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THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL NUCLEAR POWER December 10, 2015 Shunsuke Kondo President Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan (NUMO)
THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL NUCLEAR POWER
December 10, 2015
Shunsuke Kondo President
Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan (NUMO)
Heartfelt Thanks 2
¨ I would like to express our sincere gratitude to you all, for your support and expressions of solidarity given to us in the face of the hardship due to Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami in 2011.
¨ Japan felt the deepness of the bond, or kizuna in Japanese, which we have with countries around the world and the United States of America, in particular.
Contents 3
A. Nuclear energy utilization in the future A. Nuclear reactors B. Fuel cycles
B. The future of governance for nuclear energy A. Safety B. Security C. Nuclear nonproliferation
C. The role of the US and Japan should play for the future of nuclear energy utilization in global community
The 2°C Scenario (2DS) of the IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives 2015
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¨ Call for a virtual de-carbonization of the power sector by 2050 by rising the share of nuclear power in global electricity production from 11% in 2011 to 17% in 2050.
¨ Expect that growth in nuclear capacity will be driven by non-OECD countries, though currently, OECD member countries, Russia and the Ukraine account for over 90% of total installed capacity. ¤ In 2050, these countries combined will see only a modest increase in
capacity from 350 GW to 400 GW. ¤ China will lead global growth in nuclear capacity, as China could
surpass the United States by 2030 under the 2DS and, with 250 GW of nuclear, would have more than twice the installed capacity in the United States in 2050.
¤ India would have about 100 GW of capacity in 2050, making it the third-largest market for nuclear after the United States.
¤ Other growth markets for nuclear include the Middle East, South Africa and ASEAN countries.
What Types of Nuclear Power Plants Will Be Working in 2050? : Current Status
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¨ Current status (end of 2014) ¤ There were 438 operable nuclear reactors in the world,
representing about 396 GW (gross) capacity. ¤ Of those reactors;
n 82% are LWRs (63%, PWRs and 19%, BWRs) n 11% are PHWRs, operating mainly in Canada and in India n 3% are GCRs, all in UK n 3% are LWGR (RBMK) n SFRs, 1 out of the 438 reactors and further 2 are expected to be
connected soon.
Will Advanced Reactors Be Working in 2050?
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¨ Of the reactors under construction, 89% are LWRs, 7% are PHWRs. There are two FBRs under construction, one in Russia (BN-800) and in India (PFBR). LWR will be dominant. Advanced reactors will be a much smaller number.
¨ Estimated SMR Capacity in 2035: 1 Gwe - 21 Gwe OECD NEA 6 Gwe - 19 Gwe J. Hinze 65 Gwe - 85 Gwe UK NNL
¨ It is uncertain when and how nuclear energy will be applied commercially beyond electricity generation, including desalination and hydrogen production.
Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Front-End 7
¨ The current world market for fuel services (uranium supply, conversion, enrichment services, fuel fabrication) provides a considerable degree of security of supply.
¨ Uranium supply is currently more than adequate to meet demand up to 2035 and beyond. Investments in environmentally sustainable uranium mining should be developed, however, to address expected long-term demand.
¨ Security of enriched uranium supply is being Increased through governmental initiatives and international agreements dealing with fuel banks.
Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Back-End 8
¨ Every year, about 11 000 tonnes of heavy metal (tHM) of used fuel is unloaded from the world’s reactors. Most of LWR users consider used fuel of LWRs as high-level waste to be disposed of.
¨ The key challenges in progressing an open fuel cycle relates to the long term storage of used fuel and its final disposal in a deep geological repository (DGR): they are; ¤ Assurance that extended (dry) storage of used fuel satisfies the
highest safety and security requirements. ¤ Public acceptability with respect to radiological and volumetric
capacity for the DGR. ¨ The implementation of deep geological disposal requires
long-term planning, political commitment and strong engagement with local communities.
Joint Study by French CEA and industries on feasible scenarios with progressive deployment of fast neutron reactors (FNRs) in the French nuclear power fleet, limiting its capacity to 60GWe* 9
¨ Start recycling plutonium from MOX fuel on EPRs and on a few FNRs and introducing FNR fuel cycle in 2040
¨ Attain an equilibrium fleet composed of 16 FNRs and 22 EPRs in 2150. At this point the inventory of plutonium will be stabilized.
¨ From 2150, this EPR/FNR reactor fleet is progressively renewed to a new one composed of 41 FNRs in around 2200, which does not require natural uranium to operate.
v M. Tiphine et al: SIMULATIONS OF PROGRESSIVE POTENTIAL SCENARIOS OF Pu MULTIRECYCLING IN SFR AND ASSOCIATED PHASE-OUT IN THE FRENCH NUCLEAR POWER FLEET, Proceedings of Global 2015 September 20-24, 2015 - Paris (France) Paper 5326.
v C. Chabert et al: CONSIDERATIONS ON INDUSTRIAL FEASIBILITY OF SCENARIOS WITH THE PROGRESSIVE DEPLOYMENT OF PU MULTIRECYCLING IN SFRs IN THE FRENC NUCLEAR POWER FLEET, Proceedings of Global 2015 20-24 September 2015 - Paris (France) Paper 5351.
The Benefit of Closed Cycles 10
¨ Closed cycles offer the benefit of not only optimizing the sustainability of nuclear energy for decades to come but also significantly reducing the heat generating long life waste and thus contributing to better utilisation of ‘scarce’ geological disposal site：footprint of the site will be one-third.
¨ To enjoy the benefit, it is crucially important to commercialize, in parallel with advanced reactors, advanced reprocessing and recycling technologies that are more economic, generate less wastes and offer greater proliferation resistance than PUREX reprocessing technology, through persistent and continuous efforts for R&D over several generations.
Global Nuclear Governance 11
¨ The growing use of nuclear power may increase risks in terms of safety, security and nonproliferation.
¨ It will be essential to avoid accident like those at Chernobyl and Fukushima and prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons or detonating dirty bombs as well as nations from building nuclear weapons.
¨ The growth in civil nuclear power needs, therefore, to be complemented with an equally ambitious enhancement of global nuclear safety, security and nonproliferation. �
The tsunami attack triggered a major accident at units 1- 4 of TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power station (FDNPS).
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l About 79,000 people are still requested to evacuate from their home.
l About 70,000 people, many of whom are families with children, have left their home, having made up their own mind to do so, due to anxiety about health and health of children due to radiation exposure, in particular.
l About 1,700 persons have died from worsening of diseases owing to careless emergency evacuation from hospitals and/or physical and psychological stress in the life in a shelter after dislocation.
Decontamination of Contaminated Areas
l Comprehensive decontaminations
are to be completed in these areas except forest within this year.
l Evacuation orders to Tamura City and Kawauchi Village were uplifted in 2014, and that to Naraha Town was done so in 2015.
l Decontamination of red areas has not been done yet, due to the difficulty in the decontamination of forest. Only fallen leaves, lower twigs, pruning etc. in forests are removed from the border area of forest (within 20m from the border) at present.
l The preparation of interim storage facilities for decontamination waste is discouragingly slow due to difficulty in obtaining the consent of landowners, who are evacuees and sufferers of the accident.
FDNPS
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/final_report230114. pdf#search= 'IAEA+FUKUSHIMA+report+Mission+2013+October'
At Fukushima: Decommissioning of FDNPS
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/final_report230114.pdf#search='IAEA+FUKUSHIMA+report+Mission+2013+October'
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1. Stop the leakage of contaminated water to the outside as soon as possible: completed
2. Reduce the volume of contaminated water generated as soon as possible: significant progress was made.
At Fukushima: Decommissioning of FDNPS (2) 16
3. Start the removal of the spent fuel from the spent fuel pool in the damaged reactor buildings in three years: completed at unit 4: preparatory civil works are in progress at unit 1 & 3.
4. Start the removal of fuel debris (fuel containing material: FCM) from the damaged units in ten years: still in exploration phase.
Ø Explore the location and characteristics of FCMs as well as methods for FCM removal.
5. Promote stabilization, conditioning and safe long term management of radioactive wastes.
6. Promote pubic communication efforts including risk communication, struggling to get out from the valley of trouble in obtaining the understanding of skeptical people around the site.
Post-Fukushima Activities Taken at National Level
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l The first action focused on the review of the validity of design basis analysis (DBA) for external hazards of which frequency of exceedance should be 1 in 10 000 years;
l The DBA of the engineering design on a conservative basis that reflects the uncertainty in the prediction of external hazards of such frequency due to progress in global warming, which is already causing extreme weather events such as flooding, should demonstrate that none of the physical barriers to prevent the escape of a significant quantity of radioactivity is breached or, if any are, then at least one barrier remains intact and without a threat to its integrity.
l The measures taken to implement the results of the national assessments: Ø those to ensure flexibility and resilience against organizational, human
and logistical challenges resulting from unexpected harsh situations; Ø the provision for assisting from off-site in a timely manner, under the
disastrous conditions on-site and off-site.
Major Actions Items in The IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety Adopted in 2011
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² Assess the safety vulnerabilities of nuclear power plants in the light of lessons learned to date from the accident.
² Review and strengthen IAEA Safety Standards. ² Strengthen IAEA peer reviews to maximize the benefits to Member States. ² Strengthen emergency preparedness and response. ² Strengthen the effectiveness of national regulatory bodies. ² Strengthen the effectiveness of operating organizations with respect to
nuclear safety infrastructure development and capacity building. ² Improve the effectiveness of the international legal framework. ² Facilitate the development of the infrastructure necessary for Member
States embarking on a nuclear power programme. ² Strengthen and maintain capacity building. ² Ensure the on-going protection of people and the environment from
ionizing radiation following a nuclear emergency.
The IAEA Published Reports on the Fukushima Daiichi Accident in September 2015
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¨ The IAEA Director General’s Report on the Fukushima Accident and the five technical volumes include authoritative, factual and balanced assessment, addressing the causes and consequences of the accident as well as the lessons learned, and provide a knowledge base for the future.
Ensure Global Nuclear Safety 20
l Enhance peer oversight and cooperation of both regulators and operators. ¤ The IAEA should lead an international effort to strengthen
a global nuclear safety network and ensure that critical knowledge, experience, and lessons learned about safety are exchanged as broadly as they need to be.
p In close consultation with national regulators, the IAEA should continue to consolidate and promote IAEA nuclear safety standards. Over time countries should enter into binding agreements to adhere to effective IAEA safety standards.
Structure of the IAEA Safety Standards Series
Ensure Global Nuclear Safety Safety Culture
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¨ All State and the IAEA should strengthen and coordinate their efforts to ensure that countries embarking on nuclear power programs develop sound safety infrastructures, including effective and independent regulatory bodies.
¨ Safety culture needs to be enhanced across the whole nuclear sector and at all levels of staff. All players in the nuclear industry should continue to emphasize constant improvement in nuclear safety at the design, construction, and operation stages.
¨ The operator should permanently strengthen its efforts to exchange best practices, lessons learned and peer reviews, through organizations such as the INPO and WANO.
Nuclear Security 22
l International instruments for nuclear security include: u The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of
Radioactive Sources
u The amended Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities
u The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
l Voluntary initiatives: u The Global Threat Reduction Initiative
u The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism
A Credible Threat Exists: Nuclear Security Culture
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INFCIRC/225/Rev5 the IAEA Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
3.48. The foundation of nuclear security culture should be the recognition that a credible threat exists, that preserving nuclear security is important, and that the role of the individual is important. 3.49. The four component groups – the State, organizations, managers in organizations and individuals – should work together to establish and maintain an effective nuclear security culture. 3.50. The State should promote a nuclear security culture and encourage all security organizations to establish and maintain one. A nuclear security culture should be pervasive in all elements of the physical protection regime.
Global Nuclear Security Framework 24
l As the only global body with relevant competence and expertise, the IAEA should continue to address nuclear security threats and maintain the global nuclear security framework ² Recommendations and standards ² International reviews ² Capacity-building activities such as training, exercises, regulation
development, reviews and more.
l The global nuclear community should continue; ² to emphasize a philosophy of sustained improvement in nuclear
security ² effort to promote best practices in nuclear security, for example
through an organization such as the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) .
Nuclear Nonproliferation 25
l International political and legal mechanisms to help stem the spread of nuclear weapons are; ² Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) ² Regional nuclear weapon free zone treaties ² Export control arrangements: parts 1 and 2 of the NSG
Guidelines (the Nuclear Suppliers Group) ² Nuclear security measures ² IAEA safeguards system ² Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (should be entry into force) ² Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (negotiations should be started)
IAEA Safeguards System 26
The purpose: to provide credible assurances to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not being diverted from peaceful nuclear activities, and, through the risk of early detection, to deter proliferation. System: Over 180 States accept the application of technical safeguards measures through the conclusion of safeguards agreements. The majority of States have undertaken to place all of their nuclear material and activities under IAEA safeguards. Additional Protocol (AP)and State level approach: Over 120 States have brought APs into force, which provides the IAEA with supplementary tools that provide broader access to information and locations. The widening focus of safeguards implementation, beyond the verification of declared nuclear material at declared facilities to the consideration of the State’s nuclear activities and capabilities as a whole, has resulted in improved ways safeguards activities are planned and conducted.
International Initiatives and Cooperation to Assure Nuclear Fuel Supply
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l In order to minimize the proliferation risks created by the further spread of sensitive nuclear technology such as uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, international community should reduce the need for countries to develop their own facilities.
l As for assurance of fuel supply, owing to the IAEA’s encouragement for assured supply arrangements and its leading role in backing them up, there already exist; ¤ The IAEA LEU Bank located at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in
Oskemen, Kazakhstan ¤ Guaranteed physical reserve of LEU maintained by Russia at the
International Uranium Enrichment Centre in Angarsk, Russia ¤ Assurance of supply guaranty for supplies of LEU enrichment services
in the United Kingdom. ¤ LEU reserve operated by The United States
The Proliferation Risk Management for Plutonium Utilization in Japan
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¨ Extrinsic measures ¤ IAEA safeguards (state-level approach, OSL at RRP for NRTA and 24hr
resident inspectors) ¤ Nuclear security measures in conformity with INFCIRC 225 Rev.5 ¤ Annual publication of the status of Pu management including usage and
stockpile
¨ Intrinsic measures ¤ Pu recovered in UK and France should be fabricated into MOX fuel
there: only MOX fuel should be transported to Japan. ¤ Only mixed oxide powder should be the product of domestic
reprocessing facilities. ¤ Used fuel should be reprocessed only after the owner’s publication of
the reactor the resultant MOX fuel is loaded (with local gov.’s concurrence). NOTE: The delay of completion of Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant and the setback in nuclear power generation due to the severe accident at Fukushima necessitates the revision of the publication made before 2011.
The Roles of the US and Japan 29
¨ Governments of the US and Japan should recognize the value of operation of nuclear power plants and LWRs, in particular, to maintain low-carbon generation capacity and security of energy supply, provided safety requirements are met.
¨ Clearer policies should be established to encourage operators to invest in both long-term operation and new build so as to replace retiring units.
¨ Considering that the majority of nuclear power plants in operation in 2050 will be LWRs, plant suppliers should also be encouraged to boost competitiveness of their technology, deploying deploying solutions from knowledge creation that internalize the results of R&Ds supported by the Government, diverse innovation in engineering and material science and abundant skills and experiences in construction, operation and decommissioning of LWRs and waste management thereof in a variety of countries.
Infrastructure, Education, Training and Knowledge Management
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¨ The countries with companies that sell reactors like the US and Japan should work together to help “newcomer” states with the IAEA to put in place the necessary infrastructure to develop nuclear energy safely, securely, and peacefully as an essential part of activities to launch their nuclear energy programs.
¨ Though there exist well-developed training programmes promoted by industries that are providing an important source of nuclear training, both countries should continue ¤ to support international and bilateral initiatives focused on
collaborative education, training and knowledge management; ¤ to encourage young generation of newcomer countries around
the world to make best use of diverse training opportunities in high-technology nuclear-related areas provided by well-developed university programmes of nuclear education in both countries.
Aggressive Nuclear R, D&D Program 31
¨ Looking longer-term, an aggressive government-industry nuclear research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) program can help form the basis for advanced (Generation IV) nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies that may be deployed around the middle of the century.
¨ The Government and industries of the United States and Japan should work together to promote internationally cooperative programs to demonstrate advanced nuclear technologies, including Generation IV nuclear technologies, SMRs and nuclear desalination or hydrogen production, recognizing globally beneficial roles the products of such R&Ds can play for preparing ourselves for the future.
¨ Both countries should continue to invest in the university and national laboratory research facility infrastructure needed to develop and demonstrate these nuclear technologies.
Deep Geological Disposal of High-Level Waste in the US
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¨ The dual challenges of spent nuclear fuel management and disposal are addressed at length in the final 2012 report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future.
¨ We hope that the U.S. Government act on recommendations in these reports as a critical step toward supporting the revival of the nuclear industry in the United States.
Deep Geological Disposal (DGD) of High-Level Waste in Japan
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¨ The Government published, after turns and twists in policy deliberation, a revised Strategic Energy Plan in April 2014.
¨ It specified, among others, that Government should proactively commit to the siting of a deep geological repository (DGR) for radioactive waste, as any progress had not been made in the siting of a DGR based on consent-based approach since the establishment of NUMO in 2000.
Deep Geological Disposal (DGD) of High-Level Waste in Japan
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¨ The Government amended, in May this year, the Basic Policy on the Final Disposal of the Specified Radioactive Waste.
¨ The new Basic Policy stresses; ¤ the responsibility of the current generation that has
produced the waste to realize a deep geological repository (DGR);
¤ the importance of communicating with the public on the necessity of realizing a DGR and its safety, and on the importance of paying respect and gratitude of the public to the communities that volunteer to accept the geological survey for the siting of a DGR for the benefit of society.
Unsuitable Areas
Suitable Areas
Handling of “Areas to be preferably avoided” is to be
discussed.
Highly Suitable Areas
Geo-scientific viewpoints and others for safety
Social-scientific viewpoints
Factors to Distinguish All Areas in Japan into Three Categories, i.e. Highly Suitable, Suitable and
Unsuitable Areas for Siting a DGR
► Geological characteristics and their long-term stability
► Pre-closure safety
Areas to be avoided: vicinity of volcanoes/active faults Areas to be preferably avoided: l Significant uplift/erosion, high geo-temperature,
existence of volcanic thermal water/deep-seated fluid
Areas to be preferably avoided: l Areas where there is a danger that surface facilities are
damaged by the pyroclastic flow. l Areas where unconsolidated bedrock is too thick to assure
the integrity of underground facility
► Safety of the waste transport Preferable areas: short distance (<20km) from the harbor
All Areas of Japan
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Summary of discussions until September 2015
Conclusions 36
p The United States has been historically a leader in nuclear technology research and commercialization in the world.
p Nuclear Energy in America is at a crossroad. There are diverse drivers shaping its future: DOE’s strong support for innovation, decaying nuclear infrastructure, change of characteristics of extreme events due to climate change, increased threat of terrorism, low energy prices, emerging nations seeking to establish nuclear energy based on LWRs as a new domestic source of electricity, to site a few.
p Benjamin Franklin: “Energy and persistence conquer all things.” p We sincerely hope that the United States will persistently support
research and development efforts within the nuclear industry, the national labs, and U.S. universities as the global community is pursuing the increase in nuclear energy utilization in the future for the benefit of mankind as shown in 2DS of the IEA ETP 2015.
Thank you for your kind attention
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