demography,MulticulturalismandUrbanPolicies,”European Journal of Population17,no.2(2001),165–199;EliBerman,“Sect,Subsidy,andSacrifice:AnEconomist’sViewofUltra-OrthodoxJews,”(Jerusalem:MauriceFalkInstituteforEconomicResearchinIsrael,1998).

67 JosephChamie,Religion and Fertility: Arab Christian-Muslim Differentials(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1981).

68 CarlHaubandO.P.Sharma,The Future Population of India: A Long-range Demographic View(Washington,DC:PopulationReferenceBureau,2007).


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Beyond the Future

Arethererolesforpoliticaldemographyanditsforecastsinforeignpolicyanddevelopmentplanning?Thereshouldbe.Bypositioningstatesaccordingtotheirmedianage,andarrangingthemwithinthecontextofthefourage-structuralstagesdiscussedearlier,policyanalystsandforesightresearchersgenerateimagesoftheglobaldistributionoffavorableandunfavorableagestructures.Byusingavailabledemographicprojectionstopeeroneortwodecadesintothefuture,theseanalystscanobtaina“firstapproximation”oftheidentityofstatesinwhichthepotentialforpoliticalstabilityanddevelopmentalprogresswillarise,wherethatpotentialwillremainstrong,andwhereitsstrengthwilldiminish.Thissystemprovidesamuchmorenuancedandrealisticcategorizationofstatesandtheirpaceofprogressthantheincreasinglymisleadingdichotomyof“developedcountries”landscapeversus“developingcountries”thatpervadesthecurrentdiscussion.Thisnow-datednomenclatureremainsanchoredtoper-capitaincomelevelsofcountriesduringthedecadesfollowingthecloseofWorldWarII.USAIDanditsdevelopmentpartnersarewelladvisedtoplacegreateremphasisonage-relatedstructures. Theunderlyingthesisofcurrentdemographicresearch—that“someage-structuralconditionsaremuchlessconducivetobuilding,maintainingandexercisingstatecapacitythanareothers”—hasmajorimplicationsforhowdevelopmentplannersandforeignaffairspolicymakersgoabouttheirbusiness.Yet,becauseuniversitycurriculainpoliticalscience,internationalrelationsandinternationaldevelopmentrarelyrequireacourseindemography,moststudentswillgraduatewithoutunderstandingthedegreetowhichtheage-structuraltransition,familysize,andfertilitydeclinebearuponthefocusoftheirstudies.Unlessthisomissioniscorrected,America’snextgenerationofforeignaffairsanalystsanddevelopmentpractitionerswillbedeprivedofawindowthroughwhichtheymightbetterunderstandthepresentbehaviorofstates,andglimpsecriticalfeaturesoftheglobalfuture.

Richard Cincotta Demographer-in-residence, The Stimson Center

This chapter is included and reproduced with the permission of the author. The chapter or any part of it may not be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the author except that reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any use of the United States Government or those acting on its behalf.


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Science and technology (S&T) has facilitated incredible advances in international development such as oral rehydration therapy, wind and solar power, mobile banking, and geographic informa-tion systems. In short, S&T has improved the lives of millions and made development initiatives more efficient and cost effective. The USAID Futures Symposium panels on “Science and Technol-ogy” brought together a number of experts to discuss important topics such as the explosion of information communications technologies, proliferation and access to data, and the “democ-ratization” of science and technology.

Panelists noted the challenge of mapping future S&T trends is, in large part, due to a surge in innovation targeted at the developing world combined with unprecedented rapid change. In 2002, for example, there were just two countries in the world with mobile cellular penetration over 100 percent. By 2010, almost 100 countries had mobile cellular penetration over 100 percent and 17 countries had penetration over 150 percent. Rapid develop-ments such as these make futures analysis even more essential. Panelists stressed the importance of thinking ahead to stimulate future innovations. Speakers highlighted the explo-

sion of information communica-tions technology (ICT). ICT is currently helping practitioners address some of the most compelling development chal-lenges throughout the world. It is widely recognized that Facebook played a game-changing role during the Arab Spring, particu-larly in orchestrating the revolu-tion in Tunisia. It is estimated that more than three quarters of the world’s population has access to mobile phones; nearly 5 billion of the 6 billion mobile subscrip-tions belong to individuals in developing countries. Mobile devices, including short messag-ing services, otherwise known as SMS, and applications are being used to improve access to health care, to facilitate making cash payments (limiting corruption), to expedite humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to improve literacy, and to assist the moni-toring and evaluation of develop-ment projects. Conversations about the ICT revolution sparked a second set of discussions about data

Science and Technology

Science and technology can empower countries and their citizens, and can transform society.


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proliferation. With increasingly varied and numerous ways in which to collect data, we now have access to more information from multiple sources than ever before. The challenge is how to use this data to understand the development challenges, design on-target programs, and monitor progress. How do we analyze all of this data once it is collected? For example, Frontline SMS, an open source platform that helps non-governmental organizations lower barriers to positive social change, receives 192,000 texts per second. These texts consti-tute an enormous amount of potentially useful information. However, these messages are neither searchable nor stored in an accessible way. Indonesia represents the largest national population using Twitter. People tweet about looking for work, migrating, getting sick, and rice prices. This information, if harnessed, could be used to map development-related trends and address future challenges. The importance of building

new partnerships was also highlighted. It was noted that two-way communication be-tween institutions and individuals will be vital if science and tech-nology is to truly impact devel-opment. The World Bank, for example, is becoming a much more open institution, and in 2012, threw an “Apps for Cli-mate” competition and awarded $55,000 to the finalists. USAID and other development organiza-tions are creating competitions to pull in new actors such as universities, and the private sector, and intelligent individuals. Finally, there was considerable discussion about the benefits of the “democratization” of science and technology. With the spread of the mobile phone and broad-band, new inventions can come from anyone, anywhere in the world. This individual empower-ment has enormous potential for good. The developed world must act as a catalyst rather than just a disseminator of technology. Countries should be empowered to tackle development issues

independently but cooperatively; the transfer of knowledge and education is more important than ever.


PanelsonthetopicofscienceandtechnologyattheSymposiumonFutureDevelopmentChallengesfocusedonnextgenerationtechnologicalinnovationsandtheirpotentialtoincreasemobilization,globalizationandconnectivity.Someoftheseinnovations,suchasimprovedtoolsforirrigationandfoodproductivity,andinnovationsforbetterdiseasediagnosis,prevention,andtreatment,aredestinedtobecomegame-changersfordevelopment.Atthesametime,itwasnotedthattheevolutionandfieldapplicationofothertechnologies,likenanotechnology,werepromising,butmuchlesscertaintorealizepositivedevelopmentimpacts,atleastinthenearterm.Themosthighlydiscussedtopicregardingscienceandtechnologyinnovationswasunsurprisinglytheunprecedentedgrowthofinformationandcommunicationstechnology(ICT).69Thepotentialofhand-helddevicestoimprovethequalityoflifewasemphasizedfrequently.Mobiledevices,forexample,canincreaseaccesstomodernhealthcare,safelymovemoneydigitally,andfosterlearningbyincreasingliteracy. Thereisnodoubtthattechnologyischangingtheworldinwhichwelivefasterthaninanyotherperiodinhumanhistory.Technologicaladvancementsaffecteveryaspectofsociety.Theproliferationofscienceandtechnology(S&T)ishelpingtocreatetoolsthatarecheap,widelyavailable,andeasytouse.Theindividuals,corporations,andgovernmentsthatbestmakeuseofthesenew

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C H A P T E R 4

Technological Change and Sustainable DevelopmentLinton Wells highlights the importance of the fast-changing trends in biotechnology, robotics, information sciences, nano-technology, and energy that are re-shaping tools for development success.

69 InformationCommunicationTechnology(ICT)isthepreferredterm,asopposedtoInformationTechnology(IT),becauseitincludesbroadcastradio,whichservesasaprinciplemeansofmasscommunicationsinmanypartsofthedevelopingworld.


technologieswillhavetheopportunitytodeterminetomorrow’seconomicwinnersandlosers,reshapepoliticalpowerstructuresandprofoundlychangethedevelopingworld.S&Twillrevolutionizethewaythenextgenerationofchildrenlearn,howfamiliesreceivehealthbenefits,andthequalityandquantityofthewatertheydrinkandthefoodtheyconsume.AidorganizationsthatfailtograsptherevolutionarypowerofS&Twillbeleftinthedust. FosteringthedevelopmentofcuttingedgetechnologyisinthevitalinterestoftheAmericanpeople.TheObamaAdministrationhaspaidagreatdealofattentiontoscienceandtechnology,understandingtheimportantroleitplaysinadvancingournationalsecurityinterestsandhelpingtostimulateinnovationandeconomicgrowth.Viewedinthislight,thechallengethatpolicymakersfaceoverthenexttwodecadesishowtodevelopastrategythatsimultaneouslymaintainstheUnitedStates’technologicaledgewhiledetectingemergingtechnologiesanddiscoveringnewwaystoemploythesetechnologiestoimprovethelivesandlivelihoodsofthoseinthedevelopingworld.Beforeaworkablestrategycanbedeveloped,however,itisnecessarytounderstandthedifferenttypesoftechnologicaldevelopmentsthatareunderway.

Parallel Revolutions in Science and Technology

Severalparallelscientificandtechnologicalrevolutionsareinmotion.Theinformationrevolutionisobvious.ICThasnotonlyincreasedthespeedwithwhichwecommunicate,italsohasfundamentallyalteredthewayinwhichwecommunicate.ICTandcellphone-basedserviceshavehelpedtoimproveeverythingfromeducationtomaternalcare,particularlyinthemostremoteareasoftheworld.The2010Haitiearthquake,2011Tōhokuearthquakeandtsunami,and2012HurricaneSandyshowhowadvancementsinICTcanhelptosavelivesandmakeadifferenceontheground.70Likewise,whenpolicymakersandpractitionerslookatthefutureofaidanddevelopment,ICTisanareacommonlycitedasacatalysttodeliverandadministerassistancemoreeffectivelyandefficiently.Crowd-sourced71informationincreasinglyisbeingusedinhumanitarianassistanceanddisasterreliefforeverythingfromdamageassessmentstolocatingunexplodedordnanceandlinkingcitizenstofirstresponders.Theseexampleshighlightthevalueofhavingeducateduserswho

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70 JohnCrowleyandJenniferChan,Disaster Relief 2.0: The Future of Information Sharing in Humanitarian Emergencies(Washington,DCandBerkshire,UK:UNFoundationandVodafoneFoundationTechnologyPartnership,2011),availableat<http://issuu.com/unfoundation/docs/disaster_relief20_report>;LoisAppleby,Connecting the Last Mile: The Role of Communications in the Great East Japan Earthquake(London:InternewsEurope,undated),availableat<www.internews.eu/News/Japanreport/>;and“GISTechnologySavesLivesinHurricaneSandy,”Information Technology Blog,AmericanSentinelUniversity,October29,2012,availableat<www.americansentinel.edu/blog/2012/10/29/gis-technology-critical-in-hurricane-sandy/>.

71 Crowdsourcing,here,isshorthandforavarietyofopen-source,social-media-enabled,approachestotakeadvantageofthecollectivewisdomoflargegroups.TechnologiesusedrangefrombloggingtoSMStextmessaging,fromsocialmediaplatforms(Twitter,Facebook,hi5,others)totheintegrationofopensourcedataontosatellitebasemaps.


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understandhowtousetechnologyinnewwaystosolveproblems. Yet,informationtechnologyisjustonepartofalargertechnologicaltransformationoccurringthroughouttheworld.Collectively,muchofthechangewillbedrivenbyagroupoftechnologiesknownasBRINE:Biotechnology,Roboticsandhumanperformanceenhancements,Information(asreferencedabove)andcognitivescience,Nanotechnologyandnewmaterials,andEnergy.72Thesetechnologieshavethepotentialtodramaticallychangethewayweliveandhowlongwelive—intheUnitedStatesandaroundtheworld.BRINEconcepts,outputsandinteractionswillalsohaveaprofoundimpactontheglobaldevelopmentspherewhereUSAIDworks.Eachoftheserevolutionswarrantsacloserlook:

• Biotechnologyischangingevenfasterthaninformationtechnologyinmanyrespects.Syntheticbiologyoffersextraordinarypromise,perilandethicalissues,andbiomedicalengineeringmajorsnowcommandthehigheststartingsalariesofrecentcollegegraduates.

• Roboticsbringsincreasinglycapableunmannedmilitaryvehicles,exceptionaltoolsforscientificexplorationandnewapproachestomanufacturing.Howeverasrobotsbecomemoreindependentinaction,thisalsoposesconceptual,operationalandethicaldilemmas.

• Informationthroughneurocognitiveresearchisopeningnewinsightsintohowwethink,howpeopleinteractandhowtotreatbraininjuries.

• Theverysmallproductsofnanotechnologyresearcharefindingtheirwayintoeverythingfromnewtypesofmaterialstocancertreatmentstoenergystorage.

• Energyitselfisanotherrevolution.Thesearchforalternativestohydrocarbons,learningtousethefuelswehavebetter,andunderstandingrelatedenvironmentalimpactsshapetechnical,economicandpoliticalagendasaroundtheworld.

ItmaybepossibletoexpandBRINEbyaddingdevelopingtechnologiessuchasadditivemanufacturing(alsoknownas3Dprinting)whichallowsforthecreationofcomplexthree-dimensionalobjectsbylayingdownsuccessivelayersofmaterialinaprintingdevicebasedonaComputer-AidedDesign.Thistechnologywilllikelyhaveahugeimpactoninternationallogisticsandsupplychains,movingtraditionalmanufacturingfromindustrialcenterstomorelocalizedenvironments.73Thiswillhaveimplicationsfordevelopmentplanners

72 SeeLintonWells,II,“TechChangesAffectU.S.Security,”Defense News,January22,2012,availableat<www.defensenews.com/article/20120122/DEFFEAT05/301220002/Tech-Changes-Affect-U-S-Security>.

73 SeeNeylaArnas,TomCampbell,andConnorM.McNulty,Toward the Printed World: Additive Manufacturing and Implications for National Security,DefenseHorizons73(Washington,DC:NDUPress,September2012).


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asurbanization,smartcities,innovationhubsandnewinfrastructurebecomeevenhottertopicsindevelopmentthinkingandprogramimplementation.Otherrevolutionsmayalsoarisesuchasdiscoveriesindarkmatterordarkenergy,buttheBRINEtechnologiesarelikelytostimulatediscoveryandspurinnovationgloballyoverthecourseofthenext20years.

The Strategic Challenge of Technological Development

Thevelocityofchangeisalsoanimportantfactortoconsider.Technologyismovingatamuchfasterpacethanmanyrealize.Bysomemeasures,thenumberoftransistorsonacomputerchipisdoublingaboutevery18months(oneformulationofthefamous“Moore’sLaw”).Thismeansthatintheeightyearsuntil2020,thisreflectionofcomputingpoweralonewillincreaseby4,000to5,000percent.Speed,mobility,commoditization,bigdata,andthecloudwilldrivethefutureICTenvironment.74Biotechnologyischangingevenfasterthaninformationtechnologyinmanyrespects.Genescanbesequencedinafractionofthetimeandcostofevenafewyearsago.Theirinfluenceswillcontinuetogrow,andtheopportunitiesandriskstheyprovideneedtobeaddressedasstrategicissues.Linearprojectionsbasedoncurrenttrendscannotworkinthisworld.75 Thevarietyofscientificandtechnologicalrevolutions,andtosomeextentthewaytheyaredistributedgeographically(geotechnology),arealsochanging.Toolsforinternationalaidanddevelopmentwillbeincreasinglydistributed.Forinstance,threeofthe10fastestsupercomputersarelocatedintheUnitedStates,buttheleadhaschangedseveraltimesinthepasttwoyears.76Inthepast,mostoftheworld’scentersforinnovationwerelocatedintheUnitedStates.ThefactthatSiliconValleywasphysicallylocatedinCaliforniagavetheUnitedStatesacompetitiveadvantage,allowingforclosercollaborationamongdevelopers,innovators,andeducators.However,thefuturecentersoftechnologicaldevelopmentarelikelytobelocatedinmanynationsacrossthedevelopedanddevelopingworld.Asmorerobustscienceandtechnologycapabilitiesdevelopglobally,theUnitedStateswillnolongerbethepreeminentdriverofinnovation.77Researchinothernations,suchastheBRIC(Brazil,Russia,India,

74 LintonWells,II.Managing Network Risk in Times of Rapid Change: Implications for DOD IT Investments and Enterprise Architectures,unpublishedarticle.

75 SeeLintonWells,II.“TechChangesAffectU.S.Security,”Defense News,January22,2012,availableat<www.defensenews.com/article/20120122/DEFFEAT05/301220002/Tech-Changes-Affect-U-S-Security>.

76 “NuclearweaponssupercomputerreclaimsworldspeedrecordforUS,”The Daily Telegraph,June18,2012,availableat<www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/9338651/Nuclear-weapons-supercomputer-reclaims-world-speed-record-for-US.html>.

77 TimCoffeyandStevenRamberg,Globalization of S&T: Key Challenges Facing DOD,Defense&TechnologyPaper91(Washington,DC:CenterforTechnologyandNationalSecurityPolicy,2012),availableat<www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DTP91%20Globalization%20of%20SandT.pdf>.


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China)countriesandSingapore,whichisactivelyseekingtobecomeaworld-classbiotechnologycenterthroughitsinternationalresearchanddevelopmentfacilityBiopolis,78willproduceworld-classresults.

The Humanitarian and the Machine: Leveraging Technology is as Important as its Development

WhileBRINEtechnologiescanhaveamajorimpactonsocieties,technologyaloneisnotenough.Considerthecaseofdevelopingcountries,humanitarianaid,anddisasterrelief.Giventhenumberofstakeholderswhohaveequitiesinthedeliveranceofaid,buildingsocialnetworksanddevelopingtrustwithlocalpopulationsiscritical.Therehavebeencountlessexamplesoffaileddevelopmentprojectsduetothefactthatthelocalpopulationcouldnotsustainthetechnologybeingused.Solutionsneedtobedesignedfromthebottom-upfocusingontheneedsofthelocalpopulationratherthantheinterestsofaidproviders.79Unlesslocalpopulationsindevelopingandemergingcountriescansustaintechnologiesintheirownworldsandwiththeirownresources,thesecountrieswillonlycontinuetobedependentonoutsidedevelopmentassistance. Theaidanddevelopmentlandscapeischanging.Inordertoutilizetechnologiesmoreefficiently,wehavetodeveloprobustnetworksinadvance.Nooneorganizationhasamonopolyongoodideas.Increasedcollaborationandsharedsituationalawarenessamongdisparatestakeholderscanhelpimprovereadinessfor,andresponsestonaturaldisasters,instabilities,insurgencies,foodcrises,andotheremergencies.AnexampleofonesuchapproachistheTransformativeInnovationforDevelopmentandEmergencySupport(TIDES)approach,80aU.S.DepartmentofDefenseresearchprojectattheNationalDefenseUniversity.TIDEShasdevelopedanintegrated,whole-of-governmentapproachbasedonlow-cost,crosscuttingsolutions.TheprojectsupportsfourDefenseDepartmentmissionareas:steadystateinitiativestoshapesecurityenvironmentsandengagewithpartners;post-conflictstabilizationandreconstruction;ForeignHumanitarianAssistance/DisasterRelief(FHA/DR);andDefenseSupportofCivilAuthorities(DSCA)athome.OneofTIDES’mostvaluableassetsisitsabilitytoengagetalentandtapintoinnovationthroughtheglobalSTAR-TIDESnetwork.81Theprojectencouragespublic-private,whole-of-governmentandtransnationalapproachesforanunpredictable

78 FormoreinformationonBiopolis,see<http://www.biopolis.es/en/inicio/index.php>.79 LintonWellsII,WalkerHardy,VinayGupta,DanielNoon,STAR-TIDES and Starfish Networks:

Sharing Sustainable Solutions for Populations under Stress,DefenseHorizons70(Washington,DC:NDUPress,availableat<www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DH%2070.pdf>.

80 ThisresearchprojectiscoordinatedattheCenterforTechnologyandNationalSecurityPolicy(CTNSP)attheNationalDefenseUniversity(NDU),whichispartoftheDepartmentofDefense.Seethehomepage,availableat<www.star-tides.net>.

81 TIDESispartofabroadernetworkcalledSTAR(SharingtoAccelerateResearch).TheSTAR-TIDESnetworkisaglobalcommunityconsistingofover1500members.


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andcomplexworld.Forexample,afterthe2010Haitianearthquake,theprojecthelpedcatalyzecooperationandinformationsharingbetweengovernmentagenciesandciviliantechnologists. Inadditiontobuildingnetworksitisalsoimportanttounderstandhowtoconvertpolicyanddoctrineintoeffectivefieldoperatingprocedures.Thisisespeciallyimportantforaiddevelopmentprogramsandprojects.Itisnotenoughtohavehigh-levelpolicydoctrine.Peoplemustunderstandwhattodointhefieldinordertoimplementactivitieseffectively.Itisalsoimportanttounderstandthelegalandregulatoryconstraintsthatsurroundoperations.Differentscenarioswillrequiredifferentresourcingapproaches,rangingfromimmediatecrisisresponsetolong-termcapacitybuilding,sustainability,andresilience.Theaveragestayinarefugeecampisoversevenyears,whichrequiresadifferentsetofsolutionsthanimmediateresponses.Finally,lessonsareneverlearneduntilbehaviorschange.Training,exercises,andeducationarecriticaltochangingbehaviors. Organizationalculturecanbeanimpedimentthatcreatesresistancetochange,causinggroupstoshunnewideasandworklessproductively.Cultureisadelicateandimportantaspectofeveryorganization,academicinstitutionandlocalpopulation.Oneneedstolooknofartherthanthemilitarydepartmentstounderstandtheimportanceofcultureinanorganization’sdailylife.ThesameistruefordevelopmentdonorsliketheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)andotheraidplayersalongwiththeprivatesector.Theinnovativeuseofnewtechnologiesmayclashwithexistingcultures.However,thelackofattentiontoculturewilllikelyweakenanyproject’seffectiveness.Thechallengewillbeconvincingrelevantorganizationsandindividualstoadoptnewmethodswithintheirculturalnormsandlearninghowtochangeculturesatanappropriatepacetothinkdifferently.Thiswillrequirenewapproachestotrainingandeducationaswellasincreasedcollaborationwithvariousstakeholders.

The Basis for Future Strategy

Inanageoffiscalausterityanddecliningbudgets,developmentassistancewillplayanimportantroleinhelpingtoadvanceAmericaninterestsabroad.Fromchallengecompetitions,suchasUSAID’sGrandChallengesforDevelopmentinitiative82tothePresidentialPolicyDirective(PPD)onGlobalDevelopment,theObamaAdministrationhasdoneagreatdealtoelevatetheroleofdevelopmentas“acorepillarofAmericandiplomacy.”83Similarly,theQuadrennialDiplomacyandDevelopmentReview(QDDR)isafirstattemptathelpingtheU.S.DepartmentofStateandUSAIDlookbeyondtoday’sproblems

82 SeeGrand Challenges for Development,Homepage,availableat<www.usaid.gov/grandchallenges>.83 OnSeptember22,2010,PresidentBarackObamasignedaPresidentialPolicyDirectiveonGlobal

DevelopmenttoelevatetheroleofdevelopmentasacorepillarofAmericanpower.


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toachievefutureaidanddevelopmentgoals.84Whilepolicymakershavestartedtoadvocatestrategiesthatfocusmoreonsolvinglong-termdevelopmentchallenges,strategicguidanceisneededtohelpagenciesmakesenseoftheparallelrevolutionstakingplaceandtheirimpactontheglobaldevelopmentsphere. Ourinvestmentinandunderstandingofkeytechnologicalopportunitiesandrisksshouldbeasmuchapartofglobalstrategydebatesasgeopolitics,demographics,economics,andthenatureofconflict.Theseeffectsdeservetheattentionofpolicymakers,ambassadors,commanders,andUSAIDAdministratorsandAgencymissiondirectors,notjustspecialistsortechnologists.Informationagetechnologiesneedtobefullyintegratedintopolicy,doctrineandoperatingprocedures.Justasinbusiness,newtechnologiesandbettercoordinationofeffortshelpstomaximizeefficiency.AnationthathastakenthistypeofapproachisSingapore.AcloserexaminationofthemethodsSingaporeisemployingisinstructivetounderstandpotentialsolutions. Singaporehaslongbeenfocusedonachievinga“Whole-of-government”and“Whole-of-society”approach,involvingthedeputysecretary-equivalentsfromacrossthegovernmenttodiscussemergingissuesandtoshareexperiencesonforesightinitiatives.85Thistypeofsystemallowsleaderstothinkstrategicallyandtolearnfromeachotherinsteadofepisodicengagementslikequadrennialreviews.OrganizationssuchastheNationalIntelligenceCouncil(NIC)andtheDefenseScienceBoardalsoarelookingattechnologytrendsindetail,butcoalitionsacrossallsectorsofgovernmentmustbebuilt.USAIDandtheNIC,forexample,areincreasinglycooperatingtobetterunderstandemergingdevelopment-relatedtrends. TranslatingSingapore’s“Whole-of-government”and“Whole-of-society”approachintopracticemeansthattheUnitedStatesshoulddevelopconnectionsatalllevels,betweengovernmentofficials,internationalorganizations,academicsandlocalactorsbeforeeventsoccurinsteadofonanad hocbasis.Informationsharingcanhelpidentifyvulnerabilities,devisebetterdefenses,establishbestpractices,anddetectandmitigatefutureattacks.Theaidlandscapewithbefilledwithnewplayers,eachwithdifferentpriorities,methods,andperspectivesforengagementwiththelocalpopulation.Intheyearsahead,civil-militarycoordinationwillbecriticalinhelpingtosolvefuturedevelopmentchallenges.Sustainedengagement,agility,commitmentandcoordinationamongdifferentpartiesisessentialtoachievesustainableandlastingaidanddevelopmentgoals.

84 SeeRichardLKugler,New Directions in U.S. National Security, Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy(Washington,DC:NDUPress,2011),availableat<www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded//New%20Directions.pdf>.

85 S.Ramesh,“Singaporeformsstrategicfuturesnetworktodiscussemergingrisks,”SingaporeNews,September13,2010,availableat<www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/1080932/1/.html>.


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Conclusion

Whileadvancementsinscienceandtechnologywillcontinuetohaveaprofoundimpactontheglobaldevelopmentcommunity,thefuturewillbefilledwithcomplexity,uncertaintyandinterdependency.S&Tmustbeintegratedintopolicyandplanningtohelpsetnationalprioritiesandshapefuturedevelopmentinitiatives.Wemustdesignsolutionsthatareaffordableandsustainableasprioritiesshiftandwefaceamoreausterefiscalenvironment.Newformsofpublic-privatecooperationwillbeessentialtoensurelong-termsustainability.TheQDDRemphasizestheneedtobuildglobalcoalitionstoaddressglobalproblems.86Thegovernmentcannotkeepupwiththescaleandvelocityofcommercialinnovation.Entrepreneursneedtobeencouragedtocooperatewithoneanothertoensurethesuccessofprojectsandsustainlocalcapacity. Thechallengeaheadforpolicymakersistolookbeyondtoday’sissuestounderstandhowtheconvergingrevolutionsinS&Twillintersectwithfuturedevelopmentefforts.Agilityandresiliencemustbefactoredintotheplanningprocesstoprepareforfutureshocksandallowforafasterrecovery.Preexistingnetworksthatarereadytobedeployedatamoment’snoticeshouldbethehallmarkoffuturetechnologystrategies.BuildingthesehumanconnectionspriortoanemergencywillonlyhelptostrengthentheUnitedStates’competitiveedgeandsavelives.Prospectsforsuccessindiversemissionsfromdisasterresponsetobuildingpartnershipcapacitytostabilityoperationscanbeincreasedifauthoritiestreatscienceandtechnologyascriticalinfrastructuresandessentialservices.

Dr. Linton Wells II Director, Center for Technology and National Security Policy,National Defense University

86 The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review(QDDR):LeadingThroughCivilianPower(Washington,DC:DepartmentofState,September2010),23,availableat<www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/index.htm>.



Itwasnosurprisethattherewasstanding-room-onlyduringthethreeScienceandTechnology(S&T)panelsattheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment’s(USAID’s)FuturesSymposium.Theever-increasingnumberofheadlines,blogs,YouTubevideos,andTweetsthatfloodedtheairwavesandbroadbandthisyearaboutgame-changingS&Ttoolspoisedtorevolutionizetheimpact,sustainability,andscaleofdevelopmentassistancewasunheralded.Inreality,thisexplosioninsocialnetworkingrepresents“thenewnormal.”Thesetoolsrangedwidelyfromtheuseof“concretetents”forhumanitarianassistanceanddisasterrelieftothefirst-timeavailabilityofcropinsurancebyprivatecompaniestargetedtosmall-scalefarmers.Localizeddatafromsatellitescombinedwithcomputerizedon-groundsensorsgrabbedheadlinesasdidexponentialsurgesincellphonebanking,moneytransfersandmicrocreditschemes.Cheaper,faster,andmoreaccuratemedicaldiagnosticshavebeenmadepossiblebyhandhelddevices.Byallaccounts,thiswastheyearforS&Tdevelopmentbreakthroughs. ThischapterdocumentsmajorthemesthataroseduringtheScienceandTechnologypaneloftheUSAIDSymposium’sVision2025Session.87The

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C H A P T E R 5

Future Trends: Science, Technology, and Engineering for DevelopmentAndrew Reynolds provides insights into how the advancement of science, technology, and engineering are radically re-shaping the development assistance landscape.

87 AttheUSAIDSymposiumonFutureDevelopmentChallenges,thethematicpanelswereorganizedintothreesessions:Evolutions,Revolutions,andVision2025.Moreonthesesessionscanbefoundintheintroductiontothisbook.WhiletheEvolutionsSessionexaminedcurrenttrendsandrecognizablepatterns,theRevolutionsSessionconsideredfuturepossibilitiesandpotentialgame-changingevents.TheVision2025Sessionbuiltfromthefirsttwosessions,andcombinedtheseideasandmoretoexaminewhatdevelopmentmightlooklikein2025.


speakersatthisthirdsessionexpandedonideasthataroseduringtheEvolutionsandRevolutionsSessionstoexaminehowS&Twillchangetheglobal“aidscape”by2025.Withtherapidexpansionofglobalconnectivityandtheresultingincreasedhumanempowermentpotential,howmustactorsinthedevelopmentsphereadaptinordertoberelevantandeffectiveinthefuture?PanelistsandparticipantsaddressedtherelevanceoffuturesanalysisandcapacitybuildingforUSAIDaswellasforotherdonororganizations.

Previous U.S. Government Initiatives

TheObamaAdministration’sNationalSecurityStrategyandtheQuadrennialDiplomacyandDevelopmentReview(QDDR)providesdeepercontextforthediscussion,asdoestheU.S.StateDepartmentandUSAIDjointbudgetandresourceplanningprocess.88Inthesestrategicplanningexercises,severalthemesareemphasized:

• TransnationalissuesandglobalchallengesrequireinterdisciplinaryapproachesandsolutionsforsuccessfulU.S.diplomacyanddevelopmentpoliciesandprograms;

• Science,technology,engineeringandinnovationareseminalforaddressingthesechallengesandempoweringtherelatedpoliciesandprograms;and,

• Public-privatepartnershipsarealsocriticaltosuccessfordevelopmentprograms,especiallyinaperiodofacutebudgetconstraints.

Strategicforecastsmadeoverthepastdecade,suchasthoseprovidedbyState/USAIDProjectHorizon2025andvariouseditionsoftheNationalIntelligenceCouncilGlobalTrendsReports,reachedsimilarconclusionsaboutmajortrendsthatwillimpactthefuture.89Severaltrendsworthnotinginclude:

• Science,technology,andengineeringwillbeindispensabletoaddressgrandchallenges,butwillfaceeconomic,socialandethicalboundariesandlimits;

• Growingpopulationandincreasedhumanneedswillcollidewithresourceconstraints;

• Theassaultontheglobalcommonscouldbecomemoreintractableas

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88 National Security Strategy(Washington,DC:TheWhiteHouse,May2010),availableat<www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf>;The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR): Leading Through Civilian Power(Washington,DC:DepartmentofState,September2010),availableat<www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/index.htm>.

89 Project Horizon Progress Report(Washington,DC:InteragencyStrategicPlanningCoordinatingConference,2006);Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds,NationalIntelligenceCouncil,NIC2012-001,December2012,availableat<www.dni.gov/nic_2030>.


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nationalandinternationalinstitutionsmaynotbecapableofprovidingadequateleadershipandgovernance;and,

• Theinformationrevolutionisempoweringindividualsandnon-stateactorsinunforeseenandunprecedentedways,challengingthestatusquoandtraditionalinstitutionsandspurringanewgenerationofspecialinterestsandentrepreneurship.

InthestrategicforecastsofProjectHorizon2025andGlobalTrends2030,scienceandtechnologywerecitedascriticaldriversforfutureprosperityandeconomicdevelopment,potentiallydisruptiveinbothpositiveandnegativewaysandseminalforaddressingglobalchallengesinfoodsecurity,humanhealth,managementofwaterandothernaturalresources,energy,environmentalandbiodiversityconservation,andclimatechange.

Practitioner Viewpoints

Duringthesymposiumpanel,anumberofspeakersmadeastrongcaseforthenotionthatS&Twillhaveirreversibleimpactsonthefutureofdevelopment.Monumentalgainsincommunicationassetsandtherelateduseofsocialmediawillleadtothegradualerosionofformalinstitutionsandtheriseofindividualdatageneratorsandconsumers.WhiletheWorldBankandotherinstitutionslikeUSAIDhavebeentransformingtoembracenewideaslikeopendata,prizes,andcompetitions,theirleadershipknowsthatovertime,theseandother“brickandmortar”institutionsmustadaptandwilllikelybecomeanotherpowerfulonlinenodeintheglobaldevelopmentspace. TraditionaldevelopmentinstitutionslikeUSAIDareseekingtobreaktheirinsularityandlistentothe“outsideworld”tofostermorediscourse,dialogueandimproveinformationexchangesaboutdevelopmentneeds—especiallythosethatarisefrompeoplebestplacedinthedevelopingworldtounderstandthem.Theseinstitutionswillretaintheircapacitytoadvocateandlobbygovernmentsandotherstakeholderstofurtheropensuchchannels.Inshort,theeffectivenessoftraditionaldevelopmentinstitutionsinthenew“aidscape”willbebasedonhowwelltheygenerateandfostergenuinedialogue. Thirty-fivebilliondeviceslikePCs,mobilephonesandiPadsintheworldrepresentahuge,“two-wayradiocapability”thatcanbeleveragedtohearthevoicesofpeopleusingthecellphoneasamicrophonetovoicetheirdevelopmentneedsandaspirations.Theavailabilityofover50billiondevices,predictedby2020,willmakethisvoiceubiquitous.90 Whiletherewasgeneralconsensusontheabilitytousefuturesanalysisfordevelopment,somevoicedskepticismandcalledforcaution.Onepanelist

90 NetworldtoCISCOpredictionsavailableat<http://www.networkworld.com/news/2011/071511-cisco-futurist.html>


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suggestedthatexpertsarenobetterthan“dart-throwingmonkeys”atpredictingthefuture.Policymakers,heargued,shouldfocusonidentifyingandachievingambitiousandachievablegoals,ratherthanattemptingtopredictsolutions. Duringthesession,panelistsandparticipantsalikediscussedsettinggoalsforpolicymakers.Anumberofthought-provokingfuture-focusedquestionsemerged.Forexample,isitpossibleto:

• Movebeyondcarbon-neutralenergysourcestoscalablehighcapacityenergyones?

• Increasetheutilizationofexistingvaccinesanddevelopnewones?

• Buildnewformatsforbehaviorchangecommunicationtopropelpublichealthinformation?

• Boostagriculturalproductivitygainswhilefacingreductionsinthearablelandneededtofeedmorepeople?

• Speeddevelopmentofmobiledevicestoprovideinformationneededtoanswertoppriorityquestions?

• RolloutmoreUSAIDprogramsbasedonan“experiment,validate,andscale”approach?

• Envisionnewtoolssuchasgrandchallenges,openinnovationplatformstocreatedemandfornewproductsandservices?

• Strengthenpartnershipsbetweengovernmentandtheprivatesector,NGOs,andindividualstobetterdesign,launchandsustaincollaborativeefforts?

TherewaslivelydiscussionatthesessionontherecentlaunchoftheUnitedNationsGlobalPulseresearchanddevelopmentlaboratory.91This,andotherslabslikeit,havethecapacitytocapturereal-timedataforamoreagileapproachtodevelopmentpracticeinvolvingbigdataandsocialmediaasajumpingoffpoint.ItwassaidthatGlobalPulsearoseduetothefactthatcurrenteconomicresponsesanddevelopmenttoolsareseriouslyoutofdate.Inaddition,traditionalsurveysandnationalstatisticstaketoolongtoprocessandevaluate,andarecostly.Thisslownessandhighunitcostinhibitsquickresponsesindeterminingdevelopmentsuccessorfailure.TheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals,forexample,willnotprovidemeasurableresultsuntil2019accordingtoGlobalPulse.Moreover,theseexpertsclaimthatcloseto90percentoftheworld’sexistingdatawascreatedinlasttwoyears;so,unlessweusenewtools,developmentpractitionerswillforeverbebehindthecurve.

91 TolearnmoreabouttheUnitedNations’GlobalPulselab,seetheirHomepage,availableat<www.unglobalpulse.org/>.


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Itwasemphasizedrepeatedlythatsocialnetworkingrepresentsagreatopportunitytohelpaddressthisdatadeluge.Indonesia,forexample,acurrentrecipientofUSAIDdevelopmentassistance,hasalargenumberofTwitterusers.Infact,Jakartaistheworld’smostactiveTwittercity.92Citizenstweetaboutlookingforemploymentandshareinformationaboutavarietyoftopicssuchasmigration,healthservices,andpricesforriceandothercommodities.Muchofthisinformationispublicandcanbeusefulasmetricsfordevelopmentprograms.Retrospectiveanalysesarebeingconductedonmobilecallingpatternsfrom2008,beforetheglobaleconomiccrisishit,todiscerntrendsinhealthandeconomicissuesandpossiblecorrelationsorpatternsthatcouldhavebeenusedpredictivelyin2009–2010. Privatedatanetworksandmobilecallingtrendscanalsoprovide“digitalsmokesignals”toidentifyissuesofconsumptionbehaviorandwell-beingthroughoutthedevelopingworld.Whiletheuseofaggregateddatacanbemadeanonymoustoprotectpersonalsecurityandprivacy,moreeffortneedstobeputintoworkingwithprivateindustrytofostergreater“dataphilanthropy.”Privateindustryhasbeguntorealizethatputtingdataintoa“commons”toprovideinformationforexaminationofpossiblesolutionsisasolidbusinessstrategyandwillprotectfutureeconomicinvestments.Sessionparticipantsalsopointedoutthatsocialmediamaybeinstrumentalinhelpingdevelopmentpractitionersknowwhetherornotaprojectworkedimmediatelyafteritsimplementationanddowntheroadfollowingcompletion.Theimpactofdevelopmentassistancewillbemoredynamicasmoreaidrecipientsprovidetimelyfeedback. Otherpractitionerpointsthataroseduringthesessionfocusedontheriseandchangingnatureoftheaidindividualorclient,whobothprovidesolutionsandreceivebenefitsinthenewworldofdevelopmentassistance.ThefutureroleofdevelopmentagencieslikeUSAIDandtheWorldBankwillbetoserveasconnectorstosolutions,notjustprovidersofexpertsasinthepast.Openinnovationwillbeimperative,nolongerjustanoption.Thedevelopmentfield,itwasgenerallyagreed,mustovercomethecollectivechallengetolookatissuescollectivelyratherthaninisolationandtoseekcross-cuttingsolutionsfordevelopmentproblems.Thesenewapproachesandanalyticpotentials,onceadopted,willhelpharnessinnovationfordevelopmentandleadtobreakthroughsinlow-costsolarenergyuse,cheaperhousing,andmoredrinkablewater. Discussionabouttheroleofuniversitiesalsodrewconsiderableattentionduringthesymposium.Forexample,itwasnotedthatuniversitiesaredemonstratinganincreasinginterestindevelopmentstudies,bothinundergraduateandgraduatelevelsand,inparticular,intheareaofglobalhealth.HarvardUniversityhasimplementedacross-cuttingprogramthatstrivesto

92 “Jakartais‘world’smostactiveTwittercity,’”Al Jazeera,August1,2012,availableat<www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/08/201281141334716.html>.


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tacklethechallengeofmalaria.93Theprivatesectorhasalsowitnessedanincreasedlevelofinterestandparticipationindevelopment.Manyexportedgoodsaresoldinthedevelopingworldandstablesocietiescombinedwithhealthierpeoplemeansabiggerpotentialmarketforneededgoodsandservices. Therewasageneralconsensusamongparticipantsthattherewasanimpendingshiftinsolutionprovidersasfewergovernmententities,andmoreindividualsandcommunities,participateinthe21stcenturydevelopmentspace.AcceleratinggrowthininformationsharingviaInternet-basedplatformswillyieldbetteraccesstoresourcesallaroundtheworld.

Four Thematic Highlights and Conclusions

TraditionalstakeholdersandinstitutionslikeUSAIDwillstillbevitalinthefuturedevelopmentspace.Atthesametime,individualsarebecomingmorecritical,empoweredbymoderninformationandcommunicationtechnologies,socialnetworkingandopeninnovationplatforms.Traditionalassistanceorganizationsandfacilitatorsneedtobecomemoreattunedtolocalstakeholder’sneedstoidentifythebestsolutionsforlocalproblems.Withthosepointsascontext,fourmainconclusionscanbedrawnfromthesessionaboutthefutureroleS&Tandengineeringcanplayindevelopment.Thesearebrieflydescribedasfollows:

1)Traditionalandchanginginstitutionalculturesandcodesofconductfordevelopment;

2)Theroleofuniversitiesindevelopment;

3)Theimperativeforinstitutionalculturalchangetoembracedevelopmentinthenew,21stcenturyparadigmandtoserveasconnectorsforandbetweenindividualsandallstakeholders;

4)Theimportanceofmetricsandnewadministrativeapproachesandfundingmodalitiesfordevelopment.

Institutional Culture and Codes of Conduct: the World Bank and the United Nations Must Change

Onorganizationalculture,itwasaskedrhetoricallyiftheWorldBankisa“bankwithbrainsorauniversitywithmoney?”Inresponse,itwasstatedthat“learningandlendingareconnectedandthejobnowistoconnectpractitioners.”TheWorldBankInstituteisanarmforcapacitybuilding,buttheWorldBankasa

93 Harvard Malaria Initiative,HarvardSchoolofPublicHealth,Homepage,availableat<www.hsph.harvard.edu/research/hmi/>.


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wholehasalimitedroleasa“globaluniversity”andmustservemoreasafacilitatorforinformationexchangesbetweencountriesaboutbestpracticesintraining,contentandothercapacity-buildingendeavors.Culturally,theWorldBankisstillstructuredaroundoldparadigms,andaccordingtosome,reformhasbeenunevenatbest.Ithasbeendifficult,forexample,fortheWorldBanktobreakawayfromthetraditionalapproachofproviding“firstworldsolutions”for“thirdworldproblems.”However,progressisbeingmadetocultivateanopeninnovationteamapproachtoshiftfromcloseddevelopment(i.e.,North/Southknowledgeexchangeandworkwithgovernments)toopendevelopment(suchasmulti-modesoflearningwherelendingisbutonetoolutilizedwithmanyparticipants).Thistypeofinstitutionalculturereformisalsoneededinotherinternationaldevelopmentbanks. ThesamechallengesfaceU.N.organizations.Itisnowwidelyrecognizedthatinstitutionalculturalchangesarerequiredtomeetfutureneeds,andorganizationsmusteitheradaptorperish.Bureaucracieshaveatendencytoslowdowndecisionsandpunishmistakesthroughcommission,yettheydonotpunishinactionortraditionalhabitsofomission.Inthebrave,newworldofempoweredindividuals,opensourcesandsocialnetworking,bureaucraciesarebeingheldmoreaccountableandmustreact,forexample,tonegativeTweetsandothersocialnetworkobservationsabouttheorganization.Inaddition,itisthepeopleatthegroundlevelinthebureaucratictrenchesthatareoftenthebestrepresentativesoftheirorganizations,nottheseniorofficials.Thesefrontline“troops”areinbettertouchwithopinionmakerswhoTweetabouttheirdiscussions,thuscreatinganewenvironmentofblendedprivate-publicinformationgenerationandsharing. Notwithstandingthesenewalignments,governmentswillalwayshaveaseminalroletoplayindevelopment.Practicallyspeaking,theU.N.“stakeholders”are193sovereignnationsthatwillcontinuetoestablishandregulatestandardsforcommodities,healthproductsandtechnologies,andwillprovidetrainingandeducationresourcesforcitizens.Butitisclearthatgovernmentsmustadapttothenewworldofsocialnetworkingandindividualempowerment,andtheymustengagemoredeeplyandtransparentlywiththeirpeopleandrecognizethatcitizensarebecomingmoreeducatedandsophisticatedinallfacetsofcivilsocietyandgovernance.

The Role of Universities

USAIDistappingtheuniversitycommunitymoreandmoreeffectively,particularlythroughregularhigh-levelfacultyandstudentexchangesandjointresearchprograms.Universitiesareuniquebecausetheycanbringabreadthofspecialistsfrommanydifferentdisciplinesandwithdifferentviewpointstoaddressaproblem.Asageneralmatter,universitiescangenerategreatideas,but


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technologytransferconcernsandmodalitiestobringproductstomarketarealsocriticalissuestoaddress.Forexample,someuniversitiesaresuccessfulatmovingsoftwareandhealthcareservicestomarket,butlessexperiencedinprovidingdevelopmentsolutions. ImprovementsandculturalchangeatUSAIDhavebeenunderwayforseveralyears,butthelasttwoyearshavebeenextraordinary,especiallywithregardtouniversityengagement.EarlyoninApril2008,USAID,theStateDepartment,andtheDepartmentofEducationhostedaSummitonHigherEducationattendedbyover300universitypresidentsandprovostsfromtheUnitedStatesandabroadtodiscussnewmodalitiesforcooperation.Subsequently,fourregionalconferencesprovidedmomentumforthesummitandhelpedtofurtherstrengthennetworksbetweenuniversities,governmentsandotherstakeholders. Manyfacultymembersarealreadypioneeringandusingnewtoolsfordevelopmentsolutions,butuniversitiesstillneedbetterguidanceonhowtodefineproblemsandfocusonthemostimportantdevelopmentquestions.USAID’swidelyacclaimedHigherEducationSolutionsNetwork(HESN)isalreadyprovidingopportunitiestocultivatesuchguidance.Atthesametime,itwillalsofosternewpartnershipsbetweenuniversities,USAID,andforeigndevelopmentcounterpartswhiletappingintotheoutsizedcontributionsmadebystudentengagement.AspartoftheHESNinitiative,afirstcohortofsevenuniversitieswasselectedforfundinginNovember2012toprovidearangeofexpertiseinvalue-addedagriculture,healthservices,geospatialdatamanagement,disasterrecoveryandassistance,andentrepreneurshipandinnovation.94 Inthemoderncontextof“softpower”fordiplomacyanddevelopment,itisnowwidelyappreciatedthatsomeofAmerica’sbestambassadorsarescientistsandengineers.Developmentinstitutionsneedtotakebetteradvantageoftheseindividuals.AssetsforUSAIDandStatearealsobeingaugmentedthroughprofessionalfellowships.AmericanAssociationfortheAdvancementofScience(AAAS)FellowsandJeffersonScienceFellows,forexample,bringfreshenergyandimpetustoscienceandengineeringchallengesindiplomacyanddevelopment.95Inaddition,agreatreservoirofU.S.immigrants—thediaspora—isalsoapowerfulassetthroughwhichdevelopmentactivitiesarebeing

94 TolearnmoreabouttheHigherEducationSolutionsNetwork,seetheHESNHomepage,availableat<www.usaid.gov/hesn>.

95 AmericanAssociationfortheAdvancementofSciences(AAAS)arePh.D.’sintheirfieldsrecruitedannuallybyAAAStoservein1–2yearassignmentsintheexecutivebranchandCongress.Theybringexperiencefromtheacademic,researchandpublicandprivatesectors,andmanyarehiredbytheirhostinstitutions,includingUSAIDandStateDepartment,onapermanentbasis.JeffersonFellowsaretenuredprofessorsofscienceandengineeringembeddedatUSAIDandStateforone-yearassignmentsand,uponreturningtotheiruniversities,remainavailableassubjectmatterexpertsforanunlimitedperiod.TheseprofessorscanengagetheirownglobalresearchandacademicnetworkstosupportandinfluenceUSdiplomacyanddevelopmentinitiativesandprograms.


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cultivated,includingactivitiesthatsupporttheempowermentofwomenandyouthwhoviewnaturalizedAmericanrolemodelsfromtheircountrieswithgreatrespect,especiallyinthesciencesandengineeringfields.

Institutions and Millennials as Connectors

Assistanceinstitutions,facilitators,andconvenerorganizationssuchasUSAID,internationaldevelopmentbanks,andU.N.organizations,mustevolvetobetterconnectpeopleandassetsinordertoprovidesustainable,scalableandresilientdevelopmentsolutions.Forexample,USAID’ssuiteofGrandChallengesdemonstratesthepowerofdefiningaproblem,notdictatingasolution,andthenusingcrowdsourcingtoidentifyviable,impactful,andscalablesolutions.96 Developmentinstitutionsshouldnotabandontheirtraditionalprograms.Infrastructureforwater,energyandcommunicationservices,schools,foodstaples,vaccinesandmedicines,forexample,cannotbeprovidedbythe“Twittersphere”alone.Traditionalprogramswillcontinuetorequirefurthersupportandfundingevenastheybecomemoresustainable.However,withnewparadigmsevolving,developmentinstitutionswillincreasinglypartnerwithotheractorssuchasprivatecompaniesanduniversities.Together,theseactorswillcreate“centersofexcellence”thatarecapableofaddressingmultipledevelopmentissueswithmultidisciplinaryapproaches,ratherthantreatingscientificortechnicalchallengesinisolation. Studentsandmillennials97allaroundtheworldarehungrywithidealismandpassionforaddressingdevelopmentissuesandhelpingthelessfortunate.Theyareconnectedtooneanotherinunprecedentedwaysthroughtheirformaleducationandexchangeprograms,fieldsofresearchandsocialnetworkingspacesandonlinecommunitiesthataresecondnaturetothem.Inthedevelopedworld,andincreasinglyindevelopingcountries,millennialsareworldlierandmoretraveledthantheirparentswereattheirage.Inshort,Americanstudentsandtheirforeigncounterpartsarequicklybecomingglobalcollaboratorsandinnovatorsandtheyrepresentperhapsthesinglemostpowerfulnewassetinthe21stcenturydevelopmentsphere.Traditionalinstitutionsandstakeholdersmustcultivateandharnessthispotentialasquicklyaspossible.

96 USAID’sGrandChallengesforDevelopmentInitiativeaimstodefineproblems,identifyconstraints,andprovideevidence-basedanalysis.Thusfar,fourGrandChallengeshavebeenlaunched.FormoreinformationaboutUSAID’sGrandChallenges,seethehomepage,availableat<www.usaid.gov/grandchallenges>.

97 TheMillennialsarecurrentteensandtwenty-something’stransitioningintoadulthood.FormoreinformationonMillennials,seePaulTaylorandScottKeeter,ed.,Millennials: A Portrait of Generation Next(Washington,DC:PewResearchCenter,February2010,availableat<www.pewresearch.org/millennials/>.


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Metrics, Administrative and Programmatic Challenges

USAIDanditsstakeholdersandfundersshouldbemoreopentothevalueofstrategicplanningfordevelopmentinthemedium-tolong-term,particularlyinthescience,technology,andengineeringsphereswherelongleadtimesareneededforsuccess.Atthesametimeitiscriticaltoservestakeholders’needsformeasureableprogrammilestonesandresultsintheshortertermofonetothreeyears.Dataanalysisiscriticaltoanswertheseneeds,particularlymetadataanalysisinanerawhenrawinformationandknowledgeareincreasingexponentially.Bettermetricsarealsoneededtoinformpolicymakersanddonorsabouttheimportanceofincorporatingscience,technology,andengineeringintodevelopmentprogramming. Fundingmechanismsalsoposeadministrativechallenges,particularlywhenattemptingtoprovideresourcestonon-traditionalinstitutionsandindividuals.ProcurementchangesarealsoneededtomoveUSAIDfromitstraditionoffundinglargecontractorswhomeetallspecificationstoamoreflexiblemodelforfundingmoreexpertswithinnovativeapproacheswithsmallerawards.Smallandmediumenterprisescanalsobetargetedtoharnesssmaller,“off-grid”technologieswithexcellentpotentialfordevelopmentapplicationsincluding,forexample,small-scalerenewableenergyplatforms,waterpurificationtechnologies,healthservicestechnologiesandmobilephoneandbroadbandsystems.Itissaidthatinnovationiseasy,butprocurementishard.USAIDisalreadybeginningtoembracemanyofthesenew,non-traditionalfundingapproachestoleverageinvestmentsinthefastercyclesofthemodern“aidscape.” OtherU.S.Governmentagenciescanserveasexcellentdevelopmentpartners.Forexample,theNationalScienceFoundation’sPartnershipsinEnhancedEngagementinResearch(PEER)programwithUSAIDfundsmeritoriousscientificandtechnicalresearchbetweenUSAIDanddevelopingcountrycounterparts,anditisalreadyunderway.98TheAgencyhasalsocultivatedasimilarpartnershipwiththeNationalInstitutesofHealth.Theelevationofdevelopmentonequalfootingwithdiplomacyanddefense—ascalledforintheNationalSecurityStrategyandtheQDDR—iscriticaltotheUnitedState’seconomicandnationalsecurityinterests.Furthermore,theQDDRhascalledfor“Whole-of-government”andeven“Whole-of-society”partnershipstoachieveourdiplomacyanddevelopmentobjectives.USAIDhasopenedalargeapertureofcooperationtoengageinthemodernaidscapewiththeU.S.GeologicalService,theDepartmentofEnergy,theDepartmentofAgricultureandtheNationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration,andeffortswithNGOsandacademiaaremovingaheadbrisklyinparallel.

98 FormoreinformationaboutPartnershipsinEnhancedEngagementinResearch,seetheirHomepage,availableat<http://sites.nationalacademies.org/pga/dsc/peer/index.htm>.


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Last Word

The21stcentury“aidscape”presentsenormouschallengesandopportunitiesforalldevelopmentstakeholders.Openarchitectureforinformationanddataexchange,analysisandnewmodalitiesofcooperationandinnovationcharacterizethenew“aidscape.”Governmentsremainvitalfundersandfacilitatorsfordevelopment,buttheyandothertraditionaldevelopmentorganizationsmustadapttotheshiftingdevelopmentlandscapeandtheglobalinformationsocietyorrisklosingrelevancyandinfluence.Inparticular,theymustchangeorganizationalbehaviortobecomebetterfacilitatorsandconnectorsforandbetweenthesenumerousindividualsandnewstakeholders.Entrepreneursamongthesestakeholders,includingsmallandmediumenterpriseswithinnovativeapproachesandtechnologiesyetuntappedfordevelopment,shouldbeidentifiedandtargetedforspecialattention.TheircontributionstodevelopmentalsorepresentsanewgenerationoftradeopportunitiesfortheUnitedStates. Whileitistruethat“therearenofactsaboutthefuture,”99strategicplanningandanalysisofmedium-andlong-termtrendsprovideimportantcontextfordevelopmentprioritiesandprograms.BuildingastrategicplanningandfuturesanalysiscapacityatUSAIDtoconsistentlyexaminealternativescenarios,challengesandopportunitiesshouldbeattheveryheartofarevitalizedsciencebasedAgency. Finally,anewgenerationofcitizensandpassionatemillennialsarebeingempoweredbyincreasedglobalconnectivityandthemobilityofintellectualcapitalresultingfromtherapiddeploymentofcommunicationstechnologyandinternetservices.Theseindividualsrepresentsomeofthemostpowerful,newpotentialassetsforthedevelopmentsphere.Itisintheself-interestofthedevelopmentcommunitytoembraceandleveragetheseassets,especiallyinthefaceoflimiteddevelopmentresources.Traditionaldevelopmentorganizationssuchasgovernments,theUnitedNations,internationaldevelopmentbanks,andnon-governmentalorganizationswillneedtoreachouttothesenewpartnersinordertoadapttothisnewrealityandtoharnesstheenormousopportunitythesepartnersrepresenttoshapethe21stcenturyaidscape.

Andrew Reynolds Senior Advisor, Space and Advanced Technologies, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State

99 AdministratorLincolnE.Moses,PreambletoThe Annual Report to Congress—1978,DOE/EIA-0036/1&2(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofEnergy,February1978).



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Developing countries and economies in transition are shifting the balance of power on the world’s economic stage. The World Bank reports that almost half of the world’s economic growth can be attributed to developing countries. In 2009 and 2010, China issued more loans to developing nations than the World Bank. In terms of political change, the implications of the Arab Spring, which changed the political landscape of the Middle East, are yet to be fully assessed. The civil war in Syria and the insurgency in Mali are testaments to the notion that political

change can be unpredictable and destabilizing. All of these factors, economic and political, will impact the way the global community does development. During the “politics and economies” panels at the USAID Symposium, these issues drew considerable discussion. Panelists engaged questions on topics such as shifting donor-recipient relationships, economic uncer-tainty, the role of political institutions, and a growing number of new strategic partner-ships. Throughout the discussion, several key changes and chal-lenges emerged.

One topic that dominated discussion was the changing role of the nation-state. Although states remain key actors, the ‘playing field’ has diversified dramatically in recent years, and many other stakeholders now have the power to influence the future of development. Panelists discussed the importance of engaging not only national governments, but also regional and local governing bodies as well as institutions, civil society, and the private sector. With the spread of information communi-cations technologies, citizens throughout the world are making their voices heard. Despite the increased number and power of non-traditional actors, it was noted that ultimately, success is unlikely if key political decision-makers are not involved in processes. A second discussion trend which surfaced in this track was the high degree of interconnect-edness of current trends and the increased complexity of the development landscape in

Politics and Economies

Over the past few years, the world has witnessed dramatic shifts in both the global economy and in worldwide political trends.


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general. For example, issues pertaining to water, land, agricul-ture, migration, and rising inequality all require the atten-tion of governance. One panelist stated that food insecurity is a direct result of poor governance. Another pointed out the fact that fragile new democracies often find it difficult to provide basic services to citizens. The technology to produce food exists; droughts and famine, for the most part, are predictable. Governments must develop the institutional capacity to make public goods accessible to their citizens. Rapid urbanization is another demography-related phenomenon that is tied to governance. Megacities in particu-lar create a unique challenge for governments striving to provide basic goods and services to their populations. If development challenges such as these are to be overcome, political will must be present. The importance of forging strategies to mitigate economic shocks was also underscored.

Developing countries, not unlike developed ones, will face sizable challenges to sustain economic growth and to cope with rising demand for goods and services from a newly emerging middle class. The global community must learn to better predict and prepare for economic downturns in order to bolster microeco-nomic resilience. One strategy for doing this would be to create stronger regional integration among countries. Finally, one of the most salient trends discussed in these panels involved the shifting donor landscape. USAID regu-larly graduates countries from development assistance. These “graduates” become success stories, such as South Korea and Costa Rica, and in many cases, they become donor countries themselves like Brazil and India. Trilateral cooperation is becom-ing more frequent and is a great way to leverage available knowl-edge and resources. Additionally, the BRICs are changing the face of international development.

While spending on foreign assistance by developed coun-tries is stagnating, foreign assistance from emerging economies like China, Brazil, and India is growing fast. Western donors must learn to cooperate and collaborate with these economies. The challenge over the next 25 years will be to widen the team of nations supporting international develop-ment initiatives and to forge strategies together that will support a more equitable and prosperous world.


Theforeignassistancelandscapehaschangeddrasticallyoverthepastseveralyears.Withtheriseofemergingdonors,unprecedentedlevelsofprivatesectorengagement,anexpandedroleoffoundations,andtheexplosionsofpublic-privatepartnerships,theforeignassistancelandscapeofyesterdayhasbecomeamemory.Thesizeandvelocityofprivatecapitalflowstothedevelopingworld,peer-to-peerphilanthropy,andothereconomicspigotshaveforeverchangedthefinancialroleoftraditionaldonors.AlloftheseissuessparkedlivelydiscussionattheUSAIDSymposiumonFutureDevelopmentChallenges.Thiswasespeciallysointhe“politicsandeconomies”forumwheretimeandagainspeakersasked:WhatwillUSAID’srolebeinthefuture,andhowwillitmobilizestillsizableresources—capitalandhuman—tomeetthedevelopmentchallengesofthe21stcentury?Participantswerequicktopointoutthatwhilemuchhaschanged,persistentchallengeslikeilliteracy,under-nutrition,andcorruptionarestillwidespread.Newtrendslikeglobalclimatechangeandrapidurbanizationareposingtheirownuniquechallengetosustainabledevelopment. Byallaccounts,theAgency’sprogrammingandplanningeffortshavetraditionallyfocusedonaiddeliveryovertheshorterterm.Countrystrategies,forexample,usuallymapassistancetwotofiveyearsintothefuture.ButthepaceofchangeinthedevelopmentlandscapehasskyrocketedasseemlydistanteventssuchasrapidurbanizationandclimatechangearriveupontheAgency’sfrontdoorstep.Newplayersinthedevelopmentarena,hugeshiftsintheeconomicbalanceofpower,unpredictablepoliticalchangesandotherdevelopmentswill

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C H A P T E R 6

Beyond Traditional Foreign Assistance: USAID’s Future Role with Middle-Income CountriesDaniel Runde discusses new approaches that are necessary to dramatically transform a now outdated and ineffectual donor engagement strategy.


forceUSAIDtobecomemoreflexible,innovative,andfuturefocusedinordertostayafloatandtothrive.Inshort,thetraditionaldonor-recipientmodelisoutofdateandill-equippedtoaddresstoday’seconomicandpoliticalrealities.Theroleoftrade,oftenundervaluedfordevelopment,newfundingmechanismsandpartnershipopportunities,andagreatlyexpandedroleforscienceandtechnologyallemergedasfrontandcenterissuesatthesymposium.Keepingallofthesedevelopmentsinmind,thischapterexploresanewroleforthenow50-plus-year-olddevelopmentagency.

Today’s Budget and Strategic Realities

Officialdevelopmentassistanceisatacrossroads,andtheU.S.Governmentisoneofmanytraditionaldonorshavingtomakedifficultchoicesaboutthedirectionandextentoftheirassistanceprogramming.Budgetcutsduringrecentyearsofausterityhaveaffectedeverysectorofgovernment,includingdevelopmentagencies.TheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID),despiteusingonlyasmallfractionofthefederalbudget,hashadtomakedowithless-than-idealbudgetrealities. Yetshrinkingbudgetsareonlyoneaspectofthechangingnatureofdevelopmentassistance.ManytraditionalrecipientsofforeignaidfromtheUnitedStatesandotherOECD(OrganizationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment)countrieshavemadetremendousstridesintermsofeconomicgrowth,announcingthemselvesasequalplayerswiththerichcountriesoftheGlobalNorth.China,India,andBrazilarejustafewexamplesofcountriesthathaveundergoneeconomictransformation,liftinghundredsofmillionsofpeopleoutofpovertyinthelasttwodecades.Continuingtoprovidesuchpowerfulnationswithtraditionalforeignassistanceisthereforeincongruouswithtoday’seconomicandpoliticalrealities.Infact,manycountriesthathavereachedorsurpassedmiddle-incomestatushaveestablishedtheirownbilateralforeignaidagenciesoragendas,tovaryingdegreesofsophistication,suchastheBrazilianAgencyforCooperation(ABC)andtheIndianDevelopmentPartnershipAdministration.TraditionalU.S.assistancetothesecountries,somewithmultitrilliondollareconomies,isnotonlylesseffectiveasfarasmeetingglobaldevelopmentgoals,butlessstrategicfromabroaderU.S.foreignpolicyperspectiveaswell. AlthoughU.S.Governmentdevelopmentresourcesarefocusedintheworld’spoorestregionsandcountries,andinconflictanddisaster-affectedzones,thisisnottosaythatthereisnolongeraneedforassistancetomiddle-incomecountries.Onthecontrary,certainUSAIDactivities,suchasitsdemocracyandgovernanceprogramminginnon-democraticcountries(suchas,untilrecently,itssupportforRussiancivilsocietyorganizations),meritcontinuationevenwheneconomicrealitiessuggestotherwise.Rather,theU.S.Governmentshouldbegin

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shiftingitsrelationshipswithmiddle-incomecountriesfromadonor-doneeapproachtowardsmoreofapartnershipmodel.USAIDisalreadyassumingtheroleoffacilitatorforthesetransitions,suchasinPanama,buttheseeffortsshouldbescaledupandacrossthebreadthofUSAID’sreach,asthephenomenonofrapideconomicgrowthisvisibleoneverycontinent.Aswillbedescribedbelow,helpingtheseemergingplayersbecomebetterdonorsshouldbeavitalcomponentofUSAID’sengagementstrategy.Inanumberofcountries,includingBrazil,USAIDisalreadypursuingthis,withpromisingresults.

Boosting Trade

AnotherwaytoexpandU.S.partnershipswithmiddle-incomecountriesistodoawaywithtraderestrictions,andinselectcases,worktowardsfreetradeagreements(FTAs).TheU.S.CongresslastyearratifiedFTAswithPanama,SouthKorea,andColombia,100allcountrieswithverypositiveexperienceswithU.S.assistance(theUSAIDmissioninPanamacompleteditsactivities,asscheduled,inSeptember2012).101ItiscertainlynocoincidencethatinplaceswithastronglegacyofU.S.developmentassistance,apowerfultraderelationshipwiththeUnitedStateshasblossomed.AsTable1shows,middle-incomecountriesthatunderwenteffectivetransitionsoutoftraditionalUSAIDassistancewitnessedexponentialgrowthintheirtradewiththeUnitedStates,atrendthatholdstothisday. TransitioningfromtraditionalforeignassistanceandpursuingapartnershipwithacountryisnothingnewfortheU.S.Government,butitremains,asalways,achallengingproposition.Transitionsinthepast,asaresult,haveyieldedmixedresultsinthelongterm. OneofthemostimportantconsiderationsforpursuingatransitionawayfromtraditionalforeignaidiswhetherthetransitionthreatenstoundermineUSAID’slegacyinthatcountry.USAIDhasbeenoperatinginsomecountriesfordecadesandhasmadefundamentalcontributionstothelong-termprosperityofthosecountries.Forinstance,USAIDwasinstrumentalinbringingtheGreenRevolutiontoIndia,whichturnedthatcountryintoanagriculturalexporter.102Alsointheagriculturalsphere,USAIDhelpedtheBrazilianGovernmentstartupEmbrapa,103whichisnowamongthemostinnovativeagriculturalresearchagenciesintheworld.

100“U.S.-KoreaFreeTradeAgreement,”Office of United States Trade Representative,accessedJanuary31,2012,availableat<www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta>.

101 CarolElron,“Welcometoourwebsite,”USAID Panama,2011,<www.usaid.gov/pa/Information/Documents/Message%20from%20the%20Acting%20Mission%20Director_FINAL.July%206%202011.pdf>.

102“GreatUSAIDProjectsinHistory:IFFCO,”ACDI/VOCA,availableat<www.acdivoca.org/site/ID/Feature-Great-USAID-Projects-in-History-IFFCO>.

103IsadoraFerreira,“FromFaminetoFeastinBrazil,”USAID Frontlines,November/December2011,availableat<www.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl_nov11/FL_nov11_50_BRAZIL.html>.


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Table 1 Moving from Aid to Trade, 1985–2011

AsUSAIDdrawsdownitstraditionalassistanceinplaceslikeBrazilandIndia,itiscriticalthatthetransitionsarenotsoabruptastomakeacleanbreakwiththecountlesscontributionsthatUSAIDmissionshavemadeovertheyears.Thiscaveatisnotanexaggerationoftherisk,asanumberoftransitionsinthepastwerenotsosmooth,particularlywithrespecttotransitionsinseveral

Sources: “U.S. Trade in Goods by Country,” U.S. Census Bureau, available at <www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/; Larry L. Burmeister>, “Development Dilemma: Trade Pressures and Agricultural Sector Adjustment,” Asian Survey 30, no. 7 ( July 1990), 711–723.

Costa Rica1985 923.01990 1,991.7 1996 (USAID transition) 3,790.61997 4,347.71999 6,348.52011 16,236.5

Portugal1985 (USAID transition) 1,240.51986 1,189.91990 1,754.22005 3,460.62011 3,903.0

South Korea1980 (USAID transition) 9,1181983 12,9521985 15,969.61990 32,889.62001 57,362.22011 100,140.5

Lithuania1998 143.01999 163.02000 (USAID transition) 194.62001 264.22005 1,023.92011 2,186.3

Tunisia1993 273.01994 (USAID transition) 381.21995 285.32000 383.22011 938.0

CountryandYear BilateralTradeinGoodswiththeUnitedStatesmillions of dollars, on a nominal basis


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Africancountriesinthe1990s.Insomecases,bothUSAIDpartnersandemployeesfeltthatthenatureofthetransitiondidnotdojusticetothelegacyofUSAIDworkinthecountriesinquestion. IncasessuchasSouthKorea,CostaRica,andPortugal,planninginadvanceallowedUSAIDanditspartnerstoestablishbi-nationallegacyinstitutionsthathaveworkedtocarrythebilateralrelationshipforward,evenmanyyearsafterUSAIDendeditsactivitiesthere.Whilebi-nationalinstitutionsmaynotbefeasibleineverycase,theypresentasustainableandpowerfulinstrumentforbothsides,donorandrecipient.Theseinstitutionsaregenerallyentrustedwithanendowment,withcontributionsfromtheprivatesector,andthereforerequirenofurthertaxpayerfundinggoingforward.Atatimewhenitisincreasinglydifficulttosecuresupportforimportantdevelopmentprogramming,legacyinstrumentsareperhapsanunderappreciatedapproachtoreshapingtheU.S.relationshipwithmiddle-incomecountries.However,securingendowmentauthorityfromtheU.S.Congressisinitselfachallengingtaskaswell;thus,itisimportanttoexplorethepotentialforendowmentauthorityforaseriesofcountriesassoonaspossible.

Scenario Planning

AnotherrealitythatUSAIDhistoryteachesusisthatforeignassistancetransitionsoftencannotbeplannedexactlytoofarinadvance.Onmorethanoneoccasion,therehasbeenanattempttoformulatesomesortofobjectivemetricsfordeterminingwhenatransitionshouldtakeplace,lookingatsocialandeconomicindicestocomeupwith“magicnumbers.”Theseeffortshavebeeninconclusive,however,andingeneral,attemptingtoidentifyclear-cutrulesfortransitionsisprobablyaskingthewrongquestion.Thefocus,rather,shouldbeonbeingpreparedtotransitionatanymoment,astheultimatedecisiontodosowillbeinfluencedbypoliticalorbudgetaryrealities,oftenoutsidethescopeofUSAIDpolicy.WhathappenedinRussiainSeptember2012starklyillustratesthissituation.USAIDwasforcedtostopfundingallactivitiesinRussiabecauseofwhattheRussianGovernmentdemanded,notbecauseofstrategicplanningbyUSAID.Fortunately,USAIDhadbeenstrategicallyreducingthescopeofitsactivitiesinRussiaoverthelastseveralyears,narrowingitsfocussectorsonebyone,butUSAIDgoalsandpartnersalikewerehurtbytheabruptfarewell.ItisquitepossiblethatothergovernmentswillmakesimilardemandsofUSAIDinthecomingyears,forvariousreasons,andtheAgencyneedstobepreparedforboththebest-andworst-casescenarios.Thisiswhyscenarioplanning,avitalcomponentoffuturesanalysis,mustbecomecentraltoUSAIDthinking. Nevertheless,anumberofcountriescanbereadilyidentifiedwhereU.S.foreignassistanceislikelytowinddownoverthenextdecade,andinthesecases,programmingshouldimmediatelybefocusedtowardsestablishingalong-term


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bilateralcooperationpartnershipratherthanfollowingthetraditionalmodelofdevelopmentassistance.Althoughtherecanbenoobjectiverubricfordeterminingwhenexactlythetimefortransitionhascome,asmentionedabove,thereareanumberofindicatorsthatarehandypointsofreference.Whenacountrypossessesasophisticatedspaceprogram,itsownforeignassistanceagency,asovereignwealthfund,and/ormembershipintheG-20,thenitcansafelybesaidthattraditionalUSAIDprogramsdonothavealongfutureinthatcountry.Atthesametime,theseindicatorssuggestthatthecountryinquestionisready(andeager)forabroadenedcooperationpartnershipwiththeUnitedStates.Brazil,whichrecentlybecamethesixth-largesteconomyintheworld,isaprimeexampleofthisphenomenon.104CountrieslikeBrazilareeagertoshedthetraditionalforeignaidrelationshipwiththeUnitedStatesandpursuedeepercooperation.

Linking Communication and Transition

Inallassistancetransitions,communicationiskey;afactattestedtobyUSAIDofficialswhowereinvolvedwithsuchtransitionsinthepast.105InadditiontoUSAID,thesetransitionsinvolveavarietyofactors:otherU.S.Governmentelements(includingCongress),partnernon-governmentalorganizations(NGOs,localandAmerican),recipient-countrygovernmentministries,andmultilateralinstitutions.Effectivetransitions,historically,haveinvolvedclosecoordinationbetweenUSAIDandtheseotherstakeholders,wellinadvanceoftheultimatetransition.InadditiontoUSAID,theU.S.Governmenthasanumberofothernon-traditionaldevelopmentinstrumentsatitsdisposal,suchastheU.S.TradeandDevelopmentAgency,theOverseasPrivateInvestmentCorporation,andtheExport-ImportBank.Theseagenciesallhaveimportantrolestoplayinanyassistancetransition,andUSAIDshouldfurtherexpanditscooperationwiththem.Thesenon-traditionalassistancegivingactorshavetheaddedbenefitofadvancingU.S.interestsandyieldingdevelopmentreturnswithlittletonoextracosttotheAmericantaxpayer.TheDevelopmentCreditAuthority(DCA),aninstrumentofUSAIDitself,accomplishesdevelopmentgoalswithsimilarlycost-effectivemethods.106DCAshouldbeexpandedandappliedinmoresettings.

104PhilipInman,“Brazil’seconomyovertakesUKtobecomeworld’ssixthlargest,”The Guardian,March6,2012,availableat<www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/mar/06/brazil-economy-worlds-sixth-largest>.

105InterviewwithWilliamPaupe,formerseniorUSAIDofficialpresentatthecloseoftheSouthKoreamission,September21,2011.

106United States Agency for International Development, Office of Development Credit, Credit Guarantees: Promoting Private Investment in Development—2010 Year in Review(Washington,DC:USAID,2010),availableat<www.usaid.gov/our_work/economic_growth_and_trade/development_credit/YIR_2010.pdf>.


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Fostering Cooperation

Thepost-foreignassistancepartnershipcanalsotaketheformofdevelopmentcooperation.Triangularcooperationisanincreasinglypopularformofdeliveringforeignassistance,andUSAIDisalreadyexploringthisapproach.Intriangularcooperation,twodonorcountriespartnertogetherfordevelopmentprojectsinathirdcountry.Thetwodonoragenciesleveragetheircomparativeadvantagesinordertoachieveagreaterdevelopmentoutcomethaneithercouldindividually.Thesecomparativeadvantagesincludeaccesstoawiderangeofcapabilitiesandresources,whetherfinancial,technical,cultural,orevenlinguistic.InLusophoneAfrica,forexample,USAIDandBrazilianpartnersarepursuingtriangularcooperation.107USAIDhasalsopartneredwiththeIndianGovernmentinAfrica,108andsuchcollaborativedevelopmentpursuitsarelikelytoincreaseinthenearfuture. Ofcourse,coordinatingtwo(ormore)donorsisnevereasy.TheexperiencesoftheOrganizationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment,whichhassoughttocoordinatedonorsfordecades,canattesttothischallenge.Asaresult,theextentandimpactoftriangularcooperationhavebeenlimitedtodate.Resultswillcertainlyimprovemovingforward,asallsidesgainexperiencewiththisstillnovelapproach.Triangularcooperation’sshortcomingssofarcanbeexplainedinpartbythedifferencesincapabilitiesacrossvariousdevelopmentagencies.SomenewdonorcountriesdonothaveadistinctbilateraldevelopmentagencylikeUSAID,whileothersthatdo(suchasBrazil)arestillnewcomerstothefield.UntilagenciessuchastheBrazilianAgencyforCooperationmaturetomorecloselymatchUSAID’sscale,coordinationwilllikelyremaindifficult.ThisdiscrepancyneverthelessoffersUSAIDtheopportunitytohelpstrengthenandexpandothercountries’nascentdevelopmentprograms.Certainly,USAIDalreadydoessotoanextent.InBrazil,USAIDandABCarecurrentlyimplementinganexchangeprogram,inwhichemployeesfromoneagencyspendtimeattheotherinordertolearn,teach,andbringthetwoagenciesclosertogether.Suchcollaborationisencouraging,andideally,moreexchangemechanismscanbesetup,notonlyinothercountries,butalsoinsuchawaythatallowsofficialsfromothercountries’developmentagenciestospendtimeatUSAIDheadquartersinWashington. Everycountry’sneedsanddesires,withrespecttoitsrelationshipwiththeUnitedStates,areunique.However,thereareanumberofsectorsinwhichthemajorityofmiddle-incomecountrieswanttoexpandtheircooperationwiththeUnitedStates.Scienceandtechnology,forinstance,continuestobeanareaofstronginterestthroughouttheworld.Asoneofthegloballeadersin

107“Brazil,theU.S.andMozambiqueSignAgreementforTrilateralCooperation,”U.S. Agency for International Development,January23,2012,availableat<http://brazil.usaid.gov/en/node/1368>.

108“APartnershipforanEvergreenRevolution,”U.S. Agency for International Development,availableat<www.usaid.gov/indiatrip/evergreen_revolution.pdf>.


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thisfield,theUnitedStateshasmuchtooffermiddle-incomecountries,butitcangainagreatdealfromthemaswell.USAIDhashelpedmanycountriesexpandtheircapabilitiesvis-à-visscienceandtechnology,andrecipientsofU.S.assistancearehungryformorecollaborationinthisarea.Recently,USAIDandtheFederationofIndianChambersofCommerceandIndustrylaunchedaninitiativearound“frugalinnovation,”109India’suniquebrandoflow-cost,high-impacttechnologies.U.S.developmentgoalswouldcertainlybenefitfrombringingproductsinspiredbyfrugalinnovationtoscaleinthedevelopingworld.U.S.relationshipswithmiddle-incomecountries,especiallyinapost-foreignaidcontext,shouldhaveplentyofroomforpartnershipsaroundscienceandtechnology.In2010,USAIDestablishedanewOfficeofScienceandTechnologyintheBureauofPolicy,Planning,andLearning;thiswasagiantstepintherightdirection. Onarelatednote,educationalandprofessionalexchangeprogramswiththeUnitedStatesarealsoextremelypopularamongemergingcountries.Person-to-personexchangesareinfactamongthebestwaystolinktwosocietiestogether.Inthepast,USAID-supportedexchangesofAmericansandSouthKoreansbuiltthepersonalrelationshipsthatinextricablylinktheUnitedStateswithSouthKoreainoneofthestrongestalliances.NowtheU.S.Governmentandthoseofothercountriesalikearerecognizingtheimportanceofsponsoringsuchmechanisms.BrazillauncheditsScienceWithoutBordersinitiative,whichissupposedtosupply100,000Brazilianstudentsandresearcherswithscholarshipstotravelabroad,withmostlikelytocometotheUnitedStates.110TheU.S.Governmentintroducedasimilarprogram—100,000StrongintheAmericas—tosendjustasmanyAmericansthroughouttheWesternHemisphere.111Thereismuchappetiteforthistypeofcollaborationinotherpartsoftheworldaswell,andUSAIDcanhelplaythegroundworkforbroadeningbilateralpartnershipsonthisfront. Asthenumberofglobaldonorsincreasesandthecapabilitiesofmiddle-incomecountriesrise,thereisstillatleastoneareainwhichtheUnitedStatesoffersauniquedevelopmentexport:civilsociety.Americancivilsocietyisextremelyactiveandwell-developedcomparedtomostcountries,’especiallyemergingones.USAID,unsurprisingly,hasimplementedsomeofthemostextensiveandsuccessfulcivilsocietydevelopmentprogramsthroughouttheworld,includingincountrieswherethegrowthofnativecivilsocietyisextremelyhinderedbypoliticalorotherrestrictions.InadditiontosupportingandprofessionalizingtheNGOsector,USAIDalsohasmuchtoofferemerging

109“USAIDandFICCIAnnounceMillenniumAlliance,”FederationofIndianChambersofCommerceandIndustry(FICCI),December20,2011,availableat<www.ficci.com/pressrelease/846/press-ficci-dec20-USAID.pdf>.

110 “Brazil’sScienceWithoutBordersProgram:AbouttheProgram,”InstituteofInternationalEducation,availableat<http://www.iie.org/en/Programs/Brazil-Science-Without-Borders/About>.

111 PhillipKurata,“U.S.,BrazilExpandandDeepenCooperation,”United States Diplomatic Missions to Brazil,April9,2012,<http://brazil.usembassy.gov/usbrexpand.html>.


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countriesintermsofcreatinganarchitectureofphilanthropy.UnlikeintheUnitedStates,manysocietieslacktheincentives(suchasaneffectivetaxcode)thatencouragephilanthropy.BringingsomeoftheAmericanexperiencetothesecountrieswouldhelptheircivilsocietiesflourishthewaytheireconomieshave,andthereisstillmuchworktobedoneinthisrealm.EvenifUSAIDmissionslacktheresourcesortimetoundertakethischallenge,theycanengagetherightpartnerstopursuethisimportantwork,orhelpestablishbi-nationalinstitutionsthatcanhousetheseactivitieslong-term. Overall,itisbecomingmoreandmoreimportantforUSAIDtobecomehighlymorecreativeandinnovative,andtoshedtraditionalapproachesandmodelsofthinking,particularlywithrespecttomiddle-incomecountries.Toalargeextent,USAIDhasrisentothechallenge,butthereremainsmuchworktobedonetopositiontheAgencyevenmoreeffectively.USAIDwillhavetotreadmorelightly,engageoutsidepartnersmoreactivelyandstrategically,andfindmorenon-traditionalsourcesofsupportthaneverbefore,inordertosimultaneouslyserveinternationaldevelopmentgoalsandU.S.foreignpolicyinterestsatatimeofshrinkingresourcesandchangingglobalrealities.

Daniel F. Runde Director, Project on Prosperity and Development and William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis, Center for Strategic and International Studies



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TheFuturesSymposiumsessionon“politicsandeconomies”raisedanumberofpowerfulargumentsforthepositivedevelopmentimpactsofagrowingandrobustuptickinworld-widetrade.Thisisonetrendthatseemslikelytocontinueunabatedoverthenextdecade. Considerablediscussionfocusedonnewtradingpartnershipsamongregions,especiallybetweenAfricancountries.AlsoinplaywereissuesonevolvingtradebetweenAfricaandAsia.Seriousdebatewasgeneratedoverthechallengeofbuildingfuturetradingpartnershipswhileexpandingexistingones.Anumberofspeakershighlightedtheimportanceofreducingeconomicuncertaintiesindevelopingandmiddleincomecountriesalongwithdevelopingstrategiestomitigateunforeseeneconomicshocks.Anotherprevalentissuediscussedwashowtopreparenationstoanticipateandprepareforeconomicdownturnsinordertostrengthentheireconomicresilience.OneapproachthatreceivedsizablediscussionrevolvedaroundhowtheUnitedStatescouldfacilitatemoredurableeconomicregionalintegrationamongcountriesandbetweendeveloping,middleincomeandemergingdonorcountries. Withtheseissuesasabackdrop,thischapteraimstoshedlightonthecomplexandevertighteningeconomiclinksthatconnecttheUnitedStatesandthecountriesofLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.UnderstandingthenatureoftheselinksisimportantifwearetopromotethekindoffutureeconomicgrowththatwillhelpthecountriesoftheWesternHemispheresecureprosperityandaddresscentraldevelopmentchallengesinthecomingyears.Whiletheregionhasexperiencedadeepandmostlypositiveeconomic,political,andsocial

C H A P T E R 7

The United States, Latin America, and the Caribbean: Securing Recovery and Prosperity through Deeper Economic PartnershipLeonardo Martinez-Diaz examines the growing economic trends that are strengthening links between the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean.


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transformationinthepast25years,importantchallengesremain,includinghowtoensurethatglobalizationleadstobroad-basedgrowthinallourcountries.Inaddressingthosechallenges,theUnitedStates,LatinAmerica,andtheCaribbeanwillneedoneanothermorethaneverbefore. Thischapterisdividedintothreeparts.ThefirstsectionarguesthatclosereconomiclinkswiththecountriesofLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanwillbecriticalifwearetoaccelerateandsustainU.S.economicgrowthandjobcreation.Thereasonisthatchangesinthehemispherearemakingmanyofthoseeconomiesmoredynamicandresilientthaneverbefore,andtheirpolicyframeworkshavemadethemmorecredible,responsible,andreliableeconomicpartners. ThesecondsectionarguesthattheU.S.economywillproveindispensableforthecountriesofLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeaniftheyaretoachievetheirfulleconomicpotentialinthecomingyearsandjointheranksoftheworld’smostprosperoussocieties.ThisisbecausetheUnitedStateswillcontinuetoofferthebiggestandmostopenmarketsforgoodsandservices,thedeepestandmostliquidcapitalmarkets,andauniquecapacityforinnovationandentrepreneurship.ThelastsectionprovidessomeexamplesofhowtheU.S.Government,andtheU.S.Treasuryinparticular,isworkingtodeepeneconomicrelationshipswiththehemisphere.

Latin America’s Importance to American Growth and Recovery

TheUnitedStatesismoreinterconnectedtoLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanthananyotherregionintheworld.Fiftymillionpeople—oneinsixAmericans—identifyasHispanicorLatinoandtracetheirrootstoLatinAmericaortheCaribbean.TheUnitedStatesexportstotheregion$370billionworthofgoodsandservicesperyear—three-and-a-halftimesmorethantheUnitedStatesexportstoChinaand30percentmorethanitexportstotheEuropeanUnion.112AthirdofglobalimportsofcrudeoilcomefromLatinAmerica,andnearlyafifthofhigh-skilledmigrantsadmittedintotheUnitedStateseveryyearthroughtheH1BvisaprogramarefromLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.TheseimmigrantsfuelinnovationandgrowthintheU.S.economy.

A Quarter-Century of Progress

Giventhelong-standingrelationsbetweentheUnitedStatesandothercountriesinthehemisphere,itiseasytolosesightofhowmuchtheLatinAmericanandCaribbeaneconomieshaveindividuallyevolvedinthelasttwodecades.Atthe

112 FranciscoJ.Sanchez,Doing Business in Latin America: Positive Trends but Serious Challenges,TestimonytotheU.S.SenateCommitteeonForeignRelationsSubcommitteeonWesternHemisphere,PeaceCorps,andGlobalNarcotics,112thCongress,July31,2012,availableat<www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/doing_business-in-latin-america-positive-trends-but-serious-challenges>.


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beginningofthe1990s,LatinAmericawasemergingfroma“lostdecade”ofzeronetgrowth.Povertyandinequalitywerestubbornlyhigh,andhyperinflationwascommon.Fiscalimbalancesweredangerouslyunsustainable,andbankingandcurrencycriseswerechronic. Sincethen,theregion’seconomyhasmorethandoubledinrealterms,inequalityhasdeclined,andpovertyhasfallensignificantly,from48percentin1990to30percentin2011.113Inflationismostlyinthesingledigits,financialsystemsaregenerallystable,andmacroeconomicframeworksinmostcountriessound.SeveralcountriesinLatinAmericaareevenenginesofinclusive,sustainable,andbalancedgrowthinaworldeconomythatbadlyneedsit. LatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanwillprovecriticalforacceleratingandsustainingU.S.growthandjobcreationforseveralreasons.First,theregionisexpectedtocontinuegrowing,andtodosoatafasterratethanthematureeconomiesandmanyemergingones.OneoftheclearestreasonsthisgrowthmatterstotheUnitedStatesistrade.ExportstoLatinAmericaalonemadeasignificantcontributiontoU.S.growthintheperiodimmediatelyprecedingthe2008crisis.Andintheaftermathofthecrisis,exportstoLatinAmericaneconomieshavecontributedmoretoU.S.recoverythanexportstoanyotherregionoftheworld. AnotherreasonwhytheregionwillbecriticalforU.S.growthisthatLatinAmerica’salreadylargemiddleclassisexpectedtokeepexpanding.AccordingtotheUnitedNationsEconomicCommission114forLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,thenumberofmiddle-classhouseholdsintheregiongrewby56millioninthepasttwodecades.Theregion’smiddleclasspopulationhasexpandedbysome150millionpeople,theequivalentofhalfthepopulationoftheUnitedStates.Sustainedgrowth,evenifatslowerrates,willenableLatinAmerica’smiddleclasstokeepgrowing. Andthird,anunprecedentedlevelofresilienceisevidentinmanycountriesoftheregion.LatinAmericaneconomieswerehighlyvulnerabletonegativeshiftsinglobaleconomicconditionsinthe1980sand1990s.Weakfinancialsystemsandunsustainabledebtstructuresmagnifiedexternalshocks—whentheUnitedStatescaughtacold,LatinAmericancountrieswouldgetpneumonia. Buttheregion’sexperiencein2008reflectsanhistoricshift.ColombiaandPerumaintainedpositivegrowththroughoutthecrisis,andmostofthosethatdidsufferdownturnshaveexperiencedquickrecoveries.Manyeconomiesintheregionarebetter-equippedtoabsorbexternalshocksandcapitalizeonpositiveglobalconditionsthaninthepast.Asdownturnsaffectotherregionsoftheworld,thecountriesofLatinAmericaactassourcesofstabilityandsupportfortheglobaleconomy,andtherebycontributetorecoveryintheUnitedStates.

113 Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean(NewYork:UnitedNations,2002).114OsvaldoRosalesandMikioKuwayama,China and Latin America and the Caribbean: Building a

Strategic Economic and Trade Relationship(NewYork:UnitedNationsECLAC,2012),111.


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Noeconomyisimmunetotheriskoftemporaryreversals,butLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanarepoisedtomaintainstronggrowthinthemediumandlongtermbecausetheirgrowthisunderpinnedbyfourpowerfulfactors:demographics,competitiveness,capital,andprudenteconomicpolicy.

Demographics

Theregion’sdemographicadvantage,relativetotherestoftheworld,becomesclearestafteranalyzingdependencyratios,whichmeasurethenumberofworking-agepersonsinaneconomyrelativetothosethatarenotinthelaborforce.AccordingtoU.N.projections,LatinAmericahas20yearsbeforethereare50dependentsforevery100personsofworkingage.115 Then,theratioswillstarttorise,buttheslopeofthatcurvewillonlybecomesteepafter2040.Bycomparison,in2035,China’sdependencyratiowillequalLatinAmerica’s,andthenrapidlyexceedit.Thistranslatesintoatwo-decadedemographicdividendinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,duringwhichconditionswillbefavorableforsavingandinvestinginactivitiesthatincreasefutureeconomicgrowth.

Competitiveness

LatinAmericanmanufacturing,particularlyinMexico,isbecomingincreasinglycompetitiverelativetoChinaandotherEastAsianeconomies.RecentstatisticssuggestthatwagesinChinesemanufacturinggrewbyanaverageannualrateof19percentindollartermsfrom2005-10,andanecdotalevidencesuggestswagesarestillrisingduetotighteninglabormarketconditions.116Incontrast,Mexicanmanufacturingwagesmeasuredindollarsremainverycompetitive.ThoughChinahasseenstrongerproductivitygainsthatoffsetasubstantialportionoftherisingcostoflabor,theclosingwagegapwillmakesomeLatinAmericancountriesincreasinglyattractiveasbasesforinvestingandmanufacturing,providedthattheymakethenecessaryinvestments.

Global Capital

GlobalcapitalflowsintoLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanwilllikelycontinuetogrow.Expectationsaboutrelativelyhighfuturegrowthrates,coupledwithslowergrowthinsomematureeconomies,willpushcapitalinsearchofhigherreturnstotheregion,aslongasadequatepolicyframeworksremaininplace.Thesecapitalflowswillmakeupforlowsavingsratesinmanycountries,andhelptheregioncapitalizeonitsdemographicdividend.

115 LeonardoMartinez-Diaz,Latin America: Coming of Age(WorldPolicyInstitution,2008),222,availableat<www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2008/10/fall-latin-america-martinez-diaz/fall_latin_america_martinez_diaz.pdf>.

116 HaroldL.SirkinandMichaleZinser,Made in America, Again: Why Manufacturing Will Return to the U.S.(Boston:BostonConsultingGroup2011),7.


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An Emerging Latin American Framework for Stability and Growth

Thelast—andarguablymostimportant—driverunderpinningLatinAmerica’sbrightprospectsisrelatedtopolicychoices.Averysimilareconomicpolicyframeworkistakingrootsimultaneouslyinmanycountriesacrosstheregion,incountriesasdiverseasMexico,ElSalvador,Uruguay,Peru,andBrazil.Thisframeworkisaboveallpragmaticandhome-grown.Itisbeingembracedbygovernmentsofallpoliticalstripesacrosstheregion,anditsadvantagesoveralternativeframeworksarequicklybecomingcleartoall. TheframeworkspreadingacrossLatinAmericahastwocomponents.Thefirstisastabilitycomponent,whichhasseveralelements. Fiscal discipline and transparencyareenablingcountriestoavoidunsustainabledebtburdens,securereliableaccesstointernationalcapitalmarkets,andprovideroomforcountercyclicalfiscalpolicies.Inaddition,credible monetary anchors,suchasinflation-targetingregimes,havebeenimplementedbysevenLatinAmericaneconomies,includingthetwolargest,BrazilandMexico.Well-containedinflationhasallowedcountriestoadoptmoreflexibleexchangerateregimes.Inturn,greaterexchange rate flexibilityhasaffordedthesecountriesmoreroomtomanageexternalshocksatlowercostintermsofgrowthandemployment,discouragedangerousbuildupsofforeigndebtandcurrencymismatchesintheprivatesector,andavoidspeculativeattacks.Well-regulated and capitalized financial systemshavebeencriticalinhelpingtheregionweatherthe2008globalcrisis.However,thereremainsmuchtobedoneifthefinancialsystemsaretobebothstableandsufficientlydevelopedtosupportsophisticated,globallyintegratedeconomies. ThesecondcomponentoftheLatinAmericaneconomicframeworkhastodowithpromotingsustainable,inclusivegrowth.Largeandwell-focusedinvestments in education, infrastructure, and R&D,whicharewidelyrecognizedasessentialforcompetingeffectivelyintheglobaleconomy,arevitalforgrowth.Further,mostcountriesintheregionnowrecognizethatprivateenterpriseisthemostpowerfulengineforgrowthandinnovation,evenwherethestateretainsasignificantpresenceintheeconomy.Forthisreason,theyareadoptingregulatory frameworks that encourage private entrepreneurship.CountriesasdiverseasJamaica,Honduras,andColombiahaveembracedrules-based, open trading regimes,whichhaveproveninstrumentalinhelpingemergingmarketcountriestakeadvantageofglobalopportunities. Opennesstocapitalflows,inthecontextofeffectivefinancialregulation,isanotherelementessentialforsustainablegrowth.In2011,LatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanreceived$113billioninforeigndirectinvestment(FDI),continuingastrongupwardtrendthatisprovidingtheregionwiththecapitalitneedstokeepgrowing.117Measurestomitigateinequalityofopportunityandprotectthemost

117 Foreign Direct Investment: in Latin America and the Caribbean(NewYork:UnitedNationsCEPAL/ECLAC,2011),24.


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vulnerablepopulationsareessentialforbroad-basedeconomicgrowth.Conditionalcashtransferprograms,pioneeredbyMexicoandBrazil,havebeenimplementedtogreatsuccessthroughouttheregion.Efficientandincreasinglyprogressivetaxregimesarebeingembracedbothforequityconsiderationsandtoensurethatthestatecandeliverkeyservices,especiallytothepoorestcitizens.Finally,stabilizationfundsandothermeasurestoprotecteconomiesfromdeclinesincommoditypriceshavebeenadoptedby,orarebeingconsideredin,manyLatinAmericancountries.

The U.S. Economy’s Importance to Latin America’s Development

Althoughmuchhasbeenachievedinrecentyears,itisimportantnottoobscurethefactthatLatinAmericanandCaribbeancountriesstillfaceenormouseconomicanddevelopmentchallenges.Inmanyplaces,povertyremainsendemic,incomeandwealthinequalityalarminglyhigh,socialexclusionpervasive,andvulnerabilitytonaturaldisastersaconstantpreoccupation. IntheCaribbean,thereisconcernofaself-reinforcingtriangleoflowgrowth,deterioratingfiscalpositions,andfinancial-sectorstress.MexicoandCentralAmericafacecrimeandinsecuritythatriskundermininginstitutionsanddrainingeconomicdynamism.IncountriessuchasElSalvador,insecuritymaybecostingtheeconomyasmuchas8percentofGDPeveryyear,118andthatdoesnottakeintoaccountthedirecthumancost.AndwhiletherearestoriesofeconomicdynamisminLatinAmerica,therealityisthatrealGDPpercapitahasgrownmuchtooslowlyinthelast25years,especiallywhencomparedtothemostsuccessfulemerging-marketeconomies,thoseinEastAsia. Effectivelyaddressingthesechallengeswillrequiregrowththatisstrong,sustained,andinclusive.Andthatwilldependonhowthecountriesoftheregionadapttoachangingglobaleconomyandleverageitsmostvaluableopportunities. Inthecomingyears,theUnitedStateswillprovidemanyoftheseopportunities.DeepereconomicengagementwiththeUnitedStateswillbecriticalforLatinAmericanandCaribbeancountriesastheyseektobecomesocietiesthataremoreprosperous,fair,andsecure.

Trade Diversification

TheUnitedStatesistheworld’slargestmarketandisgeographicallyclosetotheregion.Inaddition,U.S.marketsremainamongthemostopenintheworld,providingampleopportunitiestoLatinAmericanexporters,evenasprotectionistcurrentsemergeinotherpartsoftheworld.TheUnitedStateswillplayaparticularlyimportantroleforcountrieslookingtodiversifytheirexportbaskets.

118 RodrigoSerrano-BerthetandHumbertoLopez,Crime and Violence in Central America: A Developing Challenge(Washington,DC:TheWorldBank2012),6.


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Brazilisacaseinpoint.Brazil’stradewithChinahasgrowndramaticallyinthelastdecade,butthecompositionofthattradehascometoresemblethatofU.S.-Braziliantradeinthe1950s.Over85percentofBrazil’sexportstoChinaarebasicgoodsandrawmaterials,whilemorethan90percentofBrazil’simportsfromChinaaremanufacturedorcapitalgoods.In2011,BrazilranadeficitinmanufacturedgoodstradewithChinathatexceeded$25billion,upfrom$800millionin2003.119 TheBrazilianandU.S.economiesarecomplementaryinadifferentway.AbouthalfofBrazilianexportstotheUnitedStatesaremanufacturedgoods—regionalaircraft,autoengines,cellularphones,andmachinery.Inturn,BrazilimportsfromtheUnitedStateslargecommercialaircraft,semiconductors,andcomputerequipment.IftheEuropeaneconomygrowsmoreslowlyinyearstocome,theU.S.marketwillbecomeevenmoreimportantasasourceofopportunitiesforBrazilianindustry,andasasolutiontoBrazil’sneedtodiversifyitsexportsandmoveupthevaluechain. TheBraziliancaseisnotunique.AsimilarstoryexistsinPeru,where80percentofChina-boundexportsaremetalsandminerals,but40percentofU.S.-boundexportsarehigher-value,120non-traditionalgoods.TradewiththeUnitedStateshelpsPerudiversifyexportsandcreatejobs.

Source of Capital and Investment Opportunities

Inadditiontovitalinternationaltrade,theUnitedStateswillalsoremainanindispensablesourceofcapitalforLatinAmerica.TheUnitedStatesisthelargestinvestorintheregion,providingnearlyafifthofallforeigndirectinvestment(FDI)eachyear.U.S.companieshaveover$200billioninvestedinLatinAmericanandCaribbeancountries,121andU.S.capitalmarkets,whichremainthedeepestandmostliquidintheworld,continuetohelptheregion’sgovernmentsandcompaniesraisefinancing. Atthesametime,theUnitedStateswillproveanimportantsourceofinvestmentopportunitiesforLatinAmericanandCaribbeaninvestorsandentrepreneursseekingnewhorizons.In2010,outwardFDIfromLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanreachedanall-timehigh,of$43billion.122MostoftheseinvestmentswerebymultinationalcompaniesbasedinMexico,Brazil,Colombia,andChile.Mexico-basedGrupo BimboisnowthelargestbakinggoodscompanyintheUnitedStates,with34bakeriesin13states,employing

119 “Brazil’sTradePolicy:SeekingProtection,”The Economist,January14,2012,1,availableat<www.economist.com/node/21542780>.

120OsvaldoRosalesandMikioKuwayama,China and Latin America and the Caribbean: Building a strategic economic and trade relationship(NewYork:UnitedNationsECLAC,2012),15.

121 Survey of Current Business(Washington,DC:DepartmentofCommerce,BureauofEconomicAnalysis,2012),139.

122Foreign Direct Investment: in Latin America and the Caribbean(NewYork:UnitedNationsECLAC,2011),12.


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15,000workers.123TheBraziliansteelmakerGerdau,whichproducessteelin19Americanstates,employs10,000workers.Diaspora Entrepreneurs and Networks

Finally,theUnitedStatesremainshometoover50millionpeoplewhotracetheirrootstoLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.ThesecommunitiesrepresentoneofthegreatestpotentialcollectiveassetsfortheUnitedStates.DiasporacommunitieslinktheUnitedStateswithMexico,Guatemala,Colombia,ElSalvador,theDominicanRepublic,Jamaica,Haiti,andothercountries.Theysupporttheirhomecountriesbysendingmorethan$40billioninremittanceseachyear.124Perhapsmoreimportantly,diasporacommunitieshaveincreasinglybecomeagentsofchangeinprivateenterprise,combiningAmericanbusinessknow-howwithknowledgeoflocalmarketsinLatinAmericatobuildsuccessfulbusinesses—bothintheUnitedStatesandintheircountriesoforigin—thatgenerategrowthandconnectthehemisphere.

Seizing the Opportunities

TheU.S.Treasurywillsupportcountriesimplementingthestabilityandgrowthframeworkdescribedabovethroughvarioustools.Theseincludebilateralandmultilateralpolicydialogues,policyactionsintheexecutiveboardsoftheIMF,WorldBankGroup,andInter-AmericanDevelopmentBank(IDB),andTreasury’stechnicalassistancecapability.Currently,thisassistanceishelpingbuildinstitutionalcapacityin10LatinAmericanandCaribbeancountriesthroughdozensofprograms. TheTreasurywillcontinuetostrengtheneconomicandfinancialpartnershipswiththeregion’slargesteconomies.InBrazil,theministerial-levelEconomicandFinancialDialogueseekstoforgestrongercollaborationoninfrastructurefinanceandinternationalmacroeconomicissues.Mexico,oneoftheTreasury’sclosestpartnersonarangeofeconomicandfinancialissues,willremainconnectedthroughrigorousdialogueasthecountryhasbecomeagloballeaderinadvancingfinancialinclusion.TheTreasuryiscommittedtostrengtheninganddeepeningitsrelationshipwithG-20memberArgentinaafteritaddressesconcernsinavarietyofareas,includingengagementwithinternationalinstitutionsandpaymentoffinalInternationalCentreforSettlementofInvestmentDisputesawardsandParisClubdebt.TheTreasuryalsoworkswithregionalG-20partnerstoadvancecommoninterests,includingresistingprotectionismintradeandinvestmentandaddressing

123 ChristopherWilson,Working Together: Economic Ties between the United States and Mexico(Washington,DC:WilsonCenter,2011),25.

124R.Maldonado,N.Bajuk,M.Hayem,Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean: Regaining Growth,MultilateralInvestmentFund(Washington,DC:Inter-AmericanDevelopmentFund,2011),5.


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globalimbalances. TheTreasurywillalsocontinuetosupportandcollaboratewithLatinAmerican-andCaribbean-ledeffortstobuildmoreeffectiveregionaleconomicinstitutions.TheUnitedStatessupportedahistoriccapitalincreasefortheIDB,thelargestproviderofmultilateralinvestmentinLatinAmerica,aswellasreplenishmentoftheFundforSpecialOperations,whichsupportstheregion’spoorestcountries.ThecapitalincreasehasdoubledtheIDB’sannualdisbursementcapacity,from$6billionto$12billion.TheTreasurywillcontinuetoencouragetheIDBtosharpenitsfocusontacklingpovertyinthehemisphere,buildingpublic-privatepartnerships,andadvancingregionalintegrationinitiatives,particularlyininfrastructure. TheUnitedStateswelcomesthegrowthofeffectiveandinnovativeregionalinstitutions,suchastheAndeanDevelopmentCorporation(CAF),whichhasrecentlybeenrebrandedastheDevelopmentBankforLatinAmerica.CAFhasemergedasaleadingregionalproviderofcapitalforinfrastructureinvestment.Further,theIntegratedLatinAmericanMarket,orMILA,isanongoingefforttopoolthestockmarketsofChile,Colombia,Peru,andMexico.Ifsuccessful,theMILAwouldprovideaneffectivemechanismfordeepeningcapitalmarketsinmembereconomiesandattractingequityinvestmentfromacrosstheregionandtheworld.TheTreasuryalsoplanstoengagemorecloselywithregionalinstitutionsintheCaribbean,especiallytheOrganizationofEasternCaribbeanStatesandtheEasternCaribbeanCentralBank. Lookingforward,theTreasurywillalsoendeavortopromotedevelopmentandresilienceforthepoorestandmostvulnerablepopulationsinthehemisphere.PresidentBarackObamahasaffirmedthiscommitment.AttheSummitoftheAmericasinTrinidadandTobagoin2009,ObamalaunchedtheMiGroFund,aninnovativepublicprivate-partnershiptohelpensureaccesstocapitalformicrofinancefundsstrainedbythefinancialcrisis.DuringtheG-20Small-andMedium-sizedEnterprises(SME)FinanceChallengein2010,theTreasurymarshaledover$500milliontosupportinnovativeproposalstoimproveaccesstofinancebySMEs.TogetherwithCanada,Spain,Mexico,andColombia,theUnitedStateslaunchedthemulti-milliondollarCrossroadsFundtosupporthigh-impactcross-borderinfrastructureprojectsinCentralAmericaandtheCaribbean.And,throughtheAdministration’sPartnershipforGrowth(PfG)efforts,theTreasuryisworkingwithElSalvadortoidentifyandeliminateconstraintstoeconomicgrowth. Finally,theTreasurywilldeepenitsworkwiththeU.S.privatesectorandthefinancialcommunitytoraiseawarenessofhemisphericopportunities,andtoremovebarrierstodoingbusinessintheregion.Lately,itisoftennotedthatU.S.businessesarenotasengagedintheregionastheyoncewere,orastheyshouldbe,givenLatinAmerica’seconomicpotential.Indeed,whiletheUnitedStatesremainsthelargestsinglesourceofFDIintheregion,itsshareofthetotalhasdeclinedsignificantlyinrecentyears.Thisisironic,giventhatLatinAmerica


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todayoffersnotjustcompetitiveratesofreturn,butalsoamorepoliticallyandeconomicallystableenvironmentthaneverbefore.IncollaborationwithcolleaguesatCommerce,State,andtheUnitedStatesTradeRepresentativetheDepartmentoftheTreasurywillcontinuetoworkwithU.S.businessesandinvestorstoensurethattheycancompeteonanevenplayingfieldandarewell-informedofthevaluableopportunitiesthatexistinthehemisphere. Thisisaspecialmomentofopportunitythatmustbeseized,bothintheUnitedStatesandacrossthehemisphere.Adeeper,morematureeconomicrelationshipbetweencountrieswillproveincreasinglyimportantforeconomicgrowthandjobcreationintheUnitedStates.And,atthesametime,accesstotheopportunitiestheU.S.economyprovideswillhelpcountriesthroughouttheregioncapitalizeonthisauspiciousperiodofstabilityandgrowthtoaddresskeydevelopmentchallenges.

Leonardo Martinez-Diaz Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for the Western Hemisphere



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Rapid and widespread environ-mental changes will impact development in a number of significant ways. Growing resource scarcity, population movements, increased risks of communicable diseases, and increased conflicts are just a few of the potential consequenc-es of a changing environment. Concurrently, biodiversity promises to serve as a buffer against some of the detrimental effects of climate change. Topics such as climate change, decreasing biodiversity, resource scarcity, and the importance of resilience were discussed. The most central question that guided the conversation was:

How do we do development work without sacrificing global environmental sustainability? How can future gains be achieved without damaging the environ-ment, especially in the face of global climate change? Although climate change has often been lumped in with discussions about the environ-ment, it was noted that these two issues need to be considered separately. Climate change is not something that needs to be protected, nor is it an outcome that should be achieved. It is a force that can severely damage resources that need protecting, and its effects such as rising sea levels, forest degradation, and

species destruction undermine development efforts. The effects of climate change are cross-sec-toral, and it can impact the way we think about population, agriculture, economic growth, health and conflict. Climate change is clearly a phenomenon that must be viewed as a very broad development issue, not just as a narrowly defined environmental one. Also discussed was the problem of sharply decreasing biodiversity. Changes such as population growth, economic development, and climate change combine to impact the availability of water, soil, timber, and energy resources. Desertification in the Sahel is taking place at an alarming rate and a large portion of the African population is currently living in dry, increasingly unfertile places. Roughly 20 percent of the global population lives in water scarce areas. It is estimated that by 2030, that number will grow to 47 percent. Simultaneously, tropical forests across the world are shrinking in

Environment

Climate change is substantially affecting countries around the world.


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size and entire ecosystems are disappearing. Lively discussions centered on in the interconnectedness of water, food, and energy scarcity and the need to approach these issues collectively. All of these resources are highly integrated, and the development community must thus work to ensure that solutions are also integrative. The potential of using public-private partnerships to achieve develop-ment goals was also highlighted. Major companies such as Coca-Cola, Adidas, and IKEA are now incorporating environment programs into their corporate social responsibility policies and view issues such as environmen-tal degradation, energy scarcity, and climate change as business risks. Public and private sector actors will have a greater chance of engaging governments, changing policies, and making an impact if they work together. Efforts to improve conserva-tion and strengthen resilience must be simultaneously top-down and bottom-up. Without

political will, legal frameworks that can help protect the environment will not be imple-mented. Without the help of NGOs and local communities, information dissemination campaigns about the importance of minimizing environmental harm will not be successful. It was suggested that devel-opment professionals learn to make better use of science and technology to tackle difficult environmental challenges. Geographic information systems, for example, can be used to provide information to help development practitioners monitor forest fires, floods, and drought. Mobile banking projects and cell phone technology can be used to help farmers implement adaptation strategies. Investments in wind and solar power can provide electricity to populations living in informal settlements in cities such as Nairobi and Mumbai which are experiencing dramatic growth. Panelists concluded with five policy-oriented questions: How

can USAID, as a bilateral agency in a trans-boundary world, develop regional links to increase program resilience? What should be done now to strengthen cooperation between U.S. Government agencies to improve capacity-building to address climate change? Can more effective resource management overcome some of these environmental challenges? What role can science and technology play in mitigating these threats? What changes are needed in national and local government to minimize environmental threats?


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Bureaucraticstovepipesundermineinternationaldevelopmenteffortstoimprovehumanwell-beingandtheenvironment.Theseproblemsarefundamentallyinterconnected,butdevelopmentaidforaddressingpressingenvironmentalandhumansecurityconcerns—suchasclimatechange,foodshortages,freshwateraccess,andglobalhealththreats—rarelymatchestherealityonthegroundinthedevelopingworld.Theshortcomingsofbureaucraticstovepipespervadenotonlytheenvironmentalrealmbutalsoalldevelopmentsectors.Understandingandrespondingtothesechallengesarekeytoachievinglastingsuccessindevelopment.TheseconcernswereamongthetopissuesthatsurfacedattheU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment’s(USAID’s)SymposiumonFutureDevelopmentChallengesheldinWashingtonin2011. Developmenteffortsaimedataddressingtheselong-termtrends,whetherspearheadedbymultilaterals,bilaterals,ornon-governmentalorganizations,arecommonlydevotedtosingle-sectorapproaches.Therearemanyreasonsforthisnarrowfocus:finiteresources,tightfundingstreams,simpleanddiscreteindicatorsofsuccess,andinstitutionalandprofessionaldevelopmentpenaltiesforthosewhoconductintegratedwork.Butintegratingproblem-solvinginitiativesacrosstraditionalenvironmentalandhealthcategoriesmaynotonlyimprovetheefficacyofdevelopmentefforts,butalsobetterimprovelivesintargetcommunities. Integratedanalysisofenvironmental,demographic,political,economic,andhealthtrendsanddevelopmentprogramsthatcombineenvironmentalandhealthinterventionsoffermanypotentialbenefits:

C H A P T E R 8

The Periphery Isn’t Peripheral: Addressing Future Trends Through Integrated Analysis and DevelopmentGeoffrey Dabelko addresses the unrealistic expectations and analytic inadequacies that are hindering global development progress on the environment.


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• Incorporatingawiderrangeofcriticalvariables,bothwithinandoutsidetheirtraditionaldisciplines,willallowresearcherstofullyrealizethepotentialoflong-termtrendanalysis.

• Understandinghowtrendsinothersectorscouldintersectwiththeirprogramswillhelppractitionersavoidunintendedconsequences;forexample,aprogramshouldensurethataclimateinterventiondoesnotinadvertentlyspurconflict,orahealthinterventiondoesnotaccountfortheimpactofclimatechange.

• Combiningenvironmentandhealtheffortsinintegrateddevelopmentprogramsforexamplecannotonlysavepractitionersmoneyandtime,butalsoproducebetterresultsduetogreatercommunitybuy-in.

Ifintegratedanalysisofferssomanybenefitstoanalystsandresearchers,communitiesontheground,andthedevelopmentworkersinthefield,whyisitsohardtodo?Whyistheresuchabigmismatchbetweenthenatureoftheproblemsandthebureaucraticsolutionstypicallydeployed?

Barriers to Integrated Development: The Four Tyrannies

Fourmainbarriersimpedemoreeffectiveresponsetolong-range,complex,andmulti-scalehealthandenvironmentalchallenges.These“tyrannies”oftenpreventdevelopmentworkersfromconductingintegrated,long-termanalysisanddevelopingintegratedprograms.

• The“tyrannyoftheinbox”forthedevelopmentpractitioner,nomatterwhereoneworks,isever-present.Thenecessityofrespondingtotheimmediatecrisisorthehotpoliticalpriorityblockslong-termdiagnosis,design,andresponse.Thesepriorityitemscommonlyadduptomorethanafull-timejobforthedevelopmentpractitioner,especiallyinanagencysuchasUSAIDthatisonlybeginningtorecoverfromhistoricaleffortstoeviscerateitsworkforce.Atthesametime,thevelocityoftoday’schangesmeansthatover the horizonchallengeswithsizabledevelopmentimplicationsreceivemuchlessattention.

• The“tyrannyofimmediateresults”isdrivenbyabsurdlyshorttimelinesforbothprojectsandfunding.Theexpectationthatresearchorprojectsproducepositiveandmeaningfulresultswithinayearortwodoesnotpassthelaughtestintermsofasustainableandsuccessfulapproach.Thedemandforimmediateresultscoupledwiththeheavyworkloadgeneratesthecommonlamentthatdevelopmentpractitionersdonothavetimetothinkaboutlong-termtrendsandprojectsdonothavetimetoproducemeaningfulresults.

• The“tyrannyofthesinglesector”dominatesthetoolboxdespite


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growingrhetoricandoccasionalforaysintointegratedapproachesthatreflectthecomplex,interconnectedchallengesofdevelopment.Thatverycomplexityencouragespractitionersto“staywithintheirwheelhouse”thusreinforcingdisciplinaryorbureaucratichomogeneity.Manyoftenfeelthat“myissuesaretoughenough”withoutintroducingotherdriversorresponsestotheequation.

• The“tyrannyoftheuni-dimensionalmeasurementofsuccess”isthelogicalextensionofthesingle-sectorfocus.Theadmirablefocusonresultsandindicatorsofsuccesshasalsopushedareductionistapproachthatcannothandlethemessinessofmulti-topicindicators.Forexample,clearandimmediatehealthindicators—suchasvaccinationrates—donotcombineeasilywithlong-termconservationindicators,wheresuccessmaybeactionsnottaken,suchasdeforestationavoided.Addinmeasuringimpactatecosystemoratmosphericscales,andimpactandevaluationassessmentsforintegratedprojectsbecomeevenmorechallenging.

Allfourofthesetyrannies(andthereareprobablymore)impedeintegratedanalysisoflong-termtrendsacrossissueareasandscales,andpreventdevelopmentpractitionersfromactingontheseinsightstodesignandimplementintegratedprograms.

Integration in Practice: Success Stories

Thesetyranniescanbeconquered,asdemonstratedbysomenotablesuccesses.AfewintegrateddevelopmentprogramsinAsia,thePhilippines,andtheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongoillustratehowintegratedtrendanalysisiscriticaltounderstandingfuturedevelopmentanddemonstratewaystoaddressthesechallengesinanintegratedfashion.Asia’s Future Trends:Beforetacklingintegratedprograms,weshouldstartwithabetterunderstandingofhealthandenvironmenttrendsandtheinterconnectionsamongthem.USAIDAsiaBureaustaffrecognizedthatawidesetofclimate,energy,economic,governance,andconflictissuesaffectedtheircorebiodiversityandwaterportfolios,eveniftheydidnothavethetime,expertise,orresourcestoinvestigatethoseissuesindetail.Trendsthatappearedatfirstglance(andcertainlybybudgetline)tobeintheperipherywerenotperipheraltoplanninganddesigningprogramsforlong-termsuccess. WorkingwiththeWoodrowWilsonCenter,USAIDengagedexpertsonadiversesetoftopicsnormallyconsideredoutsidetheirportfolios.TheresultingworkshopseriesandreportAsia’s Future: Critical Thinking for a Changing Environmentledtoadeeperunderstandingofthepossibleimpactsofthese


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futuretrends,suchasthepotentialconsequencesofincreasedHimalayanglaciermeltandChinesehydropowerplansonfoodsecurityandbiodiversityprogramsinthelowerreachesoftheMekongRiver. Bringinganalysisfromthesetopicallyandgeographicallyremoteareasintolocal-leveldevelopmentplanningisaprocessthatrequirespractitionerstobewillingtogooutsidethetypicalboundsoftheirbrief.Moresimply,ifyouknoweveryoneatthemeetingorontheprojectteam,youarenotdoingyourjob.The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC):MercyCorpshassuccessfullypursuedcross-sectoralprogrammingaspartofalargerefforttobemoreholisticinitshumanitariananddevelopmentresponses.Inwar-torneasternDRC,MercyCorpsbroughtpractitionerswithexpertiseinnaturalresourcemanagementintowhathashistoricallybeenanemergencyreliefmission.Inparticular,theMercyCorpsmissionfusedhumanitarianassistancewithlonger-termdevelopmenteffortssuchasenhancedenvironmentalstewardship.Forexample,theuseoffuel-efficientcookstoveseasespressureonlocalforestresourcesbyreducingthedemandforfirewood,andimprovesrespiratoryhealthbyloweringairpollution.Theprojectscaleduptheeffortthroughresourcesfromfurtherintegration,withcarboncreditsfromavoidedemissionsbeingsoldthroughalocalbrokertotheEuropeancapandtrademarket.Theseresourcesinturnhelpedfinancemorecookstoves.Ifintegrationandlong-termeffortsinclimatechangecanbepracticedinthehighlyunstableregionsofeasternCongo,thensuchintegratedprojectsandmarryinglong-termdevelopmentandshort-termcrisisresponsecouldbepossibleinotherdifficultsettings.

Philippines:ThePATHFoundationPhilippines’IntegratedPopulationandCoastalResourceManagement(IPOPCORM)initiativeusesanintegratedapproachtoaddresshealth,population,andenvironmentalconcernsincoastalcommunities.Their“basketofservices”includesestablishingalocallymanagedprotectedmarinesanctuarytoallowlocalfishstockstorecover,promotingalternativeeconomiclivelihoodsoutsideofthefishingindustry,andimprovingaccesstolocalhealthservicesandcommodities,includingfamilyplanning.Todate,IPOPCORMhasyieldedseveralnotableimprovements,amongthemreducedprogramcostsandimprovedhealthandenvironmentaloutcomesascomparedtoside-by-sidesinglesectorinterventions.Accordingtoapeer-reviewedstudy,IPOPCORM’sintegratedeffortsyieldedbetterresultsthansingle-sectorinterventionsincostandmostoftheindicatorstracked.

Reaching the Center: The Integration Imperative

Whathasbeenontheperipheryofourportfoliosisnolongerperipheral.Cross-sectoralprogrammingdemandsthatoldproblemsbeaddressedininnovativeand


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perhapsunfamiliarways,requiringtheadditionofnewcapacityindevelopmentorganizationsandbettercoordinationwithinandbetweenagencies.Still,significanthurdlesremainstandinginthewayofregularandeffectiveintegration.Toovercomethem,wemust:Get out of our comfort zone:Developmentpractitionersneedtoworkacrossdisciplinary,topical,andgeographicgroupingstobecomeconversant—ifnotfluent—inthelanguages,tools,andgoalsofcommunitiesreflectingthemanytrendsthatbearonenvironmentalchallenges.Movingbeyondthestereotypes,suspicions,andignoranceaboutothercommunitiescancomethroughamuchmoremeaningfulinvestmentinhumanresourcesandtheirdevelopment.Find better ways to collaborate:Policypractitionersmusthavegreaterfacilitywithscience,andscientistsmustbetterunderstandpolicyprocesses.Wemustbewillingtodevelopnon-traditionalpartnershipsthatbringotherskillsetstothetable.Wemusttransitionfromintegratedanalysisofproblems(whereweareimproving)tointegratedactions(wherewestillstruggle).

Lower the transaction costs:Wemustincentivize,ratherthanpunish,cross-disciplinaryorcross-sectoralapproaches;putapremiumonmultiplewinsandco-benefitsfromsingleorcoordinatedinterventions;andfostermeasurementthatallowsfordifferenttimeframesandmultipleindicators.

Build flexible institutions:Wearesofocusedonincrementalchangethatitisdifficultforustounderstandtheconnectionsandchangesthatareoccurring.Wemustbuildorganizationsforwhichvariability,andnotstasis,isthenorm.

Think long-term:Weneedtostayaheadofthedevelopmentcurveintoday’sfast-pacedworld.Thevelocityofchangedemandsthatwelookmorecloselyatemergingtrendsfive,10,and15yearsoutbecausethesedevelopmenttrendsrequireactiontoday.Wemustbuildandsustainthecapacitytodofuturetrendsanalysistosupportanticipatoryefforts.

Thisessayoffersonlyaglimpseofwhatintegratedanalysisandprogrammingcanlooklikeifthetyranniesareconqueredandtheimperativeanswered.Integratedeffortsarenotonlyrespondingtolong-termtrendsinsideandoutsidetheenvironmentsector.Fundamentally,theyarerespondingtotheinterconnectedrealitiesoftheworld’spoor.

The author thanks Woodrow Wilson Center colleagues Russell Sticklor and Meaghan Parker for their contributions to this article. Portions of this article originally appeared in Russell Sticklor,“ThereIsNoChoice:Climate,Health,Water,Food


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SecurityMustBeIntegrated,SayExperts,”New Security Beat,August9,2010,availableat<www.newsecuritybeat.org/2010/08/there-is-no-choice-climate-health-water-food-security-must-be-integrated-say-experts/>.

Geoff Dabelko Professor and Director of Environmental Studies at the George V. Voinovich School of Leadership and Public Affairs at Ohio University



Part 3


Conclusion


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Strategicvisionistheconceptualizationofanalternativefuture,deemedtohavesuchmajorsocietalbenefitsastobeworthyoftherisks,sacrifices,andtenacityrequiredtosecureit.Foresightresearchcanbedescribedasaprocessforsystematicallyidentifyingplausiblealternativefutures,andforstudyingonacomparativebasisthewaysinwhichshort-termbehaviorcaninfluencelong-term,strategicconsequences.Simple,linearmodelsofcausalrelationships,whichhaveprofoundlyinfluencedthesubstanceofpublicpolicyandtheorganizationofgovernance,arebothcommonandwrong.Complexitytheoryoffersafarmoreaccuratedescriptionoftheserelationships,withmajorimplicationsforstrategicvisionandforesightresearch,forsubstantivepolicyandforpolicymakingsystems.

Strategic Vision, Foresight Research and International Development

ThereiswithoutdoubtamoralimperativebehindAmericanandmostotherformsofbi-nationalassistancefordevelopment.Certainlythisimperativeisamajorfactorbehindtheactivitiesofreligiousgroupsandotherdonorsasreflectedintheirprogramsoneducation,healthcare,nutrition,etc.Themoralimperativeisalsocentraltotheactivityofmajorprivatelyestablishedfoundations.Likewise,themoralimperativehasalsobeenimportantinthedevelopmentactivitiesofmultinationalinstitutionssuchastheUnitedNations.It’sfairtosay,however,thatthedevelopmentofinternationalassistanceas

C H A P T E R 9

Strategic Vision: Foresight Research for DevelopmentLeon Fuerth, one of the leading thinkers and foresight research advocates, analyzes why current linear thinking about today’s development challenges is a dead end.


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practicedbytheU.S.Governmentowesmuchmoretoitsperceivedutilityasafactoringeo-strategiccompetition,withstrongcommercialandideologicalundertones. Internationaldevelopmentseemeddestinedtoproceedina“linear”fashion(atermfurtherexploredlaterinthischapter)astheresultofanaccretionofprogressinareassuchasagriculturalproductivity,infantmortality,femaleeconomicempowerment,andanumerousotherfactors.Theworldhasmadeprogressineachoftheseendeavors,butthereisstillalongwaytogo.Humankindisinthemidstofanintenselytransformativeperiodindevelopment.Thenextindustrialrevolutionisalreadyunderway,emergingfromtheabruptappearanceofnewsystemsoffinanceandproduction,withprofoundconsequencesextendingwellbeyondnear-termeconomicandgeo-strategiccompetition.Forexample,climatechangehasalreadybeguntohaveasizableimpact.Wearenolongerinaracetopreventitfromhappening,butrather,topreventitseffectsfromexceedingtheadaptivecapacityofindustrialcivilization.Furthermore,aspontaneousmergerofhumanandartificialintelligenceisunderway.Naturalevolutionisbeingdisplacedbyhumandesignandintervention.Wemustcometogripswithnew,“ultra-longrange”policyissuesrelatingtothepotentialofthehumanspecies,andevenmoretoitsprospectsforsurvival. Theseeventsareunfoldingwithsuchvelocityastotelescopethelong-rangefutureofdevelopmentandshort-rangeplanninginwaysthattheinternationalcommunityshouldnowbegrapplingwith.TheUnitedStatesshouldbeleadingtheway.AnewAmericanstrategicvisionisneeded,andthekeytoitisforesightresearch(whichisalsodescribedindetaillaterinthispaper).WithintheU.S.Government,USAID’sstrategicmissionplacesitatthepointofintersectionbetweentheold,linearconceptionofdevelopmentandthenewcomplex,non-lineardevelopmentrealitythathastakenhold.USAIDcanhelptoinspirethenationandthelargerglobalcommunitybypioneeringtheapplicationofforesightresearchtoitsownplanningandoperations. USAIDmustanalyzehowtraditionalactivityareassuchashumanrights,agriculture,nutritionandhealth,workforcedevelopment,diseaseprevention,andenvironmentalprotectionrelatetotheongoingglobalrevolutionsthatarecreatingnewchallengesandopportunitiesacrosstheworld.Inthiscontext,variousnewquestionsarise.Whatdohumanrightsmean,stackedupagainstthedoctrinethatsuggests“corporationsarepeople?”Isthereapathtohigheragriculturalproductivity,otherthangeneticallymodifyingcropswhoseseedsdonotreproduce?Howshouldincreasingdemandsforproteinbebalancedagainsttheimpactofwithholdinggrainsfromhumanconsumptiontoserveascattlefeedorfuelforautomobiles?Whatarethefeedbackeffectsofclimatechangeonagriculturalpractices?Howshalldiseasecontrolbemanagedtodealwithplungingeffectivenessofantibioticsoverusedtostimulatemeatproduction?Whatcanbedonetoprotectlocalenvironmentsagainstplanetaryscaleclimate


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change?Whenshouldprogramsofadjustmentbereadiedtocompensateforclimaticdisruption?Thelistofurgentquestionsalonecouldfillmanypages. InChemistry101,onelearnsthatthereisadifferencebetweenendothermalandexothermalreactions:theformerrequireanexternalsourceofenergyinordertokeeprunning;thelatterhavepassedatippingpoint,beyondwhichtheyself-generateenoughenergytocontinue.Thisisausefuldistinctiontokeepinmind,whenthinkingaboutthekindoftransitionthathasonlyrecentlyoccurredininternationaldevelopment.Bilateralinternationalassistanceisendothermalinthesensethatwhenitceases,theprocessesthatitsetinmotionalsotendtodieout.However,insomepartsoftheworlddevelopmenthasabruptlyshiftedtosomethingthatlooksmuchmorelikeaself-sustaining,exothermalprocess—forexample,theextraordinarygrowthoftheChineseeconomyandotheremergingeconomiessuchasBrazilandIndia.Thismarksanewstageinaglobaleconomywhosecenterofgravityisshiftingfromthestrictlywesternformofcapitalism,ofwhichtheUnitedStatesistheavatar,tothevariantwhichisevolvinginChinaandelsewhere.Inthecourseofthisabrupttransition,developmenthasshiftedfromanessentiallylinearprocesstoonethatisacceleratingandincreasinglycomplex. InthefaceofnewglobaldevelopmentssuchastherapidgrowthofmegacitiesinAfricaandAsia;thegrowingdemandforfood,water,andenergyresources;theexplosionofscienceandtechnology;andadynamicallychangingworld-powerlandscape,itwillbevitalforUSAIDtohaveaforesightprocessinplacetofacilitatelong-termthinking.ItwillalsobeimportantforUSAIDtotaketheleadroleinencouragingdevelopingcountriesandemergingeconomiestodevelopforesightresearchontheirown,ortotapintocapabilitiesthatalreadyexist.Inlightoftrendsthatclearlypointtotheneedforglobaleffortstodealproactivelywiththeconsequencesofacceleratingglobalchange,achievingstrategicvisionisespeciallyimportantforgovernanceinbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountries.Thisisnotsomethingthatcanworkonatop-downbasis.Thepriorlinearrelationshipbetweendonorsandrecipientsdoesnothelpeithergroupcometotermswiththefactthattheyaremutuallyentwinedinacomplexglobalsystem. TheU.S.Government,unfortunately,doesnotcurrentlyhavethiscapabilityinplace.PerhapsthenextAdministrationwillrecognizeandrespondtotheneed.Inthemeantime,thereisgoodreasonforUSAIDtoexperimentwithitatitsownlevel.Muchoftheworld’smiserycomesfrombadorineffectivegovernance,ratherthanfromthewaynatureandhistorydealtthecards.Intheglobalizedworld,knowledgeandvisionbegetdevelopment.USAIDmustshiftawayfromlinearanalysesinordertotackletoday’sglobalchallenges.


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The Basic Lexicon

Termssuchasstrategy,strategicvision,foresight,foresightresearch,nationalinterest,nationalsecurity,stability,sustainability,etc.areusedfrequently—butnotalwaysprecisely—infuturesanalysisandtheoreticaldiscourseaboutpoliciesthathavemeasureable,life-changingconsequencesnotonlyforAmericans,butforhundredsofmillionsofotherpeople.

U.S. National Security

Nationalsecurity,developmentassistance,anddiplomacyareinextricablylinked.Americanthinkingaboutnationalsecuritywasformedduringthesecondhalfofthe20thcenturybytheexperienceofWorldWarIIandtheColdWar.Asaresult,nationalsecurityisoftenconflatedwithnationaldefense.Inthe21stcentury,however,itisclearthatnationaldefenseisactuallyasubsetofnationalsecurity.Ifrawmilitarypoweristhekeytosecurity,Americahaslittletoworryabout.Butwhatdoesitmeanifthecountryisskirtingeconomicfailure,despitebeingarmedtotheteeth?Whatdoesitmean—inaworldwhereinformationliterallyispower—ifprimaryandsecondaryeducationisfailingtoliftthemindsoftensofmillionsoftheyoungeststudents,whilehighereducationisonlyavailabletomillionsofcollegeagestudents,inexchangefortheequivalentofindenturedservitudetocommerciallenders?Whatdoesitmeanwhenthenationissobitterlydividedthatgovernmentcannotdealwiththemostfundamentalpublicneeds,otherthanbyaseriesofpatchworkcompromisesthatbuytimebutsolvenoproblems?Andwhatdoesitmeanwhentherestoftheworld—friendsandenemiesalike—viewtheUnitedStatesasmiredinthiscondition?Abroaderdefinitionofnationalsecurityisclearlyneeded.Nationalsecurityistheintegralsumofsustained,world-classAmericanperformanceinalldomainsthatcontributetothegeneralvitalityoftheUnitedStates:economicpower,militarypower,humanresources,andmoralconfidence.

American Strategy and Strategic Vision

ThebasicstrategyoftheUnitedStatesistoindefinitelypreserveawell-functioningrepublicwhichisable,underdemandingandcontinuouslychangingcircumstances,tosafeguardthesecurity,thefreedoms,andthewell-beingofAmericansundertheruleoflaw,byemployingthemechanismsofself-governmentaslaidoutintheConstitution.Thenationalinterestistoacquireandtosafeguardassetsthatareconducivetothevitalityofthenationasawhole,measuredintermsofitseconomicgrowth,itscohesionasasociety,anditsabilitytomaintainnationalsecurity.Americanstrategicvision,whichbeganwiththeideaofattaininga“moreperfectUnion,”nowacknowledgesthatthenationaldestinyisinseparablyentwinedwiththatofothers.Thus,itisinAmerica’sinteresttopursuegoalsthataddressuniversalaspirations.Thistranslatesintoamorejustandstableglobalorderbasedondemocracy,theruleoflaw,respectforhumanrights,andprivateeconomicinitiativeinasustainablephysical


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environment.StabilityisoftenincludedaspartoftheAmericanstrategicvision,butitisatrickyconcept.Perfectstabilitydoesnotexistinanypoliticalsystem,unlessaneffortismadetosuppresschangebyforce.Dynamicequilibrium,ontheotherhand,canbemaintainedprovidingthereisperiodic,consensualadjustment.Thisunderscorestheimportanceofdemocracyasastrategicgoal.

Foresight and Foresight Research

ForesightresearchwasacentraldiscussionpointattheSymposiumonFutureDevelopmentChallengesandcameupineachofthesessionpanels.Foresightisthecapacitytovisualizealternativefutures,basedonmodelsofhowtheseforcesmayinteract.Foresightresearchisasystematicefforttoacquireinformationaboutthefuture,presentedasanarrayofalternatives,byusingmethodologiesthataretransparenttoallinterestedpartiesandsubjecttocriticalevaluationbythem.Foresightisanalytic,andestimativeratherthanpredictive.Itrequiresafusionofcapabilities:historicalawareness,systemsawareness,andforecastingmethodologies.Foresightaimstobedispassionateaboutparticularoutcomes,concerningitselfwithdescriptionratherthanprescription.Inthisregard,foresightisabsolutelydistinctfromprophesy,whichreliesoninspirationasopposedtoanalysis.Foresightmaybetheproductofindividualimagination,orofalargecollectiveeffort.Eitherway,however,itdoesnotstandonauthoritybutonpropositionsthatmustbedemonstrated.Itisthereforeanoffsettothenearlypropheticcertitudesofpoliticallife.Effectiveleadershiprequiresstrategicvision,butgoodmanagementrequiresforesight.

Complexity: Strategic Vision, Foresight Research and Systems

Ascitedearlierinthischapter,understandingthenon-linearrelationshipbetweenglobaleventsandtrendsisessential.Politicaldiscoursetoday,however,assumesthattheworldisacollectionoflinearrelationships—muchliketheworldofNewtonianphysics.Inthisworld,inputsandoutputs—actionsandconsequences—canbesegregatedanddealtwithonthebasisofanunderlyingmathematicalrelationship.Changesofinputproduceproportionateandpredictablechangesofoutput;relationshipsbetweeninputandoutputholdtrueacrossaverybroadrangeofconditionsoverlongperiodsoftime.Butinreality,especiallyinaglobaldevelopmentcontext,relationshipsarefarfromlinear.Theyarecomplex—muchastheyareintheworldsofrelativisticandquantumphysics.Inputsandoutputs—actionsandconsequences—cannotbeisolated.Atanygivenmomentalltheelementsofacomplexsystemaresimultaneouslyinteracting:boththedriversandthedriven.Changesofinputatanypointcanproducedisproportionatechangesofstateacrosstheentiresystem.Thesechangescaninvolvecatastrophicdisruptionofpatternstowhichwearehabituated.Forexample,changesintradepolicymighthavemultipleunpredictableimplications. Therelationshipsthatgoverntheworld,andtheplaceoftheUnitedStates


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withinit,arenotlinearsystemsinwhichactorsmaydecidewhetherornottoengage,butcomplexsystemsintowhichtheyareembedded,simultaneouslydrivingeventsandbeingdrivenbythem.Complexitytheory125hasprofoundimplicationsforAmericanpolicy(includingdevelopmentpolicy)atalllevelsandinallsubstantivedomains:domesticandinternational;defenseandeconomics;andshortandlongterm.Italsohasimplicationsforoursystemsofgovernance.Inlinearsystems,policiesandtheirconsequencescan,intheory,bestudiedinisolation,andtheirmanagementcanbehandledbyverticallyorganizeddepartments.Inacomplexsystem,however,policiesandtheirconsequencesareinteractiveandmustbestudiedandacteduponconcurrently.Complexityunderminesanyassertionthatapolicycanbeperfectandpermanent.Allpoliciesareimperfectatthemomentofinceptionandwillbecomemoresoovertime.Managementbecomestheartofknowinghowtobringabouttimelyadjustmenttochangingcircumstances,ratherthanthepracticeofanill-advisedconsistency.

Disruptive Change

Startinginthelate20thcentury,andincreasinglyintheearlyperiodofthe21stcentury,thedominantcharacteristicsofsocietaldevelopmentbecamecomplexandbegantoaccelerate.Ifthereisatheoreticalreasonforthis,mostlikelyitwouldbeMoore’sLaw,whichdescribesthegeometricincreaseincomputerspeedanditsinverseconsequence:thegeometricdeclineinthecostofcomputer-basedtransactions,which,inturnisthebasisfortheexplosivespreadoftheInternet,undertheimpulseofventurecapitalism.Governancehasbeenunabletokeeppace.Thisispartlyduetotheseverepoliticizationthatnowaffectsdecision-making.Butitisalsoaconsequenceofthefactthatoursystemsofgovernancewereorganizedonalinearbasis,reflectingmethodstypicalofthe“high”industrialage:verticalorganization;top-downmanagement;information-hoarding,andthelike.Bureaucraticfunctionsareadaptedforincrementalresponsestoincrementallychangingconditions.Theycannothandledisruptivechange,whichisthekindofchangeactuallytakingplace.Athome,publicconfidenceinourformofgovernancehasbeenbadlydamaged.ThesameistrueofpublicopinionintheEuropeanUnion.Inthedevelopingworld,democraticgovernanceisnotlookinggoodincontrasttoitsmainalternative:Chinesecapitalism.Thatinturn,willmakeitmuchharderfortheUnitedStatesanditsalliestomobilizesupportforthekindofglobalorderthatwouldbemostsuitableforthemaintenanceoftheAmericanwayoflifeandthepracticeofdevelopmentassistance.

125 OfallthesourcesforComplexityTheorythatImightidentify,thelateJamesN.Rosenau,notonlymypersonalfriendbutavalidator,asoundingboard,andacolleaguewasdeeplyathomeinthesearchformeaningandwisdominhumanaffairs.SeeJamesN.Rosenau,Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2003).


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Forward Engagement

Currentinformationsystemsservingseniorlevelsofgovernmentaregenerallysufficient(althoughnotalways)forplanningfortheshortterm.Theyareabsolutelydeficientforlongtermplanning.Attheircurrentcapacity,theyareincapableoftrackingthetransitionofeventsfromprospectivetoactual.Moresothaneverbefore,trendsaretransitioningmorerapidly,andpossibleeventsarebecomingoccurringeventsintheblinkofaneye.Thesetypesoftransitionshavethepotentialtooverwhelmtheadaptivecapacitiesofourgovernancesystem—presentingmajorchallengesthatmatureataratefarinexcessoftherateatwhichwemightadjust.Theamountoftimeandeffortrequiredtoshiftthecourseofopinion,programming,andoperations,hasincreasedexponentially—notwithstandingthetremendousnationaladvantagesenjoyedearlierinU.S.history.Americacouldbebadlydamagedbyapowerfulemergentdevelopmentrecognizedtoolateforeffectiverepositioning.

Anticipatory Governance

Thefusionofforesightandpolicyisattheheartofanticipatorygovernance.AnticipatorygovernancerequiresupgradestoexistingWhiteHouseprocessesinthreeareas:systemstoencourageaconstantinteractionbetweenlong-termforesightandshort-termdecision-making;systemstofacilitate“wholeofgovernance”responsestocomplexissues;andsystemstoapplytheconceptoffeedback,tothemanagementofpolicy,inlightofresults.MyrecentreportonAnticipatoryGovernance,publishedbytheNationalDefenseUniversity,representsamajorefforttobringtheoryandpracticetogetherforthefirsttime.126Oneofthepreceptsofthisworkwasthatallrecommendationsmustbeapplicableunderrealisticcircumstances:verylightonresources,implementableunderexistingpresidentialauthorities,andcompatiblewiththeexistingprocessesingovernment.AlthoughthereportfocusedontheU.S.executivebranch,manyofitsconclusionsaboutthekindofgovernanceneededtodealwithacceleratedchangeareclearlyapplicabletointernationaldevelopmentingeneral,andtotheoperationsofallagenciesoftheU.S.Governmentthatarestakeholdersintheprocess,especiallyUSAID.

Conclusion

Thedaysofcreatingpolicybasedonalinearconceptualizationofworldeventsandglobaltrendsareatanend.U.S.policy,tomeettoday’srealities,requirescomplexanalysisthatisforwardthinkingandfocusedonthelongterm.Thefutureofdevelopment—oncevisualizedintermsofallthingsmadeproportionatelybetter,inaworldmoreorlessstillrecognizableinsocial,

126LeonS.Fuerth,withEvanM.H.Faber,Anticipatory Governance Practical Upgrades: Equipping the Executive Branch to Cope with Increasing Speed and Complexity of Major Challenges(WashingtonDC:NDUPress,October2012).Thereportisavailableatwww.forwardengagement.org.


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economicandpoliticalterms—hasturnedouttobeawaveofchangesweepinghundredsofmillionsofpeopleintounknownterritory.Inabestcasescenario,wewillfindwaystoadapttothisrateofchangeandmight“surf”ittoanewworld,betterthantheold.Inaworstcasescenario,chaotic,non-linearchangewillbringaboutextremesocialturbulenceinthemidstofanincreasinglyinhospitableplanetaryenvironment.Strategicvision,linkedtoforesightresearch,isneededinordertofacilitatedecision-makingdomestically,internationally,andultimatelyatthelevelofthecomplexglobalsystemthatisestablishingitselfasthebasisforplanetary-scaledevelopment.

Leon Fuerth Research Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University



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WiththeU.S.AgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)holdingthefirst-everSymposiumonFutureDevelopmentChallengesinWashingtoninlate2011,theAgencyhasturnedapagebyfocusingsignificantanalyticalenergiesandAgencyleadershipattentionontheimportanceofidentifyingemergingdevelopmenttrends.TheAgencyisbeginningtoaskthisfundamentalquestion:Whatwillthefutureofdevelopmentlooklikein2025?Toputthatfutureviewintoasharperperspective,itmakessensetobeginwithacurrentassessment. Letusstartwithakeyobservation,oftenmissed:Therehasbeengreaterprogressinglobaldevelopmentandpovertyreductioninthelast20yearsthanatanytimeinthehistoryoftheworld.Developingcountriesareexperiencingunprecedentedreductionsinpoverty,increasesinincome,improvementsinhealthandeducation,andinmanycases,shiftstowardsdemocracyandimprovedgovernance.Ofcourse,manyothercountries(andregionswithincountries)continuetomakelittleornoprogressatall.Thetwoclearestpatternsamongdevelopingcountriessincetheearly1990sarevastimprovementanddivergence.Agrowingnumberareachievingimportantdevelopmentgainswhilemanyothersarebeingleftbehind. Inthemidstoftheseimprovements,andpartlybecauseofthem,theglobalcontextfordevelopmentischangingrapidly.Incomesandcapabilitiesarerisingquickly,privatecapitalflowstodevelopingcountrieshavegrownenormously,therearefarmoredemocracieswithmorecapableandaccountablegovernments,

C H A P T E R 1 0

Can Global Development Progress Continue? Three Future Scenarios and What They Depend OnSteven Radelet makes a convincing case that the global context for development is changing exponentially and explores three starkly different future scenarios.


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cellphonesandothertechnologiesarecreatingtremendousnewopportunities,andaplethoraofnewdonorsandfoundationshaveenteredthescene. Developingcountryprogressduringthelast20yearsprovidesastrongfoundationforfurthereconomicgrowthandpovertyreductiontocontinueandpossiblyevenaccelerateinthefuture.Butthereisnoguaranteethatthisprogresswillbesustained,muchlessacceleratedandspreadtoothercountries.Significantnewdevelopmentchallengesarearising,includingtensionsfromrapideconomicpowers,religiousandculturaldivisions,andgrowingenvironmentalpressuresfromdemographicshifts,resourcedemands,andclimatechange.Whatmightthefutureofdevelopmentlooklike?Cantheprogressbesustained,orwillitbederailed?Andwhatdotheseoutcomesdependon?

A Snapshot of Global Development Progress

Duringthe1960sagrowingnumberoflow-incomecountriesbegantoachieverapidgrowthandpovertyreduction.TheprogresswascenteredinEastAsia,ascountriesdeepenedtheirtradeandintegrationwitharesurgentJapanandwiththeUnitedStates.In1980there-awakeningofChinaopenedvastnewopportunitiesfor1billionoftheworld’spoor,andIndiabegantosurgein1990.WhileprogresscenteredinAsia,itwasnotexclusivelyanAsianphenomenon.CountriessuchasBotswana,Mauritius,CostaRica,theDominicanRepublic,Turkey,Tunisia,andothersmadesignificantgains. Sincethemid-1990s,boththepaceandthebreadthofglobaldevelopmentprogresshaveacceleratedmarkedly.ThebigchangecamewiththeendoftheColdWarandthecollapseoftheSovietUnion.Strongformsofstatecontrolandsocialismlostcredibility,authoritariandictatorsbegantodisappearinfavorofdemocraticallyelectedgovernments,andmorecountriesbegantointegratewiththeglobaleconomy.DevelopmentprogressspreadmorewidelytoEasternEurope,CentralAsia,LatinAmerica,andAfrica.Whereasduring1960–95therewere31developingcountriesthatachievedmorethan2.2percentpercapitagrowth,thelong-termNorthAmericanandEuropeanaverage,since1995morethantwicethatnumber,73developingcountries,haveexceededthatbenchmark.Injust15yearsinthesecountries,realincomeshaveincreased60percent,infantmortalityrateshaveplunged35percent,andgrossprimaryschoolenrollmentratesjumped13percent.Democracyismuchmorewidespread.Insub-SaharanAfricaalone,thenumberofdemocracieshasgrownfromthreein1989tomorethan20today.127Andmostdramatically,thenumberofpeoplelivinginextremepoverty(withincomeslessthan$1.25/day)hasfallensharplyfromover1.9billionin1993tolessthan1.3billionin2008,areductionbyone-thirdinjust15years.128

127StevenRadelet,Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries are Leading the Way(Washington,DC:CenterforGlobalDevelopment,2010).

128SteveRadelet,RachelBahnandSarahLane,“RisingOutofPoverty,”USAID Impact Blog,May8,2012,availableat<http://blog.usaid.gov/2012/05/rising-out-of-poverty/>.


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Ofcourse,despitethishugeprogress,theglobaldevelopmentpictureisfarfromuniversallypositive.Manyothercountries(orregionswithincountries)havemadelittleornoprogress,withstagnatingordecliningincomesandlittlechangeinpoverty.Afterall,therearestill1.3billionpeoplelivingon$1.25aday,andnearly2.5billionthatliveonlessthan$2aday.Andwhiledemocracyhassweptacrossdevelopingcountrieslikeneverbefore,thegainshaveslowedinrecentyears,andmanycountriesstillliveundertyranny,dictatorship,orinthemidstofconflict.Sadly,someoftheworld’smostdifficultdevelopmentchallengeshavenotyetbeentackled.

The Changing Context for Development

Whileunderstandingthepastisimportant,ourrealconcernmustbewiththefutureofdevelopment.Newforcesarerapidlychangingtheglobalcontextfordevelopment.Thedevelopmentchallengesfacingcountriestodayisfardifferentthanitwasjust20yearsago.Futuresuccesswilldependonunderstandingthepast,butevenmoresointakingadvantageofnewopportunitiesandpreparingtomeetemergingthreatsandchallenges.Sixkeydimensionsofchangestandout.129 First,asoutlinedabove,thereareenormousandgrowingdifferencesinperformanceacrosscountries.Highperformingcountrieshaveanexpandingmiddleclass,highersavingrates,largermarkets,moregovernmentrevenue,moretrainedandcapableworkers,andmoreforeigninvestment.Someemergingmarkets—especiallytheso-calledBRICs(Brazil,Russia,India,andChina)arebecomingsomeofthelargestmarketsintheworld,whiletheoldreliablerich-countrymarketsinEurope,theUnitedStates,andJapanareunderenormouspressure.Theresultisadramaticchangeintheglobaleconomicbalance.Butatthesametime,otherdevelopingcountriesremainstuckwithslowgrowth,littleinvestment,stagnantrevenueandsaving,fewneweconomicopportunities,andoftengreaterconflict. Second,democracyhasexpandedrapidly,especiallyfollowingtheendoftheColdWarandthecollapseoftheSovietUnion.DemocracyemergedincountriesasdiverseasSouthKorea,Indonesia,Poland,SouthAfrica,Ghana,Brazil,andElSalvador.Tobesure,thesedemocraciesarefragileandfarfromperfect,butneverbeforehavesomanylow-incomecountriesattemptedtobecomedemocraciesinsoshortatime. Third,injust10yearsbetween2001and2010,netprivatecapitalflowstodevelopingcountriesgrewsix-foldfromlessthan$200billiontoover$1trillion.130

129Foradiscussionofsomeofthesetrends,seeUSAID Policy Framework2011–2015(Washington,DC:USAID,2011),availableat<http://transition.usaid.gov/policy/USAID_PolicyFramework.PDF>.

130Global Development Finance: External Debt of Developing Countries(Washington,DC:TheWorldBank,2012),availableat<http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/gdf_2012.pdf>.


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Investorsarearrivingfromaroundtheworld,includingmiddle-incomeemergingeconomiessuchasChina,India,Malaysia,Brazil,Russia,SouthAfrica,andmanyothers.Thesecapitalflowscreatesomerisks,butoverallcreatehugenewopportunitiesforjobcreation,skillstransfer,andgrowthindevelopingcountries.Theynowdwarfofficialaidflows. Fourth,newtechnologiesarechangingthedevelopmentprocess.Cellphoneshavebecomeubiquitous,andInternetaccessisgrowingquickly.Thecostofshippinggoodsandmovingpeopleisfarlowerthanitwasjust20yearsago.Thesetechnologiesarecreatingneweconomicopportunities,helpingtodeliverbasicservices,facilitatingpoliticaldebate,andimprovingtransparencyandaccountability,allofwhichstrengthentheprospectsforcontinuedprogressinmanylow-incomecountries.Andtheirinfluencewillonlygrowintheyearstocome. Fifth,pressuresaregrowingfromdemographictrends,resourcedemand,andclimatechange.By2050,theworld’spopulationwillgrowtoaround10billionpeople,withthefastestgrowthindevelopingcountries,andmorespecifically,inurbanareasofdevelopingcountries.Demandforcriticalresources,especiallywater,landandenergy,willgrowrapidly.Globaldemandforfoodandwaterislikelytoincreaseby50percentinjustthenext20years.Climatechangewillonlyaddtothesechallenges. Sixth,religiousandethnictensionsarerisinginmanypartsoftheworld,creatingdisputesandconflictsthataredisruptingor,insomecases,reversingdevelopment.ThetensionsareobviousinAfghanistan,Pakistan,Somalia,Sudan,Iraq,andmanyotherplaces.Theyareamajorundercurrentinthestill-unfoldingArabspring,andmorerecentlyhavebecomemajorproblemsinothercountriessuchasMaliandEgypt.

Three Scenarios for the Future of Development

Withthesedramaticglobalchangesunfolding,thefuturefordevelopingcountriesisuncertain.Thereareatleastthreeforward-thinkingscenariosforthefuture,whichIwillonlyattempttooutlinebroadlyandstylistically.

Scenario 1: The continuation of rapid global development.Thetrendsofthelast20yearsexpandandaccelerate.TheBRICscontinuetheirascendancy,withseveralothermiddleincomecountriesfollowingcloselybehinds,includingTurkey,Indonesia,Thailand,SouthAfrica,andChile.Manylow-incomecountriescontinuetoexpandtheireconomiesandreducepoverty,suchasGhana,Tanzania,ElSalvador,theDominicanRepublic,thePhilippines,andBangladesh.Asmorecountriessucceed,marketsfortradegrowbetweendevelopingcountries,allowingmarketstoexpandregionallyandbeyond.Moreover,pressuregrowsinthecountriesleftbehindtofollowtheexamplesof


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theirmoresuccessfulneighbors.Technologies,experiences,andideasthatsucceedinonecountryspreadeasilytoanother.Cellphoneusecontinuestoexpand,theInternet(andtheopportunitiesitcreates)makesanevenbiggerimpactonthepoorestcountries,andnewresearchleadstoanexpansioninagriculturalproductivity.Countriesthathavebeen“stuck”begintoturnaround,includingCoteD’Ivoire,Nigeria,andEgypt.WhowouldhaveevenconsideredBurmaasaturnaroundcandidatetwoyearsago? Alongwiththisgrowth,theextraordinarilyrapidadvancesinglobalhealthcontinue,withahaltinthespreadoftheHIV/AIDSepidemic,reductionsinmalaria,theexterminationofpolio,andtheeliminationofpreventablechildhooddiseases.Globalpovertyratescontinuetodeclinesharply.Democracycontinuestospread—althoughhaltinglyandimperfectly—withmorecountriesembracingaccountability,transparency,andgoodgovernance.Somecountriescontinuetostagnate,buttheirnumberbecomessmaller,andtheyincreasinglybecometheexceptionratherthanthenorm.

Scenario 2: Global conflict derails development.Globaltensionsrisesharply,eitherbasedoneconomicstrainsfromtheriseofAsiaanddeclineofEurope,orbasedonreligiousorideologicalfrictions.Countriesmoveintonewgeo-politicalspheres,replacingthetwooldColdWarsphereswithblocksalignedaroundtraditionalwesternpowers,anascendantChina,anempoweredIndia,andacoalitionofMuslimcountries.ConflictintheMiddleEastexplodes,andquicklyspillsovertoSouthAsia,NorthAfrica,andCentralAsia.EconomicdisputesbetweenarisingAsiaandadiminishingWestdecayintomajortradewars,andanagingandfrustratedWestbecomesmoretemptedtousethethreatofadvancedweaponstokeepothersincheck.TensionswithinAsiariseoverterritorialwatersandclaimstoundersearesources. Inshort,theworldgoestowar.Thosewhothinkthisisfar-fetchedneedonlyrememberthatthelastgreateraofglobaldevelopment,theexpansionofEuropeandtheUnitedStatesinthelate19thandearly20thcenturies,endedabruptlywiththedescentintothefirstWorldWar,followedshortlythereafterwiththeGreatDepressionandWorldWarII.Obviously,thisscenariowouldresultinthecompletederailmentandreversalofglobaldevelopment.

Scenario 3: Increasing pressure on the planet.Thecombinationofrisingurbanpopulationsandincreasingincomesputsgrowingpressuresonwatersupplies,energy,demandforminerals,andairquality—challengescreatedinpartbytherecentgreatsuccessofglobaldevelopment.Climatechangeunderminesagriculturalproductivityanddiminishesfoodsupplieswhileglobaldemandforfoodreachesanall-timehigh.Commoditypricesrisesteadily,whilefoodpricesacceleratetheirrecenttrendsofbothextremevolatilityandsteadyincreases.Asagriculturalproductivityfallsinmanydevelopingcountries,poverty


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rateshalttheirdeclineandbegintoriseagain.ThisscenariothenmorphsintoScenario2.Pressureontheplanetandthedemandforscarceresources(suchaswater)leadtoanexplosionofconflictandtheendofglobaldevelopmentasweknowit.

What Can Be Done?

Itisunlikelythatanyofthescenariosoutlinedabovewilltakeplaceexactlyaspredicted.Butinabroadsensetheycapturesomeofthemajorchoicesandfuturesthattheworldfaces.Whichwillitbe?Whatdotheseoutcomesdependon,andwhatcanwedotoinfluencethem?Inmyview,theanswerdependsonfourbroadfactors:technology,connectivity,policychoices,andgovernanceandinstitutions.

Technology:ThomasMalthusfamouslypredictedthatpopulationgrowthwouldresultinfamine,disease,andunrelentingpoverty.WhatMalthusoverlooked—notsurprisinglysincehewaswritingintheearly19thcentury—wasthepoweroftechnologytoincreaseagriculturalproductivity,createneweconomicopportunities,andimprovehealth.TodaytheworldcomfortablysupportsfarmorepeoplewithahigherstandardoflivingandlowerratesofpovertythaninMalthus’sdaylargelybecauseofimprovementsintechnology.FromtheindustrialrevolutiontonewenergysourcestoimprovementsintransportationtonewvaccinestocellphonesandtheInternet,technologyhasbeenthekeytoallowingtheplanettosupportmoreandmorepeople.Consequently,investmentsbybothprivatecompaniesandgovernmentsinnewagriculturaltechnologies,health,andotherareaswillbecentraltowhethertheplanetcancontinuetosupportagrowingnumberofpeople.Butdevelopingtechnologiesisneitherautomaticnorguaranteed.Itwilltakestrategicinvestmentsandcreativepublic-privatepartnershipstosucceed.

Connectivity: Themorecountriestrade,shareideas,connectthroughtheInternet,sharetechnologies,andotherwiseincreaseconnectivity,themoretheworldeconomygrows,andthemorewedependoneachotherforsharedprosperity.Thetwomostpowerfulenginesforglobalgrowthsincetheindustrialrevolutionhavebeentradeandtechnology.Bothrequireintegrationandconnectivity(somemightusethewordglobalizationhere,butitisanoverusedwordthatmeansallthingstoallpeople).Theeconomicgainsfromtradearewellknown,butIbelievetradeisextremelyimportantpoliticallyaswellintermsofgettingdifferentcultures,markets,institutions,peoples,andsocietiesengagedwitheachotherandbenefittingandlearningfromeachother.Themorethatdifferentpartsoftheworldareintegratedandconnectedeconomically,thelesslikelywearetohavelargeconflicts,sincewewillallhavetoomuchtoloseaswe


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areinthistogether.Inshort,tradeprovideseveryoneagrowingstaketoworktogethertofindsolutionstocommonproblems.Continuingglobalgrowthanddevelopmentwillrequireincreasingregionalandglobaltradeties,includingfinalizingtheDoharound(orsomethinglikeit)andsubsequenttradeagreementsinthefuture.Doingsowillrequiredeepeningregionaltradeamongdevelopingcountries,andreducingbarrierstocross-borderinvestment.Itwillrequiresharingofideas,especiallytowardsdevelopingthetechnologiesneededtoaddresskeyglobalchallenges. Perhapsthewisestobservationsaboutthispointwerevoiced236yearsagobyAdamSmithinThe Wealth of Nations.Heforesawthatincreasedtradewouldbethevehiclenotonlyforraisingincomesbutforcreatingmutualrespectandreducedconflictandinjustice:“Hereafter…theinhabitantsofallthedifferentquartersoftheworldmayarriveatthatequalityofcourageandforcewhich,byinspiringmutualfear,canaloneoverawetheinjusticeofindependentnationsintosomesortofrespectfortherightsofoneanother.Butnothingseemsmorelikelytoestablishthisequalityofforcethanthemutualcommunicationofknowledgeandallsortsofimprovementswhichanextensivecommerce…carriesalongwithit.”131Asusual,AdamSmithhaditright.

Policy choices:Muchofthefuturewilldependonthepolicychoicesthatindividuals,communities,andcountriesmakeinkeyareas.Allowingpricestomovetoreflectscarcityvaluesandtruecostscreatespowerfulincentivestoshiftbehavior.Forexample,removingfuelsubsidiesandmovingtowardstaxesonfossilfueluseandcarbonemissionsisnotonlyfiscallyresponsible,butwilldampentheuseoffossilfuelsandwillbegintomitigateclimatechange.Atthesametime,choicestoinvestinalternativefuelswithamuchsmallerenvironmentalfootprint—gas,solar,andwind—willmoveinthesamedirection.Asdiscussedabove,investmentsinnewagricultural,health,andenergytechnologieswillbecritical,butsocietiesneedtomaketheactivechoicestodoso.Similarly,choicestoinvestineducation,health,andfamilyplanningwillhelpkeepcountriesontherightpathaswemovetowardsgreaterglobalprosperity.Butallofthesechoicesrequiresacrificeandinvolveshiftingawayfromeasy,currentconsumption.Instead,weneedtofocusonmakinggreaterinvestmentsinthefuture.

Governance and institutions:Continuingwidespreadglobaldevelopmentwillrequirestrengtheninginstitutionsandgovernancebothnationallyandinternationally.Themoretheworldmovestowardsaccountable,transparent,inclusive,democraticinstitutions,themorelikelywewillbetocontinuethemovetowardsglobalprosperity.Theevolutionofdemocracyhasbeenakeyforceinmitigatingconflictandfacilitatingchoicesthathavekepttheworldbroadlyat

131 AdamSmith,The Wealth of Nations(London:J.M.Dent,1910),280.


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peaceandmovingtowardsprosperityinrecentdecades.Peopleneedtohavetheirvoicesheardandtofeelthatchoicesarebeingmadefairly.Inclusivedemocracyisthebestsystemtofacilitatethedebatesandchoicesweneedtomaketocontinueglobalprosperity. Democracyisfarfromperfect.ButWinstonChurchillhaditrightwhenhesaid“democracyistheworstformofgovernmentexceptallthoseotherformsthathavebeentriedfromtimetotime.”132Thequestionofwhichcausestheother—inclusivedemocracyorsustainedgrowthanddevelopment—isalmostbesidethepoint.Ibelievethecausalitycanandhasrunbothwaysindifferentcountries,witheachreinforcingtheother.Weneedboth.Thekeyistoestablishinstitutionsthatcreateleadershipthatisaccountableandcanmakedecisionsthatwillbenefitsocietiesasawholeinthelongrun.Democracies,foralltheirweaknesses,arethebestsystemwehavethatwillhelpleadersmakethosechoices. Ataninternationallevel,thekeyglobalinstitutions—theUnitedNations,WorldTradeOrganization,InternationalCourtofJustice,WorldBank,InternationalMonetaryFund,andG-8—wereestablishedatanearliertimeinhistorytofacedifferentchallengesinthecontextofadifferentglobalstructure.Inmanyways,forallthecriticismheapeduponthem,theyhavebeenenormouslysuccessfulincontributingtothegoalsforwhichtheywereestablished—maintainingglobalpeaceandmovingtheworldtowardssharedgrowthandprosperity.Buttheymustevolvequicklyandresponsiblytoreflectbothchangesintheglobalstructureandchangesinthekeyproblemsweface.Thebalanceofpoweranddecision-makingintheseinstitutionsmustreflecttheriseofemergingpowersandrelativedeclineofEurope.ThetraditionalWesternpowersmustembraceandincludetheserisingpowersinorderforthesecountriestobuyintotheseinstitutionssothattheymaintaintheirlegitimacyandtheirabilitytocollectivelysolvemajorchallenges.Similarly,traditionaldonorgroupsmustactivelyreachoutandincludeChinaandotherrisingdonorstojointhematthetable,ratherthanexcludingthem.Theseglobalinstitutionsmustalsoadapttoreflecttheevolutionofkeyissues.FromtheColdWar,tokeepingthepeaceafterWorldWarII,todealingwiththeneweconomicbalanceofpowerandrisingreligiousandideologicaltensions,prioritieshavechanged.Theseinstitutionshavebeguntochangeaswell,butthereisalongwaytogotofullyequipthem,especiallytheUnitedNations,todealeffectivelywiththeglobalissuesthatwillfaceusinthecomingdecades. Obviously,themarginoferroriswideinthescenariosandrecommendationslistedabove.Noonecanpredictthefuturewithprecision.Butthinkingabouttheseissuesandaboutpotentialfuturescenarioshelpsustoindividuallyandcollectivelyconfrontandaddresstomorrow’sglobalchallenges

132 WinstonChurchill,SpeechtotheHouseofCommons,November11,1947,availableat<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1947/nov/11/parliament-bill>


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andgivesustheopportunitytocontinuefightingpovertyandwideningthecircleofglobalprosperityanddevelopment.

Steven Radelet Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Development Georgetown School of Foreign Service, Formerly Chief Economist, USAID



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Richard Cincotta, PhD is the demographer in residence at the Stimson Center in Washington, D.C., a consultant to the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Project, and a frequent contributor to the National Intelligence Council’s strategic foresight efforts. Cincotta served as the director of Demographic and Social Science Programs in the National Intelligence Council’s Long Range Analysis Unit (2006–09), and was an AAAS Diplomacy fellow and public health fellow in the Policy and Evaluation Division, USAID’s Office of Population and Reproductive Health (1992–96). His current research focuses on demographic and age-structural transitions, and he has published on their relationships to the politics of ethno-religious change, the onset of civil conflict, regime type and political stability, natural resource dynamics, and population policies. His publications on these topics appear in ForeignPolicy, CurrentHistory, Nature, and Science, and in several edited volumes on political demography and human ecology.

Geoff Dabelko, PhD is professor and Director of Environmental Studies at the George V. Voinovich School of Leadership and Public Affairs at Ohio University in Athens, Ohio. From 1997–2012, he served as Director of the Environmental Change and Security Program (ECSP), a nonpartisan policy forum on environment, population, and security issues at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington. His recent research focuses on climate change and security as well as environmental pathways to confidence building and peacemaking, with a special emphasis on management of fresh water resources. Dabelko is co-editor, with Ken Conca of GreenPlanetBlues:FourDecadesofGlobalEnvironmentalPolitics and EnvironmentalPeacemaking. He is a member of the United Nations Environment Programme’s Expert Advisory Group on Environment, Conflict, and Peacebuilding, an editorial board member of GlobalEnvironmentalChange, and a contributing editor of Environment. Dabelko is a lead author for the 5th assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

Leon Fuerth is the founder and Director of the Project on Forward Engagement, distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University, research professor of International Affairs at the George Washington University, and the former national security advisor to Vice President Al Gore. During the Clinton Administration, Fuerth served simultaneously on the Deputies’ and Principals’ Committees of the National Security Council, and created and managed five bi-national commissions. Fuerth holds a Bachelor’s Degree in English and a Master’s Degree in History from New York University, as well as a Master’s Degree in Public Administration from Harvard University.

About the Contributors


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Steven Gale, PhD is Senior Advisor for Strategic Opportunities in the Office of Science and Technology at the U.S. Agency for International Development where he focuses on innovations to accelerate development and using futures analysis to inform decision-making on emerging global trends. Gale was a Brookings Legislative Fellow on the House Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign Operations from 2009–2010, and the founding director of USAID’s Global Development Commons. He served as USAID’s principal advisor for Strategic Communications from 2005 to 2008 and deputy to the Interagency Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) on Public Diplomacy from 2007–2008. Gale was formerly the Director for Afghanistan at the National Security Council (NSC) under Condoleezza Rice (2004–2005) at the White House. Earlier in his career, he served as Chief of Evaluation at the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food and Nutrition Service. Gale was a National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Columbia University post-doctoral fellow (1977–1979), earned his Doctorate of Philosophy in Experimental Psychology from the Graduate School, City University of New York (1977), and his Bachelor’s Degree from Hobart College in 1969.

Sarah Irene Jackson is an information officer at USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance. Previously, she served as a research analyst specializing in conflict and humanitarian assistance at USAID’s Knowledge Services Center. She has worked at the United States Institute of Peace and Georgetown University. She holds a Master’s Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and a Bachelor’s Degree in International Studies from the University of Richmond.

Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, PhD is Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for the Western Hemisphere. In this role, he oversees the Treasury Department’s engagement with Latin American and Caribbean countries, as well as with Canada, and plays a leading role in shaping Treasury and U.S. Government policy toward the Hemisphere. Previously, he served as Director of the Office of Policy at the U.S. Agency for International Development. He was a fellow and Deputy Director of the Global Economy and Development Program at the Brookings Institution and has consulted for the IMF and the World Bank. Dr. Martinez-Diaz specialized in International Political Economy, receiving a Master’s of Philosophy Degree in 2001 and a Doctorate of Philosophy in 2007 from Magdalen College, Oxford University, where he was a Marshall scholar. He graduated with honors from Northwestern University in 1999 with degrees in Economics and Political Science, and was a 1998 Truman Scholar.

Steven Radelet, PhD is distinguished professor in the Practice of Development at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. He formerly served as Chief Economist at the United States Agency of International Development (USAID). From 2002 to 2010, he was a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development


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where his work focused on poverty reduction, foreign aid, debt and trade. He served as an economic advisor to the President of Liberia from 2005 to 2009 and was founding co-chair of the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network. From 2000 to 2002, he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Africa, the Middle East and Asia. From 1990 to 2000, he was a fellow at the Harvard Institute for International Development, director of the institute’s macroeconomics program, and a lecturer on economics and public policy. He holds a Master’s and a Doctorate of Philosophy degree in Public Policy from Harvard University, and a Bachelor of Science in Mathematics from Central Michigan University.

Andrew W. Reynolds is Senior Advisor for Space and Advanced Technologies in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. A career civil servant at the U.S. Energy and State Departments, Mr. Reynolds has focused on Science and Technology and engineering fields, strategic planning, disruptive technology forecasting and assessment, and cooperative research. He served as Department of Energy representative at the U.S. Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris from 1983–1986 and Science and Technology Counselor in the U.S. Embassy in Rome from 1996–2000. From 2000–2011, he was deputy adviser in the Office of the Science and Technology Adviser to the Secretary of State and led efforts to hire Science and Technology personnel, strengthen partnerships with the global S&T community, and foster joint, strategic planning between State, USAID and the U.S. Government. Mr. Reynolds earned a Bachelor’s Degree from the University of Virginia, and Master’s Degrees in Energy Technology Management from George Washington University and Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence University.

Daniel Runde is the Director of the Project on Prosperity and Development and holds the William A. Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Previously, Mr. Runde was head of the Foundations Unit for the Department of Partnerships and Advisory Service Operations at the International Finance Corporation, the private sector arm of the World Bank Group. From 2005–2007, Mr. Runde was the Director of the Office of Global Development Alliances at the U.S. Agency for International Development. Earlier in his career, Mr. Runde worked for CitiBank and BankBoston in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and started his career with Alex Brown & Sons, Inc. Mr. Runde received a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and holds a Bachelor’s Degree, Cum Laude, from Dartmouth College.

Donald Steinberg served as Deputy Administrator at USAID, providing overall direction and management for the Agency. He previously served as deputy president for policy at the International Crisis Group and as a Jennings Randolph senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace. During his 30 years with the U.S. Government,


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Steinberg served as Director of the State Department’s Joint Policy Council, White House deputy press secretary, National Security Council Senior Director for African Affairs, Special Haiti Coordinator, and U.S. Ambassador to Angola. He also served as officer-in-charge at the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria during South Africa’s transition from apartheid and has held postings in Mauritius, Brazil, Malaysia and the Central African Republic. Steinberg has published more than 100 articles on foreign policy, gender issues, children and armed conflict, and disarmament. He holds Master’s Degrees in Journalism from Columbia University and Political Economy from the University of Toronto, and a Bachelor’s Degree from Reed College.

Linton Wells II, PhD is Director of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, distinguished research professor, and Force Transformation Chair at the National Defense University (NDU). He has served in the Department of Defense for 47 years. During 26 years as a naval officer he served in a variety of surface ships, including command of a destroyer squadron and guided missile destroyer. Before NDU he spent 16 years in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, serving last as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Networks and Information Integration). He has thrice been awarded the DOD medal for Distinguished Public Service.

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“Government agencies are not normally known for thinking outside the box. This book is the rare and welcome exception, a genuine breath of fresh air. It is the kind of project that should become the norm in Washington, challenging all of us to look beyond what one participant describes as the tyrannies of the in-box, the demand for immediate results, the focus on a single sector, and reliance on uni-dimensional measures of success. It should become an annual exercise.”

Anne-Marie SlaughterBert G. Kerstetter ‘66 University Professor of Politics and International Affairs Princeton University Former Director of Policy Planning, United States Department of State

“Perhaps the most embarrassing failure of international development agencies has been their excessive focus on programming for past problems instead of anticipating the challenges of the future. Black swans have derailed many a development budget by forcing the reallocation of scarce resources to address game-changing events no one anticipated. This thoughtful and timely book remedies this failure and provides some useful guidance to policymaking on how to catch the next black swan before it catches us.”

Andrew S. NatsiosExecutive ProfessorGeorge H. W. Bush School of Government and Public ServiceFormer USAID Administrator

“Development assistance is one of our most powerful and cost-effective tools of national power to promote global democracy and economic growth. Yet, it is often behind the curve, focused only on today’s challenges, or last month’s crisis. Development practitioners must be in the vanguard, not the rear-guard, when it comes to trends in population, migration, urbanization, natural resource depletion, and science and technology or become obsolete. Today’s world is moving too fast, is too complex, and inaction too detrimental not to make futures analysis the leading edge of development thinking.”

E. William ColglazierScience and Technology Adviser to the Secretary of State

This book is the rare and welcome exception, a genuine breath of fresh air.– Anne-Marie SlaughterFormer Director of Policy Planning, United States Department of State



The Future C

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