The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare · network-centric operations (NCO), including the...

The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare i

Message from the Director, Office of Force Transformation

Warfare is about human behavior in a context of organized violence directed toward political ends. So,network-centric warfare (NCW) is about human behavior within a networked environment. “The network” isa noun, the information technology, and can only be the enabler. “To network” is the verb, the human behavior,the action, and the main focus. So, implementation of NCW must look beyond the acquisition of the tech-nical enablers to individual and organizational behavior, e.g., organizational structure, processes, tactics,and the way choices are made. In other words, all elements of the enterprise are in play.

The U.S. Armed Forces’ progress in transforming from the Industrial Age to the Information Age, thoughfar from complete, has been illustrated during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Thesecampaigns, mounted against determined, potent foes in Afghanistan and Iraq, were characterized by theconduct of highly effective, network-centric operations by coalitions organized and led by the U.S. CentralCommand.

Our military is embracing NCW. All of the Service and Joint Transformation Roadmaps are based on a central principle. This is helping to create and maintain a decisive warfighting advantage for U.S. forces. Inthe Information Age, power is increasingly derived from information sharing, information access, and speed,all of which are facilitated by networked forces. NCW involves a new way of thinking about how we accom-plish our missions and how we organize and interrelate within and among all echelons and at all levels ofwarfare—strategic, operational, and tactical.

Modern technology and new operational concepts enable networked units and individual platforms tooperate together in ways not possible just a few years ago. NCW is characterized by the ability of geographically dispersed forces to attain a high level of shared battlespace awareness that is exploited toachieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives in accordance with the commander’s intent. Thislinking of people, platforms, weapons, sensors, and decision aids into a single network creates a wholethat is clearly greater than the sum of its parts. The results are networked forces that operate with increased

iiThe Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

speed and synchronization and are capable of achieving massed effects, in many situations, without thephysical massing of forces required in the past. This increased speed and synchronization directly impactsoperations across the battlespace, from support areas through combat zones.

In sum, NCW enhances the U.S. Armed Forces’ ability to combine into a seamless, joint, coalitionwarfighting force. When implemented, it takes full advantage of the trust we place in our junior and noncommissioned officers. As information moves down echelon, so does decision making. Thus, smallerjoint force packages can possess more flexibility and agility and are able to wield greater combat powerthan before. NCW generates new and extraordinary levels of operational effectiveness. It enables andleverages new military capabilities while allowing the United States and our multinational partners to usetraditional capabilities with more speed and precision.

Recent progress in developing network-centric capabilities throughout the U.S. Armed Forces, evident inAfghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, is most encouraging, but we must not rest on our laurels. A great deal ofwork remains to be done. If we are to retain our competitive advantage in the 21st century, the Departmentmust continue to move ahead in this vital area of military transformation.

How are the profound increases in capability and performance attributed to NCW implementation beingattained from the perspective of force building and actual operations? This booklet will point to some of the answers.

A. K. CebrowskiDirector, Office of Force TransformationOffice of the Secretary of Defense

The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare iii

Introduction

• Purpose........................................................................................................................................3

• What Is Network-Centric Warfare? ................................................................................................3

• Origins of Network-Centric Warfare ................................................................................................5

• Central Role in Force Transformation..............................................................................................5

• Tenets and Principles of Network-Centric Warfare ..........................................................................7

• Strategy for Implementation..........................................................................................................11

Theory and Practice of Network-Centric Warfare

• An Emerging Theory of War ........................................................................................................15

• Information Age Warfare ..............................................................................................................17

• Network-Centric Warfare and the Domains of Conflict ..................................................................19

• Benefits of Network-Centric Warfare ............................................................................................21

• A Source of Warfighting Advantage..............................................................................................23

Network-Centric Operations

• NCO and the Joint Operations Concepts ......................................................................................27

• NCO in Afghanistan and Iraq ......................................................................................................29

• NCO Conceptual Framework ........................................................................................................31

• NCO Case Studies ......................................................................................................................33

Contents

ivThe Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

NCW Implementation

• Joint NCW Implementation..........................................................................................................44

– FBCB2–Blue Force Tracking ..............................................................................................44

– Horizontal Fusion—a Catalyst for Net-Centric Transformation ..............................................45

– Sense and Respond Logistics ............................................................................................46

– Cultural Change and Education ..........................................................................................48

– Other Joint NCW Initiatives ................................................................................................48

• Service NCW Implementation ......................................................................................................49

– Army ................................................................................................................................50

– Navy and Marine Corps......................................................................................................53

– Air Force ..........................................................................................................................55

• Allies and Multinational Partners ................................................................................................58

Conclusions—Network-Centric Warfare in Perspective

• Towards a Network-Enabled Force: the 1990s ............................................................................65

• Building Transformational Capabilities in the 21st Century ............................................................67

• Implementing NCW—Three Cautions ..........................................................................................68

Sources ..................................................................................................................................69

Notes ........................................................................................................................................72

Introduction

“… we must achieve: fundamentally

joint, network-centric, distributed forces

capable of rapid decision superiority and

massed effects across the battlespace.

Realizing these capabilities will require

transforming our people, processes, and

military forces.”Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,

Transformation Planning GuidanceApril 2003

The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare 3

second chapter. The third chapter focuses on network-centric operations (NCO), including therelationship of NCO to the overarching JointOperations Concepts (JOpsC), the NCO experiencein Afghanistan and Iraq, the development of theNCO Conceptual Framework, and the conduct ofNCO case studies. An overview of Joint andService plans and initiatives to develop and imple-ment network-centric capabilities and the growinginvestment in these capabilities by our allies andmultinational partners are provided in the fourthchapter.

What Is Network-CentricWarfare?Network-centric warfare is an emerging theory ofwar in the Information Age. It is also a conceptthat, at the highest level, constitutes the military’sresponse to the Information Age.2 The term network-centric warfare broadly describes thecombination of strategies, emerging tactics, tech-niques, and procedures, and organizations that afully or even a partially networked force can employto create a decisive warfighting advantage.3

The implementation of NCW is first of all abouthuman behavior as opposed to information tech-nology. While “network” is a noun, “to network” isa verb. Thus, when we examine the degree towhich a particular military organization, or theDepartment as a whole, is exploiting the power ofNCW, our focus should be on human behavior inthe networked environment. How do military forcesbehave, perform, and organize themselves whenthey are networked? As illustrated in the nextchapter, experience with networked forces to dateindicates that Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and

Introduction

PurposeAs the world enters a new millennium, our militarysimultaneously enters a new era in warfare—anera in which warfare is affected by a changingstrategic environment and rapid technologicalchange. The United States and our multinationalpartners are experiencing a transition from the Industrial Age to the Information Age.Simultaneously, we are fully engaged in a globalwar on terrorism set in a new period of globaliza-tion. These changes, as well as the experiencesgained during recent and ongoing military opera-tions, have resulted in the current drive to trans-form the force with network-centric warfare (NCW)as the centerpiece of this effort.

To better understand why NCW is so important tothe force transformation process underway in theU.S. Armed Forces,1 this document providesanswers to some of the fundamental questionsregarding NCW as an emerging theory of war inthe Information Age. It also describes how thetenets and principles of NCW are providing thefoundation for developing new warfighting con-cepts, organizations, and processes that will allowour forces to maintain a competitive advantageover potential adversaries, now and in the future. Insum, the purpose of this brochure is to provide anoverview of the ongoing implementation of NCW inthe Department of Defense (DoD).

A brief description of NCW, including its origins, itscentral role in force transformation, its tenets andprinciples, and an implementation strategy, areprovided in this first chapter. An examination ofNCW as an emerging theory of war, its relationshipto the four domains of Information Age warfare, thegrowing evidence of its benefits, and the warfight-ing advantages it can provide, are examined in the


Marines conducting military operations at the tac-tical and operational levels of war gain a significantadvantage over adversaries because of shared sit-uational awareness. NCW theory has applicabilityat all three levels of warfare—strategic, opera-tional, and tactical—and across the full range ofmilitary operations from major combat operationsto stability and peacekeeping operations.

A networked force conducting network-centricoperations (NCO) is an essential enabler for theconduct of effects-based operations by U.S.forces. Effects-based operations (EBO) are “sets ofactions directed at shaping the behavior of friends,neutrals, and foes in peace, crisis, and war.”4 EBOis not a new form of warfighting, nor does it dis-place any of the currently recognized forms of war-fare. Throughout history, decision makers havesought to create conditions that would achievetheir objectives and policy goals. Military com-manders and planners have attempted to plan andexecute campaigns to create these conditions—an approach that would beconsidered “effects-based”in today’s terminology. EBOin the 21st century, enabledby networked forces, is amethodology for planning,executing, and assessingmilitary operations designedto attain specific effectsthat achieve desired nationalsecurity outcomes.

The armed forces of manyof our allies and multina-tional partners are movingrapidly into the NCW arenaand developing network-

centric capabilities of their own to be able to conduct EBO. When we conduct military operationswith our allies and multinational partners today andin the future, we seek to obtain maximum advan-tage derived from the power of NCW. At the sametime, it should not surprise us that our enemies andpotential adversaries around the world, includinginternational terrorist organizations like al Qaeda,may seek to acquire network-centric capabilitieson their own terms in order to use them against uswhen conducting surveillance, planning operations,or actually carrying out attacks. It is reasonable toexpect that terrorist organizations are also analyz-ing the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of our networks and planning to exploit them in the future.

NCW generates increased combat power by net-working sensors, decision makers, and shooters toachieve shared awareness, increased speed ofcommand, high tempo of operations, greaterlethality, increased survivability, and a degree ofself-synchronization (figure 1). In essence, it

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Figure 1: Information Age Transformation: Network-Centric Warfare


translates information advantage into combatpower by effectively linking friendly forces withinthe battlespace, providing a much improvedshared awareness of the situation, enabling morerapid and effective decision making at all levels ofmilitary operations, and thereby allowing forincreased speed of execution. This “network” isunderpinned by information technology systems,but is exploited by the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen,and Marines that use the network and, at the sametime, are part of it.

Origins of Network-CentricWarfareOne of the first clear, compelling descriptions of“network-centric warfare” was published in a 1998U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings article. The authorscompared the potential impact of NCW today withthe transformational impact of the French conceptof the levee en masse during the Napoleonic period.“NCW and all of its associated revolutions in mili-tary affairs (RMAs) grow out of and draw theirpower from the fundamental changes in Americansociety. These changes have been dominated bythe co-evolution of economics, information technol-ogy, and business processes and organizations andthey are linked by three themes:

• The shift in focus from the platform to the network;

• The shift from viewing actors as independentto viewing them as part of a continuouslyadapting ecosystem; and

• The importance of making strategic choic-es to adapt or even survive in such chang-ing ecosystems.”5

These ideas have not only changed the nature ofAmerican business today—they have changedand will continue to change the way military oper-ations are conducted.

The development of the intellectual foundation ofNCW within the DoD continued with theInformation Age Transformation Series of bookspublished by the Department of DefenseCommand and Control Research Program (CCRP)under the auspices of the Assistant Secretary ofDefense for Networks and Information Integration(ASD [NII]). The first book in this series, NetworkCentric Warfare: Developing and LeveragingInformation Superiority, provided the first detailedarticulation of the tenets that link a robustly net-worked force to dramatically increased combatpower.6 It also described how information, coupledwith changes in command and control (C2), couldtransform military organizations. Two additionalvolumes completed the three-volume set,Information Age Anthology: Understanding InformationAge Warfare and Information Age Transformation.7

Another important book published by the CCRP,Effects Based Operations: Applying Network CentricWarfare in Peace, Crisis and War, explored the link between network-centric organizations andprocesses and mission outcomes.8

Central Role in ForceTransformationThe President and the Secretary of Defense havefrequently emphasized that the transformation of theDepartment of Defense lies at the heart of U.S.defense strategy. As one of the seven major inter-connected tenets of our strategy, transformationsupports the four major defense policy goals: assur-ing allies and friends; dissuading future militarycompetition; deterring threats and coercion againstU.S. interests; and, if deterrence fails, decisivelydefeating any adversary.


Overall, DoD’s transformation addresses threemajor areas—how we do business inside theDepartment, how we work with our interagencyand multinational partners, and how we fight.While all three areas are vital in the Department’songoing transformation to the Information Age, theconcepts of NCW and our steadily improving network-centric capabilities are transforming howwe fight. Thus, NCW is at the very center of forcetransformation.

Force transformation includes new technologiesbut also depends on the development of new oper-ational concepts, organizational structures, andrelationships. The development of network-centriccapabilities depends on all of these. The ongoingshift from platform-centric to network-centricthinking and NCW is key to force transformationand an evolving approach to the conduct of jointwarfare in the Information Age.9

The development of network-centric organizationsand the growing capability of U.S. forces to conductNCO are not ends in themselves, but a means togenerate increased combat power by:

• Better synchronizing events and their conse-quences in the battlespace;

• Achieving greater speed of command; and

• Increasing lethality, survivability, and respon-siveness.

As already mentioned, the capability to conductNCO is a key enabler of effects-based operations(EBO). Unless our forces are able to apply their net-work-centric capabilities to achieve the effects thatresult in attaining strategic, operational, or tacticalobjectives, the full value of these capabilities willnot be realized. In addition, without a robust net-work structure and the phenomena that result fromthe application of network-centric capabilities, itwill be far more difficult, if not impossible, for theU.S. and our multinational partners to conduct NCOand EBO against our adversaries.

6


“Throughout history, warfare has assumed thecharacteristics of its age and the technology ofits age. Today we see this trend continuing aswe move from the Industrial Age warfare withits emphasis on mass to Information Age war-fare, which highlights the power of networkeddistributed forces and shared situationalawareness … Within this wider context of mil-itary transformation, network-centric warfareis one of the key concepts for thinking abouthow we will operate in the future.”

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,July 2001.

Tenets and Principles ofNetwork-Centric WarfareFour basic tenets of NCW and a set of governingprinciples for a network-centric force have beenidentified. Together, these tenets and principlescomprise the core of NCW as an emerging theoryof war in the Information Age. The four tenets ofNCW help us understand the enhanced power ofnetworked forces. At the same time, they consti-tute a working hypothesis about NCW as a sourceof warfighting advantage:

• A robustly networked force improves informa-tion sharing.

• Information sharing enhances the quality ofinformation and shared situational awareness.

• Shared situational awareness enables collabo-ration and self-synchronization, and enhancessustainability and speed of command.

• These, in turn, dramatically increase missioneffectiveness.10

The governing principles for a network-centricforce are summarized in figure 2 and discussed inmore detail below. These principles, still evolvingand subject to further refinement, are guiding theapplication of NCW as an emerging theory of war.In effect, they constitute the new rules by which a net-work-centric force organizes, trains, and operates.


While it is not suggested that the governing princi-ples for a network-centric force have supplanted orare going to replace the time-tested principles ofwar—mass, objective, offensive, security, econo-my of force, maneuver, unity of command, sur-prise, simplicity—they provide added direction forexecuting military operations in the InformationAge. They are guiding the development and refine-ment of the overarching JOpsC and the four sub-ordinate Joint Operating Concepts (JOC):Homeland Security; Major Combat Operations;Stability Operations; and Strategic Deterrence.

Fight First for InformationSuperiority: Generate an information advan-tage through better timeliness, accuracy, and rele-vance of information.

• Increase an enemy’s information needs,reduce his ability to access information, andraise his uncertainty.

• Assure our own information access through awell networked and interoperable force andprotection of our information systems, includ-ing sensor systems.

• Decrease our own information needs, espe-cially in volume, by increasing our ability toexploit all of our collectors.

Shared Awareness: Routinely translateinformation and knowledge into the requisite levelof common understanding and situational aware-ness across the spectrum of participants in jointand combined operations.

• Build a collaborative network of networks,populated and refreshed with quality intelli-gence and non-intelligence data, both raw andprocessed, to enable forces to build a sharedawareness relevant to their needs.

• Information users must also become informa-tion suppliers, responsible for posting informa-tion without delay. Allow access to the dataregardless of location.

• High-quality shared awareness requiressecure and assured networks and informationthat can be defended.

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Figure 2: Governing Principles of a Network-Centric Force


Speed of Command and DecisionMaking: Recognize an information advantageand convert it into a competitive advantage by creating processes and procedures otherwiseimpossible (within prudent risk).

• Through battlefield innovation and adaptation,compress decision timelines to turn informa-tion advantage into decision superiority anddecisive effects.

• Progressively lock out an adversary’s optionsand ultimately achieve option dominance.

Self-Synchronization: Increase theopportunity for low-level forces to operate nearlyautonomously and to re-task themselves throughexploitation of shared awareness and the com-mander’s intent.

• Increase the value of subordinate initiative toproduce a meaningful increase in operationaltempo and responsiveness.

• Assist in the execution of the “commander’sintent.” Exploit the advantages of a highlytrained, professional force.

• Rapidly adapt when important developmentsoccur in the battlespace and eliminate thestep function character of traditional militaryoperations.

Dispersed Forces: Move combat powerfrom the linear battlespace to non-contiguousoperations.

• Emphasize functional control vice physicaloccupation of the battlespace and generateeffective combat power at the proper timeand place.

• Be non-linear in both time and space, butachieve the requisite density of power ondemand.

• Increase close coupling of intelligence, opera-tions, and logistics to achieve precise effectsand gain temporal advantage with dispersedforces.

Demassification: Move from an approachbased on geographically contiguous massing offorces to one based upon achieving effects.

• Use information to achieve desired effects,limiting the need to mass physical forces with-in a specific geographical location.

• Increase the tempo and speed of movementthroughout the battlespace to complicate anopponent’s targeting problem.


Deep Sensor Reach: Expand use ofdeployable, distributed, and networked sensors,both distant and proximate, that detect actionableinformation on items of interest at operationallyrelevant ranges to achieve decisive effects.

• Leverage increasingly persistent intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).

• Use sensors as a maneuver element to gainand maintain information superiority.

• Exploit sensors as a deterrent when employedvisibly as part of an overt display of intent.

• Enable every weapon platform to be a sensor,from the individual soldier to a satellite.

Alter Initial Conditions at HigherRates of Change: Exploit the principles ofhigh-quality shared awareness, dynamic self-synchronization, dispersed and de-massed forces,deep sensor reach, compressed operations andlevels of war, and rapid speed of command toenable the joint force to swiftly identify, adapt to,and change an opponent’s operating context to ouradvantage. Warfare is highly path-dependent;hence, the imperative to control the initial condi-tions. The close coupling in time of critical eventshas been shown historically to have profoundimpact both psychologically and in locking outpotential responses.

Compressed Operations andLevels of War: Eliminate procedural bound-aries between Services and within processes sothat joint operations are conducted at the lowestorganizational levels possible to achieve rapid anddecisive effects.

• Increase the convergence in speed of deploy-ment, speed of employment, and speed ofsustainment.

• Eliminate the compartmentalization of processes(e.g., organize, deploy, employ, and sustain)and functional areas (e.g., operations, intelli-gence, and logistics).

• Eliminate structural boundaries to mergecapabilities at the lowest possible organiza-tional levels, e.g., joint operations at thecompany/sub-squadron/task unit level.

10


Strategy for ImplementationThe Department’s overall strategy for NCW imple-mentation is based upon: 1) Setting priorities toenable, develop, and implement network-centricconcepts and capabilities; 2) Establishing specificgoals and measuring progress toward these goals;and 3) Overcoming impediments to progress.

Setting Priorities: A critical mass of theJoint Force must be robustly networked as the“entry fee” for NCW and transformation. Thisrequires a focus on interoperability which must notbe sacrificed for near-term considerations.Battlespace entities (platforms, units, sensors,shooters) must be designed “net-ready.” In addition, increased emphasis must be placed upon research in developing shared situationalawareness and new organizational approaches to achieving synchronization. Research must con-tinue to improve our ability to accurately representNCW-related concepts and capabilities in modelsand simulations and to help us understand andmanage complex networks.

Establishing Goals and MeasuringProgress: The Department recognizes theneed to establish measurable NCW goals, to devel-op an investment and implementation plan toachieve these goals, and to measure progress. Animmediate goal must be the availability of a robustlynetworked joint force that can experiment with network-centric concepts and capabilities accom-panied by a campaign of experimentation focusedon discovery. To measure progress, metrics areneeded. Ongoing efforts to develop measures ofkey aspects of NCW, including the quality of infor-mation, collaboration, awareness, and shared situational awareness, have been given moreemphasis and related to measures of commandand control, synchronization, and, ultimately, tomeasures of mission effectiveness.

Overcoming Impediments toProgress: Technical, cultural, and organiza-tional impediments to accelerating theDepartment’s progress in fully implementing NCWremain. Each can be overcome through focusedefforts in areas such as network security, networkinteroperability, an understanding of human andorganizational behavior, and key NCW-enablingtechnologies. The creation of a DoD environmentthat supports innovation will enable us to reap thefull potential of NCW, just as better understandingof individual, team, organizational, and culturalbehaviors will significantly accelerate our progressin implementing NCW.11

Key Elements of Proposed NCWImplementation Strategy: The DoDstrategy for the implementation of NCW includesseven key elements:12

• Get the Theory Right: The new rules ofInformation Age warfare and the theory ofNCW must be continually refined through theprocess of experimentation and testing andfrom the real world experience of U.S. forcesengaged in combat and other military opera-tions worldwide, including ongoing stabilityoperations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, andBosnia.

• Apply the Theory Enterprise Wide: It willnot be enough to implement network-centriccapabilities, conduct network-centric opera-tions (NCO), and test the theory of NCW only ina “critical mass of the joint force” or in certainhigh priority units. Instead, the capabilitiesmust be developed and the theory appliedenterprise wide, i.e., throughout the DoD.


• Accelerate Networking of theJoint Force: Understandably, muchof the effort to network U.S. forcesto date has been undertaken by theServices. In the future, however,joint forces must be networked notonly at the strategic and operationallevels, but also at the tactical level.

• Accelerate Deployment ofNetwork-Centric Systems,Concepts, and Capabilities: Asnew network-centric systems,concepts, and capabilities aredeveloped by the Services andCombatant Commands, theyshould be deployed to the unitsand geographical areas wherethey can be refined and employedwhen needed.

• Experiment with Network-Centric Concepts and Capa-bilities: The role of experimentation inadvancing the implementation of network-centric concepts and capabilities is absolutelycritical. The Department depends upon a rigorous program of Joint and Service experi-mentation to nurture new and better ways toconduct NCO.

• Address Challenges of Allied and CoalitionNCO: As discussed in the third chapter, U.S.allies and multinational partners are develop-ing their own concepts and capabilities for theconduct of NCO. Some of the challenges ofconducting NCO within the NATO alliance havealready surfaced during operations in Bosniaand Kosovo and to some extent in Afghanistanand Iraq. These challenges should beaddressed and overcome as soon as possible.

• Develop Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures (TTP) for NCO: In order tomaximize the potential for increased combatpower from NCW, Joint and Service warfightingdoctrines must evolve as network-centriccapabilities are implemented in U.S. forces.Simultaneously, mature TTPs will be needed tofacilitate the effective conduct of NCO by U.S.,allied, and multinational forces during com-bined military operations.

The Department’s strategy for implementing NCW,as outlined above, is having a major impact on keyforce development and investment decisions by theDepartment and the Services. Figure 3 illustrateshow the application of NCW theory can support keyDoD investment decisions.

12

Networking the Force

DecisionMakers

Regardlessof Location

War

fig

hti

ng

Eff

ects

Forces Applied

SensorsRegardlessof Platform

EffectorsRegardlessof Service Mission Area "A"

Mission Area "B"

Mission Area "C"InformationAdvantage

Combat

Power

Information

Richness

Information

Reach

SharedAwareness(Cognitive)

Lethality(Value)

OperationalTempo(Value)

Survivability(Value)

Degree ofCollaboration

(Process)

Degree ofSynchronization

(Process)

Platform-Centric

Network-CentricPlatform-Centric

Network-Centric

Figure 3: Applying NCW Theory to Support Key Force Developmentand Investment Decisions

Theory and Practiceof Network-CentricWarfare

“What we are seeing, in moving from

the Industrial Age to the Information

Age, is what amounts to a new theory of

war: power comes from a different

place, it is used in different ways, it

achieves different effects than it did

before. During the Industrial Age, power

came from mass. Now power tends to

come from information, access, and

speed. We have come to call that new

theory of war network-centric warfare. It

is not only about networks, but also

about how wars are fought—how

power is developed.”Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski,Director, Office of Force Transformation,

IEEE Spectrum,July 2002.


An Emerging Theory of WarA theory is “a hypothesis assumed for the sake ofargument or investigation, an unproved assump-tion.”13 It is also “a formulation of apparent relationships or underlying principles of certainobserved phenomena which has been verified tosome degree.”14 The working hypothesis of network-centric warfare (NCW) as an emergingtheory of war, simply stated, is that the behavior offorces, i.e. their choices of organizational relation-ships and processes, when in the networked condition, will outperform forces that are not. Thefour basic tenets of NCW, introduced in the pre-ceding chapter, elaborate on this basic premise.The governing principles of a network-centric forceguide the application of this emerging theory ofwar and help to explain its power.

A theory of war must account for new sources ofpower, relations among them, and how they arebrought to bear across the entire spectrum of mili-tary competition from peacekeeping, deterrence,and dissuasion to violent clashes and sustained,high-intensity conflict, and from force building andcountering traditional threats to countering irregular,catastrophic, and disruptive threats. The basis ofNCW as an emerging theoryof war is that power flowsfrom society and society’smethods of creating powerand wealth and that therehas been a fundamental shiftin sources of power fromindustry to information. Thisis comparable to the earliershift from the Agrarian Age tothe Industrial Age. In theIndustrial Age, land was still

important, but it was no longer the primary source ofpower and wealth. In the Information Age, industrialpower remains important, but it has been replacedby information as the most important source ofpower and wealth. NCW is in a different competitivespace from Industrial Age warfare and, therefore,has some different competitive attributes.

NCW is an emerging theory of war because it iden-tifies new sources of power (information sharing,information access, speed), how those sourcesrelate to each other, how they are brought to bearto gain the desired outcome, and how they link topolitical objectives (figure 4). It explains how oneside uses violence to compel an opponent to dowhat it would not otherwise do and eliminate theopponent’s ability to do the same to them. Itspeaks to the character of war, not to its nature,accepting that war by nature is a form of intensehuman competition and involves violence, pro-found risk, and mutual danger. The NCW emergingtheory of war accepts the notion that it is thenature of war to be nasty, brutish, and very com-plex, however short a conflict, campaign, or battlemay be. Some have said that NCW applies only to“high-end” traditional warfare. This says more

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Figure 4: Network-Centric Warfare … An Emerging Theory of War

Theory and Practice of Network-Centric Warfare


about our preference for “high-end” traditionalwarfare than it does about NCW, an emerging the-ory of war that applies to all levels and modes ofcompetition.

Many of the recent and ongoing efforts to enhancethe network-centric capabilities of U.S. forces havefocused on the tactical and operational levels of war.However, the relevance of NCW extends to thestrategic level. Strategy involves choices that controlthe scope, pace, and intensity of a conflict.As shownduring the major combat operations phase ofOperation Iraqi Freedom, the capabilities of theforces in the networked environment gave seniorcivilian leaders a broader array of options not other-wise possible.

As with other, earlier theories of war15, NCW has itscompetitive space, rule sets, and metrics. Wherethe competitive space of industrial warfare was thecapacity to produce heavy weapons and get themto where they could be most destructive, the com-petitive space in NCW is the capability to obtainand integrate information into military operations.The metrics used to gauge the relative power ofmilitary forces in the Industrial Age were generallyinput measures. We measured and compared military mass, expressed in terms of numbers ofweapons, ton-miles per day, military manpower,and units. Our planning focused on achieving asuperior advantage in each of these areas,whether in individual battles or larger campaigns.But the metrics of NCW seek to describe the rela-tive ability to create an information advantage andturn it into a military advantage. These metrics aregenerally output measures like speed, rates ofchange, operational and tactical innovation, howfast one side can couple events together and acton the information, and achieve political outcomes.

Where Industrial Age warfare revolved aroundefforts to obtain overwhelming force and attrition,NCW revolves around information superiority16 andprecision violence to dismantle an opposing force.

Assuming NCW gains wide acceptance as a new oremerging theory of war, is it likely to render theworks of Carl von Clausewitz and other classicalstrategic thinkers obsolete? Michael Handel of theNaval War College, one of the foremost contempo-rary students of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung, Jomini, and others, concluded that while theclassic strategic theories of war may require adap-tation to a changing environment such as we areexperiencing in the Information Age and in the conduct of the global war on terror, they remainfundamentally intact. The logic of waging war andof strategic thinking is as universal and timeless ashuman nature itself.

Observing that for many students of war today, “theadvantages offered by advanced military technolo-gy represent the realization of a long-awaitedpanacea for the complex political and strategicproblems of waging war,” Handel adds a usefulnote of caution for those involved in the implemen-tation of NCW. “Many of the latest military theoriesand doctrines assume tacitly or explicitly that thewars of the future will be waged with perfect ornearly perfect information and intelligence (‘infor-mation dominance’) … This vision is a chimera,because it implies that friction in war will be great-ly reduced if not eliminated.”17 This will not be thecase. Rather, the issue is how one creates andexploits an information advantage within the context of the fog and friction of war.

16


A survey of recent and emerging military theoriesand the future of war has led to the observationthat, “In the 1990s, military theory reflected therapid diffusion of conflict following the end of thebipolar Cold War world.” These theories rangedfrom John Mueller’s “obsolescence of major war”theory and Martin van Creveld’s argument thatWestern military theory derived from classical war-fare had become obsolescent to Alvin and HeidiToffler’s theory of “third wave” high-technologyinformation warfare. According to the Tofflers andthe Information Age theorists who followed them,the Gulf War of 1990–91 had provided a glimpseof postmodern war as the realm of high technolo-gy. On the other hand, military writers like RalphPeters, Robert Kaplan, and Philip Cerny haveoffered visions of future war involving the “cominganarchy” of a world of failed states or a struggle bythe West against a world of warrior cultures andparamilitaries. The intellectual challenge facingmilitary professionals in the early 21st century isnot, as some are suggesting, “to consign Carl vonClausewitz to the dustbin of history. Rather the taskis to learn how to fight effectively across the spec-trum of conflict.”18 The NCW theory of war, as it isimplemented throughout the U.S. Armed Forces,addresses this formidable task.

Information Age WarfareNetwork-centric warfare (NCW) offers a uniqueapproach to the conduct of joint warfare in theInformation Age. Constructed around the tenets ofNCW and the governing principles of a network-centric force and emphasizing high-quality sharedawareness, dispersed forces, speed of command,and flexibility in planning and execution, the appli-cation of this emerging theory of war is giving U.S.forces the capability to conduct immensely power-ful effects-based operations (EBO) to achievestrategic, operational, and tactical objectivesacross the full range of military operations.

The recent performance of U.S. forces in the successful conduct of Operations EnduringFreedom (OEF, Afghanistan, 2001–2002) and IraqiFreedom (OIF, Iraq, 2003) has provided a glimpseof its potential. As General Tommy Franks, USA(Ret.), commander of coalition forces during OEFand OIF, observed recently, “I believe one of thelessons well identified as enduring is the power ofa net-centric approach, which [lends itself] to theeffects of munitions, actions, and informationrather than the old way of stove-piping activities.”When reflecting on OIF and his ability to see theaccurate locations of his forces in near-real-time,thanks to the Blue Force Tracking (BFT) system


used by ground forces, General Franks describedhis feelings at the time: “… I’ve died and gone toheaven and seen the first bit of net-centric warfare at work!”19

Information technology advances in the areas ofcommand and control (C2); intelligence, surveil-lance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and precisionweapons delivery are dramatically reshaping theconduct of warfare in the 21st century, as GeneralFranks and many others witnessed in Afghanistanand Iraq. The principles of NCW provide a newfoundation with which to examine and considerchanges in military missions, operations, andorganizations in the Information Age. The full appli-cation of these principles will accelerate the deci-sion cycle by linking sensors, communications net-works, and weapons systems via an interconnectedgrid, thereby enhancing our ability to achieve infor-mation and decision superiority over an adversaryduring the conduct of military operations.

As a new source of power, NCW has a profoundimpact on the planning and conduct of war byallowing forces to increase the pace and quality ofdecision making, in effect changing the rules andpace of military operations. A warfighting forcewith networked capabilities allows a commander tomore quickly develop situational awareness andunderstanding, rapidly communicate critical infor-mation to friendly combat forces, and marshal theappropriate capabilities to exert massed effectsagainst an adversary.

As mentioned previously, NCW provides the foun-dation for transforming the way U.S. forces willorganize and fight in the Information Age. WhileNCW is the theory, network-centric operations(NCO) is the theory put into action. In other words,the conduct of NCO represents the implementationof NCW. Military operations will emphasize gainingand maintaining information superiority to provide acompetitive advantage based on the implementa-tion of NCW and its principles. The objective ofdecision superiority is to turn an information advan-tage into a competitive advantage.

18


“Information Superiority is an imbalance inone’s favor in the information domain withrespect to an adversary. The power of superi-ority in the information domain mandates thatthe United States fight for it as a first priorityeven before hostilities begin … The quality ofthe information position depends on the accu-racy, timeliness, and relevance of informationfrom all sources … The continuous sharing ofinformation from a variety of sources enablesthe fully networked Joint Force to achieve theshared situational awareness necessary fordecision superiority.”

Department of Defense,Joint Operations Concepts,

November 2003, p. 17.

This competitive advantage is readily apparentwhen comparing forces conducting NCO and thoseoperating under the old paradigm of platform-centric operations. Platform-centric forces lack theability to leverage the synergies created through anetworked force. A force implementing NCW ismore adaptive, ready to respond to uncertainty inthe very dynamic environment of the future at alllevels of warfare and across the range of militaryoperations. When we consider the most recentcombat experience of U.S. forces in Afghanistanand Iraq, it is apparent that platforms retained acentral focus, but the networking of those plat-forms and organizations greatly enhanced theirlethality and survivability.

Network-Centric Warfareand the Domains of ConflictTo successfully implement the emerging theory ofwar and the NCW capabilities now being devel-oped by the U.S. and our multinational partners,the four domains of warfare—physical, informa-

tion, cognitive, andsocial—must be under-stood, as well as theintersections, or areasof overlap, between thedomains. As stated ear-lier, the four basic tenetsof NCW constitute ahypothesis regardingNCW as a source ofpower. Figure 5 illus-trates how this hypothe-sis may be explored at a high level across thedomains of InformationAge warfare.

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Figure 5: Tenets of NCW … the New Value Chain


The overarching Joint Operations Concepts(JOpsC) and its subordinate Joint OperatingConcepts (JOCs), Joint Functional Concepts(JFCs), Joint Integrating Concepts (JICs), architec-tures, requirements, and capabilities are basedupon the vision of a transforming network-centricjoint force and a capabilities-based defense strat-egy designed to attain the six operational goalsestablished by the Secretary of Defense in the2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.

The required attributes and capabilities of a newjoint force capable of conducting NCO must becarefully considered for each of these fourdomains.

Physical Domain: The physical domain isthe traditional domain of warfare where a force ismoved through time and space. It spans the land,sea, air, and space environments where militaryforces execute the range of military operations andwhere the physical platforms and communicationsnetworks that connect them reside. Comparatively,the elements of this domain are the easiest tomeasure and, consequently, combat power hastraditionally been measured in the physicaldomain.

Information Domain: The informationdomain is the domain where information is creat-ed, manipulated, and shared. It is the domain thatfacilitates the communication of informationamong warfighters. This is the domain of sensorsand the processes for sharing and accessing sen-sor products as well as “finished” intelligence. It iswhere C2 of military forces is communicatedand the commander’s intent is conveyed.Consequently, it is increasingly the information

domain that must be protected and defended toenable a force to generate combat power in theface of offensive actions by an adversary.

Cognitive Domain: The cognitive domainis in the mind of the warfighter. This is the realm ofEBO. Many, though not all, battles, campaigns, andwars are won in this domain. The intangibles ofleadership, morale, unit cohesion, level of trainingand experience, and situational awareness are ele-ments of this domain. This is the domain wherecommander’s intent, doctrine, tactics, techniques,and procedures reside. This is also where decisivebattlespace concepts and tactics emerge.

Social Domain: The social domaindescribes the necessary elements of any humanenterprise. It is where humans interact, exchangeinformation, form shared awareness and under-standings, and make collaborative decisions. Thisis also the domain of culture, the set of values,attitudes, and beliefs held and conveyed by leadersto the society, whether military or civil. It overlapswith the information and cognitive domains, but isdistinct from both. Cognitive activities by theirnature are individualistic; they occur in the mindsof individuals. However, shared sensemaking—theprocess of going from shared awareness to sharedunderstanding to collaborative decision making—is a socio-cognitive activity because the individual’scognitive activities are directly impacted by thesocial nature of the exchange and vice versa.20

20


As illustrated in figure 6, the domain intersectionsrepresent important, dynamic areas within whichconcept-focused experimentation should be con-ducted. The precision force so vital to the conductof successful joint operations is created at theintersection of the information and physicaldomains. Shared awareness and tactical innova-tion occur at the intersection between the informa-tion and cognitive domains. Since many battlesand campaigns are actually won or lost in the cog-nitive domain, this intersection is enormouslyimportant. The intersection between the physicaland cognitive domains is where the time compres-sion and “lock-out” phenomenon occur, where tactics achieve operational and even strategiceffects, and where high rates of change are devel-oped. NCW exists at the very center where all fourdomains intersect.

Benefits ofNetwork-CentricWarfareEvidence accumulated from awide range of U.S. military activi-ties, including combat opera-tions, training events, exercises,and demonstrations, has stronglysupported the validity of NCW asan emerging theory of war andillustrated the power of net-worked forces. In general, theoutcomes have consistently beendecisive in favor of forces thatare robustly networked. Whenboth sides have similar network-ing capabilities, competitionshifts to other attributes. Thisis discussed further in thefinal chapter, “Conclusions—

Network-Centric Warfare in Perspective.”

In some tactical engagements, “superior” plat-forms were decisively defeated by “less capable”platforms that were able to leverage order-of-magnitude improvements in information sharingenabled by networking. In other engagements,digitized and networked ground forces with areduced number of “platforms” were able to “sub-stitute information for mass” and outperform unitsequipped with a larger number of “platforms” notsimilarly digitized and networked. Even moreimpressively, the combination of networked anddigitized ground and air forces was able to deci-sively defeat an opposition force (OPFOR) withunprecedented lethality by creating and leveragingan information advantage.

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Air-to-Air Mission Area: Some of themost thoroughly documented and convincingexamples of the power of NCW have been drawnfrom the air-to-air mission area. Increased situa-tional awareness and enhanced situational under-standing are major contributors to enhanced sur-vivability and lethality in this mission area. Withaudio-only communications, pilots and controllersmust share information on adversary forces gener-ated by onboard sensors, as well as their own posi-tion and status, via voice. Communicating the min-imum essential information by voice takes timeand the resulting situational awareness often dif-fers significantly from reality.

In contrast, when datalinks are employed on fight-er aircraft, digital information on blue and redforces is shared instantaneously, enabling all par-ticipants to share a common tactical picture. Thisimproved information position constitutes asignificant “information advantage” ascompared to an adversary fighting with onlyvoice communications. This informationadvantage, in turn, enables a cognitiveadvantage, in the form of dramaticallyincreased shared situational awarenessand enhanced situational understanding.The result is that pilots flying datalink-equipped aircraft can translate theseadvantages into increased survivabilityand lethality.21

The same sort of evidence of increasedwarfighting effectiveness enabled by net-working during air-to-air combat has beendemonstrated in other important missionareas including combined arms maneuverwarfare and close air support (DivisionCapstone Exercise—Phase I); counter anti-access (Fleet Battle Experiment Foxtrot);

counter-special operations forces (SOF) (FleetBattle Experiment Delta); and multinational rapidreaction forces (Allied Command Europe MobileForce—Land) (figure 7).

Combined Arms Maneuver andClose Air Support: One of the most powerful, well documented examples of increasedwarfighting advantage achieved through NCW wasprovided by the U.S. Army’s Division CapstoneExercise—Phase I (DCX-1), conducted in thespring of 2001 at the National Training Center at Ft.Irwin, California. During this exercise, the BlueForce, consisting of two brigade combat teams(BCT) of the 4th Infantry Division with close air sup-port (CAS) provided by F-16 and A/OA-10s fromthe Arizona Air National Guard, was digitized andnetworked to a degree never before achieved in amajor joint exercise.

22

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During DCX-1, digitized and networked forcesdemonstrated significantly improved warfightingcapabilities and prevailed over the opposing force(OPFOR) in multiple engagements. The Arizona AirNational Guard F-16s and A/OA-10s providing CASto the ground forces were equipped with theSituational Awareness Data Link (SADL), enablingthem to exchange real-time targeting informationand receive a current forward trace of the BlueForces on the ground situation. The result of thisnetworking was more than an order-of-magnitudeimprovement in the ability of ground and air forcesto work together through more effective sharing ofinformation.22 As a direct result, the networkedjoint force employing combined arms maneuverduring DCX-1 decisively defeated an experienced,well-trained OPFOR (figure 8).

In the words of a mechanized infantry companycommander whose unit participated in DCX-1,“When fighting at night, these systems areunmatched. My Bradleys made direct fire kills rou-tinely at 3700 meters and beyond. Additionally, the

FBCB2 increased our situational awareness dramatically. We were able to conduct boldmaneuvers at night that we would normally onlydo during daylight.”23

A Source of WarfightingAdvantageOver thousands of years of recorded history, thevast majority of innovations that created significantwarfighting advantages were concentrated in thephysical domain as opposed to the informationdomain. These innovations translated primarily intoadvantages at the tactical level of warfare, but theyalso had an impact on what are now generallyreferred to as the operational and strategic levelsof warfare. They resulted in such battlefield advan-tages as: increased range of engagement (com-posite bow, rifled musket, long-range artillery,long-range bombers, guided and ballistic missiles);increased lethality (gunpowder, musket, rifle,machine gun, rocket launcher, chemical warhead,nuclear weapon); increased speed of maneuver(chariot, horse cavalry, steam propulsion for

ships, railroads, combus-tion engine, tanks, jetengine, nuclear propul-sion); and increased pro-tection and survivability(body armor, fortifications,trench warfare, battle-ships, submarines, tanks,armored personnel carri-ers, armored fighting vehicles, low observable“stealthy” aircraft andships).

While all of these exam-ples of innovation are con-sidered platform-centric,the past century has also

RobustlyNetworked

Force

PreciseApplication of

Force

Precision Effects

Information Domain Cognitive and Social Domains

Physical Domain

MissionEffectiveness

SharedSituationalAwareness

Qualityof OrganicInformation

IndividualSituationalAwareness

CollaborationQuality of SharedInformation

InformationSharing

CommonTactical Picture

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● Red Force Information: “Sensor Points of Interest”

Quality of Information Enhanced

Networked Force● Air

● Ground

Output Measure:

Decisive Defeatof OPFOR

Figure 8: Exploiting Order of Magnitude Change (DCX-1)


seen many innovations focused on creating advan-tage in the information domain. The ability todevelop and exploit an information advantage hasalways been important in warfare, hence the time-lessness of security and surprise as importantprinciples of war. Examples of innovations that created information advantages in warfare haveincluded couriers on horseback, signal flags,encryption and code breaking, telegraph, wirelessradio, aerial reconnaissance and photography,radar, electronic warfare, satellites (communica-tions, reconnaissance), and advances in navigation(magnetic compass, Global Positioning System[GPS]). While the importance of innovation in theinformation domain in the past has been great,its importance has gained critical significance inwarfare today.

Today, the implementation of NCW through theconduct of NCO is creating a warfighting advan-tage for those who pursue it. At the most basiclevel of warfare, there has always been a critical

need to be able to distinguishfriend from foe on the battle-field, day and night and in allsorts of terrain and weatherconditions. The introductionand widespread use of nightvision equipment has providedour forces with a very impor-tant advantage. Similarly, thecombination of digitization andnetworking can be employedto develop a common tacticalpicture that reduces the fog ofwar to clearly identify the posi-tions of friendly forces and theknown positions of the enemy.The ability to provide such apicture provides an example of

developing an information advantage through NCW. Combat power can be increased sharply bysuccessfully exploiting this advantage.

Across a broad spectrum of mission areas,evidence collected to date indicates that the devel-opment of a common operational picture (COP),such as that depicted in figure 9, can significantlyincrease the warfighter’s awareness and under-standing of tactical and operational situations. Thesharing of information obviously contributes toshared situational awareness and understanding.The ability to develop a higher level of situationalawareness, in less time than an adversary,combined with the ability to act on it, is a source ofconsiderable warfighting advantage. This advantageis not intuitive, but its impact is profound.

24

Figure 9: OIF Screen Capture – Common Operational Picture

Network-CentricOperations

“A networked Joint Force is able to

maintain a more accurate presentation

of the battlespace built on the ability to

integrate intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance, information and total

asset visibility. This integrated picture

allows the JFC to better employ the

right capabilities, at the right place and

at the right time. Fully networked forces

are better able to conduct distributed

operations.”Department of Defense,

Joint Operations Concepts,November 2003, p. 16.


NCO and the JointOperations ConceptsNetwork-centric operations (NCO) involve theapplication of the tenets and principles of NCW tomilitary operations across the spectrum of conflictfrom peace, to crisis, to war. The development ofnetwork-centric forces by the U.S. Armed Forcesand the increasing readiness of commanders at alllevels to apply the principles of NCW to the plan-ning and execution of military operations areresulting in new capabilities of our joint, land,naval, air, space, and special operations forces.

Due in part to rapidly evolving concepts about howNCO will be conducted, perspectives are changingabout how wars and other military operations willbe conducted by the U.S. and our allies. As men-tioned in the first chapter, NCW is central to theDepartment’s force transformation efforts. Thebasic tenets and governing principles of NCW hada significant impact on the development of theJoint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) approved by the

Secretary of Defense in November 2003.24 Theyhave also influenced the development and refine-ment of the subordinate Joint Operating Concepts(JOC), Joint Functional Concepts (JFC), and JointIntegrating Concepts (JIC).

“Networked” is one of the seven attributes, identi-fied by the JOpsC, that the future Joint Force mustpossess, the others being “fully integrated,” “expe-ditionary,” “decentralized,” “adaptable,” “decisionsuperiority,” and “lethality.” Networked, accordingto the JOpsC, “describes a Joint Force that is linkedand synchronized in time and purpose. The JointForce capitalizes on information and near simulta-neous dissemination to turn information intoactions. Networked joint forces will increase oper-ational effectiveness by allowing dispersed forcesto more efficiently communicate, share a commonoperating picture, and achieve the desired end-state. A networked Joint Force expands its reach.Reachback is the ability of the Joint Force toextend beyond organic capabilities to include fire support, sustainment, and information. Thisnetwork includes interagency, designated multina-tional partners, academic and industrial sources,and includes both technical linkages and personalrelationships developed through training andhabitual association.”25

As stated in the April 2003 Transformation PlanningGuidance (TPG), the key to the Department’s trans-formation strategy is the development of futureJOCs.26 These concepts must be specific enoughto permit identification and prioritization of trans-formation requirements inside the defense pro-gram, yet flexible enough to absorb valuable newideas as they emerge. The overarching JOpsCprovides the operational context for military trans-formation by linking strategic guidance with theintegrated application of Joint Force capabilities.

Network-Centric Operations


JOCs are further developing key areas of theJOpsC. Focusing at the operational level andabove, JOCs describe how a Joint ForceCommander will plan, prepare, deploy, employ, andsustain a joint force given a specific operation orcombination of operations. As shown in figure 10,four initial cornerstone JOCs have been developed:Homeland Security, Major Combat Operations,Stability Operations, and Strategic Deterrence.

Like the JOpsC, the JOCs are expected to evolveover time to reflect insights gained from experi-mentation and actual operations. All are based, atleast in part, on the availability of networked forcesand the implementation of the NCW theory by jointforces. The Service transformation roadmaps haveidentified the desired operational capabilitiesneeded to implement the JOCs and the preferredmeans of obtaining those capabilities, includingthe essential capabilities for conducting NCO.

As an example of a JOC explicitly taking intoaccount the availability of network-centric capabil-ities and the ongoing implementation of NCW the-ory, Version 1.10 of the Major Combat Operations(MCO) JOC identifies “seven core building blocksthat form the foundation for U.S. success in future

major combat operations.” One of the seven is:“Use a coherent joint force that decides and actsbased upon pervasive knowledge.” This particularcore building block involves the employment “of anetwork-centric method to collect, fuse, analyze,then provide access to information supportingleader decision requirements” and “a joint mili-tary/interagency decision making process thatuses a collaborative information environment andfunctions with coalition partners … The networktools of the Information Age allow a degree of inter-dependence among Service forces that had alwaysbeen desired but had never been achievable.Interdependence, to be sure, relies upon technicalconnectivity that maximizes machine-to-machineinterface when and how that makes sense, buteven more importantly it relies upon breaking downlong-developed cultural positions and barriers.”27

Joint Functional Concepts articulate how the futureJoint Force Commander will integrate a set ofrelated military tasks to attain capabilities requiredacross the range of military operations. They arebroad, but derive specific context from the JOCs.Existing JFCs include: Battlespace Awareness,Command and Control, Force Application, FocusedLogistics, and Protection. Joint Integrating Concepts

are intended to be buildingblocks for JOCs or JFCs and will describe how a commander integrates func-tional means to achieve operational ends. ExistingJICs include Forcible EntryOperations and UnderseaSuperiority; JICs for GlobalStrike Operations, Sea-BasingOperations, Integrated MissileDefense, Joint Logistics,and Joint C2 are beingdeveloped.

28

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NCO in Afghanistan and Iraq

“You are looking at the implementation ofnetwork-centric warfare, which is a growingimplementation and will go on for a very longtime. We are looking at a shift in sources ofpower. . . when the lessons learned (fromOperation Iraqi Freedom) come out, one of thethings we are probably going to see is a newair-land dynamic. . . we will have discovereda new ‘sweet spot’ in the relationship betweenland and air warfare, and a tighter integrationbetween those. The things that compel thatare good sensors, networked with good intel-ligence, disseminated through a robust net-work of systems which then increasesspeed.”

Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski,Director, Force Transformation

From remarks to the Defense Writers Group,April 23, 2003.

The real-world experience of partially networkedU.S. and coalition forces during recent combatoperations in Afghanistan (Operation EnduringFreedom, 2001–2002) and Iraq (Operation IraqiFreedom, 2003) has provided preliminary, yetpowerful, evidence about the value of NCW andthe conduct of NCO. More extensive studies andassessments are expected to follow.

Operation Enduring Freedom(2001–02): The network-centric capabilitiesof U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) elementsduring the conduct of Operation Enduring Freedomin Afghanistan proved vital to the defeat of Talibanand al Qaeda forces throughout the country. U.S.forces conducted operations in a mountainous,landlocked country the size of Texas that present-ed an extremely challenging environment. Thelong-sought goal of networking weapons platformswith sensor platforms came to fruition in this aus-tere environment where both the need and theadvantages were readily apparent.

USCENTCOM employed Special Operations Forces(SOF) teams on the ground working directly withour Afghan allies. These SOF elements were net-worked with other friendly forces on the groundand U.S. aircraft capable of delivering advancedprecision-guided munitions. This combinationproved extremely effective. Networking the sensorsand the shooters in real time was only part of therequirement, however. Taliban and al Qaeda targets during Operation Enduring Freedom wereoften fleeting and weapons platforms had to beupdated very quickly while in the air. In the case ofB-2 bombers flying from bases in Missouri and B-1 bombers flying from other bases far from thetheater of operations, this required a capability tochange mission-tasking enroute to the target areain Afghanistan. Carrier-based aircraft needed asimilar capability to deal with the dynamic natureof their targets.

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) were used to agreater degree than ever before. The ability to passinformation gathered by Predator and Global HawkUAVs to ground commanders in Afghanistanenabled near-real-time battlefield situationalawareness. The geographic location of the com-batant command headquarters presented some


challenges for network-centric operations.Nevertheless, the USCENTCOM headquarters inTampa was successfully networked with a forwardheadquarters in Kuwait and a subordinate forwardheadquarters in Uzbekistan. Satellite communica-tions and related technologies enabled this net-working capability to a degree not previouslyachievable.

Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003):The impressive network-centric capabilities of U.S.forces on display during OEF in Afghanistan wereclearly evident during the conduct of OperationIraqi Freedom (OIF). Many significant improve-ments in these capabilities were apparent by thetime OIF began in March 2003. Network-centriccapabilities provided, without question, a majorcontribution to the decisive victory of U.S. andcoalition forces over Saddam Hussein’s forces dur-ing major combat operations in Iraq during Marchand April 2003.

Network-centric capabilities evident in U.S. forcesduring OIF included not only the technology andsystems that enabled the effective conduct ofNCO, but innovative new concepts for the employ-ment of the technology and an enhanced under-standing of the human side of the NCW equationas well—highly trained, motivated Soldiers,Sailors, Airmen, and Marines fighting as part of anintegrated, networked joint force. The implementa-tion of NCW is, after all, about human behavior, notjust new technology.

The effectiveness of NCO as conducted by U.S.and coalition forces during OIF has been stronglypraised by senior commanders, including General(Ret.) Tommy Franks, Commander of the CENTCOM and coalition forces during OIF, andother commanders at all echelons of commanddown to battalion and company level.28

Most of the groundwork for the information network and other network-centric capabilities thatempowered our forces during OIF was actuallycompleted during OEF. After the success of U.S.forces in Afghanistan in 2001–02, the gradualbuildup to the war in Iraq allowed careful planningand positioning to provide the necessary technolo-gies and systems that enabled commanders toconduct high speed, non-contiguous NCO and,when necessary, to change plans as rapidly as thesituation required. According to Brigadier GeneralDennis Moran, then CENTCOM/J-6, “The rapidsharing of information at all levels of command waspossible because of the technology we had inplace. The ability to move intelligence rapidly fromthe sensor to either an analytical decision maker ordirectly to the shooter was the best that we haveever seen … We validated the concept of network-centric warfare and the need for communications,C2, and ISR systems to be hooked up to, and inter-operable with, the Global Information Grid and to beadaptable to whatever circumstances are on thebattlefield.”

One of the biggest challenges during OIF, accord-ing to General Moran, involved sharing informationwith coalition partners. “Our ability to take informa-tion drawn predominantly from systems on theU.S.-only network, and then being able to rapidly,seamlessly move those into a coalition network,was extremely challenging. We had some work-arounds that were less than fulfilling, but one of thebiggest challenges we faced was sharing timelyinformation in a seamless manner with our coali-tion partners. That’s one of the key take-aways ofthis conflict.”29

30


The Director, OFT, in referring to the emergingNCW capabilities that gave U.S. and coalitionforces a warfighting advantage during OEF andOIF, observed that, “DoD (now) has experience innetwork-centric warfare … people have put theirhands on it, they have seen it in action. They realize that in western Iraq you couldn’t possiblyhave done the non-contiguous battlespace opera-tion without being very well networked. TheDepartment is, in fact, internalizing these lessonsand making the appropriate adjustments.”30

Among the lessons learned from OIF is a realiza-tion of how NCW works operationally and theimpacts this realization may have on materiel andforce organization. The Office of the Secretary ofDefense, JFCOM, the Services, and other DoDorganizations are likely to study networked capa-bilities and their role during OIF “not as a tem-plate for future action but as a model of somecapabilities that may be desirable to implement inthe future.”31

NCO Conceptual Framework

The Office of Force Transformation (OFT) and theOffice of the Assistant Secretary of Defense forNetworks and Information Integration (OASD [NII])have collaborated for several years on an effort todevelop metrics to test the working hypothesis andtenets of NCW. The primary objective has been todevelop a rich and comprehensive set of NCW-related metrics that could be used in experimenta-tion and other research endeavors to gather andevaluate evidence concerning NCW and NCO.Potentially, this evidence could then be used toinform DoD investment decisions across the doc-trine, organization, training, materiel, leadershipand education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF)functional areas. Thus far, the results of this efforthave included the development of the NCOConceptual Framework (CF), the conduct of relat-ed case studies, and a variety of other NCO-relat-ed research, outreach efforts, and publications.32

The NCO CF identifies key concepts and linkages tooutput measures in the NCO value chain in thecontext of the four domains of Information Agewarfare: physical, information, cognitive, andsocial. The NCO CF is intended to help guide andmeasure NCW implementation in the Departmentof Defense through its application to various mission sets or scenarios. The CF has beendesigned to help answer the “why” question. Oneof its main purposes is providing the means toexplain the dramatic increases in effectivenessthat are evident when network-centric capabili-ties are acquired and network-centric practicesare adopted by military forces.

Version 1.0 of the NCO CF was published inNovember 2003; Version 2.0 (Draft) followed inJune 2004. An international team of government,


industry, and academic personnel organized byOFT and OASD (NII) continues to evaluate andrefine the NCO CF and conduct a series of NCOcase studies. Figure 11 shows the current versionof the top-level NCO CF.33 An earlier version of theCF was successfully applied and initially validatedusing an air-to-air case study. In order to refine andvalidate the NCO CF, it is being applied to a broadrange of mission areas in both combat and peace-time training environments.

Seven case studies of the CF have been com-pleted, all involving its application to variousmission areas:

• Air-to-air operations;

• Ground maneuver operations (Stryker BrigadeCombat Team);

• US/UK coalition operations during OperationIraqi Freedom (OIF);

• Air-to-ground operations (close air support);

• Special opera-tions (NavalSpecial WarfareGroup One);

• Multinationaloperations(NATO); and

• Naval operations(CommanderTask Force Fifty)during OperationEnduringFreedom (OEF).

Additional case studies are currently in the plan-ning or early initiation stages including: groundmaneuver operations (V Corps and 3rd InfantryDivision) during OIF; stability and restoration operations; and crisis management operations.Version 2.0 of the NCO CF will be finalized, usingfeedback from the case studies.

OFT’s effort, in partnership with OASD (NII), todevelop and refine the NCO CF is aimed at supporting two of the Director, OFT’s “Top FiveGoals”:

• Implement NCW as an emerging theory of warfor the Information Age and the organizingprinciple for national military planning and jointconcepts, capabilities, and systems.

• Get the decision rules and metrics right andcause them to be applied enterprise wide.

32

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Specific near-term objectives associated with thedevelopment of the NCO CF are:

• Develop and codify the underlying theory ofnetwork-centric warfare through developmentand refinement of an underlying conceptualframework for analysis and assessment;

• Apply the conceptual framework to a range ofmission areas and assess its ability to explainkey underlying relationships between inputvariables and output measures;

• Support the application of the conceptualframework to help facilitate requirements def-inition for network-centric concepts, capabili-ties, and systems (e.g., FORCEnet, C2Constellation, Future Combat System);

• Develop analytic methodologies that can beapplied to enhance the planning and executionof experiments that explore and validate net-work-centric concepts as well as the trainingand evaluation of networked forces; and

• Develop an enhanced understanding of thechallenges associated with allied and coalitionnetwork-centric operations.

NCO Case StudiesThe NCO Conceptual Framework initiative isenhancing our understanding of NCW and NCO bygathering and analyzing evidence on NCO-relatedtechnologies and practices. The seven completedNCO case studies have provided the primary vehi-cle for applying the NCO CF, gathering the data, and analyzing the evidence. The followingsummaries of four case studies illustrate theprogress to date.

Ground Operations (StrykerBrigade Combat Team): The results ofthe Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) NCOCase Study demonstrate the power of NCW capa-bilities. The Army’s SBCT is a new force design utilizing an information-centric concept of opera-tions; enhanced vehicle speed and stealth basedon the Stryker wheeled fighting vehicle; improvedreconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisi-tion (RSTA) capabilities; and first-generation NCOcapabilities including interim mobile networks,satellite communications, and evolving battle com-mand systems.

The hypothesis explored by this case study wasthat the NCO capabilities of the SBCT would enableinformation and decision superiority and increaseforce effectiveness. The study objective was tounderstand how the Stryker Brigade’s NCO capa-bilities could actually provide these advantagesand if they could provide additional combat power.

The operational environment for the StrykerBrigade case study was a small-scale contingencyinvolving early entry operations in a rapid responseand deployment scenario. The data collection andanalysis were focused on a Stryker Brigade JointReadiness Training Center (JRTC) exercise con-ducted in May 2003. The baseline for comparison


was a non-digitized light infantry brigade, theSBCT’s “closest predecessor.” The quality of situa-tional awareness, situational understanding, speedof command, quality of decisions, and force self-synchronization were used in the case study asmeasures of command and control (C2) effective-ness. Similarly, force effectiveness and survivabilitywere used as measures of mission effectiveness(MOEs).34

The results of the SBCT Case Study demonstratedthat the Stryker Brigade is significantly more agileand capable than a non-digitized light infantrybrigade. Based on the analysis, the followingobservations concerning the Stryker Brigade’sNCO capabilities have been made:

• Several key NCW factors contribute to an order-of-magnitude increase in StrykerBrigade force effectiveness:

–75% of SBCT with networked battle com-mand systems;

–Selected high bandwidth beyond line-of-sight satellite communications links;

–Increase in individual/shared informationquality from 10% to 80%;

–Acceleration of speed of command from 24to three hours in key engagements; and

–Ability to control speed of command.

• Key result from SBCT certification exercise atJRTC—friendly vs. enemy casualty ratiodecreased from 10:1 to 1:1.

• Caveats:

–Stryker’s mobility—soldiers arrived fresh forbattle;

–Other factors contribute to increase in forceeffectiveness—training, leader development,personnel stabilization, and firepower; and

–Current results may underestimate futurepotential of SBCT’s NCW capabilities in landwarfare.

In conclusion, significant NCW capabilities wereeffectively demonstrated by the Stryker Brigademission capability package (MCP). The Brigade’snew organizational structure, battle command andnetworking capabilities, and evolving operationalconcepts improved the quality of information avail-able to soldiers throughout the unit. In turn,improved information quality resulted in improvedinteractions and collaboration, which led toenhanced shared awareness and understanding.Ultimately, the Brigade’s NCW capabilities providedcommanders with better decision options andenabled better control of the speed of command.Collectively, all of these information-based attrib-utes made the Stryker Brigade’s decision-makingability more agile. These qualities, along withimproved organizational, equipment, and trainingcapabilities, increased combat effectiveness.

34


US/UK Coalition OperationsDuring Operation Iraqi Freedom:This case study examined United States/UnitedKingdom coalition land combat operations duringOIF (February–April 2003). The focus was on theuse of NCO technologies and practices, specifical-ly the use of the Force XXI Battle CommandBrigade and Below (FBCB2)/Blue Force Tracker(BFT) system by ground forces. FBCB2/BFT is adigital network that allows users to send andreceive information across the battlefield. It con-sists of a computer equipped with communicationand global positioning system (GPS) transceiversand is designed to work with brigade-and-belowoperators. It not only displays the location of blueforce elements, but also mapping and satelliteimagery. BFT is also capable of creating graphicaloverlays, assisting in the conduct of terrain analy-sis, and providing text messaging.

The objective of this case study was to assess theeffectiveness of a networked force (relative to anon-networked force) in high-intensity combat,utilizing the NCO CF as the vehicle for research.The study sought to identify levels of effectivenessrelated to the degree of networking. The hypothesisexamined in the study was that during OperationIraqi Freedom, as compared to previous operationsand training without NCO capabilities, the directaccessibility to NCO capabilities by U.S. and UKunits improved individual sensemaking, enhancedthe quality of interactions, improved shared sense-making, and increased mission effectiveness.

The initial focus of the case study was on landcombat operations conducted by the UK’s 1stArmored Division. Subsequently, land combatoperations of the 1st Brigade Combat Team (1BCT)of the U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) werealso analyzed. Three key factors contributed to the degree to which FBCB2/BFT was successfullyemployed and exploited by coalition forces: densi-ty of deployment, scheme of maneuver, and degreeof training.

The density of deployment varied between U.S. andUK forces. The 3ID deployed approximately 150units, which enabled deployment down to the company level. The UK 1st Armored Divisiondeployed 47 units, which translated to a signifi-cantly reduced deployment footprint. The schemeof maneuver for the U.S. and UK forces also variedsignificantly. The vast distances that the 3ID oper-ated over in advancing from Kuwait to Baghdadsignificantly stressed line-of-sight terrestrial com-munications capabilities and placed a premium onthe SATCOM-enabled digital communications. Incontrast, the UK 1st Armored Division’s scheme ofmaneuver was geographically less dispersed andits three major subordinate units (3rd MarineCommando Brigade, 7th Armored Brigade, 16thAir Assault Brigade) were able to use their terres-trial and SATCOM voice communications to devel-op situational awareness and perform commandand control. In key instances, FBCB2/BFT con-tributed to the development of enhanced situa-tional awareness within the UK forces. The degreeof training with the new equipment also variedbetween U.S. and UK forces, but both found thesystem valuable during OIF.35


The employment of FBCB2/BFT by U.S. forces(3ID’s 1BCT) during OIF had a dramatic effect onthe speed of command and effectiveness:

• FBCB2/BFT provided tactical commanderswith enhanced situational awareness relativeto previous operations and exercises when thesystem was not available.

• The FBCB2/BFT system was primarily used toaugment situational awareness provided fromother systems.

• FBCB2/BFT was used as a tool for missionplanning and the conduct of operations.

• The FBCB2/BFT system improved “macro”situational awareness.

• FBCB2/BFT provided a facilitating capabilityfor coalition operations.

The limited deployment, training, usage, and oper-ation of FBCB2/BFT with UK units limited the contribution to overall situational awareness.Evaluation of the UK forces’ use of BFT revealedthe following:

• Although the FBCB2/BFT was not used wide-ly, it was perceived as providing a good, if limited, situational awareness picture.

• The currency, precision, and consistency ofinformation provided by FBCB2/BFT wererated significantly higher than the baseline.

• Uncertainty in shared sensemaking usingFBCB2/BFT is much higher, largely because oflimited combat net radio interactions betweenunits and delays/errors in passing informationup and down the chain of command.

• Many UK participants agreed there was greatpotential for utilizing FBCB2/BFT to communi-cate boundaries, command intent, and reports,but none had done so during OIF.

Several lessons from the employment ofFBCB2/BFT during OIF were common to U.S. andUK forces:

• FBCB2/BFT does not replace voice communi-cations in ground combat operations—it aug-ments it.

• A ground combat unit’s effectiveness alsodepends on its combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) assets; like theground combat units they support, CS and CSSunits also require high-quality situational aware-ness. Thus, the FBCB2/BFT system should beintegrated with CS and CSS elements.

36


Air-to-Ground Operations: This casestudy focused on air-to-ground engagements, andspecifically examined the role of NCO technologiesand practices in support of close air support (CAS)operations. The central focus of the study was toanswer three questions. First, what explained thesuccessful results of certain nighttime CAS mis-sions during the U.S. Army’s Division CapstoneExercise—Phase 1 (DCX-1) at the NationalTraining Center in 2001? Second, to what extentwere NCO technologies and practices, such asthose used in DCX-1, employed during OperationsEnduring Freedom (2001–2002) and IraqiFreedom (2003)? Third, what was the impact oftheir use on mission effectiveness?

In analyzing the results of DCX-1, the study con-cluded that two factors directly contributed to thedramatic success realized by CAS: The robust net-working of both ground and air forces; and theemployment of precision engagement capabilitiesby the CAS aircraft.

The evidence showed that the robust networkingenabled an order-of-magnitude improvement ininformation sharing across the air-ground seam,which in turn enabled CAS pilots to develop a com-mon tactical picture of the Blue and Red groundforces. This common picture in turn enabled theCAS pilots to develop very high levels of sharedawareness, which, when combined with their pre-cision engagement capabilities, enabled them to

decisively engage the opposing force (OPFOR) inclose proximity to Blue ground forces. The net resultwas that the training exercise had to be stoppedand restarted to enable the Blue force to engagethe OPFOR and achieve their training objectives.

The study next examined CAS operations duringOEF and concluded that SADL use between air andground elements was limited due to ground unitequipment constraints. However, SADL was effec-tive in coordination among aircraft in support ofground operations, and Litening Pods were effec-tive in air-ground coordination. Preliminary findingsduring OEF indicated that there was little air-ground networking at the tactical level.

Finally, the air-to-ground operations case studyexamined CAS in OIF and determined that NCOtechnologies and practices provided U.S. forces inIraq with the ability to reconcile air and ground per-spectives and successfully attack ground targets ina limited number of engagements. Most CAS mis-sions conducted during OIF depended primarily onlegacy systems at the aviator-ground maneuver element level. Both Army and Marine ground unitsusually called for CAS and guided CAS aircraft to thetarget using voice communications. However, NCOsystems were used extensively between air andground components at the operational level andwithin component chains at all levels.Multiple network-centric systems supported networking between staffs.


Overall, the results of this case study show thatthere is room for much improvement in networkingCAS operations at the tactical level. In recognitionof this problem, the Services “are pursuing equip-ment, concepts, and experiments that leverageNCO at the tactical level.” On the other hand, “theuse of relatively robust NCW systems” at the oper-ational level provides a “a measurable improve-ment in the confidence and trust of the warfightersand ultimately, improved combat effectiveness.”When available to pilots and ground troops at the tactical level, network-centric systems will further enhance CAS engagements, reducing thekill-chain timeline and contributing to improvedresponsiveness and flexibility. Already, these NCWsystems are allowing air controllers at higher levelsof command to gain enhanced situational aware-ness; this, in turn, is beginning to change the tra-ditional definitions of “tactical” and “operational.”36

Special Operations (Naval SpecialWarfare Group 1): This case study focusedon the role of NCO in the activities of the NavalSpecial Warfare Task Group 1 (NSWG-1), a U.S.Navy special operations forces (SOF) unit, duringOEF and OIF. The manner in which NSWG-1 con-ducted its missions during OEF and OIF demon-strated its ability to exploit NCO technologies, orga-nizational structures, and processes during combatoperations. Across all mission types, the Navy SEALteams of NSWG-1 overcame harsh operating con-ditions and were able to dramatically improve themission planning process, resulting in improvedforce effectiveness. They did so by developing andutilizing network-centric capabilities. NSWG-1’sunprecedented success during OEF and OIF illus-trated the tenets of NCO: better quality networkingleads to enhanced information sharing, improvedcollaboration, and increased speed of commandand self-synchronization.

38


The purpose of the case study was to documentand explain the exceptional performance ofNSWG-1 during OEF and especially OIF. It focusedon NCO technologies and practices—the people,processes, and technologies used in the conductof war planning and fighting. The basic hypothesisexplored was that the innovative co-evolution ofNSWG-1’s Mission Support Center (MSC), alongwith the development, adoption, and adaptation ofnew information technologies, improved missionplanning and execution.

The capabilities facilitated by NSWG-1’s MSCclearly provided additional support to the forwardelements of NSWG-1, both the warfighters andsupport staff. The MSC enabled enhanced collabo-ration among and between forward and rear SEALunits. This collaboration was made possible by adramatically improved physical networking infra-structure and information management system.Ultimately, the MSC was responsible for shared situational awareness that enabled SEAL plannersand warfighters to plan and execute successfulmissions.

The results of this case study indicate that meas-urable improvements in speed of decision makingand synchronization at the unit and team levelwere achieved with the evolution of the NSWG-1mission capabilities between the beginning of OEFand the end of OIF. The improvements evident dur-ing OIF were achieved as a result of more leverag-ing of reachback support at the MSC. Measurableimprovements in NSWG-1’s network-centric capa-bilities resulted in enhancements in informationsharing, collaboration, and the decision-makingprocess. Additionally, SEAL teams gained anenhanced ability to conduct distributed, collabora-tive planning and were able to sustain a higheroperational tempo during OIF compared to OEF.37


NSWG-1 assessed the improvements achievedbetween the beginning of OEF and the end of OIF.They concluded that these improvements signifi-cantly increased NSWG-1’s combat power byincreasing the number of combat missions thatcould be simultaneously conducted worldwide.Other highlights of their findings included:

• Enhanced Command and Control (NSWG-1):

–Increased mobility of the commander and hiskey battle staff;

–Effective information management providedcommander with rapid, tailored, decision-quality information;

–Increased global situational awareness forthe operational commander;

–Increased consistency of global planningefforts; and

–Increased survivability—reduced force pro-tection concerns.

• Increased mission effectiveness (Naval SpecialWarfare Task Unit [NSWTU]):

–Increased quality of information;

–Increased situational awareness at the unitlevel;

–Increased time available for mission planningand rehearsal; and

–Reduced risk—increased probability of mis-sion success.

40

NCW Implementation

“Transformation is yielding new sources

of power … One such source is informa-

tion sharing through robust network

structures. We have a mountain of

evidence—from simulation, from experi-

mentation, and from real world experi-

ence—that substantiate the power of

network behavior … Each of the

Departments’ efforts reflects an under-

standing of this phenomenon … These

efforts reflect the ongoing shift from plat-

form-centric to network-centric thinking

that is key to transformation.”Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski,

Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense,Prepared Statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee,

March 14, 2003.


Transformation, including the implementation ofNCW capabilities to enable the joint force and theongoing shift from platform-centric to network-cen-tric thinking, is a continuing process with no dis-cernible end point. Those involved in transformationand NCW implementation in the Department ofDefense (DoD) must anticipate the future and wher-ever possible help create it. Transformation and NCWimplementation deal with the co-evolution of theseven key functional areas of doctrine, organization,training, materiel (technology), leadership and edu-cation, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) (figure12). Consequently, progress in implementing network-centric warfare cannot be measured solely by focusing on one dimension, such as tech-nology or doctrine. Rather, progress must beassessed in terms of the maturity of mission capa-bilities that integrate key elements of DOTMLPF.

A profound change in any one of these areasnecessitates changes in all. Ultimately, militarytransformation and NCW implementation are aboutchanging the values, attitudes, and beliefs of theU.S. Armed Forces concerning how combat poweris developed and employed.

At the Joint and Service levels, significant progressis being made in developing NCW capabilities that leverage the power of order-of-magnitudeimprovements in information sharing enabled bynetworking. The NCW-related initiatives describedin the first two sections of this chapter, “Joint NCW Implementation” and “Service NCW Imple-mentation,” provide a snapshot of the myriad ofactivities that are being pursued across DoD tohelp enable NCW. Therefore, the discussion of U.S.NCW-related initiatives that follows is not meant tobe exhaustive, but rather representative.

To varying degrees, the U.S. Joint andService initiatives described in this chapterare enabling the components of the NCWvalue chain described previously in thisdocument by improving our forces’ capabil-ities to:

• Improve information sharing;

• Enhance the quality of information;

• Increase shared situational awareness;

• Enhance collaboration;

• Enable self-synchronization;

• Enhance sustainability;

• Increase speed of command; and

• Improve mission effectiveness.

NCW Implementation

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Figure 12: NCW Implementation—Co-Evolution of DOTMLPFFunctional Areas


The third and final section of this chapter, “Alliesand Multinational Partners,” offers a brief look atthe impressive efforts of U.S. allies and multination-al partners to develop or enhance their network-centric capabilities. These international develop-ments, including the ongoing efforts of NATO tostudy a NATO Networked Enabled Capability (NNEC)and develop an overarching Strategic Frameworkand Concept for NNEC, are very promising for theconduct of combined network-centric operations(NCO) in the future.

Joint NCW ImplementationA number of new operational concepts, organiza-tions, and systems are being developed to enablea networked Joint Force. Impressive new network-centric capabilities such as the Force XXI BattleCommand Brigade and Below (FBCB2/BFT)/BlueForce Tracking (BFT) system, so valuable to Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations unitsduring Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), are providing

significant enhancements in shared situationalawareness and other vital areas of NCW.FBCB2/BFT and the other initiatives described inthis section are enabling U.S. forces to conductincreasingly effective network-centric operations(NCO) across the full range of military operations. Inaddition, significant efforts are underway within theDepartment to promote cultural change in the U.S.military through training and education.

FBCB2—Blue Force Tracking: Jointnetwork-centric capabilities gave U.S. forcesunprecedented advantages during the conduct ofOIF in March–April 2003. A prime example was theArmy’s satellite-based FBCB2 system, also referredto as the Blue Force Tracker, successfully employedby Army, Marine Corps, Special Operations Forces,and British ground forces (1st UK Armored Division)during OIF. The system uses Global PositioningSystem (GPS) transmitters mounted in militaryvehicles and aircraft to monitor their locations. Theinformation is combined with terrain maps and

intelligence on enemy positions to create a battlefield picture that can beshared over commercial satellite networks(figure 13).

General Tommy Franks, USA (Ret.), com-mander of U.S. Central Command and thecoalition forces during OIF, credited net-work-centric warfare, and the Blue ForceTracker in particular, with enabling theArmy and Marine Corps’ ability to worktogether and track each other’s progressthroughout the operation. It was by allaccounts a major factor in reducing inci-dents of friendly fire during OIF. Accordingto General Franks, FBCB2 gave groundcommanders a “precise sense of the location, capacity, and capability of the

44

“When my TF seized a key highway intersection south of Baghdad, I could see the company commander icons at each blocking position and I knew we had control of the objective.”

- LTC John Charlton, Cdr Task Force 1-15 Inf, 3rd Infantry Division

M2A2

M1A1

HMMWV

Delivering Situational Awareness to 3rd Infantry Division forces supporting stability operations in Baghdad

Figure 13: FBCB2—Blue Force Tracking


battlefield. What a powerful, powerful thing!” Headded that he personally used the Blue ForceTracker to watch in “near-real-time” as leading ele-ments of the Army’s 3rd Infantry Divisionapproached and entered Baghdad in early April.38

While FBCB2’s performance during OIF has beenwidely praised, the Army is looking for ways to bet-ter collect data across the forces and feed it intothe system. In the words of Colonel Nick Justice,USA, FBCB2 Program Manager prior to and duringOIF, “What we need is common, shared informationthat I might use in different ways to meet every-one’s needs, whether they’re a logistician, a com-bat company commander, or a theater-level Armycommander.”39

Horizontal Fusion—a Catalyst forNet-Centric Transformation: TheHorizontal Fusion Portfolio of the AssistantSecretary of Defense for Networks and InformationIntegration (ASD [NII]) is one of DoD’s most com-prehensive and promising efforts for advancing theimplementation of net-centric40 capabilities in theU.S. Armed Forces. It was created in early 2003 torespond to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s vision offorce transformation and to achieve “power to theedge” in the new battlespace. Horizontal Fusionequips warfighters, or “Edge-Users,” with the abilityto access the information they need at the right timeto make the right decisions. The initiative has integrated and demonstrated net-centric capabili-ties that will transition directly into operationalcapabilities.

Horizontal Fusion is the catalyst for the net-centrictransformation of the DoD. It will provide real-timesituational awareness throughout the battlespace,sensemaking tools, multi-community-of-interestcollaboration, and critical intelligence informationsharing. The Horizontal Fusion Portfolio integratesadvanced technologies to make the “QuantumLeap” to NCO, with an emphasis on support to thewarfighter. Horizontal Fusion is one of the pillars ofthe Department’s NCW/NCO transformation effort,which includes Global Information Grid BandwidthExpansion (GIG-BE), Joint Tactical Radio System(JTRS), Wideband Satellite Communications (SATCOM), Net-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES),and Information Assurance (IA).

The term “horizontal” refers to the ability to reachacross traditionally stove-piped organizations; and“fusion” refers to the process and applications thatallow net-centric “melding.” Users will be able toseek the information they need across the battle-space through “smart-pull” and, in turn, informa-tion sharing. This process is described by the verbstask, post, process, and use (TPPU). With TPPU, theuser can smart-pull information in seconds ratherthan minutes. To be effective, the TPPU processrequires interoperable infrastructures within theDoD and across external U.S. and coalition intelli-gence-gathering organizations. Real-time collabo-ration allows users, regardless of their respectivecommunities of interest, to share insights and add value to posted information; it will also allowgeographically separated commanders and units toact as a cohesive team by sharing a common oper-ational picture (COP).


The aim of Horizontal Fusion is to establish stan-dards, policies, and procedures for future Web-enabled capabilities. This represents a significantchange in culture for security, acquisition, andfielding. As currently envisioned by the ASD (NII),the Horizontal Fusion initiative will “end” in 2008,leaving a new acquisition mindset among theServices and Defense Agencies. Horizontal Fusionhas annual goals that touch all areas in net-cen-tricity. Each year’s portfolio of initiatives expandson the capabilities and standards of the previousyear. Ongoing and new capabilities that are readyto be fielded are demonstrated through the annualQuantum Leap demonstration, a proof-of-conceptdemonstration of the operational Horizontal Fusioncapabilities at multiple geographical locations. It is thegraduation of the year’s capabilities to operations.

The 2003 Horizontal Fusion objectives included thefollowing: searching capabilities through edge com-puting power; providing users with the ability to pub-lish to the GIG; sharing intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaisance (ISR) data; improving operationswithin DoD and the intelligence community; and

exploiting diverse data sources. The 2004 Portfolioexpands the collateral space to more communities ofinterest by integrating operational NCES with organ-izations and programs that hone capabilities andservices that can be readily adapted to the collater-al space. Horizontal Fusion is working cross-domainand secure wireless security issues using architec-tures designed by the National Security Agency(NSA) and other intelligence and security organiza-tions. The Horizontal Fusion Portfolio membershipincludes DoD, industry, and multinational partnerprograms. The sponsors of current initiatives now inthe Portfolio include the Army, Navy, and Air Force;U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Strategic Command;Defense Intelligence Agency; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency;Department of State; North Atlantic TreatyOrganization; and several DoD industry and educa-tion programs.

Sense and Respond Logistics: Aninitiative sponsored by the Office of ForceTransformation (OFT), Sense and Respond Logistics(SRL) is an emerging logistics concept tied closelyto NCW theory and practice, as evidenced by some of its main characteristics: shared awareness,speed and coordination, dynamic synchronization,adaptability and flexibility, and networked organiza-tion. In general, SRL is an adaptive method for

46

maintaining the operational availability of units bymanaging their end-to-end support network. Unitsoperating under the SRL concept are networked anddynamically synchronized to satisfy demand inresponse to changes in the environment.Therefore, all units within that network are poten-tial consumers and providers of supply to andfrom all other units in the network.

The development of SRL involves not only theimplementation of a new concept, but also theinfusion of key technologies, the realignment of thelogistics infrastructure, and the inclusion of newprocesses that fully exploit the concept. Figure 14highlights three approaches to logistics—Mass-Based, Just-in-Time, and Sense and Respond—and the ongoing transformation of the logisticsfunction in military operations. As the SRL conceptevolves, it is intended to parallel the changesunderway in Joint Force operations. It relies on IT-enhanced adaptation and learning; translating to adistributed, adaptive systems capability; andresulting in rapid planning, coherent execution, andsustainment of military operations in complex,uncertain environments.


The SRL initiative has three goals. First, increasethe robustness of logistics support to include theability of sense and respond (S&R) networks tooperate in an environment where communicationsand node connectivity may be restricted and secu-rity is challenged. Second, provide more flexibilityto the commander; this flexibility is required by the more dynamic future battlespace. And third,increase the adaptiveness of the logistics systemin order to decrease the reaction time requiredresponding to environmental changes or newoperational missions. In its ongoing efforts to help DoD achieve these goals, the OFT is sponsoringseveral projects and initiatives to move SRLfrom the concept phase to a new capability forthe warfighter.

Prime Metric: Days of Supply

Prime Metric: Flow Time

Prime Metric: Speed/Quality of Effects

Figure 14: Transforming Logistics


Cultural Change and Education:As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, militarytransformation and NCW implementation requirechanging the culture of the U.S. Armed Forces.Much of this vital cultural change can be accom-plished by the implementation of educationalreforms that will influence the attitudes, values,and beliefs of future U.S. military leaders andinstill in them a sense of urgency to transformand to be innovators. The education of our futureleaders will be crucial to the success of NCWimplementation and the overall force transformationprocess in the DoD.

Accordingly, one of the highest priority objectivesof the Office of Force Transformation since itsestablishment in late 2001 has been to act as a catalyst for cultural change within theDepartment. OFT’s core initiative for facilitatingcultural change is “Education for Transformation.”This initiative is focused on developing anddiffusing knowledge in areas that are key totransformation.

Other Joint NCW Initiatives:• Common Relevant Operational Picture for

Joint Forces: The Common Relevant Opera-tional Picture (CROP) will present timely, fused,accurate, and relevant information that can betailored to meet the requirements of the JointForce Commander and the Joint Force. As thelead agent for this program and the systemsengineer for the Joint Forces Command(JFCOM) in coordinating joint battle manage-ment C2 programs, the Air Force is working to achieve the CROP for joint forces throughthe Family of Interoperable Operational

Pictures (FIOP) program. The FIOP is a multi-Service program with new funding provided byOSD that will close the seams between existinglegacy C4ISR systems and extend the capabili-ty of systems under development in order toexploit the full data collection and managementabilities of current C4ISR assets. In order toprovide an all-source picture of the battlespacecontaining actionable, decision-quality informa-tion to the warfighter through a fusion of exist-ing databases, this program will implementdata-sharing and fusion among heterogeneous,stove-piped systems in support of users at theoperational and tactical levels. It will facilitatethe establishment of interoperability standardsand architectures to guide future acquisitions.41

• Standing Joint Force Headquarters(SJFHQ): DoD is strengthening joint opera-tions through the establishment of StandingJoint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) at theCombatant Commands (COCOM). When field-ed, each SJFHQ will provide a standing body ofplanners, who possess the full range of skillsand training necessary to plan and conducteffects-based, joint operations, while employ-ing the tenets of NCW. With an initial capabili-ty to be fielded at each of the COCOMs inFY05, the SJFHQ will provide the manning,equipment, training, and procedural enhance-ments needed to become a core around whichthe staff of a regional COCOM or a JTF com-mander can operate across the spectrum ofoperations from daily routine, through pre-crisis, to crisis response. The Deployable JointC2 (DJC2) system will provide the materialcomponent of the SJFHQ.42

48


• Collaborative Information Environment(CIE): The CIE is the aggregation of hardware,software, and procedures that leverages theGlobal Information Grid (GIG) to enable sharingof information and collaboration within andamong staffs, including interfaces with bothDoD and commercial communications path-ways. USJFCOM will provide an interim CIEtoolset in conjunction with the initial fielding of the SJFHQ in FY0543 In general, the CIEconcept aims to provide common situationalawareness and understanding to all decisionmakers by collaboratively linking the JTF staffand its components with the COCOM, intera-gency participants, and allied or coalitionorganizations.

• Distributed Common Ground/SurfaceSystem: DCGS is the Department’s intelli-gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)network-centric enterprise that provides Task-Post-Process-Use (TPPU) capabilities for theJTF and below. It is the key component forproviding fused ISR-based decision-qualityinformation for effective joint C2.44

• Dynamic Joint ISR Concept: The DynamicJISR Concept applies a net-centric approachto the management of ISR capabilities to inte-

grate sensors and processing capabilities intoa coherent whole and thus better support theknowledge demands of the Joint ForceCommander and his staff, his components,and multinational coalition forces. This con-cept supports and relies on collaborative plan-ning and execution across the full range ofmilitary operations among international agen-cies, the intelligence community, and the JointForce Commander and his Service compo-nents.45

• Joint Interagency Coordination Group(JIACG): The JIACG will establish operationalconnections between civilian and militarydepartments and agencies to improve plan-ning and coordination within the government.The JIACG will be a multi-functional, advisoryelement providing perspective on civilianagency capabilities, approaches, and limita-tions in the development of a coordinated useof national power. This will ensure the best mixof capabilities is employed to achieve thedesired effects that include the full range ofdiplomatic, information, and economic activi-ties. The potential requirements for achievinga fully networked JIACG during future contin-gencies are formidable.

Service NCW ImplementationFor some time, the Services have recognized thetremendous leverage available to their personnel,organizations, and platforms/systems from theexploitation of NCW as an emerging theory of warand the increasing implementation of joint andService NCW capabilities, not only for warfighting,but also across all mission areas and throughoutthe battlespace. Their progress and future plans in


this regard were evident in the first editions of theService Transformation Roadmaps, published in2002, and are even more apparent in the annualRoadmap updates of 2003 and 2004.46 Whereasthe authors of the 2002 Roadmaps were able toincorporate some of the NCW lessons learned fromOperation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the2003 and 2004 Roadmaps have benefited fromthe additional combat experience gained by U.S.forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom, theoccupation of Iraq in the face of multiple threats,continuing U.S. military operations inAfghanistan, and the completion of the JointOperating Concepts (JOC).

The Services are accelerating their efforts to net-work their forces, develop innovative new conceptsof operations tied to NCW in support of the JOpsCand the JOCs, experiment with new concepts andtechnology, enhance the readiness of their person-nel and organizations to participate in joint net-worked operations, and, in general, to capitalize onthe power of NCW theory and network behavior. Thematerial in this section is drawn almost entirelyfrom the 2003 Army Transformation Roadmap, theNaval Transformation Roadmap 2003, and the AirForce Transformation Flight Plan (November 2003).

Army

“Transforming our Nation’s military capabili-ties while at war requires a careful balancebetween sustaining and enhancing the capa-bilities of current forces to fight wars and winthe peace while investing in the capabilities offuture forces. Joint concept development andexperimentation, science and technology(S&T) investment, and future force design thatenables interdependent network-centric war-fare will ensure future capabilities meet therequirements of tomorrow’s Joint Force.”

R. L. Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the ArmyGeneral Peter J. Schoomaker, USA, Chief of StaffForeword, 2003 Army Transformation Roadmap,

1 November 2003.

The Army, in coordination with the other Services, isdeveloping transformational capabilities from aninherently joint perspective. In the near term, theArmy will maintain and improve capabilities toenable the Current Force to conduct joint operations.At the same time, it will develop transformationalcapabilities for the Future Force.47 Although theFuture Force will be a hybrid force, one of the keyfuture elements of the hybrid mix will be the FutureCombat Systems-equipped Unit of Action. TheFCS-equipped Unit of Action encompasses morethan a new set of capabilities; rather, it reflects afundamentally transformed method of combat.48

50


Enabling Interdependent NCW:The Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) identifiesseven Joint Force attributes that the future Joint Forcemust embody to achieve “full-spectrum dominance.”The 2003 Army Transformation Roadmap (2003 ATR)describes how the Army is increasing its capabilitiesto achieve these attributes and is implementing theJOpsC and the JOCs.

As mentioned previously, “Networked” is one of theseven Joint Force attributes identified in theJOpsC.49 In discussing its plans for networking itsforce and enabling interdependent NCW during theconduct of joint operations, the Army Roadmapstates: “Information superiority and situationalunderstanding are critical enablers for future jointoperations. Operating in the collaborative informa-tion environment, Army forces will harness thepower of the ongoing revolution in informationtechnology to aid in the fusion of data and infor-mation to develop actionable and predictive intelli-gence and to link people and systems—horizon-tally and vertically—within the joint network toincrease situational understanding. Army battlecommand capabilities will enable interdependentnetwork-centric warfare within joint, interagency,and multinational full-spectrum operations.”50

The Army is planning to accelerate the FutureForce network to enhance the joint battle com-mand capabilities of the Current Force. Building on

recent efforts to analyze the development of cur-rent network architecture and supporting systems,the Army is reprioritizing development of the net-work to focus on top-down fielding to the CurrentForce. It is also leveraging experiences and les-sons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom(OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) toenhance joint battle command, including battlecommand on-the-move (BCOTM) and Blue ForceTracking (BFT) capabilities for select Current Forceunits. To ensure operating forces have the mostadvanced network capabilities, the Army is syn-chronizing the fielding of battle command capabil-ities with unit rotation schedules. Also, the Armycontinues to partner with Defense Agencies, otherServices, the Joint Staff, and Joint ForcesCommand (JFCOM) in all aspects of networkdevelopment.51

Future Combat System (FCS): TheFCS is the Army’s “multifunctional, multimission,reconfigurable family of systems (FoS) designed tomaximize joint interoperability, strategic trans-portability, and commonality of mission roles.”52 Itis the core of the Future Force’s brigade-sized Unitof Action (UA), comprised of 18 manned andunmanned platforms centered around the Soldierand integrated by a battle command network. FCSwill provide Soldiers with significantly enhancedsituational awareness, enabling them “to see first,understand first, act first, and finish decisively.” An


FCS-equipped Army force will be capable of providing mobile, networked command, control,communication and computer (C4) functionalities;autonomous robotic systems; precision direct andindirect fires; airborne and ground organic sensorplatforms; and adverse-weather reconnaissance,surveillance, targeting, and acquisition.

The FCS program is developing network-centricconcepts for a multi-mission combat FoS that willbe lethal, strategically deployable, self-sustainingand highly survivable in combat. The FCS-equipped Army unit will be capable of adjusting toa changing set of missions, ranging from humani-tarian operations to peacekeeping to combat operations. Figure 15 illustrates how the net-worked communications subsystem will providethe connectivity for the brigade-sized UA to inter-act/interface on the battlefield within the FCS FoSand from the Army’s FCS platforms to the Unit ofEmployment (UE), the Joint Force, the MultinationalForce, the Legacy Army, and Army Stryker units,as well as government and nongovernmentalorganizations.

Warfighter Information Network—Tactical (WIN-T): Together, FCS and WIN-T will comprise the Army Future Force’s net-work-centric architecture, under the umbrella ofthe DoD’s Global Information Grid (GIG). WIN-T isthe key enabler to execute the NCW capability ofthe Army’s Future Force. It is the “tactical digitalcommunications system that will provide advancedcommercial-based networking capabilities to the warfighter,” replacing the current MobileSubscriber Equipment (MSE) and Tri-ServicesTactical Communications (TRI-TAC) systems. TheWIN-T network will provide enhanced C4ISR capa-bilities that are mobile, secure, survivable, seam-less, and capable of supporting multimedia tacticalinformation systems. The network’s capability tosupport unit task reorganization and real-timeretasking of battlefield support elements provides avital enabler for the conduct of NCO.

As the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division prepares for itsupcoming deployment to Iraq, it is fielding the JointNetwork Transport Capability-Spiral (JNTC-S), acapability that will eventually evolve into WIN-T.

In effect, JNTC-S,which will also befielded to the 101stAirborne Division, the10th Mountain Division,and the 4th InfantryDivision, is an interimsystem intended tobridge the gap betweenthe legacy MobileSubscriber Equipment(MSE) and WIN-T.53

52

Figure 15: FCS-Enabled Integrated Unit of Action (UA) External Interfaces


Navy and Marine Corps

“The transformation of naval forces is dedi-cated to greatly expanding the sovereignoptions available worldwide to the Presidentacross the full spectrum of warfare by exploit-ing our control of the sea. The result of ourtransformation will be a Navy-Marine CorpsTeam providing sustainable, immediatelyemployable U.S. combat power as part of atransformed joint force ready to meet anychallenge.”

Gordon R. England, Secretary of the Navy,Admiral Vern Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations,

General Michael W. Hagee, USMC, Commandant of the Marine CorpsForeword, Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003,

April 2004.

Seabasing is the overarching expression of theNavy-Marine Corps Team’s shared vision, incorpo-rating the initiatives that will allow the Joint Forceto fully exploit one of the United States’ asymmet-ric advantages—command of the sea. Seabasingis the “overarching transformational operatingconcept for projecting and sustaining naval powerand joint forces which assures joint access byleveraging the operational maneuver of sovereign,distributed, and networked forces operating glob-ally from the sea. The sea base of the future will

be an inherently maneuverable, scalable aggrega-tion of distributed, networked platforms thatenable the global power projection of offensiveand defensive forces from the sea … Seabasingunites our capabilities for projecting offensivepower, defensive power, command and control,mobility, and sustainment around the world.”54

Naval Capability Pillars: A series ofNavy-Marine Corps capabilities to operationalizeSeabasing are being developed through four inter-dependent and synergistic Naval Capability Pillars(NCP): Sea Shield, Sea Strike, Sea Basing, andFORCEnet. Each NCP represents a broad group ofnaval capabilities. They summarize the naval toolsthat will help Joint Force Commanders produceand exploit a discontinuous battlespace withinwhich distributed and sustainable surface, sub-surface, air, ground, and space elements form aunified force that assures access and projects bothoffensive power and defensive capability.FORCEnet will enable these capabilities.


FORCEnet: FORCEnet (figure 16) is theoperational construct and architectural frameworkthat will provide the Navy-Marine Corps team “withthe capability to deliver the persistent and compre-hensive surveillance, rapid networked command,and common, accurate battlespace picture neces-sary to support decision making at a tempo thatoverwhelms an adversary’s capability to react andrespond … FORCEnet is the enabling capability fora fully networked naval force, connecting it to the similarly networked joint force that will be linked together by the Internet Protocol (IP)-enabled Global Information Grid.” Navy and MarineCorps systems “will be conceived, developed, andimplemented as truly joint, integrated capabili-ties—capable of generating improved coalitioneffectiveness.”

“Implementing the FORCEnetvision will link warfightersashore, at sea, and in the airinto a series of highly integrat-ed distributed services net-works that are capable of pro-viding critical operational andtactical information to speci-fied users on a rapid and con-tinuous basis. The ‘publishand subscribe’ construct formoving data within the net-work backplane will facilitategreatly improved, shared bat-tlespace awareness, rapiddissemination of the Joint

Force Commander’s evolving campaignplan/‘intent,’ and faster passing of informationabout the enemy from surveillance systemsthrough controllers to ready forces with the rightweapons for attacking key targets. FORCEnetenhances naval capabilities to quickly make andexecute decisions in the battlespace, to synchro-nize the activities of widely distributed forces tomass effects on the enemy,” and to reduce threatsto friendly forces by providing broader situationalawareness. “The distributed services and special-ized mission applications carried on FORCEnet areas important to future naval combat capabilities asthe platforms and weapons they link. Thus,FORCEnet is a critical enabler of naval forcetransformation.”55

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• NCW is the theory.

• NCO is the concept.

• FORCEnet is the architecturalframework to make the theory andconcept a reality.

Figure 16: FORCEnet — Enabling Capability for the Fully Networked Naval Force


Air Force

“Our legacy aircraft systems were built withspecialized roles and they were very good. Butwe have limited networking, limited all-weath-er delivery and limited stand off, and our sen-sors are only partially integrated … We willnetwork these systems in ways that enable usto find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess intimelines unimaginable just a few years ago. Itis our goal to have consistent, persistent intel-ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,and, once a decision to attack is made, we willattack instantaneously.”

Dr. James Roche,Secretary of the Air Force,

The Air Force Transformation Flight Plan,November 2003.

The Secretary of the Air Force has identified net-working and the enhancement of the Air Force’snetwork-centric capabilities as a top priority in thedevelopment of the “transformational capabilities”needed to enable the Air Force’s six new conceptsof operations (CONOPS) and DoD’s transformationgoals. In The Air Force Transformation Flight Plan,the Service’s transformation roadmap for 2004and beyond, the Air Force embraces the key JointForce Attributes of the Joint Operations Concepts(JOpsC), including fully integrated, networked,decentralized, and adaptable, and is developingconcepts and capabilities to support them.56

The first five of 16 transformational capabilitiesidentified by the Air Force that it “cannot achievetoday or must be significantly improved to enablethe new JOCs, DoD’s transformation goals, and theAir Force Vision and CONOPS” are clearly aimed atenabling NCO:

• Seamless joint machine-to-machine integrationof all manned, unmanned, and space systems;

• Real-time picture of the battlespace;

• Predictive Battlespace Awareness;

• Ensured use of the information domain viaeffective information assurance and informa-tion operations; and

• Denial of effective C4ISR to adversaries viaeffective information operations.57


In the context of air and space operations, the AirForce believes that the closely related concepts ofparallel warfare and effects-based operations (EBO)are “the keys to threat avoidance and applying theright force to the right place at the right time.”58

Network-centric capabilities will enable both.

Parallel Warfare: Parallel warfare refers tothe simultaneous attack of carefully selected tar-gets to achieve specific effects, as opposed toattacking targets in a more sequential fashion withthe goal of destroying everything on a target list.Until the 1990–91 Gulf War, parallel warfare wasvery difficult to execute because of the require-ment for mass to compensate for a lack of preciseweaponry, the large number of assets needed tosuppress enemy air defenses, and a general lackof understanding of EBO. The development of lowobservable “stealthy” platforms, precisionweapons, and information operations capabilities,along with a new concept of operations (i.e., EBO),overcame these obstacles and made parallel war-fare possible.

Effects-Based Operations: As explainedin The Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, the mainidea of effects-based operations is to design cam-paign actions based on desired national securityoutcomes, rather than merely attacking targets todestroy adversary forces. The goal is to understandthe effect that is desired in the battlespace andthen create that effect more efficiently and effec-tively. EBO may enable striking fewer targets, usingfewer weapons, avoiding enemy threats, mitigatingthe consequences of enemy action, and limiting thepotential for collateral damage and civilian casual-ties that might occur from a more traditional aircampaign. EBO also focuses on combining andcoordinating all elements of national power, militaryand non-military, to achieve its goals by influencingthe will and perception of the adversary’s decisionmakers. It requires intelligence analysis thatreveals what an adversary relies on to exert influ-ence and conduct operations and the ability to getthat intelligence and all other relevant informationto the right place at the right time. It also requiresthe ability to precisely conduct operations in theright order, with a wide range of tools, to includenon-lethal weapons and information operations.59

Command and Control (C2)Constellation: The centerpiece of the AirForce’s NCW implementation efforts is the C2Constellation initiative (figure 17). The Air Force istransitioning from collecting data through a myriadof independent systems (such as Rivet Joint,AWACS, JSTARS, and space-based assets) to a C2Constellation capable of providing the Joint ForceCommander with real-time, enhanced battlespaceawareness. It will provide Ground Moving TargetIndicator capabilities along with focused Air MovingTarget Indicator capabilities for Cruise Missile

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Defense. Additionally, every platform will be a sensor on the integrated network. Regardless ofmission function (C2, ISR, shooters, tankers, etc),any data collected by a sensor will be passed to allnetwork recipients. This requires networking all air,space, ground, and sea-based ISR systems, com-mand and control nodes, and strike platforms toachieve shared battlespace awareness and a synergy to maximize the ability to achieve theJFC’s desired effects.60

Network Centric CollaborativeTargeting (NCCT): NCCT is an AdvancedConcept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) thatwill demonstrate a network-centric operating system designed to horizontally integrate air,

space, and surface ISR assets at the digital level.By providing a seamless, machine-to-machineinterface, this ACTD will improve geo-locationaccuracy, timeliness, and combat identification oftime sensitive targets. With an enhanced wide-band battle management C4ISR network, it willultimately enable a network-centric, distributedprocessing environment by leveraging existingsensors, communications, and processing sys-tems to dramatically reduce the time required todetect, identify, locate, and designate fleeting targets. The long-range goal is to expand thiscapability to additional ISR sensor systems to create a greater network-centric approach to find,fix, and track time-sensitive targets.61

Figure 17: C2 Constellation Interoperability with Maritime and Ground BattleManagement Command and Control (BMC2) Systems to Provide Joint BMC2


Allies and MultinationalPartnersAround the world, the armed forces of manynations are developing their individual responses tothe challenges and opportunities of the InformationAge. A growing number of our allies and multina-tional partners are exploring new technologies andoperational concepts in order to develop orenhance the network-centric capabilities of theirforces. Some have conducted NCO while workingtogether with U.S. forces in Afghanistan, Iraq,Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere. The partial net-working of coalition forces during recent combat(and other multinational military) operations,including OEF and OIF, has helped move NCW andNCO to a central role in the Information Age trans-formation of military forces around the world.

Significantly, in November 2003, nine NATOnations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, theNetherlands, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom,and the United States) agreed to fund a feasibilitystudy on the NATO Networked Enabled Capability(NNEC) as an important step towards NATO’stransformation. Subsequently, three others(Belgium, Denmark, and Turkey) joined this effort.This study, which began in January 2004, is to becompleted by June 2005. It is being conducted bythe NATO Consultation, Command and ControlAgency (NC3A) “with the aim of examining issuesraised by the network-centric approach … NNECis based on national and NATO capabilities (tacticaland strategic) being networked together in a ‘plugand play’ fashion as required to support flexibleforce structures such as the NATO ResponseForce.62 The Allied Command Transformation (ACT) has established an integrated productteam for NNEC. It is also developing an NNECStrategic Framework including an overarchingNNEC Concept.

By way of example, the network-centric plansand future capabilities of four U.S. allies are summarized below:

Australia: For the Australian Defence Force(ADF), NCW is a means to achieving a more effec-tive warfighting capacity and lies at the heart of theADF’s vision outlined in Force 2020. In the past,the Australian Department of Defence focused pri-marily on the delivery of engagement or sensorplatforms, with minimal attention paid to an under-lying networking infrastructure. Many platformshave thus been “stand alone” in their ability to network with other force elements.

In embracing NCW, the ADF has established a con-cept-led, long-range, capabilities-based planningview (in the context of achieving a joint system ofsystems). The initial step in regard to NCW is toenhance the ADF’s warfighting effectivenessthrough improved collaboration and ability to sharesituational awareness. The following initiatives arebeing explored:

• Establish a network capability that will linkengagement systems with sensor and com-mand and control systems and provide theunderlying information infrastructure uponwhich the networked force will be developed.This network will also provide informationinteroperability with Australia’s allies and coali-tion partners.

• Examine new sensor technologies for theirability to better cue engagement systems.Notable technology areas being examinedinclude UAVs, high-frequency (HF) radar,space-based surveillance, and unattendedground sensors.


• Examine the human dimensions of the net-worked force and how doctrine, education,and training may need to change.

• Accelerate the process of change and innova-tion through alternative partnering arrange-ments with defense industry.

It is the ADF’s aim that a well planned and imple-mented transition to an effective suite of NCWcapabilities will enable the conduct of Effects-Based Operations (EBO) as a centerpiece of theForce of 2020.

Canada: The Canadian Forces (CF) have followed international concept development withregards to NCW and EBO quite closely and under-taken a considerable amount of work in these tworelated fields, both within Canada and with like-minded allies. The CF seeks to maximize the posi-tive utility and transformational benefit of network-related phenomena and an effects-basedapproach without overlooking their potential limitsand adverse consequences.

In order to do so, the CF seeks to maximize net-work-based interoperability both internally, withother government departments and with allies. Inaddition, it sees the full attainment of this potentialas extending beyond simply the technical and com-munications challenges, to include all elements ofcapability, such as doctrine, organization, trainingand culture, and the widest possible integration ofthe elements of national power and influence. This

commitment was made clear in the most recentannual report of the Chief of Defence Staff:

“First, we must transform the way we

perceive and think … We are moving from

an industrial, hierarchical mode of thinking

to a world powered by collaborative human

networks. We must learn to think, behave,

and act as a node in a collaborative network

that includes our warfighters, all three mili-

tary environments, our civilian colleagues in

the department and broader public security

portfolio, as well as our allies.”

Moreover, this commitment is reflected at all levelsof command within the CF: NCW and EBO informforce development planning at the strategic andjoint levels, and amongst the individual services.

As is the case for many of Canada’s allies, theresource-related implications of military transfor-mation compel a degree of pragmatism insofar asimplementation within the CF is concerned. Near-term opportunities will be exploited and risk will betolerated; however, transformation is seen as ajourney rather than a destination, and evolutionaryadaptation will be the norm.

New Zealand: The four capability conceptsupon which New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)force development is based require:

• A knowledge edge force;

• A force tailored for integrated joint operations;

• A multi-mission force capable of tasks rangingfrom civil emergency response through peace-keeping to combat; and

• A networked force.


There are likely to be few missions or tasks that theNZDF of the future will undertake where it will notbe working at some level with other partners,either the military forces of allies and coalitionpartners or other national agencies in NewZealand. To be effective in its tasks, the futureNZDF must be capable of flexible and versatile net-working, with the ability to connect seamlesslyinternally and with a wide range of other forces and agencies.

Networking activity is concentrated, therefore, onachieving interoperability and the identification ofstandards on which to base national initiatives.NCW in the NZDF is the concept that will drive pro-grams of work aimed at enabling the warfighter.

NCW programs are currently focused on projectsto provide the significant enhancement of connec-tivity out to and between deployed force elementsthat are needed to support improved national andcoalition networking extending from the strategicto tactical levels. Following on, new programs are underway to upgrade information exchangeservices and capabilities, culminating with theimplementation of the NZDF Joint Command andControl System over the 2005–2007 timeframe.

Participation in Joint Warrior InteroperabilityDemonstration (JWID) and Combined FederatedBattle Lab Network (CFBLNet) experimentationprovides particular benefit in enabling the develop-ment of concepts and frameworks for NCW as wellas enhancing the investigation and implementationof individual elements of NCW.

United Kingdom: The most recent UnitedKingdom (UK) Strategic Defence Review under-scored the importance of Network EnabledCapability (NEC) (figure 18). It also lies at the heartof the UK’s Joint High Level Operational Concept,which outlines how the UK expects its forces andmethods of operation to develop.

The UK is moving from platform-centric planning toa full NEC to exploit effects-based planning andoperations, using more adaptable forces, capableof greater precision and rapid deployability. This willchange the way the UK plans and executes opera-tions and place different demands on people,equipment, infrastructure, and processes. This evo-lutionary process has three phases:

• Interconnection: Based on current doctrine,organizations, processes, and equipment withminor organizational changes and equipmentenhancements;

• Integration: Drawing on current doctrine,organizations, processes, and equipment withimproved capabilities from major organization-al change and systems integration, givinggreatly improved, shared understanding; and

• Synchronization: Optimal information manage-ment and distribution, supporting developeddoctrine, organizations, processes, and equip-ment with agile mission groups formeddynamically with collaborative workingenabled by system flexibility.


NEC is based on seven themes:

• Shared Understanding: Covering situationalawareness and command intent;

• Full Information Accessibility: Users able tosearch, manipulate, and exchange relevantinformation;

• Effects Synchronization: Achieving desiredeffects through synchronizing activities;

• Agile Mission Grouping: Enabling the dynamiccreation/configuration of task-oriented Groups;

• Dynamic Collaborative Working: Enabling agileC2 in a dynamic, continuous, and synchro-nized manner;

• Resilient Information Infrastructure: Managedcoherent information across the battlespacewith secure/assured connectivity; and

• Inclusive Flexible Acquisition: CoordinatedGovernment/Industry action to promote rapidtechnology insertion and an incrementalapproach to “net-ready platforms.”

A vital NEC component is the UK’s NetworkIntegration, Test and Experimentation Capability(NITEworks), an experimentation environment toassess the benefits of NEC and the options for itseffective and timely delivery, focused on coordinat-ing joint effects and improved targeting.

Figure 18: Network Enabled Capability (NEC)—Heart of the UK's Joint Vision


Conclusions— Network-CentricWarfare in Perspective

“Here at the end of a millennium we are

driven to a new era in warfare. Society

has changed. The underlying economics

and technologies have changed.

American business has changed. We

would be surprised and shocked if

America’s military did not. For nearly 200

years, the tools and tactics of how we

fight have evolved with military tech-

nologies. Now, fundamental changes are

affecting the very character of war. Who

can make war is changing as a result of

weapons proliferation and the fact that

the tools of war increasingly are market-

place commodities. By extension, these

affect the where, the when, and the how

of war.”Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka

“Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Future”U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1998.


Towards a Network-EnabledForce: The 1990s“How can the [U.S.] military not change?” This sim-ple, yet extraordinarily important question wasposed six years ago when discussions of network-centric warfare were in their infancy. The answer isabundantly clear today. The U.S. military is chang-ing at an increasingly rapid pace in response to theInformation Age and changes in U.S. strategy, theinternational environment, and technology.Transformation is a vital component of U.S. defensestrategy and NCW occupies a central place withinthe DoD’s force transformation process.

Many recognized, as the nation entered theInformation Age, that this new age was also influ-encing change within the U.S. military. However, inthe view of some, this change was not occurringfast enough. They observed that a logical model forimplementing NCW was already emerging, but itwould require a high-performance information gridto provide a backplane for dynamic computing andcommunications. This information grid wouldenable the operational architectures of sensorgrids and engagement grids. In turn, sensor gridshad the potential to generate high levels of battle-space awareness and synchronize awareness withmilitary operations. Engagement grids could thenexploit this awareness and translate it intoincreased combat power for U.S. forces.63

Some very promising network-centric capabilitieshad been developed, experimented with, and test-ed by U.S. forces by the late 1990s. Many key ele-ments of the information, sensor, and engagementgrids were already in place or readily available bythat time. At the planning level, the elements of aDoD-wide intranet were emerging. Joint interoper-ability could be achieved in large measure when allelements of the three grids were compliant with theJoint Technical Architecture (JTA) and the DefenseInformation Infrastructure Common OperatingEnvironment (DII COE).

The Navy began experimenting with network-cen-tric operations (NCO) during exercises at sea in thelate 1980s when the Cooperative EngagementCapability (CEC) system of systems was developedand initially tested. CEC, combining a high-per-formance sensor grid with a high-performanceengagement grid, was “enabled by a shift to net-work-centric operations.” In 1995, the Navy’sSeventh Fleet, commanded by then Vice AdmiralArchie Clemins, employed rudimentary NCO to

Conclusions—Network-Centric Warfare in Perspective


excellent effect during the dangerous TaiwanStraits crisis.64 CEC reached Initial OperationalCapability (IOC) in 1996 after a series of tests andexperiments during the early 1990s. Testing andoperational evaluations continued in the late1990s and early 2000s. Today CEC, combined withthe Marine Corps’ CEC-based Composite TrackingNetwork, is creating an effective, common networkof sensors and weapons that extends the naval airdefense capability over sea and shore. Thus, it isan important capability of the Navy-Marine Corps’overall C2 architecture, FORCEnet.65

Also in the 1990s, the Army was testing digitizationand network-centric concepts and making verysignificant investments in the development of newwarfighting capabilities as it fielded and began toexperiment with the first digitized brigade in the4th Infantry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. AdvancedWarfighting Experiments (AWE) were conducted at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin,California, as well as Advanced Concept TechnologyDemonstrations (ACTD) to demonstrate and testnew concepts and technologies. Eventually, theentire 4th Infantry Division became the Army’s firstdigitized division, which presented for the first timean entire division that was truly networked with

Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below(FBCB2) providing the core capability. It wasdeployed to Southwest Asia in 2003 for participa-tion in Operation Iraqi Freedom and its aftermath.

Similarly, the Air Force used a combination ofExpeditionary Force Exercises (EBX) and ACTDs toexplore the potential of networking and digitization.The power of information sharing to enableincreased survivability and lethality in the air-to-airmission was substantiated by the Air Force in themid-1990s during the Joint Tactical InformationDistribution Systems (JTIDS) Operational SpecialProject. Air Force Pilots flying F-15Cs with andwithout data links clearly demonstrated the powerof information sharing enabled by data links. Nowthe Air Force is developing a series of newCONOPS based on improving network-centric andother transformational capabilities while buildingthe Command and Control (C2) Constellation asdescribed in the previous chapter.

66


Building TransformationalCapabilities in the 21stCenturyWhat about the present and the future of NCW andNCO? NCW as an emerging theory of war isbecoming more and more an integral part of howthe military is transforming and clearly impactedthe development of the Joint Operations Concepts(JOpsC), the Joint Operating Concepts (JOC), andthe current Transformation Roadmaps of the JointForces Command (JFCOM) and the Services. In

short, NCW theory and the governing principles ofa network-centric force are guiding, and will likelycontinue to guide, the development of future war-fighting concepts and the development of transfor-mational capabilities within the U.S. Armed Forces.

As shown in this document, great strides havebeen made in refining NCW theory, documentingthe benefits and warfighting advantages of NCW,developing network-centric capabilities, and gen-erally implementing NCW throughout the U.S.Armed Forces in the first few years of the 21stcentury. Indeed, the most visible and convincingevidence of the validity of NCW theory and thetremendous potential of networked, joint forces(even partially networked joint forces) has beenprovided by our experience, together with ourcoalition partners, in Operations Enduring Freedomand Iraqi Freedom from 2001 to the present.

And yet so much remains to be done. Like theforce transformation process itself, the develop-ment and implementation of NCW capabilities toenable the Joint Force is likely to be a long-term,continuous process with no clear end in sight.


Implementing NCW—ThreeCautionsIn implementing NCW, no matter how successfully,we must consider that it is nearly impossible togenerate certainty on the battlefield with regard tooutcomes and consequences. Effects-based oper-ations cannot deliver inviolate cause-effect rela-tions, but they can put the odds on our side. Thatmay be as good as we can get. The multi-sideddynamics of combat defy prediction. NCW is meantto help with this reality, and it does.

Second, the military competition is continuous andno military is as thoroughly studied as our own. Aswe have become more formidable on the tradition-al battlefield, potential adversaries have moved tothe extremes of terrorism and irregular warfare atone end and weapons of mass destruction (WMD)and catastrophic warfare at the other. Just as theDepartment must shift its focus to these extremes,so must it work to exploit NCW principles andsources of power there.

Third, over time information technology and net-working will become commodities. Everyone willhave them. At that point, the advantage will go tothose best able to exploit those commodities withnew organizations and the ability to rapidly changeorganizations, new doctrine, the ability to createand discard doctrine rapidly, and the ability to create and assimilate technologies within veryshort cycle times.

68


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Alberts, David S. Information Age Transformation:Getting to a 21st Century Military (revised).Washington, DC: Department of Defense (DoD)Command and Control Research Program (CCRP),June 2002.

Alberts, David S., John J. Garstka, and FrederickStein. Network Centric Warfare: Developing andLeveraging Information Superiority, 2nd edition(revised). Washington, DC: DoD CCRP, 2000.

Alberts, David S., John J. Garstka, Richard E. Hayes,and David A. Signori. Understanding Information AgeWarfare. Washington, DC: DoD CCRP, 2001.

Alberts, David S. and Richard E. Hayes. Power to theEdge: Command … Control … in the InformationAge. Washington, DC: DoD CCRP, 2003.

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1 For an understanding of the nature, purposes, anddirection of defense transformation, including forcetransformation, see the Transformation PlanningGuidance document approved by Secretary ofDefense Donald Rumsfeld in April 2003. See alsoMilitary Transformation: A Strategic Approach, a doc-ument approved by the Director, Office of ForceTransformation, OSD, in November 2003.

2 Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowski, Director,Office of Force Transformation, interview with FrankSwofford, Defense AT&L, March-April 2004.

3 John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare OffersWarfighting Advantage,” Signal, May 2003, p. 58.

4 Edward A. Smith, Jr., Effects-Based Operations:Applying Network-Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis,and War, Washington, DC: DoD CCRP, 2002, p. 108.

5 Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J.Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin andFuture,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Annapolis,Maryland: January 1998.

6 David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P.Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing andLeveraging Information Superiority, 2nd edition(revised). Washington, DC: DoD CCRP, 2000.

7 David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, Richard E.Hayes, and David A. Signori, UnderstandingInformation Age Warfare, Washington, DC: DoD CCRP,2001. David S. Alberts, Information Age Transforma-tion: Getting to a 21st Century Military (revised),Washington, DC: DoD CCRP, June 2002.

8 Edward A. Smith, Jr., Effects-Based Operations:Applying Network-Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis,and War, Washington, DC: DoD CCRP, 2002.

9 See the final chapter, “The Emerging Way of War,”in Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, adocument published by the Director, Office of ForceTransformation, OSD in November 2003.

10 These four basic tenets of NCW were initially setforth in Network-Centric Warfare: Department ofDefense Report to Congress, 27 July 2001.

11 Department of Defense. Network-Centric WarfareReport to Congress. Washington, DC, 27 July 2001,pp. ii-iii.

12 The “Key Elements of Strategy” for implementingNCW in the Department were presented in a briefing,“Defense Transformation and Network-CentricWarfare,” by Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K. Cebrowskiat the Network Centric Warfare 2004 conference on22 January 2004, Washington, DC. They have alsobeen presented in numerous briefings by JohnGarstka, Office of Force Transformation, 2002-2004.See also the foldout brochure, “Network-CentricWarfare: Creating a Decisive Warfighting Advantage,”published by the Director, Force Transformation,Spring 2004.

13 Frederick C. Mish, Editor in Chief, Webster’s NinthNew Collegiate Dictionary. New York: Merriam-Webster, Inc., 1990, p. 1223.

14 David B. Guralnik, Editor in Chief, Webster’s NewWorld Dictionary of the American Language, SecondCollege Edition. New York: Prentice Hall, 1986, p. 1475.

15 The Art of War by Sun Tzu and On War by Carl vonClausewitz are widely regarded as classic theoreticalworks on war. Other well known theorists of warinclude Niccolo Machiavelli (The Art of War), BaronAntoine-Henri Jomini (The Art of War), Mao Tse-tung(Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung), andAlfred Thayer Mahan (The Influence of Sea PowerUpon History).

Notes

16 According to the DoD’s Joint Operations Concepts(JOpsC) document approved by the Secretary ofDefense in November 2003, “Information Superiorityis an imbalance in one’s favor in the informationdomain with respect to an adversary. The power ofsuperiority in the information domain mandates thatthe United States fight for it as a first priority evenbefore hostilities begin.” See JOpsC, p. 17. For an in-depth, scholarly examination of the term “informationsuperiority,” how information superiority can beachieved, and whether it can be measured by assess-ing the performance of C4ISR systems during militaryoperations, see Walter P. Fairbanks, InformationSuperiority: What Is It? How to Achieve It? Cambridge,Massachusetts: Center for Information PolicyResearch, Harvard University, June 1999.

17 Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: ClassicalStrategic Thought (3rd revised and expanded edition).London: Frank Cass, 2001, pp. xx-xxiii. For a recentcritique of “the new American way of war” andemerging NCW theory, see pp. 12-18 of LieutenantColonel Antulio J. Echevarria II, U.S. Army. Toward AnAmerican Way of War. Carlisle Barracks,Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, Army WarCollege, March 2004. LTC Echevarria describes theunderlying concepts of the current American way ofwar as “a polyglot of information-centric theoriessuch as network-centric warfare, rapid decisive oper-ations, and shock and awe.” These concepts focus“on ‘taking down’ an opponent quickly rather thanfinding ways to apply military force in the pursuit ofbroader political aims. Moreover, the characteristicsof the U.S. style of warfare—speed, jointness, knowl-edge, and precision—are better suited for strikeoperations than for translating such operations intostrategic success. “

18 Michael Evans, “From Kadesh to Kandahar:Military Theory and the Future of War,” The Naval WarCollege Review, Summer 2003, Vol. LVI, No. 3, article 6.

19 “Impact of the Network on Operation IraqiFreedom,” a special presentation by General TommyFranks, USA (Ret.) at the Network-Centric Warfare2004 conference on 22 January 2004,Washington, DC.

20 Office of Force Transformation, OSD, NetworkCentric Operations Conceptual Framework, Version1.0, November 2003, pp. 10-11. See also NetworkCentric Operations Conceptual Framework, Version2.0 (Draft), June 2004, pp. 24-25.

21 John J. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare OffersWarfighting Advantage,” Signal, May 2003, p. 58-59.

22 Ibid., pp. 59-60.

23 Captain Dane Acord, Commander, B Company,2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry, 2nd Brigade Combat Team,4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), DCX-1. (Theacronym, FBCB2 refers to the Army’s Force XXI BattleCommand Brigade and Below system.)

24 The Joint Operations Concepts is “an overarchingdefinition of how the future Joint Force will operateacross the entire range of military operations. It is theunifying framework for developing subordinate jointoperating concepts, joint functional concepts,enabling concepts, and integrated capabilities.”Department of Defense, Joint Operations Concepts,Washington, DC, November 2003, p. 5.

25 Ibid., pp. 15-18.

26 Department of Defense, Transformation PlanningGuidance, Washington, DC, April 2003, p. 15.

27 Department of Defense. Major Combat OperationsJoint Operating Concept, Version 1.10. Washington,DC, 8 June 2004, pp. 12, 14-15.

28 “Impact of the Network on Operation IraqiFreedom,” keynote address by General Tommy Franks,USA (Ret.) at the Network-Centric Warfare 2004 con-ference on 22 January 2004, Washington, DC.


74The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare

29 Robert K. Ackerman, “Iraq War OperationsValidate Hotly Debated Theories,” Signal, July 2003,p. 31-34.

30 Remarks by Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K.Cebrowski, Director, OFT at the Network-CentricWarfare 2004 conference on 22 January 2004,Washington, DC.

31 Remarks by Vice Admiral (Ret.) Arthur K.Cebrowski, Director, OFT, at the Defense WritersGroup, 23 April 2003.

32 Office of Force Transformation, OSD, NetworkCentric Operations Conceptual Framework, Version 2.0(Draft), June 2004, p. 2. See also Network CentricOperations Conceptual Framework, Version 1.0,November 2003.

33 Ibid. p. 4.

34 Ibid. pp. 78-80. See also Director, Office of ForceTransformation, “Network Centric Operations CaseStudy: The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (Draft.)”May 2004.

35 Ibid. pp. 76-77. See also Director, OFT, “NetworkCentric Operations Case Study: US/UK CoalitionCombat Operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom(Draft).” June 2004.

36 Ibid. pp. 74-76. See also Director. OFT, “NetworkCentric Operations Case Study: Air-to-Ground” (Draft).Vienna, VA, June 2004.

37 Ibid. pp. 83-88. See also Director, OFT, “NetworkCentric Operations Case Study: Naval Special WarfareGroup One (NSWG-1), Draft.” June 2004.

38 “Impact of the Network on Operation IraqiFreedom,” a special presentation by General TommyFranks, USA (Ret.) at the Network-Centric Warfare 2004conference on 22 January 2004, Washington, DC.

39 “Situational Awareness in OIF via FBCB2 – BlueForce Tracking: A Preview of Future Battle Command,” abriefing by Colonel Nick Justice, USA and Colonel CurtisMcCoy, USA at the Network-Centric Warfare 2004conference on 22 January 2004, Washington, DC.

40 “Net-Centric is an approach to exploitation ofadvancing technology that moves from an approachbased on applications standards to one based ondata standards—that is, providing users the abilityto access applications and services that make senseto them through a Web-enabled space, while simul-taneously moving toward a Web-enabled user com-munity in which each members can provide andaccess data.” “About Net-Centricity” page on theHorizontal Fusion website: http://www.horizontalfu-sion.dod.mil/vision.

41 U.S. Air Force, The Air Force Transformation FlightPlan, Washington, DC, November 2003, p. B-4.

42 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint TransformationRoadmap, 21 January 2004, p. 10.

43 Ibid., pp. 10-11.

44 Ibid., p. 12.

45 Ibid.

46 The 2003 Service Transformation Roadmaps andthe Joint Transformation Roadmap prepared by USJF-COM were submitted to the Director of ForceTransformation in the fall of 2003 and forwarded tothe Secretary of Defense in early 2004. (SubsequentRoadmaps will be approved by the ServiceSecretaries.) The 2004 Service and Joint Transforma-tion Roadmaps were submitted to the Director ofForce Transformation in July 2004, but have not yetbeen reviewed by the Secretary of Defense.


47 U.S. Army, 2003 United States ArmyTransformation Roadmap, Washington, DC, November2003, pp. 1-5, 1-6. The 2004 Army TransformationRoadmap (ATR) “updates the 2003 ATR and describesthe execution of Army transformation strategy in thecontext of evolving security challenges, continuinghigh demand for operational forces, and lessonslearned from recent operations.” See 2004 ATR, 4August 2004, p. ii.

48 U.S. Army, 2004 ATR, 4 August 2004, p. 56.

49 Department of Defense, Joint Operations Concepts,Washington, DC, November 2003, pp. 15-18.

50 2003 United States Army TransformationRoadmap, p. 1-7.

51 Ibid. pp. 1-12, 1-13. The 2004 ATR states that“the Future Force is founded on six main operationalthemes,” one of which is “networked-enabled BattleCommand.” See 2004 ATR, 4 August 2004, p. 55.

52 Ibid., p. B-3.

53 Emily Hsu, “Division Expects ‘Quantum Leap’ inCommunications Technologies in Iraq,” Inside theArmy, 23 August 2004.

54 Department of the Navy, Naval TransformationRoadmap 2003: Assured Access & Power Projection… From the Sea, Washington, DC, April 2004, p. 2.For an updated discussion of the Joint Seabasingconcept, see Chapter II, “Transformational Concepts,”of the Naval Transformation Roadmap 2004 (Draft),Washington, DC, July 2004, pp. 6-8.

55 Ibid. pp. 3-4, 63-64. For an updated discussion ofthe FORCEnet Naval Capability Pillar (NCP), see pp.68-85 of the Naval Transformation Roadmap 2004(Draft), Washington, DC, July 2004, pp. 6-8.

56 U.S. Air Force, The Air Force Transformation FlightPlan, Washington, DC, November 2003, pp. 17-18, 45.

57 The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan2004, Washington, DC, July 2004, p. ES-6. See alsoThe Air Force Transformation Flight Plan, Washington,DC, November 2003, p. 45.

58 Ibid, p. 6. See also The Air Force TransformationFlight Plan, Washington, DC, November 2003, p. 6.

59 Ibid.

60 The Air Force Transformation Flight Plan,Washington, DC, November 2003, p. B-6.

61 Ibid., p. B-7.

62 NATO, “Signing Ceremony to Initiate a Study onNATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC), NATO HQ,Brussels, 13 November 2003,” NATO Press Release(2003) 135, 12 November 2003.

63 Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J.Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin andFuture,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. Annapolis,Maryland: January 1998.

64 Ibid. By taking advantage of the capabilities of theGlobal Network Initiative (GNI) he had developed andimplemented while commanding the Seventh Fleet,Admiral Clemins and his subordinates reduced theirplanning timelines from days to hours. This “order ofmagnitude change” suggested to Clemins and otherswho had witnessed it that “something very fundamen-tal” was happening.

65 Department of the Navy, Naval TransformationRoadmap 2003: Assured Access & Power Projection… From the Sea, Washington, DC, April 2004.


Director, Force Transformation, Office of the Secretary of Defense,1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1000

www.oft.osd.mil

Date of Publication: January 5, 2005

Cleared for public release by Department of Defense Office of Freedom of Information and Security Review, 05-S-0235

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