- 0 - The Institutionalization of ‘Tripartism’ as a Public Policymaking Mechanism in Ghana: The Perspective of Policy Concertation Theory Frank L. K. Ohemeng, PhD Assistant Professor School of Political Studies University of Ottawa 120 University Private Ottawa, On. K1N 6N5 [email protected]& Emelia Amoako-Asiedu Lecturer Faculty of Business Wisconsin International University College P. O. Box LG 751 Legon, Accra [email protected]A paper prepared for the 23 rd World Congress of Political Science: Challenges of Contemporary Governance, July 19-24, Montreal, Quebec, Canada Working Draft Not to be quoted without the authors’ permission
Transcript
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The Institutionalization of ‘Tripartism’ as a Public
Policymaking Mechanism in Ghana: The Perspective of
Challenges of Contemporary Governance, July 19-24, Montreal,
Quebec, Canada
Working Draft
Not to be quoted without the authors’ permission
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Abstract:
In 2003 Ghana enacted a law that covers almost every facet of labour life in the country. One of
its most important aspects is the creation of a tripartite committee -- comprising government,
labour, and employers -- to determine the national minimum wage as a basis for collective
bargaining. Why did the government decide to institutionalize tripartism by enshrining it in the
labour act, a development possibly unique in the world? Has it, as some have argued, ceded its
policy making function to an unelected partnership? Drawing on the theory of policy
concertation, we argue that the institutionalization of tripartism evidences no weakness on the
part of government, and that it is, rather, a concerted effort to ensure industrial harmony, as well
as enhance public participation in an area of policy making that is essential for development. Nor
is tripartism new in Ghana. Since 1957 and independence, the idea has been integral to the
process of making policy, especially economic policy, under both constitutional and military
governments. It was, in fact, an informal recognition of what have described as social partners in
national development. By formally recognizing tripartism, government was thus showing the
efficacy of a system that has been used, and continues to be used, to create industrial harmony
and help propel the country to middle income status.
Introduction:
In recent years the attention of scholars has been directed to the possibility of engaging
societal actors, particularly civil society, in national development. In the public administration
literature, for instance, the idea has culminated in what is referred to as public participation in
both policy development and implementation. In the implementation literature, we have seen the
rise of collaborative governance and co-production as the main route to public engagement. In
economics and sociology, as well as in development studies and industrial relations, this process
has been called the social dialogue (Hyman, 2010). Defined as the inclusion of “…all types of
negotiation, consultation or simply exchange of information between or among, representatives
of governments, employers and workers, on issues of common interest relating to economic and
social policy,” social dialogue has been the poster child of the International Labour Organization
(ILO). The ILO continues to encourage governments to engage with what they refer to as social
partners in economic development, especially by settling minimum wage and other industrial
issues so as to promote economic growth and industrial harmony, considered a sine qua non of
development. A major aspect of this social dialogue is reaching consensus on collective
bargaining agreements through tripartism. Collective bargaining is a key means for improving wages and conditions of work, and
for regulating employment relations. Consequently, many governments pursue it by establishing
a tripartite committee, comprising government, employers, and labour, where the actors engage
in dialogue and seek consensus on industrial and other economic issues. Indeed, some have
recently passed legislation that recognizes tripartism as a way of resolving industrial issues. As
explained by Baah and Akorsu (2007: 32), tripartism “has been identified as one of the effective
means by which countries can achieve a true political and economic democracy. The
involvement of workers’ and employers’ representatives in the formulations and implementation
of national policy decisions, particularly in labour policy decisions, is a necessary condition for
economic and social development. This has been clearly demonstrated by the Nordic countries
and Ireland.”
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Ghana's social dialogue system thrives on a tripartite basis, while many countries,
including developed ones, had no such a system. What might be called the “culture of tripartism”
is thus firmly embedded in the industrial relations landscape, particularly at the national level.
Organized labour, consisting of the major labour groups, and led by the Ghana TUC, is
frequently consulted, and participates in the formulation and implementation of major
government policies, particularly those affecting workers. Participation is, however, undermined
by the limited capacity of the unions, and enterprise level dialogue remains elusive. Even so, it
was not until the Labour Act, 2003 was passed that tripartism was fully, firmly, and officially
institutionalized in Ghanaian socioeconomic life.
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate that policy concertation, or social dialogue, is not
necessarily new in Ghana; that since the colonial period, and throughout the political turmoil
from the immediate post independent era until the formal institutionalization of tripartism, Ghana
has continued to demonstrate the efficacy of participatory dialogue in national development,
especially when it comes to collective bargaining and deciding the national minimum wage.
Furthermore, the case of Ghana deserves the most attention, since political liberalization has
brought significant changes in state-trade union relations (Konings, 2003). Why did it take so
long to formally institutionalize this process for national development? What have the benefits
been? In keeping with the theory of policy concertation, we argue that the institutionalization of
tripartism can be attributed to the official adoption of the social dialogue process by the
international community, as well as to the many benefits it has brought the country, even in
economically and politically turbulent times. Its institutionalization in the Labour Act was thus,
simply, official recognition of a system that has served, and continue to serve, the country very
well. In other words, the new Act provides the needed legal backing for a system that has, in fact,
been in existence for more than 50 years. We are interested in the subject because we want to
know whether the interests of unions and employers are equally served by tripartite institutions --
a question that, according to (Aleman, 2009: 156), merits closer attention. The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we will review the literature on
policy concertation. That will be followed by a discussion on the trajectory of collective
bargaining and tripartism in Ghana. After that we will briefly look at the Labour Act of 2005,
which formally institutionalized tripartism, and continue with reflections on the reasons for that
development, and its benefits to the Ghanaian economy, drawing on extensive interviews with
the major players. The last section draws the conclusion of the paper.
The Review of the Literature on Policy Concertation and Tripartism
Involving societal actors in what has become commonly known as public participation in
the public administration literature is not necessarily new. This idea is the same as to those found
in the sociology and economic literature. The problem, though, is the failure of scholars to agree
on a theoretical construct and context in which to discuss that involvement. For example, some
have described public participation, especially when it involves either a small group of powerful
actors or exclusively organized interest groups, as corporatism (Streeck and Schmitter, 1991).
Variations notwithstanding, it is “a system of interest and/or attitude representation, a particular
model or ideal-typical institutional arrangement for linking the associationally organized
interests of civil society with the decisional structures of the state” (Schmitter, 1974: 86). In
corporatism, the character of the actors involved in the decision-making process and the nature
of their relations with the state are its principal distinctions from a pluralist system of
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representation (Molina and Rhodes, 2002: 308). Others have seen participation as a collaboration
among various actors in the policy making process, while others view it from the policy network
perspective (Ansell and Gash, 2007). Our interest in using the policy concertation concept in this
paper stems from the fact, argued by a number of scholars, that corporatism seems to have
declined dramatically because not all countries have a corporatist structure (Afonso, 2010;
Compston, 2003; Schmitter and Grote, 1997). This decline has led to the proliferation of such
concepts as that of social pacts, which are “specific forms of macro-cooperation in relation to
other related forms of macro-concertation in policy exchange” (Avdagic et al. 2005: 6),
including competitive corporatism, social dialogue, and other forms. Second, a social pact can be
either bi-or tripartite, unlike concertation, which normally deals only with three main actors
(Hamann and Kelly, 2007). We have chosen policy concertation because we believe it captures
the essence of this new approach to policy making. Third, and as argued by Alonso (2010: 58),
corporatism emphasizes the structural characteristics of organized interests, while concertation is
more concerned with the process of policy-making, which is also what we are interested in. It
has, further, been distinguished from other forms of participation; concertation deals with
tripartite or bipartite relationships, and is the focus of this paper (see also Falkner et al. 2005:
235).
The literature shows continuing disagreement over the term policy concertation. In what
follows we will attempt to arrive at an understanding of it to make intelligible our use of it in this
paper. Alonso (2010), in his study of it in Europe, uses Compston’s definition. He thus says it is
“a system of policy-making which involves government representatives and representatives of
peak employer and/or trade union organizations [in] the formation of government policy in areas
including fiscal policy, monetary policy, industrial policy, trade policy, labour market policy,
employment law, social welfare and regional policy” (58). For analytical purposes it means national level discussions between government
representatives and representatives of peak employer and trade union confederations that lead to
agreements on public policy – that is, to government commitments to adopt particular policies; in
contrast with discussions that do not lead to such commitments. The focus is on co-determination
of public policy, as opposed to mere consultation. More specifically, it is a matter of policy
concertation over a broad range of public policy, definable as concertation that covers a broader
range of public policy than its core areas of employment and social policy.
Broad policy concertation, by this definition, takes four main forms: decision by
agreement within government committees; formal tripartite or government union agreements,
such as social pacts; informal agreements; and the implementation by the state of bipartite
employer-union agreements. Incomes policies are included, insofar as they include government
commitments on public policy (791). In defining policy concertation, we follow the one given by Trebilcock (1994): “the
process of moving towards consensus through dialogue among the social partners” (4). This
definition is strongly preferred in the present context because it captures well the nuances of the
Ghanaian situation.
Policy concertation has been used to account for a variety of policy outcomes. For
instance, Ebbinghaus and Hassel (2000) have explained the apparent divergences of national
reform approaches in four continental European welfare states that otherwise have similar reform
pressures (44). They offered two reasons they believe concertation was a superior theory to
explain the different approaches and the outcomes to the reforms in these countries. They
maintained:
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...there are two reasons why concertation plays an important role in the reform of the
welfare state. First, welfare state reform entails more than welfare retrenchment (that
is, merely cutting public expenditure); it involves the adaptation of social, employment
and wage policies which are largely interdependent, in particular in respect to their
impact on employment. Second, concerted reform built on a consensus of
governments, employers and unions can be crucial not only in overcoming potential
blocks against reforms but also in co-ordinating policies across policy fields (45).
Compston (2003) has cogently separated the essence of policy concertation from other policy
making approaches. He wrote that it … can be termed ‘policy concertation’ to distinguish it from the more pluralist policy-making characteristic of Britain and other Anglo-Saxon countries, [and that it]
is significant because it affects the content of public policy and therefore the shape of
the society we live in. Because decisions are taken by agreement, each participant has
a power of veto and is therefore guaranteed influence over the decision. This rules out
policy decisions that are unacceptable to employers or trade unions. It also leads
governments to introduce policies that they would not otherwise have introduced, in
exchange for concessions from employers and unions (788).
Fontana (2009) has also used the approach to examine how European legislation weakens
domestic relationships among policy actors, and strengthens domestic executives by offering
them justification for reforms, leading the executives to marginalize the role of concertation
among such actors. Similarly, Regini (2003) has shown in his study how concerted regulation
has led to the steady weakening, or even dismantling, of liberal capitalism. He reveals that
concerted regulation of economies in Europe has made them more susceptible to pressures, even
if they are better able to foster involvement; and he says that the involvement of various social
groups in decisions, typical of these systems, is less about slowing down (or, worse, preventing)
the decision-making process than it is about ensuring the success of those decisions because they
are not constantly coping with resistance (260). Menz (2011:183-184) has identified three elements that must be present in policy
concertation. First, actors must share at least some perceptions. They need to agree that a crisis
exists, and that it can be solved by negotiation and bargaining. According to him, “in the absence
of such agreement on the basic premise of a common challenge, problem-solving strategies and
bargaining are unlikely to evolve, either because one side will refuse to enter the process or
because there is no common understanding of the character of the problem.” Second, it is
essential that all parties share a sense of economic understanding. By this he means that mutual
acceptance and a common understanding of “the general aims and mechanisms of economic
policy” (Compston, 2003, p. 792) are paramount. Third is that “there is the perceived likelihood
of implementation, capturing the perception of governments, employers, and union central
associations of each other.”
Tripartism in Focus
Policy concertation is concerned with tripartism, so it is necessary to briefly review it
here. The Ghana case we are analysing very much concerns the tripartite relationship among
government, labour, and employers, especially in collective bargaining issues; hence the
importance of at least understanding what the concept stands for. Since the early 1980s, and with
the spread of neo-liberalism and the withdrawal from classical corporatist ideologies, interest has
grown in tripartite modes of governance (Schmitter, 1979; Lembruch, 1979; Cawson, 1986).
Despite the general decline of the influence of trade unions, tripartite policy co-ordination still
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has an important role in welfare and labour market regulation, at least in some European
countries (Bacarro, 2003). What, then, is tripartism? Silva (n.d.), for instance, uses the term to denote a
[s]ense of a process of cooperation whereby governments consult and involve
representatives of employers and workers in the formulation of socio-economic
policies at the national and industry levels and in particular, on the legal framework of
labour relations and labour-related policy; ensure that the social partners’ views and
concerns are reflected in the policies and laws formulated and provide the social
partners with opportunities to contribute to socio-economic progress, and thereby
enable them to fulfil a wider role than one of only providing direct services to their
members in relation to matters covered by the employment relationship.
Nzioki and Mukulu (2013), on the other hand, say that “[t]ripartite consultation is generally
understood to refer to a process whereby workers, employers and governments contribute to the
development of labour standards and the protection of workers’ rights through voluntary
interaction and dialogue. It is a means of reconciling interests of the various social actors and of
achieving fair and reasonable conditions of work” (18).
Trebilcock (1994) has defined the concept from two different perspectives, narrow and
broad. In its narrow sense, the term refers to a “three-way interaction among government,
employer’s organisations and worker’s representatives in formulating or implementing labour,
social, and economic policy,” while in its broad sense it “encompasses bipartite relationships
between employers and trade unions, where the government acts as a silent partner by setting the
parameters for the parties’ interaction” (3). It is Trebilcock's narrow definition that interests us in this paper, because it corresponds
to the situation in Ghana, where government, labour, and employers are seen as equal partners,
with equal powers to negotiate collective bargaining agreements -- in particular, the national
minimum wage and other social and economic issues relevant to national development.
Government is thus not a silent partner, but an active one. In the Ghanaian case the equality in
partnership is evidenced by the fact that any of the three major actors can call for a meeting of
the National Tripartite Committee to meet to discuss issues or concerns. Justifying tripartism has been attempted on a number of premises. Their common element
is that it attempts to bring employers, workers, and governments onto a common platform to
resolve industrial disputes. Hence, it ensures the involvement of representatives of all three
parties in the dispute resolution process, and thus makes a consensus certain. This involvement is
ensured by bringing representative of the parties into the process. Involvement of representative
workers (in other words, trade unions), representatives of employers (business organizations) and
government representatives (regulatory bodies, labour ministry, and so on) makes it certain that
the dispute redressal process includes representatives from all the three key players. The benefit
of doing so is that decisions regarding the dispute are arrived at using the consensus approach,
which is normally accepted by all. Tripartism ensures equal participation, with equal weight given to the opinions of the
representatives of employers and workers in the decision making process that affects them.
These two parties, which are often opposed through conflicts of interest, are united by the
principle of tripartism to ensure that a democratic method of decision making is adopted in order
to safeguard the interests of both parties without giving undue advantage to any of them, thereby
creating industrial harmony for socio-economic growth, and resolving the political issues that
may underpin national development.
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Tripartism, it has been argued, is one of the most effective means by which countries can
achieve true political and economic democracy. The involvement of workers’ and employers’
representatives in the formulation and implementation of national policy decisions, particularly
in labour policy decisions, is a condition for economic and social development. According to
Simpson (1994: 41), “tripartism can become an institutional safeguard to stabilise and guarantee
the smooth functioning of democratic structures. Ideally, it would imply a certain equilibrium
among governments, workers, and employers, with no one group exercising a particularly
dominant force over the other.” Societal corporatist institutionalization, or tripartite co-operation involving government,
unions, and employers, has also been used to manage conflict by building consensus against
adversarial relationships. In seeking solutions to industrial conflicts, it is based on the beliefs that
consensus-building is preferable to adversarial relations, and that centralized negotiations on
basic issues, such as wages and working conditions, remove the potential for numerous conflicts
in workplaces. It also believes in the proposition that conflict is natural in employment
relationships, and that it is best managed through centralized negotiations between strong union
and employer organizations, together with the government (Adu-Poku, 2006: 87). It has also
been argued that tripartite consultation ensures that competent public authorities seek the views,
advice, and assistance of employers’ and workers’ organizations, affecting their interests,
establishment and functioning of labour bodies responsible for labour administration (Nzioki and
Mukulu, 2013: 18).
Trebilcock (1994: 7-9) has identified four assumptions that underlie the development and
the efficacy of tripartism. First is that tripartism connotes the acceptance of societal pluralism, in
which autonomous groups operate within a sovereign state. She goes on to say that in such an
environment, groups with divergent interests recognize each other’s existence, at the same time
as promoting their own distinct views; although it is the state that ultimately lays down the legal
framework in which the groups are to conduct their bipartite relations. Consequently, she notes,
“tripartism involves a reconciliation of interests, whereby government, employers, and trade
unions, despite their inevitable differences, find areas of common accord to obtain medium and
long term advantages for themselves and society as a whole” (7).
The second assumption is that tripartism enhances representative democracy, in the sense
that it is complementary to parliamentary democracy. She is of the view that in a situation where
the three actors meet to resolve issues, “arrangements focusing on economic and social policy of
direct concern to employers and workers thus emerge alongside legislative bodies.” To
Trebilcock, then, the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of such groups and their representatives
also implies the government's acceptance that their contribution to policy-making is useful” (7).
Third is the respect accorded to the result of the process in which decisions are made. To
Trebilcock, without such respect the parties will neither find it worthwhile to continue nor be
able to justify further participation to their constituents.
The Emergence of Tripartism Consultations in Ghana:
In this section we take a look at the emergence of tripartism in Ghana. Before one can
understand this emergence and its subsequent institutionalization there, one must first understand
the appearance of trade unionism, or associational life, in the country. Furthermore, recounting
events from the immediate post-independence era to the period where the nation's labour law
(2003) was promulgated, one gets a good picture of how far Ghana has come with the
institutionalization of tripartism as a developmental forum for the discussion of national socio-
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economic issues. We must, however, acknowledge that from that outset, state interventions in the
activities of the trade union movement have been an inherent feature of all political regimes, and
they have had both positive and negative effects on industrial relations in Ghana. The emergence of tripartite consultation can be traced to the formation of trade unions in
Ghana in the early 1920s under British colonialism. It must be acknowledged that until the
establishment of the formal civil service and the Trade Union Congress (TUC), some
associations, such as the Gold and Silver Smiths Colony, the Ashanti Motor Union, and the Gold
Coast Carpenter’s Association, regulated wages, and made laws concerning apprenticeship,
unfair competition, and dispute settlement among craftsmen in the 1920s. These associations
resembled guilds, and their leaders replaced the tribal chiefs as protectors and adjudicators. The
former was established in protest against the Gold Mining Protection Ordinance of 1909 (Gray,
2002). The genesis of these associations has been attributed to the first successful industrial
action, which took place in 1919 in the Gold Coast, and was conducted by the country’s miners.
This occurrence triggered a series of successful collective actions by workers. The success of these associations in bargaining with the employer led to the formation of
other associations of craftsmen that had the sole objective of improving wages and working
conditions among their members. For instance, in 1925 the Government School Teachers' Union
(GSTU) was formed. This was followed by the Motor Drivers' Association in 1928 and the
Carpenters' Association in 1929, and the Motor Transport Union of Ashanti and the Assisted
School Teachers' Union (ASTU) in 1931. The ASTU was formed following a protest by teachers
from non-government schools -- that is, those established by religious bodies -- at the imposition
of a 29% tax on their salary by the government. It was later opened to all teachers in the country.
In 1956 the ASTU and GSTU merged to form the Gold Coast Teachers' Union (GCTU)
(Adu-Amankwah, 1990; Britwum, 2007; Ghana Trades Union Congress (TUC), 2012).
According to Kraus (1979: 267), “house unions predominated in Ghana before 1958, the largest
being the Mine Workers, Public Works Department, Railway and United Africa Company
unions. But most unions were small and the movement as a whole had little leverage. In 1956
nine unions with over 1,000 members had 77% of the membership, while 50 unions with under
250 members had 9%.” It is important to note that these associations were founded at individual
work places and government departments. Despite this, their formation led to the process of
collective bargaining in the workplace, and which served as the impetus for tripartism in later
years. To understand this process it is important to understand the official emergence of trade
unions in the country.
As already noted, although by the early 1940s individual unions had formed in different
workplaces, it was not until 1941 that the then colonial government officially recognized them.
The recognition was made manifest with the passing of the Trade Union Ordinance of 1941,
which officially allowed the formation of trade unions in the colony. The official recognition was
meant to avoid the kind of labour struggles that had accompanied the Industrial Revolution in
Europe and North America. Consequently, on September 8, 1945, the Gold Coast Trades Union
Congress (later the TUC) was founded, with an initial membership of 6,030 and 14 affiliates at
the offices of the Railway African Employees Union in Sekondi. The GCTUC, however, was more or less an appendage of the Convention People's Party
(CPP), which had been formed by Kwame Nkrumah as a political party to fight for national
independence. It thus was no surprise when the struggle for better working conditions was
coupled with calls for independence, especially with the arrest in 1948 of what have become
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known in Ghana’s political history as the “Big Six,”1 as well as several other pro-independence
politicians. After their arrest, the GCTUC called for a nationwide strike, which led to the release
of the politicians. Notwithstanding, it was the official recognition of trade unionism that led to the
emergence of collective bargaining – and, subsequently, tripartism -- in Ghana in the immediate
post-independence era: when, in 1957, Ghana became a member of the ILO and ratified
Conventions 87 and 98, and many other conventions related to labour issues.2 The joining of the
ILO and the role played by the GCTUC led the Nkrumah government to pass the Industrial
Relations Act of 1958: which, according to Kusi and Gyimah-Boakye (1992: 91), “first
introduced the idea of compulsory collective bargaining by a joint standing committee consisting
of an equal number of members of a certified union and the employer’s representative.” The
provisions of the ratified conventions were thus incorporated into the Industrial Relations Act of
1958, creating the legal foundation for collective bargaining in Ghana.
In 1965 the government produced a new Industrial Relations Act (1965), which
recognized for the first time the right of public service workers to bargain collectively. This new
Act gave the “joint standing negotiating committees jurisdiction to negotiate all matters with the
employment or non-employment, or the terms of employment or the conditions of labour, of any
of the employees of the employer” (Kusi and Gyimah-Boakye, 1992:91). The Act not only
legally recognized the TUC as the only national centre for unionism, and even provided it with
buildings for its unions' headquarters; it also made collective bargaining compulsory. It legally
prescribed regulation of labour practices in Ghana, and laid the foundation for the tripartite
national labour policy consultative body -- that is, the National Advisory Committee on Labour,
a tripartite body comprising government and employers’ and employees' representatives (social
partners). It did so in pursuance of section 35 of the 1965 Industrial Relations Act, on advising
the government on all matters of policy relating to labour and labour relations, all proposals for
legislation relating to labour and labour relations, and any other matters that may be referred to it
from time to time. The tripartite committee was set up consistently with international
conventions and local legislation to determine the minimum wage, for later approval by
government. It was initially named the Tripartite Committee on Wages and Salaries Guidelines.
The committee, which is consultative in nature, meets to deliberate on the minimum rates at
which employed labour in specified trades and sectors of industry is paid. Thus, through the Act,
collective bargaining through tripartism became, and has continued to be, the main tool for
unions in their dealings with employers, including government and private employers through
the tripartite system. The Nkrumah government's acceptance of trade unions and tripartism in national
development was echoed in a speech delivered in January 1959 by Mr. Kojo Botsio, at the time
the minister responsible for labour, at the inauguration of the Employers’ Association of Ghana.
The minister remarked: The Government welcomes the formation of this Association, the lack of which has
long been felt by Government and workers alike. Good industrial relations are based
1For more on the “Big Six,” see Charles Quist-Adade (2007) “Kwame Nkrumah, the big six, and the fight
for Ghana’s independence,” The Journal of Pan African Studies, 1(9), 230-233 2For a very good understanding of state-labour relationship in the post-independence era, see
Abeeku Essuman-Johnson (2007), “Organised labour and the liberal state,” in K. Boafo-Arthur
(ed.) Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State, London: Zed Books.
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on a tripartite foundation of government workers’ and employers’ organisations.
Government attaches the greatest importance to industrial peace and stability and
hopes the work of your Association will help in our objective of intensifying the
economic reconstruction of our country (Annual Labour Reports 1960, cited in Adu-
Poku, 2006: 194).
The overthrow in 1966 of the CPP was welcomed by many workers discontented with the
TUC’s relationship with the CPP government. It was supplanted by the National Liberation
Council (NLC). According to Adu-Poku (2006), “the co-operation between the TUC and the
CPP Government had deteriorated by the one-party state period although there still remained a
considerable degree of industrial peace”. He compared this unhealthy situation to that of a once
happily married couple, and attributed it to either the government's tight control of the unions or
to the provisions in the 1967 Act for the settlement of grievances, as well as to the compulsory
collective bargaining imposed by the Act on the private sector (217). Unfortunately, in spite of early acceptance of the NLC, from 1996 to 1972 was a period
of uncertainty for unions and tripartism. The relationships continued to deteriorate even when a
new civil regime was installed in 1969. Those between the NLC and the TUC, in particular,
started to go downhill with the passing of the 1967 Labour Decree (NLCD 157).
Although the Decree called for the establishment of, and prescribed the composition and
functions of, machinery for determining “the minimum remuneration and other conditions of
workers and for matters connected thereto,” a number of provisions and actions of the
government especially negatively impacted the TUC. Some of its leaders were imprisoned for
their close relations with the CPP during the Nkrumah era and the government imposed a
Secretary-General on it. Furthermore, in 1967 the government passed a new Act to repeal the
Civil Services Act of 1960, which had made trade union membership compulsory for civil
servants. This action affected the membership of national unions (e.g., the Public Services
Workers’ Union), a significant proportion of whose members were in the civil service. In
addition, the implementation by the NLC Government of an IMF sponsored policy package had
negative effects on workers and the labour movement. These policies involved massive
retrenchment of unionized workers in state-owned enterprises, minimal increase in the minimum
wage, and reduced government expenditure and trade liberalization (TUC, n.d.). The frosty relationship between the TUC and the NLC continued under the latter’s
successor, the Progress Party (PP) government (1969-1972), which was a surrogate of the NLC.
Its policies thus reflected those of its predecessor. The relationship between the government and
the TUC therefore continued to be, at best, frigid, resulting in a significant number of strikes
during the short life of the government, partly caused by demands for wage increases,
unsurprising in the economic situation of the time. The attitude of government to trade unions
generated much suspicion on the part of labour; this was exacerbated when the government
supported the breaking away from the TUC of some unions, including the industrial and
commercial workers' union and the railway and port workers', in 1972. Matters came to a head
when the government passed an Act, the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act (Act 383), which
led to the abolition and dissolution of the TUC in 1971. The police invaded the offices of the
TUC, and seized files and other documents. The Act also required the registration of unions,
gave the government sole discretion in awarding bargaining certificates, and prescribed large
fines for union infractions. The tripartite relationship that had existed before the PP government
was thus decisively done away with, and the government continued to interfere in labour
relations.
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The overthrow of the PP by the National Redemption Council (NRC) in the early days of
1972 altered the relationship between the TUC and the government. The NRC, which was
ideologically left-leaning, embraced the TUC, and reversed a number of the policies against it.
The regime insisted on a semi-corporatist arrangement in policy making, which facilitated group
representation that quelled conflict and compelled cooperation among key social actors. The
government was also interested in direct involvement, with government department’s
cooperation coordinated by military officers. The NRC succeeded in maintaining cooperation in
state-union relations, and recognized the TUC’s positions on issues as important and legitimate.
Under the Acheampong regime, a National Tripartite Committee (NTC) was established as the
main social dialogue organization. The NTC is a powerful institution, consisting of several
ministers, the General Secretary of the GTUC, and the Chief Executive Officer of the Chamber
of Mines. One of its important functions is to determine the minimum daily wage (Norwegian
Agency for Development Cooperation, 2011: 14).
The years that followed, until the coming of the Provisional National Defence Council
(PNDC) and the introduction of the structural adjustment, saw few activities that undermined the
effectiveness of the TUC and tripartism in Ghana. Under the Third Republic (1979-81), for
example, there was little influence on trade union activities. During this regime the constitution
identified trade unions as key stakeholders in discussions on national socio-economic issues.
This is not surprising, since all the regimes that had gained political power were considered to be
on the ideological left, and were thus favourably disposed to unionism, while it supported
Acheampong’s idea of a “Union Government,” after agitation from some civil society groups for
the return to constitutional governance in the latter part of the 1970’s (Essuman-Johnson). This
struggle for the return to constitutional government and the explicit support of the TUC did not
affect tripartism -- the main focus of this paper – in any way. The overthrow of the Third Republic on the last day of 1981 brought about enormous
pressures on the TUC and union activism, especially after the introduction of structural
adjustment policies in 1983 to renew the ailing Ghanaian economy (Essuman-Johnson, 2007).
Although it has been called a difficult period for the TUC, tripartism was still upheld as a vital
process for developments in the economy. In fact, one may argue that it was during the PNDC
era, and especially under D.S Boateng as the minister for employment and social welfare, that
tripartism became much more useful, consistent with the various attempts by labour to have the
government develop policies to cushion workers against the effects of the SAP. Thus, as one
interviewee pointed out, “it [tripartism] was here already, but when D.S. Boateng became the
minister, he got it fully institutionalized, but not legalized.” In other words, until the Labour Act
was promulgated, tripartism, although quite institutionalized, was a “gentleman’s agreement by
all the social partners.” In 1992 Ghana returned to constitutional governance, a development of some
significance. The new constitution granted freedom of association, and opened up both political
and economic spaces for discussion of national development. The new environment thus also
greatly improved conditions for trade unions. Most important, tripartism continued as a venue for
social dialogue, although conflict between labour and government also continued. In 2003 a
tripartite National Labour Commission was created to help resolve such disputes. It also assumed
responsibility for issuing bargaining certificates for unions seeking to establish collective
bargaining agreements.
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Institutionalizing Tripartism: The 2003 Labour Act in Brief Focus
The previous section described some developments in industrial relations in Ghana, and
the setting up of tripartism as a social dialogue forum for the three major actors in the Ghanaian
economy. In what follows we will briefly examine the Act that finally institutionalized tripartism
formally as a platform for the discussion of national issues. The Labour Act of 2003 (s.112) gave
the NTC statutory backing, and broadened its responsibilities (s.113) to encompass advising the
minister responsible for employment on all labour market issues, as well as on broader “matters
of social and economic importance”. The Act further empowers the NTC to set up regional and
district subcommittees, which must also be tripartite (s.115). It makes it clear that the main
tripartite committee, and any sub-committees, must have secretarial services for the effective
performance of their functions. With the promulgation of the Labour Act in 2003 the NTC thus
received statutory mandate, tasking it with determining the national daily minimum wage, and
with advising on employment and labour market issues, including labour laws, international
labour standings, industrial relations, and occupational safety. Furthermore, Act 651 contains extensive provisions on tripartite consultations, with Part
XIII setting out the legal framework. Section 112 details the structure of the NTC, with the
minister responsible for employment as chairperson, five representatives of the government
(ministers of finance and trade and industry and the commissioner of the Ghana Revenue
Authority, with the government statistician and chief labour officer serving as the technical
mouthpiece for the government), five representatives of employers’ organizations, and five
representatives of organized labour. Labour unions are represented by three members from the
TUC: the secretary-general, the deputy secretary-general, and the chairman. There is a
representative each from the Forum and the Ghana Federation of Labour, the latter of which
consists of the Civil Servants Association (CSA), the Ghana Registered Nurses Association
(GRNA), and the Ghana National Association of Teachers (GNAT).
The functions of the NTC, according to the Act, are: (a) to determine the national daily
minimum wage; (b) to advise on employment and labour market issues, including labour laws,
international labour standards, industrial relations, and occupational safety and health; (c) to
provide consultation with partners in the labour market on matters of social and economic
importance; and (d) to perform other functions as the Minister may request to promote
employment development and peace in the labour market.
While the Act is comprehensive on industrial relations in Ghana, a substantial portion
concerns tripartism as a way of resolving industrial disputes before they proceed to the National
Labour Commission. To the government, following the tripartite approach was a matter of
building trust among the major actors in the Ghanaian economy.
Effectiveness of Tripartism in Ghana: A Policy Concerted Perspective In this section we draw on interviews to analyse the effectiveness of tripartism in Ghana,
especially when it comes to the development of the national minimum wage and creating
industrial harmony for the smooth functioning of the national economy, and with specific
reference to the theories developed by Trebilcock (1994). It must be acknowledged that the new
Act expands on these two areas, and covers all aspects of labour and industrial relations. As
already noted, we limit ourselves to these two main issues because they were, and continue to be,
the main focal points in industrial relations in Ghana; and, until the passing of the 2003 Act, they
were the main focal points for social dialogue.
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The primary element of policy concertation is the coming together of the three major
actors in industrial relations -- that is to say, government, employers, and labour -- in the process
of making policies for economic development. In every country, one of the fundamental issues in
ensuring social justice and equity is the development of a threshold at which individual workers
must be paid (Grimshaw, 2013). This is commonly referred to as the minimum wage. The
minimum wage is important for the general economic conditions of a country, as is pay equity;
moreover, minimum wage effects may be subsumed, reinforced, or distorted by collective
bargaining (Grimshaw, et al. 2013; Lemos, 2009). Furthermore, and as argued by Grimshaw
(2013: 20), “the setting of a statutory minimum wage is one of a number of instruments of public
policy at the disposal of governments -- along with, for example, minimum working hours and
minimum paid holidays -- to set basic legal standards in the labour market.” The fixing of a
minimum wage prevents the exploitation of weak, ill-informed, or isolated groups of individuals;
it affords such people a more comprehensive protection than is available through existing
voluntary bargaining machinery (Fapohunda, et al. 2012) What has been the benefit of the concertation approach in setting the minimum wage and,
therefore, wage policy in Ghana? Interviews with the three major players, and others, revealed
that opinions did not differ on the benefit of the approach as a way of setting wage policy, as
well as to create industrial harmony for the country’s economic development. One interviewee
expressed satisfaction at the use of this approach: So as far as possible, we know it’s a very good system. It’s a very good practice
because it creates an even platform for these three parties, which we call the social
partners, i.e., the government, employer, and employee, for them to interact and to
consider critical issues that affect their relationship as far as possible. So Ghana sees it
as a very unique model, and we incorporated it into our national laws, especially the
Labour Act 2003, where we have the national tripartite committee, an institution
which has a lot of functions, and among which is the negotiation on the national law
on wage.
While the ILO convention on minimum wage – that is, convention 313 -- stipulates that it
is government's responsibility to determine the minimum wage of a country, it also stipulates that
government must do so in consultation with representatives of employers and workers. In its
attempt to deepen tripartism in fulfilment of this convention, however, Ghana has gone beyond
consulting to negotiating. What this means, according to an interviewee, is that “the three parties
have equal strength to be able to determine what is good for themselves as far as the minimum
wage is concerned, so we see it as a very good practice.” Another interviewee remarked that
“consultation, as the word implies, is just to take one’s views to determine something, but
negotiating means one also comes with his/her proposal. In this sense, we all bargain, and then
arrive at an acceptable figure for all. Unfortunately, with consultation, one may just ask a few of
their opinions, and out of that create something for the person, and this becomes either-take-it-or-
leave-it-syndrome, which does not augur well for national development”. Similarly, another
interviewee, speaking on why Ghana has moved beyond consultation to concertation through
negotiation, said that such negotiations lead to a binding agreement among the social partners.
“Yes”, he said, “at the end we all we all agree, but [with] consultation, I just take your views, and
come out with something; but if we are negotiating, it’s more binding, and more resourceful, as
far as possible. But generally speaking, the practice now is [to] negotiate to come out with the
minimum wage, which becomes the benchmark, the wage below which no employer should
employ anyone as far as possible.”
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The concertation approach has been described as very effective, and perhaps the best
approach in policy making in Ghana. It is so because it includes an opportunity for a meaningful
discussion, with mutual trust, as well as the platform on which every party can reflect on
whatever comes out of the negotiation process. It is a real example of representative democracy,
as well as a venue for resolving social conflict, while creating industrial harmony for national
development. In the Ghanaian case, tripartism negotiation is preceded by a meeting of a technical
team or a sub-committee comprising representatives of the three major partners, which then
brainstorms, and looks at a number of scenarios before the three partners meet to discuss issues
relating to the setting of the minimum wage: which, as already explained, then serves as the base
pay for negotiations in both the public and private sectors. The technical committee thus
considers the social, economic and, even, political implications of what is to be discussed before
matters are brought up for a decision to be taken. The sub-committee collects data, and analyses
the data on inflation, the tax system and the trends in the labour field; this makes it easier for the
social partners to decide what they really want to concentrate on to determine the national daily
minimum wage. This kind of system, that is the openness and trust, has really transcended into
most organizations, says an interviewee and although there are times where there are hostilities,
the system generally helps to cool things down, and helps to arrive at an acceptable policy for all.
One of the fundamental assumptions of concertation is respect for all the partners
involved in the process. In Ghana, the new Act has strengthened the already existing trust among
these partners. We have already noted how throughout the history of tripartism, governments
have in some ways clashed with their partners, especially labour. The Act offers a basis on which
to consistently respect labour, despite the economic challenges that labour's demands may
impose on the economy. Concisely, the Labour Act has not deprived unions of the right to
negotiate. In fact, the 1992 Republican constitution itself is explicit as to the right to such
negotiation. The Labour Act takes it even further. It recognizes that unions have the economic
right to negotiate for their salary and terms and conditions of service. It is this legitimacy that has
been exercised, and continues to be exercised, by unions representing public sector organizations
in the discussion on the introduction of the single spine salary in the country. Managing the wage bill in every country has assumed paramount importance in recent
years. Ghana is no exception, and the wage bill has there become a serious, even devastating,
issue. Recently, the IMF warned the government of the possible truncation of its
transformational agenda if it does not control the ballooning of the wage bill. This warning came
at a time when many public sector workers were still pressing for better conditions and market
related incomes. Fortunately, the concertation approach is helping the government to manage the
wage bill in such a way as to avoid derailing its “Better Ghana” transformation agenda. The
government is now able to know, and have meaningful discussion about, the overall implications
of the ballooning wage bill for the economy. It is now able to openly tell its social dialogue
partners what exactly is being spent, and discuss ways that are acceptable to all actors, with the
full participation of labour in curbing the ever growing wage bill. Transparency, fairness, and
equity in the public pay administrations are thus among the benefits of tripartism in Ghana, said
an interviewee.
Some Challenges to the Concertation Process In spite of the acceptance in Ghana of the benefits of the concertation approach, and its
extensive use, it still presents a number of challenges to both government and the other social
partners, and these must be addressed. The problem has also reared its ugly head with the formal
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institutionalization of tripartism as a way to determine the minimum wage, which serves as the
base pay for all other negotiations. This problem is more prevalent on the side of labour in
general. Before we look at this problem from labour’s perspective, we must acknowledge the
challenge posed by negotiation in this process.
We have already conceded that the Ghanaian situation goes beyond consultation, which
is the basis of concertation efforts all over the world. In Ghana the basic challenge to negotiation,
according to one interviewee, is that “when you have negotiated or when you are going to
negotiate, you are not the one holding the purse. So one will not call it a full mandate in the sense
that somebody else has to determine the base pay, somebody else make the budget, somebody
else pays and then you are the one negotiating or administering what has been agreed upon.” In
other words, the negotiation is constrained by the dynamics of a system in which the government
can refuse to pay as agreed, especially when the existing policy says that at no other point should
the base pay be lower than the national minimum wage. Thus, it means that the base pay must be
equal to or more than the minimum wage. As an interviewee noted, “Over the last three years
we’ve had various negotiations that have attempted to fulfill that rule. But you see, one problem
came up. The public services joint standing negotiating committee believes that using this
approach does take away the rights of unions to negotiate.” Obviously, this affects the
negotiation process in general. A far more serious challenge is the fragmentation of labour. In general, when one talks
about labour, it is assumed that all labour unions come under the umbrella of a TUC.
Unfortunately, this is not the case in Ghana. There are a number of unions, such as the Ghana
National Association of Teachers (GNAT), the Graduate Teachers Association (GTAG), the
University Teachers Association of Ghana (UTAG), the Civil and Local Government Staff
Association (CLOGSA), and so on, which are all independent of the TUC. This disunity is a
major threat to tripartism, to the extent that they normally attempt to negotiate separately,
especially with government. For example, the CLOGSA recently took the government to court
over the status granted to the TUC in the dialogue process. They entreated the court to declare
the public services joint standing negotiating committee an illegal entity, on the basis that it takes
away their right to negotiate under the constitution and under the Labour Act. Although the case
was dismissed, it delayed the negotiation process, as well as creating animosity among other
unions. Commenting on this particular case, an interviewee noted how CLOGSA has failed to
return to the negotiating table, despite being ordered to do so by the court, even though the
negotiated base pay, among other things, affects them. This, in turn, undermines the
government’s ability to negotiate well with all partners. Another challenge is the failure of the institutionalization process, in this case Act 203, to
strengthen the inspectorate division of the chief labour officer’s office. As it stands now, the
office charged to ensure that the agreed minimum wage is paid lacks the power to inspect the
workplace without notice, as well as to compel other public bodies, such as the district
assemblies, to contribute their quotas by monitoring the activities of the various organizations,
especially the private ones, and providing the feedback necessary for the NTC to have access to
the information.
Conclusion
In recent years the engagement of the public, including private actors, by governments to
deal with wicked (that is to say, intractable) societal problems has been, and continues to be,
encouraged. The hope is that by doing so government can find better solutions to those problems,
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which seems so far to be beyond what government bureaucrats alone can do. Various approaches
continue to be developed that enhance societal participation in both policy development and
policy implementation. One area in which engaging society has yielded benefits is industrial relations. In these
turbulent economic times, engaging the major actors in economic development is seen as a sine
qua non if problems are to be resolved in ways that will promote social, political, and economic
growth. It is not surprising that the ILO and other international organizations continue to call for
dialogue among societal actors. Scholars have attempted, and continue to attempt, to find ways of explaining the possible
approaches to, as well as the benefits and weaknesses of, social dialogue as a policy making
process. They also continue to find variations in different countries, and to explain and account
for the factors that produce such variations. One area that continues to attract attention but, at the
same time, also defies better explanation is the institutionalization of the social dialogue process
in various countries. There is thus a lacuna in the study of the institutionalization process, and it
should be filled.
Consequently, in this paper we have attempted to take up this challenge by studying the
institutionalization of social dialogue through tripartism in Ghana. Ghana merited our attention
because it had, and used, this process long before it became internationally known. At the same
time it is one of the few countries that have institutionalized the process formally through an Act
of Parliament, although until recently, as already noted, it was based on no more than a
gentleman’s agreement. It is thus unique in the context of social dialogue, especially in the
process of determining the national minimum wage.
The question that underpinned the study was why Ghana, despite the success of that
gentleman’s agreement, decided to institutionalize the process by formally passing a law on
tripartism. Focusing on policy concertation, and discussing the benefits of concerted efforts
toward national development, we made the case that the idea to formally institutionalize the
process stemmed from the many benefits that the three main actors have derived from it, even
under authoritarian regimes during periods of military rule. To fully understand the concerted efforts we uncovered the beginning of the process by
looking at the emergence of unionism in Ghana, and at the fight by these unions to be formally
heard, even during the colonial period. The voice these unions projected, and their subsequent
role in Ghana’s independence movement, made them an essential part of Ghana’s development,
especially where policies on socio-economic and, even, political developments were concerned.
We were able to then look at the various developments that affected social dialogue throughout
the years, all the way to the passing of the new Act. The new Act formally recognized the process by noting that the employer-employee
relationship is very interdependent, and that every employer must be honest with his or her
employees. Section 9 of the Act, therefore, encourages the employer to have an open system of
communication with workers, so as to nurture harmonious industrial relations for the benefit of
all. Through tripartism, Ghana has been able to avoid the labour militancy that has characterized
many countries; doing so has produced a system in which mutual respect continues to be the
norm, despite the challenges that continue to affect the entire process. We are of the view that the
Ghanaian case offers a valuable lesson for all countries that are in search of a process that will
lead to peaceful industrial relationships.
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analysis,” International Political Science Review, 30(2), 141–162
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