THE GRIFFITH-TSINGHUA ‘HOW CHINA SEES THE WORLD’

griffith.edu.au/asiainstitute imir.tsinghua.edu.cn

THE GRIFFITH-TSINGHUA ‘HOW CHINA SEES THE WORLD’Working Paper Series, No 6 (2017)

Chinese Scholars' Debates on International Responsibility By MAO Weizhun

Chinese Scholars’ Debates on International Responsibility

MAO Weizhun

The Griffith-Tsinghua Project “How China Sees the World” Working Paper Series

No. 6 (2017)


www.griffith.edu.au/how-china-sees-the-world

I

Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University

Griffith was the first University in Australia to offer Asian Studies to undergraduate students

and remains a pioneer in this field. This strong history means that today the Griffith Asia

Institute can draw on the expertise of some 50 Asia-Pacific-focused academics from many

disciplines across the university. Our Strategic Vision is to promote greater interest in and

awareness of Australia’s changing region and its importance to Australia among the public,

universities, policy makers and the media. The Griffith Asia Institute produces innovative,

interdisciplinary research on key developments in the politics, economics, societies, and

cultures of Asia and the South Pacific. By promoting knowledge of Australia’s changing region

and its importance to our future, the Griffith Asia Institute seeks to inform and foster

academic scholarship, public awareness, and responsive policy making. The Institute’s work

builds on over 40 years of Griffith University tradition of providing cutting-edge research

on issues of contemporary significance in the region.

Institute of International Relations, Tsinghua University

Tsinghua University’s Institute of International Relations (TUIIR) is a university-level

academic institution with a strategic goal of becoming a leading international research

think-tank in China. TUIIR concentrates on both research and instruction. Currently, there

are seven research centers, three research programs, and two editorial departments. The

faculty of the institution acts as both instructors and researchers. The TUIIR organizes a

variety of academic activities every year, such as forums, seminars and lectures. We have

held the Community Conference of Political Science and International Relations eight

times, in which more than 700 scholars participated each year. Also, TUIIR has held the

Tsinghua International Security Forum 15 times, the Theory Seminar Youth International

Relations Scholars four times, and the Summer School of the International Relations

Research Methods and Arms Control Seminar nine times. In 2012, TUIIR successfully

organized the first World Peace Forum, which made a major impact globally.

This project is supported by a research Grant (No.16-1512-150509-IPS) from the John D.

and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.



II

Project Introduction

How to understand China’s rise and its implications for Asia and the world is an imperative

task for both scholars and policy makers. China has become the second largest economy

next to the United States since 2010. China is also the major trading partner for over 140

countries in the world. As United States-China relations will define the next century, it is

essential to build mutual understanding for policy makers. If strategic distrust is a major

obstacle in US-China relations, as Kenneth Lieberthal and Jisi Wang have suggested,

deepening our understanding of Chinese perceptions and views on international relations

will be a crucial task for bridging the perception gap and mitigating the strategic distrust

between the two nations.

This project aims to make sense of China’s rise in world politics through examining

Chinese International Relations (IR) scholars’ perceptions and debates on key issues in

international relations and Asian security. This project will deepen our understanding of

Chinese scholars, especially regarding how they perceive world politics and how they can

impact Chinese policy making via internal debates. There are two parts in this project. First,

we organize and conduct onsite surveys of IR scholars at the annual conference of the

Chinese Community of Political Science and International Studies in Beijing. Second, we

examine the internal debates among Chinese scholars over international politics, Asian

security, and Chinese foreign policy.

With generous support from the MacArthur Foundation (grant No. 16-1512-150509-IPS),

the Griffith Asia Institute is able to successfully collaborate with Tsinghua University’s

Institute of International Relations to carry out the survey research as well as conduct the

research project on the Chinese IR debates through expert conferences and other academic

exchanges. This working paper series will feature major Chinese scholars’ analyses of

internal debates and our survey findings.

We appreciate your comments and suggestions very much.

Kai He and Huiyun Feng (Co-Chief Investigators, Griffith University)

Xuetong Yan (Lead Project Collaborator, Tsinghua University)



III


Abstract

“International Responsibility” has become one of the most significant topics in Chinese

International Relations studies over the last decade. Although growing numbers of scholars

have focused on this issue, there remains a low awareness of the need to explore its roots in

China’s academia, and to investigate the internal debates that display the different Chinese

perceptions of international responsibility. This article provides a discourse-activation

framework to explain why Robert B. Zoellick’s speech polarized China’s attention on

international responsibility. It moreover constructs a typological framework based on

dimensions that include the nationalism–internationalism orientation and degree of

fulfilling international responsibility. It singles out three camps of scholars and their

respective viewpoints on international responsibility and China’s relevant policies in this

regard, and demonstrates the “divergent convergence” feature that characterizes the debate

on the topic. In addition to this structural analysis, the article also summarizes the overall

trend from 1950 to 2015 of the preventative to projecting preferences apparent in China’s

academic studies and political discourses on international responsibility. Subsequently,

the article briefly investigates the possible factors affecting convergence and divergence

of perceptions of international responsibility, which imply that fulfilling international

responsibility is crucial to China’s growing presence on the global stage, and that Chinese

academics’ attention to international responsibility should focus on collaboration towards

improving the effectiveness of China’s assertive behaviour in international affairs.

Acknowledgements

This working paper is a revised version of the author’s article “Debating China’s International

Responsibility” in the Chinese Journal of International Politics 10, no. 2 (2017): 173-210.



IV

About the Authors:

MAO Weizhun is Associate Professor in International Politics at the School of Government

and Researcher at the Centre for Asia-Pacific Development Studies, Nanjing University. He

holds the Doctor’s degree in Social Science (Dr. rer. soc) awarded by Universität Konstanz in

2015 and a PhD degree in International Relations from Renmin University of China in 2012.

His research interests include International Institutions and International Responsibility.

This Working Paper Series presents papers in a preliminary form and serves to stimulate

debates and discussions among scholars and policy analysts. The views expressed are

entirely the author’s own.



1


Mao Weizhun

Introduction

“International responsibility” has been on China’s International Relations (IR) research

agenda for more than one decade. In September 2005, Robert B. Zoellick (2005) gave a

speech on the United States’ China policy at the National Committee on US-China Relations,

proposing that China act as a “responsible stakeholder” rather than “just a member”, which

would help the US and China work together and “sustain the international system that has

enabled its success”.

Zoellick’s remarks had at least two impacts on both theoretical and policy-related studies

in China. On the one hand, they started the collective large-scale research endeavors on

“international responsibility”. In fact, China showed some hints of “obsession” with Zoellick’s

ideas, in particular with the statement of “responsible stakeholder” (Stratfor 2005). Deng

Yong (2015: 119) finds the diffusion of “responsible power” in China “extraordinary”. As

shown in Figure 1, from 2005 to 2010, there is a stable increase in the number of studies

with the keywords relating to international responsibility. Therefore, it is also interesting

to investigate the following question: why and how has Zoellick’s speech triggered the

emergence of China’s large-scale focus on international responsibility?

In addition, Zoellick’s speech catalyzed a series of debates on China’s own foreign policies

towards the US. For example, some Chinese policy advisors optimistically highlight the

impact of this speech on Sino-US relations

as a way to “alleviate the wave of ‘China

threat thesis’”, which indicates “a com-

paratively reasonable and pragmatic tone”

for the US view of China (Yuan 2006). However, another group shows a relatively unfriendly

attitude to this new American term. They regard the new idea of “responsible stakeholder”

as a variant of hostile arguments such as the “China threat thesis” and the “China collapse

thesis” (Ma 2007).

In addition, there have been several internal debates about various terms related to the

concept of “international responsibility”. Since then, Chinese scholars have shown divergent

there have been several internal debates about various terms related to the concept of “international responsibility”.



2

050

100

150

Art

icle

Num

ber

at C

NK

I

1995 2000 2005 2010 2015Year

fuzerendaguofuzerendedaguodaguozerendaguodezeren

guojizerenguojiyiwuzhongguozeren

zhongguozerenlun

Source: http://trend.cnki.net

Figure 1 Trend of Studies on International Responsibility in Chinese, 1995–20151

attitudes, especially when the terms “China’s responsibility”, “responsible power” and

“international responsibility” are closely intertwined. Some have embraced this concept of

“responsibility”, because it indicates a strategic change in US’ China policies and it potentially

emphasizes the irreplaceable role of China in the international order. In contrast, others

warn of the possible trap set by the US in line with its long-time containment policies

towards China. In a long-term perspective, most Chinese scholars have finally accepted the

concept, which shows an aspect of increasing convergence in the debate, despite different

opinions in applying international responsibility.

As a result, it is necessary to investigate the following questions: to what extent and why do

Chinese scholars diverge in their views of international responsibility? What factors affect

the divergence and convergence of Chinese

scholars’ attitudes towards international

responsibility? In fact, it seems that China’s

attitudes on international responsibility

experienced an unusual evolution process, featuring an unanticipated start, internal debates,

and unintended consequences on China’s international performance.

Chinese Attention Shift to International Responsibility

It has not been easy for China to shift its attention to international responsibility after

1 In addition to international responsibility (guoji zeren) and international obligations/duties (guoji yiwu), there are some other synonymous terms in Chinese that are related to international responsibility and connected to China’s role within the scope of international responsibilities, such as responsible great powers (fuzeren daguo), responsible states (fuzeren guojia), responsible developing countries (fuzeren de fazhanzhong guojia), great power responsibility (daguo zeren), great power undertaking (daguo dandang), responsible China (fuzeren de zhongguo), China’s responsibility (zhongguo/woguo zeren), global responsibility (quanqiu zeren) and China’s undertaking (zhongguo/woguo dandang), etc. It calculates the number of articles with the title containing the above keywords in CNKI as the indicator of China’s academic studies.

It has not been easy for China to shift its attention to international responsibility after Zoellick’s 2005 speech.



3

Zoellick’s 2005 speech. To be exact, Zoellick reactivated Chinese discussions of international

responsibility, as there were some discussions concerning international responsibility

before 2005, which had lost their momentum. Hence, this study analyzes the historical

development of Chinese attention to international responsibility before 2005 through both

the academic debates and the dimension of political discourse.

On the Academic Discussions before 2005

Chinese IR scholars acknowledged the significance of international responsibility within

the context of national power in the 1980s. In August 1987, the first nation-wide IR

conference with more than 80 participating scholars was held in Shanghai. They argued

that national power is closely connected with international responsibility/obligations (Tian

1987: 58). Also, in the 1980s, the term “international obligation (guoji yiwu)” was used in

academic journals to refer to China’s contribution in terms of foreign assistance, which

shows China’s internationalism (Xiao 1987).

In the 1990s, international responsibility became more relevant, which indicated China’s

increasing willingness to integrate in the international community. China’s academic

concerns regarding international responsibility synchronized with scholars in other countries

and regions. For example, in 1994, Young

Seek Choue (1995), the rector of Kyung

Hee University in South Korea, argued

that the three major countries in East Asia

(China, Japan and South Korea) should contribute to the global community and human

future. Hou Jiaju (1995), an economist from Taiwan, called for China to integrate into the

global society, fulfill its responsibility in the international community, and share the

Chinese experience with others.

Furthermore, Yan Xuetong (1996: 207–208) proposed that China should bear more “political

responsibilities” to match its increasing power, which would eventually become “China’s

important interests”. Nevertheless, he cautioned the pitfalls of accepting international

responsibility, because there is no common definition and the strong countries actually define

this term (Yan 2001: 37). In addition, Wang Yizhou (1999) highlighted “responsibility with

its related interests” as one of China’s three quests of twenty-first century foreign policies,

paralleling development and sovereignty. Other scholars regarded fulfilling international

responsibility as one of China’s regional strategies in the early 2000s (Tang and Zhang

2004; Xiao 2003).

In the meantime, scholars outside China also started to deliberate on China’s responsibility

in the very process of its rise. For example, when the People’s Republic of China (PRC)

celebrated its fiftieth anniversary in 1999, scholars like Zhang Yongjin and Greg Austin

(2001) attempted to analyze China’s diverse attitudes on the “responsibility of its rising

power in international relations”.

Chinese IR scholars acknowledged the significance of international responsibility within the context of national power in the 1980s.



4

On the Political Discourse, 1949–2005

“International responsibility” appeared in China’s political discourse in an even earlier

period. Taking articles appeared in the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) as an indicator,

Figure 2 proves that the term “international responsibility” is not new at all. China started

to demonstrate its first wave of advocating international responsibility from 1949 to 1965.

This wave was mainly associated with Chinese enthusiasm for internationalism on the

international platform, in which the term usually functioned as a propaganda tool in

disputes between China and the Soviet

Union. It also indicated China’s willingness

to participate in international affairs and

ease its isolation imposed by Western powers. From 1966 to 1989, China’s references to

international responsibility showed sporadic distribution as a result of a series of

influential events. Despite coming back to an international platform, China remained in an

isolated and self-centered situation: regaining its UN seats was only a symbol of Chinese

international legitimacy. During this period, China emphasized the significance of fulfilling

responsibility to world peace when interacting with other powers such as Britain and Japan.

010

020

030

040

0N

ew

s N

um

ber

in P

eopl

e's

Dai

ly

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015Year

News 1949-1965 Fitted Curve 1949-1965News 1966-1989 Fitted Curve 1966-1989News 1990-2004 Fitted Curve 1990-2004News 2005-2015 Fitted Curve 2005-2015

Figure 2 Distribution of News about “International Responsibility” in the People’s Daily, 1949–20152

In fact, China revived its active willingness regarding international responsibility around

the last decade of the twentieth century. Hereby, China attempted to show its own

responsible face towards the US. For example, Deng Xiaoping asserted that China is an

honest and a responsible country in 1988 (Sun 1988). In 1992, Qian Qichen proposed China

as “a responsible great power in the world” when discussing Sino-US relations (He 1992).

When Jiang Zemin met with Bill Clinton in 1994, he declared, “the two countries will

assume more and more responsibilities for maintaining peace in the world” (citing from 2 The figure sets the number of news that contain guoji zeren as the measurement indicator.

“International responsibility” appeared in China’s political discourse in an even earlier period.



5

Yan 1996: 207–208). In addition, China exhibited responsible performances at regional

platforms in the mid-1990s. Its reputation as a responsible country grew as it responded to

the 1997 financial crisis by assisting its neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. In 1999,

China officially set its own image as a “peaceful, cooperative, and responsible great power”

(Office of Policy Studies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999:4).

Diverse Responses to International Responsibilities in China

As a simple roadmap, China’s intellectual attention to international responsibilities can be

traced back to the 1980s (Tian 1987: 58), but its primary development was triggered by its

response to the Asian Financial Crisis (Niu 2008; Xing and Zhan 2008). In 2005, Zoellick’s

statement on “responsible stakeholder” greatly drove China’s academic discussions to the

first climax with a series of debates concerning international responsibilities and Chinese

foreign strategies. Furthermore, China’s transformation of foreign policies under new

leadership boosted a new wave of debates, thanks to new political declarations in fulfilling

international responsibilities.

During China’s intellectual process on international responsibility, different impetuses

propelled international responsibility studies further, bringing both structural divides and

processual convergences in China’s relevant scholarship. In fact, diverse and even conflictual

viewpoints emerged within China. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze Chinese studies on

international responsibility from a “within” perspective.

A Typological Framework of Nationalism versus Responsibility

This paper assumes that Chinese academic divergence is affected not only by ideological

positions on the nationalism-internationalism continuum, but also by academic evaluations

of the extent to which China has fulfilled its responsibilities. On the one hand, the academic

orientation of nationalism can act as a typological criterion for scholars’ categorization of

international responsibility. China’s foreign policy is usually shaped by nationalism as well

as internationalism (Chen 2005). As one kind of foreign policy, international responsibility

is closely related to an ideology of nationalism, as well as its counterpart internationalism.

Qin Yaqing and Zhu Liqun (2005) argue

that China, as a responsible member of

international society, has to abandon

parochial nationalism and follow a new

internationalism. Shambaugh (2013: 25–36) distinguishes between nine kinds of contending

discourses on Chinese global identities, constructing a spectrum from nationalist to

internationalist and to globalist positions; he implies that nationalists tend to refuse

international responsibility while globalists would like to take on “an ever-greater

responsibility”. Deng Yong (2015: 117–118) argues that China’s identification as a “responsible

power” is actually manipulated by its “nationalist impulse” and “realpolitik calculations”.

international responsibility is closely related to an ideology of nationalism, as well as its counterpart internationalism.



6

On the other hand, China’s academics show their divergent positions about the desirable

extent of fulfillment of China’s international responsibility. Theoretically, “responsible

agency” is actually “a matter of degree” (Williams 2006). It should be noted that the extent

of a given scholar’s position on China’s fulfillment of international responsibility is not

necessarily related to the spectrum of China’s global identities from nativist to globalist; for

example, both nativists and selective multilateralists demonstrate a negative attitude towards

international responsibility (Shambaugh 2013: 22–36). Mao Weizhun (2016) depicts a

typological framework on international

responsibility based on the degrees of

fulfilling responsibility and the roles of

responsibility undertaken. In this model,

different extents of fulfilling responsibility reveal various perceptions on the necessity,

possibility and prospects through which China understands international responsibility in

different settings.

Figure 3 shows the academic orientation of Chinese scholars into a continuum from

nationalism to internationalism, which spans from an isolated state to an open position.

Simultaneously, it follows the dimension of responsibility from negative to positive approach.

In sum, Chinese viewpoints on international responsibility can be categorized into three

groups: averting, accommodating, and advocating.

Nationalism InternationalismAcademic Orientation

Posi

tive

NegativeDegree of Fulfilling Int’

l Res

p.

Averting

Accomodating

Advocating

Figure 3 Typological Framework of China’s Debates in International Responsibility

The Averting Camp: It’s a Trap!

In spite of traditional emphasis on responsibility and the awakening of Chinese IR scholars

(Wang 1999; Yan 1996: 207–208; Yeophantong 2013), many scholars and policy advisors

are still highly vigilant against the proposal of international responsibility (Shambaugh

Chinese viewpoints on international responsibility can be categorized into three groups: averting, accommodating, and advocating.



7

2013: 19). This camp keeps a conservative and even isolated stance on nationalism and

negative opinions regarding international responsibility. There are three arguments that

are generally put forward to support this viewpoint.

First, they mostly emphasize the morally accountable dimension of responsibility, and are

highly cautious of foreign critics on the causes of a specific crisis. For example, Ma Zhengang

(2006, 2010) argues that Zoellick’s speech hides some “subtext”, implying that China is

irresponsible and should act according to

the ideas of Western countries. Ma’s opinion

and his official position as the Director of

China Institute of International Studies

make him highly influential. Many articles about China and international responsibility

cite Ma’s viewpoints (Hu 2007; Liu 2007b; Niu 2008).

Second, scholars are alert to the strategic concepts proposed by the Americans, believing

that the argument of “China’s responsibility” is in line with “the China threat thesis” and

“the China collapse thesis” (Zhang 2012), and thus thought to be tools of US’ policy of

containment against China. Many scholars consider this a variant of “the China threat

thesis”, while other scholars directly label it the “US’ ‘China’s responsibility’” (Xie and Tang

2006). Zhang Shengjun (2007) regards “China’s responsibility” as an alternative form of

imposing pressure on China. Zhang Ruizhuang (2008) is vigilant about responsibility-

related proposals (e.g. Responsibility to Protect, R2P), asserting they would overturn the

international order and pose challenges to China. Shambaugh (2013:19) observes that

Chinese scholars consider the proposal as a kind of “Western effort” to “tie China down” or

a tool to “contain China”.

Third, this group pessimistically predicted that China’s rise might be interrupted by the

burden of taking on more responsibilities. It is true that “China’s responsibility” has been

a trial for China’s peaceful development (Liu 2007a). Some directly consider “China’s

responsibility” to be a huge threat to China’s development security (Zhang 2012). Given

China’s rise and the relative decline of the US, the Chinese, including the scholars, do not

believe that the US will easily accept this situation; when the US’ long-term hostility is

taken into account, the degree of mistrust increases. As Zhang Shengjun (2007) notes,

“China’s responsibility” is a requirement of “Western Anti-China Forces”.

The Accommodating Camp: It’s a Trend!

A second group attempts to accommodate China with the appeal of international

responsibility within contemporary international society. They disagree with the judgement

of the averting camp, regarding the arrival of “China’s responsibility” and “responsible

stakeholder” as not merely challenges, but also as presenting some opportunities (Liu

2007b), when taking a pragmatic approach. In line with this camp, it seems inevitable that

international responsibility is closely related to an ideology of nationalism, as well as its counterpart internationalism.



8

China must undertake its international responsibilities, because it is not only the

international society’s “external expectation”, but also China’s own “development demand”

as a rising power (Hu 2007; Niu 2008). For example, Jin Canrong (2009) evaluates the

pros and cons of China’s fulfillment of international responsibilities, concluding that

China’s benefits will be greater than the relevant costs in the international system.

However, this camp also realizes that China may encounter a series of problems when

taking on more international responsibilities (Niu 2008; Xing and Zhan 2008). As a result,

some scholars give more attention to the approaches to bearing international responsibility

rather than totally refusing responsibility (Gan 2010).

What scholars want to accommodate includes the world situation, China’s power, the

balance between internal and external expectations, as well as a fair trade-off in China’s

capacity between domestic and international responsibilities. First, Chinese scholars partly

accept the notion of the “responsible great power” and subsequent “responsible stakeholder”

more willingly. In fact, fulfilling international responsibility coincides with China’s interests

and China’s identity on the international stage. In addition to Yan Xuetong’s (1996: 207–208)

argument wherein bearing responsibility becomes “China’s important interest”, others

like Ren Xiao (2007), Liu Hongsong (2004) and Wang Gonglong (2008) highlight the

enhancement of public interest, shared interest or integrated interest in international society

when China bears relevant responsibility. On the other hand, international responsibility

connects with identity-driven willingness.

Niu Haibin (2008) argues that international

responsibility is a derived duty that a

country holds as a member of international

society. With its rise, China therefore has

to meet both its own demands as well as those of the international community as a

responsible great power (Wu 2011). Meanwhile, Qin Yaqing (2003) points out that China’s

identity as a responsible great power can increase its security interests and promote

interaction between China and the international society.

Second, this group shows cautious attitudes regarding the relations between China’s power

and international responsibility. China’s rise has both revived its internal willingness and

triggered external expectation in the fulfillment of its international responsibility. For

example, many studies focus on the issue of China as a “responsible great power” rather

than “China’s responsibility” (Li and Xu 2006; Xing and Zhan 2008). The scholarship has

realized the significance of China’s power in the supply-demand structure of international

responsibility (Xu 2008). Nevertheless, most Chinese scholars take a prudent approach

when they attempt to bridge China’s power and international responsibility. Liu Feitao

(2004) argues that power and responsibility together construct the preconditions of great

power identity, highlighting that responsibility is actually “adequate exertion of powers”.

Therefore, Chinese scholars admit that China should bear international responsibilities,

What scholars want to accommodate includes the world situation, China’s power, the balance between internal and external expectations, as well as a fair trade-off in China’s capacity between domestic and international responsibilities.



9

but they argue that China itself should set the standards of “power adequacy” in the

fulfillment of international responsibility (Li 2008; Pan and Zheng 2007). For example,

some scholars assert that a country should bear its responsibility in accordance with its

position within the international power structure (Liu 2007b; Ren 2007).

Third, these scholars set up an alternative “defensive” principle in fulfilling international

responsibility, that is, China’s most important international responsibility or its largest

international contribution is to solve its domestic problems. In 2007, then Chinese Foreign

Minister Li Zhaoxing claimed that the foremost of China’s responsibilities is its responsibility

for the Chinese people. In addition, the People’s Daily declares the starting point of China’s

active participation in international affairs is being “responsible for the people of our country”

(Wang 2007; Zhong 2012). This orientation is followed in the academic discussions on

international responsibility. For example, many scholars insist that China’s internal affairs

are included as the first priority of its great power responsibilities (Wu 2011); according to

Ren Xiao (2007), taking responsibility for domestic citizens and prioritizing China’s own

problems are two principles by which China fulfills its international responsibility.

Fourth, regarding international responsibility, this group adopts a narrower approach

in operationalizing the concept and defining the issue scope. Chinese scholars have

deliberated on the conceptual operationalization of international responsibility and have

categorized it according to various dimensions that clarify the relationship between

international responsibility and other variables. For example, Li Dongyan (2011) disagrees

with the use of the term “international responsibility” and prefers the concept of “international

contribution”, thus identifying different sources of international responsibility and breaking

down the relations between power and

international responsibility. Others have

probed diverse aspects of international

responsibility, concentrating on its moral

essence and noting that there are no

“recognized and operationalized” standards in fulfilling international responsibility (Li

2011; Zhou 2011). Despite some scholars’ application of the concept to diverse issues like

human rights, climate change, energy and humanitarian actions (Cai 2010; Wu 2010; Yu

and Tang 2009), most researchers maintain a defensive stance on identifying international

responsibility. For instance, Liu Ming (2008) proposes a concept of “limited responsibility”

concerning “international obligations”, one that goes beyond narrower domestic interests

and strategic targets.

The Advocating Camp: It’s a Tool!

The advocating camp takes a more proactive viewpoint in fulfilling international

responsibility, while keeping a more open opinion in exerting China’s nationalism. These

scholars further emphasize the significance of fulfilling international responsibilities across

Chinese scholars have deliberated on the conceptual operationalization of international responsibility and have categorized it according to various dimensions that clarify the relationship between international responsibility and other variables.



10

diverse issues within the context of China’s rise and China’s new position in the last decade.

They mostly regard it as an opportunity for China’s further development on the international

stage, although China may suffer some costs and risks. For them, fulfilling international

responsibilities should be an active performance for a specific country based on its own

situation rather than purely conforming to a trend.

Here Chinese scholars reaffirm the connections between China’s capacity and international

responsibility, underlining China’s ambition as a great power rather than

over-emphasizing China’s status as a developing country, thereby promoting its role in

providing public goods in global governance. As Yan Xuetong (2011) points out, “if China

wants to regain its historical status as a great world power, it must act like a great world

power”. In general, what these scholars try to advocate includes the strategic value of

assuming international responsibilities, the necessity of participating in the global

community, and China’s updated views on sovereignty-related notions.

First, most scholars consider international responsibility as a strategic issue for China’s

global performance. For example, Wang Yizhou (2011) proposes a concept of “creative

involvement”, in which fulfilling international responsibility can take a significant part.

Meanwhile, Shi Yinhong (2008, 2011) emphasizes China’s changed role in the world, thus the

need to change its strategy to take up its share of international responsibility. Yan Xuetong

(2013: 183–190) calls for the transformation of China’s foreign principles from economic

concerns to political orientation based on its role as a responsible great power.

Second, advocating scholars not only consider fulfilling international responsibilities as a

necessary step for participating in international society, but they also regard it as a

problem-solving approach, for example, “China’s Plan” in global governance. Pang Zhongying

(2006, 2011) differentiates between China’s international involvement and its greater roles

in international system, arguing that its involvement dimension prevails while its “role”

consciousness has been relatively insufficient, which is actually a “responsibility” issue; thus,

he calls for China to take on responsibilities for global governance through its problem-solving

approaches. Qin Yaqing (2014) argues that

China should contribute “China’s Plan” for

the transformation of the international order.

Additionally, advocating scholars have

started to focus on international leadership.

For example, Liu Hongsong (2004) examines China’s international leadership responsibility

and calls for China to actively provide public goods and build international institutions.

Yan Xuetong (2013: 183–190) proposes international leadership responsibility within

China’s foreign policies as a responsible great power, whereby China should learn to lead.

In addition, many scholars in this camp have taken a reflective viewpoint on China’s

traditional principles (like non-interference) in the new era and have propose a series of

related notions about international responsibility with more open minds (Chen 2016). For

advocating scholars not only consider fulfilling international responsibilities as a necessary step for participating in international society, but they also regard it as a problem-solving approach,



11

example, Yan Xuetong (2015: 3, 236) proposes a theory of “moral realism”, which regards

fulfilling international responsibilities as the core of the wangdao strategy in order to

maintain the stability of the international order. Meanwhile, some specific topics within

the broad concept of international responsibility such as R2P and “Sovereignty as

Responsibility” are discussed via theoretical and policy perspectives, reflecting Chinese

academic attempts to abandon dogmatic principles like sovereignty in order to follow

international trends (Liu and Zhang 2014; Mao and Bu 2015; Ruan 2012).

However, the advocating group’s support for China’s increasing international responsibilities

is not without any conditions: according to Shi Yinhong (2011: 95), China’s fulfillment of

international responsibility holds only when it “(1) will not violate its vital interests and

surpass its capability; (2) results from equal consultation between China and the external

world, rather than from any ‘dictation’ or coercion by the latter; and (3) largely matches

China’s reasonable international rights and privileges”.

Towards Divergent Convergence in Debating International Responsibility

It is important to note that the typology of these three camps on international responsibility

is based on ideal rather than actual types, however a scholar might cross two camps

depending on issues and during different time periods. What the typology seeks to clarify is

the intellectual roadmap rather than labelling individual scholars. Furthermore, “international

responsibility” is embedded in an existing structure of many key indicators including

security, sovereignty, realpolitik, international image, China’s identities and so forth; as

Alastair Iain Johnston (2008: 146) indicates, the Chinese have to make multiple trade-offs

amongst different political dimensions. In this vein, no Chinese IR scholar totally refutes

or absolutely accepts the notion of international responsibility. Conditions matter. They

actuate trade-offs according to objective

evaluations and academic orientation

amongst different sets of tensions. Most

importantly, China possesses conflictual

identities (Shambaugh 2013: 35–36), which further diversify the viewpoints of Chinese

scholars on international responsibility.

As a result, Chinese debates regarding international responsibility show a seemingly con-

tradictory characteristic: “divergent convergence”. First, the referred terms of international

responsibility in Chinese debate are still diverse, but internally it presents an increasingly

positive meaning. Chinese scholars have finally accepted the term “China’s responsibility”

which was a negative expression before 2008, admitting that China should actively take

on relevant international responsibilities. While the averting scholars are adjusting their

viewpoints towards a positive position, the advocating scholars are also adjusting their

outlook to avoid excessive responsibility activities.

Chinese debates regarding international responsibility show a seemingly contradictory characteristic: “divergent convergence”.



12

Second, China’s preference in international responsibility is becoming positive, but different

terms imply a variety of inferences of Chinese scholars in connection with China’s multiple

identities. China’s evolving notions could reflect an evolution from “responsible state”, to

“responsible power”, to “responsible stakeholder”, and to general international responsibility.

For example, the use of “responsible state” takes on a neutral logic of China being a developing

country in the world; when using “responsible power”, scholars are actually highlighting

China’s relatively higher status and potential prestige with a latently nationalist position;

while the reference to “responsible stakeholder” shows Chinese support of the state as a

community member with a significant internationalist identity.

Third, “divergent convergence” also indicates that China’s comprehensive perceptions of

international responsibility would take more and more complicated issues into account.

When diverse issues are included into the

rhetoric of international responsibilities in

a convergent manner, a problem emerges:

fulfilling international responsibility of

different issues may bring incoherent policy consequences. For example, is it possible to

fulfill international responsibility for North Korea and balance the targets between insisting

upon nuclear non-proliferation and providing foreign aid?

Finally, new disputes come up from the general convergence of Chinese viewpoints in

international responsibility including: Whether or not to assume international leadership

responsibility in the face of the United States’ possible retreat under the new administration?

To what extent should China fulfill its international responsibilities and which area is the

priority? And how to effectively assume international responsibilities in a systematic manner?

In particular, most of China’s recent attention is on the debate over the extent to which

China should shoulder international responsibilities in the new strategic situation. Some

scholars argue that China should be more prudent in assuming international responsibility

given the huge investments and possible risks of China’s regional projects. Meanwhile, both

Chinese academia and policy researchers take note of the possible risks of the “Kindleberger

Trap” within a Sino-US power transition (Li 2017; Nye 2017; Xinhua 2017a).

From Preventing to Projecting

China’s studies on international responsibility can also be discussed in a time dimension,

that is, from preventing the burden of international responsibility to projecting the fulfillment

of international responsibility in order to gain a global presence. For example, some

scholars and policy advisors in the averting camp have changed their previous opinions on

China’s international responsibility. Even the scholars in the advocating group demonstrate

changing perceptions on international responsibilities. For example, Yan Xuetong (2001:

37) advocates that China should fulfill its international responsibilities but caution the

potential risks embedded in the discourses of international responsibility articulated by

“divergent convergence” also indicates that China’s comprehensive perceptions of international res-ponsibility would take more and more complicated issues into account.



13

Western countries (Shambaugh 2013: 33). Ma Zhengang (2015) demonstrated a positive

attitude towards China’s responsibility on the resolution of international heated disputes.

Before 2005, there were few disputes on the issue of responsibility in spite of some

pioneering insights among China’s IR studies. Chinese scholars had framed the issue as an

indispensable element of China’s foreign strategies agenda such as regional strategy.

However, Zoellick’s argument of “responsible stakeholder” provoked China’s academic

discussions, by challenging the prevailing intellectual positions and triggering a series of

debates. Scholars’ viewpoints diverged because of differing opinions on relevant variables

such as Sino-US competitive relations, ideological struggles, and the structural tensions of

international competition.

Later, Chinese scholars combined “responsible great power” with “responsible stakeholder”,

calming down some Chinese anxious attitudes. They found international responsibility

could benefit China in spite of the possible

costs. Moreover, as further involvement

into international society is a key task of

Chinese foreign policy, this proposal actually

provides some opportunities for China. Consequently, scholars no longer debate whether

international responsibility should be fulfilled, discussing instead possible approaches and

the extent to which international responsibility should be practiced (Zhu 2010: 41). Some

scholars even propose buiding a system of international responsibilities in the transitional

period (Gao 2013).

Nationalism InternationalismAcademic Orientation

Positi

veNe

gative

Degree of Fulfilling Int’

l Resp.

1950-1964

1965-1978

1979-1999

1998-2005

2006-2015

Figure 4 Development of China’s Attention in International Responsibility, 1950–2015

With the rise of China on the global stage, Chinese scholars found that actively promoting

the level of international responsibility may bring comprehensive benefits for China as a

great power. At present, the concept of “international responsibility” covers a diverse range

Chinese scholars combined “responsible great power” with “responsible stakeholder”, calming down some Chinese anxious attitudes.



14

of issues, over China’s historical mission of national rejuvenation, global issues and

challenges, international development and global common security. According to State

Councilor Yang Jiechi (2015), “as a responsible great power, China should introduce

China’s Initiative, exert China’s roles, and provide China’s contribution”, which aims to

project international responsibility and construct “a community of common destiny”.

In summary, China’s attention to international responsibility is not simply linear in nature.

Figure 4 indicates that China adopted a less isolated nationalism and preferred to undertake

international responsibility within the socialist bloc before the split between China and

the Soviet Union in the mid 1960s. After 1978, China gradually accepted the notion of

international responsibility, and focused on this issue from an academic perspective. From

“responsible great power” after 1997 to “regional responsibility” in early 2000s and to

“responsible stakeholder” in 2005, Chinese scholars’ research on international responsibility

continues to evolve. Based on a ten-year study of Chinese scholarly works from 2006 to

2015, three camps with different viewpoints have emerged, varying in accordance to con-

figurations composed of various academic orientations about the nationalism-internationalism

spectrum and different degrees of international responsibility fulfillment.

However, since 2015 there have been some signs of a new phase in China’s reflections

about its fulfillment of international responsibilities. For example, with the emergence of

large-scale academic studies and political discourses along with China’s assertive behaviors

under initiatives like One Belt One Road (OBOR), many scholars who were previously

optimistic have turned towards a more cautious view, implying a newly emerging convergence

in the idea of avoiding “overheated” activities of fulfilling responsibilities. They worry that

China’s over-commitment may interrupt national rejuvenation and lead to the failure of

China’s rise. For example, Shi Yinhong (2015a, 2015b), who once advocated responsibility

as a key word in China’s strategy, points out the risk of “strategic overstretch” in China’s

international expansion and emphasizes

the importance of “prudence” in OBOR.

Meanwhile, Yan Xuetong (2016: 9–19)

finds China actually over-burdens its inter-

national responsibility in terms of foreign

aid and criticizes that quixotic and extreme leftist foreign view that excessive national

capacity is indeed “Grandiose” (haoda xigong) rather than “Striving for Achievements”

(fenfa youwei). This path of “grandiosity” may disrupt China’s successful rise. Coincidentally,

some American experts notice that China is moving into the role of “post-responsible power”

with increasing “revisionist” hints (Deng 2015: 117–118).

In addition, Donald Trump’s election as US president and his declarations on climate

change and international stability provide a different perspective to Chinese viewpoints on

international responsibility. Yan Xuetong notices the contradiction between the United

States’ shifting responsibility while enjoying privileges, arguing this brings big uncertainties

many scholars who were previously optimistic have turned towards a more cautious view, implying a newly emerging convergence in the idea of avoiding “overheated” activities of fulfilling responsibilities.



15

to the world while it cannot “stop the US economy from a relative decline” (Yamada 2016). In

this case, the US withdrawal actually pushes China forward to assume more responsibilities.

Similarly, Li Wei confirms that China could play a greater role and bear more responsibility

in specific areas when the US denies its leadership responsibility, such as free trade,

infrastructure, clean energy and so forth, wherein China holds some comparative advantages

(Zhang, Xue and Li 2017:19–20)

Why Diverge and Why Converge?

There are at least five dynamics that can explain the divergence in views of China’s

attention in international responsibility. This set of variables can explain why some realists

tend to advocate that China fulfill international responsibility more than some liberalist

and constructivist scholars. First, the ideological differences between nationalism and

internationalism may determine the orientation of Chinese scholars, affecting the divergent

viewpoints on international responsibilities among different groups. In fact, China has a long

internationalist tradition, but nationalist forces have also played a great role in impacting

its policies on international responsibilities (Wu 2015; Xing and Zhan 2008: 91–92). When

some given scholars prefer an open nationalist or internationalist position, they will likely

support China’s active role in fulfilling international responsibility. Shambaugh (2013:

34–35) echoes this argument, indicating that globalists prefer to bear greater responsibilities

than other schools.

Next, the complex concept of international responsibility is too multi-dimensional and

internally conflictual. It covers issues across economic, political, security, and environmental

sectors and involves different aspects concerning legality, justice, morality, conflicts and

change, which may lead to conflictual situations or a lack of recognized operational standard

(Li 2011). Therefore, Chinese scholars have been debating concepts such as international

responsibility, China’s responsibility, responsible power, and bottom-line responsibility

(Zhu 2010: 40–44).

Third, the gap between theory and policy is an important variable in explaining theoretical

divergence. There have been some inconsistencies between academia and policy makers

in China’s foreign policies (Xu 2016: 460). Policy advisors usually take a more conservative

attitude toward fulfilling international responsibility compared with academics in universities.

This is especially the case when the notion

is proposed by the US, and hostile relations

between China and Western countries

often put pressure on policy advisors to take a more cautious stance. Additionally, China’s

foreign policy officials typically absorb academic findings into national policy, narrowing

the theory-policy gap and decreasing the divergence in debating international responsibility.

For instance, Yang Jiechi (2015) argues that three factors determine simultaneously China’s

endeavors in assuming international responsibility and obligation, as proposed by the

the gap between theory and policy is an important variable in explaining theoretical divergence.



16

academia: the inherent meaning of China’s typical great power diplomacy, the expectation

of international society and the influence of China’s diplomatic traditions.

Fourth, different theoretical IR branches play a role in affecting Chinese scholars’ choices

of whether to support or reject international responsibility. In particular, the concept

of interest is a key variable in deciding a given scholar’s preference for international

responsibility. According to liberalists, if

there exist common interests, China should

prefer to fulfill international responsibility;

the realists are more cautious with relative

gains and potential struggles among great powers. Moreover, the constructivists deliberate

on China’s identity, whether it is a responsible great power or not; if they recognize the

identity, they will actively advocate to fulfill international responsibilities. However,

when different identities of China emerge, the conflicts of fulfilling responsibility will come

to light.

Last, the potential risks of power transition and China’s own unbalanced development can

trigger different interpretations among Chinese scholars. Different camps have their own

focus and therefore different evaluations of China’s own advantages and disadvantages in

fulfilling its international responsibility. David Scott (2010) hereby notes that ambiguities

and tensions exist in the process of China accepting responsibilities given the current

international system; international responsibility as one kind of “power rise language”

implies varied debates among scholars and policy advisors.

On the other hand, China’s perceptions of international responsibility are changing from

controversy to convergence with generally more proactive approaches. The convergence of

Chinese IR scholars is out of three reasons: China’s grand strategy, Chinese world viewpoints,

and China’s international practice. First, China’s policy direction gives impetus to the basic

convergence of China’s viewpoints regarding whether to bear international responsibility

or not. Chinese scholars examplified typical connections between policy guidance and

theoretical justifications. After 2005, some ideas were proposed by Chinese leaders, including

“harmonious world” and “community of destiny”. This Chinese proactive stance caused

conservative scholars to question their former beliefs. For example, some scholars in the

averting camp finally changed their viewpoints, such as advocating China’s international

undertaking guided by its new proposal of “human community of destiny” (Lin 2017).

Second, convergence is the result of the evolution of China’s worldview during its involvement

into rhw international society. Over the decades, China has changed from a stubborn

opponent to limited involvement and to comprehensive integration. It was also a process

through which China was transformed from being “a victim of the strong” to a “responsible

power” (Deng 2015:120). The learning and socialization process has provided China with

opportunities to participate in international institutions and accept prevailing international

norms, such as being a “responsible stakeholder” (Zhu and Zhao 2008).

different theoretical IR branches play a role in affecting Chinese scholars’ choices of whether to support or reject international responsibility.



17

Besides the ideational factors, China’s rising power status provides both larger capacity

and heightened willingness as China chooses to fulfill its international responsibility. For

years, China’s responsibility activities in handling financial crises and building new

international institutions have not only brought real benefits but also led to a greater global

presence with increasing international reputation. Furthermore, China’s recent practice

(e.g. OBOR) exposes a series of latent dangers when carrying out assertive strategies,

urging China’s academia to take a more prudent posture when foeging China’s

responsibilities in a convergent manner.

Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications

The rise of “international responsibility” has been a noticeable phenomenon in Chinese

IR studies since 2005, when Robert Zoellick catalyzed the debate on this topic. Most

importantly, we can discern at least three

groups of scholars who have different

viewpoints on international responsibility

from the negative to positive dimensions

and on ideological orientations from

isolation to openness in the nationalism-internationalism spectrum—namely averting,

accommodating, and advocating. This paper argues that the overall trend of international

responsibility studies in China can be described as “divergent convergence”, showing that the

debate on China fulfilling international responsibility is still ongoing rather than stopped.

Based on the above review, two policy implications can be derived for China’s rise and

global presence. On the one hand, fulfilling international responsibility is a crucial step

rather than a trap. China should continue to fulfill its responsibility and use it as a policy

instrument. The current question is how to further bear more responsibilities and how to

improve effectiveness across different issues. China’s responsibility and its problem-solving

plans are essential for its status in the current international landscape.

On the other hand, China may enhance the significance of international responsibility in its

foreign assertiveness, i.e. “responsible assertiveness”. Can responsibility be an effective

response to the fear of a global leadership struggle? Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi

declared that “[R]ather than talking about leadership, we should really be talking about

responsibility”(cited in Xinhua 2017b). Deng Yong (2015: 163) indicates that “responsible

China” would be a good weapon to fight the fear of its possible revisionism. According to

Shaun Breslin (2010: 52, 2013: 616), the “credentials” with which a responsible power can

act is a useful means to ensure China’s national needs on the global stage while China may

seek “responsible change”. As a result, projecting more responsibilities and gaining more

support can decrease the clamor from other powers and neighboring worries, promote

China’s international performance, and provide new alternatives for China’s global

presence.

the overall trend of international responsibility studies in China can be described as “divergent convergence”, showing that the debate on China fulfilling inter-national responsibility is still ongoing rather than stopped.



18

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