The integration of cooptation and coercion: China’s Taiwan strategy since 2001

The Integration of Cooptation and Coercion: China's Taiwan

Strategy since 2001 Joel Wuthnow

In the past half-decade, China has developed a careful balance of cooptative and coercive power in its attempts to dampen the Taiwan independence movement and pursue political unification. In essence, attempts to curry favor with politically relevant constituencies on Taiwan have been paired with attempts to diplomatically isolate and militarily threaten the island's top policymakers. This balance is risky because of the possibility that it may appear too lenient to PRC nationalists, and too provocative to ROC residents. Nevertheless, the current structure of carrots and sticks has emerged for three reasons. First, the institutional coherence of Chinese decision-making and implementation has allowed for the viability of an adaptive, long-term approach. Second, the constraints on both unreinforced cooptation and coercive diplomacy have mediated toward a posture in which the former is enhanced and the latter downplayed. Third, expanded external opportunities in recent years have made it possible to exploit this middle ground.

Key words: Taiwan, China, strategy, power, coercion.

Introduction

In the past half-decade, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has developed a careful balance of cooptative and coercive power in its efforts to dampen the Taiwan (ROC) independence movement and lay the groundwork for political unification. In this context, cooptation refers to economic and political stratagems designed to attract support for the PRC position among various Taiwanese constituencies, especially entrepreneurs and opposition parties. Coercion refers both to the military deterrence of Taiwan leaders and to the exploitation of diplomatic leverage against the ROC. China's integrated approach represents a novelty in that it follows periods of what may be described as cooptation dominance (199 l-1995) and coercion dominance ( 1995-2001). 1

What factors account for the PRC's shift toward an integrated strategy? Does this shift indicate a decreased propensity for risk-taking? The answers are by no means obvious. First, although this strategic balancing act avoids the pitfalls of

EASTAS1A, Fall 2006, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 22-45.

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over-reliance on either cooptation or coercion, it still risks alienating those Chinese nationalists who would prefer a more hawkish posture, 2 and antagonizing those in Taiwan, the United States, Japan or elsewhere who view any coercive element as indicative of potential conflict) Moreover, since it is by nature long-term, various costs (such as granting economic incentives) will accrue, and cannot be ignored. Thus, a coherent explanation for this decision is required. Unfortunately, recent scholarship on cross-Straits relations has only described the pattern, not offered a set of reasons why it emerged as it did. 4

Second, there is no automatic reason to believe that current trends represent a long-term commitment in Beijing not to escalate tensions, nor is there obvious cause to believe that it is simply a delaying tactic, in which the use of military force may appear at a more opportune time. Moreover, even if it were shown that one intention or the other was or is present, it would still be difficult to assert the durability of such an intention. If we assume, however, that the PRC would prefer not to incur the inherent material and diplomatic costs that any military strike would bring, then an explanation for why the current strategy emerged would allow us to infer the situations in which those reasons no longer hold, and, hence, a reevaluation of strategy is likely.

Thus, the aim of this paper is to explain why China has pursued a strategy that bal- ances cooptation and coercion in recent years. The answer contains three interlinked factors. First, the nature of PRC decision-making and institutional processes has allowed for a balanced, long-term approach to be developed and executed. Second, the limited utility of both unreinforced cooptation in the early 1990s and escalated threats in the mid-1990s led Chinese officials to a search for alternatives. This implies an interaction between external constraints, on one hand, and the internal ability to adapt on the other. Finally, increasing opportunities to attract support on Taiwan, and acquire diplomatic support from the United States and others, which in turn could be used to place pressure on Taipei, granted credibility to an integrated approach.

Based on this argument, two conclusions are reached. First, assuming nontrivial risks to doing so, a state may adopt an integrated strategy when three mutually reinforcing conditions are met. These conditions are institutional competence and political stability, adaptation based on the limitations of a cooptation- or coercion- dominant strategy, and the availability of multiple sources of long-term influence. Second, based on the argument, China may revert back to a more coercion posture by several means, including domestic instability, the perception that success is not likely to obtain within some unknown timeframe, or the closing of opportunities to influence various targets without resort to an escalation of threats.

1. Developments in China's Taiwan Strategy

This section demonstrates that China's efforts to contain Taiwan independence and set the stage for unification in the past 15 years have involved fluctuations between cooptative and coercion strategies. The current approach represents a balance between the two.

24 East Asia / Fall 2006

Cooptation Dominance, 1991-1995

China's initial approach to cross-Strait relations under Jiang Zemin essentially continued what Deng Xiaoping had sought to accomplish. That is, Deng had preferred a strategy based on the precept that the economic and cultural attraction of reform- era China would be sufficient to bring previously reluctant Taiwan policymakers to the negotiating table. In January 1979, the National People's Congress sent an open letter to "Taiwan Compatriots" expressing the wish to end mutual hostilities. Not long thereafter, Deng suggested that Taiwan could retain political and economic autonomy under a "one country, two systems" formula? Concurrently, PRC leaders attempted to curry favor via economic instruments, first by establishing the concept of the "three direct links" (postal, commercial, and travel) and then by instituting policies conducive for expanded ROC investment in the mainland. Indeed, by 1995, China was tolerating a deficit in cross-Straits trade of some $14.8 billion.

On the basis of this growing economic interaction, both sides had an incentive to engage in informal negotiations. These took the form of talks between China's unofficial Association for the Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) under the direction of Wang Daohan and Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), headed by Koo Chen-fu. In 1992, the PRC scored an apparent victory when the two bodies agreed in Singapore to support the "one China policy" (stated without a definition) and to seek "national unification. ''6 Further talks resulted in agreements on issues such as how to deal with registered mail and fishing disputes. 7 Buffeted by the apparent success of the Deng approach, Jiang's maiden address on Taiwan policy in January 1995 emphasized reconciliation. In it, jiang stated the principle that "Chinese should not fight Chinese," commented on the rights of ROC entrepreneurs in the mainland, and said that unification could occur under a "transitional framework," relaxing previous demands for a "speedy" process. ~

An important feature of strategy during this period was the lack of significant coercive measures to accompany these peaceful overtures. Specifically, the buildup of deterrent forces across the Taiwan Strait did not commence until 1994, and even then, significant deployment of ballistic missiles and other capabilities did not occur until after the crises of 1995-6. Similarly, the PRC did not engage in a competition to deny Taiwan the support of its remaining diplomatic partners. This, too, did not shift into high gear until 1997, when a successful attempt was made to convince South Africa to switch its allegiance to the PRC. Finally, China refrained from exerting pressure on the United States to curtail tightening military and diplomatic cooperation with Taipei. It did, however, watch with increasing alarm as the first Bush and Clinton administrations warmed to Taiwan, leading to the decision in the spring of 1995 to allow the Taiwan president, Lee Teng-hui, to visit the United States.

Coercion Dominance, 1995-2001

This cooptative approach dramatically gave way to the direct application of military pressure in 1995, following Lee's June visit to the United States (in which he delivered an address that promised to use "all available means" to win international support). 9 In the next two months, China carried out two rounds of missile tests,

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meant to influence US policy and to deter voters from selecting Lee as candidate for the first democratic presidential election, to be held in March 1996.1~ In October, Jiang observed an amphibious landing on a mock "enemy shore" in the Yellow Sea; the following month China conducted its largest combined arms exercise, simulating an attack on one of Taiwan's offshore islands. In December, China renamed the "Nanjing Military Region," opposite Taiwan, to the "Nanjing War Zone," and displayed advanced fighter jets recently purchased from Russia.ll In January, Beijing expanded military forces near Taiwan to over 100,000 personnel, followed in March by missile tests conducted in the vicinity of two of Taiwan's major ports.

The development of coercive power became a main feature of Chinese strategy after the 1995-6 crisis. First, the PRC utilized the deterrent capacity it had achieved in the 1995-6 crisis, as well as increasing power in economic and diplomatic areas, to convince Clinton to publicly state that the United States would support neither Taiwan's bid to re-join the United Nations, nor Taiwan independence, and would not adhere to the concept of "one China, one Taiwan. ''l~ Similarly, as noted above, the PRC was able to convince South Africa, Taiwan's most powerful diplomatic partner, to switch allegiance to Beijing. In military affairs, modernization efforts accelerated, including the purchase from Russia of two Sovremennyi-class destroy- ers, and four Kilo-class submarines, providing some capability to blockade Taiwan. More obvious was the PRC's deployment of short-range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan. In 2000, the Pentagon reported that these forces totaled 300, contrasting with "negligible" ROC defenses. 13

Notably, China applied these capabilities in a series of gambits designed to dis- suade Taiwan voters from supporting pro-independence candidates, and compel ROC leaders to desist reference to Taiwan independence. When, in July 1999, Lee espoused the theory of "special state-to-state" (teshu de guo yu guo guanxi) relations between the two sides, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) conducted war games near Taiwan and placed troops opposite the island on the highest of three alert levels.14 In March 2000, China escalated tensions ahead of ROC presidential elections, hoping to convince voters not to support Chert Shui-bian, the ostensibly pro-independence candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). On Feb- ruary 20, 2000, Beijing issued an 11,000-word white paper on Taiwan. Intended to create a "sense of urgency" on the island, 15 the document stated that a major shift away from China by the ROC could lead to war. ~6 On March 15, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, who had been known to support peaceful measures, warned that the mainland Chinese are "willing to use all their blood" to prevent Taiwan independence. ''~7

Finally, in the summer of 2001, China again applied military force, after Taiwan's new president, Chen Shui-bian, made a visit to the United States, and newly elected President George W. Bush authorized the largest sale of military technology to Taiwan to date. Specifically, Beijing's response combined hostile rhetoric 18 with military exercises. On August 17, the PLA began its largest combined-arms drills since 1949, prompting the United States to conduct aircraft carrier exercises in the region. In November, perhaps to impact Taiwan's December legislative elections, the PLA carried out war games off the coastal provinces of Zhejiang and Guang- dong, simulating attacks on carriers and launching ballistic missiles against floating targets.


Toward an Integrated Strategy, 2001-2006

In recent years, Beijing has avoided escalating tensions to the crisis proportions of 1995-2001. For instance, in August 2002 Chen announced the "one side, one country" (yi bian yi guo) theory of cross-Straits relations, but was met with only muted criticism from the PRC. Similarly, there was no major PLA attempt to sway voters ahead of the March 2004 presidential election in Taiwan, in which Chen was again a candidate. Neither was there a harsh rebuke when, in July 2004, US National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice told Jiang that weapons transfers to Taiwan were nearing actual completion and rebuffed PRC attempts to deter such sales. 19 In fact, China's most controversial move in recent years came in December 2004, when the National People's Congress approved a draft of an "anti-secession law," which simply reiterated the rather ambiguous phrase that "non-peaceful means" could be used as a "last resort. '',-~ Instead, the PRC has redoubled its efforts to secure support among politically relevant constituencies in Taiwan, while continuing to utilize military and diplomatic means to exert pressure on Taipei.

First, China has continued to offer preferential treatment to Taiwan firms, honing in on major conglomerates, such as Formosa Plastics Group and President Enterprises, which could in turn influence mainland policy. 21 In January 2003, PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen suggested that the three links, which, if implemented, would reduce costs to Taiwan businessmen] ~- could be considered as a purely economic issue, and de-linked from the contentious political connotations of the "one China" principle. 23 The PRC also repeated long-standing claims that unification would not endanger Taiwan's "economic and political rights. ''24 In addition, the PRC targeted firms traditionally loyal to the DPE On July 28, 2005, China announced that it would abolish import tariffs on 15 kinds of Taiwan fruit; this was intended to be- guile farmers in Taiwan's southern counties, which composes a major constituency for the DPR 25

Second, Beijing initiated efforts to isolate DPP leaders by developing a "united front" with the Taiwan opposition, especially the new People's First Party, and certain individuals within the Kuomintang (KMT). This approach kicked into high gear after Chen's election. Between 2000 and 2001, about one-third of the ROC legislature's 221 members visited the mainland, many to lavish treatment. Rumors also circulated that economic and political assistance was offered to the KMT in return for efforts to challenge the DPE 26 Moreover, China attempted to attract support by relaxing the definition of "one China" so that the PRC was no longer the "representative" of China, but that both Taiwan and the PRC were simply "part of it." The goal was to suggest that favored Taiwan politicians could play a prominent role in the future development of both sides. 27

In 2002, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began to target the DPP itself. On January 24, Qian invited DPP members to visit the mainland, though it was reported that Chert was not on the "invitation list. ''28 This process continued in mid-2005 with the visits of several high-profile politicians. In April, Lien Chan became the first KMT chairman to visit mainland China since 1949. While there, he discussed economic and political issues, including the three links and preferential treatment for Taiwan businessmen. 29 The following month, James Soong, chairman of the People's First Party, conducted a similar trip. 3~

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Coercive power apparent in this period is threefold. First, pressure from Taiwan business leaders and politicians for a more lenient mainland policy can be seen as secondarily coercive in nature. That is, Beijing applied the power of cooptation to sources that could, in turn, employ the power of coercion against intractable ROC leaders. Second, Beijing retained the ability to coerce in two principal cases. The first of these involved continued military modernization, the purpose of which was to enhance leverage over decision-makers in Taipei and Washington. Thus, the PLA expanded its naval presence in the region, with the East and South Sea Fleets fielding 29 diesel submarines (compared to four for the ROC) and 140,000 troops (Taiwan has 60,000). It increased missiles deployments opposite the island from about 300 in 2000 to 650-730 in 2005. 31 China also redoubled its efforts to deny the United States a credible capability to intervene in a putative Taiwan Straits crisis, 32 by developing information and electronic warfare units, as well as long-range ballistic missile technology and airpower. 33 Importantly, however, since 2001 the PRC has avoided overtly threatening the use of military force, instead leaving target states to imagine the potential risks of inciting such use and any resulting, inherently unpredictable escalation. Third, the PRC developed several methods of affecting policy in the United States and other states (described in Section 3), continuing a general pattern of diplomatic isolation of Taiwan.

In particular, the United States has been careful to distance itself from Chen and the Taiwan independence movement. For instance, In October 2002, Bush met with Jiang at Crawford, Texas, and expressed his disapproval of Taiwan independence. 34 In the winter of 2003-4, the PRC relied on US pressure to convince Chen to revise the language of a proposed referendum calling for the withdrawal of PLA forces near TaiwanY In December 2003, Bush referenced Chen's plan by saying that the United States was "opposed to any unilateral action from either side that would change the s t a tu s q u o . ''36 12 months later, the United States opposed controversial attempts by Chen to change the name of ROC overseas offices to "Taiwan." Meanwhile, Secretary of State Colin Powell, in a trip to Beijing, commented that Taiwan lacks "sover- eignty as a nation," and that the optimal outcome would be "peaceful reunification," wording that exceeded the prior formulation of a "peaceful resolution. ''37 Similarly, states that continue to recognize Taipei have had to think twice. In October 2003, Liberia shifted its recognition to Beijing, and the island of Dominica did the same in March 2004. Grenada recognized Beijing in January 2005, followed in October by Senegal) s The latter defection prompted Taiwan's foreign minister to remark, "The overall situation is not favorable to us, and our ambassadors stationed in our ally countries have to work so hard that they can't even sleep well at night. ''39

In sum, the past fifteen years have witnessed a trend in China's Taiwan strategy away from reliance on what may be termed "polar" strategies, i.e., the dominance of either cooptative or coercive elements, and toward the careful integration of both elements. The remainder of this paper explains why this balancing act emerged, and, in the conclusion, suggests how a reversion to a coercion-dominated approach may occur.

2. Domestic Sources of Change: Political Stability and Policy Coordination

A starting point for explaining why China's Taiwan strategy since 2001 has taken the form that it has would be to assess the institutional factors underpinning the


decision to adopt it and the capacity to implement it. This section is divided into a discussion, first, of the elite level of policymaking and assessment and, second, of the bureaucratic level of implementation.

The Decision-Making and Policy Assessment Level

There is no automatic reason to believe that, for PRC decision-makers, the choice to avoid skewed reliance on polar (i.e., cooptation- or coercion-dominant) strategies and seek a balance in which the two coincide is a given. The potential risks are that, in adopting a moderate position, a nationalistic domestic audience, demanding short-term resolution and off-put by regular pro-independence rhetoric from Taipei and continued military support from the United States, will be alienated and that, both Taiwan citizens and an international audience, concerned about the modernization of the PLA and worried about the specific threat posed by increasing deployment of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), will be antagonized. Relying on both nationalism and international stability as bases of Communist Party (CCP) legitimacy, there are possible pressures on PRC decision-makers to tilt the balance in favor of a more punitive or pacific approach.

In crafting the integrated strategy described above, Chinese leaders benefited from several factors. The first is what Michael D. Swaine has described as a "con- sensus-driven" process in Taiwan policymaking. 4~ In this view, political pressures are contained because the system itself is designed to incorporate participation by representatives from parts of the Party and state, such as the economic and security arenas, with inherently different priorities, and because the decision reached by the top echelon of leaders emerges as a compromise of these various actors, rather than via the domination of one "faction" or another. Specifically, broad strategy at the elite level is coordinated by the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group (TALSG), which was established by Deng in 1987 as part of a broader effort to devolve authority to a more professional and technical-oriented collective of leaders. When Jiang assumed chairmanship of this body in 1993, it consisted of participants drawn from military intelligence, the diplomatic corps, the Party apparatus, and ARATS. 41

There has been some debate over whether factional pressures entered the decision-making arena in the run-up to the 1995-6 crisis. Swaine has argued that no such pressures existed, and that, in deciding to employ military force, PRC leaders were simply reacting to a combination of shock and the lack of alternative methods of pressure that could be brought to bear on Lee. 42 Others have asserted that fissures between Jiang and Premier Li Peng in 1995, along with Jiang's purported need to demonstrate his commitment to defending national interests with force, meant that Jiang had to escalate tensions to a higher level than he would have preferred. 43 Even if there had been such a fissure, it would likely have dissipated after the end of the crisis, since the 15th Party Congress in November 1997 led to the retirement of several individuals who were cited as skeptical of Jiang's earlier, more cautious approach. Moreover, Li Peng left the Prime Minister's position, leaving Jiang dominant in the system. 44

There is no evidence that, when Hu Jintao acceded to top positions in the Party- state starting in 2002, he faced an ideological or political battle on the direction of Taiwan strategy from the remaining Jiang associates. Rather, like Jiang's "3rd

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generation" of leaders, Hu's "4th generation" stressed both the nationalistic project of unification and the need to maintain peace in East Asia and focus on economic development. 45

Moreover, like their predecessors, Hu's generation stressed pragmatism and flexibility in foreign policy, willing to look at the long-term benefits of any given approach, understand constraints on alternatives, and spot the widening of potential external opportunities. Finally, within the TALSG, Hu has received input from officials representing diverse bureaucratic and political constituencies (see Figure 1). That this body in 2003 contained members affiliated with different institutions, combined with the absence of a major shift in strategy from the end of the Jiang era, suggests that the process operated relatively free of factional infighting.

Supporting these leaders with policy analysis were organizations such as the Institute of Taiwan Affairs of the China Academy of Social Sciences, the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), and others. Much of their advice was informal, but one well-placed scholar in Beijing has said that, after the 1995-6 crisis, significant attention was paid to the limits on China's military capabilities, which in turn led to research and development of more advanced deterrent weapons. 46 In publicly available journals, the tendency was to recite CCP policy statements, but some scholars began to pay more detailed attention to the dynamics of both Sino-American and cross-Straits relations. For instance, Xia Liping, a scholar at SIIS, wrote a comprehensive analysis of the role of the US Congress in shaping

Figure 1 TALSG Membership in March 2003

Name Born

Hu Jintao (Chairman) 1942

Jia Qinglin (V. Chairman) 1940

Tang Jiaxuan (Secretary) 1938

Wang Gang 1942

Liu Yandong 1945

Wang Daohan 1915

Chen Yunlin 1941

Xu Yongyue 1942

Gen. Xiong Guangkai 1939

Gen. Guo Boxiong 1942

Education Position

Tsinghua University (BA) CCP General Secretary, CMC Chairman (Sept. 2004)

Hebei Engineering College (BA) Politburo Standing Committee Member

Beijing University (BA) State Councilor

Jilin University (BA) Politburo Alternate Member

Jilin University (BA) Head. CCP United Front Work Dept.

No Higher Education Chairman, ARATS (died Dec. 2005 )

Beijing Agricultural University Director, Taiwan Affairs Office, (BA) State Council

Beijiug People's Public Security Minister of State Security, State School (professional education) Council

PLA Mil. Academy (professional Deputy Chief, PLA General Staff education)

PLA Mil. Academy (professional Vice Chairman, CMC education)

Sources: Sources: CLM No. 11 "Party Politburo Processes under Hu Jintao," by H. Lyman Miller; Hu Sheng-ping, "Hu Jintao yu Jiang Zemin lingdao xia zhonggong dui tai zhengce de chubu bijiao," (An initial comparison of the CCP's Taiwan Policy under Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin), 2005 conference paper, Chinese Culture University, Taipei and relevant data from Chinavitae.corn.


US-Taiwan policy. 47 Huang Jiashu, a professor at People's University in Beijing, constructed a nuanced assessment of the concept of "one China" among several sectors of the Taiwan polity, suggesting ways of targeting those who appeared to be most flexible. 48

Since 2001, open-source articles published by such agencies since have evinced an even more complex understanding of the constraints on and opportunities for Beijing in effecting its approach toward Taiwan. For instance, Sun Yun, a scholar at the Xiamen University Taiwan Research Institute, noted that neither the United States nor China could handle the "political repercussions" of conflict in the Tai- wan Straits, but still observed persistent pressures in the United States to forge close security ties with Taipei. 49 Shi Yinhong, a professor at People's University, compared China's "long-term advantages" to Taiwan's "short-term advantages," but admitted that, in many respects, including in military preparations and in the battle to win over the 'hearts and minds' of Taiwanese, China still had much work to do. 5~ Thus, it appears that decision-makers have been supplied with increasingly proficient advice, allowing for consideration of policy constraints and external opportunities.

The Implementation Level

At the level of policy implementation, the construction of China's balanced approach required the ability of bureaucratic and Party units at the national and lower levels to be able to coordinate and, in some cases, autonomously expand, a complex series of policies. Just a few examples are necessary to demonstrate that the PRC was able to do so. ARATS facilitated China's "united front" strategy by hosting opposition politicians after Chen's election. 5~ The State Council, in conjunction with the People's Bank, offered "special incentives" for Taiwan banks to open branches in the mainland, 52 was later instrumental in eliminating tariffs on Taiwan fruit exports, part of China's economic "charm offensive." Likewise, the Ministry of Public Security arranged for more relaxed policies on granting visas to travelers from the ROC. 53 In the realm of "hard power," the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was active in efforts to convince states to abandon ties with the ROC, dispatching Minister Li Zhaoxing to Senegal, and receiving officials from Grenada and Dominica between 2004 and 2006. Regarding the PLA, the Second Artillery Corps has coordinated the build up of SRBMs opposite Taiwan, 54 and, more broadly, all seven Military Regions have been involved in training for combat in China's "near-periphery," which includes TaiwanY

At the sub-national level, local governments were already in place to manage cross-Straits economic, political and cultural affairs. Xiamen is a case in point. Shi Zhaobin, Secretary of the Xiamen Party Committee, stated in 1995 that the development of Taiwan-Xiamen relations, including "attracting Taiwan investment funds," was linked with the "big picture of national unification." Secretary Shi also said that Jiang Zemin had personally told him that forging commercial links with Taiwan was nothing less than Xiamen's "glorious historical duty. ''56 In March 1997 a Xiamen city official boasted not only that trade with Taiwan had exceeded that with Hong Kong for the first time, but also that of 126 complaints that had been received from Taiwan "compatriots," 96% had been resolved successfully. 57 In June 2005, it was

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reported that, in order to accommodate more extensive investment, Xiamen would construct an "industrial park" especially for Taiwan investors. 58

Localities were also instrumental in fostering political ties with Taiwan. For instance, a February 2001 meeting between the mayor of Shanghai and the vice mayor of Taipei marked the first "official engagement" between the two cities. 59 In May 2005, People's First Party Chairman James Soong met with officials from the Shanghai Party Committee, endorsing the "three direct links.'6~ In April 2006, the Beijing Municipal Government hosted a banquet for and held discussions with former KMT leader Lien Chan, who likewise encouraged the enhancing of cross-Straits "cooperation and exchanges. ''6) More broadly, implementation of national policy did not change after 2001 so much as it remained available for decision-makers to utilize in their pursuit of a middle-ground position.

3. Adaptive Sources of Change: Constraints on Polar Strategies

The previous section noted that PRC decision-makers and their advisors were able to assess the constraints on existing policy and adapt accordingly. The purpose of this section is to examine how Chinese officials came to understand the constraints on pursuing a strategy based too heavily on either cooptation or coercion. This establishes a motivating factor for the pursuit of a more balanced approach.

Constraints' on Cooptation Dominance

A starting point is to note that China was encouraged by the rise of Lee Teng-hui to the presidency of the ROC in 1988, assuming that he did not support Taiwan independence and that fruitful discussions could be carried out with him. 62 Even as he began to pursue "pragmatic diplomacy," seeking to strengthen ties with other states and lobby for Taiwan's participation in international institutions, Beijing remained confident about its ability to effectively pursue negotiations. This was based on the assumption that a liberalization of bilateral contact would unleash a patriotic desire among Taiwanese to return to the motherland. 63 According to Andrew Nathan,

In offering "one country, two systems," China had calculated that a substantial part of the Taiwan population, composed of mainlanders and businesspeople with ties to China, favored reunification. Beijing felt that this segment would gain strength over time through intensified economic and other contacts between the two sides and because international isolation would offer no other way o u t . 64

Indeed, China's 1993 White Paper on Taiwan sanguinely stated that "China's policies and measures toward Taiwan have achieved the support of more and more Taiwanese. Large numbers of Taiwanese are exerting great effort to develop cross- Strait relations. ''65 Growing personal visits from the ROC to the mainland, which rose from 46,679 in 1988 to 1.5 million in 1995, seemed to confirm this judgment. 66 Clearly, the power of cooptation alone was perceived as potentially efficacious.

However, such views understated the strength of the opposition to unification in Taiwan. According to the 1993 White Paper, only a "very small number of separatists" supported independence. On the contrary, one survey found that popular support for unification decreased from 69% in 1989 to 36% in 1994, while support for independence rose from 4% to 33%. 67 Similarly, with democratic reform, new


forces emerged which portrayed Taiwan as a democratic state that was culturally and politically distinct from the mainland. 68 For instance, by the mid-1990s, individuals who called themselves "Taiwanese" exceeded those who claimed to be "Chinese," while a third categorization, "Taiwanese-Chinese," remained prominent. 69 These forces are reflected in the rise of the DPP, which rejected negotiation altogether, asserting that any decisions on Taiwan's future should be made in a public referendum. 7~ That message gained support, evidenced by the DPP's success in national and local elections in the early 1990s.

It was not until 1994 that Beijing began to realistically perceive the Taiwan opposition to its position. In March 1994, Lee gave an interview with the Japanese journalist Ryotara Shiba in which Lee compared himself to Moses and promised to lead his people "out of exile." In May, Lee made a trip to South Africa, followed by an appearance at the Asian Games in Tokyo in August. These events finally diminished Beijing's optimism. In late 1994, Wang Zaixi, who later became a top official at the State Council's Office of Taiwan Affairs, commented that "The basis of mutual trust not only of the government, but also the people of Taiwan, is significantly weak. ''7~ A February 1995 Communist Party circular designed to engender support for the Jiang Eight Points commented on the "expanding" political significance of the DPP and observed that the spirit of Taiwan independence had become "bolder. ''72

Constraints on Coercion Dominance

Since the PRC had earlier avoided developing and deploying deterrent forces, when Lee made his June 1995 visit to the United States, Chinese officials decided that there was no option but to initiate a rough display of military strength. Implicit in this was the belief that such an initiative could be effective in leading to modifica- tions in US and ROC policies. Writing in 1996, Andrew Nathan argued that, "The new policy of coercion is based on an estimate that both the Americans and the Taiwanese will respond weakly. ''v3 Similarly, Michael Swaine has concluded that:

The military and civilian leaders calculated that these actions [i.e., displays of force] would chasten Taiwanese politicians and convince the populace of the dangers of Lee's pro-independence approach, resulting in votes against pro-independence legislators and Lee. The displays were also intended to demonstrate to all parties that China was (and is) deadly serious about preventing Taiwanese independence. TM

Such sentiments were clearly based on a miscalculation of political reality in both Taipei and Washington. The PLA's missile display not only failed to prevent Lee's election in March 1996, but also failed to forestall the growth of the Taiwan independence lobby. It may have, in fact, hastened that movement. The intervention of US military forces at the height of the crisis was also an unintended consequence.

The mixed results of coercive diplomacy in 1995-6 meant that such tactics could continue, but in a modified format. The use of force was partially successful, both in the sense that officials in Washington displayed greater caution on Taiwan issues, and in that Lee scaled back some controversial aspects of his mainland policy. In particular, after the March election, Lee postponed five-fire exercises on Mazu, one of Taiwan's offshore islands near the Chinese coast, and announced that, due to a

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"full schedule," he would limit travel abroad and would not make a return visit to the United States (in fact, he did not seek another visa to visit the continental United States until 1999). 75 One PRC scholar noted a "warming" of cross-Straits ties in the months after the crisis, but conceded that numerous difficulties remained. 76

However, despite these effects, the 1995-6 conflict resulted in several problems for China's Taiwan strategy, including Lee's re-election, declining popular support for unification, and the emboldening of pro-Taiwan forces in the US Congress. 77 In addition, on account of US intervention in the Taiwan Straits in 1996, the PLA was better able to gauge US commitment to its pledges not to tolerate such actions. David Lampton has argued that Beijing was "genuinely surprised at the scale, speed, and decisiveness of the [US] response, and the degree to which there was no discernible dissent in the US.'78 Another source of caution was China's growing economic reliance on the United States. Not only was the United States a "gatekeeper" to Chinese accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), but, like Taiwan, US firms had the option of relocating their "export platforms" to other labor-intensive states, and that factor may have made "access to the US market more important to China than access to Chinese labor is to the US. ''79

Nevertheless, as noted in Section 1, coercion dominance did not end in 1996. By 1999, Beijing had not only acquired the capacity to count on the United States not to diplomatically support Lee and had significantly increased its standing forces in the region, but also conducted war games, issued the 2000 White Paper, and allowed Zhu Rongji, not known for his bellicosity, to issue severe threats. Beijing had not yet learned its lesson. Lee did not immediately drop references to the "special state to state" theory, nor did it prevent Chen's election in March 2000. In addition, the Taiwanese public did not tend to differentiate threats against ROC politicians from threats against the whole island, g~ Another plausible result was that, after George W. Bush took office in January 2001, the United States proposed the most sweeping authorization of arms sold to Taiwan to date. That the PLA continued to conduct mas- sive military exercises into the summer of 2001 could not have alleviated matters.

Things began to change in December 2001, as Beijing kept a low profile ahead of Taiwan's parliamentary elections, gl In March 2004, generals attending a conference in Beijing appeared to be "under orders" not to discuss the upcoming Taiwan presidential election, g2 Of course, based on earlier lessons, deterrence continued to be utilized, though this involved rather ambiguous statements, not more overt saber rattling. Thus it was with the "anti-secession law" in late 2004, which itself entailed the risk of sparking protest in Taiwan (and, in fact, a 300,000-person protest against it did occur in Taipei in March 2005). 83 With respect to the United States, it is probable that PRC leaders connected overt antagonism against Taiwan with increased US arms sales to Taiwan in the spring of 2001 and other forms of support. While strategic development (including military modernization) has continued, Hu has also carefully delineated a theory of China's "peaceful development" (heping fazhan), meant to assuage those skeptical of China's strategic intentions. 84

In sum, over the past decade and a half, PRC decision-makers and their advisors have approached the problem of how to contain Taiwan independence and lay the foundation for unification in an increasingly pragmatic fashion. While naive ex- pectations governed the adoption of polar (i.e., cooptation- or coercion-dominant) positions in 1991 and 1996, the lessons learned from those experiences meant that

34 East Asia / Fa|i 2006

future strategy would avoid over-reliance on either. Instead, the cooptation of Tai- wanese elites and others as pursued since the Deng era has continued, abutted by the development of various coercive elements. Thus, in April 2006, meeting with Lien Chart, Hu said not only that China was willing to resume negotiations "on an equal footing," but also that peace would be ensured only by "opposing and checking" independence forces. The specter of SRBMs certainly added grist to this otherwise benign statement. 85

4. External Sources of Change: Opportunities for an Integrated Strategy

That PRC leaders recognized constraints on prior policy does not necessitate that they opt to pursue a long-term strategy which weaved together both cooptative and coercive influence. If there had there been no reason to believe that this change would be effective, a "polar" strategy may have persisted. However, as this section shows, the growth of several discrete opportunities provided a rationale for pursuing an integrated strategy.

Power of Cooptation in Taiwan

As noted above, PRC leaders had long realized the potential of utilizing cross- Straits trade to promote unification) 6 However, there were limits on the extent to which the ROC was economically reliant on China. In 1993, relatively high estimates held that between 13-18% of Taiwan exports went to the mainland, exceeding the 10% rate at which the KMT believed that the nation would be vulnerable to depen- dency. Nevertheless, one scholar has noted that a large portion of that trade involved products assembled in the PRC and re-exported to other markets, such as the United States and Germany. If necessary, Taiwan could have relocated its "export platform" to another labor-intensive market, such as Malaysia or VietnamF The KMT also regulated mainland investments, prohibiting the migration of "strategic industries," such as microprocessors, and set up a "rigorous review process" for other industries) s Although cross-Straits commercial ties continued to grow, in the early 1990s China was not yet able to use economic coercion for political gain.

In contrast, post-1996 period saw a large increase in Taiwan exports to and investment in the mainland. As demonstrated in Figure 2, exports in 1996 stood at $16.18 billion, growing to $27.34 billion in 2001. Similarly, Taiwan entrepreneurs invested $2.6 billion in the PRC in 2000, double the figure from the previous year and representing some 40% of Taiwan's total overseas investments. 89 A related source of change was that limits on individual investments imposed by Lee in 1996 were lifted by Chen in November 2001. The new policies scrapped a $50 million cap on individual investments, stated that investments under $20 million would be automatically approved, and enabled direct financial transfers between banks on both sides. 9~ Deeper and more complex economic ties facilitated diminished support among entrepreneurs for risky political gambits, such as declaring independence.

The same pattern held after 2001. ROC exports to the mainland grew from $38 billion in 200l to $64.8 billion in 2004. 91 Investments followed a similar pattern. For instance, in 1997, 22.8% of goods produced by Taiwan's influential information technology industry were manufactured in the mainland; this rate rose to 51%

Wuthnow 35

Figure 2 PRC-Taiwan Economic and Cultural Contacts Increase, 1996-2001

Ye~ Taiwan visitsto Total Volume of Chinese Expo~s Taiwan Expo~s �9 e M~nland PRC-ROCTrade* to Taiwan* to China*

1 9 9 6 1,733,897 18,980 2800 16,180

1 9 9 7 2,117,576 19,838 3396 16,442

1 9 9 8 2,174,602 20,499 3869 16,629

1 9 9 9 2,584,648 23,479 3950 19,529

2000 3,108,643 30,533 5040 25,490

2 0 0 1 3,440,306 32,340 5000 27,340

�9 MillionsofUS Doll.s

Sources: "Liangan renyuan wanglai yu jiaoliu tongji" (Cross-Straits Travel and Exchange Statistics), fact sheet issued by the State Council's Talwan Affairs Office, located at: http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/ jlwl/rywl 1 .htm; and "Linian liangan jingji guanxi tongji shuzi" (Historical Statistics of Cross-Straits Economic Interaction), fact sheet issued by the State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office, located at: http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/lamsj.htm.

in 2002 (including over 62% of motherboards, a major Taiwan export). Morris Chang, chairman of the mammoth Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, reversed his position on limiting mainland investment, calling the PRC an "irresist- ible" opportunity. Indeed, by 2004 there were reportedly 300,000 Taiwanese living in the Shanghai metropolitan area, with a total of half a million to one million ROC nationals in the PRC at any given time. 92 Despite its "social and political ramifica- tions," one author suggests that the DPP has "grudgingly accepted" the inevitability of further economic integration. 93

As with trade, the PRC's chances of forming a "united front" with the KMT were also limited during the pre-1995 period. From the beginning of the Deng era, Beijing had desired to form a rapprochement with the KMT and its then-leader, Chiang Ching-kuo. The idea was that a deal should be reached between members of a generation which shared common experiences, such as the CCP-KMT united front of 1937-45. However, Chiang was resistant to such offers and no deal was brokered. 94 Another setback came in January 1993 with the forced retirement of Hao Bocun, who had been a key supporter of unification. 95 In addition, Lien Chan and James Soong, politicians who later became standard-bearers for political exchange with the mainland, were subordinate to Lee in the KMT party hierarchy, and, even if they had wished, could not have formed unilateral connections with the CCP. 96

Following Chen's election in March 2000, anti-independence forces combined to form a "pan-Blue" coalition. This coalition consisted of the New Party; the People's First Party, which had been formed in 2000 by James Soong; and the KMT, the leadership of which bad transferred to the more moderate Lien Chart after Lee resigned and established the Taiwan Solidarity Union. The "pan-Blue" coalition, which reportedly also held the support of the majority of the officer corps of the ROC military, 97 aligned against the DPP on independence, and on more concrete issues such as the "three direct links, ''98 arguing that, to survive economically, Taiwan


must open direct air, postal and shipping relations with the mainland. 99 According to one scholar, by positioning itself as an enabler of positive cross-Straits ties, the KMT "can show its capability to make meaningful communications with Beijing and bring peaceful news to Taiwanese voters. ''1~176 In this fashion, the KMT made gains in the December 2004 parliamentary elections and fared well again in December 2005 city and municipal elections. Robert Ross has argued that voters "opted for cross-Strait stability and pragmatic diplomatic and economic policies. ''1~

Power of Coercion via Diplomatic Isolation

China's ability to rely on US pressure was based on increasing common interests in both the economic and security arenas. In economic terms, China became a critical US export market, with multi-billion dollar purchases of US aircraft, automobiles, personal computers, soybeans, etc. Between 1995 and 2001, US exports to the PRC jumped from $11.75 billion to $19.18 billion, while PRC exports to the United States soared from $45.54 billion to $102.28 billion? ~ US exports to the PRC jumped from $19.2 billion in 2001 to $34.7 billion in 2004, while imports from China nearly doubled, from $109.4 billion in 2001 to $210.5 billion in 2004.1~ In 2004, US direct investments in China totaled $15 billion, which while making the PRC only the twelfth largest recipient of US investment, represented annual increase rates of 6% since 1995, matching investments in the European Union and outpacing those in Japan. 1~ In addition, the PRC was becoming a major source of credit to cover budget deficits, possessing, by 2003, 9% of federal debt held by foreign creditors. This allowed the United States to maintain low interest rates, vital to economic growth.l~ Moreover, influential firms such as Coca-cola, General Electric, Boeing, and Motorola had a stake in maintaining positive Sino-US trade relations, and a US president could not have easily ignored such actors. 106 Chinese analysts understood this situation, with one arguing that the United States cannot "give up a market with as many opportunities as China's. ''7~

In security terms, the United States increasingly relied on Chinese support in halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction in states such as Pakistan, Iran and North Korea, and in combating terrorism. 1~ However, the more significant diplomatic change regarded a growing appreciation in Washington for the credibility of the PRC to employ military force in its pursuit of unification. David Lampton has suggested that the 1995-6 crisis had a "clarifying effect" in Washington, in which US policymakers believed that they had underestimated China's willingness and ability to cause "severe damage" over Taiwan.l~ Likewise, in his assessment of the consequences of the Taiwan Straits crisis, Robert Ross argues that, as a result of Beijing's newfound military leverage, President Clinton chose to exercise higher levels of caution on Taiwan issues. 11~

Strategic interests in the PRC also deepened during the Bush administration. For instance, the United States relied on Chinese diplomatic support in executing its invasion of Afghanistan and in conducting the larger war on terrorism after the September 11, 2001, attacks. 111 The PRC was also needed to vote for anti-terrorist resolutions in the United Nations, supply the United States with intelligence on terrorists in the Asia-Pacific region, and freeze bank accounts of terror suspects. 112 More recently, the United States has required tacit PRC acceptance of the war in Iraq

Wuthnow 37

and support for efforts by the UN Security Council to oppose Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons. In addition, the United States benefited from only muted criticism by Beijing for Washington's decision to abrogate the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. 113 Although US arms sales to Taiwan have continued, it has had little diplomatic choice but to distance itself from Chen and reaffirm the "one China policy. ''1~4

Farther afield, China's expanding influence with respect to other states provided a means of internationally isolating Taiwan. For instance, in mid-2001, the PRC was able to convince Macedonia to transfer recognition by threatening to veto a UN effort to stabilize the border between Macedonia and Kosovo. 115 China was also apparently able to leverage support for peacekeeping with Liberia, as deployment of Chinese troops to that country occurred some two months after Monrovia's decision to de-recognize Taipei in 2003.116 In 2004, China was able to sway Dominica with a $117 million gift, and, in 2005, won over Grenada by offering to rebuild that state's damaged cricket stadium, in addition to other forms of assistance. 117 The details of Senegal's move to shut off relations with Taiwan were hazier, with the former only announcing that, after an "objective and profound analysis of the global geopolitics" it was "in the fundamental interests of our country" to recognize Beijing. 118

In sum, growing opportunities for the PRC to exert various kinds of leverage on Taipei granted credibility to the potential effectiveness of a long-term, integrated strategy. Cooptation came to be more viable as cross-Straits political and economic networks deepened, while the stratagem of diplomatic isolation was made more ro- bust by various forms of influence on the United States and other states. Of course, deterrent capabilities continued to be developed as well, providing a fallback option even if the long-term approach were to falter.

Conclusion

China's Taiwan strategy since 2001 has integrated elements of cooptation and coercion into a long-term effort to dampen the Taiwan independence movement and lay the groundwork for political unification. This follows periods in which non-threatening, cooptative elements were strategically dominant, and, later, in which coercive power came to the fore. The most recent period represents a com- paratively "integrated" strategy, involving efforts to solicit support in Taiwan, such as fostering ties with opposition leaders, as well as continued development of more coercive forms of influence. Escalation of tensions to previous levels has generally been sacrificed in this balancing act. The reasons why this approach emerged are threefold: domestic capacity to settle on and execute a multi-dimensional, long-term approach; the interaction between limitations on previous policies and a domestic ability to adapt; and the availability of credible sources of external leverage.

This argument suggests that three conditions are necessary for a state to adopt such a long-term, integrated approach to resolving foreign policy dilemmas. First, at a domestic level, the decision-making process must be insulated from political pressures and from the potential repercussions of an apparent lack of progress in the near-term. Domestic institutions must also be sufficiently strong to implement and, perhaps, autonomously adjust multiple strategic elements. Second, domestic agencies must be able to identify limitations on existing policies and recommend changes accordingly. Of course, if no limitations on "polar" strategies were present,


there would be no need to pursue an integrated approach. Third, the external environment must contain a range of political, economic and diplomatic opportunities that can be leveraged, bit by bit, against an intransigent opponent.

With these factors in mind, how might cross-Strait relations develop in the coming years? Specifically, what factors may lead to a reversion to a coercion-dominant approach? Deducing from the threefold explanatory framework developed in this paper, reversion could occur as a result of any number of changes, though some are more probable than others.

Domestic political and institutional factors do not seem to be a likely source of reversion. To be sure, the ever-present chance for elite instability in an authoritar- ian system may allow near-term political pressures to enter the decision-making calculus. Failure to achieve unification itself may be a cause of instability, as restlessness among nationalists grows. However, with the recent solidification of foreign policymaking and administrative power under Hu Jintao, and the existence of a professional and relatively stable policymaking and implementation apparatus behind him, this does not appear to be a key concern.

Adaptive sources of change suggest that it would be necessary for the current mix of carrots and sticks to fail over the course of some indeterminate time frame, leading proponents to reassess the utility of an integrated strategy. On one hand, the current approach does seem to have had some effect. For instance, there is evidence that Chen's position on the three links has relaxed. After the December 2005 city and municipal elections, in which pan-Blue candidates made substantial gains, Chen claimed that the ROC supports the links, but that they must be implemented -gradually.,,119 On the other hand, Beijing has been unable to achieve fundamental objectives such as reducing US arms sales to Taiwan 1"-~ or impacting Taiwan public opinion on the question of unification (see Figure 3).

These apparent failures may be mitigated by the expansion of external opportunities, leading Beijing to perceive as yet unapplied sources of forward momentum. For instance, Taipei mayor Ma Ying-jeou provides a chance for Beijing to cement its ties with the KMT. With an 80% approval rating, Ma is the likely 2008 KMT

Figure 3 Opposition to Unification in Taiwan

Position April 2002 Responses November 2005 Responses

"Status quo now, decision later" 36.5% 37.7%

"Status quo indefinitely" 14% 18.4%

"Status quo now, independence later" 13.3% 14%

"Status quo now, unification later" 13.3% 12%

Independence ASAP 4.5% 10.3%

Unification ASAP 1.8% 2.1%

Source: Mainland Affairs Council (Taiwan), reflecting data from the Election Survey Center, National Chengchi University. Sample sizes: 1,091 adults in April 2002 and 1,102 adults in November 2005. No margin of error listed. Available online at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/pos/9411/po941 le. htm.

Wuthnow 39

presidential candidate, and supports the three links as well as talks on unification under the "one China" formula reached by both sides in 1992) 21 More broadly, it is probable that China's national power will continue to increase in political, economic and military dimensions, affecting decisions both in foreign capitals and in Taipei to adopt policies favorable to the mainland. The nature and extent of those decisions, however, remain to be seen.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Rosemary Foot, Rana Mitter, Gil Rozman, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the author alone.

Notes

1. This is, of course, a generalization. For a more discrete history, see: Suisheng Zhao, "Military Coercion and Peaceful Offense: Beijing's Strategy of National Reunification with Taiwan," Pacific Affairs 72:4 (Winter 1999). For a more complete discussion of China's Taiwan strategy, see: For a summary of shifts between Mao and Deng era strategy, see: Parris Chang, "Beijing's Policy Toward Taiwan: An Elite Conflict Model," in Cheng, Tun-jen, Chi Huang, and Samuel Wu, eds., bzherited Rival~: Conflict Across the Taiwan Straits (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 65-9; Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979-2000," in David Lampton, ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform (Stan- ford: Stanford University Press, 2001); relevant chapters in M. Taylor Fravel, The Long March to Peace: Explaining China's Settlement of Territorial Disputes, (Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 2004); and Robert Ross, "The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Credibility, Coercion and the Use of Force," International Security 25:2 (Fall 2000).

2. There are several reasons why short-term accession may be seen as an objective. Seizure of the island would mark the end of the "humiliation" that was the failure of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to destroy the Nationalists (KMT) at the end of the Civil War. The presence of a separate regime on Taiwan poses a source of inspiration to potential separatists in the mainland, such as Tibetans or Muslims in Xinjiang Province. The issue is also wrapped up in domestic politics, with citizens, along with military men and some intellectuals, willing to brand as "trai- tors" (maiguo zei) Party officials who appear to be indifferent. Thomas J. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up" International Security 25:4 (Spring 2001), 15; Michael D. Swaine, "Trouble in Taiwan," Foreign Affairs (March-April 2004); Andrew Scobell, "Show of Force: The PLA and the 1995-6 Taiwan Straits Crisis," (Stanford Asia/Pacific Research Center paper) (January 1999). There is even a geopolitical dimension, with some asserting that China's rise as a great power is intrinsically limited if divided rule across the Strait continues. See: Alexander Huang, "Taiwan's View of the Military Balance and the Challenge it Presents," in James Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., Crisis in the Taiwan Straits (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1997), 282. For a Chinese perspective, see: Wang Chunyong and Lu Xue, "Taiwan wenti de diyuan zhanlue fenxi" ( Geostrategic Analysis of the Taiwan Issue)" Journal of PLA University of Foreign Languages 23:3 (May 2000), 113-6.

3. For this type of work, see: Constantine Menges, China: The Gathering Threat (Nashville: Nelson Current, 2005), Richard Bernstein, The Coming Conflict with China (NewYork: Vintage Books, 1998), Bill Gertz, The China Threat (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2000), and Gordon Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001).

4. For instance, see: T.Y. Wang, "Cross Strait Relations after the 2000 Election in Taiwan: Chang- ing Tactics in a New Reality," Asian Survey 41:5 (September-October, 2001); Sheng Lijun, "The Taiwan Issue: Does China Have a Strategy?" Cambridge Review of International Affairs 15:1 (2002), 123-9; Suisheng Zhao, "Unification Strategy: Beijing versus Taipei," in Chien-min Chao and Bruce Dickson, eds., Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan's Politics (Armonk: ME


Sharpe, 2002); Quansheng Zhao, "Regime Chang and the PRC's Taiwan Policy in the DPP Era," East Asia (Fall 2003); Richard Bush, "Policy Towards Taiwan," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (November 2, 2005), http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/fellows/ bush_20051102.pdf.

5. Refer to: Deng Xiaoping, "Zhongguo Dalu he Taiwan heping tongyi de shexiang" ("Imagining the Peaceful Unification of China and Taiwan") Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, Disan Juan (Collected Works ofDeng Xiaoping, (Volume 3) (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1993), 30-31. Wang Daohan, "Wang Daohan Huizhang zai HaiXie chengli shi zhou nian zhaodaihui nian shang de shumian jianghua," (Chairman Wang Daohan's prepared remarks at the 10 ~u anniversary of the founding of ARATS), 17 December 2001. http://tw.people.com.cn/GB/14810/14858/870502. html. Daniel Kwan and Chris Yeung, "Strait Neighbors Seal New Relations Package," South China Morning Post, 29 April 1993, 1. Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979-2000," in Lampton ed., 313-314. Zhihuai Zhou, "Guanyu 1995-1996 Nian Tai Hai Weiji de S ikao," (Thoughts on the 1995-1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis) Taiwan Yanjiu Jikan (Taiwan Studies Journal) No. 2, 1998, 1-2. Beijing also cancelled visits by Chi Haotian and Li Guixian, and cancelled bilateral discussions over human rights and proliferation with the United States. See Ross (2000), 94-95. Yu Taifa, "Taiwanese Democracy under Threat: Impact and Limit of China's Military Coercion," Pacific Affairs, 70 (Spring 1997), 16-18 and Ross, "The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Credibility, Coercion and the Use of Force," (2000), 102-104.

12. Zhao, "Military Coercion and Peaceful Offense: Beijing's Strategy of National Reunification with Taiwan," (1999), 508. In July 1999, China made a point of emphasizing that the United States did not support Lee's theory of "special state to state relations," and had provided assurances of support for the "one China policy." Renmin Ribao People's Daily, 19 July 1999. The reassurance referenced here came through a phone call by Clinton to Jiang on 18 July 1999.

13. For details, refer to: US Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2000).

14. South China Morning Post, 15 August 1999. 15. Quote of TAO Spokesman Zhang Mingqing, Ibid., South China Morning Post, 22 February

2000. 16. "Yige Zhongguo de Yuanze yu Taiwan Wenti," (The One China Principle and the Taiwan Issue),

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guowuyuan Taiwan Shiwu Banggongshi (Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC's State Council), February 2000. This warning was met with a rebuttal, with the chairman of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council saying that, "We call ourselves a sovereign country and if they don't like it, they'll have to live with it." Quote of Su Chi, Ibid., New York Times, 23 February 2000. New York Times, 16 March 2000. However, Zhu also de-emphasized the impact of the White Paper, saying, "there's nothing new in there." For instance, on 27 July, the PLA Daily said that the Chinese military was a "great wall of iron and steel which separatism can never surpass." Later, a State Department official adamantly expressed the US position against Taiwan legislative deadlock, which had prevented the April 2001 agreements from being executed. The official, James Keither, said that, "'We would like to see Taipei do whatever it takes to get [the sales] done. Straits Times, 17 September 2005. This language was also employed in the 2000 White Paper. Yu, Taifa. "Relations Between Taiwan and China after the Missile Crisis: Towards Reconcilia- tion?" Pacific Affairs 72:1 (Spring 1999), 47. Zhao, "Regime Chang and the PRC's Taiwan Policy in the DPP Era," (2003), 55. Chao, Chien-min. "National Security vs. Economic Interests: Reassessing Taiwan's Mainland Policy under Chen Shui-bian," Journal of Contemporary China 13 (November 2004), 700. Lin Huancheng and Xu Jian, "Shiliu Da Bagao dui jiejue Taiwan wenti de xin guan dian," (The 16 ,4 Party Congress Report's New Outlook on Soh,ing the Taiwan Issue) in Ningbo Dangxiao Xuebao (Journal of the Ningbo Party School) No. 5 (2003), 13. According to the report on Taiwan of the 16 th Party Congress, the CCP surmised that it could win popular support by strengthening "cross-Straits relations in the areas of travel, economics, culture, etc." See Ibid.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

17.

18.

19.

20. 21.

22. 23.

24.

Wuthnow 41

25. Another interesting point is that, in May 2005, China decided to donate two pandas to the zoo in Kaohsiung, a southern, DPP-leaning city. See: New York Times, 3 May 2005.

26. Zhao (2003), "Regime Chang and the PRC's Taiwan Policy in the DPP Era," 48-9. 27. Ibid, 50. 28. According to Qian, "we are convinced that the broad masses of DPP members are different from

the small number of stubborn 'Taiwan independence' elements." 29. Agence France-Presse, 26 April 2005. In addition, PRC officials reportedly hinted that the KMT

could play a role in the modernization and eventual democratization of the mainland. Christian Science Monitor, 4 November 2005

30. China Post, 6 May 2005. The 'China fever' continued in July, when New Party Chairman Yo Ku-ming departed for the mainland, celebrating the 60 th anniversary of China's defeat of Japan in World War II. At the same time, KMT Vice Chairman RK. Chiang led a 52-member delega- tion of executives from the information and communications industries. Central News Agency (Taipei), 5 July 2005.

31. US Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2000); Also See relevant tables in Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005), 43-45. Road-mobile and solid-fuelled, these CSS-6 missiles were noted for survivability and a quick launch time, and could deliver a payload of 500 kilograms to a range of 600 kilometers, thus enveloping Taiwan.

32. US Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005), 41.

33. These missiles can be defeated by the Aegis air defense system, but under "tight rules of engagement," may be enough to compel a US decision to abstain. Christensen, "Posing Problems without Catching Up" (2001), 29-32. For a broader overview of missile threats to US forces abroad, see: Joel Wuthnow, The Impact of Missile Threats on the Reliabili~ of US Overseas Bases: A Framework for Analysis (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2005). Some have even suggested that the PRC seeks to develop a metaphorical "killer's mace" (shashoujian) against the United States and its allies, some kind of next-generation weapon which would give the PLA a decisive advantage, though others have doubted the plausibility of such claims. Ross (2002), Navigating the Taiwan Strait," 72-74. However, A. lain Johnston refutes this notion in an unpublished paper, "Contextualizing the Concept of a Shahoujian (Assassin's Mace)," http://www. people.f as .harvard.edu/-j ohnston/shashoujian.pdf.

34. Jiang reflected on this encounter by stressing common interests and expressing admiration for the US position on Taiwan. Jiefangjun Bao (PLA Daily), 4 August 2004. The remarks reportedly came during a meeting in December 2002 with US Congressman Henry Hyde.

35. Scobell, "Show of Force: The PLA and the 1995-6 Taiwan Straits Crisis," (2003-4), 21. This was viewed by Beijing in the context of attempts to further the cause of independence: specifically, the move was believed to be part of an effort to revise the Constitution to emphasize autonomy from the mainland. Steve Chan, "Taiwan in 2004" Asian Survey 45:1 (January-February 2005), 58.

36. Subsequently, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told Premier Wen that the moder- ated wording of the referendum raised questions about the "motives" of its supporters, because, legally, referenda were supposed to be used only in cases of drastic threats to the island. See: New York Times, 31 January 2004.

37. New York Times, 13 December 2004. 38. Agence France-Presse, 25 October 2005. 39. South China Morning Post, 28 October 2005. In late 2005, rumors circulated that the Vatican

would be the next country to abandon Taiwan. Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 18 November 2005. 40. Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979-2000," in David Lampton

ed., 322. 41. Tien Hung-mao and Yun-han Chu, China under Jiang Zemin (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,

2000), 195-196. The TALSG was supported by the State Council's Office of Taiwan Affairs, which had been created in 1988, and was responsible for policy coordination and implementation.

42. Swaine, "'Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979-2000," in David Lampton, ed., 322.


43. See: You Ji, "Making Sense of War Games in the Taiwan Strait," Journal of Contemporary China 6 (1997) and Zhao, "Military Coercion and Peaceful Offense: Beijing's Strategy of National Reunification with Taiwan," (1999), 502.

44. The same trends held with respect to the TALSG: Jiang's chief of staff, Zeng Qinghong, joined that elite body as general secretary, and Cben Yunlin became a member. Qian Qichen reprised his role as vice chairman, and Wang Daohan returned, meaning that the TALSG was composed primarily of Jiang supporters. Chu, Yun-han, "Making Sense of Beijing's Policy Toward Tai- wan: The Prospect of Cross-Strait Relations during the Jiang Zemin Era," in Tien, Hung-mao and Yun-han Chu (2000), 200-201; Zhao (1999), pg. 507; Swaine, "Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979-2000," in Lampton, (ed.), 332; and Scobell "Show of Force: The PLA and the 1995-6 Taiwan Straits Crisis," (2003-4), 189. Data is also compiled in Hu Sheng-ping, "Hu Jintao yu Jiang Zemin lingdao xia zhonggong dui tai zhengce de chubu bijiao," (An initial comparison of the CCP's Taiwan Policy under Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin), 2005 conference paper, Chinese Culture University, Taipei.

45. See: Li, Cheng, China's Leaders: The New Generation (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001).

46. Author interview with Jia Qingguo, Beijing University, June 2005. 47. Fu Liping, "Meiguo Guohui yu Zhongmei Anquan Guanxi - Yi Taiwan wei li de Fenxi" (The

US Congress and Sino-American Security Relations - An Analysis Using the Taiwan Example) Xiandai Guoji Gua~L~i (Contemporary International Relations) No. 7, 2002. Lampton (1997) made the same point regarding growing appreciation for the power of Congress in US foreign policy.

48. Huang Jiashu, "'Yige Zhongguo" Neiahan yu Liangan Guanxi" (Connotations of 'One China' and Cross-Strait Relations) Taiwan Yanjiu (Taiwan Research), 2,(2002).

49. Sun Yun, "9-11Shijian Hou Zhongmei Guanxi de Bianhua ji dui Liangan Guanxi de Yingxiang," (hnplications of Changes in Sino-US Relations Since 9-1t on Cross-Straits Relations) Taiwan Yanjiu Jikan (Taiwan Studies Quarterly) 4, (2003), 18.

50. Yah Shihong, "Zhongguo de Waibu Kunnan he Xin Lingdao Jiti Miandui de Tiaozhan" (China's External Problems and the Challenges Faced by the New Leadership Collective) Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Management), 3, (2000), 38-39.

51. China State News Agency, 16 July 2000. 52. AFX, 22 August 2001. 53. News Agency, 15 April 2006. http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=headlines&title=

Headlines&m_id=564. 54. See: Mark Stokes, China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States (Carlisle

Barracks: US Army War College, 1999) 55. Susan Puska, "Rough But Ready Force Projection: An Assessment of Recent PLA Training,"

in Andrew Scobell, Andrew and Larry Wortzel, eds., China's Growing Military Power (Carlisle Barracks: US Army War College, September 2002).

56. Zhonghua Gongshang Shibao (China Business Times), 3 July 1995. 57. Xinhua News Agency, 3 March 1997. 58. InfoProd, 23 June 2005. 59. Central News Agency (Taiwan), 25 February 2001. 60. Xinhua News Agency, 7 May 2005. 61. Xinhua News Agency• • 5 Apri• 2••6. http:••www.gwytb.g•v.cn:8•88/detai•.asp?tab•e=head•ines

&title=Headlines&m_id=559. 62. Author interview with Jing Huang, The Brookings Institutions, Washington DC, (August

20O5). 63. Author interview with Jia Qingguo, Peking University, Beijing, (June 2005). 64. Andrew Nathan, "China's Goals in the Taiwan Strait," The China Journal 36 (July 1996),89-

90. 65. Taiwan wenti yu Zhongguo tongyi Baipishu (White Paper on the Taiwan Issue and China's

Unification), Guowuyuan Taiwan Shiwu Bangongshi (The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council), 1 September 1993.

66. "Liangan renyuan wanglai yu jiaoliu tongji" ("Cross-Straits Travel and Exchange Statistics"), fact sheet issued by the State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office. http:#www.gwytb.gov.crdjlwl/rywl 1.htm.

Wuthnow 43

67. Yu, "Taiwanese Democracy Under Threat: Impact and Limit of Chinese Military Coercion," (1997), 9.

68. Chao, Chien-min, "Will Economic Integration Between Mainland China and Taiwan Lead to a Congenial Political Culture?" Asian Survey 43:2 (March-April, 2003), 284.

69. See: Su Chi "Domestic Determinants of Taiwan's Mainland Policy," paper presented at the Peace Across the Taiwan Strait Conference, (May 23-5 2002), St. Antony's College, Oxford

70. Wang, "Cross Strait Relations after the 2000 Election in Taiwan: Changing Tactics in a New Reality," (2001), pp. 720-1.

71. Wang Bao andYe Wenbing, "'1994: Liangan guanxi yibo sanzhe'" ("1994: Turbulence in Cross- Strait Relations"), Liaowang (On tlook) 46, (1994), 38.

72. Liang Maojin "Yiguo liangzhi weida gouxiang de jicheng he fazhan" ("The Inheritance and Development of 'One Country Two Systems' Thought," Fujian Xuekan (Fujian Studies Journal) 2, (February 1995), 2

73. Nathan, "China's Goals in the Taiwan Strait," (1996), 90. 74. Michael D. Swaine, "Chinese Decision-Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979-2000," in Lampton,

ed., The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, (2001), 324. 75. Ross, "The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Credibility, Coercion and the Use of Force,"

(2000), 115. 76. Zhou Zhihuai, "Guanyu 1995-1996 Nian Tai Hal Weiji de Sikao;' (Thoughts on the 1995-1996

Taiwan Straits Crisis) Taiwan Yanjiu Jikan (Taiwan Studies Journal) 2, (1998),5. 77. With respect to the election, Lee earned 54% of the vote, compared to 21% for the DPP candidate.

The pro-mainland New Party candidate came in a distant third. In addition, support for unification dropped from 23% in January 1995 to 19% in August, and 16% in March 1996, mirroring the escalation of conflict. Yu, "Taiwanese Democracy Under Threat: Impact and Limit of Chinese Military Coercion," (1997), pp. 19-24. For details on the consequences vis-a-vis the United States, see Ross "The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Credibility, Coercion and the Use of Force," (2000), 17. The PRC also concluded, perhaps incorrectly, that a US strategic partnership with Japan signed in 1998 was an outcome of the crisis. Lampton, "China and Clinton's America: Have They Learned Anything?" (1997), 1104-1105.

78. Ibid. Also, Robert Ross, "Navigating the Taiwan Strait," International Security 27:2 (Fall 2002), 68-69.

79. Phillip Sannders, "Supping with a Long Spoon: Dependence and Interdependence in Sino-Ameri- can Relations," The China Journal 43 (January 2000), 73.

80. In April 1999, 47.5 % respondents felt that Beijing's threats were aimed at the general population, growing to 66.7% inAugust 1999, after the July controversy. See Mainland Affairs Council data, at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/pos/9411/po941 le.htm.

81. A mainland official was quoted as saying that the elections of Lee in 1996 and Chen in 2000 showed that saber-rattling would not likely be effective. Central News Agency (Taiwan), 30 November 2001.

82. South China Morning Post, 4 March 2004. However in May, Beijing demanded that Chen avoid discussing independence in his inauguration speech or else "be consumed in his own flames.'" A similar statement repeated the contention that the Olympic Games would be sacrificed, if necessary, to deter Chen. This quote was from Prof. Xu Bodong, Director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at Beijing United University, Ibid Associated Press, 19 May 2004.

83. In fact, the number of individuals who expressed desire for "independence ASAP" reached its highest point since 1999 in November 1995, at 10.3%. See n49. On the protest, see: Straits Times, 28 March 2005.

84. New York Times, 17 April 2006. 85. "Taiwan, Trade Top Hu-Bush Talks," CNN news report, 16 April 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/

WORLD/asiapcf/04/16/china.hu.visit/index.html. 86. In 1981, MarshalYe Jianying stated that Taiwan could become a "special administrative region,'"

and devised the "three links" (postal, commercial, and travel) and "four exchanges" (academic, cultural, economics and sports) to "gradually eliminate antagonism between the two sides and increase mutual understanding?' Then, in July 1988, the State Council created special investment zones for Taiwan businessmen, authorizing land use rights, tax shelters and duty-free imports. The PRC also tolerated large trade deficits with the ROC, reaching $15 billion in 1995. In his


"Eight Point" speech in January 1995, Jiang Zemin repeated calls for greater Taiwan investment and trade in the mainland.

87. See: George T. Crane, "China and Taiwan: Not Yet 'Greater China'" International Affairs 69:4 (October 1993).

88. Suisheng Zhao "Economic Interdependence and Political Divergence," in Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan and the 1995-1996 Crisis, 29-30.

89. Zhao, "Beijing's Wait-and-See Policy Toward Taiwan: An Uncertain Future," (2003), 73. 90. Wang, "Cross Strait Relations after the 2000 Election in Taiwan: Changing Tactics in a New

Reality," (2001), 111-112. 91. Travel followed a similar pattern, with 3.1 million mainland visits in 2000 increasing to 3.7 mil-

lion in 2004. For sources, see Figure 2. 92. Chao, "National Security vs. Economic Interests: Reassessing Taiwan's Mainland Policy under

Chen Shui-bian" (2004), 696-7. 93. Chu, "Taiwan's National Identity Politics and the Prospect of Cross-Strait Relations," (2004),

508. 94. C.L. Chiou, "Dilemmas in China's Reunification Policy Toward Taiwan," Asian Survey 26:4

(April 1986), 477-9. 95. M. Taylor Fravel, The Long March to Peace: Explaining China's Settlement of Territorial Dis-

putes, (Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 2004), 351. 96. In addition, Wang notes that, in Taiwan's electoral system, even these individuals had to consider

public opinion and avoid appearing overly friendly toward Beijing. Wang "Cross Strait Relations after the 2000 Election in Taiwan: Changing Tactics in a New Reality," (2001), 735.

97. Denny R~y~ ̀ `Taiwan~ s Threat Percepti~ns: The Enemy Within~ Asia-Paci~c Centerf~r Securi~ Studies, Occasional Paper Series, (March 2003), 3.

98. Chao, "National Security vs. Economic Interests: Reassessing Taiwan's Mainland Policy under Chen Shui-bian" (2004), 703.

99. Zhao, "Beijing's Wait-and-See Policy Toward Taiwan: An Uncertain Future," (2003), 72. 100. Li Chenghong, "Two Level Games, Issue Politicization and the Disarray of Taiwan's Cross-Strait

Policy After the 2000 Election," East Asia 22:3 (Fall 2005), 55. 101. Robert Ross, "Taiwan's Fading Independence Movement," Foreign Affairs 85:2 (March-April

2006) 102. Data from the Foreign Trade Division, US Census. http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statis-

tics/index.html. 103. Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund, (April 2006 Edition). 104. "Foreign Investment in China," US Business Council Fact Sheet, (January 2006), http://www.

uschina.org/public/documents/2006/02/foreign-direct-inve stment-2006.html. 105. Robert Sutter "Why does China Matter?" The Washington Quarterly 27:1 (Winter 2003-4),77-

80. 106. See: Ibid for further details. 107. Liu Jianfei, "Hon lengzhan shidai de ZhongMei guanxi yu Taiwan wenti" (Sino-US Relations

and the Taiwan Problem in the Post-Cold War Era) in Zhanlue yu Guanli (Strategy and Manage- ment),6 (2002), 105.

108. Swaine, "Trouble in Taiwan," Foreign Affairs (2004). 109. David Lampton, "China and Clinton's America: Have They Learned Anything?" Asian Survey

37:12 (December 1997), 1104-6. 110. Ross, "The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Credibility, Coercion and the Use of Force,"

(2000), 112-113. 111. For instance, China played an important role in enabling the war on terrorism in South Asia

through its links with Pakistan. Sutter, "Why does China Matter?" (2003-4), 85. 112. Jia Qingguo, "The Impact of 9-11 on Sino-US Relations: A Preliminary Assessment," Interna-

tional Relations of the Asia Pacific 3:2 (2003), 164. 113. Ibid., 165. 114. Other benefits to China included US support on its own struggle against Islamic extremism, and

a positive diplomatic environment heading into final discussions on China's participation in the WTO.

115. Asia Times, 11 July 2001.

Wuthnow 45

116. Drew Thompson, "Economic Growth and Soft Power: China's Africa Strategy," China Brief4:24 (December 2004).

117. China Post, 31 March 2004.; "Grenada: Foreign Minister Outlines Reasons for Breaking Ties with Taiwan," Caribbean Media Corporation news report, (January 28, 2005).

118. Agence France-Presse, 26 October 2005. 119. Central News Agency (Taiwan), 14 December 2005. 120. See fn21. Other examples of tacit US support for the ROC include opposition to lifting of the

EU arms embargo on Beijing and portrayal of the PRC as a threat in the Pentagon's 2005 report on Chinese military power.

121. Ross, "The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Credibility, Coercion and the Use of Force," (2006).

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The integration of cooptation and coercion: China’s Taiwan strategy since 2001

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