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The Intelligence The Intelligence Function Function Issues in Crime and Justice Issues in Crime and Justice CJ 4610 CJ 4610 PA 5315 PA 5315 Professor James J. Drylie Professor James J. Drylie Week 6 Week 6
Transcript

The Intelligence The Intelligence

Function Function

Issues in Crime and JusticeIssues in Crime and Justice

CJ 4610 CJ 4610 –– PA 5315PA 5315

Professor James J. DrylieProfessor James J. Drylie

Week 6Week 6

Intelligence Politicization Intelligence Politicization

�� Occurs when intelligence analysis is Occurs when intelligence analysis is skewedskewed

•• DeliberatelyDeliberately

•• Inadvertently Inadvertently �� To give policymakers the results they wantTo give policymakers the results they want

�� Politicization a fundamental violation Politicization a fundamental violation of the commitment of intelligence of the commitment of intelligence professionals to provide policymakers professionals to provide policymakers with honest with honest

•• AnswersAnswers

•• Estimates Estimates

Sherman KentSherman Kent

�� Career CIA officer in charge of the Career CIA officer in charge of the Office of National estimates (1952 Office of National estimates (1952 ––1967).1967).

�� Cautioned analysts about the Cautioned analysts about the problem of getting too close to problem of getting too close to policymakers.policymakers.•• They would be inevitably influenced by They would be inevitably influenced by political agendas. political agendas.

•• Must maintain their objectivity. Must maintain their objectivity.

•• KentKent’’s views on the dangers of s views on the dangers of politicization are still evident today.politicization are still evident today.

The fine lineThe fine line�� Too much analytical detachmentToo much analytical detachment

�� Too little interaction between Too little interaction between analysts and policy makersanalysts and policy makers

�� Virtually guarantees that the finished Virtually guarantees that the finished intelligence will fail to address the intelligence will fail to address the current issues facing policymakers. current issues facing policymakers.

�� The intelligence manger must ensure The intelligence manger must ensure that the analyst understands their that the analyst understands their role in the process. role in the process.

Sources of Politicization Sources of Politicization

�� Scholars generally list three ways in Scholars generally list three ways in which finished intelligence can be which finished intelligence can be corrupted:corrupted:

•• Analysts can be directly pressured to Analysts can be directly pressured to emphasize findings that support policies emphasize findings that support policies and preferences or ignore issues that and preferences or ignore issues that can cause embarrassment.can cause embarrassment.

•• Policymakers clearly express views Policymakers clearly express views about what they want to hear, and what about what they want to hear, and what they donthey don’’t.t.

•• Skew estimates for personal Skew estimates for personal advancement. advancement.

Intelligence is Politics Intelligence is Politics

�� Politicization is a charge that is often Politicization is a charge that is often leveled when the estimate supports leveled when the estimate supports one position over another.one position over another.

�� The estimates themselves are The estimates themselves are inherently credibleinherently credible

�� It is the It is the person(sperson(s) who oppose the ) who oppose the findings that are adverse to their findings that are adverse to their political position will attack the political position will attack the objectivity of the process. objectivity of the process.

The Politicization of Intelligence The Politicization of Intelligence

�� Knowledge can convey political Knowledge can convey political powerpower

�� Politics is about powerPolitics is about power

�� Past presidential elections have Past presidential elections have involved debates on intelligence involved debates on intelligence

•• Policy Policy

•• Operations Operations

�� 1976 Carter 1976 Carter –– Ford Ford

�� 1980 Reagan 1980 Reagan –– CarterCarter

�� 1984 Reagan 1984 Reagan –– Mondale Mondale

The CIAThe CIA

�� Was designed to policy neutral.Was designed to policy neutral.

�� Comprised of experts providing Comprised of experts providing information relevant to policy, not information relevant to policy, not advice. advice.

�� The CIA had a very strong cultural The CIA had a very strong cultural trait that was common to all CIA trait that was common to all CIA analystsanalysts

•• A deep sensitivity to the dangers of A deep sensitivity to the dangers of politicization. politicization.

What is politicization? What is politicization?

�� A term that has many meaningsA term that has many meanings

�� The primary meaning for our The primary meaning for our purposespurposes

•• When an agency or issue has become When an agency or issue has become politicized it has become a point of politicized it has become a point of contention between organized political contention between organized political groupingsgroupings

�� Political partiesPolitical parties

�� This can be categorized as partisan This can be categorized as partisan politicization politicization

•• With competing ideologies or preferred With competing ideologies or preferred values enter into role definitions or values enter into role definitions or policy choices.policy choices.

A Political Timeline and the CIAA Political Timeline and the CIA

�� A dominant concept in establishing the A dominant concept in establishing the CIA was a detachment from partisan CIA was a detachment from partisan politics. politics.

�� The first directors of the CIA were military The first directors of the CIA were military professionalsprofessionals

•• Normally assumed to be detached from Normally assumed to be detached from partisan politics.partisan politics.

�� The Cold War The Cold War –– 19471947

•• A consensus warA consensus war

•• Considered the optimum for intelligence Considered the optimum for intelligence agencies agencies

•• They flourish when a wartime spirit prevails.They flourish when a wartime spirit prevails.

•• When the consensus fades the intelligence When the consensus fades the intelligence system is subject to politicization. system is subject to politicization.

�� Allen DullesAllen Dulles

•• First civilian was First civilian was appointed by appointed by EisenhowerEisenhower

•• Not seen as a Not seen as a patronage patronage appointmentappointment

•• Reappointed by Reappointed by Kennedy Kennedy

•• Bay of Pigs was on Bay of Pigs was on his watchhis watch

•• KennedyKennedy’’s s confidence was confidence was shatteredshattered

�� President JohnsonPresident Johnson

•• Followed KennedyFollowed Kennedy’’s s formula of seeking formula of seeking a demonstrated a demonstrated administratoradministrator

•• William William RabornRaborn, , first appointment, first appointment, replaced after 1 replaced after 1 yearyear

•• Richard Helms was Richard Helms was first professional first professional intelligence officer intelligence officer

�� Richard Nixon sought Richard Nixon sought to replace Helms, to replace Helms, Kissinger advised Kissinger advised against it.against it.

�� Helms was replaced in Helms was replaced in 1973 with James 1973 with James Schlesinger, an Schlesinger, an economics professoreconomics professor

�� Considered to be the Considered to be the most puritanical of most puritanical of CIA Directors CIA Directors

�� Replaced by William Replaced by William Colby Colby

�� William ColbyWilliam Colby

�� Another career Another career intelligence officerintelligence officer

�� Headed Headed ““operation operation PhoenixPhoenix””•• Program of Program of assassinations of Viet assassinations of Viet Cong leadersCong leaders

•• Confirmation process Confirmation process had 10% voting againsthad 10% voting against

Issues in VietnamIssues in Vietnam

�� By 1967 there was a controversy involving By 1967 there was a controversy involving the intelligence picture in Vietnamthe intelligence picture in Vietnam

�� The CIA estimates of troop strength The CIA estimates of troop strength differed from the military picturediffered from the military picture

�� General William Westmorland rejected CIA General William Westmorland rejected CIA estimates estimates

•• Considered them inflatedConsidered them inflated

•• An overAn over--representation of insurgent groupsrepresentation of insurgent groups

Cooking the booksCooking the books

�� CBS alleged that WestmorlandCBS alleged that Westmorland’’s command s command suppressed and altered critical suppressed and altered critical intelintel

�� The general sued for libelThe general sued for libel

�� The trial concluded with no clear winnerThe trial concluded with no clear winner

�� The consensus was that the military was The consensus was that the military was playing to politics on the home front.playing to politics on the home front.

�� Main points:Main points:

•• Question of how to count the enemyQuestion of how to count the enemy

•• The war was not a consensus warThe war was not a consensus war

The SovietsThe Soviets

�� Estimates of Soviet military strength Estimates of Soviet military strength was another testament of the was another testament of the confluence of ideology, politics, and confluence of ideology, politics, and intelligence estimates.intelligence estimates.

�� The CIA was created from the ethical The CIA was created from the ethical desire for neutrality in the desire for neutrality in the intelligence processintelligence process

�� The problem was that intelligence The problem was that intelligence often times limits the policy options often times limits the policy options of decision makers. of decision makers.

�� Facts tend to interfere with policy Facts tend to interfere with policy

George Bush and the AGeorge Bush and the A--TeamTeam

�� Appointed by Ford in Appointed by Ford in 19751975

�� Developed a new Developed a new technique for analysis technique for analysis based on competitionbased on competition

�� Two analytic groupsTwo analytic groups•• A TeamA Team

�� Normal CIA analytic Normal CIA analytic groupgroup

•• BB

�� Outsiders with a rightOutsiders with a right--wing ideology wing ideology

�� Competition was less Competition was less than healthythan healthy

�� The AThe A--Team often Team often took extreme views in took extreme views in an attempt to match an attempt to match the extremism of the the extremism of the BB--TeamTeam

�� The BThe B--Team was often Team was often frustrated by this frustrated by this game of chessgame of chess•• BB--Team payback, leak Team payback, leak the info to the press the info to the press

Failure in Iran Failure in Iran

�� In 1978 President Carter had been In 1978 President Carter had been informed that the Shah of Iran was informed that the Shah of Iran was secure in his position.secure in his position.

�� By 1979 the regime was overthrown By 1979 the regime was overthrown by a revolution.by a revolution.

�� The US assessment of Iran was a The US assessment of Iran was a failure that signified politicization at failure that signified politicization at its worst.its worst.•• The collection and an analysis of The collection and an analysis of information was inadequate.information was inadequate.

•• The power of the religious opposition The power of the religious opposition was underestimated. was underestimated.

�� US policy in the Gulf Region was US policy in the Gulf Region was anchored in the survival of the anchored in the survival of the ShahShah’’s regime.s regime.

�� There was a deliberate US policy of There was a deliberate US policy of no contact with opposition elements no contact with opposition elements in fear of antagonizing the Shah. in fear of antagonizing the Shah.

�� CIA covert operations had put the CIA covert operations had put the Shah in power in the 1950sShah in power in the 1950s

�� The analytic branch failed to provide The analytic branch failed to provide policypolicy--free information.free information.•• A critical oversight was the failure to ID A critical oversight was the failure to ID the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.

The ConsumerThe Consumer--Producer Producer

RelationshipRelationship

�� ConsumersConsumers

•• Policymakers Policymakers

�� ProducersProducers

•• Intelligence operativesIntelligence operatives

•• Intelligence analysts Intelligence analysts

•• Intelligence managers Intelligence managers

�� The assumption is that they both The assumption is that they both speak the same language speak the same language –– not so. not so.

The Assumption The Assumption

�� Do the consumer and the producer Do the consumer and the producer support one or the other?support one or the other?

•• How is support defined?How is support defined?�� The consumer sees a shared and active interest, and The consumer sees a shared and active interest, and in some cases advocacy for policy initiatives. in some cases advocacy for policy initiatives.

�� The producer, as a rule, does not advocate policy.The producer, as a rule, does not advocate policy.

•• The dichotomyThe dichotomy�� Producers and consumers live in a Producers and consumers live in a ““we/theywe/they”” worldworld

�� Producers are career officersProducers are career officers

�� Consumers are viewed as transientsConsumers are viewed as transients

�� Consumers expectations may be contrary to Consumers expectations may be contrary to acceptable professional standards acceptable professional standards

The ConsumerThe Consumer

�� The consumer actually helps to set The consumer actually helps to set the agenda for intelligence collection.the agenda for intelligence collection.

�� The problem is they also have The problem is they also have priorities and preferences.priorities and preferences.

•• A review of presidential preferencesA review of presidential preferences

�� CarterCarter’’s cancellation of Us cancellation of U--2 flights over Cuba2 flights over Cuba

�� The acquiescence to the Shah The acquiescence to the Shah

�� What I donWhat I don’’t know can hurt met know can hurt me

•• Politically Politically

�� Shooting the messengerShooting the messenger

�� Consumer as analystConsumer as analyst

•• Overconfidence in personal abilityOverconfidence in personal ability

•• Tendency to think they know more than Tendency to think they know more than othersothers

�� The omniscient OzThe omniscient Oz

�� Absence of feedbackAbsence of feedback

•• Consumers are viewed as black holes Consumers are viewed as black holes where everything goes in, but nothing where everything goes in, but nothing comes back out.comes back out.

•• TwoTwo--way streetway street

�� Producers are often content with the status Producers are often content with the status quo.quo.

The Producers The Producers

�� The Intelligence ButcherThe Intelligence Butcher•• Current Current intelintel done in short, sharp chops.done in short, sharp chops.

•• A snap shot approachA snap shot approach

�� The Intelligence Baker The Intelligence Baker •• LongLong--termterm

•• Prolonged melding and blending of Prolonged melding and blending of information information

�� Current IntelCurrent Intel•• TodayToday

�� The dominant formThe dominant form

�� Very now oriented Very now oriented

�� UncertaintyUncertainty•• Providing uncertain information is Providing uncertain information is problematicproblematic�� Hampers decision makersHampers decision makers

�� Producers will cover all basesProducers will cover all bases•• Too much noiseToo much noise

�� Hesitancy to change estimates Hesitancy to change estimates •• Producers do not want to be wrong, but Producers do not want to be wrong, but recognize fallibilityrecognize fallibility

•• Fearful of losing credibility with Fearful of losing credibility with consumersconsumers

•• Prepare the consumer for change and it Prepare the consumer for change and it may be more readily accepted. may be more readily accepted.

�� Jaded or naJaded or naïïveve

•• Most producers will appear jaded over naivetMost producers will appear jaded over naivetéé

•• Problem is that this places the producer in a Problem is that this places the producer in a position that pits arguments over what position that pits arguments over what happened and spending time to make up for happened and spending time to make up for lost ground. lost ground.

�� Time restrictionsTime restrictions

•• Too little time for too much informationToo little time for too much information

•• Do not overlook or ignore Do not overlook or ignore nondevelopmentsnondevelopments

•• Periodically visit backPeriodically visit back--burner issues burner issues

�� Lack of selfLack of self--analysis analysis

•• Review institutional behaviors Review institutional behaviors

Policy Guidance Policy Guidance

�� Intelligence does not occur in a Intelligence does not occur in a vacuumvacuum

�� Agencies must have guidanceAgencies must have guidance•• This comes from the policy makers This comes from the policy makers

•• It is the job of the policy makers to give It is the job of the policy makers to give directiondirection

•• The National Security Council was The National Security Council was created under the National Security Act created under the National Security Act of 1947 for this purpose. of 1947 for this purpose.

•• The wrench in all of this is the turnover The wrench in all of this is the turnover of policy makers. of policy makers.

What needs to be done What needs to be done

�� The NSC needs to be institutionalizedThe NSC needs to be institutionalized

�� Presently subject to change with Presently subject to change with each new administration and/or issueeach new administration and/or issue

�� The NSC should be setting policy The NSC should be setting policy guidelines for the various guidelines for the various intelintelagencies agencies


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