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THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL RISK BY CHINESE MULTINATIONAL FIRMS Ilan Alon, Alfredo Jiménez, Hui Liu, Hua Wang Presented by Hua Wang, Kedge Business School, [email protected] Keywords: Political Risk; Chinese MNEs; Resource Dependence Theory; Non-market Strategy; State-ownership; Political Connections.
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THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF POLITICAL

RISK BY CHINESE MULTINATIONAL FIRMS

Ilan Alon, Alfredo Jiménez, Hui Liu, Hua Wang

Presented by Hua Wang, Kedge Business School, [email protected]

Keywords: Political Risk; Chinese MNEs; Resource Dependence Theory;

Non-market Strategy; State-ownership; Political Connections.

Agenda

1. Introduction

2. Development of the hypotheses

3. Research methodology

4. Results

5. Discussion and conclusions

1. Introduction

Context: • The rise of OFDI from emerging markets, case of China. • How political risk is perceived and managed? Contradictory findings. • Determinants of IPRA (Institutionalisation of political risk assessments) by

OFDI in China is not clear.

Core question: • To examine what are those resources, and how resources affect Chinese

companies’ IPRA in their international expansion (a specific focus on the firms’ ownership structure, the firms’ scale, and the firms’ degree of internationalization).

Objective: • Narrow the theory gap of resource-based theory

1. Introduction

Literature :

Resource dependence theory(Hillman et al., 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, Xia et al., 2013)

The non-market strategy literature (Baron, 1995; Bonardi et al,. 2006; Doh et al., 2012; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 2004; Holtbrügge et al., 2007; Oliver & Holzinger, 2008),

This study has focused on the impact of state ownership, firm scale, and the degree of internationalization as resource-based factors and points out how these factors shape a firm’s relative behavior, leading to a different level of IPRA.

2. Development of the hypotheses

H1a. State-owned Chinese firms have a lower degree of institutionalization of political risk assessments compared to their private counterparts.

H1b. State-owned Chinese firms have a higher degree of institutionalization of political risk assessments compared to their private counterparts.

H2. Larger Chinese MNEs have a higher degree of institutionalization of political risk.

H3. Chinese MNEs with a broader degree of internationalization have a higher degree of institutionalization of political risk.

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SOE

Scale

IPRAH1a (-)

H1b (+)

Internationalization

1.Assignment of responsibility

2.Frequency of

conducting an

assessment

3.Risk assessment

techniques

1.State-ownership

1.Total sales2. Number of employees

1.Years of international operations

2. International revenue3. Number of countries in

which there are operations

H2 (+)

H3 (+)

Fig. 1 The framework for the development of the hypothesis

3. Research methodology

3.1. Questionnaire

Taxonomy Adopt Al Khattab et al. (2008) that proposes a three-step process (i.e., responsibility assignment, frequency, and approach)

Adding several additional firm-level variables:

• governmental connections (Bonardi et al., 2006; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014;

Hillman et al. 2004; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978;),

• firm scale (Albright, 2004; Kearns, 1997; Kettis, 2004),

• the degree of internationalization (Keillor et al., 2005; Oetzel, 2005; Wyper, 1995)

Questionnaire design• English, Chinese version, Back translation • Mutually exclusive, multiple choice items• Five-point Likert scale

3. Research methodology3.2. SampleTwo sources according to the sample list:

• (1) participants of the Internationalization Forum of Chinese Enterprises, delivered in August 2013; • (2) participants in the training course for managers of central government SOEs, delivered in Nov, 2013.

76 copies, 47 copies qualified, 54.4% SOEsSOEs are the top 100 Chinese multinational firms

Sector Number of firms Basic Materials 5 Conglomerates 4

Consumer goods 8 Financial 3

Healthcare 2Industrial goods 12

Services 6Technology 5

Utilities 2Total 47

Table 2 Sectors and the number of firms in each sector

3. Research methodology3.3.1 Resource-related determinants

SOE

Scale

IPRAH1a (-)

H1b (+)

Internationalization

1.Assignment of responsibility

2.Frequency of

conducting an

assessment

3.Risk assessment

techniques

1.State-ownership

1.Total sales2. Number of employees

1.Years of international operations

2. International revenue3. Number of countries in

which there are operations

H2 (+)

H3 (+)

SOE: 31/47 • Official list of SOEs by SASAC • Annual report (onwership)• Firm’s home page (7 cases).

Scale: Total sales, N° of employees:

The degree of internaionalisation

Variables Number of firms

Small scale Medium Scale Large Scale

Total Sales 12 14 21

Employees 17 11 19

Variables Strategies Low Medium High

YEARS Number of years 10 11~25 26

N 14 17 16

REVENUE International revenue 10% 10%~25% 26%

N 17 15 15

COUNTRIES Number of countries 5 6~10 10

N 14 10 23

3. Research methodology

3.3.2 Institutionalization of political risk assessment Quantifying Institutionalization of political risk assessment (IPRA) – AI Khattab et al. (2008)

Three stage process Indicator to distinguish a rank

responsibility assignments

non-institutionalizedless institutionalized more institutionalized

frequency of conducting assessments

NeverOccasionallyYearlyQuarterlydaily

risk assessment techniques

judgment and intuition of the manager, expert opinions, Delphi techniques, a standardized checklist, scenario development, quantitative techniques

4. Results

Test the normality and homogeneity of parametric data

A Normal Quintiles-Quintiles chart-> All the variables were normally distributed

Bartlett test: -> The homogeneity of the variable assumptions was reasonably

met of the parametric statistics

Therefore: In this case, both parametric statistics and non-parametric statistics can be used to examine the underlying connections among the variables.

4. Results

Determinant Variable Df Sum of Sq Mean Sq F-value P-valueOwnership SOEs 1 1278 1277.9 7.736 0.00788**

ResourcesSales 1 1444 1444.5 8.945 0.0045**

Employees 1 1974 1973.6 13.18 0.00072***

Degree of internationalization

Years 1 46 46.34 0.241 0.626Revenue 1 347 347.0 1.867 0.179Countries 1 1417 1416.7 8.74 0.00494**

0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05

Hypothesis 1 confirmed: SOEs have a higher degree of institutionalization of political

risk assessments as compared to non-SOEs.

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Fig. 2 Tukey’s HSD test for ownership

1. One-way ANOVA suggests a statistically significant difference in the level of institutionalization between SOEs and non-SOEs (P=0.00788, <0.01).

2. Tukey’s HSD test - to compare the means (see left)

Hypothesis 2 confirmed: • Larger Chinese MNEs have a higher degree of

institutionalization of political risk

– by the number of employees

– By sales

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Fig. 3 Tukey’s HSD test for scale

Hypothesis 3 is partially confirmed: • Chinese MNEs with a broader degree of

internationalization have a higher degree of

institutionalization of political risk.

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statisticallysignificant

P

Number of years in international business

NO P>0.05

Firm’s international revenue NO P>0.05

Number of foreign countries YES P<0.01

5. Discussion and conclusion

State-Ownership

Ownership

Total sales

Scale

Employees

The scope of internationalization

Countries

Firm-government resources

Large collaborative networks as

resources

Experience as resources

Resource dependence

The level of institutionalization

of political risk assessments

IPRA+

++

+

+

Fig. 4 Firm-specific resource-based factors and the IPRA framework

Limitation and direction for

future research• Only focus on China. applying this framework to other sets of host

countries and should include relevant country-specific factors

• Industry-specific factors are not accounted for in our study given the limited size of our sample.

• Additional factors, such as individual-related factors, the specific characteristics of the members of the top management team (i.e., their experience, age, tenure, education, and so forth) need to be integrated.

• We are unable to distinguish between the different types of government ownership. (central, regional, or municipal)

• Data limitation: uses ANOVA. More sophisticated methodologies if larger samples become available.

Thanks

Q&A

Titre du document - page 18


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