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The Impact of Corporate Governance on Performance of Quoted
companies in Nigeria
Omolara Mulikat Ojulari,
Accounting Unit, Department of Accounting and Finance,
School of Business and Governance,
College of Humanities, Management and Social Sciences,
Kwara State University, Nigeria.
Email: [email protected]
___________________________________________________
Abstract
This paper explores the relationship(s) that exists between Corporate Governance and the
performance of Quoted Companies in Nigeria using the corporate governance variables
namely, separation of CEO and Chairman, Director’s Independence and Number of meetings
of the board and three enterprise performance indicators namely, return on Equity, Earnings
per Share and Net Profit margin. Twenty five quoted companies on the Nigerian stock
exchange were selected for the study and two years data was collected on these firms. The
two sets of variables (i.e. corporate governance and financial performance) are first
summarised using descriptive statistics and then test of association (Correlation and
Regression analysis) was carried out between the two sets of variables individually. The
result of the tests shows that the two variables (i.e. corporate governance and financial
performance) are more positively related on an individual proxy basis than on an overall
proxy basis. The overall impact of corporate governance on the performance is also negative
so also are the result of the regression models. This result shows that although there is a
relationship between the two variables, the predictive power of corporate governance on
companies’ performance is too low to be meaningful. Other performance measures like
Return on capital employed (ROCE) can be used in further studies to determine if the
relationship between the two variables would be linear.
___________________________________________________________________________
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Financial performance, Role of Board, separation of
ownership and control
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1. Introduction
Corporate Governance is a phenomenon that has been widely looked into through
different dimension in testing the validity of Agency Theory. The incidence of corporate
failure is a familiar occurrence with devastating consequences for all the stakeholders of an
organisation particularly the shareholders, hence the need to regulate and harmonise the
activities of organisations to ensure proper conduct of the people who are at the helms of the
affairs of public and private organisations.
Corporate governance can be defined in a different ways; it generally involves the rules
and guidelines to be followed by the board of directors and the management of a company in
running the affairs of the company to ensure that the interest of all the different stakeholders
of the company are met and protected and also to ensure transparency in the reporting of the
company’s annual report to the larger society who are interested in the business.
These Corporate governance codes differ from one country to the other although the
ultimate aim and objectives of these codes are the same; i.e. the proper management of
companies’ resources to ensure proper running of the company and transparent accountability
of management. The Corporate Governance codes are grouped under various sub-headings
dealing with different issues. According to Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the principles Of Corporate Governance are grouped under six main
headings namely:
1. Basis for effective Corporate Governance framework
2. The rights of shareholders and key ownership function
3. The role of stakeholders
4. Equitable treatment of Shareholders
5. Disclosure and Transparency
6. The responsibility of the Board of directors (OECD, 2004)
Every shareholder, whether individual or corporate investor have invested in a business to
earn a return whether in terms of dividend payment or share appreciation hence the
motivation for investing in any business organisation will be based on that firm’s
performance.
As owners of the business, they have entrusted their resources onto the managers of the
business organisation to manage their resources and give them a report about how those
resources are managed and how the returns on those resources are maximised. This
relationship between the owners of the business and the managers of the business gives rise to
what is referred to as the agency theory.
Since the managers of the business have to give the report of their stewardship to the
owners of the business, there could arise a situation where these reports are falsified to give
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the owners of the business an impression that the business is doing very well when in fact the
business may not be well managed. This falsification of results always creates problems for
the owners of the business as they might lose their investment.
A lot of research has been carried out in the field of corporate governance looking at
different ways an organisation is governed and managed to ensure that the interest of all
stakeholders but most especially, the shareholders are been protected, however, this purpose
of this study is to examine whether there’s any connection between the performance of a
business and the effectiveness of the board of directors of an organisation.
The question that comes out of this is how the effectiveness of board of directors would
have an impact on a firms’ profitability; the board of directors is to ensure better
transparency, accuracy and reliability of the financial report of a business organisation. Their
activities serve as a check and balance procedure on the management of an organisation not
only in terms of reporting the financial activities of the organisation, but also in maintaining
proper internal procedures that would ensure that the resources of the owner’s of the business
are properly utilised hence the need to explore the relationship between the effectiveness of
the board of directors and the profitability of a firm.
The focus of this research is on the last OECD guideline which is the responsibilities of
the Board of Director. This is examined to see if there is a relationship between the
effectiveness the board of directors and the firms’ value as investors normally place some
premium on the quality and accuracy of accounting reports.
Therefore, the main aim of this study can be summarised as follows:
To find out if adopting corporate governance measures by a company will have a
significant effect on the performance on that company.
This can be put in a research question form as follows:
Does effective board of directors have an impact on Companies’ performance?
This is further broken down into three objectives as follows:
1. To find out if effective board of directors have an impact on Return on Equity
2. To find out if effective board of directors have an impact on Earnings per share
3. To find out if effective board of directors have an impact on Net Profit margin.
This three objectives are expressed in the form of hypotheses below:
Hypothesis 1
H0: Return on Equity (ROE) is significantly related to good corporate governance practice
Hypothesis 2:
H0: Net Profit Margin (NPM) is significantly related to good corporate governance practice
Hypothesis 3:
H0: Earnings per share (EPS) is significantly related to good corporate governance practice
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To explore the relationship between the profitability of a firm and good corporate
governance practice, the study looks at three characteristics of good corporate governance
practice and three measures of profitability of a company. These characteristics and financial
measures are then statistically analysed to check for any relationship between the good
corporate governance practice and any of the three financial measures.
The three variables used to measure good corporate governance practice are separation of
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman of the board of directors, number of times the
board meets and the independence of members of the board of directors in terms of the ratio
of non-executive members to executive members of the board. The first variable is to ensure
that there is a proper separation of ownership and control, the second is to ensure that the
board meets regularly to discharge its duties and the last is to ensure proper independence of
the board members to ensure fairness in their decision making.
The three measures of financial performance examined are the return on equity, net profit
margin and earnings per share. The three financial ratios on profitability; return on equity, net
profit margin and earnings per share shows the proper management of a business
organisation’s resources to achieve high financial performance which could eventually lead to
investor’s confidence in the share of such firms hence increasing the financial performance of
the firm.
The responsibilities and activities board of directors are to increase investor’s confidence
in a company and also to ensure proper utilisation and maximisation of shareholders fund as
represented by the three measures of a firm’s profitability, hence, there should be a
relationship between good corporate governance practice and companies performances.
The scope of this study is limited to the examination of the composition and
responsibilities of the company’s board of directors and firm’s performance. The data set used
is also limited to a two year period, and retrieved from 2011 and 2012 financial reports. The
companies used are quoted companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.
While using these companies might make the study to be looking at only companies with
presumed effective board of directors and good financial performance, most of the companies
that had been involved in one scandal or the other in recent times like Cadbury PLC and
Intercontinental Bank, to mention a few, are companies believed to be performing very well
financially and also with very good and effective boards of directors, hence this study might
be able to prove that presumed practicing of good corporate governance might not necessarily
lead to high company performance.
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2. Literature Review
2.1 Corporate Governance
Researchers have extensively studied the conflict between managers and owners
regarding the functioning of the firm, although, the research on understanding the differences
in behaviour of different shareholder identities is limited. The principal-agent framework is
used by Jensen and Meckling (1976) to explain the conflict of interests between managers and
shareholders. The agency problem (Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983))
is an essential part of the contractual view of the firm. A rich empirical literature has
investigated the efficacy of alternative mechanisms in terms of the relationship between
takeovers, performance, managerial pay structure and performance of the firm.
The issue of misuse of corporate entities for illicit purpose has generated a lot of concern
from policy makers and other authorities. (Monk. 2003) Corporate entities have been misused
for illicit purposes such as money laundering, shielding assets from creditor, bribery and
corruption, tax evasion and other market fraud to the extent that these illicit purposes can
threaten the financial stability of the market in which they are operating.
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW, 2007) reckon that
“Corporate governance is concerned with the relationships and responsibilities between the
board, management, shareholders and other relevant stakeholders within a legal and
regulatory framework” So corporate governance codes and policies are designed within both
legal and regulatory framework to ensure compliance and strict adherence.
Different countries adopts different approach to corporate governance depending on how
the government considers a corporate entity to be, i.e. whether a social institution in which
case the interest of all the stakeholders are important or public/private institution where the
interest of the shareholders supersedes all other stake holders interest and as such the focus is
on creating wealth for the shareholders. Coffee J.C (2003). But despite these differing views,
there’s a convergence on what should be attained and these are accountability, transparency,
responsibilities and fairness.
The OECD defines the responsibilities of the Board as follows:
“The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the
company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s
accountability to the company and the shareholders” OECD (2004 Pg 24)
Board members should act in good faith with best interest of the company and
shareholder; board members should treat all shareholders equally, apply highest ethical
standards, fulfil key functions like review and guiding corporate strategy, ensure the integrity
of the financial statement, exercise judgement on corporate affairs and have access to
accurate, relevant and timely information in the performance of their duties.
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2.2 Corporate Governance and Companies Performance:
Baysinger and Butler (1985), in their study of the relationship between the percentage of
independent directors and return on equity found that boards with more independent directors
performed better than other firms however having a majority of independent directors is not a
necessity for the company to perform well.
They were also of the opinion that firms with a mixture of independent and dependent
directors’ produces better financial value however, MacAvoy and Millstein also reported a
positive relationship between board independence and financial value. Various researchers
have used different performance indexes to check the relationship between good corporate
governance and performance. The results have been mixed with some finding positive
relationship between some of the corporate governance variables and the firm performance
variables.
While Bhagat and black (2002) could not find any possible link between the size of
outside directors to return on asset, Tobin Q ratio (i.e. Total Market Value of firm / total asset
value), returns on stock and asset turnover, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) did revealed that
investors pays premium for the appointment of outside directors.
While Jensen (1993), reports that a small board size could improve firm performance due
to the fact that the benefits attributable to larger boards in terms of increased monitoring may
be outweighed by poor communication and extended decision making process of bigger
groups. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) are in support of this opinion too however Yang and
Krishnan (2005) have opposite view in that they reported that they discovered a significant
positive correlation between board of directors sizes and lower quarterly discretionary
accruals.
Due to the fact that the researchers compared different corporate governance variables
with different firm performance variables, the consensus is that invariably, some corporate
governance variables are definitely responsible for good firm performance hence there is a
relationship between corporate governance and firms’ value as demonstrated by the findings
of Brown and Caylor (2004) where they find that although increased in outside directors does
not increase Tobin Q ratio in their research but corporations with outside directors have
higher stock return, return on equity, higher profit margin and larger stock repurchase.
3. Methodology
It is the philosophical bias of this study that determines both the research approach and
methodology that this researcher adopted in conducting this research. This research is about
discovering of new facts which will subsequently lead to new knowledge on the efficacy of
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Corporate Governance. Therefore, the philosophical bias of this study is the epistemological
positivism and ontological objectivism.
This study is investigating present situation through a structured approach that can
facilitate a replication of the situation without actually interfering with how the data used is
generated with the objective of generating different scenario to identify any possible
relationship in the present situation.
The deductive research approach is adopted for this study. This is in line with the fact that
the aim of this study is to test the relationship between two variables to decide whether
corporate governance, particularly role of board of directors have an impact on how well a
firm is performing, this is therefore a study of a general subject leading to more specific
conclusion i.e., testing the agency theory, not a study to develop a new theory
In adopting the deductive research approach, the quantitative research technique is also
used due to the nature of the study. The quantitative research technique used is the survey
strategy which is a descriptive type of strategy whereby the data set were looked for,
recorded, tested and result described to give a better understanding of the theory being tested.
The observation or the data set used is gathered through the website of Nigerian Stock
exchange, (NSE). All the companies on the NSE were selected initially but some were
dropped because of non-availability of data for some specific years that are required leaving
only twenty five companies using IFRS and two years data set for the study. These twenty
five companies however cuts across many different industry like food and beverage,
household product, investment companies, pharmaceutical companies, mining companies and
lots more. This will give a more generalised result since the sample is not limited to just one
industry set up
This study uses already available data to determine whether there exists any relationship
between good corporate governance practice and a companys’ performance based on past
records of such firms without actually interfering with the determination of those data used.
Due to the nature of this research, the research data to be used is the mainly the secondary
data which has been collected and available for public used by other establishments. . The
data required for this study are as listed below:
Good corporate governance data: - Three different variables will be used in assessing the
characteristics of good corporate governance practice which would allow the committee to
perform its roles effectively and these are Separation of Chief Executive Officer and
Chairman of the board, No of meetings held by the board, and Independence of directors in
board.
1. Separation of Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board: The Nigerian Stock
Exchange Commissions’ codes of corporate governance (2008) requires in section 5.1(b) that
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“for all public companies with listed securities, the positions of the chairman of the board and
the Chief Executive Officer shall be separate and held by different individuals. This is to
avoid over concentration of powers in one individual which may rob the board of the required
checks and balances in the discharge of its duties”. Going with this rule, the separation of
chairman of the board and the Chief Executive Officer is to give the board the proper
environment for it to carry out its oversight function hence companies that uphold this rule
can be said to be practising good corporate governance.
2. Independence: - The ratio of non-executive board members to executive board member.
While non-executive members could be dependent or independent directors, having more
non-executive director than executive directors is believed to be more advantageous for the
organisation in that these non-executive directors will most likely be directors in other
organisations and they can therefore be seen to be incorruptible, hence they cannot be
influenced by management therefore, they would be more objective in discharging their duties
in the board.
3. Frequency of meeting: - The general belief is that the more the board meets the more they
would be able to carry out their supervisory role, hence the more effective the board will be.
However for the firm’s profitability variables, data on the following variables as used by
Brown and Caylor, (2007) were collected to explain the relationship between the firms’
profitability and the role of the board, they are as follows; Return on Equity (ROE), Net Profit
Margin (NPM) and Earnings Per Share (EPS).
4. Return on Equity: - This is defined as the profit generated on the use of ordinary
shareholders fund, i.e. the net profit after tax and preference dividend divided by shareholders
equity (share capital + reserves). This is important in assessing the firms’ value because it
shows how effective management uses the retained earnings to generating earnings growth. In
situations where management would rather pay out little amount as dividend and put back
some of the profit into the business to generate income, investors and shareholders want to be
sure their investment will be growing with the re-investment of part of their profit.
5. Net Profit Margin: - This is the margin of net profit to the turnover. The usefulness of this
is in terms of proper management of expenses by the management committee. If expenses are
not properly managed, then the amount of return available to shareholders will be low or
nothing at all.
6. Earnings per share: - EPS may be a more accurate performance indicator than the trend in
profit; it measures performance from the perspective of investors and potential investors by
showing the amount of earnings available to each ordinary shareholder. It indicates the
potential return on individual investments because the growth is far more than return on
equity where retained earnings are re-invested
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Data analysis involves transforming and presenting the data in a form that will be able to
communicate information to the reader and hence the data collected were transformed using
Microsoft Excel 2010. Data was analysed using both descriptive statistics to find out the
average board of director’s effectiveness for the companies in the sample and inferential
statistics like correlation and regression to test the degree of association between the two
variables.
Companies’ performance is the dependent variable while good corporate governance is
the independent variable.
The correlation will help to find out what type of relationship, if any that exists between
the two variables independently and collectively while the regression will show whether the
effectiveness of board of directorss actually causes increase in profitability of a firm.
4. Analysis of Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
In conformity with earlier literature, this section starts with the descriptive statistics. The
descriptive statistics presents the characteristics of the data set for 2011 and 2012. The
Security and Exchange Commission requires the separation of chairman and chief executive
officer, most of the directors in the board should be independent directors, and a minimum of
four meetings annually to coincide with the review of the quarterly financial report and lastly,
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for 2011
SCM IND NOM ROE EPS NPM
Mean 1 0.70109402 5.28 7.255753 53.1392 -5.85673
Standard Deviation 0 0.11562308 1.51437556 20.98575 141.2972 42.61008
Sample Variance 0 0.0133687 2.29333333 440.4018 19964.89 1815.619
Range 0 0.44444444 5 86.89899 769.95 218.722
Minimum 1 0.44444444 3 -29.9138 -415 -190.356
Maximum 1 0.88888889 8 56.98521 354.95 28.36592
Count 25 25 25 25 25 25 Source: From the Researcher’s data
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for 2012
SCM IND NOM ROE EPS NPM
Mean 1 0.671817 4.92 18.70721 161.9312 14.79012
Standard Deviation4.53E-16 0.119994 1.441064 21.73312 190.0992 17.73827
Sample Variance2.05E-31 0.014398 2.076667 472.3284 36137.72 314.6463
Range 0 0.444444 5 100.7908 793 84.83823
Minimum 1 0.444444 3 -22.2536 -48 -13.4194
Maximum 1 0.888889 8 78.53725 745 71.41884
Count 25 25 25 25 25 25 Source: From the Researcher’s data
From the statistics presented in tables 1 and 2 above, it shows that there is separation of
Chairman and Managing Director. A dichotomy variable 1 is used for companies with
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separation of Chairman and Managing director while 0 is used for companies without
separation of Chairman and Managing Director. The ratio of non-executive directors to
executive directors ranges between 44% and 88% for both years. This indicates that most
companies have more non-executive directors than executive directors and the number of
meetings held by the board of director’s ranges between three to eight meetings per annum.
This is well above the Nigerian Security and Exchange Commission’s Code of Corporate
Governance benchmark of four meetings per annum.
The mean of all the corporate governance variables are in line with guidelines of the
Nigerian Security and Exchange Commission’s Corporate Governance Codes. This suggests
that all the companies in the sample can be assumed to be following Good Corporate
Governance practices.
For Return on Equity (ROE), the average return on equity of 7.25% and 18.70% in tables
1 and 2 respectively shows that most of the firms made profit in the years under review. With
a maximum of 56.98% and 78.53% in tables 1 and 2 and a minimum of -29.91% and -22.91%
respectively, The profitability of the companies increased in the year 2012. The net profit
margin measures the ratio of the net profit to turnover. With a mean of almost -5.85%,
minimum of -190.35% and maximum of 28.36% in 2011 and mean of 14.79%, minimum -
13.41% and maximum of 71.41% in 2012, the result is in line with the Return on Equity’s
result.
The Earnings per share shows the amount of returns each individual shares have earned in
the year. It shows the amount that each investor/shareholders would have received if
management decides to pay out all what the shares earned to the shareholders. With a mean
value of 53.13 kobo and 161.93 Kobo in 2011 and 2012 respectively, it shows a tremendous
increase from 2011 to 2012. This however does not mean that all the companies under review
made profit in 2012, the minimum EPS in 2011 and 2012 respectively are -415 kobo and -48
kobo while the maximum EPS for the two years are 354.95 kobo and 745 kobo respectively.
It can be concluded that most companies made more profit in year 2012 than in year 2011.
Looking at the trend in the corporate governance variables and the financial performance
variables for the two years, there are no noticeable changes in the corporate governance
variables in the two years, yet the changes in the financial variables are visible incredible.
This alone could point to the fact that there may not be any relationship between the two
variables but tests of association should provide more evidence.
It was observed from the data that most companies had to adopt the IFRS framework for
reporting in 2011; hence many of the firms recorded losses. This is evident in the 2012 reports
where most of the companies had their 2011 reports adjusted.
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4.2 Test of Association
The test of association conducted on the data gathered for this research study is to
determine the sub-objectives and find out if they are true or not which will help in achieving
the main aim of this research study.
Two correlation exercises were undertaken, the first correlation exercise is to see what
kind of relationship exists between all the individual board of directors’ variables and the
individual profitability variable since it is possible that these variables may react differently to
each other.
Table 3: Correlation 2011
SOC IND NOM
ROE 3.97E-17 -0.25033 0.129571
EPS 1.64E-16 0.001704 0.166651
NPM 2.72E-17 -0.12931 0.269615
SOC IND NOM Overall
Cop
ROE 3.97E-17 -0.25033 0.129571 -0.05757
EPS 1.64E-16 0.001704 0.166651 -0.08916
NPM 2.72E-17 -0.12931 0.269615 -0.00691
Source: Researcher’s data
Table 4: Correlation 2012
SCM IND NOM
ROE -1.3E-16 0.13308 -0.28983
EPS 7.32E-17 0.235995 -0.12432
NPM 1.96E-16 0.094898 -0.10954
From table 3, it can be seen that Separation of Chairman and Managing Direction is
positively correlated with all the financial variables, so also is Number of meetings in year
2011, however ratio of non-executive directors is only positively correlated with Earnings per
share but negatively correlated with Return on Equity and Net Profit Margin.
However, table 4 presents a different picture of the correlations, while ratio of non-
executive directors to executive directors is positively correlated with all the three financial
variables, Number of meetings is negatively correlated with all the three financial variables
while Separation of Chairman and Managing director is positively correlated with Earnings
per share and net profit margin, it is negatively correlated with Return on Equity.
Since seven out of the nine correlations in 2011 are positive, it can be concluded that
77.7% positive correlations exists between the profitability variables and the corporate
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governance variables. However, in 2012, only five out of the nine correlations are positive,
this is just 55.56%. This is lower than 2011. This also indicates that high performance may
not be caused by good corporate governance practice.
Hypothesis Testing:
Regression results (Table 5 & 6)
While the line has a positive intercept and positive coefficient for number of meetings, it
has negative coefficients for ratio of non-executive to executive directors. The R Square in
table 5 and 6, which is the coefficient of determination, is what really determines to what
extent the Return on Equity can be determined by the board of directors’ variables. With an R
Square of 6.32% and 8.46% in 2011 and 2012 respectively , this mean that only 6.32 % and
8.46% of the value of Return on Equity can be explained by the board of directors’ variables
in the two years respectively, this can be said to be insignificant, hence the null hypothesis
that Board of directors’ effectiveness cannot enhance Return on Equity will be accepted.
Hypothesis 2: Refer to tables 7 & 8
With a coefficient of determination (R²) of 3.42% in table 7 and 5.71% in table 8, the
predictive power of the corporate governance variables are very weak in the two years under
review, in addition, with a negative intercept, the null hypothesis, that is, that the board of
directors’ effectiveness cannot enhance the Earnings per share will be accepted
Hypothesis 3: Refer to tables 9 and 10
The coefficient of determination R² in table 9 is 7.29% for 2011 and in table 10 is 1.53%
for 2012, these are also too week to predict the changes in the Net Profit margin. While the
intercept for 2011 is negative, the intercept for 2012 is positive, there are just too many
contradictions to suggest that good corporate practice could have an influence on the
performance of a company, hence the null hypothesis will also be accepted, that is, net profit
margin cannot be influence by effective board of directors.
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
The descriptive statistics shows that all the firms can be said to have effective board of
directors on the average due to the fact that the mean of all the board of directors variables are
more than the minimum standard required. The firms also displayed some form of
profitability in the years under review. The test of association shows that there is indeed some
form of relationship between the two main variables i.e. board of directors’ effectiveness and
firm profitability, however the firm profitability cannot be predicted to a large extent by the
board of directors’ effectiveness.
While the correlation test on individual variables shows a positive correlation of 77.7% in
2011 and 55.67% in 2012, The decline in 2012 which is a more profitable year is supported
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by the weak regression result which leads to a the logically conclusion that the effectiveness
of board of directors does not have a noticeable impact on the profitability of a firm.
All statistical methods have their inherent weakness; hence the multiple regression
models may not have been the best statistical method to use for this study most especially
because of the qualitative nature of the board of directors effectiveness variable. It would be
recommended that the study can be replicated using a combination of qualitative and
quantitative statistical model like the logistic regression model.
References
Baysinger, B. D. and Henry N. B., (1985). Corporate governance and the board of directors:
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Appendix:
Table 5: ROE Regression 2011
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.290945524
R Square 0.084649298
Adjusted R Square -0.044018948
Standard Error 21.71751212
Observations 25
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 959.5744 319.8581 1.017252 0.404892
Residual 22 10376.31 471.6503
Total 25 11335.88
CoefficientsStandard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%
Intercept 36.09677066 36.54964 0.987609 0.334082 -39.7025
SOC 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0
IND 4.979122795 39.90236 0.124783 #NUM! -77.7733
NOM -4.214353914 3.322566 -1.2684 0.217912 -11.1049
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Table 6: ROE regression 2012
Table 7: EPS Regression 2011
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.185188
R Square 0.034294
Adjusted R Square -0.09895
Standard Error 145.0274
Observations 25
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 16432.44 5477.48 0.390636 0.760959
Residual 22 462724.9 21032.95
Total 25 479157.3
CoefficientsStandard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%
Intercept -124.341 269.6733 -0.46108 0.649268 -683.609
SOC 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0
IND 109.1869 283.2635 0.385461 #NUM! -478.266
NOM 19.11543 21.62726 0.883858 0.38633 -25.7368
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Table 8: EPS Regression 2012
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.239027651
R Square 0.057134218
Adjusted R Square -0.074035398
Standard Error 192.7967062
Observations 25
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 49552.81 16517.6 0.66656 0.581932
Residual 22 817752.5 37170.57
Total 25 867305.4
CoefficientsStandard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%
Intercept -46.14709352 324.4686 -0.14222 0.888198 -719.054
SOC 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0
IND 349.3311288 354.2323 0.986164 #NUM! -385.302
NOM -5.408208697 29.496 -0.18335 0.8562 -66.5792
Table 9: NPM Regression 2011
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.270058064
R Square 0.072931358
Adjusted R Square -0.056802155
Standard Error 42.85115988
Observations 25
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 3177.973 1059.324 0.865357 0.474515
Residual 22 40396.88 1836.222
Total 25 43574.86
CoefficientsStandard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%
Intercept -40.40652485 79.6802 -0.50711 0.617124 -205.653
SOC 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0
IND -6.302168014 83.69569 -0.0753 #NUM! -179.876
NOM 7.380341771 6.390194 1.154948 0.260503 -5.87211
Table 10: NPM Regression 2012
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(ME14 DUBAI Conference) Dubai, 10-12 October 2014
ISBN: 978-1-941505-16-8 Paper ID_D462
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SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.123849
R Square 0.015338
Adjusted R Square -0.11963
Standard Error 18.38438
Observations 25
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 115.8285 38.60949 0.171351 0.914543
Residual 22 7435.682 337.9855
Total 25 7551.511
CoefficientsStandard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%
Intercept 13.79627 30.94013 0.445902 0.660025 -50.3696
SOC 0 0 65535 #NUM! 0
IND 9.227429 33.77828 0.273176 #NUM! -60.8244
NOM -1.05799 2.81263 -0.37616 0.710404 -6.89102