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Proceedings of the First Middle East Conference on Global Business, Economics, Finance and Banking (ME14 DUBAI Conference) Dubai, 10-12 October 2014 ISBN: 978-1-941505-16-8 Paper ID_D462 1 www.globalbizresearch.org The Impact of Corporate Governance on Performance of Quoted companies in Nigeria Omolara Mulikat Ojulari, Accounting Unit, Department of Accounting and Finance, School of Business and Governance, College of Humanities, Management and Social Sciences, Kwara State University, Nigeria. Email: [email protected] ___________________________________________________ Abstract This paper explores the relationship(s) that exists between Corporate Governance and the performance of Quoted Companies in Nigeria using the corporate governance variables namely, separation of CEO and Chairman, Director’s Independence and Number of meetings of the board and three enterprise performance indicators namely, return on Equity, Earnings per Share and Net Profit margin. Twenty five quoted companies on the Nigerian stock exchange were selected for the study and two years data was collected on these firms. The two sets of variables (i.e. corporate governance and financial performance) are first summarised using descriptive statistics and then test of association (Correlation and Regression analysis) was carried out between the two sets of variables individually. The result of the tests shows that the two variables (i.e. corporate governance and financial performance) are more positively related on an individual proxy basis than on an overall proxy basis. The overall impact of corporate governance on the performance is also negative so also are the result of the regression models. This result shows that although there is a relationship between the two variables, the predictive power of corporate governance on companies’ performance is too low to be meaningful. Other performance measures like Return on capital employed (ROCE) can be used in further studies to determine if the relationship between the two variables would be linear. ___________________________________________________________________________ Keywords: Corporate Governance, Financial performance, Role of Board, separation of ownership and control
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Proceedings of the First Middle East Conference on Global Business, Economics, Finance and Banking

(ME14 DUBAI Conference) Dubai, 10-12 October 2014

ISBN: 978-1-941505-16-8 Paper ID_D462

1

www.globalbizresearch.org

The Impact of Corporate Governance on Performance of Quoted

companies in Nigeria

Omolara Mulikat Ojulari,

Accounting Unit, Department of Accounting and Finance,

School of Business and Governance,

College of Humanities, Management and Social Sciences,

Kwara State University, Nigeria.

Email: [email protected]

___________________________________________________

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship(s) that exists between Corporate Governance and the

performance of Quoted Companies in Nigeria using the corporate governance variables

namely, separation of CEO and Chairman, Director’s Independence and Number of meetings

of the board and three enterprise performance indicators namely, return on Equity, Earnings

per Share and Net Profit margin. Twenty five quoted companies on the Nigerian stock

exchange were selected for the study and two years data was collected on these firms. The

two sets of variables (i.e. corporate governance and financial performance) are first

summarised using descriptive statistics and then test of association (Correlation and

Regression analysis) was carried out between the two sets of variables individually. The

result of the tests shows that the two variables (i.e. corporate governance and financial

performance) are more positively related on an individual proxy basis than on an overall

proxy basis. The overall impact of corporate governance on the performance is also negative

so also are the result of the regression models. This result shows that although there is a

relationship between the two variables, the predictive power of corporate governance on

companies’ performance is too low to be meaningful. Other performance measures like

Return on capital employed (ROCE) can be used in further studies to determine if the

relationship between the two variables would be linear.

___________________________________________________________________________

Keywords: Corporate Governance, Financial performance, Role of Board, separation of

ownership and control

Proceedings of the First Middle East Conference on Global Business, Economics, Finance and Banking

(ME14 DUBAI Conference) Dubai, 10-12 October 2014

ISBN: 978-1-941505-16-8 Paper ID_D462

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1. Introduction

Corporate Governance is a phenomenon that has been widely looked into through

different dimension in testing the validity of Agency Theory. The incidence of corporate

failure is a familiar occurrence with devastating consequences for all the stakeholders of an

organisation particularly the shareholders, hence the need to regulate and harmonise the

activities of organisations to ensure proper conduct of the people who are at the helms of the

affairs of public and private organisations.

Corporate governance can be defined in a different ways; it generally involves the rules

and guidelines to be followed by the board of directors and the management of a company in

running the affairs of the company to ensure that the interest of all the different stakeholders

of the company are met and protected and also to ensure transparency in the reporting of the

company’s annual report to the larger society who are interested in the business.

These Corporate governance codes differ from one country to the other although the

ultimate aim and objectives of these codes are the same; i.e. the proper management of

companies’ resources to ensure proper running of the company and transparent accountability

of management. The Corporate Governance codes are grouped under various sub-headings

dealing with different issues. According to Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD), the principles Of Corporate Governance are grouped under six main

headings namely:

1. Basis for effective Corporate Governance framework

2. The rights of shareholders and key ownership function

3. The role of stakeholders

4. Equitable treatment of Shareholders

5. Disclosure and Transparency

6. The responsibility of the Board of directors (OECD, 2004)

Every shareholder, whether individual or corporate investor have invested in a business to

earn a return whether in terms of dividend payment or share appreciation hence the

motivation for investing in any business organisation will be based on that firm’s

performance.

As owners of the business, they have entrusted their resources onto the managers of the

business organisation to manage their resources and give them a report about how those

resources are managed and how the returns on those resources are maximised. This

relationship between the owners of the business and the managers of the business gives rise to

what is referred to as the agency theory.

Since the managers of the business have to give the report of their stewardship to the

owners of the business, there could arise a situation where these reports are falsified to give

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(ME14 DUBAI Conference) Dubai, 10-12 October 2014

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the owners of the business an impression that the business is doing very well when in fact the

business may not be well managed. This falsification of results always creates problems for

the owners of the business as they might lose their investment.

A lot of research has been carried out in the field of corporate governance looking at

different ways an organisation is governed and managed to ensure that the interest of all

stakeholders but most especially, the shareholders are been protected, however, this purpose

of this study is to examine whether there’s any connection between the performance of a

business and the effectiveness of the board of directors of an organisation.

The question that comes out of this is how the effectiveness of board of directors would

have an impact on a firms’ profitability; the board of directors is to ensure better

transparency, accuracy and reliability of the financial report of a business organisation. Their

activities serve as a check and balance procedure on the management of an organisation not

only in terms of reporting the financial activities of the organisation, but also in maintaining

proper internal procedures that would ensure that the resources of the owner’s of the business

are properly utilised hence the need to explore the relationship between the effectiveness of

the board of directors and the profitability of a firm.

The focus of this research is on the last OECD guideline which is the responsibilities of

the Board of Director. This is examined to see if there is a relationship between the

effectiveness the board of directors and the firms’ value as investors normally place some

premium on the quality and accuracy of accounting reports.

Therefore, the main aim of this study can be summarised as follows:

To find out if adopting corporate governance measures by a company will have a

significant effect on the performance on that company.

This can be put in a research question form as follows:

Does effective board of directors have an impact on Companies’ performance?

This is further broken down into three objectives as follows:

1. To find out if effective board of directors have an impact on Return on Equity

2. To find out if effective board of directors have an impact on Earnings per share

3. To find out if effective board of directors have an impact on Net Profit margin.

This three objectives are expressed in the form of hypotheses below:

Hypothesis 1

H0: Return on Equity (ROE) is significantly related to good corporate governance practice

Hypothesis 2:

H0: Net Profit Margin (NPM) is significantly related to good corporate governance practice

Hypothesis 3:

H0: Earnings per share (EPS) is significantly related to good corporate governance practice

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To explore the relationship between the profitability of a firm and good corporate

governance practice, the study looks at three characteristics of good corporate governance

practice and three measures of profitability of a company. These characteristics and financial

measures are then statistically analysed to check for any relationship between the good

corporate governance practice and any of the three financial measures.

The three variables used to measure good corporate governance practice are separation of

Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman of the board of directors, number of times the

board meets and the independence of members of the board of directors in terms of the ratio

of non-executive members to executive members of the board. The first variable is to ensure

that there is a proper separation of ownership and control, the second is to ensure that the

board meets regularly to discharge its duties and the last is to ensure proper independence of

the board members to ensure fairness in their decision making.

The three measures of financial performance examined are the return on equity, net profit

margin and earnings per share. The three financial ratios on profitability; return on equity, net

profit margin and earnings per share shows the proper management of a business

organisation’s resources to achieve high financial performance which could eventually lead to

investor’s confidence in the share of such firms hence increasing the financial performance of

the firm.

The responsibilities and activities board of directors are to increase investor’s confidence

in a company and also to ensure proper utilisation and maximisation of shareholders fund as

represented by the three measures of a firm’s profitability, hence, there should be a

relationship between good corporate governance practice and companies performances.

The scope of this study is limited to the examination of the composition and

responsibilities of the company’s board of directors and firm’s performance. The data set used

is also limited to a two year period, and retrieved from 2011 and 2012 financial reports. The

companies used are quoted companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.

While using these companies might make the study to be looking at only companies with

presumed effective board of directors and good financial performance, most of the companies

that had been involved in one scandal or the other in recent times like Cadbury PLC and

Intercontinental Bank, to mention a few, are companies believed to be performing very well

financially and also with very good and effective boards of directors, hence this study might

be able to prove that presumed practicing of good corporate governance might not necessarily

lead to high company performance.

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(ME14 DUBAI Conference) Dubai, 10-12 October 2014

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2. Literature Review

2.1 Corporate Governance

Researchers have extensively studied the conflict between managers and owners

regarding the functioning of the firm, although, the research on understanding the differences

in behaviour of different shareholder identities is limited. The principal-agent framework is

used by Jensen and Meckling (1976) to explain the conflict of interests between managers and

shareholders. The agency problem (Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983))

is an essential part of the contractual view of the firm. A rich empirical literature has

investigated the efficacy of alternative mechanisms in terms of the relationship between

takeovers, performance, managerial pay structure and performance of the firm.

The issue of misuse of corporate entities for illicit purpose has generated a lot of concern

from policy makers and other authorities. (Monk. 2003) Corporate entities have been misused

for illicit purposes such as money laundering, shielding assets from creditor, bribery and

corruption, tax evasion and other market fraud to the extent that these illicit purposes can

threaten the financial stability of the market in which they are operating.

The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW, 2007) reckon that

“Corporate governance is concerned with the relationships and responsibilities between the

board, management, shareholders and other relevant stakeholders within a legal and

regulatory framework” So corporate governance codes and policies are designed within both

legal and regulatory framework to ensure compliance and strict adherence.

Different countries adopts different approach to corporate governance depending on how

the government considers a corporate entity to be, i.e. whether a social institution in which

case the interest of all the stakeholders are important or public/private institution where the

interest of the shareholders supersedes all other stake holders interest and as such the focus is

on creating wealth for the shareholders. Coffee J.C (2003). But despite these differing views,

there’s a convergence on what should be attained and these are accountability, transparency,

responsibilities and fairness.

The OECD defines the responsibilities of the Board as follows:

“The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the

company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s

accountability to the company and the shareholders” OECD (2004 Pg 24)

Board members should act in good faith with best interest of the company and

shareholder; board members should treat all shareholders equally, apply highest ethical

standards, fulfil key functions like review and guiding corporate strategy, ensure the integrity

of the financial statement, exercise judgement on corporate affairs and have access to

accurate, relevant and timely information in the performance of their duties.

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2.2 Corporate Governance and Companies Performance:

Baysinger and Butler (1985), in their study of the relationship between the percentage of

independent directors and return on equity found that boards with more independent directors

performed better than other firms however having a majority of independent directors is not a

necessity for the company to perform well.

They were also of the opinion that firms with a mixture of independent and dependent

directors’ produces better financial value however, MacAvoy and Millstein also reported a

positive relationship between board independence and financial value. Various researchers

have used different performance indexes to check the relationship between good corporate

governance and performance. The results have been mixed with some finding positive

relationship between some of the corporate governance variables and the firm performance

variables.

While Bhagat and black (2002) could not find any possible link between the size of

outside directors to return on asset, Tobin Q ratio (i.e. Total Market Value of firm / total asset

value), returns on stock and asset turnover, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) did revealed that

investors pays premium for the appointment of outside directors.

While Jensen (1993), reports that a small board size could improve firm performance due

to the fact that the benefits attributable to larger boards in terms of increased monitoring may

be outweighed by poor communication and extended decision making process of bigger

groups. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) are in support of this opinion too however Yang and

Krishnan (2005) have opposite view in that they reported that they discovered a significant

positive correlation between board of directors sizes and lower quarterly discretionary

accruals.

Due to the fact that the researchers compared different corporate governance variables

with different firm performance variables, the consensus is that invariably, some corporate

governance variables are definitely responsible for good firm performance hence there is a

relationship between corporate governance and firms’ value as demonstrated by the findings

of Brown and Caylor (2004) where they find that although increased in outside directors does

not increase Tobin Q ratio in their research but corporations with outside directors have

higher stock return, return on equity, higher profit margin and larger stock repurchase.

3. Methodology

It is the philosophical bias of this study that determines both the research approach and

methodology that this researcher adopted in conducting this research. This research is about

discovering of new facts which will subsequently lead to new knowledge on the efficacy of

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Corporate Governance. Therefore, the philosophical bias of this study is the epistemological

positivism and ontological objectivism.

This study is investigating present situation through a structured approach that can

facilitate a replication of the situation without actually interfering with how the data used is

generated with the objective of generating different scenario to identify any possible

relationship in the present situation.

The deductive research approach is adopted for this study. This is in line with the fact that

the aim of this study is to test the relationship between two variables to decide whether

corporate governance, particularly role of board of directors have an impact on how well a

firm is performing, this is therefore a study of a general subject leading to more specific

conclusion i.e., testing the agency theory, not a study to develop a new theory

In adopting the deductive research approach, the quantitative research technique is also

used due to the nature of the study. The quantitative research technique used is the survey

strategy which is a descriptive type of strategy whereby the data set were looked for,

recorded, tested and result described to give a better understanding of the theory being tested.

The observation or the data set used is gathered through the website of Nigerian Stock

exchange, (NSE). All the companies on the NSE were selected initially but some were

dropped because of non-availability of data for some specific years that are required leaving

only twenty five companies using IFRS and two years data set for the study. These twenty

five companies however cuts across many different industry like food and beverage,

household product, investment companies, pharmaceutical companies, mining companies and

lots more. This will give a more generalised result since the sample is not limited to just one

industry set up

This study uses already available data to determine whether there exists any relationship

between good corporate governance practice and a companys’ performance based on past

records of such firms without actually interfering with the determination of those data used.

Due to the nature of this research, the research data to be used is the mainly the secondary

data which has been collected and available for public used by other establishments. . The

data required for this study are as listed below:

Good corporate governance data: - Three different variables will be used in assessing the

characteristics of good corporate governance practice which would allow the committee to

perform its roles effectively and these are Separation of Chief Executive Officer and

Chairman of the board, No of meetings held by the board, and Independence of directors in

board.

1. Separation of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board: The Nigerian Stock

Exchange Commissions’ codes of corporate governance (2008) requires in section 5.1(b) that

Proceedings of the First Middle East Conference on Global Business, Economics, Finance and Banking

(ME14 DUBAI Conference) Dubai, 10-12 October 2014

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“for all public companies with listed securities, the positions of the chairman of the board and

the Chief Executive Officer shall be separate and held by different individuals. This is to

avoid over concentration of powers in one individual which may rob the board of the required

checks and balances in the discharge of its duties”. Going with this rule, the separation of

chairman of the board and the Chief Executive Officer is to give the board the proper

environment for it to carry out its oversight function hence companies that uphold this rule

can be said to be practising good corporate governance.

2. Independence: - The ratio of non-executive board members to executive board member.

While non-executive members could be dependent or independent directors, having more

non-executive director than executive directors is believed to be more advantageous for the

organisation in that these non-executive directors will most likely be directors in other

organisations and they can therefore be seen to be incorruptible, hence they cannot be

influenced by management therefore, they would be more objective in discharging their duties

in the board.

3. Frequency of meeting: - The general belief is that the more the board meets the more they

would be able to carry out their supervisory role, hence the more effective the board will be.

However for the firm’s profitability variables, data on the following variables as used by

Brown and Caylor, (2007) were collected to explain the relationship between the firms’

profitability and the role of the board, they are as follows; Return on Equity (ROE), Net Profit

Margin (NPM) and Earnings Per Share (EPS).

4. Return on Equity: - This is defined as the profit generated on the use of ordinary

shareholders fund, i.e. the net profit after tax and preference dividend divided by shareholders

equity (share capital + reserves). This is important in assessing the firms’ value because it

shows how effective management uses the retained earnings to generating earnings growth. In

situations where management would rather pay out little amount as dividend and put back

some of the profit into the business to generate income, investors and shareholders want to be

sure their investment will be growing with the re-investment of part of their profit.

5. Net Profit Margin: - This is the margin of net profit to the turnover. The usefulness of this

is in terms of proper management of expenses by the management committee. If expenses are

not properly managed, then the amount of return available to shareholders will be low or

nothing at all.

6. Earnings per share: - EPS may be a more accurate performance indicator than the trend in

profit; it measures performance from the perspective of investors and potential investors by

showing the amount of earnings available to each ordinary shareholder. It indicates the

potential return on individual investments because the growth is far more than return on

equity where retained earnings are re-invested

Proceedings of the First Middle East Conference on Global Business, Economics, Finance and Banking

(ME14 DUBAI Conference) Dubai, 10-12 October 2014

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Data analysis involves transforming and presenting the data in a form that will be able to

communicate information to the reader and hence the data collected were transformed using

Microsoft Excel 2010. Data was analysed using both descriptive statistics to find out the

average board of director’s effectiveness for the companies in the sample and inferential

statistics like correlation and regression to test the degree of association between the two

variables.

Companies’ performance is the dependent variable while good corporate governance is

the independent variable.

The correlation will help to find out what type of relationship, if any that exists between

the two variables independently and collectively while the regression will show whether the

effectiveness of board of directorss actually causes increase in profitability of a firm.

4. Analysis of Results

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

In conformity with earlier literature, this section starts with the descriptive statistics. The

descriptive statistics presents the characteristics of the data set for 2011 and 2012. The

Security and Exchange Commission requires the separation of chairman and chief executive

officer, most of the directors in the board should be independent directors, and a minimum of

four meetings annually to coincide with the review of the quarterly financial report and lastly,

Table 1: Descriptive statistics for 2011

SCM IND NOM ROE EPS NPM

Mean 1 0.70109402 5.28 7.255753 53.1392 -5.85673

Standard Deviation 0 0.11562308 1.51437556 20.98575 141.2972 42.61008

Sample Variance 0 0.0133687 2.29333333 440.4018 19964.89 1815.619

Range 0 0.44444444 5 86.89899 769.95 218.722

Minimum 1 0.44444444 3 -29.9138 -415 -190.356

Maximum 1 0.88888889 8 56.98521 354.95 28.36592

Count 25 25 25 25 25 25 Source: From the Researcher’s data

Table 2: Descriptive statistics for 2012

SCM IND NOM ROE EPS NPM

Mean 1 0.671817 4.92 18.70721 161.9312 14.79012

Standard Deviation4.53E-16 0.119994 1.441064 21.73312 190.0992 17.73827

Sample Variance2.05E-31 0.014398 2.076667 472.3284 36137.72 314.6463

Range 0 0.444444 5 100.7908 793 84.83823

Minimum 1 0.444444 3 -22.2536 -48 -13.4194

Maximum 1 0.888889 8 78.53725 745 71.41884

Count 25 25 25 25 25 25 Source: From the Researcher’s data

From the statistics presented in tables 1 and 2 above, it shows that there is separation of

Chairman and Managing Director. A dichotomy variable 1 is used for companies with

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separation of Chairman and Managing director while 0 is used for companies without

separation of Chairman and Managing Director. The ratio of non-executive directors to

executive directors ranges between 44% and 88% for both years. This indicates that most

companies have more non-executive directors than executive directors and the number of

meetings held by the board of director’s ranges between three to eight meetings per annum.

This is well above the Nigerian Security and Exchange Commission’s Code of Corporate

Governance benchmark of four meetings per annum.

The mean of all the corporate governance variables are in line with guidelines of the

Nigerian Security and Exchange Commission’s Corporate Governance Codes. This suggests

that all the companies in the sample can be assumed to be following Good Corporate

Governance practices.

For Return on Equity (ROE), the average return on equity of 7.25% and 18.70% in tables

1 and 2 respectively shows that most of the firms made profit in the years under review. With

a maximum of 56.98% and 78.53% in tables 1 and 2 and a minimum of -29.91% and -22.91%

respectively, The profitability of the companies increased in the year 2012. The net profit

margin measures the ratio of the net profit to turnover. With a mean of almost -5.85%,

minimum of -190.35% and maximum of 28.36% in 2011 and mean of 14.79%, minimum -

13.41% and maximum of 71.41% in 2012, the result is in line with the Return on Equity’s

result.

The Earnings per share shows the amount of returns each individual shares have earned in

the year. It shows the amount that each investor/shareholders would have received if

management decides to pay out all what the shares earned to the shareholders. With a mean

value of 53.13 kobo and 161.93 Kobo in 2011 and 2012 respectively, it shows a tremendous

increase from 2011 to 2012. This however does not mean that all the companies under review

made profit in 2012, the minimum EPS in 2011 and 2012 respectively are -415 kobo and -48

kobo while the maximum EPS for the two years are 354.95 kobo and 745 kobo respectively.

It can be concluded that most companies made more profit in year 2012 than in year 2011.

Looking at the trend in the corporate governance variables and the financial performance

variables for the two years, there are no noticeable changes in the corporate governance

variables in the two years, yet the changes in the financial variables are visible incredible.

This alone could point to the fact that there may not be any relationship between the two

variables but tests of association should provide more evidence.

It was observed from the data that most companies had to adopt the IFRS framework for

reporting in 2011; hence many of the firms recorded losses. This is evident in the 2012 reports

where most of the companies had their 2011 reports adjusted.

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4.2 Test of Association

The test of association conducted on the data gathered for this research study is to

determine the sub-objectives and find out if they are true or not which will help in achieving

the main aim of this research study.

Two correlation exercises were undertaken, the first correlation exercise is to see what

kind of relationship exists between all the individual board of directors’ variables and the

individual profitability variable since it is possible that these variables may react differently to

each other.

Table 3: Correlation 2011

SOC IND NOM

ROE 3.97E-17 -0.25033 0.129571

EPS 1.64E-16 0.001704 0.166651

NPM 2.72E-17 -0.12931 0.269615

SOC IND NOM Overall

Cop

ROE 3.97E-17 -0.25033 0.129571 -0.05757

EPS 1.64E-16 0.001704 0.166651 -0.08916

NPM 2.72E-17 -0.12931 0.269615 -0.00691

Source: Researcher’s data

Table 4: Correlation 2012

SCM IND NOM

ROE -1.3E-16 0.13308 -0.28983

EPS 7.32E-17 0.235995 -0.12432

NPM 1.96E-16 0.094898 -0.10954

From table 3, it can be seen that Separation of Chairman and Managing Direction is

positively correlated with all the financial variables, so also is Number of meetings in year

2011, however ratio of non-executive directors is only positively correlated with Earnings per

share but negatively correlated with Return on Equity and Net Profit Margin.

However, table 4 presents a different picture of the correlations, while ratio of non-

executive directors to executive directors is positively correlated with all the three financial

variables, Number of meetings is negatively correlated with all the three financial variables

while Separation of Chairman and Managing director is positively correlated with Earnings

per share and net profit margin, it is negatively correlated with Return on Equity.

Since seven out of the nine correlations in 2011 are positive, it can be concluded that

77.7% positive correlations exists between the profitability variables and the corporate

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governance variables. However, in 2012, only five out of the nine correlations are positive,

this is just 55.56%. This is lower than 2011. This also indicates that high performance may

not be caused by good corporate governance practice.

Hypothesis Testing:

Regression results (Table 5 & 6)

While the line has a positive intercept and positive coefficient for number of meetings, it

has negative coefficients for ratio of non-executive to executive directors. The R Square in

table 5 and 6, which is the coefficient of determination, is what really determines to what

extent the Return on Equity can be determined by the board of directors’ variables. With an R

Square of 6.32% and 8.46% in 2011 and 2012 respectively , this mean that only 6.32 % and

8.46% of the value of Return on Equity can be explained by the board of directors’ variables

in the two years respectively, this can be said to be insignificant, hence the null hypothesis

that Board of directors’ effectiveness cannot enhance Return on Equity will be accepted.

Hypothesis 2: Refer to tables 7 & 8

With a coefficient of determination (R²) of 3.42% in table 7 and 5.71% in table 8, the

predictive power of the corporate governance variables are very weak in the two years under

review, in addition, with a negative intercept, the null hypothesis, that is, that the board of

directors’ effectiveness cannot enhance the Earnings per share will be accepted

Hypothesis 3: Refer to tables 9 and 10

The coefficient of determination R² in table 9 is 7.29% for 2011 and in table 10 is 1.53%

for 2012, these are also too week to predict the changes in the Net Profit margin. While the

intercept for 2011 is negative, the intercept for 2012 is positive, there are just too many

contradictions to suggest that good corporate practice could have an influence on the

performance of a company, hence the null hypothesis will also be accepted, that is, net profit

margin cannot be influence by effective board of directors.

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

The descriptive statistics shows that all the firms can be said to have effective board of

directors on the average due to the fact that the mean of all the board of directors variables are

more than the minimum standard required. The firms also displayed some form of

profitability in the years under review. The test of association shows that there is indeed some

form of relationship between the two main variables i.e. board of directors’ effectiveness and

firm profitability, however the firm profitability cannot be predicted to a large extent by the

board of directors’ effectiveness.

While the correlation test on individual variables shows a positive correlation of 77.7% in

2011 and 55.67% in 2012, The decline in 2012 which is a more profitable year is supported

Proceedings of the First Middle East Conference on Global Business, Economics, Finance and Banking

(ME14 DUBAI Conference) Dubai, 10-12 October 2014

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by the weak regression result which leads to a the logically conclusion that the effectiveness

of board of directors does not have a noticeable impact on the profitability of a firm.

All statistical methods have their inherent weakness; hence the multiple regression

models may not have been the best statistical method to use for this study most especially

because of the qualitative nature of the board of directors effectiveness variable. It would be

recommended that the study can be replicated using a combination of qualitative and

quantitative statistical model like the logistic regression model.

References

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Appendix:

Table 5: ROE Regression 2011

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0.290945524

R Square 0.084649298

Adjusted R Square -0.044018948

Standard Error 21.71751212

Observations 25

ANOVA

df SS MS F Significance F

Regression 3 959.5744 319.8581 1.017252 0.404892

Residual 22 10376.31 471.6503

Total 25 11335.88

CoefficientsStandard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%

Intercept 36.09677066 36.54964 0.987609 0.334082 -39.7025

SOC 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0

IND 4.979122795 39.90236 0.124783 #NUM! -77.7733

NOM -4.214353914 3.322566 -1.2684 0.217912 -11.1049

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Table 6: ROE regression 2012

Table 7: EPS Regression 2011

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0.185188

R Square 0.034294

Adjusted R Square -0.09895

Standard Error 145.0274

Observations 25

ANOVA

df SS MS F Significance F

Regression 3 16432.44 5477.48 0.390636 0.760959

Residual 22 462724.9 21032.95

Total 25 479157.3

CoefficientsStandard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%

Intercept -124.341 269.6733 -0.46108 0.649268 -683.609

SOC 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0

IND 109.1869 283.2635 0.385461 #NUM! -478.266

NOM 19.11543 21.62726 0.883858 0.38633 -25.7368

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Table 8: EPS Regression 2012

SUMMARY OUTPUT

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0.239027651

R Square 0.057134218

Adjusted R Square -0.074035398

Standard Error 192.7967062

Observations 25

ANOVA

df SS MS F Significance F

Regression 3 49552.81 16517.6 0.66656 0.581932

Residual 22 817752.5 37170.57

Total 25 867305.4

CoefficientsStandard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%

Intercept -46.14709352 324.4686 -0.14222 0.888198 -719.054

SOC 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0

IND 349.3311288 354.2323 0.986164 #NUM! -385.302

NOM -5.408208697 29.496 -0.18335 0.8562 -66.5792

Table 9: NPM Regression 2011

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0.270058064

R Square 0.072931358

Adjusted R Square -0.056802155

Standard Error 42.85115988

Observations 25

ANOVA

df SS MS F Significance F

Regression 3 3177.973 1059.324 0.865357 0.474515

Residual 22 40396.88 1836.222

Total 25 43574.86

CoefficientsStandard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%

Intercept -40.40652485 79.6802 -0.50711 0.617124 -205.653

SOC 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0

IND -6.302168014 83.69569 -0.0753 #NUM! -179.876

NOM 7.380341771 6.390194 1.154948 0.260503 -5.87211

Table 10: NPM Regression 2012

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SUMMARY OUTPUT

Regression Statistics

Multiple R 0.123849

R Square 0.015338

Adjusted R Square -0.11963

Standard Error 18.38438

Observations 25

ANOVA

df SS MS F Significance F

Regression 3 115.8285 38.60949 0.171351 0.914543

Residual 22 7435.682 337.9855

Total 25 7551.511

CoefficientsStandard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%

Intercept 13.79627 30.94013 0.445902 0.660025 -50.3696

SOC 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0

IND 9.227429 33.77828 0.273176 #NUM! -60.8244

NOM -1.05799 2.81263 -0.37616 0.710404 -6.89102


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