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Blowout Risk - can technology reduce human factor causes?
During Drilling, Production, Well Intervention & Abandonment
Colin Stuart FIMechE & John Wright
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Introduction
3
Colin Stuart – Petroleum Engineer
• Forty years experience in wells; drilling, production, well Integrityand well control
• Stuart Wright company formed in 2006 with John Wright; Singapore, UK & Australia
• Expert witness for regulators
• Support for Underwriters on complex well reviews
• Reduction of Blowout risk is my mission
Well Engineering ✔
Well Integrity Management
✔
Well Control InvestigationGovernments/Operators/
Underwriters✔
HPHT & Deepwater ✔
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Introduction
4
John Wright - Global Relief Well Advisor for Wild Well Control
John is a graduate and a member of the distingished Alumni in Mechanical Engineering at Texas A&M University. His operational expertise is in blowout control management and contingency planning and specifically the design and execution of relief wells. He has 41 years experience working on 101 relief well and intersection P&A projects around the world, personally supervising 47 at the rigsite, including the Deepwater Horizon Blowout in the Gulf of Mexico, Saga Petroleum, Ocean Odyssey, Repsol and Piper Alpha in the North Sea. He developed the first commercial service for relief well contingency plans in 1989, introduced the first OLGA transient software for hydraulic kill design and risk assessments in 1991 and has written hundreds of plans covering most all of the oil and gas operating environments worldwide.
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Blowout Risk - can technology reduce human factor causes
5
The answer is yes but….
• Not following procedures, Poor Supervision, and missed signals are the primary Human Factor causes
• Better technology can improve signal recognition and shut-in response, however, technology gets great support if it reduces time and cost but not necessarily if it only reduces risk of LWC
• Not following procedures and poor supervision can be improved by following smarter/more disciplined systems – not a natural human behaviour!
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Blowout Risk - can technology reduce human factor causes
6
..and another thing, the LWC risk will grow with time
• LWC happens in production wells typically during Well Interventions, and increasingly will happen in already abandoned/long term suspended well. How do we tackle these with technology?
• Blowouts in interventions is due to barrier failure during well construction or post construction deterioration, or failure to respect barrier changes during the intervention
• Blowouts in already abandoned wells is arguably inevitable in cases where reservoirs re-pressurise and barriers degrade.
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Blowout Risk - can technology reduce human factor causes
7
The presentation will touch on these challenges and show :
➢ how technology and discipline around Process Safety using barrier management can significantly reduce LWC risk
➢ What the Underwriting community could do to reduce risk
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Total loss of well control is devastating..
8
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Total loss of well control is devastating..
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Onshore wells in the US is exempt from Process safety regulation…..
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Intervention Wells blowout…
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Primary Barrier (Mud Column) Failure ->Surface Blowout underneath platform
11
13-3/8" Shoe @492.5m TVD
20" Shoe @201m TVD
13-3/8" Shoe @891m MD/774m TVD
Directional Drilledtoward the targetwell
Loss Zone @160m BDF
13 3/8" Csg Parted@ 185m BDF
Intersect @ 873mMD/780m TVD
Bit @ 1996m MD/774m TVD
9 5/8" Shoe @854.55mMD/750m TVD
5" Drillpipeinside 13 3/8"Csg
Gas Kick broke down shoe – failed cement job, broach to surface due to failed barriers.
Wells on platforms can cost the entire asset to be lost
This incident was felt to potentially cost the Operator their entire LNG contract
Human Factor Well Barrier Failure example
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Well Barrier Failure example
•Indonesia, Surabaya, 2006
•Primary Barrier (Mud) Failure during Construction Phase - Underground Blowout
Drilled into an over pressured water zone (4000 psi)
Kick broke down formation – Previous casing too shallow, broach to surface
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Blowout Statistics - during Well Interventions
BOEM Study
• BOEM commissioned a study in 2014 to establish statistics of oil spill occurrences,
• statistically significant non-Arctic empirical data from the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) – including the Gulfof Mexico (GOM) and Pacific OCS – and world-wide sources, together with their variance
Ref: Loss of Well Control Occurrence and Size Estimators for Alaska OCS, October 2014, https://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/BOEM_Newsroom/Library/Publications/BOEM_2014-772.pdf
Most blowouts by quantity occur during Well Interventions compared to other well phases!
14
The Problem
Our Environment has a problem
Millions of already Abandoned Oil & Gas wells all over the world many over a century old with:
1. Uncertain location2. Unknown abandonment condition3. Unknown emissions to the environment
Some historical wells are leaking alreadyMany owners of abandoned wells no longer exist
A global solution to a global problem is needed
Blowout Risk also applies to already abandoned wells !
15Private and Confidential
Surface Contamination
In addition to fugitive methane emissions, well fluids can reach the surface and contaminate thesurrounding area and subterranean bodies such as freshwater aquifers.
Texas, United States
In Texas over 1.5 mm wells have been drilled and abandoned. In the last century. The Texas Railroadcommission has actively been re-abandoning leaking wells since the 1990’s but many leaking sites, causingunquantified aquifer and surface contamination still exist.
Texas Tribune
Surface Contamination & Case Studies
16Private and Confidential
Colombia
In March 2018, the Lizama 158 previously abandoned oil wells in northern Colombia burst, causing anunclear amount of oil to flow into the Magdalene River, a principle waterway that flows about 950 milesnorthward through the western half of the country. Over the next month, reports say the crude killed morethan 2,400 animals. More than 1,000 tree species in the area have been damaged, and families have beenrelocated and treated for vomiting, headaches, and dizziness associated with the spill. (NationalGeographic)
Lizama field (nearby Barrancabermeja, Colombia) belonging to Ecopetrol
Surface Contamination & Case Studies
17Private and Confidential
Calmar, Canada
Five homes were demolished in Calmar, Canada in 2010 for re-abandonment due to sweet gas leaking froman old abandoned well.
Residents were asked to leave in 2013 and 2015 while operator tried to fix the leak.The well has been reported to be still leaking today.
Surface Contamination & Case Studies
18Private and Confidential
Miri, Malaysia
A Gas leak was discovered at an abandoned well when workers were clearing the land for propertydevelopment.
The Gas leak was confirmed from“B’ annulus and the gas was fingerprinted to be reservoir gas.
Surface Contamination & Case Studies
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Blowout Consequences & Impact
• Loss of Life
• Oil Spill, associated pollution, and other environmental damage
• Cost of Control – Capping, Relief Wells, Underground Blowouts, Snubbing
• Loss of assets, re-drills & replacement cost
• Lost production and reservoir damage,
• Spill Cost – containment, clean-up, socio-economic, litigation, fines
• Damage to company reputation – share price, partners, customers, insurance, regulators
• Contract and cash flow interruption
• Government regulatory consequences - loss of license to operate, fines, more regulations
• Not all costs are covered by Insurance – Insurers are also being more aggressive in requesting evidence of competency due to increasing number of claims and payouts
• Blowout Costs impact 1 to 60 + Billion
• Long term damage to ecosystem of further major blowouts$$$?
20
Blowout Causes
So What Causes Blowouts ?
Human factors review
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 21
FOR OFFSHORE BLOWOUTS DURING DRILLING, COMPLETION OR WORKOVER
1. Inattention to Operations 26%2. Improper Maintenance of Equipment 21%3. Inadequate Supervision of Work Performance 20%
4. Improper Planning 12%5. Improper Procedures 11%6. Unpredictable events 4%7. Improper Installation Inspection 3%8. Inadequate Documentation 3%
Human factors review
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 22
FOR OFFSHORE BLOWOUTS DURING DRILLING, COMPLETION OR WORKOVER
1. Inattention to Operations
Should be an automation and Process Safety Focus
2. Improper Maintenance of Equipment Competence issue – but is this partly a technology consequence?
3. Inadequate Supervision of Work PerformanceCompetence and corporate Process Safety rules breach
4. Improper Planning 12%5. Improper Procedures 11%6. Unpredictable events 4%7. Improper Installation Inspection 3%8. Inadequate Documentation 3%
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Findings from various blowout or loss of control investigations:
Failure to learn
System
Bypass of barrier policy
Organisation
Biased decision-making
Human & Organisational
MOC system not existing or enforced
Management
Data overload and interpretation gap
System & Human Factors
Lack of as-built accurate wellbore diagrams/data
System
Blowout Causes – Human factors dominated
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“Process safety in Oil & Gas lags dangerously behind other industries” – OESI December 2018
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Data Flow/Decision Influencers
Drilling
Superintendent
Drilling Engineering Team
Logistics, Commercial, HR Resources & Support
Rig Crew (Drill, deck, maintenance, marine etc)
Third Party Services (Fluids, Cementing, Mud Logging etc)
Drilling Contractor Management Team (Driller, OIM/Toolpusher)
Operator Offshore Team (Wellsite Engr, Logistics etc)
DSV
Onshore Team
Offshore Team
Data Flow/Decision Influencers
DECISION APICES
Direction
Information Subsurface Team
Drilling Management
Team
Information
Direction
Data Flow Data Flow
Drilling contractor
Management
SeniorManagement
Drilling Operations decision making … Human Factor dominated & not always data driven
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Fundamentally this is a Process Safety & Human Factors issue, so technology solutionsneed to focus on helping front line teams improve Prevention of influx
or Loss of Containment in production wells and Response to minimise the damage
Operators Well Control Management system must focus on process safetynot just technology, if the front line teams are to be successful
Can regulation do more perhaps, – setting higher minimum standards ?
Underwriters – re-think, at a certain level, that blowouts are an acceptable risk;
more exclusions/more professional & comprehensive reviews?
Blowout Causes – Human factors dominated
www.stuartwright.com.sg
On the HF side, Industry is slowly trying….
I recently attended an OESI (Ocean Energy Safety Institute) committee meeting- have a goal to create “Leading Blowout indicators dashboard “ .
I presented our Process safety RTBC technology- recognised as a potential platform to build the dashboard .
Blowout Causes – Human factors dominated
www.stuartwright.com.sg
Prevention of kicks is about Process safety
Process Safety technology does exist today
• Support decision making by helping teams understand the importance of barriers and barrier rules
• Track any deviations from policy & decision making logic
• Cloud enabled to speed up shore base teams response and support
• Enable instantly accurate & saleable diagrams of well construction condition
• Evidentiary transparency compliance with the company barrier rules
• Works across the well life cycle
• Needs to be flexible to enable changes to plan that do not increase risk
Reality check: This system is informally supported by regulators in USA, NZ and Australia, but difficult to sell to operators due to additional 30 mins per day time investment – Underwriters can help here by attaching conditions to insurance or offering discount on premium if operators adopted such systems
Can technology reduce the risk ?
www.stuartwright.com.sg
Prevention of kicks is about Process safety
Perhaps it is time we had the equivalent of Marine Quantity Surveyors for complex Oil and Gas well projects ?
We have the talent, and we know how to improve process safety, but external drive is needed.
Can technology reduce the risk ?
www.stuartwright.com.sg
Response to kicks is about detection of change, checking for flow, followed by BOP closure
• Fluid flow dynamics, gas behaviour, penetration rate
• A flow check is conducted first if uncertainty exists, but this is a choice..
• Size of kick must be minimised otherwise pressures can exceed the well design envelope
• Historically we rely on a mud column density (MW) to prevent kicks
• If the mud column density is lower than the pore pressure in permeable formationsa kick is taken
Can technology reduce the risk of blowout even after a kick is taken ?
www.stuartwright.com.sg
Response to kicks is about detection of change, checking for flow, followed by BOP closure
• Where uncertainty in Pore Pressure is high, MW is too crude a control since it takes too long to adjust the density. Managed Bottom Hole Pressure (MPD) & Coriolis systems are then used.
• MPD can significantly reduce kick sizes since minor changes are detected early and BOP closure is much faster, though closure of BOP is still a Human decision
• Systems can be automatic or manually operated – operator choice. Both have limitations.
Can technology reduce the risk of blowout even after a kick is taken ?
www.stuartwright.com.sg
• Next big technology change:
• Auto kick detection and auto shut in of BOP – under research
Recommended by the Chemical Safety Board in their report “Gas Well Blowout and Fire at Pryor Trust Well 1H-9 “
2018-01-I-OK-R2 “Establish and convene a group of experts with drilling, engineering, and instrumentation expertise to discuss methods to achieve widespread implementation of automatic safety instrumented systems that could bring a well to a safe state in the event other operational barriers fail “
Can technology reduce the risk of blowout even after a kick is taken ?
www.stuartwright.com.sg
How to addresses all of these key Human factors and complexities?
We decided as a company, that a structured system was needed, for operations teamsto follow based on strict observance of well control prevention rules, built aroundpolicies and procedures for barrier control. Needs to create a natural flow to decisionmaking round compliance, not just check the box.
Central cloud database for data management capture and retrieval. Learning andMOC.
Represent a well diagrammatically, with scale, where appropriate, subsurface detail,and integrate critical surface equipment and barriers such as wellheads, BOP’s, MPD,well testing spreads.
To specifically address the Human Factors, help rig site teams what rules policyapplied and when; how barriers should be validated; capture evidence throughupload of supporting barrier documents, and where flexibility in decision making wasnecessary, that the logic behind all decisions including interpretation was captured inthe system for future learnings.
Loss of Well Control Causal Factors
Failure to learn
System
Bypass of barrier policy
Organisation
Biased decision-making
Human & Organisational
MOC system not enforced
Management
Data overload and interpretation gap
System & Human Factors
Lack of as-built accurate wellbore
diagrams/data
System
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RTBC – Real Time Barrier Control – an example of an improvement to process safety
RTBC is a cloud stored Barrier Validation System, which ensurescorporate Barrier Rules are verifiably applied during wellconstruction
• Instantly available accurate wellbore diagrams via cloudconnectivity
• Evidentiary transparency compliance with the company barrierrules
• Barrier validation evidence captured during well construction,completion and Interventions
• Secure cloud database storage or client server for all criticalbarrier validation information
• Scalable wellbore diagram giving accurate representation of theentire wellbore system including :✓casing, cement, formation, wellhead, BOP’s configuration ,
MPD network
• Provides the onshore management team with the same accuratewellbore status information as on the drilling rig
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WellBore diagram is created to reflect state of the well
Surface and downhole equipment is fully customizable to depict actual
details
Powerful graphical tool, Wellbore Editor, is
available as part of RTBCto show as built wellbore
diagram at any time during intervention
operations
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Well Barriers shown as primary and secondary
Barriers can be easily assigned corresponding colour in the
Envelope mode
Barriers can be primary, secondary or common.
This is easy and intuitive to show them in the
diagram using Envelope mode
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Well Surface equipment diagram
Components are shown as stacked one on another and are
customizable by the users. Other useful information like special depth
marker and length of the components can be shown as well
Well Surface equipment stack used during
intervention operations can be shown using a
separate specially developed Wellbore
Editor page
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Well Surface equipment diagram – Envelope mode
Well Surface equipment stack also can be colouredto display components as
primary, secondary and/or common barriers
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Daily Integrity Report
Once barriers are validated, a daily integrity report can be generated in
the DIR module. It shows barrier integrity status and reduced as built
WB diagram in the first page.
Barriers are shown in the table together with their integrity statuses based
on barrier validation results
Other detailed diagrams are shown in the additional pages
of the report
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Daily Integrity Report – well integrity details
Recommended responses are shown automatically according to
the barrier status.
Detailed barrier validations and evidence
statements are shown in a separate consolidated
page for all the barriers of the current activity
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Daily Integrity Report – save and distribute
Send the report either via the software to the predefined
personnel distribution list or as an attachment using your company’s
The daily integrity report is ready to be saved as pdf
or excel file and be distributed across
organisation
Redraft the report at any time shall amendments
be required
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41Private and Confidential
MPD Drawing components and system validation
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42Private and Confidential
Well Interventions can be planned using ournew innovative Wireline and Coiled tubingbuilding tools
Now engineers can show their exact systemassembly and capture the validation allbarriers prior to operations
Coiled Tubing Intervention
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43Private and Confidential
Coiled Tubing String + Perforations
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44Private and Confidential
Well testing operations can be planned using our new innovative testing flow loop buildingtool. Now engineers can show their exact system assembly and capture the validation allbarriers prior to introducing hydrocarbons
Well Testing
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Suggestions for Leading LWC Human Factor Indicators- identifiers of increased risk of LWC event
Bypass of barrier policy
Organisation
MOC system not properly
enforced Management issue
• Evidence of MOC’s being issued for Barrier failure, and increasing frequency• Management commitment to minimum competence standards, implementing a Barrier validation system,
and compliance• Rigorous pre-hire auditing of well control crew competence, flow and level detection system capabilities
function and calibration• In well design, adherence to corporate Kick Tolerance and minimum overbalance criteria, frequent flow
checks, correct tripping practices• Transparent capture, discussion and reporting of anomalies• Does the Supervisor and Superintendent relationship norms emphasise LWC prevention mind set, with
open communication, listening, and transparent compliance to rules
• Lack of Well Barriers rules (Primary and secondary Standards)• Is a well barrier plan issued for each well Y/N. If N, • Are alarms on PVT and return flow indicators, captured as CBEE (Critical Barrier elements)• Is the corporate minimum Bottom Hole overbalance pressure frequently ignored• Are drill crews trained in Well Barrier management and loss of control prevention• Is someone in the organisation focused on risk management and assessment in daily operations and
has responsibility for tracking risk?
Requires evidence of a precautionar
y mind set
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Leading LWC HF Indicators- identifiers of increasing risk of LWC event
Lack of as-built accurate wellbore
diagrams/dataSystem
• Does the operator attempt to produce accurate and instantly available wellbore diagrams?
• Are all well barriers identified on the wellbore diagram?• Is continuous barrier validation mandatory either at the rig site or office?
Failure to learn
System
• Does the learning/lessons database flag loss of control events clearly and their prevention on future wells?
• Do crews receive awareness training on offset LWC events?• Are offset well review results shared as a priority with drilling team,
crews and third party services
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Leading LWC HF Indicators- identifiers of increasing risk of LWC event
Biased decision-making
Human & Organisational
Data overload and interpretation gap
System & Human Factors
• Does the operator have compulsory training for CRM (Crew Resource Management) for key decision makers in the office and rig/well intervention site?
• Is a transparent and sharing culture evident across the wells and intervention teams and between wells, subsurface and production?
• Has the operator identified what in real time or trend captured data stream is essential to maintaining primary well control?
• Is the Bottom Hole pressure margin known at all times and reported?• Are there personnel available to support the operations team when anomalies first occur?
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• Current Methods
➢ Rely heavily on historical statistics, operator size and experience
➢ Spreading risk between underwriters
➢ Limit monetary size of exposure and exclusions in contracts
Low Cost Methods to Reduce Underwriters Exposure to Blowout Risk
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Low Cost Methods to Reduce Underwriters Exposure to Blowout Risk
Possible additions to Current Methods
➢ Operator Risks: o More detailed Well planning reviewso Verifiable documentation that the insured follows industry standard well
control and well barrier management policyo Use a Marine Quantity Surveyor approach for complex wellso Premium discounts if proper process safety systems used
➢ Well/Field/Platform Risks: o Consequence screening assessment (how bad can it be if it goes wrong) for
each contract (well/field/platform)❖ Blowout rate and effluent, personnel & 3rd party impact, environmental
& real asset impact, knock on effects to additional wells ❖ Control of Wells Cost: surface & subsea capping, relief well(s),
underground blowout ❖ Including major factors that influence those costs because of location
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• Well blowout risk is increasing, sharply if activity significantly increases
• Wells industry lags dangerously behind Military, Nuclear, Aviation in Understanding & managing Human Factor causes of loss
• Better Process safety approach needed for wells to reduce risk
• New Technologies exists already to limit Kick sizes and enable fast shut in of wells
• Automatic closure of BOP’s is the next step but will be resisted initially due to time lost
• Regulations and Underwriters could do more to implement risk reduction strategies
• Already abandoned wells may present a significant future LWC problem
Summary
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