The German Ardennes Counter Offensive, 16 December, 1944, to 2 January, 1945 (Ardennes-Alsace...

8/6/2019 The German Ardennes Counter Offensive, 16 December, 1944, to 2 January, 1945 (Ardennes-Alsace Campaign)

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General Subjeots Seot1oDA CADEM Ia D E PA R 'rD lft'mE IH FA ftRY SC HOOLFort !8Jllling. Georgia

ADVA llOBD IN FmRY OFFIC ERS ' C OUBSE194"1 - 1948

!H I GE lU IAN AR IlDDS C OUNTER OFFENSIVE 16 DEOEM BD 1944 TO2 JA NU AR Y 1946 (.A RD EN NB S.A LS lO B IlA JiPA IG N')

type of operation deaoribed. .ABJa GROUPOrmSIVE

Major Keith H. Barber. InfantryADVA lfOED IN FAmRY OnmERS C LASS NO I


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I B L I O G R A P H Y....A. Genera.l Jlarihall's 1leport, The 1f1nning of the . 1 ' in Burope andthe hoitio, !he BiennialReport of the Chief of staff ot the"United states ~, July It 1943 to June 30, 1946, to the Sec-"retary of War (!IS Library JB. Report by the Supreme Commanderto the Combined Obiet. on theOp8~tion8 in Europe of the Allied Bzped1tlonary Foroe,. , 6 June 1944 to 8 !lay 1~46 ( 1&1 Pamphlet) ('lIS Libra.ry) .

'''0. Report of' Operations, ,iret United sta.tes Artay, lAugust 1944 to22 February 1945 ('rIS Library),. _D. Seleoted Inte11ig6Doe' Reports. Volume II, Deoember 1944 to M ay 1945,O1'f10e ot the .10of S, (1..2.First United 8te.te8 Infantry Division(TIS Library) , _B .Attar Action Reports, Ifhird United at&tes A r ' m . 1 August 1944 to

9 M ay 1945 (TIS Libra~) ,-F. Dark Deoember. Robert E. JlerrUm (rIB Library)G. Luoky Porward, Robert S. Allen (The VanguardPre,.) (!IS Library )H. Be.stogll6,!he First Eight 'Days. Col. S. L. A. Jla.rsht.l1. (~IS Library)

....~ No rmandy to the Baltic, Pield llarshall Mon tgomery (TIS Libra.ry)J. The righting Foroes, Vol. XXIV1 / 0 , August. 1947 (TIS Library)K. '!he llilite.ry Rnin, June 1946 (TIS Library)

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PAGE-lndex~ ,... 1B i b l l o g r a p h y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2I n t r o d u o t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3A l l i e d S 1 t u a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4!he German Plans and P r e p a r a t i o D s ~ . 11! h e Attaok ~ 19Aaalysisand C r i t i o i s m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32L e s 8 0 n a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34Map A The western Front 16 Deoember 1 9 4 4

'Map B - G e r m a . n Penetration rhrough A l l i e d I'ront 16 D e o e m b e r1 9 4 4Map 0 . . T h e OerI I8D. P l a n A r d e n n e s C o u n t e r - O f f e n s i v eH a p D . . T h e S i t u a t i o n 1 8 D e o e m b e r 1 9 4 4 - 2 J a n u a r , y 1 9 4 6

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_IE G ER MA NA RD EN NES C OU NTER OFFEN tV E16 DECEMilER1944-2 JANUARY1946

I NTRODUCT IONO n 6 J u n e 1944 t h e A l l i e d A r m i e s u n d e r t h e o o m m a n d o f G e n e r a l

Dwight D. E i s e n h o w e r c ame o v e r t h e beaches o f Normandy, e m b a r k e du p o n t h e i n v a s i o n o f t h e c o n t i n e n t t o b r i n g t o a s u o o e s s f u l o o n -e l u s i o n t h e w a r i n E u r o p e by d e s t r u o t i o n o f t h e G e r m a n f i e l d f o r o e si n t h e w e s t .

I' S e v e n w e e k s l a t e r they h a d o a p t u r e d t h e p o r t o f C h e r b o u r g ,o l e a r e d t h e C o t e n t i n p e n i n s u l a o f e n e ' m y f o r c e s a n d w e r e d i s p o s e dg e n e r a l l y a c r o s s t h e b a s e o f t h e p e n i n s u l a , a d i s t a n o e o f a p p r o x -1 m a t e l y 6 0 m i l e s .

B r e a k i n g o u t o f t h e n a r r o w o o n f i n e s o f t h e C o t e n t i n , t h e ys w e p t e a s t w a r d a n d n o r t h w a r d t h r o u g h F r a n o e a n d B e l g i u m , o l o s e l yp u r s u i n g t h e d e f e a t e d G e r m a n A r m i e s . By 1 2 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 4 4 t h e y w e r ed i s p o s e d g e n e r a l l y a l o n g t h e M a g i n o t l i n e i n t h e s o u t h a n d t i l e W e s tW a l l in t h e n o r t h , e x t e n d e d f r o m S W i t z e r l a n d t o t ~ e N o r t h S e a .

D e e m i n g i t a d v i s a b l e t o o o n t i n u e o a r r , y i n g t h e w a r t o t h e e n -e m r in s p i t e o f s h o r t a g e s o f m e n a n d s u p p l i e s , t h e A l l i e s h a d by as e r i e s o f o f f e n s i v e s s u o o e e d e d i n o l o s i n g u p t o t h e G e r m a n f r o n t i e r ,a n d h a d p e n e t r a t e d t h e W e s t W a l l i n two a r e a s , n e a r A a o h e n o n t h en o r t h a n d t h e S a a r i n t h e s o u t h .

T h e G e r . m a n s w e r e f i g h t i n g o n t h r e e f r o n t s l t h e E a s t e r n , o rR u s s i a n , t h e S o u t h e r n , o r I t a l i a n a n d t h e W e s t e r n F r o n t . S e v e r e l yd e f e a t e d i n F r a n o e t h e p r e c e e d i n g s u m m e r , l o s i n g g r o u n d s t e a d i l y o nt h e R u s s i a n a n d I t a l i a n f r o n t s , t h e y w e r e h a r d p r e s s e d to m e e t t h ed e m a n d s u p o n t h e i r m a n p o w e r a n d s u p p l i e s . T h e i r t o t a l d e f e a t s e e m e di m m i n e n t .

S u d d e n l y , o n 16 D e o e m b e r 1944 f o u r Ger .man A r m i e s e m e r g e d f r a mthe s h e l t e r o f t h e W e s t W a l l t o l a u n c h a n o f f e n s i v e w h i c h . w a s t o c e u s et h e F i r s t u . S . A r m y t o r e e l b a c k in o o n t u s i o n a n d d i s o r d e r ) a n d t of o r o e t h e A l l i e s t o o o n o e n t r a t e t h e m a j o r e l e m a n t s o f t h r e e a d d i t i o n . la r . m i e s to l i m i t t h e p e n e t r a t i o n a n d r e s t o r e t h e l i n e s .

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The e v e n t s o ~ t h e p r o o e e d i n g a u m m e r h a d i o r o J l i t p o n t h e A l l i e dH i g h C o m m a n d o e r t a i n d e o i s i o n s , w h i o h i n t h e p r o o e s s o f e x e o u t i o n ,e e t t h e s t a g e a o r o s s w h i o h t h e o n o e :mighty Nazi war m a o h i n e was to

, l a u n o h i t s l a s t g r e a t o f f e n s i v e i n W o r l d W a r I I . I t i s n e o e s s a r y ,t h e r e f o r e , in o r d e r t o p r o p e r l y p r e s e n t the b a o k g r o u n d , to r e v i e wto s o m e e x t e n t , t h o s e e v e n t s . I t i s a l s o o f v a l u e to e x a m i n e t h eG e r . m a n p l a n s a n d p r e p a r a t i o n s w h i o h e n a b l e d t h e m t o r e g a i n t o r ashort period, the ini tta t i v e they l o s t when the A l l i e s invaded theo o n t i n e n t . ( S e e M a p A )

A L L I E D S I T U A T I O NBy m i d - S e p t e D b ' e r 1 9 4 4 t h e A l l i e d ' d r i v e t h r o u g h N o r t h e r n F r a n o e

h a d o o m e t o a h a l t a s the t a n k s , o u t o f g a s o l i n e , s p u t t e r e d to aa t o p a g a i n s t t h e Ge r .man W e s t W a l l . T h e e n o r m i t y o f t h e s u o o e s sh a d o a u g h t t h e A l l i e d High C o m m a n d u n p r e p a r e d for f u l l e x p l o i t a -t i o n . S u p p l y l i n e s h a d b e e n e x t e n d e d t o a p o i n t w h e r e p r o p e r s u p -p l y o f f r o n t l i n e units w a s impossible. O h e r b o u r g Was the o n l y m a j o rp o r t available t o the Allies and extensive dam age t o the d o o k i n gf a o i l i t i e s a n d s k i l l f u l use of t h e a o o u s t i o m i n e by t h e G e r m a n s p r e -c l u d e d i t s f u l l e s t u s e . T h e b u l k o f t h e s u p p l i e s w a s s t i l l beingb r o u g h t o v e r ~ h e b e a o h e s o f N o r m a n d y . O n o e a s h o r e t h e d i f f i o u l t i e so f t r a n s p o r t i n g t h e m 3 7 5 m i l e s t o t h e f r o n t l i n e d i v i s i o n s w a r ee n o r m o u a . A d d e d t o t h e G e r m a n d e a t r u o t i o n o f r a i l e q u i p m e n t andhighway b r i d g e s w a s t h a t i n f l i o t e d by t h e A l l i e d A i r F o r o e in i t ss t r a t e g y o f b a t t l e f i e l d i s o l a t i o n . I n t h e f a o e o f t h e s e d i f f i o u l -t i e s S O R A E F must, ~o s u o o e s s f u l l y p r o s e o u t e t h e w a r , s u p p l y i t sa r m i e s d u r i n g r e o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d a o o u m u l a t e s u f f i o i e n t s u p p l i e s a n dm a t e r i e l t o s u p p o r t f u t u r e o f f e n s i v e s . (1.)

T h e A l l i e d H i g h C o ~ d w a s f a o e d a l s o w i t h t h e d e o i s i o n o fh o w b e s t t o p e n e t r a t e t h e h e a r t o f ' G e n n a n y a n d b r i n g t o a s u o o e s s -f u l o o n o l u s i o n t h e i n ~ a i o n o f t h e o o n t i n e n t . T w o p o s s i b l e r o u t e sof adv anoe w e r e o f f e r e d , a nd a s u s u a l i n s u o h o a s e s two s o h o o l s ofthought e x i s t e d a a E o t h e b e s t approach, F i e l d M a r s h a l l Montgomery,(1) A p-37,38 4


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the o o m m a n d e r O f " 2 1 s t ( B r . ) A r n \ Y Group, suppoA b y other ale ..m e n t ~ o f t h e B r i t i s h H i g h C o m m a n d a n d B r i t i s h p u b l i o o p i n i o n u r g e dt h e u t i l i z a t i o n o f t h e a p p r o a o h o f f e r e d b y t h e N o r t h G e r m a n p l a i n sa s t h e s h o r t e s t and m o s t l o g i o a l r o u t e s i n c e i t s t e r r a i n f a v o r e d t h et a o t i o a l use 0'1' a r m o r . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , G e n e r a l OJna r B r a d l e y ,' o o m m a n d e r o f t h e 1 2 t h ~ G r o u p ( U . S . ) a b l y s u p p o r t e d b y G e n e r a lP a t t o n , o o m m a n d e r o f t h e t h i r d U. S. A r r o w f a v o r e d t h e a d v a n t a g e so f f e r e d b y the F r a n k f o r t Gap. In as m u o h a s t h e n o r t h e r n r o u t ew o u l d b e l a r g e l y a B r i t i s h e f f o r t a n d t h e F r a n k f o r t G a p w o u l d b el a r g e l y U . S . m u o h p r e s s u r e was b r o u g h t t o b e a r u p o n t h e S u p r e m eC o m m a n d e r b y b o t h p r o t a g o n i s t s . G e n e r a l E i s e n h o w e r a r r i v e d a t ad e o i s i o n w h i o h i n o l u d e d b o t h p r o p o s a l s . H e would o l o s e u p to t h eR h i n e w i t h a l l a r m i e s a n d e n d e a v o r t o d e s t r o y t h e b u l k o f t ~ e G e r . .man f o r o e s w e s t o f t h e R h i n e . T h e r e h e w o u l d h a l t , r e g r o u p , and r e -s u p p l y a n d p r o o e e d t o i n v a d e t h e h e a r t o f G e r m a n y b y t h e n o r t h e r nr o u t e . (2)

W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e d e o i s i o n w a s w i s e w i l l b e a m a t t e r o f de-b a t e f o r d e o a d e s . I t d i d , h o w e v e r , p r e s e n t m a n y d i f f i c u l t i e s . Ino r d e r t o p u t t h e d e o i s i o n i n t o e f f e o t i t w a s n e o e s s a r y t o c a r r y o no ~ f e n a i v e s a l o n g a l a r g e p a r t o f a 6 2 5 m i l e f r o n t . A d e q u a t e de-f e n s e s h a d t o b e e s t a b l i s h e d o v e r t h e r e m a i n d e r . S u p p l i e s m u s t b ea o o u m u l a t e d t o s u p p o r t t h e o f f e n s i v e s . R e i n f o r o e m e n t s m u s t b e p r o -v i d e d t o m a i n t a i n t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e f r o n t l i n e d i v i s i o n s . N e wd i v i s i o n s m u s t b e b r o u g h t o v e r f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n o r d e r t om a n a d e q u Q t e l y t h e l o n g t o r t u o u s 6 2 5 m i l e f r o n t n o w h e l d by t h eA l l i e s .

A o o o r d i n g l y , S C H A E F o r d e r e d t h e C o m m a n d e r o f t h e 2 1 s t ArmyG r o u p to o l e a r t h e S o h e l d t e s t u a r y o f G e r m a n f o r c e s t o m a k e t h e p o r to f A n t w e r p , o n e o f t h e l a r g e s t p o r t s in E u r o p e , a v a i l a b l e t o t h eA l l i e s . H e r e a m a s s o f h i g h w a y s a n d r a i l r o a d s b r a n o h e d o u t t o t h ee a s t , n o r t h a n d s o u t h p r o v i d i n g a d e q u a t e m e a n s o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o n

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~oe the supplies were a shore. By 3 November Field Mars hall MOnt~gomary h ad oleared the a.rea and by the latter part of November th eport was in'full operation. (3)

The reinforoement problem wa s not so easily solved, however.The demands upon manpower as the Allied units ware disposed along theWest Wall, were enormous. Prior to' t he b re ak th ro ug h at St. Lo theline of defena~ extended romLessay on th e west ooa st of the 00-.. __ , ._ _ .teutin peninsula, in No~dy, roughly eastward through 'St. L o andOaen thence to the English Ch annel. The seotor oooupied by the Fi~stU. S. Army w a s approximately 40 miles in length. Its sector on 16 D ec ...embef 1944 extended northward from the vio-inity of ll~!lh, south andea st "of L uxem bourg ' to G ros bE ol~ kon the Meuse River north of ! f :a~~-t_ :r ~oh t,a dis ta noe of a pp roxim atel y 165 miles. The southern poI'tionof the seotor traversed the Ardennes Forest area generally along theGerman border. Eastward of this line lay the Eifel area, the ex-

~ten~ion of the Ardennes topography into the Rhineland. In ages past

'1 ~'{" 'j -. ~v,'i o=:,"J T Iia mountain range a s high as the present day Alps,' , _ oe nt ur ie s of e ro . .i

X sion h ad reduoed it to an area of gently rolling to high pointedJr hills interspersed with narrow valleys. Numerous primary roads fol-lOW' the valleys, seoondary roads are almost nonex'istent. It is ide-ally suited to defense. It is poorly adapted to offensive operations. (4)The northern sector of the First A r m w offered better opportun-

ities for offense. As a result of an offensive launohed on 2 Ootober1944 Aaohen foll on the 2 1st. Immediately plans were made for regroup-

I f , } ) _ing resupply for a further offensive to gain the Roer River and Duren.Onoe these objeotives were gained the approaoh-aoross the plains tothe Oologne-Bonn area on the R hine w as over terrain favorable to

J'I"~ Ifj() . -. . .. ~': u{ T '_',00' ,armor. Limited offensives were oarried on prior to the offensivewtJ_1ohopened on 16 November. Gains were not substant~al, due to badweather and the stubborn defen~o of the Germ an troops. Oa qualtieswere extremely heavy.(3) B p67 (4) C~Situation Map # 4 ; I Map # 20

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It now beo~ppa:ent that a oroa sing of the4lter River belowDuren was impraotioal since the dams on the upper reac hes oithaRoar and on the Urft River, its tributary, remained in G erm an h ands .Eff' orts to destroy them by air had f'ailed. Should the '-iret A~effects orossing below these da ms the G e r m a n s could by f'loodingthe Roer Valley isolate the troops on the ea st,bank leaving themto the meroy of the German Sixth P anzer A~ laying in wait for theRoer orossing, on the plains in front of' Oologne. (5)

Aooordingly, General Bradley direoted ~at the dams be seizedby an attaok northea stward from the vioinity of MOns~h au towardSch midt. This atta ck by the 99th, 2nd, 78th and 8th Infantry Di-visions with COB of 9th Armored was launohed on the morning of' the13 Deoember 1944 and was continuing with slow progress when the Ger-~.,j" - ::r ll'lI.nattaokcarne on 16 Deoember 1944 Through Ootober and November a total of 17 divisions Were usedby the First and Ninth U . S. Armies in the AAohen Sector. Defense

\~ was s tubborn a nd losses were heavy. Battle nau.Led divisions werewithdrawn and placed in the def'ensive positions in the Ardennes tor el ie ve di vi sio ns for oo mm itm ent in the Aaohen salient. (6)Elsewhere in the Allied f'ront/in order to carry out the Su-p re ma ~ om ma nd er 's plane to olose to the Rhine)various of'fensiveswere being launched. The operation to open the port of Antwerph a d been delayed to f'ree troops for a oombined land a nd a irbor neoperation in an attempt to seoure bridgeheads over 'the lower Rhinebeyond the west Wall. Though severo losses were sustained, theoffensive fell ahort of its objeotive and resulted only in S8our-ing bridgeheads ove r the Maas and Wad. It, also served to bringthe British Seoond a n d O a n a d i a n ' F i r s t A n n i e s generally an a linewith t~e 12th A r m y Group to the south. (7)

South of the Ardennes the Third U. S. Army had reduoed Metz andbypassed its s urrounding f' ortres ses , w hioh w ere reduoed by 1 3 D ec em -ber, and advanoed to the Sa ar River and made contact with the West(6) B p-60 0 p-97 (S)B p-60 (7) A p-39 B p-6S

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e -.W a l l o v e r a 1 6 m i l e a r e a . T h e r e i t h a l t e d f o r r e g r o u p i n g a nd r e -s u p p l y a n d p r a p ~ r e d f o r an a t t a o k w h i c h w a s s c h e d u l e d t o j u m p o f fi n I 9 ' D e o e m b e r . (8)

O n t h e T h i r d A r m w ' s r i g h t f l a n k t h e 6 t h Army G r o u p o o m p o s e d o ft h e S e v e n t h U . S . a n d F r e n c h F i r s t A r m i e s ) b y a s e r i e s o f a t t a o k st h r o u g h t h e m o n t h o f N o v e m b e r l s u o o e e d e d in g a i n i n g t h e u p p e r r e a o h -8S o f t h e R h i n e a t S t r a s b o u r g .

T h e s e o f f e n s i v e s e n o o u n t e r e d s e v e r e r e s i s t a n o e a n d t h e o o s t i nm e n a n d s u p p l i e s w a s h e a v y . A s t h e i n t e n s i t y of t h e f i g h t i n g in-o r e a s e d t h e m a n p o w e r p r o b l e m i n o r e a s e d t o p l a g u e t h e A l l i e d H i g hO o m m a n d . B - r i t a i n , h e r h u m a n resources i m p o v e r i s h e d b y f i v e ~ e a r ao f w a r , o f w h i o h t h r e e y e a r s w a r e a s e r i e s o f b i t t e r d e f e a t s , h a dl o n g s i n o e s o r a p e d t h e b o t t o m o f i t s m a n p o w e r b a r r e l . F r a n o e h a dy e t t o r e o u p e r a t e f r o m f o u r y e a r s o f o o c u p a t i o n b y t h e G e r . m a n s ,

T h e o n l y r e m a i n i n g s o u r o e w a s t h e U n l t e d S t a t e s . (8)E a r l y in O o t o b e r G e n e r a l G e o r g e l h ! r s h a l l , U . S . C h i e f o f S t a f f ,

v i s i t e d t h e A l l i e d A r m i e s in t h e W e s t e r n F r o n t . H e d i s o o v e r e d t h a tm a n y d i v i s i o n s h a d b e e n in a l m o s t o o n s t a n t o o m b a t s i n o e t h e N o r -m a n d y l a n d i n g a n d o o n s e q u e n t l y o r d e r e d s h i p p e d i m m e d i a t e l y ' c h e r a g i ~m e n t s o f 9 o f 1 1 i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s s t i l l i n t r a i n i n g i n t h e S t a t e s .C o m m i t t e d t o a g l o b a l w a r , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , W h i l e w e a l t h y i n m a n -p o w e r r e s o u r o e s w a s h a v i n g d i f f i o u l t y m e e t i n g t h e r e q u i r e m a n t s o f -p r o p e r l y t r a i n e d d i v i s i o n s a n d r e i n f o r o e m e n t s n e o e s s a r y w t h e g l o b ~a l e f . t ' o r t . (8)

C a l o u l a t e d r i s k s a r e i n h e r e n t . in a l l m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s . T h i sw a s n o - s x c e p t i o n . I f o f f e n s i v e s w a r e t o b e m o u n t e d s u f f i o i e n t t r o o p sm u s t b e p r o v i d e d t o m o u n t . t h e m . T h i s t h e n n e o e s s i t a t e d h e a v y o o n -o e n t r a t i o n s i n o e r t a i n v i t a l a r e a s . S i n o e a v a i l a b l e d i v i s i o n s w a r ei n s u f f i o i e n t t o d e f e n d p r o p e r l y t h e e n t i r e W e s t e r n F r o n t , s o m e a r e a sm u s t t h e n b e t h i n l y h e l d .

T h e a r e a o h o s e n w a s t ~ e A r d e n n e s . ( ! ! _ w a s a n a r e a w e l l B u i t e dt o d e f e n s e a n d p o o r l y s u i t e d t o o f f e n s e . N o o b j e o t i v e s o f i m p o r -(8) A p-4 3

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tanoe were loc ated in rear of the lines. w ithin reasonable strikingdistance of the Germ ans. True, the Germans had attaoked through theregion in 1 9 1 4 and again in 1 940, but things were different then.In both instanoes the German war mohina WQS at the height of itseffioienoy. But now it h ad been badly defeated the preoeedingsummer in Franoe. It wa s not likely to risk its slender resouroesin an are&. where the prospeot of deoisive gain offered so littlehope. (9)

, Meanw hile the First Army oontinued to use the Ardennes sootoras a rest area for its ba.ttle w eary divisions, also to providtl new . .ly arrived units further training in oontaot with the enemy in aq uiet s eotor. ( 10)

O n 1 3 D eoem ber 1 944 the First A~ wa s oomposed of three Corps.the VII Corps on the north, adj acent to the Ninth U. S. Armfl theV Corps ~8 in the center, while on the south over the Ardennesare&. Was VI II Corps oommanded by Major General !roy H. Middleton.VI II Corps had come under First Army oontrol on 22 Ootober 1944when the Ninth U. S. A r r o w whioh h ad for a s hort period operated inthe southern part of the Ardennes following its release from theBrittany peninsula, moved north adjacent to First Army' s left flank.Originally oomposed of three infantry divisions, the 4th. 8th and83rd. there had been a oonstant ohauge in its order o t battle asbattle soarred divisions replaoed those in the line, w hile the re ..plaoed divisions went north to partake in the offensives being mount ..

r h (in the Aachen seotor. On 30 September 2nd Division replaoed the 4th~. while the 4th moved northward to be badly mauled in the Hurtgen for-Ir est. O n the 14 November the 28th Division after severe losses in

tpe fi&hting in the Hurtgen area relieved the 8th Division in thecenter of the VII I Corps seotor, w hile the 8th went northw ard to par ..tiolpate in the fighting southeast of' .Aaohen. On 1 2Deoember the4th Division was removed from the line after heavy casualties andreplaoed the 83rd Division on the south flank of the Corps sentor.(9) A p..44 B p-62 (10) F p...78

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The 83rd moved northward to take o v e r the area formerly held by the..4th. On the north flank lay the 2nd Division. On 10 Deoember the.

l06th Infantry Division relieved the 2nd while the seoond moved north-ward to partioipate in the attaok on Sohnddt. The 14th Cava.lry G r o u pwas attached to the l06th and placed on its left flank. It fll1eda small gap in the line, and being mobile could maintain conta.otwith the attaoking 99th Division on its left. (11)

s \,1

The demand for additional divisions inthe offensives in theAaohen area was 80 great that the l06th Division wus brought overf r o m England ahead of sohedule. Landing on the oontinent early inDeoember it had been t r a n s p o r t e d by trucks to its poaitions faoingthe West Wall in bitter freezing weather. Untried in battle, notaoolimated to the severity of an Ardennes winter it was ill preparedfor the blow it was to reoeive less than a week later. (12)

In mid-Ootober the 9th A r m o r e d Division was assigned to VIIIC o r p s to p r o v i d e a r e s e r v e for the defense. Its three combat com-mands were s p r e a d o v e r the 80 mile s e o t o r . On 12 Deoember OombatOommand Baker of the division moved northward to provide a reserveand an exploitation force tor the offensive being launohed toward theRoar River d~s on 13 Deoember. On 10 Deoember COA had gone in tothe line on the 28th Divisionis right flank. (13)

The defense in the area consisted of a series of strong pointswith great gaps in between them. Troops were spread too thin toprovide suffioient depth, Nor oould the one combat oommand of the9th Armored Division be' considered suffioient reserve over so largean area. Moreover, in a letter of instruotions issued by FirstA . rmy on 6 D e o e m b e r 1944 VIII Corps was 'Ito oontinu e its prev iou sJnission o f conduoting agressive defense within the Corps Zone andbe prepared to a dva nc e r on _K~E .+en z on Army ~rder~l. Offense was thekeynote of the Allied policy and defense was organized only to ~plement that policy. (14)

Thus we find that in the area w h e r e the Nazi war machine was( 1 1 ) C p - ? 8 , 8 8 , 9 ? ( 1 2 ) F p - ? ? ( 1 3 ) C p - 9 8 ( 1 4 ) C p ~ 8 8 F p - 7 9

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t p s trik e on th e4ltrnin9 of 16 Deoember 1944 the ~lOWing order of ,' b a t t l e . O n the n o r t h , i n t h e V C o r p s B e a t o r t h e 9 9 t h a n d 2 n d I n f a n -try Divisions attaoking toward the Roer River dams. On the northflank of t h e V III Corps seotor filling a small gap lay the 14 Cav-alry Group, a t t a o h e d t o the l 0 6 t h I nfa nt ry D iv is io n w h i o h was re-sponsible for the Corps' l e f t tlank. I n the oenter wa s the 28th Infan-try Division with COA, 9th Armored Division, while on the south flankthe line w as oocupied by the 4th Infantry Division. One oombat oom-m and of the 9th Armsred Division provided the reserve. Three infan-try divisions, one armored division, and a reoonnaissanoe unit de-fended a line of' approxim ately 80 miles in length. Of the divisionstw o were reouperating from reoent severe losses in the Hurtgen For-est. The third was ~eoeiving its battle indootrination. The reservelaoked battle experienoe. (15)

Thus the stage was set.T H E G E R M A N P L A N S A N D P R E P A R A T I O N S- -Behind the West Wall during the oritioal fall months of 1944 the

German High Oommand also had its problem a. Severely defeated in Franoeduring t;ha preceeddng s ummer months they had, however, salvaged lI10rethan wa s then realized by '\;heAllied High ColllJn8.tld.ighting ooreso f divisions and armies were in moat instanoes retained. The faotthat the German Command avoided a major battle after the Falaise Gapindicates a planned withdrawal. The Seventh# Fifteenth and Fifth Pan-zer Armies by a series of oovering actions suooeeded in reaChing thes helter of the West Wall, the Fifteenth in the north faoing the Brit-ish, the Seventh barring the approaoh to Cologne, the Fifth Panzerfurther south joining with the First and N i n e t e e n t h Armies. (16)

True, the Allied pursuit had moved too fast t o penuit the Germ anArmies to form on one of the many poasible defense lines short otthe West Wall. But the Allied supply lines, stretohed almost to thebrea king point slowed the paoe of the advanoing armies and providedthe G e r m a n s m uoh needed tim e.(16) 0 p~97 (16) 0 p-51

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epteIDbe~ and Ootober were months of extreme aotivity in reo~gan-,iZation. Drastio measures were needed and drastio measures were taken.,An intensive oomb . .ut of Gernnn manpower produoed an, estim ated

230,000 men for the defense of the West Wall. Of these 100,000 vrereused to form fresh divisions, the Y o l k s Grenadiers, 50,000 ~re useda s repl aoem ents in ba ttle depleted divis ions , 20,000 were formed intoGHQ Troops while 50,000 were members of ,fortress battalions with someprevious training. Many were "ersatzlI infantr~/air foroe and navalpersonnel given a few days infantry training and assigned to combatunits. (17)

T he fo rt re sS ' b at ta li on s, 70 ,in all proved a valuable asset.Taken ovar by the Headquarters of' divisions badly m auled in the fight-ing in Franoe they formed the oore of the West Wall defense duringthe oritioal period. Remnants of the divisions were then sent to therear for reorganization and resupply. Fighting from the well pre-pared positions they were able to w ard off th e Allied attaoks, thusenabling th e G erma ns to take their depleted P anzer Divisions fromthe line for reorganiza tion and refitting. (17)

By proolamation all able bodied males from 15..60 years of age,in the area between the West Wall and the Rhine, were made availableto the a~ to work on the fortific ations. B y the opening days ofOotober order had been brought o u t of the c h a o s i n t he R h in el an d.Faoed at la st with the defense of the saored 80i1 of th eir h omela ndthe G e r m a n people ha .d responded to H e r r Hitler's ory lIDefend to thelast m an a nd the last round". (17)

The p r o b l e m of rega inin g t h e initiative l o s t with the Alliedlandings i n Normandy w a s Herr Hitler' s greatest oonoern. Severelyinjured by the bomb in the attempt on his life on 20 July 1944 andoonfined to his bed he devoted his time primarily to the militarysituation. Obsessed with the idea ?f attaoklHitlG~ in early S ap-t e m b e r . l n f o r . m e d Field M a r s h a l l W i l h e l m K e i t e l , C h i e f ' of'W e r m a o h t, 'High Oomnand and Colonel General Alfred Jodl, Chief of' the Armed(11) C p..5?

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Foroes Operation Staff that the initiative wa.1 ! I to be regained.Sinoe the deoision h ad been made to oounterattaok, the problam

remained to seleot the a.rea. Analyzing, the situa.tion on the variousfronts on whioh they were eng~ged, they arrived at the oonolusionthat the Western Front offered the best opportunity for deoisiveresults. rhe Allied supply problem h ad yet to be solved. Moreoverthe Allies ~re still-wea k in m an power. Redisposed a l o n g the WestWall after the narrow oonfines of' the Normany perimete~the lineswere thinly peld. The Germans were well aware of this situation.Also Hitler's contempt for demooraoies lad him to believe th at theirw i l l to w i n was weak and that a severe defeat on the Western Frontmight pos sibly foroe them ou~ of the war. (18)

It remained for Hitler hinwelf to s elect the Ardennes seotorfor theattaok. Learning th at only four U . S . divisions defended th earea he direoted JodI to submit a detailed plan at the earliest pos-sible date. It wns to be a thrust through the Ardennes aoross theMeuse thenoe to Antwerp. The port with its oom munioation lines tothe southeast toward Liege was to be seized. thereby throttling theBritis h and U . S. divisions in the north. (1 8) (19 ) C-M ap opp p-104(See M a p C )

In spite of the heavy Allied bombing r e _ l d e th e Germans h a d mir-aoulously been able to inorea se their production in tanks, artilleryand a mmunition, chiefly by the expedient of lll? vingth eir vita l pla ntsunderground.. Their greatest problem wa s fuel. but by reduoing th eallowanoes to other fronts a surfioient quantity was aooumulated forthe attaok. They were weak in the air ..and th ough the Luftwarfe 'WaSto oonoent~ate all its available planes to support the attaok itmust be so timed that the massing of the troops immediately priorto the attack could be done in weather unfavorable to air reeonn-aissanoe. Also the first few days of the attaok should r e . ve the bene-fit of weather unfavorable to the Allied Air Foroe ..thus denyingthem the advantage of their a ir s up er io ri ty . (:). '8)( 1 8 ) F p - 4 . . 5 inol. 1 3


15/36

he wettest fall ~d winter in years proved of immeasurableassistanoe to the Germ ans particularly in the North where the flood-ed valleys of the Roer, Waal and Rhine Rivers enabled them to defend

!" --with fewer men than would h ave 'otherwise been possible. This -enabledthem to withdraw divisions for reorganization and refitting, and alsoto give their Volk sgrenadier divisions battle indootrination underfavorable oonditions. (20)

The Sixth Panzer Army was organized with remnants of panzer divi-sions withdrawn from the line. I n mid-November it moved from itsposition deep in Germany , to the plains in front of Oologne. Thereit served a dual purpose, to oounterattaok should the Allies suooeedin orossing the Roar River and further, toconfuae Allied Intelligenoea s to the role for whic h it w as primarily intended, oom mittment inthe coming attaok. (21)

T~e S ixth P anz er A r r r t : V wa s composed of two P anzer Corps, the Iand II, with a total of 4 Panzer Divisions plUB the 180'Panzer Brigadeand elements of the Srd Panzer Grenadier Division and 2 infantry divi-sions. The oonnne.ndwas given to Joseph ItSeppttDietrioh, rankingWeffenSS Offioer in Germany. A fanatio loyal Nazi, 'a fa .ot to w hi ohhe owed his as signment, he la.oked the training snd experienoe to com-mand an arrl\Y" ( 21) (22 )

The preparation of the Fifth P anz~r Army for its part in theattaok was more of a problem. MOved northw ard in mid-September frompos'itions facing the Third U. S. Army to the Aa chen area it parti-oipated in the defense of that oity. Withdra wing prior to its surren-der, it beoame a soreening foroe covering the entire area in frontof the Ruhr industrial district. He~ be~an the refitting prooes s,but many of the dbrisi ons which w6l1l:intended for incluaion in theforoe'were oom mitted elsewhere, first east of Aaohen, then in Hollandand again in the south, west of the Sa ar industrial area. (23)

During the latter part of November the Fifteenth Armu moved(20) A p-42 C p-68 12 1) C p-83 (22) F p-20-23 (23) F p-25-26

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~. .outh to relieve thE{ Fifth Panzer whioh moved furthTr, south to Ko-blenz. Both armies,now entered the final weeks of preparation. (24)Surprise is an es sential element in a successful attack. TheGermans took elaborate precautions to preserve seoreoy. Originallygiven the oode name of 'Waoht Am Rhein" in order todeoeive AlliedI ntelligenoe in to believing the projeoted attack w a s defensive inoharaoter should it become known, it w as later oh anged to a oode noonemore in c ha ra ot er " He rb at ue be l" (Autumn Smoke). During the earlystages of planning only Headquarters Staff Offioers were a ware of itatrue nature. Hitler' s long standing mistrust of the high rankingA r m y offioers was inoreased by the attempt on his life by a olique,whioh inoluded members of the General Staff Corps. E Ven Field M ars h-all Von Rundstedt and Model, COllllJlSndern Chief of the West and Cononand..er of Array Group ' 'B'' r es pe ot iv el y, k ar e' u na wa re of the projeoted plansuntil the latter part of Ootober. As it beoame neoeBsa~ that subor-dinate offioers be informed they were torced to sign a pledge ofseoreoy under the penalty of being S hot. Mention of the plans bynormal means of Qonanunioation W'8.S forbidden. Only officer courierswere to_be trusted with necess ary m aaaagea and plans. 'Even theyoould not fly west of the Rhine. (2 5)

troop movemants wa st of the Rhine in the build up were for-bidden except at night. During daylight hours all tank s, artilleryand bridging equipment were oarefully hidden. (25)

the tentative date for the attac k 1~S set a s 25 November. Latein October Field Marshalls Von Rundstedt and M o d e l w e r e : ' i n f o r m a d , giventha plans of the opera tion and ordered to study them' thoroughly andsubmit their vieW's and ,,:onnnents. (26)

though worked out in mdnute detail the plan w as essentiallysimple. The Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies w are to make the thrust,the Sixth on the north advancing ..-ith"ts right flank generally 1'01..lowing the line Elsenborn and Spa and to cress the' M euse River atBuy and other points between Huy and Liege, thenoe to Antwerp_(24) 0 P 83-84 (25),F p ..37,42,43 (26) F p .. 7

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h e F i f t h o n t h e s o u t h w a s t o a d v a n c e w i t h i t s l e f t f l a n k g e n e r -a l l y o n t h e l i n e W i l t z , B a s t o g l l e , S t . H u b e r t , C e l l e s a n d D l n a n t ,f o r o e o r o a s d n g a o f t h e M e d s a at D i n a n t and N a D l U r and thenoe to B r u s -s e l s and Louvain. O n the . n o r - b h f l a n k t h e L X V I I C o r p s o f t h e F i f -t e e n t h Army w a s t o e n t e r t h e a r e a o f p e n e t r a t i o n o n t h e r i g h t f l a n kat t h e ' S i x t h P a n z e r A r m y t h e n $ W i n g n o r t h t o t h e n o r t h e r n s l o p e s o ft h e E l a e I i b o r n R i d g e g e n e r a l l y o n t h e l i n e M u t z e n i o h . , V e r v i e r s , S p a a ndL i e g e a n d b l o c k o f f t h e a r e a o f h e a v y c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f F i r s t U . S .Armlf d i v i s i o n s . O n t h e south ~ h e S e ~ e n t h Army w a s t o p e r f o _ r m t h esame i ' l m o t i o n f o r t h e F i f t h P a n z e r , f o r m i n g o n a l i n e e x t e n d i n g g e n -e r a l l y f r o m E o h t e r n a o h , t o N e u f ' o h a t e a u t o G i v e t o n t h e M e u s e , g u a r d -i n g a g a i n s t P a t t o n ' s d i v i s i o n s f u r t h e r s o u t h . I n f i l t r a t i o n p a r t i e sw e r e t o s e i z e M e u s e R i v e r b r i d g e s i n t h e v i o i n i t y o f H u y . A p a r a -o h u t e b a t t a l i o n VIaS t o b e d r o p p e d i n y h e v i c i n i t y o f E u p e n t o b l o c k

t ,,(,._t h e m a i n h i g h w a y s o u t h t o M O n s o h a u ; t o a s s i s t t h e b l o o k i n g f o r o e .O n o e t h e M e u B e w a s orossed t h e F i f t e e n t h Army w a s t o l a u n o b . a n a t t a o kt o w a r d M a a , 1 J : i : ; r _ i C ? h tr o m . t h e n o r t h e a s t . D i v e r s i o n a r y a t t a o k s w e r eplanned t o w a r d A n t w e r p f r o m t h e n o r t h a n d a g a i n s t t h e S e v e n t h U . S .a n d F i r s t F r e n o h Armies in t h e s o u t h . ( 2 7 )

A f t e r a s t u d y o f t h e p l a n s R u n d a t e d t a n d M o d e l s u g g e s t e d t}~tt h e a t t a o k b e a d o u b l e e n v e l o p m e n t J t h e s o u t h e r n t h r u s t t o s t r i k e i nt h e v i o i n i t y o f M o n s c h a u a n d ,gwing n o r t h w a r d e a s t o f L i e g e . T h enorthern pinoer w o u l d a t t a o k north a n d east o f M a a s t r i c h t a n d d r i v eup t h e M e u s e R i v e r . T h e two p i n c e r s would j o i n a n d d e s t r o y t h eF i r a t A r m y t r o o p s o o n o e n t r a t e d i n t h e a r e a f o r t h e d r i v o o n C o l o g n e .S h o u l d t h i s not be a p p r o v e d , they then r e c o m m e n d e d t h a t t h e a t t a o kp l a n n e d f o r t h e F i f t e e n t h Army t o w a r d M a a s t r i o h t b e o a n o e l e d andt h e t r o o p s t o b e o o m m d t t e d t h e r e d i v e r t e d t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e A r d e n n e st h r u s t . ( 2 8 )

H i t l e r , b a o k e d by K e i t e l a n d J o d ! . " r e f u s e d t o o o n s i d e r ' b h echangee reoomnen dSd." T h e possible r e w a r d w a s m u o h l e a s t h a n i n the

o r i g i n a l p ~ o p o s a l . T h a t t h e o b j e o t i v e s o f t h e A r d e n n e s t h x o u s t n d g h t( 2 7 ) C 103.,t04 ( 2 8 ) F p - 2 8 , 2 ~

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be beyond the capabilities of the resouroes available did not oocur~q~he ex~oorporal of World War I. The Ardennes attaokwould be oar-I ~ried out as ,planned, with Antwerp as the objeotive. Nothing shortof that would satisfy Herr Hitler. (28)

Rundstedt, apparently feeling that the plan oould never suooeed,divoroed him self from further effort other than supply administra-ti~n relating to the attaCk. ~odel, however,whose oomm and, ArmyGroup !lBIl, w ould bea r th e res 'ponS lbility entered enth us ia stioa llyinto the plann~ng. A wall t~alned and oompetent field oomm ander, hew as also a loyal Hitler supporter. General Del' Panzer TruppenVon M anteufel, whose Fifth Panzer A"t"IIWas to make the southernthrust was not so eager. Realizing that unles s extreme good fort~ew as to favor the attaok Antwerp was hopelessly out of reaoh, heaooordingly made plans whioh were to ta ke him only to the MeuseRivar. He would nake further plans if' the neoessity arose. A oom ..petent field c omma nde l' and S o mas' ber of'arm ored taotios his advanoeelements w are toreaOh a point four ndles from the Meuse where theriver w as visible in the distanoe. One oan but speculate on wh atsuooes s might have been aohieved with the ~esouroa B provided for thenorthern thrust had Monteurel's oompetence be6n present. (28)

A total of twenty eight divisions were tentatively allotted.! he Sixth Panzer, m aking the prim ary thrust was to receive the mostgenerous, allotment. Four SS Panzer divisions plus panzer elementsequal to-a fifth division, and two infantry division~were Dubordi-pated to the SiAth for the opening attaok. Manned in exoess of itstable of organization, 100% equipped it was well prepared for thejump oft. Manteuf'el'a Fifth Panzer Arnw did not fare so well. - s a , : ; -- t I fto 80% equipped)his divisions were also understrength. ' Initially hisarnw wa,S oomposed of three panzer di'visions and three Yolks Gren-a di er d iv is io ns . (29) ,

Attaohed to the Sixth P anzer Arnw w as the l60l~anzer Brigade.USing u . S. equipment, uniforms, weapons and insignia it wa s to(28),F P 28-29 (29) F p~12

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paIS thrOUgh the advanoe elements onae St. Vith had been reaohedand m o v e BWiftly toward the K 8 U a 8 liver seizing supply installationaon the way and oreating havoo with rear oOImllUnioations. It was thento seize the Meuse River bridges. Known by the oode name of HGriai'1lthough it aocomplished nothing taotioally it WAS to have oonsid-erable psyohologioal effeot on the Allied foroes. Road blooks wereestablished as tar welt a8 Paris in an effort to blook partiel whiohwere still in rea.r of the German leading units. (29)

Bitler's Generals were not yet ready o n the tentative date ot26 No_vember. fighting in the Roar River area had made it impossibleto withdraw some of the ear marked divisions in time tor r e f i t t i n g .

\H i t l e r reluotlantly oonsented to postponement to 1 0 Deoember. Whenthat date arrived he again agreed to a postponement to the 16 Deoem-b e r linO. ~ a t h e r foreoasts predioted that t h e w e a t h e r o o u d i t i o n lwould be more favorable on that date. (30)

!J:.le Seventh Af '1 I13 , oOJTf l l l l .Uded by an artillery general, Branden-berger,was already in position holding that part of the line. ' l h eFifth andSfxth P~er Armies began ololing in to assembly a r e a sin the wooded t e r r a i n behind the "est Wall. Ixtrem.e precautionswere taken to preserve seoreoy. On the even1l:1gat the 15 Deoemberthey ~ere moved to the final assembly areas from whioh they wouldjump oft on the next morning. (31)

Faoing the West Wall, the .AJnerioantroops were blissfully un-aware at the impending blow. U.S. A r D w Intelligence had suooeed-ed in gathering suffioient .videnoe to support the assumption ot animpending attaok. rhe buildup at the Sixth Panzer A r r r I V had been re-ported and the movement ot the Fifth Pll1Isr Armq to Coblenz oppositethe Ardennes was known a& was the southward shift of the Fifteenth. A x f t r . _Captured Germans reported that an att~ok was planned. Allieda i r r e o o n n a i s s a n q e r e p o r t e d a troop buildup in the O o b l e n . a r e ain lfo'Yember. A German woman reported to VIII Corps on 14 Deoembor(29) C p-104 (30) r p-42 (31) P p-46 (32) C p-84

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\ .

: the presonoe of large quantitielS of bridging 'equipment::in the samearea. a sure indioation of offensi~rplan8. (32)While possessing suffioient intor.mation. the interpretation of

its ,true meaning was in error. '!he use of the oode l U U 1 I 8 "We.ohtA mRhein" led the Oel"J l !8n A:nq perl50nnel to believe that the plans were

, ,defensive in oharaoter and this belief was transmitted to the AlliedIntelligel\oe offioers by the oaptu.red""_,J'iii~ In any event, whilet h e y ' r e a l i z e d the possibility of an attaok they believed it wouldo o m e in t h e Aaohen seotor, s e e k i n g at m o s t to reoapture the oity asa O~istma8 gift to Der Fuehrer. fhe_ area. in whioh the attack wasmade, and its enormity oame as a oomplete surprise to the All:l.edHigh O o m m l n d . (33)

The Sohnee Eifel is a high, rugged and woodedridge extendl~in a northeasterly direotion trom the Tioinity8~!~if to Qr.mont. a. - - ~-~'i'-"-""-.distanoe of, roughly, ten miles. On the ridge lay tv(o regiments otthe 106th Division. The rome,1ning regiment, the 424th lay just tothe south. while in the north the 14th Cavalry Group held the linenorthward to maintain oontaot with the attaoking 99th Division.

B i t h e r e n d o f the Sohnee Eitel otters r o u t e s o t a p p r o a o h t o t h e,important rail and highway oenter ~t St. Vith. The north end otter'san approaoh t o the Elsenborn Rtdge, vital to the ..ttaoldng Germans,to provide roads and _neuver spaoe and as an anchor point uponwhioh to build the defense ap1nst interferenoe f'rom1:he north. (34)

At 0530 hours on the 16 Deoemberthe GermansopenedWith a heavy.artillery barrage all along the Ardennes from.the vioinity of MIlt-len1oh. north of JIonaohauin the V Oorps seotor to Bohterna.oh nearthe south flank of the VIII Corp.,. Direoted at first o~ front l1eelements after two hours it was s h i f t e d to rear a r e a in8tallat~ons.At 0700 hours Manteufel's LXVI Corps with two intantry divisions. one. .oneaoh end of the Schnee Eitel at ..rte~mo~ng up through the wr-(32) 0 p-84 (33) 0 99-103 (34) 0 p 104-106

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,ioc lines. At 0730 the attaok turther north by Dietrioh's IS8Panzer Oorp. composedof' the 1st and 12th 88 Panzer Divisions be-. .. .gan the attaok. the 1st SS Pa.:a.eerDivision toward Bullingen, the

;12th toward Uonsobau. North ot Monsohauthe LDII Corps exeouteda front.l attaok against the attaoking 2nd and 99th Divisions inan attempt to ga in.the northern slopes of Bl.enborn Ridge. (34)

The 2nd and 99th u. S. Divisions, attaoking to'Wa:r~tl1e R()erRiver were not prepared for defense. Badly shaken they oontinuedto hold through the 16th and on the af'ternoon of' the 17th permittedtl1elr lines to be bent baok to the southern slopes of E1Benbo~Ridge. Here they were to hold until the threat 'Was,eliminated,a nd their line provided the base upon -whiohthe Firat ~ was tobu:i.ld its defense to oontain the (Jermans, and later to oounter-attaok. (34) .

, !he l4th Caval;ryGt-oup had givg, way under pressure ot theI S S P a n z e r C o r p s a n d t h e ridge extending t r o m the Sohnee ,Bl'el tothe Blsenborn was lost. By the evening ot 17 Deoember1944 a gap of

~.~I .,S ndles e x i s t e d . ThrOugh , t n i s g a p the lat 88 Panzer Divisionp o u r e d e n r o u t e to S t a v e l o t . , ( 3 4 )

'the divisions enoiroling the Sohnee-altal joiiled at Sohonbergby mid..mornlng ot 17 D~cember and were advancing on St. Vith. (36)

General Middleton, realizing the threat to St. Vith on the 16th. - - . - - . - - ,had obtained release of COB.9th Armored Dhision trom V_Corps .~aS8igned to it the defense ot that vital rail and higpway oenter. (36)

Parther to the south in the 28th Infantry, DiTision aone I I an-teufel's two Panzer Corps. the LVIII and XLVII. using both infantryand tanks in the initial aSBaulthad drinn the division baok threemiles. On the 17th the attaok oarried to the ridge WE I s t ot the Ourlliver and out the me. in north and south highway1t'e'atJot llarburg. (35)

In the lone ot the 4th Inta:ptrypiv1~,,1on on the VIII OOrPBIsouth flank the Seventh GermanA r r l r : ! struok early on the 16th. _ Laok-ing the mobility ot the ar.mies on the north Brandenberger Gould not(34) 0 pl04-106 (36) C pl06-10B

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ove 80 taBt.!h. 4th U. S. Division with COA, 7th Armored D1"1'i-sion suooeeded in falling baok aoross the Sauer RiTer, faoing north.!hough subjeoted to heavy attaok, the linens m&intal~.d and,WlLItolater tor.m the anohor upon whioh the third U. S. ~ was to group itsforoes for the oounterattaok. (36)

Wh en w ord of the attack reaohed Generals Eisenhower and Bradley,they were in oonferenoe seeking a solution to the reinforoement prob-lem. While not yet oognizant o t the strenbth o t the attaok both were~lly aware o t the weakness of the detense in that area. GeneralEisenhower suggested to General Bradley that available armor be d1s-patohed to the lIoene. Oonsequently the lOth Armored Division, wait-ing to partioipate in the oftensive aoross the Saar River soheduledto open on 19 Deoember,wa s movednorthward to re1n1"oroe the 4th In-tantry Division. The 7th Armored Division in Ninth U. S. A r m 1 re-lerva was released to VIII Corps and dispatohed to st. Vith, whereit was to arrive on the atter.noon ot the 17th. (36)

The G e r m a n paratroop drop in the Tioinity o f B u p e n reBulted intotal taotioal failure. Soheduled for the early hours of 1 6 Deoemberbad weather foroed postponement until 2400 hours that day. Inex-perienced in night drops the air torce soattered the paraohutistsover a large area. Only a tew hundred met at the rends.vous and the)"were inefteotual. The promised support failed to arrive and the menwere rounded up by units of the Plrst and N:t.nthU. S. Armies. (37)

T he psyohologioal effeot wa s great, hOW8'Y8r.Allied troops inlarge numbers were diverted to hunting reported, parachutists, whileone oombat o o m m a n d 0 1 ' the 3rd Armored Di~sion w a s held in the vi-oini ty 01 ' lupen in antiairborne defense when it was urgently neededin the tight against the armored elements used in the attaok.

,By the eve:niDgof 17 Deoemb.ertwo !:aps had been ade throughthe Amerioan lines. The .pproach over the ridge north of the Bohne.lUtel; nine miles in width was open and the 188 PUler Division wasmoving through. ,The southern gap, in 28 D1Tiaion aeotor was 10 to(36) 0 pl06-l0B (36)8 p-62

2 1


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2 miles wide and maTing through it were moving three armored andtw o infantry division.. (38)!he 8t~ of the attaok had become more apparent by m1dday

on 17 Deoember. It was evident'that .. _jor problem. in oonta1Dmenttaoed the Allied foroes. !he only theatre reserve available toSCHAEFwere the two airborne divi8iona, the 82nd and lOlet. Intraining areas near Rheims, Franoe, reouperating tromthe Hollanddrop in September, they were being prepared tor a mission in the pro-jeoted Rhine orossing. Refitting was inoomplete. 1 l any ot the otti-oers and men were absent on leave or other duties. It was deoidedto oomm1t them, however, and they were ordered to 01OS8 in to ,assemblyare.stu t h e vioinity ot Bastogne, Belgium, w h e r e a good road netp r a r l d e d r o u t e s tor moTementt o threatened spots a s the neoessityarose. (39)

!he 82nd Airborne Division was dispatohed first. Bnroute to Bas-togne its destination 'Wasohanged to Werbomon t sinDa leading elementsor the lSS Panzer Division were moving westward along the AmbleveRiver toward that town. The lOlst Airborne Di'ViBion, dtspatohedin the late afternoon at 18 Deoember pl'()oeeded to Bastogne. (39)

On 18 Deoember the penetrations were extended. In the lone otthe 28th Intantry Division the ReserYe Combat Oomoandof the, 7thArmored Division whioh had been oOJmnitted in an attempt to stem_thetlde, oontinued withdrawing torIaf'd .Bastope. the lloth RegiJllent, in

, \..

thezone or the 28tl'!: Infantry had been over run. !he 112th Regimentwas withdrawing toward, st. Vith, as was the 424th Infa.ntry Regimentof the lOBth Division. The gap now extended trom the vioinityot IIonachau on the north to Bohtemaoh on the south with the ex-oeption at the 422nd e.nd 423rd Regiments ot the l06th Division whichoontinued to hold out in the Sohnee mitel. (40)

!he lat U. S. Division, whioh began moving in to e~end the2-99th Division line on Elsenborn Ridge, on 17 De,oamber, was in po-sition and repulsed a hea~attaok on the 18 Deoember. The 12_88(38) ., p-116 C P 111-112 (59) B p-63 ,. P 119-120 (.0) 0 p-l10

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anzer Division oontinued ita attaCk to open the gap tnto the ridge"and olear the- way for the II 88 Panzer Oorps which was waiting in an

assembly area in the vioinity of Sohleiden. (41)!he 1 8S Panzer Division oontinued westward. Bypassing Mal..

medy the oolumn\;oontinued on to Stavalot. there it foroed a orossingover the AnibleTeRiver and oontinued westward to Trois Ponts. Attempt..ing to orOIB the Salm River there, the leading elements were stoppedby a oompany of the 51at lng1neers Combat Battalion, who blew thebridge. Laoking bridging equipment, the oolumn t~en turned north,

1 \ ' reorossing the AJDbleveand headed u , p the valley on the north side. of;~.\~ the river. Finding another bridge to the west aoross the Ambleve,

the oolUJDllheaded weat again toward Werbomont. Here again a oompanyof engineers~ from the 291st Engineers CombatBattalion de1~ed hisleading tanks and blew another bridge. Turning north again the oolumn'WaS heavily bombed by a flight of P..47' a. It halted south of St~mont for the night. (42)

The 30th I n f a n t r y Division was assigned to First A r m W on the l7~.It began moving into position to extend the line ,west trom Yalmedy.The flight of P-47ts had reported the l o o a t i o n ot the 1 a s PanzerDivision' a leading elements and in order to blook their westward move-~nt the ll9th Regimtmt 'Wl\S dispatohed in a oiroling l'OOvemento War-

t}(J./l 1 D m ! m , t and Stf.;ftmont. (42)The line on the north now extended from Butgenbaoh through Mal-

m e d y t o , S t a v e l o t . A r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f F i r s t ~ n o w plaoed V Corpstao~ south and southeast. VII C o r p . ' boundary was shi~d southto inolude Konsen and to exolude lupen. V Corpsl east boundary rang e n e r a l l y on a line from. l l a1medy ' to Vervier8. (43)

Attaoks oontinued on th~ north flank on the 19th. 12 SS PanzerDivision movedwestward_ and attaoked to the north toward Valmedy.'!his &tt~Okalso railed. The Gerfl~ now began reinforOing the as-s a u l t i n g o o r p s o n t h e n o r t h flank. , 2 as P a n z e r D i v i s i o n w a s o r d e r e d(41) C p ..107 Situation Map 1 /6 (42) 0 p 107..110 F P 141-149 (4 3) C p..108

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eouth around at. nth whioh was stUI held by the 7th Annored I . J 1 dattaohed troops. 9 88 Panzer Division and 16th Panler GrenadierDivis1Oll8 were dispa.tohed westward to join the 12 88 Panaer Diyi ...sion on the assault on the north moulder. 3 Panzer Division re-1noroed the frontal attaok units faoing Elsenborn R1~e. (43)

!he pattern of the attaok now beoame olear. The oOJl'DDl,~~rfthe German paratroop unit" Lieutenant Colonel Van Dar Heyde, uponsurrender bad disolosed the plans a n d oonfirmed the faot thatAntwerp was the objeotive. The oontinuing assaults on the northshoulder and flanks were further evidenoe tha.tthe impetus of theattaok was to the north. Aooordingly, aC l lAEF nG'l aoted. ~hird A f ' 1 l 1 3 'postponed its soheduled offensive and prepared to attaok to the north. :o n a ganeral d i r e o t i o n B a a t o g n e - C o l o g n e . !he ~lth Armored D i v i s i o nnewly arrived on the oontinent ....8o r d e r e d to the vioinity ot Rheima1.8 theatre reserve. !he 17th Airborne D i v i s i o u w i t h several tnt~try divisions then i n England were ordered immediately to the oontin-ent. (44)

!he Sixth A r r r t : f Group '\'I8.S to halt its offensives and eJrtend t othe left to hold the southern half of Third ArmIY's_seator. Th~ 21st~ G r o u p was t o plaoe its reserve oorps, the llX, in the Brusselsarea to meet any thrust across the Jleuse. (44)

Uaanwhile the two German1n.fantry divisions the 18th and 62nd,pluB _the Fuehrer Esoort Brigade were alosing in on St. Vith. TheU. s . 7 t h Armored D i v i s i o n had g o n e fn to p o s i t i o n north and eastof the town to a point in the St. Vith ...V1elaalm highway near PetitThier. A n attaok to relieve the tw o surrounded regiment of theloath ~ the Schnee Bifel wa s halted by the westward pressure of, theGermans. COB,9th Armored Division extended the line south. 424thand 112th Infantry Regiments were being foroed baok toward st. Vith.'lhese two regiments by the 19th e a t e n d e d the .line south and west toform the U..ahaped defense around the oity. (45)(43) C p-10B (44) B p-63 (46) 81tua.tioD Jlap # 6

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B y 19 D e a e m b J i l b c R J 9 th A r m o r e d Division had ~ t o r c e d b a o kt o Longvilly seven miles e a s t of B a s t o g n e . COB, loth Armored Divi ..aion, dispatohed to B a s t o g n e on the 1 7 t h h a d established road blooksaround t h e t o w n . These tw o armored units blooked the Ger .man attaoksg i v i n g t h e l O l s t A i r b o r n e D i v i s i o n time t o c o n s o l i d a t e i t s p o s i t i o n s .I t h a d o l o s e d i n t o Bastogne d u r i n g 1 8 - 1 9 D e o e m b e r . O r i g i n a l l y s e n tthere to attaok itwas soon to bo engulfed in the defense ot theoity. (46)

A small detaohment of e n g i n e e r s and other t r o o p s were s t i l lholding o u t in W i l t s . l I I l e m e n ' t 8 of t h e 1 1 0 t h I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t ,~th Division were s t i l l holding o u t in i s o l a t e d areas, p o s i t i o n sunknown. (47)

t h e south shoulder oontinued t o hold. COA l l o t h Armored Di-vision was oounterattacking in conjunotion with e l e m e n t s of t h e 4t hD i v i s i o n . (47)

the S2nd Airborne Division had olosed in to an assembly areain the v i o 1 n i t y of WerbOniom,Jiuring the night of 18-19 December.- - ,Going into positions in line due south of Werbomont it md movedforward to the Alnbleve- Balm R i v e r a , extending south to Vielsabi.In 80 doing their lett flank along the Amble~ River, together with-, two battalions of 119th Infantry, 30th Division on the east end south,oomple~ed a ring around the leading elements of the 1 88 Panaer Di-vision . In the battle th a t followed the German tankers abandoned

. their vehioles and riltetoed baok to the ea.st and rejoined the assaultunits. (48)

lJhe a t t a o k to gain st. Vith, k e y ~ the routes leading we~tstill oontinued. U a n t e u t e l had hoped to O Q o u p y it on the 17th. Hehad kept his panzer divisions m o v i n g " w e s t through the existing gapand' kept his: F1feJlti'y:,ail8i.~J.t~ 'the t own . Other than forcing slight~thdrawa18 i n the U-sha.peddefensa the attaokshad ~i1ed._ Henow r e i n f o r o e d h i s a s s a u l t unite. P r e v i o u s l y t h e F u e h r e r E s o o r tBrigade had b e e n s e n t around to the north flank and arrived in(46) 0 p-10e,l'p-118 Gp-221 (47) Cp-llO(48) Cp-113

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Jlosit~on on 20 Deoember faoing the 7th Armored Division on the northflank. On the 21st a ooordinated a.ttaok was made on the town andthe defenders were driven baok a short distanoe west or st. 'ftth.Losses were hea.vy and in the foroed withdrawal any of the unitshad lost oohesion. A'defense line was hastily eatabliahed , however,and the Germans, while gainin~ lateml roads were still denied aooesato the routes to the west. (49)

Mee.mrhile at 191330 Deoember nIl Oorps pasled to the controlat third U. S .ArIrry, the boundary re-established on the line St.Vith ...Glwt. Further ohanges were forthooming. At 20 1330 the en-tire First and Ninth U. S. Armies passed to the oontrol of 21st. A r m i Y Group. The group boundary as laid downby Sohaef' ran east-ward from Glvet to Prum then bent northward to Oologne. (60)

!he aotion was prompted by several influencing faotor8~ the ohietbeing that the First and Third U. 8. Armies 'ltere out in two, a sixty'mile gap existing between them a.t the base of the penetration.Radio cQmmunioation was unoerta1n due to the weather and battle con-ditions. The Gerena were oertain to out the telephone oa.bles. Fur-ther, the impetus of' the attaok was to the north. the Ninth and rirstU . S . Armies a nd the Seoond British A n r r v were &11_needed to provideadequa.te seourity for the vital objeotives north of the Meuse River.A commanderwas needed to ooordinate the three. Under the oiroum-stanoes Yon tgomery was the logical choice. !his action oaused astorm ot protest. It is still being oritioised. However~ the oriti ..oism seems in most instances rather to be a def'ense of' General ODarH. Bra,


28/36

lIIOTiugaround it to the west it was a oonsiderable handioap. (51)!hird U. S. Arrq was nowprepa.r~ to attaok to the north from

the vioinity ot Luxembourg. III Corps, with 8oth'and 26th Infa.ntryDbisions and the 4th Armored Division was to attaok norlhwardastride the Arlon~iege h i g h w a y and relieve the lOlst Airborne andattaohed troops, in Bastogne. XII Corps, with the 4th and, 6th In-tantry Divisions pluB COA,loth ArmoredDivisions and COR,9th ArmoredDivision and the 2nd Oa;n.lry Groupwas to oontinue to 'hold the westbank of' the Uoselle River in its .lone and be prepared to attack tothe north on armf order. Originally soheduled for- 21 Deoember itopened on the 22nd. VIII Corps, now badly disorganized, with. lOlstAir~orne Division, reJllIllmts ot the 28th Infantry Division, plusC O R , ,9th A rm ored and OOB, loth Armored Division was to oontinue thed8te~e ot the seotor east ot the Meuse River. (62)

Ii O n the, north the XVIII Airborne Oorp~ had ~oome operative oni .1 9 D~oember, a s s u m i n g oontrol ot the 3 0 t h , 8 4 t h , l 0 6 t h , I n f a n t r y D i -I . .ViSiins, Sand Airbor.ne Division, 3rd Armored Division 1es8 OOA, 7thArmoNd Div1Gion, and the 112th Infantry Regiment of the 28th In-fantry Division. ~heCorps Zone now extended west from Ua1medy throughStavelot, stoumont thenoe south to the vioinity ot Vlesalm, then westto the vioinity of Marohe. (63)

VII Corps WAS relieved ot its sone no:rth ot V Carpi and on. the22 Deoember wa s assembling north of Marohe, with 2nd Armored Divisionan'd the 75th Intantry Division. Its mission was to oounterattaokand soreen right to' the !leuse River. (63)

the 422nd and 423rd regiments, l06th I n f a n t r y Division, surround-ed in the Schnee Eifel on 17 Deoember surrendered on 20 :o.oember.after a . half-hearted attempt to fight their way "Westto St. Vith. (54)

O n the22nd. the 12 SS Panser joined in an attaok against the 7thArmored Division and attaohed unite making a stand west of St. Vith.Already badly shaken tram the attaok the preoeeding day the 7th suo-oeeded in holding. Their position was preoarious. however. Ho( 5 1 ) 0 p - 1 1 4 ( 5 2 ) E p - 1 1 7 ( 6 3 ) C p - 1 1 4 ( 6 4 ) F p - 1 6 8

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, _resupply had ben etfeoted since they entered the salient on the '17thand aDDIIllnitiollwas low. By order ot Field Marshall Montgomery theywere to withdraw. O n the morning of the 23rd, a daylight withdrawal.was begun, w e st aoros a the aalm River north ot V i e l 1m, passing throughthe lines ot the 82nd Airbol"Jle Division. Aooomplished during heavyGer.man attaoks, losses again were heavy.

T h e ~ r 1 o a n defense lines s t i l l d e n i e d t o t h e G e r . m a n s t h e u s eof the vital road nets to the north and west in th e norther.n seotor.!he Sixth Panzer A r r r . w naking the llIl.inthrust had stalled. Failureto attain first the Elsenborn Ridge and then St. Vith, its attaCkhad stalled. Heavy reinforoements to its a s s a u l t i n g divisions hadresulted in jammedroads, and ma ny tanks had bogged down in_the mud.O n the 18 Deoember the orowded roads h ad p rovid ed targets for the.A.m.BrioanAir Foroe during the f" hours ot flying permitted by theweather. The w e a t h e r from 16..23 Deoember tor the most part renderedair support impossible. The Germans had ohosen this time to a'l?taokbeoause weather t o r e o a s t s h ad indioa ted fo~ for a period of several days.(66)

T h e s t a o k i n g o f a s s a u l t u n i t s , one behind the other in t h e l i m -ited road spaoe between the n o r t h f l a l l k and the St. Vith se.lient he.dbeen a_taotioal error on the part of Dietrioh, the Fifth Panzer A r r r r : !OOlIlJIander. A f t e r the collapse ot the St. Vith salient Taluable t~.was lost olearing the area. (66)

H a d Hitler and MOdel reinforoed the Fifth Panser ~ r a t h e rthan the Sixth the results might mve been tar different. lIanteu-tel met his sohedule westward until his supply lines ge.veway~ Behad kept his Panzer divisions moving weBt. bypas8ing B a s t o p e , leav-ing i t s reduction to his infantr,y divisions with tank support.

Dietrioh, however, deoided to make another t r y tor routes to thenorth and west by d. at_t~'Okthrough the 82nd Airborne _Division inthe vioini ty of Vielealm. Here the 82nd Airborne Division lines ranf rom Trois Ponts to Vielsalm then west toa oro8sro&ds .outh of J a n -hay where it joined w i t h units of' the 3rd .ArDl.oredDivision. The(560 C pl16 ..117 2 8


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oollapse ot the st. Vlth defense lett the 62nd with a . . salient atViels.1m. On the 24 Deoedler the 2nd Panzer of the J'uehrer EsoortBrigade attaoked, the 2nd SS Panzer striking at the juotion of the8 2 n d and 3rd Armored, the 9 S S P a . . n z e r directly west north of Viel-Balm. The 2nd s a Panzer penetrated to ~, overrunning elementsof the 3rd and 7th Armored Divisions. Fearing that the S2nd Air-borne Division's right flank would be turned and provide a gaptor the Gennans to pour through, and. also probably influenoed byhis desire to ''Put on a tidy show'l Field Marshall Montgomeryordered the 82nd to higher ground several miles to the west. theline now ran due southeast tromTrois Ponts to lIanhay. (66)

Mlstaking the withdrawal for a retreat the Ger.mansregroupedand attaoked again the following day. Though heavy it was broken upafter a slight penetration. (66)

this was to be the last heavy attaok on the north flank. Un-able to gain routes through First ArlIW's 11nes on the Meuse theynow ' conoentrated on th e south. On- 23 Deoember the weather improvedand Allied taotioal planes were again in the air. NUmerousairstrilc:6s were JlU\deagainst tank oolUllDlsand oonoentrations as wellas supply trains. Their effeot beg~ to tell in the reduotion a tth e pressure against the Allied lines. Laok of air support, bothreoonnaissance and oombat airoraft had been a handioap in the earlydays of the attaok. It was to prove invaluable in the reduotion of

the G e r m a n salient. (57)!he_ VII Corps_had been_plaoed in the line and the north flank

defen8~ now ~rlended tram Butgenbaoh through lIalmedy, Trois Pants,lfanhay, Laroohe, Uarohe to the Ueuse at Givet where it joined theBritish 29th Household Cavalry Regimant. (68)

, J;lritish units now defended the Meuse River line trom Givet toLiege. South of Givet were the 17th Airborne Division, the 11thArmored Division and sevaral battalions ot the FrenohArmy. (59)

Elements ot the 2nd SS Panzer Division had penetrated to(5 6) Cp-1 2 0 (67) C p-l18 (68) C Situation Map# 1 0(69 ) C p-1 2 2 B p-63 29


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.11es, t o u r m i l e s f r o m D l n a n t o n the l l e u s e , a ~ t o cm.y, . f o u r m i l e sd o w n t h e r i v e r . ' t h e 2 n d U . S . A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n , with B r i t i s h u n i t s h a dd e s t r o y e d them o n 2 5-26 D e o e m b e r . (59)

The German s i t u a t i o n was noW' p r e o a r i o u s " I \ ~ ~ ; ; ~ ~ o n the northand f a o e d with the p r o b a b i l i t y of a o o u n t e r a t t a o k " a t a n y p o i n t o ni t s r i g h t f l w n k ; 1 l ~ t k ~ s u f f i o i e n t r o a d n e t s in t h e o e n t e r o f t h ea r e a o f p e n e t r a t i o n , and. on t h e s o u t h the t h i r d U . 8. Arrr rv was a l -readr a d v a n c i n g n o r t h w a r d . T h e p o s s e s s i o n o f B a s t o g n e , s t i l l h e l db y t h e 1 0 1 s t A i r b o r n e a n d i t s a t t a o h e d t r o o p s w a s o f i n o r e a s i n g ~p o r t a n o e . ( SO )

V o n R u n d s t e d t r e a l i z e d b y 2 4 D e c e m b e r t h a t i t w a s i m p o s s i b l eto r e a o h t h e : M e u s e R i v e r . S i n o e t h e a t t a o k h a d n o a n o h o r p o i n t int h e w e s t t h e s i t u a t i o n in t h a t a r e a w a s f l u i d . T h e Gel"JDan HighO o m m a n d a d v i s e d w i t h d r a w t n g in o r d e r t o o o n s e r v e t h e i r s l e n d e r r e -s o u r o e s f o r f u t u r e d e f e n s e o f t h e Rhine. H i t l e r r e f u s e d t o a d m i td e f e a t a n d o r d e r e d a o o n o e n t r a t e d a t t a o k o n B a s t o g n a . T h r e e Y o l k sG r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n s w e r e a d d e d t o t h e S e v e n t h Army t o h e l p s t o pt h e a d v a n o i n g T h i r d U. S.~. P a n z e r d i v i s i o n , t h e 1 s t , 9 t h ,a n d 1 2 t h with t h e F u e h r e r E s o o r t B r i g a d e w e r e o r d e r e d s o u t h t o B a s -t o g n e . ( 6 1 )

t h r e e d i v i s i o n , t h e 2 n d P a n z e r ~ t h e P a n z e r L a h r a n d t h e 2 6V o l k s G r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n s o f 47th P a n z e r C o r p s h a d . t t a o k e d B a s t o g n eo n 20 D e o e m b e r a t t e r o v e r running t h e 9 t h A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n " e l e m e n t sa t Longvilly o n t h e 1 9 t h . By t h i s time t h e l O l s t A i r b o r n e h a d h a dt i m e t o o r g a n i z e t h e d e f e n s e s . With o r d e r s o n l y t o o o o u p y t h e t o w ni f n o t s t r o n g l y h e l d , t h e G e r m a n s h a d h o p e d f o r a q u i o k s u o o e s s .F a i l i n g t o t a k e i t o n the 2 0 t h , t h e tw o p ~ z 8 r d i v i s i o n s p a s s e d o nw e s t h e a d e d f o r t h e M e u s e R i T e r . O n e r e g : i : m e n to f p a n z e r s w a s l e t tb e h i n d t o a s s i s t t h e i n f a n t r y " i n t h e o a p t u r e o f t h e t o w n . On t h e 2 1 s ta r i n g h a d b e e n f o r m e d e n o i r o l i n g t h e d e f e n d e r s a n d t h e a s s a u l t so o n t i n u e d . R e s u p p l y w a s e f f e o t e d b y a i r o n 2 3 D e o e m b e r . ~ h o u g h( 6 9 ) C p - 1 2 2 B p - 6 3 ( 6 0 ) 0 p - 1 2 6 ( 6 1 ) F p - 1 9 0

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h e fighting w a s s e v e r e the G e r m a n s m a d e , n o substantial g a i n s . (62)B i t l e r n o w o r d e r e d t h e 1 6 t h P a n z e r G r e n a d i e r Dlvisionwith e l e -m e n t s o f t h e 660th Y o l k s G r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n t o r e i n f o r o e t h e a s s a u l t -ing u n i t s . tw o a d d i t i o n a l Y o l k s G r e n a d i e r D i v i s i o n s w e r e a d d e d t ot h e S e v e n t h A rm y t o a s s i s t in h o l d i n g off t h e T ' h i r d U . S .A rD \Y . (6 2 )

T h e III C o r p s , f h i r d U. S. A r m w o n 22 D e o ~ e r , a d v a n o e d t o aline generally east a n d w e s t with JIortelange in t h e oenter. TheXlI C o r p s j o i n e d the III C o r p s on ~ e r . i g b t , i t s l i n e e % t e n d ! n g t oE o h t e r D A o h t h e n b e n d i n g s o u t h a l o n g t h e S a u e r a n d M o s e l l e . A i r8 U p p o r t w a s p r o v i d e d by XIV 1 ' a o t l o a l A i r C O l I l l D A u d . (63)

The a d v a n o e o o n t 1 n u e d a g a 1 n s t i n o r e a s i n g l y s t u b b o r n r e s i s t a n o ea n d b y 26 D e o e m b e r t h e 4 t h A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n w a s w i t h i n f i v e m i l e s ofB a s t o g n e . O n t h e 26 D e o e m b e r i t s u o o e e d e d in f o r o i n g a n a r r o wo o r r i d o r i l i : " t o t h e t o w n . ! h o u g h t h e G e r n a n s b a t t l e d t o o u t t h e, _ _ . , .o o r r 1 d o r t h e d e t e n d e r s o f B a s t o g n e o o u l d new b e r e i n f o r o e d a n ds u p p l i e d . (64)

T h e h e a v i e s t f i g h t i n g f o r B a s t o g n e was n o w t o begin. T h e Fueh-r e r B s o o r t B r i g a d e , o n the 28th m a d e a d e s p e r a t e a t t a o k t o o u t t h eo o r r i d o r . T h i s a t t a c k t a i l e d . By the f i r s t ot t h e y e a r t h e r e ~t o r o e ~ n t B f r o m D i e t r i o h ' s Sixth P a n z e r A~ h a d j o i n e d t h e a s s a u l t -ing f o r o e s a r o u n d Ba,stogne. A t o t a l o f e i g h t d i v i s i o n s w e r e nowa r r a y e d , ' . & r o u n d t h e t o w u J a t t e p t i n g ; t o r e d u o e the s a l i e n t w h i c h ex-t e n d e d i n t o t h e i r l i n e s o t o o m m u n i o a t i o n . (65)

. ( ) n . , t h e w e s t i n the VIII C o r p s z o n e t h e 11th A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n ,i(;; t ' I - ' "L ~'i 8 t h D1 1 1~e~~& j o i n e d by the 1 7 t h A i r b o r n e D ~ v i s o n , and 7 v B o n

a t t a o k e d n o r t h e a s t w a r d in t h e g e n e r a l d i r e o t i o n o f H o u f f a l i . e . . G e n -eral E i s e n h o w e r f e e l i n g t h a t t h e M e u s e R i v e r w a s n o l o n g e r ind a n g e rof b e i n g f o r c e d h a d p e r s o n a l l y o r d e r e d t h e a t t a o k . (66)

f h e G e r m a n p e n e t r a t i o n h a d r e a o h e d i t s d e e p e s t p o i n t o n 24D e o e m b e r w h e n t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e 2nd P a n z e r D i v i s i o n h a d r e a o h e dC e l l e s . T h o u g h h e a v y a t t a o k s o a u s e d t h e A l l i e d lines t o r e f u s e ( S 2 F P 161-182 (63) E p-176 ( 6 4 ) Ep-161 ( 6 6 ) E p-218 ( 6 S ) F p- 1 9 7

3 1


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n some arIas the general trend was toward reduotion of the a .mansalient.The Allied lines now formed a lolid wall around the penetra ..

tion. Oer .man pressure had eased on the north flank as the Flr~t11.S. J.rar; f planned its counterattaok to open on 3 January 194~.Germanforward elements" forced by the threats to their flank, with.-drew to the east on a general line Marohe" Roohefort and. st. Hubert.British XXXOorps closed the gap existing between the First andThird U. S. Armies from Rochefort sou1:h to the vioinity of Heul..o h a t e a u . See ~p D

The oounterattaok is beyond the seepe of this monograph. Butmuo h hard fighting wa s neoessar,y before the Ge rm a n s were aga in drivenb a o k to t h e shelter of the West Wall.

T h e effects of the offensive are still a m u c h debated question.Some authorities believe it shortened the war by several monthssince the Ger.man reserves dissipated i n the a t t a o k weakened the de-fense of the Rhineland. and hastened the end. Others believe that itlengthened the war by oausing the Allies to regroup to meet the atta.okand then to redispose to oontinue the offensive.

_ A N ; ; ;; : :A L : ; ; o : r B , ; ; ; ,; ; . . : ;I _ S C R I T I C I S MIn analysing and oritioising thiB offensive action we find that

the Germans, attaining oomplete surprise, brea.ohed the Allied linesover a width of 60 miles and ponetrated Allied terri-tory to a simi...lar depth.

A s e r i e s of errors and misoaloulations resulted in t h e w e a k n e s 8of the Ardennes area. into whioh the GerDanBattacked. Allied.1n-telligenoe offioers first over estimated t h e effeot of the Germandefeat in the preoeeding summarin 'ranoe~ They oompoundedt h a terror by under estimating the Germanability to reoover and failedto reoognize indioationa of reoovery wbiobwere plainlY evident.They fUrther a11ed inproperly .valuating and interpreting evidenceof the troop m o v e m . e n t s prior to the ofensive whioh indioa.ted aJ l .offensive b u i l d u p i n the area o p p o s i t e the Ardennes.

32


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dolph H1tler 'WaS a oorporal in the Weraoht after tour yearsin World War I. Be was not a trained professional soldier yet ashead of a totalitarian state h& oould and did oommandthe Ger.man.Anrly. Bo1ng untrained his thinking and pllll1ling were unorthodox.a taot to whioh is awed muoh of the early Ger.mansuooesses. Thisfact wa s not reoognized by the Allied High OolllQandwhen it was de-oided to m a i n t a i n a defense which was little more ~ a Boreon-tngforoe in the Ardennea sector. It is significant that VonRundstedt and Mod8l~ both wall trained profess1onal Boldiers. ob-jeoted to the Ardennes attaok on the grounds that 1twas beyond thestrength of the available foroes. They reoommended that the attackbe madG in the Aaohen area in an attempt to eliminate the Alliedsalient the~ whioh oontained a heavy troop oonoentration. Thisi s t h e area where the A l l i e d Intelligenoe b e l i e v e d a n attaok~uldbe made. it the Germans did ..s~ the offensive.

The elaborate and drastio means taken by the Germans to insuresurprise was far more suooessful than they had hoped. and was largelyresponsible for the initial BucceBS. H o w e v e r . had the Allied In-telligence been functioning properly it need not have been soetteotive. The months of November and December are notorious torpoor flying weather,. in Europe, and the year 1944 was no exoeption.T h i s r e n d e r e d i m p o s G i b l e t h e r e o o n n a i 8 s a n c e f l i g h t s D 8 0 8 s 8 a r , y toobserve and Terify reports from other intelligence sou~oelS.

The defense maintained by the U. 8. VIII Oorps in' the Ardennesseotor w a s Bcarcely m o r e than a soreening toroe. DiBt$noes b e t w e e ns t r o n g points preoluded m u t u a l support. coordinated fire plans andanti-tank detenses. Depth was lacking. The reserves. thoughm o b i l e were inadequate tor t h e 80 mile seotor,. therefore it oanbe said that mobility was laoking, Se~ur! ty was insuffioient toguard against surprise, Bad patrolling been 'aotively carried on,during the 14-16 Deoember the Germanpreparations :1mmediately priort o t h e a t t a o k would have been dis oovere d.

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It was not until.or was brought into aotion ag"t the adva.noingGermans that the attaok began to 1088 its mDmElltum. Armor must beut1l1zed in '\he def'ense to provide the mob1lity and striking power I,nt seary to oombat armor in the offensive.

The Germans oommited more troop. to the offense in the narrowgap between the St. Vith salient and the north flank 1:ilanthe avail-able roads would aooommodate. the reBUl t:tng jUlDDfldighways ser-iously hampered the attaok until atter the fall of St. Vith andmuoh valuable time was lost.

the lack of reserves was a bandioa.p to the Allied High O o l l U ' l 1 8 J l d .W i t h o n l y tw o divisions aYailable in the rheatre reserve SQHAEFwashard pressed to meet the assault.

!he laok of Al11edtaotloal air support in the early days of theoffensive reaoted favorable to t h e G e r . m a n s . Had t h e weather per-mitted oontinued air attaoks on the heavy armored oonoentration inthe north oorridor on 18-19 Deoember, the results may .. 11 haveforoed the Germane to abandon the attaok. Gennan weather foreoastshad predioted the weather oonditions whioh existed prior to and dur-ing the early days of the attaok. It proTed a valuable ally.

While the Germanshad created a wide gap-in the Allied lines,'the stand a t st.Vith and it Bastogne had the ef:eot of'narrowingthe gap sinoe they limited the available road spaoa in the pene-trated area. The available roads would noii support a thrust to theJ4euseRiver. While the German o01l1lWlderaealized this, Hitler didnot and ordered the attaok oontinued long atter its f'ailure wasoertain.

LESSONSLessons to be gained from a study of' this of'f'ausive aation are

listed below.1. In the oaloulation of' risks oonsideration should be given_ _ _ _ _ ' _ _ . ~ ._ ~ _ . . _ _ . . , .. . . . . . . . . ._ . . . . . . ." ' . . . , . _ .. . . . . . . _ , . r . : . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ : - '

to the unorthodox oharaoter of' the th1Dking ot the eneJIIiYigh oommand.o _ 2. It is the tuncti on ot __ntelligence. to eVAluate and interpret 1 1 , "34


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ntormation and apply it to the tactioal situation tn terms of. . . . . . . . . . ~~_ . .oapabilities.

3. Surprise is an essential elemant in a suocessful attaok., ..Adequate seourity maasures must be undertaken to assure surprise.4. Defense should be organized in depth.6 . Mutual support must be p r O " V i d e d _ b e t w e e n strong points in

. . . . . . . . . . . _.........~.-'~.-defense . -_ " ~. . . . . _. . .. ,- .6. A ooordinated fire plan 1s neoessary in a properly oon-

structed defense.7 . C o o r d i n a t e d a n t i - t a n k d e f e n s e p l a n s m u s t b e f o r . m u l a t e d .8 . MObility must b e p r o v i d e d by a d e q u a t e r e s e r v e s

. . . . . . _ - ~ - , .. ,-9. Seourity suf'f'iciant to guard against surprise must be main.tained.

10. Adequa.te reserves !DUstbe maintained by all eohelons of"'_T~.~~~ -o- . - . ~~ . . " .

oommandfrom t h e platoon to Theatre.11. Air re oonnais aane e is neces s a r y . _in m o d e rn we.rf'a.r.e.12. Taotica1 air support is valuable in defense as well as offense.1 3. A r m o r must b e inoluded in the d e f e n s e to provide t h e m o b i l -

I.,..~ ~.r"" '~ h."' ~-". . '_o, I.I-~ . -_... . . .~,,-.' ~,~.t t y and s t r i k i n g power neoessary to oombat a r m o r whioh will be ~v a r i a b l y oommitted in the offense.

14. The number of troops whioh oan be oommitted in,an oftensiTeaotion is limited by thea~ila.ble road andnaneuver spaoe.

16. the width of the base l:1.m1ts the depth of the panetratiou.

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The German Ardennes Counter Offensive, 16 December, 1944, to 2 January, 1945 (Ardennes-Alsace...

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