CHAPTER - II THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

Relatronr between super powers and colontat Thrrd World

slates ate usually rub~ected to stresses me slra~ns because

of wrde dlvergences In Iherr percept~on pollc1e8 A super powel

conducts rts fore~gn polrcy wlth~n the global conrerl 11s polrey

alms at the conla~nmcnt of 11s rival power and the expansron

of 11s own orb^^ of rnfluence Third World rtales, on the other

hand are nal1onal19t In orlentat~on hlghly rensltlve of the~r

ldenlrty and soverlgnty and deeply concerned about lhelr

tcrr~torlal In lntegr~ry and development There slates conduct thert

foretgn pol~cles mostly In the regronal context though the~r

leaders often lecture others cspeclally the super powers on

rnternat~onal peace justcce, morrlrty and h~gher human values

There dlvergences lrmrl the scope of co-operrt10n between the

super power and Thrrd World states The cooperallon becomes

ail the more d~ff~cult , I! a Thrrd world state Irke lndra enlerlacns

greater power amb~trons on the basrs of 11s 1116. resources, locatron

ancrcnt trad~tlons m~l~tary power and democratrc pol~l~cal bystem

The global envtronment thus plays a crucral role In the

shaping of foreign poltcy of a global power ltke the US towards

a rsg~onal power Itke India As d~scurred In chapter-l two

aspects of American global ~mperallver have influenced 11s

pollcy towards lnd~a Firstly, whrle Amerrca's emergence as a

global power after Ihe end o l Second World War oblrged 11 lo

contatn all ~ndependmt cenlet i of power8 lor protecllng 118

global tnfluences, lndra'r rsptrat1on8 to play an actfve and

~ n d e p n d m t role symbol~wd by polley of non.alrgnmen1

n

created lens~ons In US-tndta tw8 Amncr'r oncour8gemont

and ars~rtance to Pak~stan can theretore tt b. soen tn mrms 01 US

attemp! to cfeale an unflroufaD1e DlianCO In South Arc. to

clrcum8cr1be Indm s role; II IS tn l h ~ s mnsa that Indo.bowel

fr~endrhlp can be v l e w d as an outcome Indo.Amer1c8n

d~fferencer Once however lndla developed frlendshrp wtth the

SovM Un~on lhra compln*lsd Indo-US dlvergencer The lrnpl~cal~onr

of Cold War for Indo-US relal~onr cannol therefore be tgnofed As

Sov~el Un~on war most tmporlant source 01 Ihreal to Arner~can

hegemony the US fore~gn pollcy durlng Ihe Cold War was

very much preoccupied w~lh ~ t r flvalry with the Sovtet Untonl

Not rurprls~ngly when US.Sovlel confronlat~on helghlcned

on accounl of Russlan Intervention In Afghanislan In 1979 l h ~ s

set ously rnfluenced US.lndia relalrons On the one hand l h ~ r

clevaltd Pakistan zlgn~ltcance In Amerlca s slraleg~c pcrcepl~on as

a bulwark againsl Sov~ct expanston In South West Asla headmy lo

Amef~ca 8 supply of arms to Pak~slan Ihls understandably angered

Indo On the other hand however lnd~a loo d~sliked Sovlel

~ntervent~on In Alghanislan that acted as a buffer slale between lnd~a

and former USSR ~hough Indh did not openly join the Wsrlern camp

tn denouncing Moscow Thta had 11s own log~c ~n movlng India

towards the U S We therelofe propose lo examme the ~mpl~catton*

of Afghanrstan crtsls known am the second Cold War lor Indo-US

rc~ar~ons In add~l~on we also propose lo d~scuss In th18 chaplet the

larues of lnd~an Ocean apartheld In South Alrrca and Narnblan

tndependunu. Polurltntm problem Non-altgnment Movement and

Nuw Econom~c lnler~t1on8l Order (NIEO) tn rnflwnctng US poltcles

towubt lndu dunng tho Reqm ara.

THE SECOWD COLO WAR

The mend of rwm Cold War whch m a n with th. Sovht antry

Into Afghantatan. led to the adoptton of r tmng antb-communlrt.

a t & - r o m t rtmnUr by RonJd Reagan The U S Govornmnt vc.wrd

th. dK.d r o m t mtlftary mterwntion cn Afghanistan as a gram thraat

to the regtonal stability ~nternatconal peace and Amerccan tnlerests

tn the Gulf region American poltcy makers were of the v i m that the

Sovcet mtlltary presence tn Afghanisthan had placed them In a better

porttion to make further moves In the Southern dtrectton. I e

Paktstan Iran and the Gulf This would not only undermine the

slab~lity of the Gulf regton but 11 would #IS0 threaten Weatern

(erpectally American) ~nteresls In the reg~on' The major Amertcan

interests tncluded the supply of Gulf 011 to the Western world at

reasonable prccea and in the requtred qurntlty. trade Investment& m d

bustnesr tnlereats of the mult~nal~onals the recycltng of petrodollars

contacnnent of Sovcet tnfluence and the preservalcon of the pro.

Amercca conrervattvc Arab regcmes If the Soviet Uncon consoltdatsd

and bgtt~mrzsd therr mtlltary control of Afghanratan. I! could be r

porenttal rrsk for these U S tnteresls 'The Arnertcrn Government

therefore undertook a number of step8 to pressure the Sovrsl& to

w~thdraw by tncreascng the coat of thew mtlttary prenenco tn

The US commctment to the Gulf regton was pledged by the

PrssrdentJ declaratcon, popularly known as the Carter doctrlne

An rnrmpt by m Mnrlde form to gain control of the Perrlan GuH

regcan wiu k fogordd w an m u u n on 1he v ~ l r l intererls of the

UntW Strtn of Armcr. a d wch m attempt d l be mpolkd by

m y w a n 8 ~ u r y Wudmng mtlrlrry fort@ Thn p m w m n l

*as aCComp8nd by uueral punlttvr measures agalnrt the Sovat

Unlon. which mcludrd. 1nl.r *Ira the boyeon of Moscov Olymptcr

the 8tOppaQe of graln supply, ~mposrtton of reslr~ct~onr on trade

e8pecr8lty On sab of htgh technology curta~lment of ftshtng prwtlcger

for Sovtet hshermen in Amertcan wafers and porlponemenl of the

consderat~on of the SALT-II treaty by the Amer~can Senate The

American Government also declared 11s support for Paktrfan a securtty

and terrttorral tntegr~ly and reaff~rmod the 1959 Paktsfan,US Treaty

If also expressed wtll~ngness lo supply arms to Paktstan to beef.up

d$ defences Inlf~ally the Amerlcan Government offered an rss~stance

package worth $400 mtllton whtch the Govonment of Paktgtan turned

down as bang inadequate Later as a result of htgh level Ialks

between Pakistan and the US the Arner~can Govarnmenf agreed In

1901 to provlde a $3 2 bllllon package of economlc asa~stancc and

mtlctary saks spread over r l x years 1901.87'

In pursuance of l h ~ s pollcy, Pakistan obtained ass~stance lor

economlc development and purchased soph~~f tca led mtlifary

sgu~pmsnl ~nciud~ng F-16 rrrcrafts and mirstles,etc Paktstan would

continue lo obtatn arms from the US unttl the exptry of the preoenl

arrangement rn 1887, when this would be renewed or a ntJr

arrangement would replace the current one prov~dsd !here 15 no

sgnif1c8nt change In the repconal secur~ly env~ronrnent In addtllon

lo thts, (ha US undertook convert operattong rtncs 1878-80 lo supply

a krn~tsd quanlrty of arm8 to the rnwrgmt groups in Afghan~~tan

Thew *.@pons fontr~butod to tha upability of these groups to pul

up a 1-h reurt.nw to the Sow! and K8rmal troops In ~ v e 1 8 l part

of Afghancstan f h e prrs~atencr and the low lntenllty of !he

a#

muqmq ~.pl mo b i e ~ troop^ undor aonUnuour P).IMI. From

mo ~ m r n p.n#c(m, mm kept HH s ~ v i o t b o w down then

and fl mmamd M. cost of mtorvm\hon in nutorbs1 and h u m n krm8

for tho Sovets Tho US also moblltud 1t8 al ter lor lrunchlng r

drptomalr offenswe agamrt the S o v ~ l mrlnary adventure and 1otnl.d

rnth other slator, erp.Wlly Th~rd World Stater. In lho~r dornmd for

the *Ithdrmal of Sovtot troopr'

In add~lion lo US-Sovlel tensions on account of Sovlet

~ntervention In Afghanistan, bolh Ihe super powerr differed on olher

burntng trruer of the day Presldenl Reagan had volced the Inlenlton

of h ~ r adminlstrat~on to promote democratic lnrtrtuttons and proctlcer

whtch pcrmtlted the 'people to choose their own way to develop their

own culture lo reconctle Ihelr own differences through peaceful

means" In pUrSU8nCe of thlr object~ve. the U S came In confl~cl

wlth the Sovtet Union The US emphasized lhal In all the counlrter

that the Sov~els had establtrhed Cornmun~st regimes through the use

of force lhey had been kept in power by the conlcnued ure of force

These 'oppretstve' governments never recetved the conranl of Ihe

people Thus. the US help lo lnrurgencier againrt them could not

be described as ' ~ n j ~ l t ~ f i ~ d and illegal ~nterference tn the ~nternal

a f fa~r l of other natlonr' They were fully In accordance w~ lh the

Amertun Declarrtton of Independence and Article 2(4) of the UN

Char te~ '~ The US dented that 1t8 rupport to the ~nrurgencrr war a

way of galntng 'world dommmce'" Aa Mrr Klrkpalrtck rtated ' Ihe

US ha8 no tmperirl vocatron and no lmperlal ambillon8 Most

A m c r ~ ~ r n do not even hvva the dartre to cas lhamretver 88 lsadrrr

0lthftnror)r l '

They onb w8nc.d to M p oth.r c w n t r n l In matnlainiq I h i r

11-nv a d int.gtltyl* ~ h . l u s ~ m ) me US suppon to insurg.nem

r g a m l 9OvOrfImQnb n Nmt*gur and EL Salvador on the b . m thN

they were not Ieg~l~mate demoeralie governmenta 'And a

government whose power depends on external support' has no

Cgitunalr grounds for complatn~ng that earernally rupporlsd lorce IS

u u d aganst d'' Thua, the superpower relattonr w r e stratnod over

the cssue of 'Ieg~limacy' of governments tn Afghanirtan. EL Salvador

and Ntcrragua

The declaration of martial law In Poland In December 1981 added

lo the tens~ons In US USSR relattons The US was 'reriourly

concerned' over the developments In Poland and demanded an end

of Sovtet ~nlervenlton which had allegedly resulted In the tmporction

of marlla1 law However the charge was denled by the Soviel Unlon

a h ~ c h ratd that the ~rnposillon of marlial law was -an inlernal matter'

of Poland Bestdes Poland was a member of the Warrrw Pacl and

a member of the social~st commun~ty of slales thus the U S was not

entitled t~ interfere in its matters In rcsponse lo the evenlr Ihe US

~mposed certain sancttons on Poland to express 11% opporil~on to thir

-brutal repression" Stnce the Soviel Union war regarded as

rerponsrbk for the 'repression ol Poland'. on 29- December 1981

aancl~ons were lmposed on 11 also The US suspended new export

lsencrar for hgh techno1oQy Items and postponed the negol~allonr

on a marnlme pact and a gram agreement The US also 'teslr~cted

the Sov~et acceaa' 10 11s ports and 'withdrew Sovlel alr rarvlce

prnflkqps' A Sovwt off-, that arranged for the purchara of US

non-rgncu)lural products, was &red down Though tho rnarlral law

war suspended on 31' hcember 1982. the government 'retamed

rrrlrutnc, powers', which cwId be used to r e ~ m p o ~ marlul law On

I

ns oarr. the US a d not remow 811 the unehdns. though they were

reeuced dunng 1983 and tW4'' Thus. the U.S sttapidan that the

S:.rtts were rttemptrng lo expand thetr tnflwnce and auppterr the

P ~ C ' O U of Poland led to a deler~oralton of super power relations

Anorher malor inc~dent whrch upset the relaltons between the

s ~ c t r powers was the shooting down ol the Korean A~rl~ner. KAL C07,

by a Sovtet jet fqhter MIG-23 on l Y Seplember 1983 The Crew

and all 269 passengers lncludfng srxty.one Amer~cans were krlled

In the ~nc~deot * The US accused the Sovrels of 'knowrngly '

do*ntng the fi~ght whlch had devrated 300 m~let from 11s assrgned

course dur~ng the last pan of 11s flrght from New York lo Seoul

Prrsldenl Reagan charged lhal the barbaric acl"' was uncalled for

aqa had no 'jlrst~f~catton ellher legal or moral' He reasoned that

commcrclal allcfalt from Sovlet Unlon and Cuba had flown over

srrTs~tive US m~l~tary fac~l~t~es"* but on no instance had they been

harmed becarisc Arnerrca bel~eved tn helping the martnes and

~ " o l s who were lost or in d~stress 'We bel~eve rn followrng

prccca~ires to prevcnl a Iragedy not lo provoke one"

A s a conseguerlce of the ~ncldent the US announced on 5'"

Sep!ernber 1983 !he suspension of certaln cullural S C I O ~ ~ I ~ ~ C and

dt~'cma!tc exchanger w~th the Sov~els However, the Prettdent d ~ d

nct adopt any sltonger measures Ithe the suspensron of srmt lalks

W I I ~ the Soviet In Geneva the cancellal~on of J 1 10 btllron. f~ve.year

US Sovtet gram deal or the bannlng of lechnolog~cal transfers to

USSR On 8" Seplember the US and ntne other nalrons tntroduced

a resolulmn m the SbCurrty Council I0 'deeply deplore the destruc(~on'

of K A L 007 and on 12' September the US Congress un8nimourly

adopted a resolut~on dercr~btng the bnctdent as a 'cold-blooded

b.c~nanrn~~ ( u r d j ~ w d t h e ~ m f ~ u r d f e ~ l l l

acts In h t s ~ o y ~ tbwwm. 1- Sew& wtood Ih. S.cunty C-1

rtrorutlon They chWW mat me w k w r had boon on r 'rpy mlrrcon'

over the 'senrcttva areas of Kamchrlrr Pentnrulr md Srkhrlln

Island:' tho US war only m r n ~ p u W ~ q the w i l d oplnan by

prewnl~ng f r l re slalemenls whtle cn rclurltty the plane had

attempted lo elude the tnlercept~ng Sov~el planer and Ignore the

wrrnlng scgnrls::

lndtrn Perspective

These developments In the early years of Ihc Reagan Prer~denc~

enhanced the super power IClnSlOnS While the US condemned lheso

Sov~el acfrons the Congress government In lndca war hes~lanl to

adopt a strong stand aga~nsl Ihe Sov~ct Union I t d ~ d not give up the

basic pr~nc~ples of 11s poltcy, yet ~t dld not openly crlllc~ze USSR s~lher

Though lnd~a contcnued lo oppose lore~gn occupahons and advocsled

the furtherance of human rcghts 11 was no1 w~lltng lo support Ihe US

I F ~ts condemnallon of the Sovtet ~ntervent~ono Mrs Gandh~ upheld

the vfes that her Gove~nmenl could not 's~ngle oul any one counlry

tor condemnal~on;' lndla saw a s~m~lartty In Ihe Sov~et ~nlervenlconu

ana Amerccan ~nlerferences' The US rearonlng that 11 had asstsled

Itle rebels In N~caragua and El Salvador agalnst '~llrgtl~mate' regcmes

was not rccepled by 4

Indm had ma~ntrmed economcc ielat~ons wcth Poland before the

elghter wh~ch conltnued to be enhanced even after mantal law war

lmpored cn December 1881 lndcr dtd no1 sever lhese I ~ e s nor

f o l l o d Ihs Amerran example, by cmpostng sanctrona on the Sovcel

Uncon and Poland The Polcrh stlurlton had been v10WOd wlth

comrmoylndu U n ~ t u ~ ~ m r t n m e ~ r .

o w t the *rue dur~ng tho Commonnatrh lherda of Government

Summtt 130" Segrembar - 7' 0ctob.r 1 B 8 f ) The Communtque

wued a1 dr and exprerud the conatn of the memb.n owr the

'reftour tmpl~carfonr' 11 could have on the communtly of nattonr

'They conrdered that the poopbe of Poland rhould be left to

deterrntnt thetr Own derllny free from foretgn 1nterferencah After

the declaratton of martla1 law Indta continued to enhance tts trade

relat~ons wtlh Poland On 23'* October 1982 the Energy M~n~rter

Mc Shtv Shankor slgned an agreemen wtth h ~ r Pol~rh counterpart

to eoubie the trade between the two counlrtes~ In December 1982

rne r ~ o countr~es s~gned a New Prolocol for tncreastng trade In

1983,' These acttons tndlcaled that the developmenlr In Poland had

not affected the lnd~an poltcy towards 11 as well as the Sovtat Un~on

W~rh respect lo the Korean Atrllner Ifagedy also Indl8 616 not

openly support the Sovtet stand, but tt adopted a mtld approach I1

had asked the Councll of the Internattonal CIVII Avtatton Orgrntrrl~on

(ICAO, tr ~nvesltgate the ~nctdent However. the Sovlelr opposed the

proposal on the ground that they w c e already ~nverttgattng the trsue

In spfte of Sovtet object~on. a resolution asking for the ~nvestgattons

was passed on 16% September 1983 and the ICAO rlarted

invest~galtons on 17- !japternber Indta, along w~th Rulrta and Chtnr

abslrtoed from votlng on the rerolutton The lndtan representaltve

clarlf~ed that the government agreed to 'the operahve part' of the

fesolutton It had abstained because 'the rerolutton as a whole was

not balanced 7' Thur the Indtan government3 stand war pfo-Sovml

T h e increalcrd IMm tn tho wper power relatwnr, duo lo these

d.rrkpmentr. d d nol mdro any c h a w in lndo SOwl lm Thts

M ttw U S to mw tnda as I, mcrmb.r of tho 'Sovml camp' a d h

was re~uctrnl lo mprwr ch mI#t*ns wlh lndu Tkur ev(Hy m t .

*mlch ouflad the US and USSR aprn reduced the p o t r ~ ~ l r l t e s of

wner US.lnd~r relatwns

The Under C u m n t r of AecommodrUonr

Though the gromng c I 0 8 e o ~ ~ of Indtr and USSR tn genrrrl m

ln61r s reful8l to Openly Cfrttcrse f?usrran lnterventton in Afghantslan

In part~culrr generated tenstons In Indo.Amertcan relat~ons ye( 8

slated above the Afghsncslan cf l r tr pushed lndla towrfds

Wa~htnglon As erplrtned by r keen of observef of lndo Amertcan

teialtons Sovtel mtlttrry tntervent~on In Afghanrslan allered the brrtc

parameters of New Delh~ 5 prospecttve stralegtc prol~le and brougtit

a grudglng realisatron on 11s part that 11 had lo cullrvate the goodwtll

of Ihe US Chtna and even Paktrtan :' (reca!l Ihs then Fo~etgn

Minirrer Natarrmha Rao 5 htntr al Karacht In 1980 for a coordtnated

ap~foach lo the Afghan trsue) to counteract the adverse tm~ltcat~ana

ct the S~sret move on lndtan secuftly That Ihe Sovtol Unron dtd so

w~thout watntng the lndrans eracerbaled New Delht s dtrenchantmenl

and provtded unwelcome proof that derpile professtons of frlendshrp

Moscow would not hes~tate tn doing whal 11 cons~dered lo be In 91%

Dcsl ~nterests regardless of India s e n r ~ t ~ v t t ~ e s ~

New Delht, on the other hand could not fall to notrce the outcome

of d~rcurstonr gorng on belwten Wrshtnglon and lalamabad on the

Afghan *sue Theti talks made I! clear thr l netther of them war

wrll~ng to go that far Pak18t.n s then Fotetgn Mtn~ster. Agha Shrht

neatly epttomrred the new fetrt~onrhrp 8s 'a handuhrbe not r o

embracen Once thbM ltm18 were understood. the worst fears of

New h l h t mga lo~ng the US-Pakruen 8Ikmce worn $ w e w n r l

N r r Q Mum. tb h e n M m w l t a t m ' s gnrl.r prudmcr n

O*aW mth Chln8 me mprovoment m Indu s own rdahons with

C - k M CoMnbutetY to ndwhon m New 0alh1'a trnmediale . though

not bn9-tern Whmly feat*. a b thereby r n r b W to dtstrnce ttrelf

from b e o r end m o w c b ~ r torrards the Amertcanr*

New Deihl's move to reduce 11s dependence on Moscow also go1

an ~mpetua from tts concerns regardlog 11s non-al~gned credentirts

which were clouded ever stnce the Slgnrng of the Indo-59v1et Tremty

tr 7971 Since lnd~a was to ~nhertt the Non.Altgned Movement (NAM)

c?a~nansh~p In 1983 the val~dat~on Of 11s non altgnmcnt ctedent~als

In Ire eyes of tts members In general and South AsIan members In

part~cular who desired the condemnat~on of the Sovlrt act had

become a mustv S~mtlarly Indla with a large Musl~m mlnor~ty and

c ~ q ? ~ ~ c a l e d fles wtth the countr~es of the Islamic crescent must have

felt the need to show greater sympathy to lhetr concerns about the

Scv~et.attempled s ~ b j ~ g a l t ~ n of thclr Musl~m brelhfsn lndta

therefore rejected the Cuban concept of the USSR as a natural ally

cr 1t.e U i as a natural adversary of the NAM

The above menl~oned roots of tens~ons In 1ndo.Sovlet relrt~ons

I e j lndta to reduce her dependance on Moscow Thts became

apparent when it refused l o review the Treaty of Peace and

Fr~endshtp (1971) wtth Sovtet Un~on T~IS provtded Reagan

admlntslrallon r untque atmosphere of co operatton between the

rif.:ary forces of US and India For the f~rst ltme a jotnl Indo-US army

expcdtttan, under the Ierdershtp of Major H S Chauhrn. cltmbed the

7 273 metre Mana peak The three batches of twenty-rrx cl~mbers

retched the peak m r~ r teen days, through the soulhern route which

had never h e n used W o r e aa n

The US-lnbta CO-Operatlon was also wttnesshd In the courses

by the National Defence College (New Delht) and the

corlege of Combat (MhOw) for US ofllcers The vlstt of US wanhrps

13 inatan ports also showed an lncrease1; by late 1988 Until then.

the US ships found It dtfflcult to sad Into lndtan ports because lndla

ha6 rns~sted that the Ships should declare thal they had no unclear

weapons on board The US had persalently refused to ellher conflrm

or deny their presence On board However, l nd~a made a compromise

and altered tts stand Now 11 just requlres thal the fore~gn naval

vessels should slgn a statement that 'they have noted the host

country s wtsh thal vtsltlng shtps must not carry nuclear weapons""

Thus the late e~ghttes wctnessed a llmlled progress In the US.lnd~an

!e!at~ons tn the sphere of arms-sales and technology transfer

INDIAN OCEAN - THE THIRD STRATEGIC AREA

In Ihe Reagan strategy of deal~ng w ~ l h the Russ~ans from a

:.:sition of strength. the lnd~an Ocean assumed an enhanced

sb~n~ficance as the l h ~ r d straleg~c area from wh~ch Amer~can power

c3uld be brought to bear upon the Sov~el Un~on Sfnce the beglnnlng

ci !he farst Cold War Ihe US and 11s European allles have targeted

tLetr bombers and mlss~les on Russ~a from the Atlantic and Pacrflc

rr;lons To thts tradtl~onal West East and Arctlc lrajector~es ol attack

cn the S ~ n o - S o v ~ e t Cornmun~st land mass the lndlan Ocean

hlsrorlcally seemed to be an allract~ve add~l~ona l staglng area for the

US arsenal The northen reach of the Indtan Qcean strelch close

enough to the S~no-Sov~et land mass lo brlng any and all po~nts there

wlthln the range of the Amencan bombers and m~sstles of even an

ear l~er vintage In fact 11 was t h ~ s strategtc dlmenston that by

md.19601 OM US b.ck to t h . Indun Wan stnu the .nd of

her oncl murlvr p- In tho a m dunng tho S.eond World War

The Unctcd States began evcnclng serious stratqlc interest In the

lnd~an Ocean regton when the Britcsh announced In 1968 thew pollcy

of w~thdrlwal from the 'East of Suer' by the end of 1971 The

Amerlcan mll~tary planners were apprehensive that the resultant

'power vacuum' may be filled by the Russians, the Ch~nere and other

elements hosttle to the American and Western interests The Bnt~sh

were anxtous that the Amerccans should step In on the scene and

the laner were not at all reluctant to do sos W~th a vlew to facrl~tate

such a process the Brlttsh government carved out the so called

Brctlsh lnd~an Ocean Terr~tory (0101) tn 1965 In the Western reglon

of the lnd~an Ocean The BlOT compr~sed the islands of Aldabra

Farquhar and Desrocher from Seychelles group of Islands and the

Chagos Arch~pelago a dependency of Maur~tlus Through thn devrce

the Brltlsh detached the Chagos Arch~pelago (In whlch the now

famous Dlego Garcia base 1s located) from Maur~tlus In December

1966 Br~laln and the US s~gned an agreement whlch allowed the

latter to use BlOT for 50 years as a jo~nt Anglo-Arner~can bare A

satelltte tracklng statcon was ret up In the laland of Mahe In

accordance w~th another agreement s~gned between them In 1967

Early tn 1970. the US Congress appropriated $5 4 mtllton lor bulldlng

a 'communccatcon base' In Dcego Garcca and the constructton work

on the base began In March 1971

S~nce then the United States d ~ d not look back Her ~nvolvemenl

and mll~lary presence in the lnd~an Ocean reglon grew by

leaps and bounds and w ~ t h it grew the size and scope of the

operat~ons in Otego Garc~a, whlch now stands as a full fledged

ultra-modarn nuclear naval a e m t s r ~ k bare 1 ranked wry htgh

as a c r ~ c t a l constituent In the natton's global r t r a teg~c~ r r cun ty

frame work conffontlng the Sovtet Unton Several dramal~c

developments In the lndtan Ocean llnoral slnce the 1970'8 (break

up of Pak~stan Arab.lrrael~ war of 1973 011 embargo by the OPEC

fall of the Shah of Iran furmoll In E t h ~ o p ~ a and elsewhere along

the eastern sea board of Afrlca Sov~e l lnvaslon of Afghanistan

and the Iran-Iraq war, etc ) enhanced the pollt~co-mtl~tary and

econornlc s~gnlflcance of the lndlan Ocean reglon for the West

Furthermore the technological break4hrough In man's abll~ty

to mlne the Sea bed greatly Increased the American and

Western ~nduslrlal and commerc~al stake In the Indian Ocean Crucial

developments In the arms race (ABMs SLBMs. SLCMs elc )

greatly Increased the strateglc Importance of the already vital ocean

The Sov~et Unlon had In the process become more vulnerable

to attack launched from the lnd~an Ocean reglon Such a strateglc

prospect of havlng the rnalnland of the adversary w ~ t h ~ n thelr range

of attack from a low p r ~ o r ~ t y reglon l ~ k e South Asta, was l ~ k e a

dream come true for Amerlcan and Western rnll~tary planners

Consequently, there would be a very welcome reducl~on In

the rlsk of Russian refahatory blow to continental Un~ted Staler

and Western Europe wh~ch after all are most v~ta l (In that order)

for the Americans That IS why successive Amerlcan

admlnlstrat~ons have strengthened the Olego Garcla base

despatched naval task forces into the reg~on in ever

~ncreasing numbers and made concerted effort6 to acqulre

more bases, other off-shore and on-shore fac~ l~ t les in the

J m d s and the littoral states of the Indtan Ocean

T)w Sovkt Union m thorefom deterantnod to do emrythlng In

r t r ~ ) O m r t n l i r r t h . W s r W m . e r s r s a d p ~ w ~ n M , q a n

horn w)mh it a mort vulnsrabb to Amenun oflenslve crp8bd1ty Was

d m y wonder then Mat Mere has been an ever gromng super power

military presence. poktccal involvement and also h~ghtened rivalry

between the Big Two in the lndlan Ocean? There was a crucial

dffference though between the objecttves and nature of the power

projected by the two super powers In the reglon The US sought the

Indlan Ocean as an area for poss~ble offensive use The Soviet goals

were essent~ally defenscve and her presence had been hlslorccally and

essent~ally react~ve However. ln the context of this chapter 11 15

necessary to h~ghllght the broad contours of the expanding US mlltlary

presence In the Indian Ocean regton

Between Oclober 1973 and December 1978, the US has sent 18

task forces of ~ t s navy into the lndtan Ocean In January 1979

Dr Zblgnlew Brzezlnskl. US Nallonal Securtty Advlser, declared that

an 'arc of crisis' stretched along the lnd~an Ocean I~ttoral. whlch IS

dotted wlth frag~le social and polttical structures He argued that

unless the 11s malntalned a v~able presence and was able to come

up wllh a qucck, strong and adequate response, the local confl~cts In

the regton and the concomitant dlsorder and lnstabtl~ty would be

exploited by 'elements hostile to our values and rympalhetlc to our

adversaries' In llne with t h ~ s perception, more ships from the

Med~terranean and the Paclhc fleets were dlverted to the lndlan

Ocean S~nce then, the US naval presence lncrsased from 14

warrhlps in Aprli. 1978 to a record hlgh of 40 warshlps In May 1981

It 18 estimated that by 1082, this number had been slabtl~~ed at about

30 wanhips permanently stationed in the lnd~an OceanY

~ftot assuming ofhca In January 1981. Pres~denl Reagan took

wgorour r w r to augment the Indian Ocean fleet on a 'permanent

barn' *nMout ~ U C I I Q the Pacific 'leer or transfer~ng naval unlts from

the Madltemnaan sea In April. 1981 the Pentagon announced plans

to create an Independent Rapld Deployment Command (RDC) AS a

first step Defence Secretary. Welnberger dlrecled that the 56 000 man

army of the laC Air-borne corps be ass~gnd to the operat~onal control

of the Marine LI General Paul Kelly who headed the planned RDF

at the Macdtll Air Force Base Tampa Flor~da The U S has now

launched a vigorous search for tac~l~tles for the forces located tn

Dtego Garcca and the RDF personnel In the reglon whlch would make

the task of per~odcc rotallon of forces easler The Reagan

admlnlstrat~on was requesting many states In the regcon for "Rest and

Recreat~on' and other on.shore and oft.shore facll~t~es In return 11

was offering sizeable cndustr~al investments and other ~nducernents

I! was rurnoured that one such offer was made recently lo the SII

Lankan govoernrnent that latter was favourably ~ncllned and was

cons~der~ng the macn naval port of Trtncomalee In th~s regard'

It was als? reported that the US was conslderlng the creatlon of

a F~f th flee1 haw~ng at least two nuclear powered alrcraft carrles. one

crutser and SIX destroyers Furthermore the US had deployed ~ t s

long-range 8-52 bombers and the h~gnly sophlstlcated combat control

acrcraft called AWACS In Olego Garcia. Saudc Arabta. Israel and

Egypt Bestde. D~ego Garc~a was batng developed cnto a super base

with a 12.000 feet runaway capable of handllng all-types of a~r-craft.

a deep water anchorage capable of recelvlng even Nlmttz class

nuclear-powered errcraft carrcers. and e~ghl fuel storage tanks wlth a

total capaclty of 640.000 barrels suff lc~nt to support a carrler task

force for 30 days and a h~ghly soph~amted eleclron~c communtcal~on

star~on:' The olego Garc:a base has undoubtedly assumed

consduabk gao-Stfatwe Sgntf inca tn lhe polit~m-mtlmry str8t.g~

of the Reagan Admmlstrat~on

lmplicationr of lndian Ocean Politics for US-India Relations

S~nce both Indta and the US are 'stgnlficanl players' tn the mgion.

they have several shared interests In the region, lncludtng those of

prevent~ng confllct and promottng economtc development. social

coheston, polltlcal stablllty, democrat~c governments. human rtghts

and the upllftment of people In splte of these common perspectives.

the two have d~vergent gCOp0llll~al perspect~ves~ Thus, the Indian

Ocean contcnued to be a major factor In the US-lnd~a relal~ons in the

e~ghr~es

The lnd~an government was disturbed over the developmenl of

US bases on the terrttorles bordertng the lndtan Ocean and the

establtshment of the Rap~d Oeploymenl Force These US acl~ons

were ~ncons~slenl wlth the 1970 Lusaka Declarat~on, whtch had

procla~med the lnd~an Ocean a Zone of Peaceao. On the contrary.

the US regsrded the establ~shment of bases In the lndian Ocean as

an essent~al component of tts forelgn policy, espec~ally after the Sovtet

entry into Afghanistan4'. Secondly, the growth of the US and Sov~et

naval factllties in the lndian Ocean was viewed w~th grave concern

by Ind~a, slnce it was teared that the b ~ g power rivalry would inevitably

become linked with the regional confl~cts Thls would accelerate the

arms race between the countr~es of the region and divert their

resources and energies away from developmental act~vit~es At the

same t~me, the influence of the superpowers would bring about

'distortions of their natural evolution' and increase the poss~bil~ties

$1 .convulttVe Or v lot tnt PoI~ttcaI change- Further. the

:uzrrp0$1~0nln0 of S u W V o W n Could L a d to thelr confrontrt~on and

.war utn~ch would endagner the enllrc region': Thus Mrs l nd~ ra

3andh1 denled the posslblllty 01 the US or any other forces acting as

a 'Stab~lu~ng factor' In the regton '1

Paklstan s antlcl~ated support to the Central Command operalung

from Kenya to Paklstan StnOuSly threatened lnd~an secur~ty Interests

The US-Paklslanl co.operatl0n In the held of tntell~gence gathering

crovlded Paklstan with essential ~nformatlon about Ind~a" and the US

a ~ d provtded Pahlstan wcth an opportun~ty of slrengthen~ng ~tsetf For

'PIS ass~stancc Pakistan would be wllllng to reply the US wlth ~ t s

support to RDF and 'varlous forms of strategic co-operation" In the

Ferslan Gulf '' These fears had been substantlaled by a former

-ember o f the US Slate Department s Policy Plannlng Counc~l

'.Ir Fukuyama s statement that Pak~stan could serve as an ~mportant

ei!repot for the RDF movlng from Dlego Garcia or Phlllpp~nes Inlo

'"e Perslan Gulf Mr Fukuyama s report and Mr Jack Anderson s

"sclosures lndlcated that Pak~stan had agreed lo prov~de use of 11s

a fttelds to the US planes In case of a Soviet threal lo the Gulf from

Afghanistan The President of the Movement for Restoration o f

Democracy also alleged on 4" March 1983 that Pres~denl Z~a.ul.Haq

bad 'offered uncondltlonal support to plans for upgrad~ng naval

facil~lies for RDF in Baluchtstanl ports and the construct~on of alr

bases In southern Baluch~stan as a part of US 'forward strategy' In

the regton Pakistan had acqu~red the status of a 'front-llns state'

due to the exlstlng ctrcumstances In Afghanistan and Iran Thus

lnd~a feared that the US and Pakstan would promote the11 relations

for mutual benehtr. wh~ le endanger~ng lnd~an ~nterests*

The Indims Wn 8SpaCully pef lurkd by the enhancement of

naval hull108 on the bland of Owgo G a w . They viewed it as 'an

arrow potnted at the heart of world peace Under the c~rcumrtances

one a n only conclude that D q o Garaa IS alrned at the developtng

countrtem as 11 1s agatnrt the Sovut Unton' The lnd~an anx~ousness

was further ~ncreafed when the US den~als about the butld-up bases

proved to be false A US lnformatlon Service offlctal obrerved In

February 1883 at Allahabad

'The evolut~on of the Amertcan plans for Dtego Garctr have changed rad~cally over time and 11 ts futlle to try convtnce lndtanr that we d ~ d not secretly Intend all along to turn the atoll Inlo a major stagtng area complete wtth runways for 8-52s and anchorage for balltsttc rnlss~le submar~nes'

In splte of this acknowledgement the Reagan Adm~mstrat~on

cont~nued to deny the lnd~an allegattons of the developmenl bang

aimed aga~nst the Thtrd World and declared that the lnd~an

statements had exaggerated the relevance of D~ego Garc~a These

den~als of the US even whtle the developments conl~nued on the

island, created doubts aboul the 'cted~bthty and ~ntenttons' of

Amer~ca. whtch resulted In a deler~oral~on of the US.lnd~a relal~ons"

The lnd~an government also expressed 11s d~mapproval of the US

lark force It was seen as a potentla1 threat rlnce non of the ltttoral

states had the ab~ l~ ty to counteract 11s force. All the atr-craft carrters

of the force operate about twenty-four flghterr like F-14, thtrty r l x

atlack alrcrafl like A-6 and A.7. four E.2 Hawkeye early warnlngl

control aircraft, four EA-60 electron~c warfare a~rcraft. and three

RA-SC long-range reconnaissance aircraft In ~ t s martltme

rtconnairrance and anti -cubmar~ne optrat~onr 11 IS supported by ten

S-E V~king ASW aircratl and eight SH-3 Seeklng ASW heltcopterr

Indta feared that, 'These large float~ng aifieldr. protected by ruffact

f l

md rubm8nnn. u n bring to k r r 8 concentt8ted fire-pomr

at l g w n W e e at any g m n tlmeu Though the US presence In the

Indian Oman ma h a than that n the Paclf~c and the Atlrntlc or the

med~terrmem. I( endangered Indlan securlty

These lndlan concerns were accentuated by the tact that the U S

had developed close 'polltlco~m~lttary Ilnkages' w~th some powers of

the regron and reglonal groups Its relatrons wrth the members of

the ASEAN rn South East Asla. Bangladesh Sf1 Lanka and Pakrstan

In South Asla some members of the GCC In the Gulf Somal~a and

Kenya In East Africa. Egypt and Israel in the Red Sea and the

Medrterranean reglon had helped 11 to 'consol~date and leg~trmixe" 11s

presence Thus the US threat lo any country wh~ch was not a part

of 11s fold. was ~ncreased'* The lnd~an allegat~ons become stronger

when In early 1988. the US based International Development Aid

IIDA) announced a reductton In the a ~ d to lnd~a by more than hall

due to 'budgetary constraints' (from f 5 5 million to S Z 5 million)

However, at the same t~me the a ~ d to Sf1 Lanka was enhanced and

the a ~ d packet of $480 million lo Pak~slan *as no1 reduced Pakrsriln

had recelved th~s favoured treatment since it provlded bases and

strong polnts for stalronlng addillonal contrngents of the RDF and the

use of ~ t s bases and facll~t~es In Karach~ Gwadar and Peshawar"

This proferentral treatment of Pakistan 11s assrslance by the US was

seen as a direct threat by lndra due to the tradtllonal rlvalry between

lndra and Pak~stan

Role of the Soviet Union

The U S on 11s part, accused lndla drscr~m~nating between the

two super powers and condoning Sov~et actlvrt~es, whlch threatened

w ragma ngloculrca and wcunty After tho oil crisis of 1973. VH rovwt

Union had 8ROmpt.d to over the Iittofrl m d hinterland states by

means of 'friendship' trestles The Sovletr had concluded such

treaties with Afghanistan. Ethiopia. Ind~a. Iraq. Maur~tius.

Mozambqw. Tanzmu. and five countries in the Middle East Within

one year of such a treaty being signed w~th Afghanistan. the Soviet

troops had entered the country The U S feared that the other

treaties could be used in a similar manner to establish Soviet control

over the Indian Ocean regions'

The US viewed the establishment of Soviet military positions

along the northern Gulf margin or on the Arabian Sea I~ttoral

overlooking the Hormuz Strait, as a threat to the free flow of oil It

bel~eved that through these establishments. the Soviets would

pressurize the countries dependent on ~rnported 011 for their ~ndustrial

energy upp ply'^ The Soviet military bu~ld.up would also be a threat

to 'the stability of the region and to the national Independence of the

nations in the area"

The U S cr~tcised Indla's 'soft' att~tude towards the Soviet Union

and its expansion in the lnd~an Ocean The US stated that both lndia

and Sri Lanka had contributed towards the declaration of the Indian

Ocean as a zone of peace, but since then lndia had changed its

stand While Sri Lanka viewed the Soviet and American actions with

'apprehension*, Mrs lnd~ra Gandhl's Government tended to 'tilt'

towards the Soviets lndca dismcssed the Sri Lankan appfehens~ons

as an 'e~aggeratton'~ and was h~ghly critical of the US actions

The Indian government clarified that it advocated the removal of

all foreign forces and baser from the region Though ~t expressed

as dissat~sfrction w~th the Soviet activities, i t severely opposed the

US pramco W u S e the US was greater threat to rrg~on" lndta

argued that the Indian Ocean has a greater strateg~c relevance for

the US than for the USSR because the Tndent.1 submar~ne.taunched

m ~ s s ~ l e s from the lndlan Ocean can strtke the ~ndustr~al areas of

southern Russla. While the US can u t ~ l ~ z e t h ~ s threat lo deter the

Sovtets. the USSR Cannot stm~larly operate agalnst the US9* The

S o v ~ t s would not be anxlous to deploy thelr SLMBs In the area since

the~r range was such that they would not reach the US from the Ind~an

Ocean Secondly the Sovlet submarines have lo crulse long

d~slances through choke polnts conftolled by the West to reach the

l nd~an Ocean The USSR could pose ~ t s counter threat more

eflect~vely 11 11 SLBMs In the Paclflc the North Sea and the Atlantlc

Thus the Sov~ets would not be ~nteresled tn uscng the lndlan Ocean

for any rn~l~tary programmes

l n d ~ a also alleged that the conllnuous US deployments slnce

1971 had not been prlmar~ly the result of the cold war of the Sov~et

threat I t had evolved the RDFICENTCOM strategy not to prevent

Sonlet expanslonlsm In the Gul f but to secure the 011 f~elds for ~lsel f

The Sov~et mllltary occupal~on of Afghanistan had only been used as

a pretext for a strategy whtch had been worked out In advance and

perhaps would have been executed even 11 the Sov~ets and not

entered Afghan~stan"

The lndtan government dtd not etrongly oppose the Sov~et moves

In the regton because the Sov~et Unlon appeared lo be more

'sympalhettc' of the Indlan v~ews on the lnd~an Ocean, and even

expressed tts support for the ~ d e a of a zone of peace The Sov~et

Un~on endorsed the proposal for an rntsrnat~onal conference In Srl

Lanka, to cons~der the ~mpkmenta t~on of the 1971 General Asrembly

r m M m Hl<l pmpO@d by W r g a l c r r for a confarenu of world

wdom on tnr, lndun Ocem On the contrary, tho US had adoptd

a d~ffefent DoSdmn to that of lndta It had m s t w t l y refused to accep~

the proposal for a peace zone as a 'real~sttc' and 'kas~ble' one.

Amenca had reasoned that even tf the superpomn agreed to a

compbte d ~ ~ t I l t ~ r t t 8 t t O ~ of the reglon. 11 would rematn 'an area of

~nternal. tntrareglonal. tnterreg~onal nvrlrces', stnce several countrces

of the regton had devloped thetr own navtes At the same Itme. the

US was not supportive of a conference tor d~scuss~ng the

~mplemenlatron of the December 1971 resolullon stnce 11 felt that

'such a conference would be long on denunc~at~ons of the US and

shon on aclual achtevernenlW

Both lnd~a and the US contrnucd to uphold the same vlews wh~ch

had been presented In the late stxlles Thus the lnd~an Ocean

poltt~cs and r~valry created obstacle tn Irnprovernenl In Indo.US

relat~ons However as d~scussed In the next chapter, once the second

Reagan adrnrntstratton moved towards accornmodat~ng Ind~a's

reg~onal tnleresl In south asla (except Pak~stan). Indra loo moderated

~ t s cr~tc~sms of US act~v~t~es tn the lnd~an Ocean

SOUf H AFRICA - APARTHEID AND NAMIBIAN

INDEPENDENCE

Apartheid a@ a Factor

Afrrca, ltke Asla and Laltn Amenca, IS a part of the world where

the two super power* are attemplcng to enhance thetr tnfluence The

Sovtst Uncon had gamed tnfluence over various l~beratton movements

ltke the Popular Movement for the Lcberalcon of Angola (MPLA). the

Front for th. Liberation Of Mozambique (FRELIMO). the African

National C o n p W in South A t r ~ u and S W A W in Nam~ba

by assnttng their =wars of l~berat~on ' *~ Tho US was not wtlltng to k t

the enttre 19gW SltP Out of tts control and thus planned ~t Afr tun

pol~cy accordingly In Africa. South Afrca was awarded a rpectal

stgndcance for Amertcan Plans of creatag 'a Qlobal Pax Amertcm

systemw It not only prevents Sovlet expanstontsm. but also provides

economtc beneflts The US has substantla1 ~nvsstments In the form

of bank loans, d~rect investment a13 securlty In south Atr~ca"', and

~mports all 11s ~ndust r~a l dtamonds 80% 11s manganese and large

quanttttes of copper, ztnc tin, asbestos chromtum and vanadium from

the country ': It also provtdes the sea route for otl and other raw

maternls Thus. the US d ~ d not want to loose lhrs s~gn~f~cant lrade

partnePJ It was also grateful for South Afrlcan support to be US

naval presence In the l nd~an Ocean. and oppostt~on to the

establlshmenl of a zone of peace In the regton *'

The advenl of Mr Reagan to Pfes~dency further enhanced the

srgnlflcance awarded to Soulh Afr~ca Durlng the electton compalgn

hls refererace lo "states' rtghts' had provrded the lndlcat~on lhal Soulh

A!rlca would recelve h ~ s support This lndlcal~on was strengthened

by h ~ s descr~ptton of South Afrlca as a 'protector of Weslern ~nlererls'

and 'a bastton of Weslern ~nfluence and control"" whtch had offered

Its assistance to the US In all tts wars Even before he had become

President, he had asserted

many Americans have lnlerpreted our tnlerest In Afr~ca as an extenston of our desire to achteve rec~al equaltty and ellm~natton of inlurttce bared on race I 'm afratd that thts IS a nattve over s~mpl~flcatton of what really 1s at ISSU~ '

Consoquantly. he m n o U n W In h18 h n t Intenww that the US

would not 'abmdon' South A f r l u *' Later n Match 1981, In r n

~nlervrew wth Mr Walter Cronk~ta he repeated that the US would be

.helpful' lo South Afrlcr To achleve th~a object~ve. the Rergrn

Adm~n~stnt~on adopted a fresh approach with reapect to the prevvhng

concerns of enforcing reforms n South Afrtcr, end~ng aprrthed and

secunng Nrmlblan lndependenceH These atma had been addrea~ed

by the Carter Admlnlstratlon as problems of the reglon W~thout the

emphasls on the Sovlet role I t had therefore, l a ~ d exphas~s on the

North-South d~alogue rather than the East-West President Reagan

however regarded lhls as an 'unrealist~c' approach. slnce Mr Carter

had not comprehended the Sovlet ~nfluencc': Mr Reagan vlewed the

sltuatlon In Afrlca as a "Russian weapon acmed at us"" and South

Alrtca as 'one of the most Important arenas for East-West rivalry*

He thus Intended to adopt a polrcy whlch would fulfil US natlonal

Interests rather than one based on 'African concerns"? Another

aspect of the Carter policy whlch was rejected by Mr Reagan was 11s

'public scolding' of South Afrlcan government for 11s pollcy of raclal

d~scrlrn~natlon '' In splle of certain changes the Reagan

Admlnlstrat~on clarified that it was as much an advocate of human

rtghts as 11s predecessor It would only alter the method for promoting

!hem7' The admlnlstration practised by South Afrlca was expressed

by Mrs Kirkpatrlck she sald that the US had ended ~ t s raclal

dtscrlmlnat~on and would not give acquiescence lo 11 In other partB

of the world"

In thla goal, the Reagan admlnlstrat~on expressed a scm~tartly wllh

the lndran condemnallon of apartheld lndla had been a conatant

C~I~ IC of the pract~ce whlch v~olates the human rtghts and the UN

Charter 11 condemned the practice of aparthetd at vrrloua forums

Jnd mrk.4 mth olhef Afro-Asun countrmr In the Common malth,

the UN and tho Non-Alqned Movement to m d the n u r t poItc108'~.

Even after the Botha nptm set tavorad for ward the new conrblut~on

~n 1983. lndra remrlned dlssrtrsflbd It referred to the trtcrmerrl

Parl~amenl as a 'constltut~onal shame* whcch provtded democrrt~c

rrghts to the 'whrtes the Indrans and the Coloureds' but dented them

to the 'Blacks' Indta. consequently. banned the entry anto Indta of

those South Afrtcan lndlans who had prrttccprted In the elect~ons held

lo ~mplement the constrtutron In 1984 '.

Besrdes lndra also assrsted the llberat~on struggle by 'moral and

mrl~tary* a ~ d to the mrl~tary wlng of the Afrrcan Nat~onal Congress and

by economrc atd to the AsIan Offcce of the ANC In New Delh~ The

lndlan governmenl asstsled the ANC and SWAP0 rn eslablcshlng lhe~r

rnlsslons rn New Delhr" Econorn~c mater~al and humanltarcan a ~ d

was provrded lo South Afrlcan and Namlblan Independence

movements Some economtc atd was also provcded to the

lnternatconal Defence and Atd Fund for Soulhern Afrlca, UN Trusl

Fund lor South Afrcca. UN Educal~on and Tralnlng Programme for

South Afrcca. UN Fund for Namcbca the UN lnstltute for Narnrbra and

the Spec~al Nonalrgned fund for Nam~bra" It welcomed the

estebl~shment of the Southern Afr~ca Development Coordtnalron

Conference (SADCC) for endrng the domlnatron and explortat~on of

South Alrtca on the other Afr~can states Ind~a attended some of the

SADCC meetlngs r s an 'observer' and offered ~ t s 'expert~se and

techn~cal co-operal~on' In the fleld of food and agrcculture small scale

tndustrles, transport. telecornmun~catrons, conventronal sources of

energy, rural eledrtfeat~on, solar energy and w~ndpower'~

Dt i iemmS a m balween Indta m d tho US wnh respect to the

method of endlng apartherd and securlnp Namibian ~ndependence

The Reagan odmlntstratton had given up the 'frosty aloofness' of the

Carter years, to Present a new approach of 'conrtructive

engagement" It referred to the imposition of 'pressure for an end

to apartheid wlth restraint and decorum. and always behind the

scenes'Q Thts pol~cy was atmed at securlng a government bared

on the constnl of the people and end of racial dtscrimlnation, along

w~th malntalntng the US access to minerals and the -8trrteglc- Cape

Sea route It. further, almed at the preserval~on of 'reg~onal secur~ty

In Southern Afrlca agalnst the Soviet-Cuban threat'*x In order to

achieve these ob~ect~ves. the pollcy offered *matcrtal and polltlcal

support' to the "forces 'wtthin and outstde' the South Afrlcan

government whlch strive lor 'peaceful change' in South A l r ~ c a ' ~

It belleved that ~mposilton of economlc ranctlons war not

sufflc~ent The mll~tary strength and economlc self-sufl~ciency ol

Saulh Afr~ca would prevent it from be~ng pun~rhed and presrur~zed

by olher countr~es The l~mited economic loss caused by the

sanct~ons would only make South Africa more obstructive to reforms

Thus the US laid slress on entering Inlo a d~alogue, rather than

confrontation wlth South Alrrca" Instead of the 'counter productlve'

confrontation. w~th South Africa Instead of the 'Counter productlve'

confrontation. it bel~eved that 'qulet persuasion- would be more

conducrve to reforms in the ractal pollclesH The 'overt pressure' war

to be replaced by a 'kid-glove, all-carrot-and.no-st~ck approach' of

constructive engagement Platt stated ''

'Although we no less than others condemn 8pmk.1d. wa do no1 bat~eve t h r l sweeptng, punttlve unenforeerblm remoluttonm contribute to the eas~ng of South Att tcr ' r problsms o l a effect on the contrary IS to compl~crte the negottattons "ow undeway 'or settlement tn ~ a m t b t a ~

Thus 'coex~stence represents the best hope of foater~ng

constructtve ~ h a n g e ' ~ .

The US asserted thal sanct~ons were not needed because South

Afrlca would ~tself Itberal~ze 11s poltcy when 11 came In contact wtth

'a democracy Ilke the US*' The US further argued !hat tf the

'reallsttc' approach was adopted 11 would be reallzed that 'Blacks

dtd not have the resources needed to end aparthetd The

government on Ihe other hand was capable of dealtng wtth economtc

sanct~ons and arms embarge" The admlntstratton lhus. belteved

that 11 was a 'myth lo presume thal South Afrtca could be reformed

by "armed struggle' Accordtngly 11 welcomed Ihe stgntng of the

Nkomat~ Accord between South Afrtca and Mozambique and the

Lusaka Compromtse wtth Angola The two agreements prevented

Angola and Mozamb~que from leltmg thetr terrttor~es be used as bases

agatnst South Afrlca It advocated supporl to the Wh~tes stnce they

alone could brtng about the required changes Another reason

provtded was that when some 'Black' states of Atrlca were tradlng

wtth South Afrtca America had no reason to end tts trade Further

the US was not In favour of sacr~flclng 11s tntereets for the beneftl of

the 'Blacks' I! regarded as 'unfair‘ any atlempt 'to ask Ihe US to

be uprtght. moral and lust at the cost of 11s economlc ~nleresls In

South Afrtcaw It was reasoned that if the US ended ~ t s economtc

actlvltles tn South Africa. the loss would be enta~led entirely by the

Ameitcans The European nal~ons, led by Japan, would be agreeable

to substituts the US in Afi~ca"

Thus. Whenever m y nso lu tsn at the UN attempted to 1mpo8e

p . r twkr u m n r like the W E W 7 7 . SIRES1454 and SIRESJ475.

the US abst81ned from Voting It reasoned that such resolut~ons only

' pob r~ze re la t~ons and undermtne the poss~bllt l les of peaceful

change* ! hce the US acknowledged the economic and military

slgnlhcance of South Afrlca In the domestlc and reg~onal context tt

was supportive Of closer relatlons between the two in economtc and

mrlitary fteld The restr~ctlons placed on the purchase of mttttary

hardware by South Af r~ca were Ilftcd and the posts of naval and

airforce attaches at the Amerlcan Embassy In Prelor~a were restored

Amer~can equ~pment was supplied to the Afr~can pollce to suppress

disturbances The US vetoed a U N resolut~on condemning Pre~oria s

aggression agalnst Angola*' It. sim~larly Ignored the South African

attacks on Mozambique Sawazlland and Lesolhow To establish 11s

military control over Soulh Afrlca America supplied adv~sefs

consultants, and spec~allsts, delivered mllilary hardware, modernized

the naval bases and ports of S~monstown R~chards Bay. Durban, Port

Elizabeth, Capetown, Sal~sbufy Island and Walvrs Bay and lncluded

the Soulh Afrlcan military fac~l~t ,es in the NATO system of

communlcatlons In July 1982. the Reagan Adrn~n~stration even l~fted

the ban on the dellvery of equtpment for the nuclear power industry

and allowed the sale of plutonium-3 In March 1983 an agrcemenl

was reached on the use of South Afr~can terr~tory for the deploymenl

of Amerlcan Tomahawk cruise rn~sslles w~th nuclear warheads capable

of h~ttlng any target In Africa, south of the equator*' In the economlc

held. the US supplied a loan of $1.100 rntll~on, through the IMF. lo

South Afrlca It was meant to establish 'construct~ve relatlons and

budding br~dges of communication with South Afr~ca as a way of

e l~m~natrng apartheidu. Thus, the US developed 11s mllltary and

MX)MK ties uwth South Afrtca scnce ~t was seen 8s a 'tone of US

vltat tntersrts*

Indian Support t o Sanctions

In contrast to the US pol~cy. Indl8 matntatned no ohccr l

trade relations wtth South Afr~ca slnce 1954 and prrs~stent ly

advocated the tmplementatton of a 'global trade boycon'" l nd~a

d ~ d not accept the US reasontng that the economtc sancttons

would be more harmful to the 'non wh~le mtnortly* than to the raclsl

reglme It bel~eved that the South Atrtcan government

depended upon the tlnanclal support from other countrtes II

~t was dented Ihc loans ~nveslment funds and trade retattons

wtlh the other countr~es tt would flnd 11 dtfftcull 10 matnta~n ~lsel f

Secondly 11 agreed wtlh the optnlon of the ANC Pfsstdent

Mr Ollver Tambo that 'such measures could not hurl the

Afrlcans more than does the pol~cy of aparthetd In response to

the US excuse that sancltons would harm lhe netghbour~ng

stales l n d ~ a stated lhal the .ffontl~ne slates had thernselvea

asked for sancttons They were ready to face the loss that could be

caused by 'Prelor~a s retal~al~on' The I h ~ e a l of these retal~atory

steps should not prevent the lrnposttton of sanctions whlch could

successfully pressurtze South Afr~can -weak and stagnant'

economy'02 Indta reasoned that even tf problems came In

the way of peaceful change due to the sanct~ons they would -be

well worth the addtt~onal sacrtf~ce. ~t tt would accelerate the

ending of aparthe~d' It was also suggested that the countr~es

anxious about the 111-effects of the sanct~ons on the

netghbouring states could offer asststance to them l o

reduce the impad On 5' July 1986. Mr R a p Gandhr, dur~ng hts

vutt to Maur l tw, O ~ O w s d a Common m r t t h reonomlc packago

to cover up the l o r r e r of other netghbouring counttier when

tney ended that relation8 w t h Prrtoria':a

America had lustlfred its cont~nued support to Pretorir on the

basts that the Botha Government was movlng towards 'moderate'

apartheld and finally ending the system Thu clatm d ~ d not find any

means of substanttat~ng I( The US hope that the system would

gradually 'abolish ttselr was a 'myth meant for the un~nformed"~

The US beltef thal contact with the US democracy would facrl~tate

the reforms was an approach which had not been appled by Amerlca

whtle advocat~ng sanctions against Iran Cuba and Moscow on

previous occas~ons '~~ This dtscrepancy aroused lndtan doubts about

the US purpose It was suspected that the US was adopting a

sympathetrc attitude towards South Afrlca because it had rnvesled

large sums of money and had constantly expand~ng trade relattons

w~th it '% whtch the US d ~ d not want to loose

lnd~an did not accept the US claim that lhere was no reason for

the US to break ~ t s economrc ttes w~ th the rac~st reglme, when the

olher Black' states continued to trade wrth 11, because these states

carr~ed out transacttons under 'compulston' and were constantly

maklng attempts to free themselves Thus the11 postt~on could not

be compared to that of Amer~ca. which was free to end 11s

~nvolvement'~' Indta belteved that South Africa's suppression of its

people and aggression aga~nst ~ t s ne~ghbours caused cnsecurlty and

instablllty in the regton The practice of apartheid was 'repugnant 10

Ihe Consctence of mankind' and went aga~nst the UnlverSal

Declaratton of Human Rights as well as the UN Charter'" It.

therefore, rdvocated 'jmmcd~ate and total demolition' of apartheid.

y h ~ c h WOUM b a d to the be~olonisat~on of N l m l t a and the

cttrbltrhmmt Of UOrW m reglon Stnce I I mr h R MM wrbr l

criticism was not sufflclenl lndla stood for 'comprehenr~ve

mandatory' r a n c t ~ ~ n s ' ~ Indla bel ievd that 'quck and hard act~on'

war needed to end this 'inhuman' pracattce Any other method

besldes econornlc sanctions would no1 be able to end the system"@

Warntng agalnst the delaying tacllcs of certain interested partlea

Mr Gandhi stated

'the action cannot be delayed now It must be now perhaps even now would (mean) delay Otherwise 11 would result ln more bloodshed grealer bloodshed and perhaps unprecedented bloodshed*"'

He thus, suggested at the Inauguration of the Internattonal Youth

Conference Agatnst Apartheld that the ~nlernattonal comrnun~ty

should plan a 't~rne-bound programme' lo end apaltheid": He

ernphaslred that lnd~a would not be sallsf~ed wtlh 11s ~ndependence

as long as reciallsrn and colonlallsm continued to be perpetusled in

the world It would like to ensure that countries d ~ d not rllernpl lo

make econornlc galns by sacr~l~c~ng the -human dign~ty and human

rights' of others"'

In the vartous internat~onal forums I\ advocated Ihe lrnpos~t~on of

economic sanctions on South Afrlca The Harare Summ~l of non-

aligned natlons demanded the impos~t~on of economic sanct~ons It

called for a proh~b~tion of exports transfer to technology. transport

of otl, term~nation of air links and promotion of tourlsm to South

Africa"' The NAM also sponsored a resolution In the UN Securlty

Council which proposed n~netean mandatory economic Sanctions It

asked for the term~nat~on of ~mpolts of South African krugerrand gold

m. wuhbry goods. sugar, urantum coal Iron, rt-1 and agneulturat

products and exPorl b South Afrtca o l computers, crude 011 and

petroleum products 11 also proposed the severlng of alr ltnks nuclear

trade tax treaties. South Afrtun de~oslt accounts and promotion of

tounsm "'.

Even In the mtnl-summlt of Commonwealth In August 1986 lndla

called for effect~ve sanctlons agalnst South Africa The Communque

Issued on 4" August 1986 Imposed three addlttonal sanct~ons

bes~des those of the Nassau Accord They asked for a ban on new

bank loans to the pr~vate and public sectors In South Africa on the

tmporl of urancum coal. Iron and st111 from South Afr~ca and the

w~lhdrawl of all consular fac~lct~es In South Afrlca. "except to our own

nat~onals and nal~onals of thud countrles to whom we render consular

services"'

The lnd~an advocacy of economlc sanctlons was not supporled

by the US In spcte of the11 shared concern for the prevalence of

rec~allsm the two democracies were drawn apart due to thelr dcvergent

approaches and melhods of oend~ng the malpractice

Namibian Independence

Llke the prevlous US admlnlstrat~ons Mr Reagan also supported

the cause of Nam~b~an tndependence and upheld that 11 was an

Independent territory which was under the '~llegal occupaf~on' of South

Africa" It acknowledge that the den~al of ~ndependence to Nam~bla

would be the cause of ~nstabllQ In the regcon and dlsrupt the relations

of South Afrtca wtth the US as well as the other countrles"' Since

the US wanted to establlrh 'an tndependent stable, democtallc'

country, d m s ready to accept UN Resolution 435 It, however.

e m e d that be'cre tndepcndencc was granted, provnion should be

made for a 'ctvrlued government' whtch would provide Mcunty to tho

mlnorrtres as wC as secure the liberty of the natton"'

The Reogan admlnatrat~on however. llnked the 1s8w of Nam~blrn

rndepondrnca W h the wtthdrawt of Cuban troops from Angola It

argued that the Cuban troops were Sovtet representattver tn Angola.

atmed at provtdrng the Soviets w~th a -lorward postt~on' In A f r ~ c a ' ~ .

and lherr removal Should preceed Nam~btan Independence Prestdenl

Caner had uphela that the Cuban wrlhdrawl would aulomat~cally follow

~f Namlblan Independence could be secured However. Presrdent

Reagan d ~ d no1 ran1 to make any 'assumpttons' and held that

s~multaneous w~lhdrawl was the 'real~st~c' approach to the problem':'

Indian View Point

lndta agreed wtth the Namlbtan vrevv thal the Reagan

admln~stratlon s policy was a way of 'encouraging- the South Afrlcan

government In retalnlng 11s hold over Namlbla and econom~cally

pol~ltcally and milltarlly suppressing the frontl~ne stater'" lndta

supported the cause of the Namtbran people to gacn Ihe rrghl of

self-deterrn~natron and !he ~mplementatton of UN resolut~on 435 It

upheld the UN stand that the South Afrlcan rule of Nam~b~a waa an

'rllegal occupatron' The true representative of the Namlblan people

was the South West Afrtca Peoples' Organlsat~on (SWAPO)'" and 11

alone should have the r~ght to rule lndla accused the US of

preventtng the transfer of power to the SWAP0 It clarmed thal

Arnercca a~med at the establ~shment of a 'pro-Western puppet' reglme

In Namtbia after 11 gatned ~ndependence'~ Slnce SWAP0 was a

Marxtst organtsat~on, the US feared the ertablrshmenl of Sovtel

domnanC8, it SWAP0 O I l m d control over Nam~bu Tha US was

accused of vtew~np the nnn In tenns of Ihs East.West power brlmce

and of obltructtng NImtbl ln ~ndependence'~~ lndla blamed the

Western Contact Croup. comprlrlng of the US. Canada West

Germmy. Britatn and France. for delaying the Itberatton of Namtbu'n

)t obrcted to the Ilnkage of the a s u o of Namlblan tndepmdence

and mlhdrml of Cuban troops from Angola because these two lrsuss

were not related The Cuban forces had gone to Angola on inv~trtton.

and being an Independent counlry. Angola had a r~ghl to dec~dr when

to tnv~le them and at what llme lo end the~r occupallon In the case

of Nam~bca South Africa's mandale over 11 had been ended by the

UN In 1966 Thus, Prelor~a had no legal rcght to rule over Nam~bca

Secondly, South Afrlca was engaged In an aggression agacnst Angola

whlle the Cubans d ~ d not part~c~pate In any such act~v~ly '~ ' Mrr lnd~ra

Gandht belleved Ihal such measures reflected the lnslncertly of the

Western nat~ons lo solve the problem A1 a UN.sponsored

Conference on Nam~bla In Parls, in April 1983, she staled

'Of lale attempts have been made lo l~nk Nam~b~a's tndependence w ~ t h varlous exlraneous and unrelated Issues The Conference should reafflrm that the r~ghl of the Narn~b~an people to Independence ltke that of any other country In the world IS absolute and unfettered by lrrelevanl cons~derat~ons The Conference should urge Ihe UN Secur~ly Counctl to act ~mmed~ately to implement the plan for the Independence of Nam~b~a conta~ned In ~ t s Resolut~on 435, and lo Impose comprehensive mandatory sanct~ons agatnst South Afr~ca II 11 lns~sts on defylng the Securtly Councll Resolut~on'

l nd~a was the f~rs t country that awarded the SWAP0

d~plomal~c recpgnit~on since it had always regarded SWAP0

as the 'sole and authentic' rcprerenlattve of Ihe people

This deciscon of Mr Rajiv Gandhi was a "profound source

of ~nsp:rrlion' for ths Bkck movement for sel f -determ~nat~on'~

Thla Constant Support to the cause of Namcbcan

lndependence by lndla dcd not meet wcth the favour of the

Reagan Adm~n~st ra t lon I ls antc.Sovtet object~ves prevented

11 from contrlbulcng towards the cause of Namlbla s llberatlon

even though I! favoured the Independence of Namlbca

An tmporlant outcome of the VISI~ was the approval a

cotlaboratcve Ind~a-World Bank-USAID nat~onal soccrl lorertry

project to help the conservatcon and erpanslon of l n d ~ a s

forest resources':' It also led to a favourable turn In US. lnd~a

relat~ons because the shared percepl~ons of (he two leaders

led to a 'meeting of m~nds' conducive to the solullon of bllaleral

and golbal problems"' Senator Orf in Hatch summed ~t as

-a new beglnnlng" lor the US-lnd~a relations wklch had 'crealed

a better and more open relattonsh~p between the two"' While

MrGandhc, after the th~rty mlnule talks In Ihe Oval Offlce

appeared Impressed by the "frank for lhr~ght ' and 'humane

nature of 1.1r Reagan the Pres~dent h~mself stated "We h11 11 off":

Besldes the Impresscon whlch Mr Gandh~ made on the

US publlc and admcnlstrat~on the v~srt was a s u c c e s ~ due

to the recognctcon of I n d ~ a s gfowcng economcc mctctary and

commercial strength Secondly the US appreccated the

polcttcal stablllty In India and 11s commctrnent to democracy

As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. Mr Robert Peck. Btaled

'The Bmooth ruccesslon following Mfs Gandhl s deeply-embedded dernocrat~c ~nst l tut~ons' Further. the US rdmtniatratton wanted l o expand 11s ~nfluq;,ce In South A s ~ a and not be dependent on only Pakistan

tbwowr. Mr.Gandhl was openly cnt twl of the Reagan

administrrtion'r Strrtegrc Defence ~nlhatwe (Sol) or

Star Wars programme. its arms-supply to Pakistan, watver

to the Symington Amendment, and the Afghan policy Though

issue of conflict were reduced to a mcntmum posit~on"~. there

was no hope of a major breakthrough since Mr Gandhi had

reurned the servlces of the advcsera as well as the foretgn

pollcy of Mrs Indtrr Gandhl'" At the same t~me. the Reagan

adm~n~strat~on had also refused to change ~ t s fore~gn pol~cy

During Mr Gandhl's vtsit. the US had clartl~ed that 11 could not alter

11s 'special relat~onsh~p wlth paklstan', and that the rn~lltary

assistance would contlnue after the present agreement ended In

1987'% It meant that lndlan interests would conlinue to be

subord~naled to those of Pak~stan Another mlnor ~rr~tant

descr~bed as 'a gross discourtesy' by the lnd~an Embassy al

Washington was the lnv~tatlon of Mr Ganga S~ngh Dhlllon

a Khallstan propagandist by the Nat~onal Press Club on the day

Mr Gandhi arrived"'

THE UNDER CURRENTS OF ACCOMMODATlONS

The above mentioned an account of differences In the US-lnd~a

relat~ons should not however lead to a conclus~on that global Issues

created unbridgebale gulf tn thelr relations We have already stated

the factors that generated tenslons In US-Soviet relallons and

mollvated Mrs Indira Gandht to look towards the US leadlng to her

Washington visit In June 1982 As explatnod by a keen observer of

US-India relations. Indta's substantive motms for improving relations

wtth the US were not only recognised and appreciated by the

Washngton, but it, too, real ind the imperatives to retreat from the

#

r tgd -ha inctulb 8 d W by II 'u I n Other words. Wash~ngton

realisad thal derpcte NUW Dclhi's early dithering about the Sovlet

tnrasmn. lnU18 shared Amerrca's Interest tn a Sovtet w~thdrawal and

was opposed to further Sovwt expanabon southwards Th~s teal~sat~on

on the pafl of Washlngton IeU ~t to recognlse the slgn~f~cance of New

Delhr's to-operat~on In Pak~stan's defence It therefore, began to

encourage New Delhl's subtle attempts lo dlstance rtself strrteg~cally

from Moscow Not surprts~ngly, the Carter Admlnlstrat~on cleared In

June 1980 nuclear fuel rupplted lor the Tarapui plant after two years

of i r r~tat~ng and acrlmonlous exchanges between the two countries

As a corollary to ~ t s strategy of weanlng lndla away from Moscow

Washrngton encouraged and rejorned at lnd~a s gradually lmprovtng

relat~ons w~ th Pakistan and Ch~na In order to relieve the Amerlcan

&lemma of deallng w~ th reg~onal adversclr~es In a zero.sum game and

thereby reduce Sovtet influence In the region"" In order to address

lhts concern Washlngton had to establish a dialogue w~ th lnd~a

The prospect of securtng lnd~a s f r~ rndsh~p w~rhout abandoning

Pak~stan enthused those pro- lnd~a conservattves wtthln the

US - though very few In number but occupying key pos~t~ons In the

executtve and Ieglslat~ve branches-who were rcfuslng to see

Arner~can pollcy In South Asla as resulrlng a cho~ce between Delh~

and They were encouraged by a large number of Ind~an

e~pat r~ates tn the US Whlle the Amerlcan m~l~ tary bureaucracies had

no real contacts w ~ t h Indta, most of the corporat~ons interested In

selt~ng advanced technology and m~lttary equ~pment to lndta had on

theti stafi a large number of lndran expatriates Almost every member

of every lndcan delegation that came to the US had close relatlver

Or friends romewhere in the US, and often in the corporations they

were vls111nfi There Indo-Amencans counterbelanead to eomo

exrent the lack of potltfco-bunaucarat~c contact b.-n tho hrro

~ountrtos"'

tndts's growing CJpabll~ty also conlnbuted to tho rhl l t In US

perceptton regarding lndta Jur l prtor to Mrr Gandhl's rrt lval In

Washtngton In 1982, the Whlte House stated that 'wa wll recognve

whrch country IS Ihe moat powerful country In South ASIJ No one

has to expla~n that to you"" Whtle stmtlar vlews were expressed

earl~er ~t was the first clear cut relteratlon by the Reagan

Admtntstrat~on It revealed the Admlntstratton's realtsrt~on that

Pak~stan could no longer be balanced wtlh lnd~a and that tt, therefore

made sense for the US to Improve relatcons wllh a power wtth whtch

11 would have to deal w~ th tn the years ahead

Last but no least the economlc l~beralisat~on programme in Indta

inlt~ated by lndtra Gandh~ and acceleraled by her successors.

obvrously attracted Amertcan altentron"' Indro'r lncreasrng smphautr

on free market machan~sms and deregulation pollc~es. that were

advocaled by the Reagan and Bush Admtntstral~ons at home and

abroad enhanced lhelr Interest In amclrorat~ng ties with l nd~a This

country's mtdle class, constttuttng a vast market for US goods and

services. attracted the attention of Amerlcan businessmen at a Itme

when The US economy was suflertng from hlgh unemployment and

trade deflot"' Many large US compantes. lncludlng Pep11 Cola and

several h ~ g h technology flrrns, lobbred !he Reagan Adrn~n~atrat~on to

ruppofl expanded economlc llnks w11h India"' Moreover. Amer~ca"

econornlc problems obliged 11s pol~cy-makers to reallre that lt would

have lo wlnd down ~ t s masslue global p r e s e n c e " ~ h ~ s shrinkage

had lo be met by a new strategy and thus was born the tdea of

coopsrrtlve shcurlty' It rmplw US wtll~ngness to accept Indlr's

rcgconal strtus, d % to accept tho Amerrwn global role9*"

We rnrll therefore now turned to America s approach to Indra's

rcgbonal asp~rattonr dur~ng the Reagan era In the next chapter

F o r E ~ d ~ ~ ~ ~ R q N u . A m n c M m 1- (New MI 197Ci) MI Knt Jhr. PJtlrtm

l n d ~ o n d t h e c m e h e n o ( B U l g . b d a * h ' ~ ~ ~ ( N e w D.lh~) ~ 0 1 26 no 1 Jan-March 1989 pp 45-67 And hts 'Underslandlng Conflict and Corpotal~on between two t b m m c m o f t h e Wwld" T ) H l d C ~ ( N s w ~ i ) , vd2 no 14. ApnllQ88

S Sfown. fheFscssdPOWIH(N6WYark. 1968). p 36. Ahowe. John Lewis Gobda. 'Contrtnment Its Past and Future', in Rich8rd.A Mebm,ed.NertherCddWlrnorDdlsnte - S o d - Amencan Rekhons m Ihe 79Wh ( ChrrkttervlHs. 1902). p 6

See Prcsdent Cafter and hn National Sdcunty Advcricr. Zbgnlsw Brzezmsxi, st8ternent In New Yorlr T w s December 31. 1979 January 5 and February 22. 1980

Far a resume of the background of Mefa ~nterests Rats A Khan. 'Amera ca, Role and Interest m South and SouthWest Asla'. Asran Affarrs MI 9.n0 4.March-April 1982, pp 208 217

For the full text of the statement w e US News and World Reporl February 4 1980 pp 73-76

See 'Jornl US-Pakrstan Statemenf data June 15. 1981

lndran Expmss (New Delht) January 1 1980

Paul H Borsuk 'lnwstbk Enern- Confld and Trrnrl~on In Swd--US Relatmns". tn James C Hstung ed . US-Asran Relatmn

The Natmal SBcunty Paradox, ( New York. 1983) p 152

Jeane J Klrkpatrlck -At Nalonal Press Club Washington 0 C ' . 30 May 1985 In Legrhmacy arrd Force Polrlrcel end Moral Omnuons. vol 1. (New BrunsW. Nsw &my). 1988. pp 4 3 4 435

J Ktrkpatrk, 'To Instnuts of Publrc Affa~rs Conference.' Sydney. Australu. 19 March 1888. mbd, p 371

J K~rkpatrd, bd. 30 M a y 198% p 437

'The US Foretgn Pdtcy The Reagan Imprint'. Congressronal Ouartedy Inc ( Woshmgtoon. 1888). p 25

Sowel Unian H s n l C W s for Moscow and Wasbinglon Gmal oeumon,bQl#, p 5

^The US Fomgn Paky The Reagan Impnnt'.n 13. 30.31

I d q d B.dhmr. ' K m An L n a r Fbght of Fancy'. I N ~ J Today 30 June 1984, p 69

'The US Foreign Poky n 13. p 29

lndlra Gandhc 'Indu s Gandhi Tells Why She n Sour on US ' (Intern) US News 6 WorM Rapon 15 February 1982 p 27

Asran Recorder, (New Delhl) 26 November-2 December1981 p 16341

led. 12-18 November 1982 p 16885

lbdr. 3-9 December 1982 p 1692 1

S K Kapoor A Text Book of International Law (Allahabad Cenlrsl law Agency Allahabad 1985) pp32-33

Nalini Kant Jha. - lnd~a and Ihe Un~tCd Slates Pursu~t and Llrnlts of Accornrnodat~on- Slrareg~c A~lalysis (New Delh~) vo1 27 no 1

April 1994 P 89

S D Mun~ 'South AsIan Relatons Ellateral and Rreg~onal. In Leo E Rose and others eds Towards a New World O d r Ad)us!rng Ind~a-US Relations(Berkeley 1992) p 53 Also Salu P Ltmaye US.lndra Relatans Pursurf of Accnn~modet~on (London 1993) p 3f

Agha Shahi s statement at a seminar In Lahore on 30 June. 1981 as c~led in. W H Wr~ggins -Pak~slan's Fore~gn Pollcy after Afghantstan'. In S P Cohen. ed . The Secunly of &ufh Asla Amencan and Asran Peryxtctwes (Urbana Champagn. University of IUuuns. 1987). p 72

Former Indian Ambassadof to France Narendra Smgh'e asneflcon In lhe arl~ck, entttled. 'Mixed slgns for an ~mprwemenl of US- l n d m Trs'. Internatma! Herald Tnbum, 10 June 1985, and 'Point Paper on Atr Chlet Marshall La Fonlatne-Percepl~ons and Comments'. 5 November 1987. US Government. Deparrmant of Deform. Bndfing Paper, undassfied, p 1

IDR Research Team, The Afghan Problem and South AsIan PefcapWns'. In&an Ddtence Revtew, vol 11.1. January 1982. Pp 112-15

US Omenr far tndm Wmy Cwrrsr. rbd .17 Odobsr lB88

Wyl Rqan Mtthn. 'US Strategy In tha Indian Ocsmn'. A w Pa& Cammunq 18. Fa# 1982.64-9. Srtymvatt Jhrven. 'Super Power Rmlry m Mo Indian Ocean'. Forscgn Anam Reporft (NOW Delh~). vo1 31 no 2 February 1982, pp 32.36 and Mtchael Rrbrdron. 'Mndo Mamures' Far Eastern Econwn: Revtow 30 Apnl 1982. pp 32-33

Mtshra n 44 pp 68-9

Nonnan D Palmer. The UnRed States and lndta The Dtmns~ons of Influence (Connecllcul 1984) p 218

Governments SIalement In Lok Sabha 26 Februav 1981 lo& Sebha Debates no 26 February 1981 p 162

S N~hal Stngh 'Can the US and lnd~an be Real Friends?' Asran Survey vol 23 no 9 September 1983 p 1023

Rodney W Jones 'US Inleresh In the lndlan Ocean Reg~on - papar presented at the Intematcona~ Senrcnar on Indrurr Ocean 12-14 February 1983 Allahabad Untverstty Allahabed

lndtra Gandh~ 'Indta's Gandht Tells W# She IS Sour on US (Intervaw) US News 6 World Ropori. 15 February 1989. p 28

The US saldldas. htgh-level atr reconnatssance (SR.71) AWACS and eMron~c monttortna Oncludtng operalton w4h RC-135 could provtde strategtc and t a c k tnforiaton coocerntng 'force levels operatonal readiness statu$. deployment and mob~ltzat~onal status, ekdrontc lntelllgence for ebdrontc warfare, marlt~me survetllance,tncludtng locatton, deployment and movemenl of amroured formatmns and major polttlcal and economtc trends related lo dsfema pnparedness' In Rqv~r Slngh op crt . pp 187" 188

Rajvir Slngh, US P8krslan 8nd lndra Slralegtc Reletrons (AUohotud. 1885). p 187

PC Kapur. 'US Dtirlgns on Asv-Pac~fic ' Drrmocmrc w w vd 17. no 8.21St February 1988 p 10

B Wvekanandan. -The Inelan Ocean as a Zone of Peace . PIoMbmrandPmpects'Aww,Sutvsy mU1 no 12 Ow 1981 p 1240

Je&m J Klrkpatrlk. 'To lndls Internatconel Centre ' N m b l h ~ 24 August 1981. USlS 013~1al Tell 15 August 1981 p 30

Pahner n 48 p 200

Palmer n 48 pp 200-201

Oennts L Park ed . To Promole P e a c c U S Forcrgrl Pol~cy Irr the Mrd. 1980s (Cal~lornca Hoover Press 1984) p 185

Y Tarabrln *US Expans~onlst Pollcy In Atr~ca " Irr:crnat~alAfla~errs (Moscow) no 10. Ocf 1983 p 4 1

South Afr~ca 'Can US Pol~ctes Influence Change?' Grenf Deersans 81 p 35

Tarabrin n 60 p 42

Turkkaya Ataov "Pres~dent Reagarr s Pohcy 11 Respect to South Afrca I '. Df?mocrafic World vol 14, no 11 17 ' March 1985. p 8

Georgt W Shephered Jr . -Dem~l~tar~zat~on Proposals tor the Indtan Ocean - In Larry W Bowmarl 8 Ian Clark Eds The Indlarr Ocean m Gbbal Pobtlcs (Cokxado 'v'destvaw Press 198 1 p 240

Ataov n 72 p 7

'Afrta South of the Sahara Poverty Hunger and Refugees - Gred Deusnms '83. p 44

W Scott Thompson. 'US Policy Towards Afr~ca Al Amertca'r Semeer CWts. (Ph&&&h~a) d 25. na 4. Winter 1982. p 102 1

Peter J m n a n . ' Atnca The Struggle Behveen East and West. n l k n v s L Pa&&,n68.p193

C- Cdtw. Tmgm and Africa,' The W m T&y. vor aa.no4. AQlY 1982. P 123

S C. Seama. US 'CorntnKlwe Engagement' Pf i Sense and N o m s n r r r . ' ~ L h k k l . v d 14no42.20 Od 1985, p 10

Alan Pdw . 'fha h n s l o n s d US Polrcy Toward8 South Afrca.' Orba. vol25. no 4. Wlnter 1982 p 866

Han Saran Chhabra. 'India A New A f r a Consc~ousncss ' WorM Focus, vd 7, nod. Apnll986. p 29

Hartsaran Chhabra, "India s Support rn Struggle Aga~nst Aparthed.' The Aoneer. (New Delht) 15 October 1990

Chhabra, n 76. p 30

Han Saran Chhabra. "Co-operaton A Shared perspecltvs " WorM Focus. vol5. no 10. October 1984 p 19

Chhabra. n 76 p 31

Ptfer n 82 p 864

Fred Barnes . 'Whde House Watch Broken Engagement ' The New Repubic vol 193 no 9 26 August 1985 p 9

Tarabtn, n 60. pp 41 -42

South Afrca Can US Polisms Influence Change? Great Decrvons vd 84. p 43

Thome8 G Paterm. J Gany Cldford 6 Kenneth J . Reagan. heman F m q n ~drcy A H~stary Stnm leOO (MassachuseIts. Tormo. 1988), p ti69

PbUdt 7 0 d tho Houw Forscpn Alhrr Commmse 22 Apd 1982,' Amencan Forergn Poky Cumtnl Documents

L I-be@~. 'Fmlgn Pdcy Ch- for Amer~cans A Non. PYtorn Guda far Voters.' Fomgn Pokcy Associatron (New Yofk 1984). p 141

m.. p 10

92 S.C. Saxena, 'US 'Constructive Engagement' Pgcy : Sense and Nonsense, Democratic World, vo1.14. no.42, 20 October 1985, pp.11-12.

93 ibid.,p.lO.

94 William R. Feeney, ' Multilateral Political Aspects." in Gene T. Hsiao 8 Michael Witunski, eds.. Sino : American Nonnalisation and its Policy Implications, (New York, 1983) , p.210.

95 George Bush, In November 1982. in Y.Tarabrin. "US Expansionist Policy in Africa," lntemational Affairs (Moscow), no.10, October 1983. p.43.

96 Anirudh Gupta, "Africa:Unhelpful Policy." Wodd Focus, vo1.6, no.1, January 1985, p.35.

97 Tarabrin, n.69,p.48

98 lbid., p.43.

99 /bid., p.42.

100 Shekhar Gupta. " Indo-African Trade : Success on the Sly," lndia Today, 15 December 1985. p.70.

101 V Midstev , "USA-South Africa : A Slnlster Alllance." International Affairs (Moscow) no. 1, January 1986. p 76.

102 "lnd~a for Early Sanctions Against Pretor~a." The P~oneer, 19 February 1987.

103 Chhabra. n 89.p.32.

104 Midstev, n.110, p.74.

105 Ataov. n.72,p.S.

106 Midstev. n.110, p.76.

107 Saxena. n.101, p.11.

108 Chhabra, n.89, p.28.

109 lbid .,p.29.

11 0 ' Rajiv Calls for Tough Action Against Pretoria," Hindustan Times. (New Delh~), 9 January 1987.

Ill 'Anti-Apartheid Meet Begins : P.M Calls for F~nal Assault On Racism.' Telegraph. (Calcutta). 10 January 1987.

112 "Tm8Ound Plan to End Apartherd Urged,' The Statesman. (New Delhi), 9 January 1987.

11 3 'Rajiv Calls for Tough Action Against Pretoria." H~ndustan Times 9 January 1987.

114 'NAM Adopts Firm Steps Against SA.' The Pioneec 8 September 1986.

11 5 'US Denounced for Sanctions Veto. Patriotm23 February 1987. The resolution was vetoed by US and UK, while France and Japan abstained.

116 Rakshat Puri,"Common wealth see Wealth to Impose Harsher Sanctions Against S.Africa:". Hindusfan Times. 6 August 1986.

117 South Africa : ' Can US Policies Influence Change? " Great Decisions vol. 84, p.36.

118 Kirkpatrick, 17.9, p.20.

119 Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, To the Overseas Press Club. Waldorf Astoria. New City. 29 April 1981, in The Reagan Phenomenon : and Other Speeches on Foreign Policy. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, Research, Washington 8 London 1983, p.161

120 Ibid., p.159

121 Donald Rothchild & John Ravenhill. ' From Carter to Reagan : The Global Perspective of Africa Becomes Ascendent." in Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber & Donald Rothchild, eds . Eagle Defient- United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s, (Boston and Toronto. 1983), p.361.

122 Ataov , n.72, p.10.

123 K.M. Panikkar, " Namibia : South Africa's Vietnam." World Focus. vo1.7, no.4, April 1986, p.15.

124 Saxena, n.101, p.11

125 Panikkar, n 133, p.16.

126 'ANC and Apartheid," Patriot. 10 January 1987

127 Panikkar, n. 133 p.17.

128 Chhabra, n.89. p.30.

129 Text of Indo-US Joint Statement , 16 June 1985.

130 Dewan Berindranath, 'Reagan-Rajiv Meeting : Issues-Real and Unreal," Democratic Wodd, vo1.14 11.23, June 85, p.5

131 lnde rjii Badhwar and Madhu Trehan. 'Indo : US Relations:A Fresh Look,"lndia Today. 15 July 1985, p.78.

132 Ibi., p.80.

133 Ibid., pp.82-83.

134 Francine R. Frankel, ' Play the India Card", Foreign Policy. Spring 1986. p.149.

135 Ibid., p.150.

136 Chadda. 'India and United States :Why Wtente Won't Happen," Asian Survey. vo1.26 no.10. October 1986, p.1128.

137 Madhu Trehan. 'The Gandhis : Stealing the Show." lndia Today. 15 July 1985. p.87.

138 Fred Greene. 'The United States and Asia in 1987 :Progress Brings Problems," Asian Survey, vo1.28.no.l. January 1988, p.20.

139 /bid., p.19.

140 Kessings Contemporary Archives, vo1.33, no.2, Feb. 1987. p.34947.

141 "Minutes of Sixth Indo-US Joint Commiss~on on Econom~cs. Commercial. Scientific, Technological and Cultural Co-operation," Department of State Bulletin, April 1986. pp.81-82.

142 Syed Ziaullah. "The UD "Goodwill" Spurt." Democratic World, ~01.15, no.4. 1 2 ~ ~ October 1986, pp.5

143 Caspar W. Weinberger, "Press Briefing after Meeting with Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi, 11 October 1986" (Repr~nts). American Centre, New Delhi. pp.1-2.

144 Ibid.. p.4

145 Ibid., p.6.

146 Dilip Bobb. "Indo-US Ties-The Hard Sell." lndia Today, 15 November 1986, p.101

147 Syed Ziallah. "Message Rhind the Weinberger Visit." Democratic World, vol. 15. no.43, 26 October 1986. p. 10

148 Ibid., p.9.

149 'US Help Sought For Alrcraft Carrier." Times of India. 26 August 1988.

150 Dilip Mukerjee, " Carlucci Visit: A Long-term Angle," Times of India. 4 April 1988.

151 K.Shankar Bajpai, 'New Delhi and Washington:The Reagan Effect," ibid.. January 1989.

152 Jha, n.27.pp.89-107.

153 see seminar Onin G. Hatch, 'Reagan and Our Strategy for India", Washington Times, 6 November, 1984. Also Ibid., p.3

154 Stephen P. Cohen, 'Right for the Right Reason : The Reagan Administration and India", lndia Quarferly (New Delhi), ~01.15, no.2, Spring. 1988. p.34

155 Ibid.. p.33, For an overview of Indians in America, see Arthur W.Hehueg and Usha M. Hehvag. An lmmgrant Success Story. East Indians in America (Philadelphia.1990).

156 White House 'Background Briefing Paper on the visit of lndrra Gandhi ",26 July 1982.

157 Satu P.Lirnaye, US-India Relations : Punuit of Accommodatron (London, 1993). p.36 Also Nayan Chanda. "A New Indian Surnmef, FarEastem Economic Review, 25 February, 1988, p.34. For an analysis of Indian Naval Expansion, see Ashley L. Tellis, 'India's Naval Expansion: Reflections on History and Strategy", Comparative Strategy, vol.16, no.2. 1987, pp.185-219.

158 Ibid., n.167.

159 For details. see ibid..

160 There is a widely shared view in the US that running Russia to ruin in an arms race sapped American industrial and technology vitality. For details, see Joseph S Nye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York, 1990); Paul Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Changes and Military Conflicts from 1500 to 2000 (New York, 1987); and C. Raja Mohan. "Towards a New World Order", in Rose et al, eds.. n.28, p.21.

161 For details see Nalini K. Jha, "Siz~ng Bill Clinton's Pol~cy on India", lndiaAbmad(NewYork), 26 March. 1993: and his. "US and India, Coming Closer?" India Currents (San Jose, Calif) February 1993, p.17.