USING ROLE THEORY TO ANALYZE THE LINK BETWEEN EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE BY STATES
By John M. Eyre
An Independent Study Thesis Submitted to the Department of Political Science
At The College of Wooster March, 2015
in partial fulfillment of the requirements of I.S. Thesis
Advisor: Dr. Jeffrey S. Lantis
Second Reader: Dr. Kevin P. Marsh
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Acknowledgements
To my parents, for allowing me to attend The College of Wooster, and for their never-ending support that they have shown me in a countless number of ways through the years.
To my Wooster friends, who from day one have given me a collection of lifelong memories that I will cherish for the rest of my life.
To my friends and colleagues from my semester in Washington, D.C. who helped shape my off-campus study opportunity into the incredible learning experience it turned out to be. Specifically, I would like to give thanks to my professor from American University, Dr. Christian Maisch. His efforts to engage our Foreign Policy class of 25 students from all over the world in the course material and field trips to embassies and think tanks were endless and always thoughtfully planned. It was his class, all the friends I met from all corners of the world, as well as the overall experience from my time in D.C., which provided the inspiration for this thesis.
To Professor Matthew Krain, my Junior Independent Study advisor and professor, who helped me to start thinking critically about my project and the I.S. process overall.
To Professor Jeffrey Lantis, my Senior Independent Study advisor, whom I offer a sincere and heartfelt expression of gratitude. Dr. Lantis always encouraged me to think big picture with my thesis. His consistent posing of questions at our meetings and determination to provide high quality edits always helped me to not only think and reason judiciously, but to also very much engage with all parts of my project. Without his unceasing support and guidance, this thesis surely would not be the piece of writing it came to be. For that, I am forever appreciative.
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Table of Contents
Introduction…………………………………………………………………….………..1
Chapter One: Literature Review and Theory…………………………………………4
Themes in Role Theory
Individual versus Collective…………………………………...………….5
Material versus Ideational………………………………………….……16
Continuity versus Change………………………………………….…….22
Chapter Two: Research Design and Methodology…………………………………...28
Independent Variable: Level of Exceptionalism in National Role Conception…30
Dependent Variable: Level of Aggressiveness in Foreign Policy Behavior…….36
Methodological Approach…………………………..…………………………...38
Chapter Three: The United States and India in Syria……………………………….43
Background………………………………………………………………………43
Independent Variable: United States………………….…………………………47
Dependent Variable: United States………………….......………………………56
Analysis: United States………………………………………………………….59
Independent Variable: India……………………………………………………..60
Dependent Variable: India……………………….………………………………65
Analysis: India………………………………….………………………………..67
Chapter Four: Russia in Crimea………………………………………..…………….70
Background……………………………………………………...………………70
Independent Variable…………………………………………...……………….74
Dependent Variable…………………………….……………..…………………81
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Analysis………………………………………………………………………..83
Chapter Five: The United Kingdom in the Falkland Islands……………………..86
Background……………………………………………………………………86
Independent Variable………………………………………………………….90
Dependent Variable……………………………………………………………96
Analysis………………………………………………………………………..98
Chapter Six: Analysis and Conclusion………………………….………….………100
Case Study Analysis………………………………..........................................100
National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Behavior...………….101
Aggressiveness in Foreign Policy..........................................................104
Conclusion…………………………………………………………….………106
Limitations and Ideas for Further Research…………………………………..110
Bibliography…………………………………………….…………………………...114
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List of Figures
Figure 1: Arrow Diagram……………………………………………….….…….29
Figure 2: Coding Scheme for Content Analysis……………….………….………34
Figure 3: Predictive Chart between Independent and Dependent Variables….…40
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Introduction
This Independent Study thesis examines the degree to which the sociological and
political phenomenon of exceptionalism plays a role in affecting the foreign policy
behavior of a state. Specifically, this project will analyze how levels of exceptionalism
exhibited by the leadership of a state may create the propensity for conflict among states.
In some cases, states may even seek exemptions from ordinary rules and norms that
dictate international relations and the greater international system.1 An example of a state
exhibiting an exceptionalist type of foreign policy is when it acts upon a perceived
responsibility to liberate other states suffering from some sort of outside conflict inflicted
upon by an aggressor state. For example, in contestation over sovereignty of the Falkland
Islands, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom David Cameron and British leadership
acted on its perceived responsibility to protect the Islands and its inhabitants from
Argentine influence. In working to fulfill their responsibilities to the international system,
states that claim to be exceptional act as if they were free from external rules and norms.2
This is especially apparent in today’s international climate, as global superpower states
like the United States have been addressing foreign challenges in Syria, while Russia has
engaged itself with matters of international concern in Crimea.
Social scientists have developed role theory and national role conceptions as a
means to study exceptionalism. The exceptionalism literature points to the idea that this
type of foreign policy contains themes of states embracing a mission to liberate other
countries from evil. This is the justification for exceptional states not following
international rules or norms that establish relations among ordinary states, or states that
do not claim to be exceptional. Exceptional states tend to see the world as a hostile place
2
with threats existing everywhere, while also acting according to a special international
role derived from their self-proclaimed uniqueness. Role theory is a general science that
studies both behaviors that are relevant to persons within a particular context and the
processes by which such behaviors are produced, explained, or affected.3 Specifically,
this project will utilize role theory by focusing on national role conceptions. According to
K.J. Holsti, national role conceptions are decision-makers’ personal definitions by which
their state comes to appropriate orientations, decisions, commitments, rules, and actions
in presenting an image towards the international community. These conceptions are the
image of the ‘appropriate’ orientations or functions of a state toward the external,
international environment.
The focus of this Independent Study project will be to determine whether or not
the phenomenon of exceptionalism demonstrates any generalizable impact on the foreign
policy behavior of state leadership. The independent variable will be the level of
exceptionalism in a state’s expression of its national role conceptions, while the
dependent variable will be the level of aggressiveness in foreign policy behavior, as
measured by the intensity of militarized foreign involvement. My hypothesis will be as
follows: If a state displays an exceptional national role conception, it is likely to adopt an
aggressive foreign policy behavior.
This project will implement a structured focus comparative case study using
content analysis as the appropriate methodology. The case studies include the eventual
decision of the United States to militarily intervene in the Syrian Civil War in 2013-2014,
India’s decision not to intervene in the 2013 Syrian Civil War, the Russian Federation’s
2014 annexation of Crimea, and the United Kingdom’s decision in late 2013 to uphold its
3
commitment to the Falkland Islands in contestation over sovereignty with Argentina and
engage in military exercises on the Islands in early 2014.
This Independent Study will proceed as follows: Chapter One will build a
foundation for the project by discussing and summarizing the review of relevant literature
and major works, theory, and empirical research that address this topic; an explanation of
how the study compares to current knowledge of the topic will also be provided. Chapter
Two will detail the Research Design and Methodology component of this Independent
Study project. Furthermore, a precise explanation of the specific theory that will be used
in this research and the definition of the concepts that concern the variables will be
offered, concluding with a clear hypothesis. Chapter Three through Five will examine the
case studies, including the actions of the leadership of four great powers. Chapter Six will
offer an analysis of the case study results and conclude with a discussion of the
implications of the research findings in connection to the existing literature, as well as
potential avenues for further research.
K.J. Holsti, “Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy: Is it Exceptional?” European Journal of International Relations, 17, 3 (November 2010), p. 381.
2 Holsti, “Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy: Is it Exceptional?” p. 384.
3 Biddle, Bruce J, Role Theory: Expectations, Identities, and Behaviors (New York City: Academic Press, Inc., 1979), p. 4.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review and Theory
This chapter surveys the relevance of role theory as a theoretical foundation for
the investigation of links between exceptionalism and foreign policy. In his work,
“National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” K.J. Holsti first lays out the
political science concept of a role. Role refers to the coherent collection of behavioral
norms that apply to all persons who interact together and occupy the same position within
a particular environment. As such, relevant decision-makers are aware of the norms
associated with the role, and knowingly adapt their behavior to such norms.1 Holsti
argues that while role, or role performance, makes up the behavior and actions of a
decision-maker, role prescriptions are the norms attached and engrained to a particular
position through different cultures, societies, institutions, or other groups.2 Such a
description of role has thus far addressed the collective or group sense of role, yet there is
an individual dimension of role and role conception to consider as well. Holsti, among
other theorists, contend that role conceptions are a singular decision-makers’ personal
conception of his or her position, functions, and relevant behavior. In this context, role
conceptions also derive from the decision-makers’ interests, goals, attitudes, values, and
personality needs.3
Holsti draws on role theory and foreign policy analysis in an attempt to further
explain roles. He defines national role performance as the set of decisions, attitudes,
responses, functions, and commitments a state has towards other states.4 Consistent with
national role performance are national role conceptions, which include a decision-
makers’ personal definitions of the decisions, commitments, rules, norms, and actions
appropriate to their state. National role conceptions also outline relevant functions the
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state should be performing on a regular basis within the international system.4 When
considering the utility of role theory in foreign policy analysis, the debate of the overall
scholarship on role theory in general is captured through a broader collection of themes.
These themes address the ways in which decision-makers come to identify with the
national role conceptions their state expresses, including individual versus collective,
material versus ideational, and continuity versus change.
Individual versus Collective
Often times decision-makers come to identify certain national role conceptions for
their state, either by means of an individual decision-maker ascertaining such role
conceptions appropriate for its state, or a state expressing certain national role
conceptions as demanded by the international, or collective, system. This is what
produces the individual versus collective theme; a majority of the literature and
scholarship on role theory and national role conceptions falls under the realm of such a
theme.
Relevance of National Role Conceptions
Holsti outlines an extensive list of contributors to the sources of decision-makers’
national role conceptions, including location, capabilities, and technical resources of the
state. For example, Holsti explains different national role conceptions, such as Sweden as
a mediator or Burma as an isolate, by making an additional reference to the internal
contributors of national role conceptions, such as national values and ideology, public
opinion ‘mood’, the personality and political needs of the decision-maker, mass
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movements, and socio-economic needs and demands expressed by political parties or
interest groups.4 National roles may direct decision-makers to either involve their state in
the international community through a certain function or commitment, or remain
completely uninvolved. Furthermore, Holsti points out an assortment of national roles
drawn from a collection of international relations literature as examples of national role
conceptions. Roles such as revolutionary leader-imperialist, bloc leader, and balancer
imply states that adopt these roles offer the greatest degree of international involvement
and presence, while roles such as isolate and protectee imply states that offer the greatest
degree of passivity in its foreign policy behavior.5 Holsti offers role theory as a general
framework for the description of role and its impact on foreign policy analysis through
role conceptions and national role performance.
The presence and importance of rhetoric also contributes to the relevance of role
theory in foreign policy analysis. Drawing upon Stephen G. Walker’s article “The
Correspondence between Foreign Policy Rhetoric and Behavior: Insights from Role
Theory and Exchange Theory,” the use of role theory is appropriate for determining
patterns of rhetoric and subsequent behavior at the national level.6 Walker describes four
distinctive propositions derived from role theory that describe foreign policy. Such
propositions include the tendency for there to be a congruent relationship between role
conception (foreign policy rhetoric) and role enactment (foreign policy behavior) for
third nations (nations that are not U.S. or USSR) and superpowers in their bilateral
relationships, and/or the tendency for third nations to avoid potential role conflict by
instituting foreign policy behavior towards both superpowers that emphasize balance and
congruence. Additionally, the effects of the expectations created by role conception
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(rhetoric) or cues that derive from role enactment (behavior) create potential deviations
from the first two propositions. Lastly, nations that have a balanced connection between
role conception and enactment have the tendency to show congruent relationships
between such foreign policy traits.7 Used in this sense, congruence relates to the matching
of a state’s rhetoric to its associated behavior.
While Walker concludes that a minor lack of correspondence between the role
conceptions and role enactments for the group of states taken under analysis exists, he
points out that differing expectations, cues, and the state’s role conceptions all influence
the selection of a particular role. Expectations and cues can be confusing and imperfect,
and states can even behave in ways that have no correlation with its own known
collection of role conceptions.8 The potential for uncertainty between the role conceptions
and subsequent role enactment can account for the idea that a state needs reinforcement
through a direct stimulus in the external environment, the underpinnings of exchange
theory.
In addition, Walker articulates an extension of role theory known as exchange
theory. Exchange theory describes the act of giving or taking one thing while expecting
another in return. Two relevant propositions in exchange theory include, first, the idea
that if an actor’s decision does not receive an expected reward or receives unexpected
punishment, aggressive behavior becomes more likely. This is because an actor chooses a
specific action under the very assumption that he will be rewarded for pursuing such a
course of action, and if such rewards are not granted or punishment is incurred, it is
understandable to anticipate aggressive behavior as a response. Second, if an actor’s
action receives an expected reward, or does not receive an expected punishment, such
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actor is more likely to perform approving behavior.9 The justification for this is similar to
that of the previously mentioned first proposition; there is the reciprocal nature with the
idea that an actor will express approving and less aggressive behavior because he
anticipated the result of either being rewarded or not punished as a result of choosing to
make the decision in the first place.
Dimensions of Role Enactment
There are a few key dimensions of an individual decision-maker’s role enactment
that explain how well such an individual or state performs a role once selected.
According to scholars, such dimensions include the number of roles, the effort expended
upon a certain role, and the time spent in one role compared to other potential roles.10
While the traditional view of the international system is that states only play a single role
within such a system, critics argue that states will often identify with and express
multiple roles. Furthermore, it has been argued that there is significant overlap in the
various roles attributed to states of superpower status. For example, between 1946 and
1975, both the U.S. and USSR expressed self-identified national role conceptions relating
to promotion of universal values, regional protection, liberation support, development,
and promotion of personal values. While these role conceptions varied in their degree of
aggressiveness and specificity, the U.S. also expressed a mediator role while the USSR
conveyed a role pertaining to the protection of its own state.11
At times, then, a state may find itself concurrently in two or more foreign policy
situations requiring contradictory role enactments. This is a problem known as inter-role
conflict. Scholars argue that foreign policy decision-makers experience a large amount of
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strain or stress as a direct result of conflicting national role expectations placed upon
them. These conflicting role expectations derive from the state’s location in private social
systems, governmental institutions, domestic society, and interactions among appropriate
parties within the decision-making unit. In order for decision-makers to come to a
conclusion about which role will be enacted in the case of interrole conflict, critics
suggest that decision-makers create what are known as role scenarios. Role scenarios are
action scripts that help the decision-maker determine which role to enact, of the many
that conflict. Role scenarios can become elaborate, and have the tendency to adapt and
change over time as well.
A second dimension of role enactment includes the amount of effort to which a
state involves itself in a particular role. This dimension can range from the expending of
no effort and complete noninvolvement in a role, to a level of complete involvement
where a tremendous amount of effort is expended in the role. Holsti offers an example of
an isolate role, and a state’s complete noninvolvement and lack of effort expenditure
likely corresponds with Holsti’s isolate role. This range of involvement also can
implicate a state’s identity. If a state engages in complete involvement, the role is the
state’s identity. Conversely, if a state engages in complete noninvolvement, the role does
not implicate the state’s identity in any way.12
A third dimension of role enactment offered by scholars involves the amount of
time the decision-maker spends expressing one role relative to another. This is a matter of
determining whether such a role has been ascribed or achieved. Ascribed roles are roles
that the state determines and chooses for itself, while achieved roles are placed upon, or
earned, by a state. Critics argue that new or emerging states in their early stages of
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development tend to express more ascribed roles over achieved roles. Additionally,
existing and more well established states of the international system often times express
multiple achieved roles on top of their particular ascribed roles.13
Key Variables in the Study of Roles
Drawing upon work from scholars like Biddle and Holsti, additional key variables
in the study of roles include role expectations, role demands and location, and the effects
of audience and cues. While role expectations are the norms and beliefs that concern a
decision-maker’s role performance, or behavior, such a decision-maker must take into
consideration the role behaviors of other occupants within the decision-making unit. In
turn, this makes a role conceptually interbehavioral. These role expectations may vary
depending on if the decision-maker holds such beliefs, coming to be known as role
conceptions, or national role conceptions.14
Furthermore, role expectations can vary on other dimensions, including their
degree of generality or specificity, scope or extensiveness, clarity or uncertainty, and if
the positions of the role are formal or informal. As role expectations become unclear,
behavior tends to become less predictable, creating a propensity for conflict. Clarity of a
role expectation usually varies by how much information is available to a decision-maker
regarding knowledge of the role expectation itself.
Role demands are another key variable in the study of roles. If a state is demanded
to take up a role, this places constraints on the choice of role that a state may express in a
certain situation. For example, critics argue that role demands account for Ukraine’s
choice to give up nuclear weapons, as role demands associated with the great power role
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were present. Ukraine did not believe it could enact the great power role at the end of the
Cold War.15
Additional variables that affect role enactment include audience and role location.
The audience is usually comprised of a member who observes the interaction process
between the role performer, or decision-maker, and the individual in a complementary
role to the performer. In the article “Role Theory and Foreign Policy,” Cameron Thies
and other scholars argue the audience serves to establish consensual reality for the role,
while also providing different cues to guide the decision-maker’s role enactment, or
behavior. The audience also engages in social reinforcement of the role through the
positive or negative sanctions related to the role enactment, alongside contributing to the
maintenance of a role behavior over time. This is usually due to a continual observance or
acceptance of the role enactment by the state. Furthermore, critics argue role location
affects role enactment in the way that a decision-maker must select and enact a role that
is appropriate to the situation at hand. Role location is a cognitive process whereby
decision-makers appropriately locate themselves within the international social structure.
Role location is often reinforced through socialization of states, where states within the
international system learn and enact their appropriate roles based upon the cues and
demands placed upon them by the audience of member states.16
Individual Motivation
Many times, national role conceptions are associated with a particular
motivational orientation. As is the case with interpersonal relationships, decision makers
can express role conceptions that may be individualistic, cooperative, competitive, or
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mixed (cooperative-competitive). One example of the individualistic role conception is
the isolate, where the decision-maker of such a state may recognize the severe domestic
and internal problems that place limitations on the state’s ability to interact
internationally, thus the decision is made to expend little to no resources within the global
arena. Often times though, states express national roles that have an international
orientation over an individualistic or domestic orientation, whereby they are motivated
through either competitive or cooperative means. Drawing upon the foundational work of
K.J. Holsti, scholar Naomi Bailin Wish provides a few examples of cooperative and
competitive roles. Cooperative roles include the faithful ally, mediator-integrator, and the
regional subsystem collaborator, while competitive roles include the anti-imperialist
agent, the bastion of the revolution-liberator, and the anti-Communist agent roles.
Furthermore, states may express a cooperative-competitive role if the decision-makers of
such states encourage their states to cooperate with one or more states in order to
compete with others. State functions that involve blocs are often relevant examples of the
cooperative-competitive role, especially if the purpose is for the cooperative bloc to
engage in the ensuing of competition with an entirely different bloc.17
Environment Perceptions and Subsequent Roles
Because national role conceptions play such an important part in determining the
foreign policies a decision-maker proposes, it is important to grasp exactly how
cognitions and perceptions inform and influence role conceptions, and ultimately, the
foreign policy behavior of a state. According to political scientist Marijke Breuning, it is
the decision-maker’s views of their state’s role and position in the international
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environment that end up forming important cues to motivations and objections that
ultimately dictate the policies pursued.18 Furthermore, it is the decision-maker’s
perceptions of the international environment that matter in determining the opportunities
and constraints relevant to foreign policy behavior. As a decision-maker’s perceptions of
the international environment and their role in such an environment are ‘two sides of the
same coin,’ it is these perceptions of the international environment that define a state’s
role within the international environment. The way in which the international
environment is structured includes not only constraints perceived by decision-makers, but
also the perceptions of positive and negative possibilities offered by the international
environment for a decision-maker’s policy choices.
Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Roles
An alternative approach to determining roles and role conceptions put forth by
scholars is the interpretive approach. In this method, structural patterns do not directly
determine foreign policy behavior. Rather, this line of thought stresses the relevance and
importance of human activity, or agency, over structure of the international system.
Individual decision-makers under this approach are agents that have the ability to modify
different inherited norms and languages following their own reasoning.19 As agency
occurs against a certain historical foundation that initially influences it, the actions and
practices carried out by decision-makers are explained while referring to the influence
and presence of traditions and dilemmas. The presence of traditions plays an important
function in determining the way in which decision-makers ascertain the role conceptions
for their state, whether that be through the influence that a certain tradition of a state
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provides as the basis for a role conception, or by means of particular historical
international traditions influencing a state’s selection of its role conceptions. On the other
hand, the presence of dilemmas provide an opportunity for decision-makers to respond
and remedy such an instance either through an individually-ascertained national role
conception, or through a collective role conception assigned to that state by the
international system.
Traditions and Dilemmas
Leslie Wehner and Cameron Thies are two scholars who show that traditions are
the starting point for human activity, through either the historical inheritance or patterns
that determine the way in which individual decision-makers act and reason. A decision-
maker receives a collection of understandings, or traditions, but such traditions do not
necessarily precisely determine the policy behavior of the decision-maker. Rather, it is
argued that traditions are a set of influences that have the ability to be changed by means
of individual decision-makers exerting the agency to do so.19 Individuals are at the very
core of traditions, as it is the mutual interaction between such agents that determine how
patterns and structures emerge. Based upon their existing beliefs and traditions, such
actors use their agency to develop national role conceptions. Scholars also consider the
presence of dilemmas to be another relevant factor in determining the role conceptions
and subsequent actions and practices of decision-makers. Dilemmas have the potential to
promote dissonance and role inconsistency. Also, decision-makers will use creativity, or
agency, to change the role currently being enacted in order to tackle the dilemma.
Traditions may provide the plan for a decision-maker to take when deciding on how to
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react and respond to an existing dilemma. Critics argue that roles are expected to change
or adjust as a dilemma is faced, according to traditions of foreign policymaking.20
Traditions and dilemmas play an important role in exploring the differing voices of a
decision-maker and ultimately determining the most appropriate role conception and role
for such a state to exert within the international system.
Elites and National Role Conceptions
It is most common for scholars of role theory to study and investigate the national
role conceptions held by foreign policy elites. The notion of national role conceptions
held by elites is related to the individual versus collective debate in the sense that at
times, individual elites, or decision-makers, will often express a national role conception
on behalf of their state according to what they personally perceive to be most appropriate.
These scholars have indicated two accounts as to why the national role conceptions of
foreign policy elites can stand on behalf of the entire state. The first explanation is that
role conceptions have a social origin to them, and therefore can be shared among all
individuals within a state. This explanation is seemingly logical, as sources of roles
include a nation’s history, culture, and social characteristics, among other features as
well. Additionally, role theory scholars contend that since roles are intersubjective, they
are shared by society at large. Secondly, national role conceptions held by elites serve as
an indication of a state’s national role conceptions because the foreign policy elites are
the individuals who ultimately make policy decisions regarding how the state will behave
in the international system. On top of this, elites supposedly will behave in accordance
with their ideas as to what would be acceptable to the people of their state. While public
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opinion or the society at large may disagree with the national role conceptions promoted
by elites, this variable of public opinion and the masses in general has not been
considered in a serious manner.21
Material versus Ideational
The focus of the second theme explains the way in which decision-makers express
certain national role conceptions according to either the material attributes their state
possesses, or in conjunction with the ideational, or more perceived, national role
conceptions and roles that decision-makers claim for their state. These material and
ideational origins of national role conceptions bridge over to explain a state’s perceptions
about what its role(s) should be. This theme can be labeled as material versus ideational.
Characteristics in Variation of Perceived National Role Conceptions
A number of scholars argue an important foundation of role theory is the impact
of a state’s national attributes on national role conceptions. This is relevant to the
material versus ideational debate because a state’s national attributes serve as the material
ways in which decision-makers come to express certain national role conceptions for
their state. In her piece, “National Attributes as Sources of National Role Conceptions: A
Capability-Motivation Model,” Naomi Bailin Wish expands upon Walker by analyzing
the variance of the national role conceptions a state exhibits. As argued by Wish, the
national attributes of a state correspond highly with such a state’s national role
conceptions and foreign policy behavior.22 Wish’s national attribute-national role
conception model compares to a capability-motivation model in that a state’s foreign
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policy behavior is largely a result of its national attributes or capabilities, and that its
decision-makers’ national motivations are conveyed as the state’s national role
conceptions.23 With her national attribute-national role conception model, Wish follows
up by claiming that since decision-makers from larger and more capable states often have
more resources at their disposal than those of smaller states, such decision-makers from
the larger states will perceive larger domains of national influence and roles that involve
more competitive rather than cooperative interests, along with the expression of roles that
are concerned with security and territory. Furthermore, critics argue that the decision-
makers from larger states perceive themselves as wielding a greater potential for
international influence. Therefore, such states will perceive national roles that heighten
the propensity for difference of policy and conflict with other nations. As these national
roles involve competition, these states will not convey a desire to change the course of
the international system. Rather, such states often express a more territorial or policeman
of the world role in order for it to maintain its own security as well as the status quo of
the international system.24
The level of economic development of a state has been indicated in the literature
as another characteristic in the variation of national role conceptions and subsequent
foreign policy behavior. Economic development is related to the material vs. ideational
debate because the level of a state’s economic development serves as a singular indicator
of such a state’s material attributes. Drawing very similar parallels to roles adopted by
decision-makers from states that are larger populated, decision-makers from more
economically-developed states often perceive their state’s national role to incorporate
larger domains of international influence and perceive a greater number of national roles
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concerned with political/diplomatic/universal issues and the seeking of less international
system change. As the attributes of economically developed states and attributes of states
with greater size and capability seemingly overlap, decision-makers from states that
embody both types of attributes often will express a greater concern with demonstrating
dominance and spreading influence over a larger domain. Decision-makers from these
states will also resist and challenge the urge to change or reform the international system,
as its domestic living standards are built around the structure of the existing international
political and economic system that directly benefits its society.25
Furthermore, the literature on national attributes as sources of national role
conceptions also indicates the political orientation of a state as a contributor to variation
in a state’s foreign policy behavior. Decision-makers of states that are more open and
democratic will perceive a greater number of national roles that are concerned with
political, diplomatic, universal, and economic issues of the international system. Such
decision-makers also will perceive a lesser number of national roles that involve
competitive over cooperative interests and relations. Expression of national roles
concerning a cooperative orientation will ensue from states with an open and democratic
system because with industries like trade, financial investment, and tourism, these states
understand the influence of areas of the private sector in decreasing national role
expressions that exemplify conflict.26 Additionally, the open and democratic states that
have an influential private sector are encouraged to express national roles that embrace
less individualistic and competitive motivations, and more roles that express diplomatic
and economic issues. In the long run, expression of such roles ultimately satisfies a
state’s national interests of maintaining both its territorial and economic security. These
19
material factors that contribute to and make up the national attributes of a state are one
instance where decision-makers can derive certain national role conceptions for their
state.
Structural Development of National Role Conceptions
National role conceptions can be structurally developed in a number of ways.
Breuning argues that national role conceptions in general are developed in a very
structural manner, claiming that such conceptions are derived from multiple sources.
These sources include the sense of the state’s place within the international environment
and its relation to the state’s perception of the current international context and historical
context.27 As scholars have claimed that national role conceptions are “foreign policy
makers’ perceptions of their nations’ positions in the international system,” it is clear that
such scholars are endorsing a structural version of role theory.28 Additionally, drawing
from Waltz, it is argued that international politics can only be understood through some
sort of systems theory. Where the system is comprised of a structure and subsequent
interacting units, with structure defining the system, the structure of relations between
states determines the interactions between two or more states. According to Kenneth
Waltz, the international system is made up of both a structure and its interacting units,
with the structure defining the way in which the interacting units, or states, are ordered or
arranged. The focus of the role conception debate should be on structure, since structure
is the feature that defines the international system.29
According to Leslie Wehner and Cameron Thies, it is argued that structure is a
priority when it comes to shaping and determining a role for a state to select and enact.
20
Furthermore, the material capability of a state is important in determining the state’s
location within the interstate social structure, or international system. What is known as a
‘master role’ defines the most salient attribute of a state.30 It is in this way that roles are
incorporated and connected to the structure of the international system. Additionally,
scholars maintain the idea that while roles are advanced by structure, they are conversely
constrained by institutional settings. This is why both institutions and structures within
the international system shape foreign policy behavior. Scholars note that it is the
institutional settings within such structures that typically completely determine the
expectations of a state’s role behavior. Institutional settings are not always consistent
with role behavior however, as structures can be subject to potential changes by agents
within the international system.31 Since role theory is a departure from the traditional
sense of realism in the way that identities can be constructed through role conceptions, it
is important to take into consideration a state’s perception of its status within the
international system.
Status Perception
Another critical aspect of a national role conception is a state’s perception of
status in the international system. Status directly relates to power and influence.
Perception of status is directly relevant to the material versus ideational debate because as
opposed to the national attributes that were indicators of a state’s material derivations of
national role conceptions, a state can perceive its status in the international system as
either one rooted in materialism or idealism. While it is often the case that power and
influence directly relate to a state’s material claim of status by means of material national
21
attributes, states may also claim and perceive a higher status in the international system
according to a decision-maker’s personal beliefs, resulting in the reflection of expression
of certain national role conceptions. Critics have defined the status of a state to entail “a
location in the social structure defined by expectations for performance by an
incumbent…the status dimension is correlated with legitimate power and social
esteem.”32
In many cases, status is measured by a state’s domain of influence and the degree
to which the state wields influence. Domains of influence can range in size, most
commonly either domestic or global. A state with greater international status is more
influential in larger domains, as opposed to smaller domains. The international
community would perceive the roles expressed by leaders of western or Communist bloc
states, for example, to be more influential. This would consequently indicate these states
as possessing higher status within the international system. Naomi Bailin Wish offers an
external environment classification list, indicating the size or level of influence domain of
a state with which a certain role is associated. These domains and associated roles include
1) domestic, where a state only acts within its own internal affairs; 2) bilateral, where a
state interacts with another state that is not a superpower; 3) dominant bilateral, where a
state interacts with another state of superpower status; 4) subordinate, where a state
interacts with a particular geographic and non-organizational group within a particular
region (Eastern Europe, Latin America, etc.); 5) subordinate other, where a state interacts
with a non-global or intergovernmental organization such as NATO, SEATO, etc.; and 6)
global, where a state interacts with a superpower and its bloc, a global organization, or
the entire international system.33
22
Continuity versus Change
The last theme highlights the possibility of the degree to which some decision-
makers feel the structure of the international system, that pre-determines national role
conceptions for states to express, has the potential to be altered or changed according to a
particular decision-makers’ desires. This theme is known as continuity versus change.
System Change Motivation
Another variable that accounts for variation in foreign policy behavior is a
decision-maker’s desire or motivation for the amount of system change within the
international structure. System change motivation is relevant to the continuity vs. change
debate because different decision-makers may possess different desires to either change
or continue the current international system, according to the national role conceptions
expressed by such decision-makers. As a result, such role conceptions can motivate
decision-makers to take action either for or against system change. Decision-makers can
adopt national role conceptions that reflect their aspiration for an array of change, ranging
from maintenance of the status quo/no change, all the way to a complete overhaul of the
international system. Roles involving mediator or developer imply a decision-maker’s
desire for moderate change; protectee or isolate roles imply the desire for minimal
change or a maintenance of the status quo, and roles involving a desire for much change
imply an association with the bastion of the revolution-liberator role.34
National role conceptions also can be categorized according to an issue or
substantive problem area. These roles are interpersonal and classified by manner of
economic, political, military, and religious means. National roles often times fall under
23
one or more of these classifications. States can perform economic, political, and/or
military roles, while interpersonal religious roles of the decision-maker often times
translate to that state expressing a national role conception that concerns an ideological
and/or religious role. An example of this role type would be Holsti’s defender of the faith
role, where the decision-makers that embrace this role conception make foreign policy
decisions in defense of value systems (liberty and freedom, humanitarianism over
militarism, etc.) rather than specific territories.
Moreover, there exist national roles that have no correlation with economic,
political, military, or ideological values. Such roles solely tend to focus on the promotion
of universal values, such as the promoting or defending justice, peace, and/or racial
harmony (ex, defender of the faith). While it may seem that states express national role
conceptions that promote universal values in order to gain a positive public relations
standing, it is suggested by Holsti that such national role expressions are not related to
behavior in any way. Wish and other critics define and place these ideological, economic,
political, universal, and territorial values of national role conceptions into certain
categories as such: 1) territorial/defense, where a state maintains, defends, or expands its
own or its collaborator’s territorial integrity/security, or inhibits that of its competitor
states, 2) ideological, where a state defends/promotes/inhibits a certain value system or
way of life (ex. Communism, capitalism, democracy), 3) political/diplomatic, where a
state affects the positions or relationships between states (ex. a decision-maker
determines his state’s relationship with other states to be peacefully coexistent, or
nonalignment), 4) universal values, where a state promotes a certain situation of peace,
24
racial harmony, and/or justice, and 5) economic, where a state maintains and/or expands
upon its own or another’s industrial development or other economics resources.35
Impact of Domestic Politics in Contestation of Roles
As states determine which national role conceptions to express, another factor to
consider includes the effect of the states’ domestic politics. A state’s domestic political
agenda can serve to create variation in expression of national role conceptions, and this in
turn has the potential to affect the way in which a state can go about determining role
conceptions and subsequently the degree to which such a state feels it can alter or change
the existing international system that pre-determines roles. This, in turn, is relevant to the
continuity vs. change debate because a state’s current domestic political structure could
for example be in favor of encouraging a decision-maker to follow continuity of the
international system, while a different domestic political structure could rise to power in a
future administration that would be in favor of discouraging continuity and subsequently
encouraging change of the international system. The contestation of role conceptions and
roles can surface from conflict over policy between governing elites and political
opposition, within governing coalitions, and among various bureaucratic agencies.36
Differing incumbent governments and political opposition have the tendency to
instigate conflict over what such a state’s national role conceptions should be. Political
parties that hold a majority of seats in one house of government may come to spar with
opposition parties that may have control in a different house. Specifically, parliaments
allow for a wide range of viewpoints to be discussed, leading to the potential for
discourse and conflict to arise. Additionally, national role conceptions could derive from
25
party ideology and be further institutionalized within electoral platforms, serving to
concrete a state’s national role conceptions according to the ruling political party.
Role conception conflict that may surface in political parties has the potential to
also rise within the cabinet, the primary body of a government for making foreign policy
decisions. Coalition governments that have multiple parties present within the cabinet
share the decision-making authority on foreign policy, so disagreement over foreign
policy may be a result of differing views of national role conceptions.37 Party conflicts
within such governments relate to more general conflicts over expression of a certain
national role conception(s). Contention over expression of national role conceptions is
especially prevalent in the legislatures of parliamentary democracies, as national role
conceptions can often be enshrined in party platforms, whereas opposition parties use
whatever means necessary to ensure the party in power does not implement and express
its version of the state’s national role conception.38
The presence of bureaucratic agencies within a state also creates the potential for
a state to vacillate over its national role conceptions and ability to instill change from its
system-dictated role conception expressions. Such bureaucratic agencies have different
organizational missions and political/personal incentives to account for, but may also
have entirely different worldviews that elicit distinctive national role conceptions. As a
result, scholars have often lumped together the national role conceptions expressed by
bureaucratic agencies in accordance with the overall role expressed by the national
elites.39 Additionally, cabinet members that serve as heads of bureaucratic organizations
frequently adopt positions of national role conceptions commensurate with the particular
interests of their organization. As cabinet members all collaborate on agenda setting,
26
assuming a context of the “foreign policy security executive,” the different positions
taken by these cabinet members are likely to lead to the promotion of different competing
national role conceptions. As a result, it is most often the case that the primary decision-
maker, or single most powerful member of the government, imposes his will on the
cabinet to ultimately ensure that the predominant leader and decision-maker determines
the selection of a national role conception.40
In summary, there exists a sweeping collection of contending theoretical
perspectives when it comes to evaluating the utility of role theory in foreign policy
analysis. The various themes previously mentioned in this chapter serve as a means of
structure and reference for the ways in which national role conceptions are formed and
subsequent foreign policy behavior is acted upon. As initially argued by Holsti, the
national role performance of a state, or foreign policy behavior, is consistent with its
national role conceptions in the sense that the role conceptions are the groundwork for
expression of the national functions and commitments of a state.
1 K.J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 14, 3 (September 1970), p. 238.
2 Ibid, p. 239. 3 Ibid, p. 240. 4 Ibid, p. 245. 5 Ibid, p. 255. 6 Stephen G. Walker, “The Correspondence between Foreign Policy Rhetoric and Behavior: Insights from
Role Theory and Exchange Theory,” in Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, ed. Stephen G. Walker (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 81.
7 Ibid, p. 82. 8 Ibid, p. 84. 9 Ibid, p. 85. 10 Cameron G. Thies, “Role Theory and Foreign Policy,” International Studies Association Compendium
Project (May 2009), p. 4. 11 Ibid, p. 5.12 Ibid, p. 7. 13 Ibid, p. 8. 14 Ibid, p. 9. 15 Ibid, p. 10.16 Ibid, p. 11.
27
17 Naomi Bailin Wish, “Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions,” International Studies Quarterly 24, 4 (Dec. 1980), p. 538.
18 Marijke Breuning, “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Assistance Policy Behavior Toward a Cognitive Model,” (PhD dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1992), p. 20.
19 Wehner, Leslie E., and Cameron G. Thies, “Role Theory, Narratives, and Interpretation: The Domestic Contestation of Roles,” International Studies Review 16 (2014), p. 416.
20 Ibid, p. 417. 21 Cantir, Cristian, and Juliet Kaarbo, “Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflection on Role Theory
in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory,” Foreign Policy Analysis 8 (2012), p. 7. 22 Naomi Bailin Wish, “National Attributes as Sources of National Role Conceptions: A Capability-
Motivation Model,” in Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, ed. Stephen G. Walker (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987), p. 95.
23 Ibid, p. 96. 24 Ibid, p. 97. 25 Ibid, p. 98. 26 Ibid, p. 99. 27 Breuning, “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Assistance Policy Behavior Toward a Cognitive
Model,” p. 20. 28 Breuning, “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Assistance Policy Behavior Toward a Cognitive
Model,” p. 23. 29 Breuning, “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Assistance Policy Behavior Toward a Cognitive
Model,” p. 24. 30 Wehner and Thies, “Role Theory, Narratives, and Interpretation: The Domestic Contestation of Roles,” p.
414. 31 Wehner and Thies, “Role Theory, Narratives, and Interpretation: The Domestic Contestation of Roles,” p.
415.32 Wish, “Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions,” p. 536. 33 Wish, “Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions,” p. 537.34 Wish, “Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions,” p. 539. 35 Wish, “Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions,” p. 540. 36 Cantir and Kaarbo, “Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflection on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory,” p. 12.37 Ibid, p. 14. 38 Brummer, Klaus and Cameron Thies, “The Contested Selection of National Role Conceptions,” Foreign Policy Analysis 0 (2014), p. 539 Cantir and Kaarbo, “Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflection on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory,” p. 16. 40 Brummer and Thies, “The Contested Selection of National Role Conceptions,” p. 7.
28
Chapter 2: Research Design and Methodology
In the previous chapter, I reviewed the relevant literature on role theory and
national role conceptions. This chapter details my research design and methodology. I
provide my hypothesis and causal model alongside a description and justification of the
case studies and methodology used for this Independent Study.
It is critical to understand the importance that national role conceptions play in
providing a foundation for a state’s foreign policy behavior. KJ Holsti, who first argued
this position in the 1970s, asserts that the roles expressed by a state and its leadership are
correlated with the subsequent decisions, actions, and behaviors of a decision-maker,
eventually setting the foundation for much more in the sphere of role theory and foreign
policy analysis. Furthermore, these national role conceptions are the decision-makers’
personal definitions of the decisions, commitments, rules, norms, and actions deemed
appropriate to their state. As a result, national role conceptions are seen to have an effect
on the subsequent foreign policy behavior expression of a state.
As noted in Chapter 1, national role conceptions can be generated in a variety of
ways. National role conceptions are seen through the position of the decision-maker on
behalf of the state. Many times, predetermined characteristics make up such role
conceptions that the international system then assigns to states, as referenced by scholars
such as Breuning, Wish, and Thies. Moreover, material attributes that determine a state’s
status within the international system are one means by which national role conceptions
can surface. Take for example one of the most prominent material attributes, the level of
economic development of a state, and compare that with the likes of the United States or
Russia. These states have well-established and developed economies, and as a result, are
29
able to express more influence and clout within the international system. Often times
interstate disputes, especially militarized, can surface as states expressing such role
conceptions interact with other actors the international system. While a state may not
have a certain elite status within the system, it is still possible for a decision-maker to
perceive its state to have status, expressing a national role conception pursuant to such
thought. As argued by scholars like Wish and Breuning, certain states can express
national role conceptions according to the individual motivations of singular decision-
makers, or elites. While some national role conceptions may be expressed in a collective
sense, derived from the demands of the international system, it is often the decision-
maker’s individual definitions and conceptions of the role its state should play that are
most important. Each national role conception that is expressed by a state has a
predictive quality to it; essentially, political scientists and role theorists assume such
conceptions can work to explain a certain outcome of foreign policy behavior. I
hypothesize that if the leadership of a state displays an exceptional national role
conception, it is likely to adopt an aggressive foreign policy behavior.
Figure 1: Independent and Dependent Variable Arrow Diagram
30
Independent Variable: Level of Exceptionalism in National Role Conception
The indicators of certain national role conceptions whose characteristics overlap
with those of exceptionalism need to be considered in determining the independent
variable. Additionally, previous studies have not explicitly claimed that the expression of
certain national role conceptions will directly result in a specific foreign policy behavior.
Rather, the literature suggests that national role conceptions have a predictive ability in
working towards determining the foreign policy behavior of a state. As such, it is the
perceptions held by the decision-makers of states that ultimately determine the national
role conceptions. This in turn may impact the subsequent foreign policy behavior of the
leadership of such states.
Exceptionalism: Conceptualized
As previously noted in Chapter One, exceptionalism is a psychological
phenomenon that influences a type of foreign policy commensurate to the expression of
uniqueness. According to scholars like Holsti, an exceptionalist foreign policy is one that
includes characteristics of states claiming exemptions from the ordinary rules and norms
that dictate international relations and the greater international system as a whole.
Independent Variable Dependent Variable
Level of Exceptionalismin National Role Conceptions
Level of Aggressivenessin Foreign Policy
Indicators: Political Structure National Attributes Regional versus Unilateral Leadership
Indicators: Intensity of foreign military involvement Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs)
31
Furthermore, states exhibit exceptionalist foreign policy when they act upon a perceived
responsibility to liberate other states suffering from an outside aggressor state imposing
conflict. States with exceptionalist foreign policies often fulfill their self-perceived global
responsibilities to the world as if they were free from the external rules and norms that
govern the relations among the lesser states. Often times, exceptionalism is claimed
through means of moral and ideological foundations.
Embodiment of Exceptionalism through National Role Conceptions
There are a variety of factors that affect how and why states express certain
national role conceptions. One of the most influential characteristics that affect the
expression of national role conceptions of a state is the impact of a state’s national
attributes. Argued by Wish, the tangible and physical elements that inform a state’s level
of national attributes can give the decision-maker of such a state more authority within
the international system. As states that are larger and more materially capable typically
have more resources at their disposal than those of smaller states, decision-makers from
these larger states many times will perceive larger domains of international influence and
role conceptions that involve competitive over cooperative interests. As such perceptions
of strengthened international influence surface, these states will perceive national roles
that heighten the propensity for conflict and difference of policy with other states. As
Holsti argues, exceptionalist states tend to perceive global responsibilities involving the
liberation of other states through the prevention of globalized threats. It is important to
consider the idea that often times it is the state with a greater amount of national
attributes at its disposal that may often perceive a national role conception overlapping
with exceptionalism.
32
Holsti presents a collection of different national role conceptions, ranging from
roles that imply a greater amount of international foreign policy action, to roles that
imply a degree of lesser activity and more passivity. According to the characteristics that
make up exceptionalism, and in line with the reasoning of Holsti, I have identified several
individual national role conceptions that imply a dynamic amount of foreign policy
activity with undertones of exceptionalism. These national role conceptions include
regional leader, regional protector, active independent, liberation supporter, and
defender of the faith. I plan on using the characteristics that make up these national role
conceptions as the basis for my content analysis scheme. The following is a list of
explanations as to how each national role conception is defined.
Regional Leader
This national role conception emphasizes the themes of a state perceiving for
itself leadership in acting upon special specified duties or responsibilities in its relations
to other states. These other states exist within a particular region with which the state
expressing the regional leader national role conception identifies.1
Regional Protector
The themes associated with this national role conception somewhat overlap with
those of the regional leader role conception. The regional protector role conception
implies the special leadership responsibilities of a state on a particular regional and/or
issue-area basis. However, this national role conception emphasizes the function or duty
33
of such states to provide protection for adjacent regions, often by means of providing
military security.2
Active Independent
States expressing this national role conception perceive the idea that they are free
from military commitments to other major powers, alongside the shunning of permanent
ideological or military commitments. This national role conception also promotes themes
of the necessity and importance in cultivating relations with many states in order to
ensure not only self-determination, but also potential mediation functions or active
programs aimed at the extension of diplomatic and/or commercial relations on an
international scale.2
Liberation Supporter
This national role conception does not specifically encourage states to act upon
formal responsibilities to organize, lead, and/or tangibly support liberation movements
abroad. Rather, states expressing this national role conception will often speculate on and
articulate more unstructured and vague attitudes about actions required to support
liberation abroad, either through a verbal commitment of solidarity by such a decision-
maker or by means of rhetoric emphasizing the ability of the state in search of liberation,
all to accomplish such liberation.3
Defender of the Faith
34
A state’s expression of this national role conception implies its commitment with
foreign policy objectives to defend value systems, such as democracy or communism, as
opposed to a specified territory, from attack. States that express the defender of the faith
role conception assume specific responsibilities designed to ensure the commonality of
ideology for a group of other states for which the defender of the faith is securing. Often
times, such special responsibilities are acted upon by means of military action abroad.4
Exceptionalism: Operationalized
It is necessary to consider that the leadership and decision-makers of states may
or may not outright claim the idea of their state being exceptional in nature. Rather, it is
the perceptions of the decision-makers that need to be analyzed in relation to their
expression or disapproval of certain characteristics that inform exceptionalism. If a
decision-maker expresses the indicators of exceptionalism in its elite rhetoric, the
decision-maker will be perceived to embrace exceptionalism in its foreign policy
decisions. Conversely, if the decision-maker of a state expresses perceptions of the role(s)
its state should play in the international system are not in line with perceptions of
exceptionalism, the decision-maker will be perceived to not have exceptionalism
influence its foreign policy decision-making. The coding scheme that forms the basis of
the content analysis (see Figure 2) will be informed by characteristics of each of the
individual national role conceptions to be studied. The following is a scheme of the
various sources of the national role conceptions to be analyzed. Derived from Holsti, the
following is a coding scheme used to operationalize exceptionalism.
35
Figure 2: Coding Scheme
Role Conception Sources and Coding Procedure
Regional Leader
Superior capabilities of state, expression of a traditional national role
Focus on references to certain duties and/or responsibilities in the context of the particular region with which the state identifies
Special regional role, responsibility Reference to a lone, moral obligation
Regional Protector
Perceptions of threat according to geographic location, adherence to traditional policies and needs of threatened state(s)
Focus on phrases or references highlighting special responsibilities involving leadership on regional/issue-area basis, providing of protection to such regions
Emphasis on protection Threat of developing nations Security of the developing world
Active Independent
Anti-bloc attitudes, foreign policy decisions made to support the state over international interests, freedom of military commitments to any major powers, encouragement of continuity of international system
Focus on words related to cooperation over conflict, terms emphasizing individuality over permanent international commitments, affirmation of national independence and/or nationalism, pronouns referring to the self (self-confidence)
Independence of foreign policy Self-determination Potential mediation functions
Liberation Supporter
Ideological principles, anti-colonial attitudes
Focus on words related to instigation of conflict, ideological and/or moral principles, and anti-colonial attitudes, phrases involving vague attitudes and actions to take over
36
explicit formal responsibilities Unstructured/no clear action to be
taken “We support this struggling nation…”
Defender of the Faith
Ideological principles, adherence to traditional national role, perceptions of threat
Focus on words related to instigation of conflict and defense of value systems over specific territories, reference to militarism and humanitarianism, defense of life/liberty/freedom
“We have a common purpose and interest to defend…”
Ensuring survival/success of liberty
Dependent Variable: Level of Aggressiveness in Foreign Policy
Aggressiveness of Foreign Policy: Conceptualized
Understanding how terms such as ‘aggressiveness’ and ‘foreign policy’ are
defined is instrumental in determining and explaining the dependent variable. For the
purposes of this study, aggressiveness of foreign policy will refer to the intensity of a
state’s foreign military involvement in the affairs of another state. In defining foreign
military involvement, this study will associate such involvement as the one-time decision
of a state whether or not to militarily intervene into the sovereign affairs of another state.
Such foreign military involvement is in congruence with militarized interstate disputes,
and according to the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) data set introduced by
scholars Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer, there exists a set of
criteria to use for reference when defining these incidents of involvement. Militarized
incidents must be explicitly directed towards one or more interstate system members and
also must be a clear, non-routine, and governmentally authorized action.5 Furthermore,
37
such actions must be decided upon by the governmental representatives, or individual
decision-makers, of the state.
Aggressiveness in Foreign Policy: Operationalized
The intensity of foreign military involvement will be operationalized according to
different levels of intensity explained through the MIDs data set. Operationalizing the
aggressiveness of a state’s foreign policy, as determined by the intensity of an act of
foreign military involvement, includes classifying specific military interstate disputes
according to the parameters of the MIDs data set descriptions. These categories are made
up of a “high”, “medium”, and “low” intensity of involvement. The MIDs data set
classifies instances of militarized action according to their magnitude. The “high”
intensity of involvement is concurrent with actual use of force by a state, the “medium”
intensity of involvement is concurrent with display of force, and the “low” intensity of
involvement is concurrent with threat of force.6
A “high level” of foreign military involvement, indicating an intense act brought
upon by an aggressor state, would consist of the actual use of force by an aggressor state.
This use of force could be exemplified by the aggressor state’s initial military presence
within the occupied state, accompanied over time by a sustained presence of such
military personnel alongside heavy casualties experienced by the occupied state. This
level of intensity of aggressiveness in foreign policy also may include the aggressor state
formally declaring war on the occupied state, or implementing a blockade or use of
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons against the forces of the occupied state.
38
A “medium level” of foreign military involvement would consist of displays of
force by an aggressor state, to a smaller degree than displays of force commensurate with
the “high level” of foreign military involvement. These displays of force could include an
initial military presence by the aggressor state, yet as opposed to a sustained military
presence within the occupied state; the aggressor state may execute some level of
oversight over the affairs of the country either through military or other means. Such
oversight could involve mobilization of troops, show of ships and/or planes, or the alert
of an increase in the military readiness of the aggressor state.
A “low level” of foreign military involvement by an aggressor state would
furthermore consist of a smaller degree of threats of military force. This would include
the initial military presence of the aggressor state within the occupied state, but with little
to no subsequent further military intervention or presence within the occupied state. The
threats of force also could include threats to fire upon the armed forces of the occupied
state, threat to blockade, to occupy territory, to declare war, and/or to use nuclear
weapons. While seemingly initially aggressive, these acts all constitute a “low level” of
foreign military involvement because they are solely threats as opposed to tangible
actions.
Methodological Approach: Comparative Case Study
This study will employ the comparative case study methodology. This is a
methodology that incorporates the “systematic comparison of two or more data points
obtained through the use of the case study method.”7 Scholars Juliet Kaarbo and Ryan K.
Beasley provide basic, general definitions of such terms that encompass the method. A
39
‘case’ is an instance or data point that can act as experimentally derived measurements,
survey responses, or classifications of different historical events. The ‘case study’ is then
“a method of obtaining a case or a number of cases through an empirical examination of a
real-world phenomenon within its naturally-occurring context, without directly
manipulating either the phenomenon or the context.”5 Case studies allow for the holistic
description of the phenomenon to be studied. Moreover, the theoretical foundations of a
study can be used to explore, examine, and interpret the case study at hand. The study can
be enhanced through the examination of such theoretical foundations within the
boundaries of an individual empirical instance.8 Consequently, the comparative case
study offers a method of structured and focused comparison of empirical instances.
Alongside the use of the comparative case study methodology will be content
analysis. According to scholars Janet Buttolph Johnson and H.T. Reynolds, content
analysis involves relying on the use of written records in order to support an observation
or relationship. It is a methodology that uses the written record through systematic coding
and classification of the content of a set of records.9 Coding schemes are created as a part
of the content analysis; such schemes are sets of categories consisting of certain units
including words, phrases, sentences, and/or paragraphs and entire documents to be coded.
Content analysis is suitable for this study because the methodology allows for the
production of a qualitative measure of decision-makers and their perceptions of their
state’s national role conceptions.
Case Selection
40
In order to test my hypothesis, utilizing the comparative case study approach is
most appropriate for this project. The case studies consist of different states, and the
comparative case study approach allows for the examination of such states and their
decision-makers, national role conceptions, and foreign policies. It is necessary to select
cases that reflect variation for purposes of comparison, and in creating my research
design I select cases that vary across the independent variable. Varying across
exceptionalistic national role conceptions, as outlined in Figure 2 of this chapter, will
allow for the testing to determine whether the expression of such role conceptions leads
to a certain foreign policy behavior outcome. The comparative case study methodology is
the most appropriate to utilize since it allows for variation to exist.
In the following figure (Fig. 3), there is a chart indicating the independent and
dependent variables, along with the outlined categories by which each variable will be
measured. The independent variable section has the five national role conceptions
outlined that will be analyzed, while the dependent variable section has a listing of the
three categories by which the foreign policy behavior will be measured, according to the
parameters of the MIDs data set that were previously outlined in this chapter. The shaded
boxes in Figure 3 line up with my hypothesized expectations and predictions for the
results of the study (e.g., I anticipate the leadership of states that express the defender of
the faith national role conception will exhibit a high foreign policy behavior).
Figure 3: Predictive Chart
Independent Variable: National Role Conceptions
41
RegionalLeader
RegionalProtector
ActiveIndependent
Defender of the Faith
LiberationSupporter
DependentVariable:ForeignPolicy
Behavior
Low
Medium
High
Each case in the comparative case study will consist of one instance of militarized
foreign policy behavior from a state. The states analyzed will include the United States of
America, India, Russia, and the United Kingdom. The case studies include the lead up
and eventual decision of the United States to intervene and engage in airstrikes in the
Syrian Civil War from 2013-2014, India’s decision not to intervene in the 2013 Syrian
Civil War, Russia’s 2014 occupation and annexation of Crimea, and the United
Kingdom’s decision in 2013 to uphold its commitment to the Falkland Islands in
contestation over sovereignty with Argentina and engage in military exercises on the
Islands in 2014.
These cases are selected because they fit into certain criteria that are
representative of variation. In selecting these case studies, I control for time by picking
cases that fall within a two-year timeframe of each other, that being 2013 to 2014.
Furthermore, the curiosity about whether or not such indicators of exceptionalism such as
environmental perceptions, governmental structure, level of economic development,
preference for type of leadership and/or action in international affairs, etc., can all be
accounted for with these cases. The cases involve states with varied governmental
structures, along with differing perceptions of the international environment because of
42
the varying cultural and social dynamic that makes up each state’s conception of its
influence in the international system.
1 K.J. Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies Quarterly 14, 3 (September 1970), p. 261.
2 Ibid, p. 262. 3 Ibid, p. 263. 4 Ibid, p. 264. 5 Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer, “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992:
Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 15, 2 (1996), p. 169.
6 Ibid, p. 170.7 Juliet Kaarbo and Ryan K. Beasley, “A Practical Guide to the Comparative Case Study Method in
Political Psychology,” Political Psychology 20, 2 (1999), p. 372. 8 Ibid, p. 375. 9 Janet Buttolph Johnson and H.T. Reynolds, Political Science Research Methods (Los Angeles, CA: CQ Press, 2012), p. 292.
43
44
Chapter 3: The United States and India in Syria
This chapter presents the cases of both the United States and India’s respective
foreign policy decisions related to the Syrian civil war, from 2013 to 2014. The chapter
first provides a background and context to the Syrian civil war generally. The chapter
will continue with a short analysis of the United States and India’s corresponding roles in
the conflict, as well as an analysis of the two states’ foreign policy behaviors in relation
with the independent and dependent variables of the study. As stated earlier, each foreign
policy case analyzed in this study focuses on a decision by the state to either militarily
intervene or not into the sovereign affairs of another state.
Background
The Syrian Civil War was a domestic level crisis that has now evolved into a
catastrophe for the international community. The conflict has claimed over 200,000 lives,
and the bloody violence associated with the war continues to this day. This conflict
started in March of 2011, where fashioned like an Arab Spring movement, pro-
democracy protests started to surface in and around the city of Deraa, Syria. These
protests were encouraged after local teenagers were arrested and tortured for painting
revolutionary slogans on a school wall. Governmental security forces responded by
openly firing upon demonstrators, eventually triggering nationwide protests that
demanded President Bashar al-Assad’s resignation. The Syrian government responded
with brutal violence and the country plunged into civil war, with governmental forces
sparring against rebel groups. The resolve of the protesters strengthened with the help of
45
the Assad-incited violence, to the point were hundreds of thousands of Syrians were
taking to the streets across the country by July 2011.1
As the violence continued, the United Nations reported a sweeping number of
alleged human rights violations committed by the Syrian government. Evidence showed
that both the government and rebel forces engaged in heinous war crimes, including
murder, torture, rape, and forced disappearances. Furthermore, investigators accused the
government of having promoted civilian suffering through blocking access to food,
water, health services, and other items of survival necessity as a method of war. Since
December 2013, the government has dropped barrel bombs onto rebel-held areas in the
capital city of Aleppo. The UN has noted that the regime in certain cases would
deliberately target civilian gathering areas, inciting continual violence and ruthless
massacres.2
Hundreds of people in districts around Damascus were killed in August 2013 after
rockets filled with the nerve agent sarin were fired into the city and its surrounding parts.
This incident was one of the most controversial developments in the Syrian civil war.
Many Western powers, including the United States, immediately blamed the Syrian
government, saying the move could only have been taken by the regime. At the same
time, the regime and its superpower ally Russia blamed rebel groups for the attack.
United States President Barack Obama responded by saying this attack crossed a “red
line.” From this point on, and as tensions continued to escalate, President Obama
contemplated an American military response to the sarin rocket firing and killing of
hundreds of Syrians. While Obama’s preferred method of addressing the issue was
46
through means of diplomacy, he did not rule out the possibility that the United States
might potentially respond to the situation with military force.
Under threat of western military assault, President Assad agreed to the complete
removal and destruction of Syria’s arsenal of chemical weapons. Syria also signed onto
the Chemical Weapons Convention, an agreement that bans the production, storage,
and/or use of chemical weapons. The United Nations, American and Russian diplomats,
and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) collectively led a
joint mission that spurred the creation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The
destruction of chemical agents and other munitions was complete in a year. At the same
time, though, the OPCW has since documented the presence and use of toxic chemicals,
including chlorine and ammonia, by Syrian government forces in attacks on northern
rebel-held areas between April and July 2014.2
The United States was not the only country to threaten military action in response
to the sarin bombing of the Syrian government. The United Kingdom Prime Minister
David Cameron and President of France Francois Hollande also amped up rhetoric
regarding the justification of military action. Ever since the chemical weapon prohibition
framework agreement came to order, insurgent forces have continued to exacerbate the
civil war around Syria proper and beyond. The insurgents claimed that such an agreement
gave Assad and the Syrian government legitimacy in the eyes of the international system,
something with which the insurgents vehemently disagreed.3
This violence also contributed to a humanitarian crisis in Syria. Since the start of
the conflict in March 2011, over 3 million people have fled Syria for neighboring
countries including Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. The mass exodus of refugees
47
accelerated considerably as conditions in Syria deteriorated. On top of the 3 million that
fled Syria, an additional 6.5 million people were internally displaced within Syria,
bringing the total number of 9.5 million people, half of Syria’s population, having fled
their homes.
Furthermore, the Syrian civil war also acquired sectarian overtones, pitting
Syria’s Sunni majority of rebels against Assad’s Shia Alawite sect.4 This eventually drew
in another dimension of players including neighboring states and world powers, and
created a vacuum of power allowing for the rise of various jihadist groups like Islamic
State. As the chaos and violence grew widespread throughout the area, the extremist
group Islamic State (IS) grew out of al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Islamic State gained regional
influence by taking control of huge areas of territory across Syria and Iraq. The regional
bitter sectarian violence only served to intensify the volatile crisis. The Islamic State’s
large collection of foreign fighters battled rebels and others in the area that objected to
their tactics and influence, and continue to do so today. The presence of Islamic State has
heavily contributed to the greater instability of Syria and that region of the world. This
instability, even still present to this day, created a number of international repercussions,
placing major players in the international system at odds with one another.5 The volatility
that surfaced from the region at that time is what led to the United States-led coalition to
launch air strikes inside Iraq and Syria in an effort to “degrade and ultimately destroy”
what it deemed to be a vicious terrorist organization, the Islamic State.6
The next section of this chapter will include an analysis of the United States’
foreign policy decision to launch airstrikes in Iraq and Syria to degrade Islamic State.
Furthermore, in this chapter I will also analyze the foreign policy decision of India not to
48
directly and unilaterally intervene militarily into the conflict associated with the Syrian
civil war. In Chapter 2, I presented an arrow diagram that showed how the case studies
would be analyzed. The independent variable of the study is the level of exceptionalism
in national role conceptions, while the dependent variable is the level of aggressiveness in
foreign policy. I proposed a hypothesis that specified if a state displays an exceptional
role conception, it is likely to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy behavior. Important
indicators of the independent variable are the political structure and national attribute
capabilities of the state, alongside the state’s capability and/or preference for unilateral or
regional leadership. Dependent variable indicators included the level of intensity of the
foreign military involvement according to the Militarized Interstate Disputes, or MIDs,
data set. These indicators will be analyzed in the upcoming sections of this chapter.
Independent Variable: National Role Conceptions (United States of America)
Evidence suggests that leadership of the United States government expressed the
regional leader national role conception in its decision to address these broader foreign
policy issues within Syria. The most important and influential decision-maker to consider
in the United States is President Barack Obama.1 With respect to the Syrian civil war,
President Obama ultimately involved the U.S. military through targeted airstrikes on
Islamic State compounds throughout regions controlled by the terrorist group. He
appealed to the heart and soul of the American people by not only referencing that
America’s interests were at risk, but also by eloquently expressing the brutality
associated with the humanitarian aspect of the crisis as well. The White House used
1 Because it is nearly impossible to categorize and generalize the decision-making behavior of the United States based solely off content analyzing a select number of speeches, it is important to narrow down the selection of what to consider to one individual in the leadership.
49
pictures of Syrian civilians having been gassed, murdered, or tortured in some sort of
other merciless manner to emphasize Obama’s point.
Obama made the case to Congress and the American people that if the United
States and the greater international community failed to act in stopping these types of
attacks by the Assad-led Syrian government forces, the regime would see no need to step
down and disengage in its use of chemical weapons to promote violence and strife among
its people. The crisis was only further exacerbated through sectarian violence that
occurred from raging extremist groups plotting to take control of the area and greater
region, one of which was the Islamic State. By painting the picture in this way, Obama
vividly made the case for why the United States should militarily involve itself in the
sovereign affairs of another state.
Remarks by Obama in Address to the Nation on Syria, Statement on ISIL and Remarks on
Airstrikes in Syria
Two distinct parts in this chapter need to be considered. With respect for the 2013
to 2014 time frame for which this case study is based, the first challenge for the United
States was the issue of Assad and the violence with the Syrian civil war. The second part
is the challenge with the Islamic State, or ISIL, that eventually rose as a result of the
conflict associated with the civil war. On the night of September 10, 2013, President
Obama took the opportunity to address the nation on the general situation in Syria. Here,
Obama went into great detail informing the American public about how President Assad
was violating international law and committing atrocities across the entirety of Syria and
amongst its citizens. About a year later, on the night of September 10, 2014, and
50
September 23, 2014, Obama specifically addressed the nation about the threat that was
ISIL (Islamic State), what the U.S. was planning on doing to combat the group, and the
status with the military airstrikes in the region.
In an effort to inform the American people about the atrocities taking place in this
area of the world, and much like one of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s famous fireside chats,
Obama made appearances on primetime television to share this information. The
president explained why the Assad regime was dangerous and how it was in violation of
international law and more broadly, common humanity, through the use of chemical
weapons in its fight against rebel forces. Furthermore, he made the case as to why the
United States, and the international community at large, should intervene in these
matters. Obama claimed that such an intervention was in the national security interests of
the nation, as the rise of the Islamic State that stemmed from the Assad-initiated
instability in Syria posed serious threats to both the United States and to the international
community at large. Particularly, the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime, and
how such weapons were inhumane and abhorrent, was something that President Obama
stressed throughout the course of his statements.7
Political Structure
One of the indicators of level of exceptionalism in national role conception that I
offered in Chapter 2 was the political structure of the state. The political structure of a
state has the potential to create differing national role conceptions for the state to express,
based primarily off factors that include political party representation in the lead decision-
makers’ cabinet, structure of houses of government, the makeup of political majority in
51
the houses of government, and conflict between the governing elite and political
opposition.
The United States is a constitutional federal republic with a strong tradition of
democratic values. Decision-making power is invested in three different branches of
government, the judicial, legislative, and executive branch. Executive power is granted to
the chief of state, the President, who also acts as the head of government. The legislative
branch is made up of a bicameral legislature, or Congress, that consists of a 100-seat
Senate and 435-seat House of Representatives that may serve an unlimited amount of six
and two year terms, respectively.8 During the time of the Syrian Civil War, the 113th
United States of Congress presided. Here, while President Obama was the head of
government and chief of state, a Democratic Party majority controlled the Senate, while
the Republican Party majority controlled the House of Representatives. The Speaker of
the House, also the third in line to the presidency under the Vice President, was John
Boehner (R-OH) at the time of this session of Congress.
As was previously noted, the differing structure of a political system can lead to
different outcomes in the states’ expression of national role conceptions. As such, it
would seem sensible that since President Obama, a Democrat, and the Democratic Party
did not exercise a majority of both houses of Congress, they would not able to put forth a
unified idea of what national role conception to express in response to how to answer to
the Syrian civil war crisis. However, in this case, President Obama appeared to enjoy
bipartisan support among leaders in Congress with respect to the efforts in engaging in
airstrikes on the ground in Syria against the Islamic State and other governmental forces
of Assad. Obama wanted the United States to look strong and unified in its efforts to take
52
on the evils of the Islamic State, and in working to encourage bipartisan support for
intervention, he suggested sending a powerful message to the international community
embracing the notion that the United States would do what was necessary to defend the
homeland.
In responding to the Syrian civil war crisis, it would seem that the differing
political parties that controlled the Congress, along with a President and his lofty
aspirations to achieve security of the U.S. homeland, would result in a conflict of
thought-processes for the United States regarding the appropriate course of action to take.
The tendency for political infeasibility in garnering complete bipartisan support for
Obama’s initiation of airstrikes in Syria suggests a sense of naivety. However, he
appealed to the general American population for military action in Syria through
highlighting the grave consequences to the interests of the nation that would surface
should no action be taken, alongside noting how America was seen as a pillar of global
security and referencing the burden that America had been historically given to ensure
such international security. In this time of crisis, even though the crisis did not directly
affect the homeland of the U.S., the fact that it subjected the interests of the United States
abroad was enough for Obama to rally enough political support to engage in the foreign
policy decision of dropping airstrikes in Syria, starting in mid-September 2014.
National Attributes
Another indicator of the level of exceptionalism in national role conceptions is the
national attributes, or material wealth, of a state. A discussion surrounding the impact of
states with a greater accumulation of wealth versus states with a lesser amount of wealth,
53
and how this status of material wealth affected a states’ propensity to engage or
disengage in international politics, took place in Chapter 1. According to the literature,
states with a greater amount of national attributes at their disposal are likely to engage
themselves in international affairs because they perceive a greater sphere of national
influence and are more concerned than smaller states with aspects like territory and
security.
The United States is a nation that possesses the most technologically powerful and
advanced economy in the international system. Its Gross Domestic Product, or
purchasing power parity, is the strongest in the world at an estimated $16.72 trillion, with
GDP per capita at $49,800 and the GDP real growth rate at 1.6%. Additionally, the
United States’ labor force is 155.4 million, and its biggest industries include petroleum,
steel, motor vehicles, aerospace, and telecommunications.9 Because of these indicators of
the United States’ economic capability and material wealth that make up its overall
collection of national attributes, the United States certainly has the ability to extend its
reach in international affairs with anything that may concern its national interests.
Whether such action is by means of unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral action, the United
States has the ability to involve itself in any sort of global crisis or situation, as backed up
by its inordinate amount of material wealth and national attributes.
The United States possesses one of the most advanced militaries that a nation
could have as well, thanks to the likes of owning the world’s most technologically
advanced economy. The branches of the United States Military include the Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard. The U.S. spends approximately 4.35% of its
GDP on military-related expenditures. With a large budget, the United States certainly
54
has the latitude to engage in any sort of military escapade that it may deem fit to follow
up on or defend its national interests in the greater scope of international affairs.
Throughout the course of his addresses to the American people on Syria and
Islamic State, Obama consistently made reference to the superior capabilities of the
American military. In his statement on the Airstrikes in Syria, Obama claimed the
American military as being the world’s finest through stating “…the American people
give thanks for the extraordinary service of our men and women in uniform, including the
pilots who flew these missions with the courage and professionalism that we’ve come to
expect from the finest military that the world has ever known.”10 This exceptional view of
military power, and American power as a whole, primarily derives from the fact that
America possesses the most advanced and technological economy in the world. Yet even
in the face of the great force that the United States had the ability to initiate on its own,
Obama and the U.S. promoted the foundations of the regional leader national role
conception in its dealings with the Syrian civil war crisis.
Regional versus Unilateral Leadership
Another very relevant indicator in the determination of the level of
exceptionalism in national role conception is a state’s inclination for regional versus
unilateral leadership in international affairs. States that adopt a very independent-oriented
mindset when it comes to international affairs may be predisposed to unilateral action,
while states that adopt a more regional outlook may support a more multilateral action
approach in engagement with international affairs and subsequent foreign policy
decisions.
55
The United States has been a nation that has historically preached the pursuit of
both multilateral and unilateral action in international policy affairs, dependent upon the
political party and president in power and other political situations at any given time.
Over the course of the crisis, Obama continually adopted a mindset of action that was
representative of the regional leader national role conception. Throughout his statements
on pressing airstrikes, the Islamic State, and the ongoing crisis in Syria, President Obama
made nine different references to the fact that the U.S. was proud to lead a broad coalition
of partners in the Middle East and across the world in pursuit of common security, very
representative of regional leadership.
Obama pledged support to meet with allies and other partners, including the
United Nations, on continuing to garner support for the broad coalition that involved
confronting the volatility in Syria and pushing back threats of terrorism. This was
exemplified though his quote, “Over the next several days, I will have the opportunity to
meet…with friends and allies at the United Nations to continue building support for the
coalition that is confronting this serious threat to our peace and security.”11 While
seemingly a burden, Obama also welcomed the responsibility that the United States
assumed with regards to leadership and making the first steps. Obama also made
reference to the notion that because of credible U.S. military threat, along with
constructive diplomacy, Russia was eventually willing to join the international
community in pushing for Assad to relinquish his chemical weapons, a move that was
huge as Russia had historically been an ally of Syria and the regime. Furthermore, Obama
moved so far as to even pinpoint the United States as being the anchor of global security,
56
with the nation taking on the heavy burdens associated with regional leadership and
general global leadership as a whole.12
While the United States under Obama often promoted the inclination to act more
multilaterally in the case of the Syrian civil war crisis, at the same time he often engaged
in a dialogue that promoted a more unilateral and exceptional line of thinking. There
were four instances across the three statements made about Syria, the Islamic State, and
airstrikes that made reference to America’s mission to defend the ideals and principles
and achieve a political solution associated with a free and prosperous society, those being
freedom and liberty in rejection of extremism, terrorism, and tyranny. America is the one
nation helping Muslim communities around the world fight for ideals like opportunity,
tolerance, and a hopeful future. Additionally, Obama asserted the world was in a better
place because of the United States’ willingness to singlehandedly accept the
responsibility to lead in international affairs.
Following the embrace of unilateral thought and subsequent course of action,
Obama continued in his statement about the Islamic State that America has suffered
many setbacks in its history but is now the nation that is best-positioned to seize the
future over any other nation. Here, Obama referenced how America had the most
superior technology companies, auto industries, thriving energy independence, and the
common goodness of the American people. Obama asserted that America is the one
constant in an otherwise uncertain world, because it has the capacity and will to combat
terrorism with military might, along with the scientific know-how and economic
influence to promote a more hopeful future for the greater international community.12
Here, it is clear Obama is referencing the notion that while America is working in a
57
multilateral way in this particular fashion with the Syrian crisis, America absolutely has
the ability to move forward unilaterally if it so desired.
Obama did occasionally express characteristics of the defender of the faith
national role conception in his alluding to America’s ability to initiate unilateral action in
Syria. However, the evidence presents findings that suggest the United States tended to
follow the regional leader role conception closely, emphasizing a more regional course
of leadership through its dealings and response to the violence stemming from the Syrian
civil war crisis and Islamic State.
Dependent Variable: Aggressiveness in Foreign Policy (United States)
As explained in Chapter 2, the dependent variable, level of aggressiveness in a
state’s foreign policy, is measured in the context of a singular military decision. Since
foreign policy in this study is associated with the military decision of a state, the primary
indicators of the dependent variable include the intensity of the foreign military
involvement regarding the military decision. This is measured through the coding
categories of the Militarized Interstate Disputes, or MIDs, data set. The MIDs data set
offers a collection of parameters through a classification of instances of militarized action
according to the magnitude of such action. The MIDs data set is structured among
categories of high, medium, and low intensity of military involvement. These varying
intensities of militaristic involvement in interstate disputes exist concurrently with the
actual use of force by a state (“high”), the display of force (“medium”), and the threat of
force (“low”). In the case of the United States in the Syrian civil war crisis, President
58
Obama and the American government acted in accordance with what the MIDs data set
defines as a “medium level” of intensity of involvement.
President Obama started his campaign from the ground up. He began by
threatening the use of U.S. military action against Assad and other government forces in
keeping pressure on the regime in the case that the diplomacy with allies, partners, and
the United Nations happened to fall through. Obama further threatened military force
through his remarks in address to the nation on Syria when he noted that the United
States should not accept a world in which enemies are emboldened to use chemical
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction against the national security interests of
the nation, among other ally nations as well. He followed this with a threat that since
America’s national interests were at stake with the existence and potential proliferation of
these chemical weapons, the United States would respond with a targeted military strike
in the Syrian region on the Islamic State. This is embodied through his quote, “Our ideals
and principles, as well as our national security, are at stake in Syria, along with our
leadership of a world where we seek to ensure that the worst weapons will never be
used.”13
The United States government did act according to the parameters of the MIDs
data set “medium level” of foreign military involvement. However, the data did show a
tendency for the dependent variable to fluctuate over time, with highs and lows of
intensity of military involvement surfacing. Through continual rhetoric regarding
intervention reinforced by means of his televised addresses to the American people about
the issue, Obama pushed the envelope from “low” intensity of involvement to a rising
and more “medium” level of intensity. Obama announced in his statement regarding the
59
airstrikes in Syria an effort to ramp up the support to both train and equip the Syrian
opposition forces in an attempt to counter Islamic State and Assad regime forces.
Furthermore, the President announced orders on the eve of September 22, 2014, into the
early hours of September 23, which included the American military starting to airstrike
Islamic State targets in Syria. These airstrikes, led by the United States but joined by the
nations of Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, sent
cruise missiles and precision-guided bombs from the air and sea into both the Islamic
State’s de facto capital of Raqqa and along the Iraq-Syria border in an effort to target
strongholds of the Islamic State.14
This effort of rising military involvement, spearheaded by the United States,
started primarily as a way to halt the continual progress of the Islamic State in promoting
its hateful ideology and tactics of terrorism across Syria and the greater Middle East
region of the world. Obama noted in his September 10, 2014, public statement on the
Islamic State his personal decision to order and deploy 475 military service members to
Iraq in order to help assess how to best support rebel ground forces in that area. The
military service members continued to further support the mission by getting involving
with training, equipping, and providing intelligence to Iraqi, Kurdish, and other ally
forces. This action was taken in addition to the United States’ decision to further ramp up
its military assistance to the Syrian opposition.
While the United States did engage in a high level of foreign military involvement
according to the MIDs data set in its action to drop airstrikes on Islamic State targets,
such use of force was not met with a continual ground military presence within the
occupied state of Syria. The military personnel deployed by Barack Obama were not
60
there to fight a war on behalf of the United States, rather, they were present for a shorter
and less sustained period of time. This claim that the United States did not engage in a
“high level” of foreign military involvement is further justified through the reasoning that
the U.S. did not formally declare war on Syria and the Islamic State, one of the primary
characteristics of a high level of foreign military involvement according to the MIDs data
set.
The United States executed a level of oversight over the affairs of Syria through
military means, a feature of the “medium level” of intensity of foreign military
involvement in the MIDs data set. Planes were flown over Iraq and arms and other
tangible assistance was sent to security forces and the Syrian opposition. Additionally,
the United States further displayed its force by helping not only mobilize rebel troops and
forces in the Syrian region, but also mobilize support from the international community
through the United Nations in this endeavor to halt Assad and the Islamic State. These
actions demonstrate the United States’ foreign policy behavior acted in accordance with
the MIDs data set “medium level” of intensity of involvement.
Analysis
The leadership of the United States appeared to primarily express a regional
leader national role conception in this case. The main features of the regional leader
national role conception include the embodiment of referencing certain duties or
responsibilities with which a state identifies, in the context of a particular region. These
special regional roles and responsibilities felt by states conveying a regional leader
national role conception fit the United States very well in this case. Furthermore, regional
61
leaders often express the superior capabilities of the state in working to fulfill such
regional roles and responsibilities. The biggest example in the case of the United States
expressing a regional leader national role conception was when President Obama
continually referenced the idea that the United States would take the lead alongside other
allies and partners in working to confront the serious threat that was the Islamic State and
Assad and associated regime forces. Obama also referenced how he would start a
dialogue in consultation with international partners, most notably the United Nations, on
how to go about forcing Assad to relinquish his chemical weapons and working to stop
the spread of Islamic State forces and related terror threats and extremism.
Independent Variable: National Role Conceptions (India)
The nation of India came to articulate its role in the Syrian civil war conflict soon
after the United States declared Assad to have used chemical weapons against Syrian
civilians. As a member of the United Nations, India declared its support for a multilateral
course of action in response to this issue. Furthermore, India clarified its position on the
matter by highlighting its claim that unilateral force by a few nations would act against
the collective international measures set and approved by the United Nations Security
Council. India pledged support to a peaceful settlement in working to stabilize the Syrian
civil war crisis. The Ministry of External Affairs, its foreign affairs wing of the
government, emphasized the nation’s critical economic interests in the region.15
In the United States case study, the unit of analysis with decision-making was
President Obama. In the India case, the leading spokesperson was Foreign Minister
Salman Khurshid of the Ministry of External Affairs. He stressed that India could not
62
support any action that was not endorsed by the United Nations. By asserting a continued
trend of escalation and instability in the region that would result from the unilateral force
of airstrikes, this claim of following UN-sanctioned action was further justified. The
airstrikes would also initiate spillover effects of conflict that would permeate Syria’s
borders into the wider region, something with which India was greatly concerned. Even
though India had a substantial amount of both economic and security interests in Syria
and the greater region, the Ministry of External affairs eventually announced its support
for any sort of UN-approved course of action, even if that included pressing airstrikes
against the region.16 The evidence from the analysis of this case study suggests India
primarily expressed characteristics of the liberation supporter national role conception in
its foreign policy response to Assad’s use of chemical weapons and the general violence
from the Syrian civil war crisis at large.
Position Statement, The Syrian Civil War: Implications for India
On September 9, 2013, the West Asia & North Africa Division of India’s
Ministry of External Affairs released a statement regarding the nation’s position and
subsequent imperatives for policy on the matter of the Syrian civil war crisis. Here, India
largely continued to vocalize its praise for a peaceful, internationally negotiated
settlement of the crisis and condemn for use of unilateral force.17
Political Structure
One of the leading indicators of exceptionalism in national role conception is
through the political structure of the state. It is important to take into account the variety
63
of political factors that can lead to differing national role conception expression; India is
a federal republic with three branches of government, much like the United States. The
executive branch consists of the chief of state (President), the head of government (Prime
Minister), and a Union Council of Ministers appointed by the president that make up the
executive cabinet. The legislative branch is a bicameral Parliament that includes the
Council of States (members chosen by elected members of state assemblies) with the
People’s Assembly (members elected by popular vote). The Supreme Court acts as the
state’s highest court, with a chief justice and 25 associate justices.18
While the Republican and Democratic political parties are most dominant over
domestic affairs in the United States government, there exist dozens of political parties
within India. These political parties subsist at the national, regional, and even local level.
On top of the numerous governmental and secular political parties, there endures an
assortment of religious and separatist-based organizations and parties that primarily exist
to promote political pressure on state leaders.19 A sweeping amount of these organizations
have ties to Islam, and the overwhelming Muslim population that resides in India has
been vocal in its discontent with the Indian government taking military action in Syria not
already sanctioned by the United Nations.
With the abundance of both secular and religious political parties that directly
influence the Indian civil society and government, it is seemingly clear that India’s
selection of a national role conception to express in response to Assad and the Syrian
civil war crisis could not stem from the majority ruling party. One of the defining
characteristics of the liberation supporter national role conception is the expression of
vague attitudes and actions to take in foreign policy behavior, as opposed to structured,
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clear, and explicit actions and responsibilities. This suggests the widespread influence of
the numerous political parties within India may impact the decision-making process of
the state government in its pursuit of finding an appropriate national role conception to
endorse in response to Assad and the Syrian civil war crisis.
National Attributes
India is a nation that has a developed open-market economy. One of its major
sources of economic growth is its services industry, which has accounted for nearly two-
thirds of the nation’s total output. Because of its large population of English language
speakers, India has also become a major exporter of information technology services,
software workers, and business outsourcing services. India’s GDP is the fourth highest in
the world, at an estimated $4.99 trillion, and its labor force is the second highest in the
world at an estimated 487.3 million. Even with these national attribute positives, India
still suffers from widespread poverty, significant overpopulation, corruption, violence
and discrimination against women, and inadequate availability of basic and higher
education. Recently, the nation’s account deficit has improved and various economic
reforms over the past number of years have led India to emerge as a regional and global
leader.20
As a result of its large level of national attributes, India may possess the ability to
act unilaterally according to its foreign policy interests. Much like the United States,
India certainly has the sizeable scale and range of national attributes needed to be a key
player in foreign affairs in the international system. This suggests India has the capacity
to be able to express a more exceptional, and subsequently aggressive, national role
65
conception in its foreign policy behavior. However, throughout the course of the Syrian
civil war crisis, India tended to promote a more internationally collective and multilateral
approach in response to the crisis. The Ministry of External Affairs continued to preach
on behalf of the Indian government for adherence to international norm in working to
craft an appropriate response to the crisis. This mantra was exemplified through the
Ministry’s quote, “India strongly supports a peaceful settlement of the issue and
collective international measures approved by the United Nations Security Council. New
Delhi opposes the unilateral use of force by a few countries.”21
Regional versus Unilateral Leadership
While it can be argued that India certainly has the material capability to lead
and/or act unilaterally in foreign affairs, the nation repeatedly emphasized its devotion to
a more regional and collaborative response in its Ministry of External Affairs position
paper, at least in response to the Syrian civil war crisis. Through the counsel of the Prime
Minister, the Ministry asserted that the Syrian issue had to be solved in a peaceful manner
in accordance with UN Security Council-approved collective international measures and
without use of unilateral force by a few nations. India asserted through its dealings and
participation in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that its
political views were firmly centered on norms of international practice, further making
the case for more collaborative and regional leadership.22
India characterized tenets of the liberation supporter national role conception in a
few different ways. This national role conception focuses the idea that nations support
liberation movements abroad, but do so in a very unclear and vague manner. India,
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through the Foreign Minister and Ministry for External Affairs, made abundantly clear its
desire and intentions to act in accordance with UN-sanctioned policy and courses of
action, whether that is through military or other means of action. However, its Ministry of
External Affairs in its position statement on the Syrian civil war crisis stated that the
nation must more actively partake in the international debate on Syria and collaborate
with as many states as possible in working to bring an end to the civil war. Here, India
took a very vague stance on how to go about actually responding to the crisis, instead
deferring to the decisions of the United Nations Security Council as the appropriate
policy decision. India referred to additional vague necessary courses of action when it
asserted the contacts between the United States and the newly elected government in
Tehran should be pursued in a more vigorous manner.23 By bowing to the actions
supported by the United Nations Security Council and giving very vague ideas for policy
and courses of action to consider, all without actually providing any concrete examples of
action to take itself, this suggests India served to only reinforce itself as a lower-tier actor
in this particular crisis in foreign affairs.
Dependent Variable: Aggressiveness in Foreign Policy (India)
According to the MIDs data set, the three defining categories for what constitutes
a “low”, “medium”, and “high” level of intensity of militarized involvement are
concurrent with threat of force, display of force, and actual use of force, respectively. In
the case of the Syrian civil war crisis, evidence suggests that India tended towards the
“low level” of intensity of militarized involvement in its related foreign policy behavior.
67
One of the defining features of the “low level” of foreign military involvement,
according to MIDs, is the use of mere threats of militarized action in response to a crisis.
While India did not unilaterally issue any threats of military intervention to Assad and the
Syrian government, the nation did eventually come to endorse UN-approved military
action, most notably the airstrikes policy action that was championed by the United States
for approval in the United Nations. Because of this, India seemed to place itself in a
puppet position, acceding to any sort of UN-endorsed action ultimately as the policy
action that itself as a nation would support.
On September 27, 2013, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted
to pass a resolution to secure and destroy Syria’s chemical weapons, pressuring Assad
and his regime to relinquish his stockpile. As a portion of this resolution, the Security
Council noted consequences for Syria if it failed to comply with the steps to destroying
its chemical weapons stockpile. While such language was somewhat vague, the door was
left open for the Security Council to approve future military strikes and further associated
militarized action against Assad and the Syrian regime.24 Because of India’s tendency to
continually support the United Nations by means of following action according to status
of approval by the Security Council, it is suggested that India would engage and
contribute to militarized action against the Syrian state, had the Security Council ever
come to vote upon such a resolution.
According to the MIDs data set, the threshold for a “low level” of foreign military
involvement is set at the instigation of mere threats of force. As India tended to exhibit
allegiance in complete solidarity with the actions of the United Nations Security Council,
it is fair to say that while India did not formally issue any unilateral threats of its own
68
volition to Syria, it supported the threats of the Security Council to approve potential
military airstrikes and further action against Syria had Syrian leadership not complied
with the framework of the resolution to disband its chemical weapon stockpile. As a
result, it can be suggested that the actions of India characterized a “low level” of foreign
military involvement according to the considerations of the MIDs data set coding
categories.
Analysis
In the case of the Syrian civil war crisis, Indian leadership appeared to primarily
exhibit the makings of Holsti’s liberation supporter national role conception. The main
features of the liberation supporter national role conception include expressing a routine
support for liberation movements abroad, yet instead of taking formal responsibilities for
such action, statements are made that indicate more so vague and unstructured attitudes
on what are appropriate actions to undertake. Voiced through India’s Foreign Minister
and Ministry of External Affairs, there was a consistent cry for action to be taken in
Syria, yet only in adherence to standard international norm and practice, along with a
greater necessity for the nation to politically collaborate with nations in the region and
world in order to eventually bring a solution to the civil war crisis. India cited no formal
responsibilities for action or leadership on its own behalf, rather it solely deferred to the
decision-making process of the United Nations Security Council with respect to how to
respond to the violence and greater instability in Syria that rose from the atrocities incited
by the Assad regime.
69
________________________________________________________________________
1 Lucy Rodgers et. al, “Syria: The Story of Conflict,” BBC News, Middle East, 8 December 2014, p.1, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868 (accessed January 5, 2015).
2 Ibid, p.2.3 Jean Pascal Sanders and Ralf Trapp, “Ridding Syria of Chemical Weapons: Next Steps,” Arms
Control Today 43, 9 (November 2013), p. 8. 4 Ted Galen Carpenter, “Tangled Web: The Syrian Civil War and Its Implications,”
Mediterranean Quarterly 24, 1 (2013), p. 2. 5 Ibid, p.11. 6 Lucy Rodgers et. al, “Syria: The Story of Conflict,” BBC News, Middle East, 8 December 2014,
p.3, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868 (accessed January 5, 2015). 7 Barack Obama, Statement by the President on Airstrikes in Syria, South Lawn of The White
House, Washington, D.C., 23 September 2014.8 “The United States: Government,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/us.html (accessed January 23, 2015). 9 “The United States: Economy,”
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (accessed January 23, 2015).
10 Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria, East Room of The White House, Washington, D.C., 10 September 2013.
11 Barack Obama, Statement by the President on Airstrikes in Syria, South Lawn of The White House, Washington, D.C., 23 September 2014.
12 Barack Obama, Statement by the President on ISIL, State Floor of The White House, Washington, D.C., 10 September 2014
14 Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, “Airstrikes by U.S. and Allies Hit ISIS Targets in Syria,” New York Times, 22 September 2014, p. 1, http://nyti.ms/1mFk2OW (accessed January 26, 2015).
15 Charu Sudan Kasturi, “India Opposes Syria Action,” The Telegraph, 1 September 2013, p. 1, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1130901/jsp/nation/story_17298146.jsp (accessed January 31, 2015).
16 Ibid, p.2.17 The Syrian Civil War: Implications for India, West Asia & North Africa Division of the
Ministry of External Affairs, 9 September 2013, p. 1. 18 “India,” p. 2, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html
(accessed January 23, 2015).19 Ibid, p. 3. 20 Ibid, p. 4. 21 The Syrian Civil War: Implications for India, West Asia & North Africa Division of the
Ministry of External Affairs, 9 September 2013, p. 122 Ibid, p. 2. 23 Ibid, p. 3. 24 Guy Taylor and Dave Boyer, “U.N. Votes to destroy Syrian chemical weapons stockpile,” The
Washington Times, 27 September 2013, p. 1, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/27/un-votes-destroy-syrian-chemical-weapons-stockpile/?page=all (accessed February 2, 2015).
71
Chapter 4: Russia in Crimea
This chapter presents the case of the Russian Federation’s intervention into and
annexation of the sovereign state of Crimea. In this case study, the foreign policy
behavior that I will be analyzing is the decision by Vladimir Putin and Russian leadership
to militarily intervene into, occupy, and annex the Crimean peninsula. The chapter first
provides a background and context to Russia’s foreign policy interests in Crimea. The
chapter will continue with a short analysis of Russia’s corresponding role in the conflict,
as well as an analysis of its foreign policy behavior correlation with the independent and
dependent variables of the study.
Background
Russia has a long and extensive history of relations with the Republic of Crimea.
One of the reasons why tensions exist and fighting has broken out between Russia and
Ukraine is because of controversy over the sovereignty status of the Crimean peninsula.
Crimea is separated from the rest of Ukraine not only geographically, but also historically
and politically. It is located on the Black Sea, almost entirely an island with the exception
of a small piece of land connecting the peninsula back to the Ukrainian mainland.
Crimea’s population is around 2 million, with almost 60 percent identifying as ethnic
Russians.1 Historically, Crimea was first annexed by Catherine the Great and Russia from
the Ottoman Empire in the late 18th century, and soon after that, Russia’s Black Sea naval
base in the city of Sevastopol, Crimea was established. The Crimean peninsula became a
part of the Soviet Union in 1921, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin at the end of World War
II deported the ethnic group Muslim Tartars that occupied most of the territory, labeling
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them as collaborators with the Nazis. Crimea remained a part of the Soviet Union until
1945, at which point it became the Crimean Oblast, an administrative region of Russia.2
Crimea eventually became a part of Ukrainian territory when Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev ceded the peninsula to Ukraine in 1954. As a part of the ‘de-Stalinisation
process,’ Khrushchev granted Crimea to Ukraine to appease national expectations of the
Ukraine and thwart the opposition of Russification that opposition leaders spread
throughout the Soviet republics after the death of Stalin.3 However, many of the ethnic
Russians that live in Crimea believe that the transferring of Crimea to Ukraine by
Khrushchev was an illegitimate move. While Ukraine has formal authority and
sovereignty over the Crimean peninsula, Russia still has many present-day key interests
in its relations with Crimea. The city of Sevastopol, a port city, is shared by both Kiev
and Moscow, the capital cities of Ukraine and Russia, respectively. Sevastopol is home to
the naval base for the Kremlin’s Black Sea Fleet, and the strategically located base is
necessary for Russia to exert its position as a regional military power and extend its
military prowess throughout the Mediterranean region.4
The new Ukrainian government, elected in 2009, was seen as a more pro-Russia
government. In contrast, present-day Ukraine has recently expressed a desire to join the
European Union as an effort to westernize the state. In 2010, the new Ukrainian
government signed a document that allowed for the Russian naval fleet to stay in Crimea
up until 2042. Before 2009, the Ukrainian government hinted that the Russian fleet would
have to leave Sevastopol by 2017. This extension of time granted to the Russian
government with the base at Sevastopol angered many Ukrainians, mostly those living
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within the western portion of Ukraine, that have always wanted to join the European
Union and stop acceding to the interests and demands of Russia.5
Ever since this split, the Ukrainian government has been relatively unstable. This
is because its geographically western half has advocated a pro-Western relations stance,
while its eastern half has advocated more of a pro-Russian relations stance. The tipping
point of the fall of Ukraine’s government came in November 2013, when then-Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovich turned away from a trade deal with the European Union
that he had initially entertained and accepted a $15 billion bailout from Moscow.
Yanukovich announced that he was suspending trade talks with the EU and that he opted
to revive and promote economic ties with Moscow and the Russian government. This led
to a number of street protests, soon prompting the overthrow of President Yanukovich in
February of the following year.
A number of demonstrations protesting the Ukrainian government’s changing of
heart took place throughout the months of November 2013 to January 2014. Many of
these demonstrations occurred in the capital city of Kiev, where crowds numbering in the
hundreds of thousands came to the city’s Independence Square calling for the resignation
of Yanukovich. After Yanukovich and President Vladimir Putin of Russia met in mid-
December 2013 to formalize the $15 billion bailout, further protests and demonstrations
ensued, with hundreds of thousands of protestors calling again for the resignation of
Yanukovich. In an effort to squash dissent, Yanukovich signed new legislation in January
2014 that banned anti-government protests. The protests in Kiev and around the Ukraine
eventually turned violent, with police clashing with protestors and unrest even spreading
to the pro-Yanukovich eastern half of Ukraine.6
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Eventually the protests became so violent and widespread that Western powers
soon started threatening sanctions. Foreign ministers of Western European states
convened with opposition leaders in Ukraine in an attempt to end the violence.
Yanukovich ended up being indicted for ‘mass murder’ over a number of deaths of
demonstrators. In late February 2014, the Ukrainian parliament voted to oust
Yanukovich, at which point he fled the country and denounced the whole situation as a
coup. At that time, Ukraine named new leaders and ministers for its government and
Moscow put over 150,000 troops in the area on high alert, angered over the idea of the
encouragement of armed mutiny against Yanukovich. Even though Washington sent a
clear message warning Moscow against military intervention, armed Russian men took
control of two Crimean airports. This indicated the first step of the invasion by Russian
forces. Soon after, President Putin won parliamentary approval to invade Ukraine on
March 1, 2014. While Russian forces tightened their grip on the Crimean peninsula
claiming “self-defense for the ethnic Russians in the area”, the new government in Kiev
warned Moscow of the potential for war and appealed to NATO for help. The United
States continued to threaten economic and political isolation against Moscow.7
In early March 2014, the pro-Russian leadership of Crimea voted to join Russia
and set the referendum vote for March 16th, a move that even further escalated the crisis.
President Obama declared the referendum as one that would violate international law,
and eventually he ordered sanctions on those responsible for the Russian military
intervention into Crimea. This hostile act by Moscow failed to produce any resolve, as the
Russian government refused to back down and accept mediation, instead becoming
increasingly aggressive as time went on towards Ukrainian troops in and around Crimea.
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In summary, Crimea is important to the Russian mainland for a number of
reasons. Starting before the existence of the Ottoman Empire, Crimea has enjoyed a long
history linked with Russia and is home to the largest number of ethnic Russians within
Ukraine. Sevastopol, Crimea is also home to a large portion of Russia’s navy.8 Ever since
the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, Ukraine has had an identity crisis, failing to resolve
internal struggles and build strong political institutions. Economic instability within the
nation has resulted from Ukraine’s inability to build political institutions, and this has led
to oligarchs gaining increased control over the nation’s economy.9 The violent conflict
spurred by Russia in its efforts to militarily invade and annex Crimea is significant
because of the dynamic that exists between the pro-European West and the pro-Russian
East of Ukraine, alongside the presence of President Putin and Moscow wishing to
reunite Crimea with the Russian homeland.
Independent Variable: National Role Conceptions
Evidence from the analysis of this case study indicates Russian leadership
primarily expressed characteristics of the defender of the faith national role conception in
its foreign policy behavior regarding its actions in Crimea and the associated region. In
this case, the most important and influential decision-maker to consider is President
Vladimir Putin. Putin escalated tensions with Ukraine and western nations as he
ultimately decided to maneuver Russian military forces in an operation that involved
intervening and annexing Crimea. Soon after the Ukrainian parliament approved the
ousting of President Yanukovich, new leaders and ministers were quickly named to
succeed Yanukovich and his regime. This action angered the Russian government, and
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Putin responded by placing armed troops in different regions within Crimea. This
prompted Russia’s initial militarized seizure and occupation of Crimea. Russian
leadership further responded through sending pro-Russian separatists to fight Ukrainian
government forces in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine. This prompted new
divisions between the eastern and western halves of Ukraine.10
The international community has widely condemned the seizure of Crimea and
continued violence by Putin and the Russian government. A number of western nations
and officials, most notably the United States, declared that Russia’s actions in Crimea
and eastern Ukraine were in total breach of international law. This was justified through
citing the nonintervention provisions in the UN Charter, the 1997 Treaty on Friendship
and Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine that required the respect of Ukraine’s
territorial integrity by Russia, as well as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security
Assurances, a document signed by the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia
ensuring security guarantees to Ukraine in exchange for the relinquishing of its nuclear
arsenal.11 Russia has since rejected the claim that it has violated international law.
Soon after Yanukovich was ousted in February of 2014, the parliament of Crimea opted
for a referendum to take place. The referendum occurred on March 16th, 2014, and
resulted in an overwhelmingly favorable position for Russia, with Crimea’s 1.5 million
voters casting support for union with the Russian mainland. Shortly after this referendum
transpired, Russian legislators put into place a resolution that nullified Ukrainian laws in
Crimea, replacing such laws with Russian legislation approving the annexation.12
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Message from the President of the Russian Federation, Address to the Federal Assembly
On March 18th, 2014, merely two days after the results of the Crimean referendum
surfaced, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a message to the Russian
government, justifying the nation’s recent various militarized actions in Crimea. Putin
delivered this address in the Kremlin before the State Duma, members of the Federation
Council, heads of Russian regions and other representatives of civil society. He stated
that Crimea’s referendum was held in compliance with democratic procedures and
international legal norms, further justifying Russia’s stance on its militarized behavior in
the intervention into and annexation of Crimea.
A few short months later, President Putin delivered the Annual Address, much
like an American State of the Union address, before the Russian government Federal
Assembly on December 4, 2014. Here, Putin further stressed the significance of Crimea
to the Russian homeland by referencing a number of both deep-seated historical and
cultural connections to the land, as well as justifying Russia’s unilateral use of force in
defending its national interests in seizing and occupying Crimea.
Political Structure
Similar to the other two case studies, the variety of political factors at play within
Russia is important to note in determining a certain expression of national role
conception. The government type of Russia is a federation, with an executive, legislative,
and judicial branch. The Executive branch consists of the chief of state, President
Vladimir Putin, alongside the head of government, Prime Minister Dmitriy Medvedev.
Within the executive branch, the cabinet is comprised of the premier (Prime Minister)
78
with his deputies and ministers, all appointed by the president. The legislative branch is a
bicameral assembly that is composed of an upper house (the Federation Council, where
members are appointed by top executive officials in each of Russia’s federal
administrative units) and a lower house (the State Duma, where members are elected by
popular vote), while the judicial branch is a Supreme Court consisting of 23 members
that are nominated by the president.13
Within Russia, there are only four main political parties that consistently maintain
representation in the national legislature.2 The current ruling party of Russia is United
Russia, of which President Putin is a member. In the most recent State Duma election
held in December 2011, the United Russia party received 49.6% of the popular vote,
bringing the party to a majority of 238 out of 450 total seats in the Duma. The last
presidential election was held in March of 2012, and Putin was elected president in a
sweeping manner, obtaining 63.6% of the popular vote. The State Duma soon thereafter
approved Medvedev as the prime minister, another member of the United Russia party.14
As the United Russia political party holds power in both the executive branch and a
majority of the legislative branch within the State Duma, this suggests Putin would have
the opportunity and ability to make use of more polarizing rhetoric in speaking to his
audience. This is exemplified through his quote, “Crimea – is our common heritage and a
crucial factor of stability in the region. And this strategic area should be strongly resistant
[to] sovereignty, which in fact can only be Russia today.”15
2 There does however exist seventy-eight other political parties that represent a wide range of religious, secular, and other political interests. These parties range from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, to the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, to smaller Orthodox or Muslim religious-based groups.
79
A defining trait of the defender of the faith national role conception is the notion
that states expressing this role will instigate conflict in defense of a specific value system.
Putin vehemently characterizes this role conception in defending truth and justice; he
reminded the Federation Council and State Duma that the Crimean people have always
been an integral part of Russia… “This belief is based on truth and justice, was
unwavering, handed down from generation to generation…”16
National Attributes
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was primarily a globally isolated
and centrally planned economy. Ever since the collapse, Russia’s economy has become
more market-based and globally integrated. Russia’s GDP is an estimated 2.553 trillion,
7th highest in the world. The nation’s labor force is 75.29 million, 8th highest in the world.
However, a high amount of the nation’s wealth is concentrated in officials’ hands, as
economic reforms from the 1990s privatized most national industries and the private
sector remains subject to high interference by the state. As one of the world’s leading
producers of oil and natural gas, Russia’s heavy reliance on commodity exports makes
the nation vulnerable to the fluctuation of oil prices. As oil prices have continued to
decrease over the past few years, Russia’s overall GDP growth rates have steadily
declined. Russia is a top exporter of metals like steel and aluminum, yet its
manufacturing sector is globally uncompetitive and relies primarily on domestic
consumption.17
Russia’s large level of national attributes and developed economy likely correlates
with its ability to exert more foreign policy influence within the international system. In
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turn, this suggests Russia has the capacity to express a more exceptionalistic national role
conception in relation to its foreign policy behavior. This was exemplified through
Putin’s words in his speech about Crimea to the Legislative branch, most notably, with
his idea that, “In Ukraine, [there] live…millions of Russian people, Russian-speaking
citizens, and Russia will always defend the interests of their political, diplomatic, [and]
legal means.”18
Regional versus Unilateral Leadership
Throughout the course of Putin’s Crimea message to the Federation Council and
State Duma, he consistently emphasized the point that Russia was acting in an
independent and unilaterally responsible way with respect to engagement with Crimean
affairs. Putin referred to the ousting of President Yanukovich in Ukraine as a coup; Putin
noted in his address that during this time of conflict, the inhabitants of Crimea appealed
to Russia to protect their right to life, saying that, “we…could not leave the Crimea and
its inhabitants in trouble, otherwise it would be simply a betrayal.”19 As the Russian
government justified its military intervention in Crimea as an act of self-defense of the
ethnic Russian population already located there, Putin followed up by noting, “Russia, an
independent, active participant in international life, she, like other countries, has national
interests that must be considered and respected.”20 This point was further developed with
Putin’s assurance that, “[With the historic reunification of Crimea to Russia] this event
has a special significance, because in Crimea live our people and the territory itself is
strategically important because it is here [that is the home of] the centralized Russian
state.”21
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Putin adapted a hardliner foreign policy view regarding Crimea and stuck by it
through the thick and thin of western-threatened sanctions. Putin’s response to the
sanctions was exemplified through the quote, “[the] hardness of Russia’s foreign policy
positions [are] based on the will of millions of people on the national unity, on the
support of major political and social forces. It is important to continue to maintain the
same consolidation, to meet the challenges facing Russia.”22 After both the United States
and European Union pursued sanctions against Russia as a means to punish Russian
leadership for its military aggression, Putin responded to these sanctions by saying, “…If
you [the United States and EU] do not wish to conduct a dialogue with us, then we will
be forced to defend our legitimate interests unilaterally…”23 This suggests Putin viewed
Russia as having the capability to act in an exceptional manner in its efforts to
circumvent the will of the western powers by seizing and occupying Crimea.
Once the referendum took place, and the majority of Crimean inhabitants
overwhelmingly voiced its support for union with Russia, Putin felt an obligation to
respond to the will of the people and to this call for action. Not only did the Crimeans
who voted express a desire to unite with Russia, but also many Russian citizens
supported the reunification of Crimea with the Russian Federation as well.24 In this sense,
action was pursued through military means. References made by Putin to defending value
systems such as national unity, national interests, political and social forces, along with
truth and justice, were repeated throughout his message to the Federation Council and
State Duma. It is by these references that it is suggested Russia, through the words of
Vladimir Putin, primarily characterized tenets of the defender of the faith role conception.
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Dependent Variable: Aggressiveness in Foreign Policy
In the case of the Russian intervention and annexation of Crimea, evidence in this
study suggests that Russian leadership tended to exemplify features of the “high level” of
intensity of militarized involvement in its related foreign policy behavior.
The “high level” of foreign military involvement indicates the presence of an
aggressor state inciting an intensely militarized act upon a lesser state. One of the main
parameters of the “high level” of foreign military involvement in the MIDs set is the idea
that the aggressor state initiates a military presence within the lesser state. That presence
continues over time with a sustained and prolonged presence of its associated military
personnel, resulting in the occupied state experiencing heavy casualties as a result of the
aggressor state’s military presence.
Through Vladimir Putin’s actions and approval, the Russian government
seemingly acted during its intervention of Crimea in a way that is commensurate with the
MIDs’ “high level” intensity of foreign military involvement. On March 22, 2014, simply
four days after Putin made his Crimean address before the Federation Council and State
Duma, Russian troops were authorized to storm Ukrainian military bases and outposts
near the capital of Crimea, Sevastopol. These troops possessed stun grenades and
automatic weapons and acted with intent to seize and occupy the bases, and during this
takeover process, there were reports of casualties on the ground. The end result turned
into a success for Russian forces, as all Ukrainian forces were soon forced out of the
region. Furthermore, Russian military forces overtook a Ukrainian warship, where after a
two-hour assault in Sevastopol, the command vessel was seized from Ukrainian control.25
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Russian forces in armored personnel carriers continued to press through Ukrainian
military outposts in Crimea, greatly overpowering a mismatched collection of Ukrainian
troops. Around various Ukrainian bases in Crimea, heavily armed pro-Russian militia
troops made their presence clear in what became an overwhelmingly successful effort of
seizing such bases. While this was taking place, the Kremlin justified the ongoing
militarized actions as actions designed “to protect its compatriots in Crimea from fascists
moving in from the mainland Ukraine.”26
The Ukrainian base near Belbek, Sevastopol, was overrun as pro-Russian military
troops initiated an assault later that afternoon on March 22, 2014. Armored vehicles
pierced the base’s walls, and a flurry of Russian infantrymen followed with setting off
gunfire and stun grenades throughout the area. Deadly casualties ensued between pro-
Russian and pro-Ukrainian demonstrators throughout the volatile areas of southeast
Ukraine for weeks to come. As western nations, under the lead of the United States, soon
pursued tougher sanctions, the Russian Foreign Ministry responded with a claim that
such moves were “divorced from reality.”27
Evidence suggests through the actions of Putin and Russian leadership in seizing
and occupying of Crimea, Russia characterized a “high level” of intensity of foreign
military involvement, according to the considerations of the MIDs data set.
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Analysis
Russian leadership appeared to primarily express the defender of the faith national
role conception in this case. The main features of this role conception are associated with
a state’s instigation of conflict in response to defense of value systems, such as life,
liberty, and freedom. Furthermore, states who adopt this role conception act upon
perceptions of threat. President Putin consistently cited Russia’s commitment to uphold
truth and justice related to the Crimean people’s historical connection to Russia, as well
as its obligation to see that the political and social interests of the Crimean people were
met. Seen in the eyes of western nations as an egregious and aggressive move by Russia
with militarily invading and occupying Crimea, the Kremlin justified their actions as not
in violation of international law by alluding to the state’s responsibility to defend the
interests of both the Russian mainland and the Crimean people.
1 Associated Press and Reuters, “Everything You Need to Know About Crimea,” Haaretz, 11 March 2014, p.1, http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/1.577286 (accessed January 5, 2015). 2 Adam Taylor, “To Understand Crimea, take a look back at its complicated history,” The Washington Post, 27 February 2014, p.3, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/27/to-understand-crimea-take-a-look-back-at-its-complicated-history/ (accessed February 7, 2015).3 Associated Press and Reuters, “Everything You Need to Know About Crimea,” Haaretz, 11 March 2014, p.2, http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/1.577286 (accessed January 5, 2015).4 “A Brief Look into Crimea’s Vexed History with Ukraine, Russia,” Circa, 2 March 2014, p.2, http://cir.ca/news/explainer-crimea (accessed January 6, 2015). 5 David Keys, “Complex Crimea: The History Behind the Relationship between Russia and Ukraine over Crimea,” BBC History Magazine, 17 March 2014, p.3, http://www.historyextra.com/feature/complex-crimea-history-relationship-Russia-Ukraine-Crimea (accessed January 7, 2015). 6 Gabriela Baczynska et. al, “Timeline: Political Crisis in Ukraine and Russia’s Occupation of Crimea,” Reuters, 8 March 2014, p.1, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/08/us-ukraine-crisis-timeline-idUSBREA270PO20140308 (accessed January 7, 2015). 7 Ibid, p.28 Adam Taylor, “To Understand Crimea, take a look back at its complicated history,” The Washington Post, 27 February 2014, p. 4, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/27/to-understand-crimea-take-a-look-back-at-its-complicated-history/ (accessed February 7, 2015).9 Robert McMahon, “Ukraine in Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, 25 August 2014, p. 1, http://www.cfr.org/ukraine/ukraine-crisis/p32540 (accessed February 7, 2015). 10 Ibid, p. 2.
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11 Ibid, p. 412 Ibid.13 “Russia,” p. 4, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html (accessed February 7, 2015). 14 Ibid, p. 515 Vladimir Putin, Message From the President of the Russian Federation, The Kremlin, Moscow, 18 March 2014, p. 3. 16 Ibid, p. 217 “Russia,” p. 6, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html (accessed February 7, 2015).18 Vladimir Putin, Message From the President of the Russian Federation, The Kremlin, Moscow, 18 March 2014, p. 4. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid, p. 6 21 Vladimir Putin, Address to the Federal Assembly, The Kremlin, Moscow, 4 December 2014, p. 1.22Putin, Message, p. 723 Putin, Address, p. 224 Putin, Message, p. 825 BBC News, “Russian Troops Storm Ukrainian Bases in Crimea,” BBC News: Europe, 22 March 2014, p. 1, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26698754 (accessed February 7, 2015). 26 Ibid, p. 2 27 Carol Morello and Will Englund, “Russian Forces Storm One of the Last Ukrainian Military Outposts in Crimea,” The Washington Post, 23 March 2014, p. 5, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/monitors-set-to-deploy-to-ukraine-to-try-to-contain-crisis/2014/03/22/742e4898-b1a4-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html (accessed February 7, 2015).
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Chapter 5: United Kingdom in the Falkland Islands
This chapter presents the case of the United Kingdom’s leadership and its
decision to uphold its commitment to the Falkland Islands in contestation with Argentina
over a sovereignty dispute regarding the Islands. This decision involves the United
Kingdom’s decision to engage in military exercises in the area, ranging from 2013 to
2014. The chapter first provides a brief background and context to the crisis involving the
Falkland Islands and the United Kingdom’s associated foreign policy interests in the
region. The chapter continues with a short analysis of the United Kingdom’s related role
in the conflict, as well as with an analysis of its foreign policy behavior in conjunction
with the independent and dependent variables of the study.
Background
The Falkland Islands have been a subject of a long-standing sovereignty dispute
between the United Kingdom and Argentina. The Falkland Islands are a British overseas
territory and set of isolated and minimally populated islands located in the southwest
Atlantic Ocean, just off the coast of Argentina and about 480 kilometers east of the tip of
South America. Both states have long coveted the islands, primarily for economic reasons
as they provide a potential collection of natural resources and oil reserves, as well as
serving as a strategic shipping stopover.1
While Argentina formally declared possession of the islands in 1820, gaining
from France’s original settlement from the Spanish crown, the United Kingdom has since
reclaimed sovereignty it originally declared back in 1765. An English captain first
recorded landing on the islands in 1690; Britain claimed ownership over the entirety of
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the Falklands in 1765 while France established a settlement on the islands as well. Even
though Britain withdrew from the islands in 1774, it has since never formally
relinquished its claim to sovereignty. In a move to support its earlier claim of
sovereignty, Britain reestablished control of the islands in 1833 and expelled all
Argentines, bringing a group of settlers who then made up the islands’ first permanent
population. Here, Britain asserted its claim had not been relinquished in 1774 “since
marks of possession had been left and all the formalities observed which indicated rights
of ownership as well as an intention to resume the occupation.”2 Subsequently, Argentina
has continuously asserted sovereignty of the islands. Ever since the 1960s, the United
Nations has declared the situation a “colonial problem,” and has called upon leaders of
both the United Kingdom and Argentina to sort out and negotiate a solution.3
Argentina has claimed sovereignty over the islands, which it calls the Malvinas,
not only because of inheritance, but also because of the islands’ proximity to the
mainland of Argentina. The United Kingdom has long held that it has managed the long-
term administration of the islands, leaning on the principle of self-determination for the
island inhabitants that happen to be almost all of British descent. From the time when
Britain reestablished its control and authority of the islands in 1833, it has long been
noted that the islands have been under the sole possession of the United Kingdom.
The administration of the Falklands Islands under Britain has been continuous for
over a hundred years now. As such, the international community at large has doubted
minimally the international legality of the United Kingdom’s claim of sovereignty of the
Falkland Islands.4 The principle of self-determination helped to substantiate the United
Kingdom’s assertion of acquisitive prescription, which states that “after all nations have
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acquiesced to one nation’s de facto control of territory for a period of time, often fifty
years, that nation gains legal title to that territory.”5 The United Kingdom government has
further delegitimized Argentina’s claims of sovereignty rooted in historical right through
asserting that historical rights to a territory may seem abstract in comparison to the right
of the island inhabitants to choose their own personal political associations.
Conversely, Argentina has been clear in making its case for sovereignty over the
islands for a number of years. While the United Kingdom’s claim has been rooted in self-
determination determined by the islanders, Argentina has long maintained a superior
historical right to the islands, deriving from its inheritance of Spain’s sovereignty and
legal title of the islands back when Spain purchased France’s settlement from France in
1811. The Argentines have also stated that even though the British left a declaration in
1774 affirming their intentions of maintaining legal right and sovereignty of the islands,
the United Kingdom made no objections for sixty plus years, because both Spain and
eventually Argentina publicly declared sovereignty over the islands. Additionally, the
United Kingdom characterized Argentina’s claim of historical right to territory as being a
dangerous practice in a world threatened by the possibility of nuclear war and with the
worry over a memory of two previous world wars.5
Most recently, the United Kingdom and Argentina took their debate to a new,
tangible level. In February of 1982, the two nations held the last round of U.N.-sponsored
peace talks regarding potential proposals to bring resolve to the sovereignty question.
After these talks came to an unsuccessful conclusion, the Argentine government made
reference to the fact that its nation would take alternate measures at addressing and
solving the sovereignty question. In March of 1982, Argentine scrap metal merchants
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raised the flag of Argentina on one of the islands in the Falklands, and the British Foreign
Office soon informed Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that an Argentine invasion of the
Islands was forthcoming. Later, on April 2, Argentine forces that included 2,000 troops
and eventually up to 20,000, descended upon and occupied the Falklands, forcing a
breaking of diplomatic relations between the two countries.6 This tension eventually led
to the formalization of the Falklands War, leading to over 700 Argentine and 255 British
deaths. In June of 1982, Argentina withdrew its forces stationed on the Islands, having
surrendered to the British, while the United Kingdom kept its troops in place to defend its
internationally recognized and U.N. Security Council-approved sovereignty and
possession of the islands.7
While the United Kingdom’s claim of sovereignty over the islands has been
internationally accepted, Argentina has not ceased its modern-day efforts to continue
exerting its own claim ever since the cessation of the Falklands War in 1982. This is what
led to the current conflict, and the foreign policy decision that will be analyzed in this
case study is the United Kingdom’s decision in late 2013 and early 2014 to uphold its
commitment and obligation to the Falkland Islands in contestation with Argentina and
engage in military exercises in the area adjacent to the islands. In the words of deputy
foreign minister Eduardo Zuain, Argentina has recently labeled these actions taken by the
British government as being “provocative,” “a new show of military force,” and “[an]
action of the United Kingdom’s disregard for United Nations resolutions, which call on
both parties to resume negotiations over sovereignty and refrain from introducing
unilateral modifications in the situation as long as the dispute exists.”8 This inflammatory
rhetoric from Argentina’s deputy foreign minister has only served to fuel the fire in what
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has been an ongoing debate for many years now. Argentina’s denunciation of UK
military exercises around the Falkland Islands has not changed British resolve to
vigorously uphold its defense of the islanders and claim of sovereignty over the islands.
Independent Variable: National Role Conceptions
This case examines the statements of British Prime Minister, David Cameron.
Over the course of 2013, he vocalized a continued commitment to the United Kingdom’s
claim of sovereignty of the Falkland Islands over Argentina. This contestation of claimed
sovereignty over the Islands recently flared up, as David Cameron and the Foreign &
Commonwealth Office noted the Argentine government’s attempts to coerce the Falkland
Islanders into becoming a part of Argentina. The Argentine government was accused of
harassing Falklands fishing vessels, closing ports to cruise ships visiting the islands, and
threatening to cut the link between the Islands and South America proper.9 David
Cameron and the United Kingdom clearly announced that any attempt to threaten the
well-being and economy of the native islanders was unacceptable, and that there would
be no negotiations on the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands until the Islanders decide
for themselves.
On March 10-11, 2013, the Falkland Islands government held a referendum
amongst its native citizens, in an effort to determine whether or not to maintain the status
of the Islands as a British Overseas Territory. After this referendum took place, a 99.8%
voting percentage resulted in favor of maintaining status as a British overseas territory,
with a 92% turnout rate among the entire electorate. Because of this result, Prime
Minister Cameron declared that, “the [British] government hopes that Argentina and
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other countries respect the referendum result and the Islanders’ expressed wishes, which
were demonstrated beyond all doubt…the UK will remain committed to the Falkland
Islanders and defend their rights…”10
Policy, Supporting the Falkland Islanders’ Right to Self-Determination; Falkland Islands
Referendum; Prime Minister’s Christmas Message for the Falkland Islands in 2013
Evidence from the analysis of this case study suggests the United Kingdom
primarily expressed characteristics of the regional protector national role conception in
its foreign policy behavior regarding its practice of military exercises around the Falkland
Islands in early 2014. Starting in March of 2013 and spanning until December of the
same year, the United Kingdom government delivered a few speeches that declared
Argentina’s efforts of nettling the Falkland Islanders and their private affairs to be
reprehensible, as well as echoing the theme that the United Kingdom would remain
steadfast in its efforts to defend and protect the rights of the Falkland Islanders from
Argentine intervention.
Political Structure
The regional protector national role conception emphasizes a nation’s
responsibility it places upon itself in providing protection and/or security to a certain
region in the world. These quotes from Cameron exemplify tenets of the regional
protector role conception because he consistently vocalized broad statements indicating
the United Kingdom’s commitment to protecting the region after the Islanders just voted
on being in favor of remaining a British overseas territory.
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The government of the United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy, with Queen
Elizabeth II as the current Chief of State in the executive branch. The head of government
is a position filled by the Prime Minister, currently David Cameron. The cabinet within
the executive branch consists of ministers appointed by the Prime Minister. The leader of
the majority political party following any legislative elections fills the position of Prime
Minister. The legislative branch is a bicameral Parliament consisting of the House of
Lords (780 seats consisting of life peers, hereditary peers, and a few clergymen) and the
House of Commons (650 seats, where members are elected by popular vote to serve five
year terms). In the House of Commons, the last election in May 2010 gave the
Conservative Party 36.1% of the vote, with the second highest percentage gained by the
Labor Party at 29%. The judicial branch consists of 12 justices recommended for
appointment by the Prime Minister, ultimately approved for service by Her Majesty The
Queen.11
Within the United Kingdom, there are a number of political parties that maintain
consistent representation within the national legislature. These parties include the
Conservative, Alliance, Labor, Liberal Democrats, Scottish National, United Kingdom
Party, Democratic Unionist, Party of Wales, and the Social Democratic and Labor Party.
The current ruling party is the Conservative Party, led by the Prime Minister David
Cameron, ever since being elected in May 2010. While the Conservative Party holds just
under 47% of the seats in the House of Commons (305, out of 650 total, per the most
recent elections in 2010), the sweeping number of major political parties that influence
the political affairs of the nation suggests David Cameron might have to be more
receptive to the desires of the leadership from these parties, resulting in a suggested
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decreased ability to promote a more unilateral and unified role conception in addressing
issues with Argentina over the Falkland Islands. However, after the Falkland Islanders
participated in the referendum and the vote turned out overwhelmingly in favor of
remaining a British overseas territory, David Cameron spoke on behalf of the entire
United Kingdom by noting, “…you can count on the British government’s continued
support in countering the Argentine government’s campaign to claim the Islands’
resources and to inflict damage on your [Falkland Islanders] economy. The British
government will remain steadfast in its commitment to your sovereignty and security…
Britain will always be ready to defend the Falkland Islands.”12
National Attributes
The United Kingdom is the third largest economy in Europe, behind Germany and
France, and is a leading financial center and trading power. The nation’s GDP is an
estimated $2.387 trillion, the 9th highest in the world. Its labor force is an estimated 30.15
million, the 20th highest in the world. The biggest drivers of British GDP growth include
banking, insurance, and business services, while the manufacturing services industry
accounts for about 10% of the nation’s economic output. Over the past couple of decades,
the government has greatly reduced public ownership over the economy. The United
Kingdom remains outside the European Economic and Monetary Union, but in times of
economic crisis, the Bank of England coordinates its interest rate fluctuations with those
of the European Central Bank. The nation’s GDP real growth rate is at an estimated
1.8%, 152nd in comparison to the world. The United Kingdom’s budget deficit has fallen
over the past few years thanks in part to austerity measures put in place in 2010 by a
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Cameron-led coalition government to circumvent the euro-zone debt crisis, but the deficit
still remains high at around 7% of the nation’s GDP, with public debt continuing to
increase.13
While the United Kingdom does seem plagued with a high-percentage budget
deficit and a lower GDP rate of growth compared to the rest of the world, it is still a
nation with an immense amount of resources and efficiency within its economy. For
example, the United Kingdom’s agriculture industry is highly intensive, efficient, and
mechanized by European standards, producing nearly 60% of food needs with under 2%
of the labor force. Alongside the Cameron-led initiative in the government to promote
more measures of austerity among the economic policies of the nation, the United
Kingdom has come to enjoy an increased ability to project influence with its foreign
policy in the international system. While it is common for the United Kingdom to partner
with the United States on certain foreign affairs issues, considering the longstanding
partnership and ally connection the two nations share, the United Kingdom’s larger level
of its national attributes suggests the nation may have the ability to express a national role
conception founded in exceptionalism.
The regional protector national role conception is a role conception more highly
correlated with exceptionalism. Exceptional nations often act according to its own
interests and upon their perceived responsibility to liberate, protect, or oversee the affairs
of another state. The regional protector role conception emphasizes a nation’s role in
acting upon perceptions of threat in a certain region in a manner that provides protection
and security to the threatened state(s). It is suggested that David Cameron exemplified
this role conception in one of his quotes, “…the Falkland Islands is one of Britain’s most
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important overseas communities. And our commitment to your prosperity, security, and
sovereignty remains as strong as ever.”14
Regional versus Unilateral Leadership
It is suggested that the United Kingdom leadership maintained a level of unilateral
leadership throughout David Cameron and the British government’s messages and
addresses articulating its longstanding support for maintaining the security of the
Falkland Islands. Through words in the messages that included, “The rest of the world
has a fundamental duty to respect and honour what you [the Falkland Islanders] have said
so clearly. The Argentine government’s attempts to deter you…will not succeed,” this
theme of support was exemplified.15 As Cameron noted the international system had a
fundamental responsibility to respect the results of the referendum, his decision to uphold
the United Kingdom’s commitment to sovereignty of the Falklands was not his personal
decision. Rather, he was obligated to act on behalf of the nation and the Falklands in
answering the message sent by the Islanders with the referendum results.
Furthermore, the emphasis on unilateral action was underlined through Cameron’s
quote, “The British government will remain steadfast in its commitment to your
sovereignty and security.” Cameron’s lack of specifically mentioning potential support of
outside actors working with the United Kingdom to ensure the safety and security of the
Falkland Islands tends to represent the presence of a more unilateral course of action. In
his Christmas Message for the Falklands Islands in 2013, Cameron continually made
reference through his choice of words to what could be perceived as a solo mission for
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the United Kingdom. These words, spoken with undertones that embraced unilateralism,
neglected mention of outside actors other than the British government.
The United Kingdom further articulated the overall nature of the regional
protector national role conception as its government indicated “a responsibility for the
defense and foreign affairs of the [Falkland] islands and with full agreement from the
Falkland Islands government, [the British government] represents and acts on behalf of
them in these areas.”16 After the Falkland Islands successfully held its referendum, the
result of the vote tremendously indicated the Islanders’ wish to continue existing under
British sovereignty. As a result, the government of the United Kingdom worked to
swiftly indicate and assert its special responsibility to provide protection to the Falkland
Islands in the face of threats of Argentine intervention in the affairs and territory of the
Islands.
Dependent Variable: Aggressiveness in Foreign Policy
In the case of the United Kingdom engaging in military exercises around the
Falkland Islands over contestation of sovereignty with Argentina, evidence suggests that
the United Kingdom epitomized the “medium level” of intensity of militarized
involvement in its associated foreign policy behavior.
The “medium level” of foreign military involvement, according to the MIDs set,
indicates the presence of displays of force by the aggressor state. These displays of force
often time denote the intentions of the aggressor state to execute some level of oversight
over the affairs of the occupied state. This is most commonly, but not exclusively, done
through military means. This oversight may be shown through mobilization of troops, the
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show of ships and/or planes, or through the alert of an increase in the readiness of
military capabilities of the aggressor state.
The United Kingdom government acted tentatively in accordance with the
“medium level” of foreign military involvement in its pursuit of military exercises on the
Falkland Islands in early 2014. The British government undertook this action as a means
to show that the Islands are under British control, as corroborated by the Islanders who
voted in a referendum in favor of remaining a British overseas territory. From April 14 to
27, 2014, the United Kingdom declared it would hold military exercises on the Islands
during this time. Tests of nuclear missile launches from the nearby area were included as
a part of these exercises. A squadron of the Air Command Branch of the British Royal
Air Force operated these missile launches, as well as the other general military
exercises.17
Argentina accused the United Kingdom of using these military exercises as a
means to further establish a powerful military base that serves its strategic interests.
Argentinian president Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner has long claimed the United
Kingdom acted in violation of international law in pursuing its sovereignty defense of the
Falklands. Accusing NATO and the United Kingdom for turning the Islands into a
nuclear base and one of the most militarized zones in the world, she noted the presence of
between 1,500 to 2,000 soldiers stationed on the islands for a total population of 3,000
civilians. Furthermore, she has asserted the United Kingdom “spends more than $31,000
a year per each citizen of their nation to maintain a military base more than 13,000
kilometers away,” rejecting Britain’s hypocrisy in the idea that the nation sometimes
upholds claims of sovereignty while other times it does not, all according to its own
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personal and national interests and not in conjunction with international law.18 Kirchner
blamed the actions of the United Kingdom in conducting these military exercises as an
excuse for the British government to establish a powerful military base that serves its
strategic national interests in the South Atlantic.
This argumentative and persistent rhetoric bashing the United Kingdom on behalf
of the leadership of the Argentine government has only served to harden British resolve,
with the government of the United Kingdom repeatedly saying there is no present need
for a discussion over the issue at the United Nations. This is due to the fact that the
Islanders voted by referendum to remain a British overseas territory. Its behavioral
outcome of employing military exercises around the Falklands Islands suggested the
United Kingdom engaged in a “medium level” of foreign military involvement as a
response in protection of both its commitment to the referendum, and to the security of
the Islands from Argentine threat. The United Kingdom’s initial military presence,
mobilization and show of troops, and alert of military readiness in planning and
conducting its tests of nuclear missile launches and other associated military exercises
around the Falkland Islands insinuates the “medium level” of foreign military
involvement, as set out by the features of the MIDs set.
Analysis
Leadership of the United Kingdom appeared to primarily express the regional
protector national role conception in this case. The main qualities of this role conception
include the responsibility of a state to act upon perceptions of threat regarding threatened
states, emphasizing the providing of protection to such a region to ultimately ensure the
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safety, security, and prosperity of that threatened state. David Cameron ultimately
perceived threats of intervention in the affairs of the Falkland Islanders from the
Argentine government, and subsequently acted upon those threats to show solidarity and
prove to Argentina that the United Kingdom would hold true to its commitment in
protecting and defending the sovereignty and security of the Falkland Islands and its
inhabitants.
1 Barry Neild and Dave Gilbert, “What Lies Behind Renewed Tensions Over the Falkland Islands?” CNN, 3 January 2013, p.2, http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/03/world/falklands-argentina-background/ (accessed January 6, 2015).
2 Peter Calvert, “Sovereignty and the Falklands Crisis,” International Affairs, (Summer 1983), p. 413.
3 “Falkland Islands Profile,” BBC News Latin America & Caribbean, 5 November 2013, p.1, http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/03/world/falklands-argentina-background/ (accessed January 6, 2015).
4 Julius Goebel, The Struggle For The Falkland Islands (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), p. xxii.
5Lowell S. Gustafson, The Sovereignty Dispute Over The Falkland (Malvinas) Islands (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. xii.
6 Richard J. Regan, Just War, Second Edition (Catholic University of American Press, May 2013), p. 155.
7 Ibid, p. 158.8 “Falkland Islands: UK Military Exercises ‘provocative,’ says Argentina,” The Independent, 12
April 2014, p.2, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/falkland-islands-uk-military-exercises-provocative-says-argentina-9256125.html (accessed January 8, 2015).
9 Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, Supporting the Falkland Islanders’ right to Self-Determination, 12 March 2013, p. 1.
10 Ibid. 11 “United Kingdom,” p. 3,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uk.html (accessed February 9, 2015).
12 David Cameron, PM’s Christmas Message for the Falkland Islands in 2013, Prime Minister’s Office, 20 December 2013, p. 1.
13 “United Kingdom,” p. 4, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uk.html (accessed February 9, 2015).
14 David Cameron, PM’s Christmas Message for the Falkland Islands in 2013, Prime Minister’s Office, 20 December 2013, p. 2.
15 Ibid, p. 1. 16 Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom, Supporting the Falkland Islanders’
right to Self-Determination, 12 March 2013, p. 2.
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17 “Argentina Laments British Army Exercises On Malvinas/Falklands,” In News, 15 April 2014, p. 2, http://inserbia.info/today/2014/04/argentina-laments-british-army-exercises-on-malvinasfalklands/# (accessed February 9, 2015).
18 Ibid, p. 4. Chapter Six: Analysis and Conclusion
This chapter offers an analysis and conclusion of the study. The chapter first
surveys the case study results and generalizable trends, patterns, and tendencies that were
present throughout the study. Results for three of the four case studies were similar in
outcomes. Leadership of the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom appeared to
exhibit national role conceptions that corresponded to the hypothesized level of
aggressiveness in its foreign policy behavior. India is the exception in this matter, as its
suggested national role conception expression did not correlate with the hypothesized
level of foreign policy aggressiveness. As such, the hypothesis of the study seemed to be
confirmed in the United States, Russia, and United Kingdom cases, while it was not
confirmed in the India case. This chapter concludes by linking this study with the overall
field of role theory, and more broadly, foreign policy analysis and international relations.
A brief discussion of the limitations of the study and ideas for future research is also
included.
Case Study Analysis
In three of the four analyzed case studies, constancy was provided, confirming the
hypothesis in each of the cases except India. These results suggest combining the
phenomenon of exceptionalism with national role conceptions in an attempt to predict
foreign policy behavior of states is a fruitful endeavor, while also allowing for a broader
understanding of how exceptionalism can manifest itself through the expression of
national role conceptions.
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National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy Behaviors
This study has attempted to analyze the connection between the presence of
exceptionalism in national role conceptions and its impact on a state’s foreign policy
behavior in the context of military force. The cases of national role conceptions and
aggressiveness of foreign policy behavior in the United States, Russia, and the United
Kingdom yielded similar findings and outcome. The India case came to be an exception
due to its results differing from the hypothesized outcome. Out of the five national role
conceptions that were selected for analysis in Chapter 2 (regional leader, regional
protector, active independent, liberation supporter, and defender of the faith), the four
states in this study happened to express four of the role conceptions from this collection
of five (regional leader – United States, regional protector – United Kingdom, defender
of the faith – Russia, and liberation supporter - India). This further legitimizes the
hypothesized connection between the individual national role conceptions offered by
Holsti and the characteristics that define the standard notion of exceptionalism.
Three relevant and distinct indicators were used to determine the level of
exceptionalism in national role conceptions, including the political structure, level of
national attributes, and inclination for regional versus unilateral leadership of a state.
These indicators provided the baseline from which the proposed national role conceptions
of each of the states were analyzed. There were a number of connections between the
states’ expression of national role conception and each of the indicators. For example, the
political structure of the United States at the time of the decision to engage in military
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airstrikes in Syria from 2013 to 2014 seemed to suggest that the state would be unable to
express a unified and cohesive national role conception. This was the case with Congress
split in terms of majority of political party representation, resulting in divided
government. While these fragmented parties assumedly owned differing conceptions as
to what America’s appropriate role should be in the Syrian civil war crisis, Obama was
able to overcome the strife associated with this gridlocked political structure and offer a
unified national role conception thorough his vision of American regional leadership.
With a presence of a variety of political parties in each nation, Foreign Minister of India
Salman Khurshid and United Kingdom Prime Minister David Cameron overcame similar
political differences and roadblocks in their efforts to offer a unified national role
conception that would inform their nation’s foreign policy behavior in their respective
instances of foreign militarized action. Conversely, Russian President Vladimir Putin
used the connection of heritage and historical claim of Crimea to mainland Russia to
unify the opinions the Russian government and ultimately justify Russia’s decision to
occupy and annex Crimea.
The second and third indicators, the level of national attributes of a nation and
penchant for either regional or unilateral leadership, served to corroborate the United
States, Russia, and the United Kingdom’s individual militarized foreign policy behavior.
Each of these nations are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council,
presumably because they represent three of the most powerful and influential actors in
global affairs and the international system at large. Because the level of national
attributes of these three nations, with highly developed economies and sizeable industrial
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power, is so high, this suggests a correlation with the tendency for more engagement with
international affairs with a potentially more exceptional outlook.
It would seem that in the case of the United States addressing the Syrian civil war
crisis, the nation would embody a sense of exceptionalism in its foreign policy behavior.
However, Obama and U.S. leadership tended towards expressing a role conception that is
considered to be less exceptional, the regional leader role conception, because of its
embrace of leadership over a multilateral course of action as opposed to unilateral action.
According to the parameters of this study, the United States did not embrace an
exceptionalistic national role conception. With the Russia and United Kingdom case,
Putin and Cameron often eluded to characteristics of exceptionalism in their respective
foreign policy decision. This correlates with their nation’s expression of the regional
protector and defender of the faith national role conception, both of which are regarded
as more exceptionalistic role conception for their embodiment of unilateral course of
action over multilateralism. These two national role conceptions share similar
characteristics in the fact that nations who express these roles act upon perceived threats
of a state, whether that be threats of something tangible (land, resources, etc.), or
intangible (value systems). The United Kingdom acted unilaterally upon perceiving a
threat from the Argentine government, that being the threat of further contestation of
sovereignty, invasion, and occupation of the people and resources of the Falkland Islands.
In the Russia case, the Russian government unilaterally acted upon a threat to its values
of truth and justice, working to ensure the survival and success of the life, liberty, and
freedom of the Crimean people and Crimea itself, of which Putin claimed Russia to have
had a longtime historical and heritage connection.
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In the India case, evidence suggested India expressed a more exceptional national
role conception in its embrace of the liberation supporter conception. This role
conception supports the instigation of conflict, often times backed up with expression of
ideological and/or moral principles and general support of action, of which the initial
nation will address in its efforts to justify foreign policy action within the state(s) under
duress. These actions imply a unilateral-approach response, as the moral principles that
were violated in the state under duress prompt the state embracing the liberation
supporter to take swift action. Furthermore, India’s high level of national attributes
suggests it can and would respond in a more unilateral fashion in a way that would suit its
national interests. However, in this case, Khurshid and the Ministry for External Affairs
championed a more multilateral approach in response to the Syrian civil war crisis. This
was epitomized through the Indian government’s actions in ceding to the decision-
making authority of the United Nations Security Council, as opposed to trying to craft
solutions to the issue of its own.
Aggressiveness in Foreign Policy
The coding categories from MIDs set offered a means to connect the different
foreign policy behaviors exhibited by the four nations to a way in which to measure the
dependent variable and its relationship to the independent variable. Specifically, the
MIDs set outlines three different levels of foreign military intervention, for which there
are appropriate corresponding parameters that are matched with each level. For example,
the “high level” of foreign military involvement in foreign policy behavior indicates the
pursuit and use of actual force by an aggressor state brought upon a lesser, occupied state,
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alongside a sustained military presence, often resulting in heavy casualties experienced
by the occupied state. This was evident with the Russia case study, where as soon as
Vladimir Putin gave his address at the Kremlin to representatives of the Russian
government, he cleared himself to take action in Crimea by militarizing the region,
overtaking military bases, all with casualties occurring as the violence continued and
spread.
While the level and degree to which each of these situations, or crises, were
responded by the leadership of the four analyzed states, the United States, Russian, and
British governments all took direct action on behalf of their respective nations. This was
different for India and its case with the Syrian civil war crisis, because the Indian
government did not decide to take action of its own choosing. Rather, India opted for its
foreign policy response in this matter to reflect the plans, decisions, and actions
sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council. This is not suggesting that India was
unable to take unilateral action in this matter, rather, it is suggested that the national role
conception its government hinted at implies a more unilateral course of action. The
foreign policy behavior and courses of action taken by the other three nations, in
conjunction with the levels of the MIDs data set and associated parameters, corresponded
positively with the set out or predicted response relevant to the national role conception
expressed.
The results of this study suggest the United States displayed the regional leader
national role conception, a conception of lesser exceptionalism due to its emphasis on
leadership that implies group and multilateral, as opposed to unilateral action. The U.S.
displayed a “medium level” of foreign military involvement in its response to the Syrian
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civil war crisis. Russia exhibited the defender of the faith national role conception, and
the United Kingdom unveiled the regional protector conception, both of which are
associated with a higher level of exceptionalism because of their emphasis on seemingly
unilateral action justified by highlighting special responsibilities, considered to promote
conflict in response to certain threats. While Russia demonstrated a “high level” of
foreign military involvement in its occupation and annexation of Crimea, the United
Kingdom revealed a “medium level” of foreign military involvement in its military
exercise affairs in the Falkland Islands. The results of these three case studies appear to
match with expected results.
In the India case, it is suggested that India displayed the liberation supporter
national role conception. This role conception is one that is linked with a higher level of
exceptionalism, as it relies on the presence of ideological and moral principles of a nation
in promoting the instigation of conflict and support of liberation of a different struggling
nation. However, India showed the “low level” of foreign military involvement in its
foreign policy response to the Syrian civil war crisis. This outcome did not match the
hypothesized result. As such, the hypothesis is upheld in the case of the United States,
Russia, and United Kingdom, while it went unconfirmed in the India case.
Conclusion
Considering the results of this study, it appears that exceptionalism and its
connection with national role conceptions and role theory in general plays an important
function in the both the development and analysis of foreign policy behavior. While the
existence of exceptionalism may not manifest itself in apparently distinctive ways among
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different national role conceptions, it is still significant to understand that there does exist
a correspondence between a nation’s sense of exceptionalism, revealed through national
role conception, and its related foreign policy behavior. K.J. Holsti’s groundbreaking
work on national role conceptions and the study of foreign policy has served as a
foundation for scholars to develop the discipline and subfield of foreign policy analysis.
Holsti’s piece, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” served as a
true inspiration for the creation and development of this thesis. Many of the original
framing ideas studied in the role theory literature and discipline held up well over the
course of this study.
Role theory has many functions to the study of leadership and selection of foreign
policy behavior. Furthermore, national role conceptions can serve as one grounding
factor in analyzing how the foreign policy decision-making structure and process works.
Role conceptions can take shape in a variety of ways. Wish argues that many times
national role conceptions are associated with a particular motivational orientation. This is
to say that individual decision-makers express role conceptions that may be cooperative
and/or competitive in nature. This was apparent in the Russia case study, as Putin, in the
face of being threatened with massive sanctions from Western nations, adopted a
competitive role conception in a pursuit to annex and occupy Crimea.
Breuning and her views further explain this enacting of the competitive role
conception on behalf of Russia. Breuning argues that decision-makers clue into
environmental perceptions, in the sense that the decision-makers views of their state’s
role and position in the international system provide critical clues to motivations and
objections that ultimately dictate the pursuit of a certain policy. Furthermore, she
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maintains decision-makers can perceive constraints (positive and negative possibilities)
to policy in the international system. This was actually apparent in all of the case studies.
Each nation perceived the environment around them in the international system to be
conducive to their respective foreign policy behaviors. For example, Putin perceived a
surplus of pros to annexation over cons offered by the international system, serving as a
means to partially explain why he chose to pursue the action he did. The United States
and India perceived the Syrian civil war crisis to be one that widely affected many of the
state actors in the international system, and so a more regional response, as opposed to
unilateral action, was preferred and pursued.
Many scholars in the field of role theory and foreign policy analysis have made
reference to the importance and influence of elites and status perception of states and
their subsequent effect on expression of national role conceptions. Often, the elite(s) of a
nation will express a national role conception on behalf of their state according to what
they personally perceive to be most appropriate. Elites frequently tap into their state’s
history, culture, and social characteristics to provide foundation for expression of a
certain role. Elites will often times select role conceptions in accordance with ideas as to
what would be satisfactory to their citizens.
In the Russia and United Kingdom cases, Putin and Cameron acted on what they
believed was satisfactory to their citizens; they were honoring the results of the
referendum that declared Crimea and the Falklands Islands as territories of the Russian
and British homeland. Additionally, Khurshid in the India case acted in a way that
appeased the Muslim population within India, promoting a more multilateral and widely
vetted approach as opposed to a potentially controversial unilateral militaristic move. In
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the United States case, Obama acted according to what he believed were in the best
national interests of the state, promoting a multilateral and regional response to the
violence and crisis that was the Syrian civil war.
The other connection between elites and their perception of national role
conception is the state leadership and its successive perception of status, power, and
influence within the international system. States can often perceive status and influence
through their decision-maker’s personal beliefs, attributing power through material and
economic means, or a combination thereof. These role conceptions are also often founded
in the social structure of the international system, with definitions of demands and
expectations for states to fulfill. This idea was most prominent with the United States,
Russia, and United Kingdom cases. The leaders of these three states perceived the role
conception of their nation to be one of great power and responsibility, founded in
perception of influence by means of material means and stature among all players in the
international system.
Role theory is a field of inquiry that holds multiple levels of analysis. In the
context of this study and what this study is trying to achieve, the individual level of
analysis was most appropriate to select. Adopting the individual level of analysis offered
an opportunity to tap into the decision-making processes of the different leaders of each
state analyzed, and consider how their words reflected their beliefs about the appropriate
role for their state to adapt within a particular context. The way in which national role
conceptions were used in this study do not reflect the manner in which Holsti first
introduced them, or the manner in which other scholars have used Holsti’s work as a
jumping-off point to further provide inspiration and foundation for their personal work.
111
The method in which national role conceptions were used in this study, in the context of
role theory, was able to ultimately provide a further understanding for the basis of
exceptionalistic decision-making. This study is essentially broadening the approach of
Holsti and his original work in a way that considers exceptionalism as a phenomenon
taken into account in conjunction with how national role conceptions are formed.
There has not been a full collection of works within the role theory and foreign
policy analysis field that address the phenomenon of exceptionalism. Exceptionalism has
been noted in the literature merely as a phenomenon that exists, a mindset that certain
leaders embrace and label their state as such. There is a lack of literature with respect to
the presence of exceptionalism and its connection and potential for influence on the
expression of national role conceptions. This is because the thrust of the literature
regarding exceptionalism has been limited in quantity, only referencing how
exceptionalism has really only manifested itself through American foreign policy. This
study has attempted to take a step back with exceptionalism and foreign policy decision-
making, and make a conclusion as to if exceptionalism has any sort of effect on the
decision-making process. The results of this study suggest that exceptionalism does play
a role in leading to a state’s pursuit of aggressive foreign policy behavior, through the
lens of military action.
Limitations and Ideas for Further Research
This study faced some limitations in analyzing the relationship between role
theory, national role conceptions, and exceptionalism, with foreign policy behavior. The
amount of national role conceptions used, number and selection of speeches analyzed,
112
operationalization of the dependent variable, and overall time allotted for the project all
posed limitations on the study. However, there are numerous ways and ideas in which
this study can be expanded upon for further research.
One limitation of the study was the number and type of state selected for the case
studies. The case studies analyzed in this thesis were all ones with nations with very
contemporary foreign policy decisions, ranging from the years 2013 to 2014. One avenue
for further explanation in future research would be contrasting the contemporary case
selection alongside an assortment of older, more historical cases. In this sense, there
would exist the opportunity to determine if the chronological difference in time between
contemporary or modern cases versus historical cases unpacks any potential change or
discovery in what informs the foreign policy decision-making process of a state. This
potential could add to the already existing literature on the relationship between
expression of national role conceptions by a state and its subsequent foreign policy
behavior.
The states taken into account with these case studies also included states that
possessed somewhat of a similar background, with respect to material capabilities. The
United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom are all permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council. These three states, along with India, also all keep a nuclear
program up and running; this is indicative of having a high level of economic capability
and stability. Based off of what was already completed with this study, case studies in
future research can reflect the selection of states with a varying background, in both an
economic and other background sense. It is generally considered that states that are major
powers in the international system are the only ones that have the capability and
113
willingness to back up claims of exceptionalism. However, with Holsti’s model of
national role conceptions as the foundation, further research can be done on this matter in
analyzing states that are not classically considered as major actors in the international
system. This would provide a different interpretation of the impact of exceptionalism in
the decision-making process and the subsequent formation of foreign policy behavior.
This leads into the next idea for future research, the change of operationalization
with the dependent variable. In this study, the dependent variable was operationalized
with the Militarized Interstate Disputes set of coding categories taken into account. In
future research, the measured foreign policy behavior could be through conduct that is
different from military action. For example, foreign policy behavior, and the
operationalization of the dependent variable, could be measured through a state’s
diplomatic efforts and response to a crisis. Cases could be evaluated with the effect of
exceptionalism and national role conception on a state’s ability to initiate or promote
diplomatic relations in its foreign policy behavior.
In future research, the independent variable can also be operationalized in a
different manner. In this study, five national role conceptions from Holsti’s original
work, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” were selected and
implemented for analysis. These role conceptions exhibited a certain connection to the
general principles of exceptionalism. For future research, there exists the potential to
expand the number of role conceptions taken into consideration. These additional role
conceptions can reflect role behavior that may not necessarily correspond with
militaristic behavior. Selecting these role conceptions can then be used for determining if
114
there exists a relationship with a dependent variable that is operationalized in a manner
other than by military means.
The subfield of foreign policy analysis in international relations is an ever-
expanding field, and scholars’ use of national role conceptions in foreign policy analysis
is no different. The application of exceptionalism has yet to be linked to national role
conceptions and foreign policy analysis in a scientific way in the literature. It is the hope
that this study offers a positive contribution to the subfield of foreign policy analysis, and
in a larger sense, the greater field of international relations.
115
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