CompMon ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ The International Legal Framework for Monitoring and Enforcing Compliance with the Sulphur in Fuel Requirements of MARPOL Annex VI Draft Final Report Prepared by Åbo Akademi University Co-financed by the Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communications and the European Union’s Connecting Europe Facility (2014-EU-TM-0546-S) Report no. 1/2017 Version 5 Date 24 April 2017 Main Author Dr. Henrik Ringbom, Adjunct Professor (Docent), Maritime Law and the Law of the Sea, Department of Law, Åbo Akademi University __________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Department of Law Tel: +358-40-7631071 Gezeliusg.2, 20500 Turku, Finland E-mail: [email protected]
ExecutivesummaryThis study analyses international law questions related to the implementationandenforcementoftheairemissionandfuelqualitystandardsforships,inviewofthestrengthenedrequirementsthatapplyin'SulphurEmissionControlAreas'(SECAs)as from1January2015.Thestudyfocuseson jurisdictionalrightsandlimitationsassetoutininternationallawofthesea,includingtheUnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea(UNCLOS)andtheInternationalConventiononthePreventionofPollutionfromShips(MARPOL),butalsoincludesEUlawandcertainhumanrightslawaspectsonenforcementoftherules.Aparticularfocusisplacedon the implementationof sanctions forviolationsof the internationaland EU rules, which is considered to represent a weak link in the currentenforcementchain.Inasummarizedform,thekeyconclusionsofthestudyarethefollowing:General
• There is a comprehensive framework in place for regulating andenforcingrulesrelatingship-sourcepollution,at jurisdictionalaswellastechnicallevel.Thisframeworkhasbeeninplaceforseveraldecadesandhasbeencomplementedbyactivitiestoimproveenforcementregionalorsub-regional organizations. However, this framework is designed fordealingwith discharges into themarine environment and is not alwaysdirectlytransferabletotheenforcementofrulesrelatingtoairemissionsfromships.
• Several features distinguish the enforcement of air emissions violationsfrom other forms of ship-source pollution, to some extent in law, butmoreimportantlyintermsofpracticalenforcement.Particularchallengesintheenforcementofairemissionviolationsincludethewaytheviolationisdetectedandverified, thegatheringofevidence,proving theviolationandsettingthepenaltylevel.Yet,inrealityfewstateshavedevelopedanenforcementschemespecificallyforairemissions.
• In practice, the absence of enforcement mechanisms that target thespecificitiesofairemissionshashadtheeffectthatveryfewinstancesofnon-compliance have resulted in sizeable penalties or other deterrentmeasures,despitethesignificanteconomicincentivesforevasion.
• The issues discussed in the studywill be of global relevancewhen thenew requirements to apply stricter requirements worldwide come intoeffecton1January2020.
Lawofthesea
• Theinternationaloriginandwidespreadacceptanceoftherulesensuresuncontested prescriptive jurisdiction of coastal states to requirecompliancebyforeignshipswiththerelevantfuelqualityrequirementsintheircoastalwaters(includingEEZ).
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• However,states'rightstoexerciseenforcement jurisdictionoverforeignships thatmerely transit theirwaters isheavilycircumscribed inall seaareasexcepttheirinternalwaters,whichsuggeststhemainenforcementof the rules will be taken by port states with respect to ships that arevoluntarilyintheirports
• Port states have a broad jurisdiction under international law toimplement the requirements in question on foreign ships, surely forviolations taking placewithin its territorial sea and exclusive economiczone,butprobablyevenbeyondthat,intheSECAmoregenerally.Suchabroadprescriptive reachof the requirement, extendingbeyond theportstate's coastalwaters, can be based onUNCLOS article 218(1) and can,depending on the enforcement measure, also be justified by the broadjurisdiction that states have under general international law to imposeconditionsonshipsthatvoluntarilyentertheirports.
• Port states' enforcement powers are limited by various safeguardsenumeratedinUNCLOSPartXII,section7,andbysomegeneralprinciplesof international law,suchasproportionality,non-discriminationandtheprohibition of abuse of rights. These principles impose few preciselimitations on port states in general and are particularly flexible in thepresentcaseinviewofthewideinternationalbackingoftheairemissionrequirements and easily-recognised need for effective and stringentenforcementmeasures.
Sanctions
• Monetary penalties seem to be the most appropriate measure forenforcing the air emission requirements. Not only does UNCLOSspecificallyrequirethisformofpenaltyformostviolations,butit isalsothe most targeted form of enforcement measure, in that it allows thepersonwho is actually responsible for theviolation tobe subject to thesanction and the individual circumstances to be taken into account ineachcase.
• International and EU law offer limited guidance on how such penaltiesshould be designed or applied, which means that states have a largediscretion to establish the sanctions they feel are best for the purpose.However,bothMarpolandvariousEUinstrumentsrequirethatpenaltiesare effective and have deterrent effects and these instruments do notpresent obstacles for more effective enforcement. Under EU law theprincipleofproportionalityplacesthelimitsonhowforcefulthepenaltiesmay be, but the air emission requirements include several featuressuggestingthatsanctionscanandshouldbemuchstrongerthanwhatiscurrentlythecase.
• Even if the territorial scope of the obligation placed by port states onforeignshipstocomplywiththeruleswere limitedto thewatersunderitsownjurisdiction,asitisundertheEUDirectiveandMARPOL,itisnotruled out that a ship that violates the requirements may be subject tosanctions which takes into account its (presumed) operations beyondthatgeographicalarea.
• SincethereductionofairemissionsfromshipsformspartofexistingEUcompetence and since effective sanctions are essential to ensure the
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effectiveimplementationofEUlegislationinthatfield,itisnotdifficulttojustify criminal competence in this field. Indeed, a duty to cater forcriminalsanctionsforviolationoftheSulphurDirectivealreadyexistsforEU member states under Directive 2008/99. The extent to which EUcompetence extends to developing those rules further, notably in theformof"minimumruleswithregardtothedefinitionofcriminaloffencesand sanctions", depends on how critical that development is for theeffective implementation of the Sulphur Directive. However, criminalsanctionsisnotnecessarilythemostefficientmeansofensuringeffectiveimplementation in this particular case. A more effective EU measurewouldprobablybetodefinecommonprinciplesfortheestablishmentofthe penalty, and various key features with respect to liable persons,standard of care and calculation of penalties, but to leave it up toindividualmemberstatestodecidewhetheracriminaloradministrativeframeworkisbettersuitedforimplementingtherules.
• The principles guiding the monetary sanctions should aim at a speedyprocess for establishing the infringement and imposing the penalty.Penaltiesshouldtargetcorporations,intheformoflegalpersonsthatareeasily identified, yet should include some flexibility to target the legalperson in actually in charge of the infringement. The penalty systemshould not impose on the authorities the full burden of proving thesubjective violation. Strict liability or presumed fault regimes arepermitted and in use in several states in the area. The penalty shall beseveretomeetitspurposeanditsbasisshouldbetheeconomicgainsoftheviolationrather than itsenvironmentalorhealth impact. Itneeds tobelinkedtotheseriousnessoftheviolationintermsoffuelquality,timeinvolvedetc.intheindividualcase.Principlesforcalculatingthepenaltiesshouldbeagreedinadvance,preferablyjointlyintheregion.AmodelofwhatsuchaschememightlooklikeisprovidedintheAnnex.
• Administrative penalties have so far been more efficient than criminalones increatinganeffectivesanctionsystemforairemissionviolations.However, they are not in use in all states. Administrative penalties ofpunitive nature need to meet human rights standards, notably thoserelating to a fair trial. The existing examples indicate that this can bedone, but the relationship between administrative and criminalproceduresmeritcarefulconsideration.
Otherenforcementmeasures
• Internationallawdoesnotruleoutothertypesofenforcementmeasures,as stand alone measures or complements to monetary sanctions. Suchadditional enforcement measures would normally take the form ofadministrative decisions by port states, within or outside port statecontrol(PSC).
• Monitoring and information gathering at sea, evenon thehigh seas, forthe purpose of subsequent enforcement, is not subject to limitations
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under the law of the sea, as long as the safety or navigational rights ofshipsarenotinterferedwith.
• PSCdetentionisawell-recognizedmethodforensuringcomplianceandisuncontroversial to use for violations of the air emission requirements.However,onthebasisofPSC,itisdifficulttojustifythedetentionbeyondthetimeatwhichtheshiphasre-fuelledorotherwisedemonstratedthatitcancontinueitsvoyageinfullcompliance.
• Shipsmayalsobedetainedoutside thePSC framework. In this case the(likely)impositionofthefinewouldformthebasisfordetention.Theshipwouldbereleasedoncetheliablepartyhaseitherpaidthefineorissuedafinancial guarantee for the full amount. There is practical experience ofthiswayofdealingwithairemissionviolationsintheSECA.
• Aheavierenforcementmeasure,whichcouldbetakenwithinoroutsidethe PSC system, is to link (repeated) infringements of the rules to theprohibition of (future) access of the ship into the port state or entireregion.
• For assessing the lawfulness of such measures, general publicinternational law principles will play a decisive role, alongside theUNCLOS safeguards. In the absence of other provisions in UNCLOS orMARPOL on the limits of the exercise of port state jurisdiction,reasonablenessprinciples,suchasproportionalityandtheprohibitionofdiscrimination and abuse of right will eventually balance the interestsbetweenportstatesandshipoperators.
• In this balancing, many considerations operate in favour of the portstate'sinterests.Theportstate'spositionisstrongtostartwith,inviewofthe absence of a right of ships to enter foreign ports which, in turn,derives from states' territorial sovereignty. In theirmost extreme form,suchmeasurescouldprohibitthe(future)accessofshipstoportstateorregion in question. In the present case, however, proportionalityconsiderationsmaywork against that type of measures, in view of theavailabilityofmoretargetedand,hence,moreeffectivemeasuresthatarelessonerousandinvolvelessdamagetopartieswhoarenottoblamefortheviolation.
• Thebalancing of interest, for any type of enforcementmeasure by portstates, will further incline in favour of the port state in the case of airemissionsstandardsthankstotheglobaloriginandworldwidebackingofthestandards.Therulesimplementedbytheportstateinthiscasedonotadd to the regulatory burden of flag states nor do they challengenavigational freedoms or the authority of the International MaritimeOrganization (IMO). On the contrary, effective enforcement in this caseonly serves to ensure compliance with - and the effectiveness of - theinternationalrules.Theinternationalregulatorhaspurposelyleftalargediscretion for states to choose their own enforcement methods andmeasureswithimportanteconomicimpactforshipoperatorsarejustifiedby the strong incentives for operators to defy the rules. Discouragingenforcementmeasuresareeven requiredbyMARPOLandEU rulesandthe main global and regional shipping organisations have called foreffectiveandharmonisedenforcementoftheSECArules.
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Table of Contents Executivesummary...........................................................................................................................21Introduction......................................................................................................................................82Thetechnicalrules.......................................................................................................................112.1MARPOLAnnexVI...............................................................................................................112.2EUlawrequirements..........................................................................................................132.3Implementingandenforcingtherules.......................................................................13
1IntroductionAnewsetofrulesgovernships'airemissionsandfuelqualityrequirements inSulphur Emission Control Areas (SECAs) since 1 January 2015. Theimplementationof these rulesposes several challengesofapractical, financial,administrative and legal nature. This study addresses the international legalframework for implementing and enforcing the rules. A particular emphasis isplaced on the rules governing the imposition of sanctions for non-compliance,which is considered to represent a particularly weak link in the existingenforcementscheme.Theenforcementofship-sourcepollutionmoregenerallyisgovernedbyawell-established legal framework, set up by jurisdictional rules of UNCLOS andtechnical rules established by the IMO, notably MARPOL. However, incomparison toother formsof ship-sourcepollution, suchasoildischarges, theenforcementofairemissionstandardspresentssomeparticularitiesandspecificchallenges,whichjustifyaseparatelegalassessmentofthismatter.Asopposedtooilspills,airemissionsdonothappenasaresultofisolatedeventsor incidents of a one-off nature, but are of a continuous operational nature.Compliance with the rules entails significant costs for ship operators. 1Conversely, there are important gains to bemade by rule avoidance and it istechnicallyrelativelyeasytoswitchbetweencompliantandnon-compliantfuel.Thisstartingpointwouldcallforarobustmonitoringandenforcementsystem,including at sea, and sizeable penalties for identified instances of non-compliance.YetairemissionsinvolvespecificchallengesinbothareasUnlawful emissions are not as easily detected as oil spills. Even an initialindicationofnon-compliancerequiressophisticatedequipmentandtheeventualverificationofaviolationisatechnicallycomplexoperation,requiringspecialistexpertise and equipment and a considerable amount of time. The continuouscharacteroftheviolationalsomeansthatproofthattheruleshavebeenviolatedatagivenmomentdoesnotnecessarilysaymuchabouttheextentordurationoftheviolation.Evenifproofofthe(objective)violationisavailable,theinfringementalsoneedsto pass the requirements on (subjective) culpability of the persons concerned.Manypersonsare involved in thedecisionsrelating to fuelusageand theoneswhocarryouttheoperationsinpracticearenotnecessarilytheonesthatbenefitfromthem.Therangeof liablepersonsandthe levelofculpabilityrequiredforaninfringementareregulatedatnationallevel,butinmostcasessomedegreeofnegligenceisrequired.Provingnegligenceisalsocomplexwhenitcomestofuelquality requirements. High sulphur contents in the fuel may be due to manydifferent reasons. Documentary evidence is normally not available todemonstrate culpabilitywhile proof that compliant fuel has beenpurchased isnormallyeasytopresent.
1By operating on non-compliant heavy fuel oil, amedium-sized container ship can save up to150.000USDonareturntripthroughtheNorthernEuropeanSECA.Seee.g. 'SulphurinMarineFuels',PolicyPaper,DanishShipowners'Association,August2016.
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Moreover,theprinciplesforaddressingthesizeofthepenaltyforenvironmentalinfractions are commonly based on the environmental harm or the level ofdangerforhumansortheenvironmentoftheinfringement,whichisnotsuitablefor air emission violations. The environmental and health risks and threats inthis case lie in the collective effects of non-compliance, rather than in anindividualinfringement.Theabsenceofsignificantenvironmentaldamageintheindividualcasealsomeansthatotherliabilitymechanisms,suchascivilliability,isnotavailableforuseasacomplementarydeterrent.Suchparticularitiesplacespecialdemandsonmonitoringandenforcement,bothatseaandinports.Yetthedifferencesbetweenairemissionsandotherformsofship-source pollution have not been given much attention in the relevantinternational rules. The jurisdictional framework for ship-source pollution aslaiddowninUNCLOSwasdraftedatatimewhenship-sourceairpollutionwasnotamatterofsignificantconcern.Theconventionfocusesonmarinepollutionandneithertheruleson'discharges'northespecificruleson'pollutionfromorthroughtheatmosphere'seementirelysuitabletogovernjurisdictionalmattersrelating to ships' air emissions. The technical rules, as laid down in themainbody and in Annex VI of MARPOL, do not significantly distinguish theenforcementofairemissionsviolationsfromothertypesofviolationsregulatedintheotherannexes.Whilepoor implementationof the fuelqualityrequirements inSECAsdoesnotappear tohavebeenamajor concern inpractice in the first twoyearsof theiroperation, 2 implementation may deteriorate if enforcement is lax and thelikelihoodofbeingfacedwithdeterrentsanctionsislow.Effortshavebeenmadeto address the risks linked to weak enforcement of the sulphur in fuelrequirements, both at governmental level3and by private actors,4but thereappears to be no other study that specifically analyses the international legalframeworkinvolved.EvenifthefocusofthestudyisontheNorthernEuropeanSECA,themattersaddressedinthisstudyareequallyrelevantforensuringtheenforcement of the sulphur in fuel requirements at global level. The globalperspective will be of increasing relevance as the coming into effect of thestrengthenedglobalstandardscomeintoeffecton1January2020approaches.Thestudyisdividedintothreemainparts.Therelevanttechnicalrequirementsarebrieflypresented in chapter2.These rules refer tomaterial standardsand
2Seee.g. thevarious reportsofat-seamonitoringaspresentedathttp://compmon.eu/reports.AccordingtotheDanishMaritimeAuthority'sactionplanonefficientenforcementofregulationsonships'sulphuremissionsfrom2016,preliminaryinspectiondataindicatedacompliancerateof 94% in the SECA, while remote sensing measurements in Danish waters indicated a non-compliancerateof2%.3At regional level, the European Commission has established aEuropeanSustainable ShippingForum(ESSF)toenabledialoguebetweenMemberStatesandbringstogethergovernmentsandmaritime industry to discuss practical issues that could be encountered during theimplementationoftheSulphurDirective.ASub-Groupontheimplementationofthedirectivehasbeen established and completed its work, but work in this field continues. More informationaboutESSFcanbefoundat:http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm.4Seee.g.www.tridentalliance.org
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requirementstobecompliedwithbyindividualships.Inthepresentcase,thesestandards are laid down in MARPOL Annex VI, in particular Regulation 14thereof, and in relatedEU law instruments.The jurisdictional rules, discussingwhatmeasures statesmust,may andmay not take to implement and enforcethese rules are discussed in chapter 3. Matters relating to enforcement thatremaintobesettledatnationalorregionallevelarediscussedinchapter4,withaparticularfocusonthenatureofthepenaltiesinvolvedandtheavailabilityofother enforcement measures than penalties. Some general conclusions aredrawninchapter5.
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2Thetechnicalrules
2.1MARPOLAnnexVIThe first global measures to limit the sulphur content in ships’ fuels wereintroduced in 1997 through Regulation 14 inMARPOL Annex VI. Those rules,whichenteredintoforcein2005,establishedamaximumsulphurcontentlimitat global level of 4.5%, with more stringent requirement for special areas(includingtheBalticSea),forwhichamaximumceilingof1.5%wasestablished.In 2008 a significant strengthening of the Annex VI was made, which isillustrated in picture 1 below. The revised Annex,which entered into force in2010,introducedaprogressivereductionofemissionsofSOxatgloballevelanda further tightening of the standards within ‘sulphur emission control areas’(SECAs),ofwhichtherearefour:BalticSea, theNorthSea, theNorthAmericanand the United States Caribbean Sea SECAs. The worldwide sulphur cap wasinitiallyreducedto3.5%,effectivefrom1January2012,thento0.5%,effectivefrom1 January2020.5The sulphur limits applicable in SECAswere reduced to1.0%, beginning on 1 July 2010 and further to 0.1%, effective from 1 January2015.MARPOL Annex VI is widely ratified, including by all littoral states in theNorthern European SECA. In January 2017, MARPOL Annex VI had 88contracting parties, representing 96% of the World’s total shipping tonnage.6Amendments to it, and to most other conventions adopted by the IMO, areadopted through the ‘tacit acceptance’procedure,whichmake themapplicabletoallpartieswithoutaneedforformalacceptanceoftheamendment.7
5UnderMARPOLAnnexVIregulation14(8)and(10),thetimeforintroducingtheglobalsulphurcapof0.5%couldbeextendedto2025,subjecttoa feasibilityreviewtobecompletedno laterthan2018.However,IMO'sMarineEnvironmentProtectionCommitteedecidedinOctober2016that the global capwill enter into force already on 1 January 2020. The EU SulphurDirectiveneverincludedacorrespondingpossibilitytopostponeimplementationbeyond2020.6Seewww.imo.org7MARPOLarticle16(2)(f)and(g).
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Picture 1: Progressive reduction of the maximum sulphur content in ships’ fuels under MARPOL Annex VI and theSulphurDirectiveInpractice,the0.1%limitamountstoarequirementtouseeitherdistillatefueloils (MarineDieselOilorMarineGasOil)orother thanpetroleum-based fuels,such as LNG, in SECAs. Given that such fuels are significantlymore expensivethanheavyfueloil(HFO,whichmaybelowsulphur(0.5%-1.5%)orhighsulphur(>1.5%) HFO), the new requirements will raise fuel costs for shipping withinSECAsas from1 January2015.8Theprecisedifferencebetweencompliant andnon-compliant fuel varies depending onwhat fuel qualities are compared andvaries from day to day depending on market prices, but the difference iscommonly estimated to be in the order of +50-75%. Based on prices in lateDecember2016thedifferencebetweenhighsulphurHFO(IFO380)(around310USDperton)and<0.1%MarineGasOil(around470USDperton)wasaround50%.Underregulation4ofMARPOLAnnexVI,flagstateadministrationsmayapprovealternative compliance methods, if such systems "are at least as effective intermsof emissions reductionsas that requiredby thisAnnex, includinganyofthestandardssetforthinregulations13and14".Inacceptingsuchequivalents,administrations should take into account any relevant IMO guidelines. Specificguidelineshavebeenadoptedfortheapprovalexhaustgascleaningsystems.9
8IMO figures indicate that the yearly average sulphur content of the residual fuels tested onboard ships in 2015was 2.45%. Theworldwide average sulphur content for distillate fuel in2015 was 0.11%. Seewww.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/GHG/Documents/sulphur%20limits%20FAQ_20-09-2016.pdf.AnumberofstudieshavebeenperformedtoassesstheeconomicimpactoftheSECArequirements.Foranoverview,seee.g.FinnishGovernmentBillHE84/2014,pp.13-14.9IMOResolutionMEPC.259(68)Guidelines forExhaustGasCleaningSystems.Thedischargeofwashwaters fromsuchcleaningsystems isprohibited incertainareaswithintheSECA,but thematterisnotharmonizedandmayoftenberegulatedindividuallybyeachport.ForanoverviewintheBalticSea,seeAnnex6ofHELCOMDoc.MARITIME15-2015,4-2.
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Global standard
SECA standard
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2.2EUlawrequirementsThe air emission and fuel quality standards of MARPOL Annex VI havesubsequentlybeenimplementedatEUlevel,inDirective1999/32onrelatingtoa reduction in the sulphur content of certain liquid fuels, as amended byDirectives2005/33and2012/33.TherequirementshaverecentlybeencodifiedthroughDirective2016/80210(hereafterreferredtoas‘theSulphurDirective’or‘the Directive’), which did not change the substance of the instrument, butaltered its numbering. This directive reiterates the MARPOL requirements onmaximumsulphurcontent ships’ fuels,withinandoutsideSECAs, and includescertain additional requirements that are not relevant for the purpose of thisstudy.11TheDirectivealsorequires,since2005,allshipsatberthinanEUporttousefuelwithamaximumsulphurcontentof0.1%.12The use of approved exhaust gas cleaning technologies, notably ‘scrubbers’,together with high-sulphur fuel, shall still be permitted under article 8 of theDirective,provided that thecontinuousreductionof sulphurcontent isat leastequivalent to the fuel quality requirements of MARPOL Annex VI.13There arevarious types of scrubbers, but all of them represent a significant investmentcostforshipoperatorswhochoosethatcomplianceoption.Theirinstallationsisnotpossibleinallships,however.14
2.3ImplementingandenforcingtherulesThe general responsibility for implementing and enforcing MARPOL'srequirement lies on flag states and the focus of the convention's enforcementregimeliesonprevention.Theflagstatemustperiodicallysurveyandinspectitsships15andmustissuerelevantcertificatesshowingthattheyareincompliancewith the relevant rules and, if not,withdraw those certificates.16ForAnnexVI,the relevant certificate is the International Air Pollution Prevention (IAPP)
10Directive 2016/802 relating to a reduction in the sulphur content of certain liquid fuels, OJ2016L132,p.58.11A purely regional requirement in the Directive is the requirements on passenger vessels inarticle6(5),whichrequires"passengershipsoperatingonregularservicestoorfromanyUnionport"tousefuelwithasulphurcontentof1.5%orlessuntil1January2020.InviewofthemorestringentrequirementsthatapplyforallshipsinSECAs,thisrequirementfindsnoapplicationinthoseareas.12Article7oftheDirective,whichmakesexceptionforshipswhichuseshore-sideelectricityinportsonlyand forshipswhich,according toapublished timetable,aredue toatberth for lessthantwohours.13TherequirementsinMARPOLAnnexVI,regulation14donotmentionthisalternativemethodof compliance, but more generally flag state administrations are authorised to approvealternativemethodsforcomplyingwiththeAnnex(regulation4).TheuseofscrubbershasbeenforeseeninvariousguidelinesadoptedbytheIMO,includingnotablytheguidelinesreferredtoinnote9above.14See e.g. American Bureau of Shipping, 'Exhaust Gas Scrubber Systems, Status and Guidance,2013, available athttp://ww2.eagle.org/content/dam/eagle/publications/2013/Scrubber_Advisory.pdf15MARPOLAnnexVI,regulation5.16Ibid., regulations 6-9. According to MARPOL article 5(1), certificates provide prima-facieevidence that the ship complieswith theConvention's requirementsand "shallbeacceptedbyother Parties and regarded for all purposes covered by the present Convention as having thesamevalidityasacertificateissuedbythem".
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Certificate,throughwhichtheflagstateadministrationcertifiesthat"thesurveyshows that the equipment, systems, fittings, arrangements andmaterials fullycomplywith the applicable requirements of Annex VI of the Convention". Theonly information relating to sulphur in fuel requirements of the Annex is aparagraphinthesupplementtotheCertificatewhereitisindicatedwhethertheshipusescompliantfueloranequivalentarrangement.17 Thisgeneralschemeforimplementingtherequirementstargetsstaticfeaturesofthe ship and is notdesigned todealwithoperational or otherwise changeablematters,suchasfuelusage.Thedecisiononchoiceoffuelqualitycanbetakenatshortnoticeandnormallyinvolvesonlylimitedadjustments/upgradesofengine,fueltanksandpipingsystemandequipment.18Establishingnon-compliancewiththefuelrequirementsthereforerequiresinformationobtainedwhiletheshipisinactiveoperation.AsunscheduledflagstateinspectionsarenotforeseenunderAnnex VI,19such information will normally be obtained by port and coastalstates.20 MARPOLAnnexVIappliesirrespectiveofthemaritimezoneconcerned.ThefuelqualityrequirementsinSECAsaccordinglyapplyintheentireSECA,irrespectiveofwhether the violation takes place on the high seas, or in the coastalwaters(EEZ,territorialseaorinternalwaters)ofastate.Undertheconvention’sarticle4(1), the flag state administration shall accordingly prohibit violations andestablish sanctions “wherever the violation occurs”.21With respect to otherstates, article 4(2) similarly provides that any violation of the convention’srequirementswithinthejurisdictionofanypartyshallbeprohibitedandsubjecttosanctionsinthecoastalstate’slegislation.22 The enforcement provisions of Annex VI do not provide for any at-seaenforcementof theairpollutionstandards.Regulation11merelyspeaksaboutport state inspections and, even then, mainly refers to flag state enforcementmeasureson thatbasis.23However, a right for theport state todetain theshipuntilcompliantfuelhasbeenpurchasedis implicit inregulation18(10)(2).24In17Seepara.2.3.1oftheSupplementtotheIAPPCertificate,IMODoc.MEPC58/23/Add.1,Annex13,atp.3518 See e.g. ABS, Fuel Switching Advisory Notice, available atwww.eagle.org/eagleExternalPortalWEB/ShowProperty/BEA%20Repository/References/ABS%20Advisories/FuelSwitchingAdvisory.19Cf.MARPOLAnnexI,regulations4(3)and5(5).20In this respect, MARPOL provides that if the flag state is informed of such a violation and"satisfiedthatsufficientevidence isavailabletoenableproceedingstobebrought inrespectofthe alleged violation, it shall cause such proceedings to be taken as soon as possible, inaccordancewithitslaw"(article4(1)andshall,subsequently,"promptlyinformthePartywhichhasfurnishedtheinformationorevidence,andthe(IMO),oftheactiontaken."(Article4(3)).21TherelevantpassageofMARPOLarticle4(1)readsinfull:“AnyviolationoftherequirementsofthepresentConventionshallbeprohibitedandsanctionsshallbeestablishedthereforunderthelawoftheAdministrationoftheshipconcernedwherevertheviolationoccurs.”22Seesection4.3.1below23Regulation11(2)provides that [i]fan inspection indicatesaviolationof thisAnnex,a reportshallbeforwardedtotheAdministrationforanyappropriateaction."24The subparagraph provides that "[i]n connectionwith port State inspections carried out byParties,thePartiesfurtherundertaketo...ensurethatremedialactionasappropriateistakentobringnoncompliantfueloildiscoveredintocompliance."
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any case, regulation 11(6),25like MARPOL article 9(2),26clarify that when itcomes to jurisdictional matters, the convention is not intended to affect theapplicationofgeneral international lawor lawofthesea.27ThosereferencestothelawoftheseaensurethatabroaderjurisdictionisavailabletoportstatesinparticularthanwhatamerereadingoftheMARPOLprovisionswouldsuggest.In contrast to MARPOL, the Directive determines its prescriptive reach byreference to themaritime zones of themember states. Thewording of article6(2)requiresEUmemberstatesto“takeallnecessarymeasurestoensurethat[non-compliant]marine fuelsarenotused in theareasof their territorial seas,exclusiveeconomiczonesandpollutioncontrolzonesfallingwithinSOxEmissionControl Areas”.28When it comes to enforcement, the Directive emphasizes theobligationsof flagandport states,29the latterbeinggivenamore independentroleintheenforcementthanunderMARPOL.Forexample,article13(2)(b)oftheDirectiveforeseesthaton-boardsamplingandanalysisoffuelareundertakenbyportstates "asappropriate"and"where technicallyandeconomically feasible".These requirements have subsequently been further strengthened andquantified.30By contrast, coastal state enforcement is only optional under thesecond paragraph of the article 6(4), providing that “Member Statesmay alsotakeadditionalenforcementactioninrespectofothervesselsinaccordancewithinternationalmaritimelaw.”BothMARPOLAnnexVIandtheDirectiveincludecertainobligationsrelatingtoensuring that fuel suppliers located in the (member) states comply with therelevantstandards.31
25Quotedinsection3.2below.26Thisparagraph,whichwasdraftedin1973andthusprecededUNCLOSprovides:”NothinginthepresentConventionshallprejudicethecodificationanddevelopmentofthelawoftheseabythe United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea convened pursuant to resolution 2750C(XXV)oftheGeneralAssemblyoftheUnitedNationsnorthepresentorfutureclaimsandlegalviewsof anyState concerning the lawof the sea and thenature andextentof coastal and flagStatejurisdiction.”27Seealsotextatnotes117-120below.28Bothparagraphs specifically emphasize that shipswhose journeysbeganoutside theEUarecoveredwithinthisscope.29Thefirstparagraphofarticle6(4)reads:“MemberStatesshallberesponsiblefortheenforcementofparagraph2atleastinrespectof:—vesselsflyingtheirflag,and—inthecaseofMemberStatesborderingSOxEmissionControlAreas,vesselsofallflagswhileintheirports.”30CommissionImplementingDecision2015/253layingdowntherulesconcerningthesamplingandreportingunderCouncilDirective1999/32/ECasregardsthesulphurcontentofmarinefuel.Under article 3(2) of the decision the sulphur content of themarine fuel being used on boardshall be checked by sampling or analysis or both of at least 40 percent of the inspected shipsreferredfullyborderingSECAsand30%oftheinspectedshipsinmemberstatespartlyborderingSECAs. In article 5 it is explained that sampling and analysis include either analysis of theMARPOLsamplesoron-boardspotsamplingorboth.31MARPOLAnnexVI, regulation 18(9), Directive article 6(9). Under the latter, there are somespecific sampling and reporting obligations under articles 13 and 14 which do not have acounterpartinMARPOL.
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Inpracticaltermstheshipisobligedtodemonstratethesulphurcontentofthefuel oil carried on board by means of two main documents. First, regulation18(5) of MARPOL Annex VI requires that "details of fuel oil for combustionpurposesdeliveredtoandusedonboardshallberecordedbymeansofabunkerdelivery note." The minimum requirements on the content of the bunkerdeliverynote('BDN')arespecified inAppendixVtoAnnexVIandonly includethename,quantity,densityandsulphurcontentof the fueloildelivered.32ThisdocumentisamongthedocumentstobeinspectedbyPSCinanystateandshallbe retained for aperiodof threeyears after the fuel oil hasbeendeliveredonboard.Second,regulation14(6)shipsusingseparatefueloilstocomplywiththeSECA requirements, "shall carry awritten procedure showing how the fuel oilchange-overistobedone."33Inaddition,regulation18(8)(1)requiresarepresentativefueloilsample(theso-called 'MARPOLsample') tobecarriedonboardtodeterminewhetherthe fueloil delivered to and used on board ships complies with the Annex VIrequirements.Thesampleshallbecarriedonboarduntilthefueloilconcernedisconsumed,butinanycaseforatleastayear,andcanbeanalysedbytheflagstate administration in accordance with a verification procedure outlined inAnnexVI,appendixVI.Toassistofficials inspectingshipsforthepurposeofverifyingcompliancewiththe requirements, the EuropeanMaritime Safety Agency (EMSA) has preparedsulphurinspectionguidance.34Morerecently,IMOhasadoptedguidelinesforon-boardsamplingmethodstoenableeffectivecontrolandenforcement.35Inconclusion,while thematerial standardsaremoreor less identicalatglobalandEUlevel,thescopeoftheenforcementobligationsincludesomedifferences.EUrulesaresomewhatbroaderwhenitcomestotheroleofportstates,butthegeographicalreachislimitedtomemberstates'coastalwatersandcoastalstateenforcement is purely optional. In practice port states are considerably moreinvolved in the enforcement of the rules thanwhatMARPOL suggests, but thepracticalitiesrelatingtotheenforcementhavesofarreceivedmoreattentionatEU-level thanat IMO.The global0.5%sulphur capwhichwill apply as from1January2020 is expected to increase IMO's attention to implementation in thecomingyears.
32Article18(6)furtherspecifiesthat"thebunkerdeliverynoteshallbekeptonboardtheshipinsuchaplaceastobereadilyavailableforinspectionatallreasonabletimes.Itshallberetainedforaperiodofthreeyearsafterthefueloilhasbeendeliveredonboard."Seealsopara.18(9)(3)requiringparties to "require local suppliers to retaina copyof thebunkerdeliverynote foratleastthreeyearsforinspectionandverificationbytheportStateasnecessary".33Thesameparagraphclarifiesthat"thevolumeoflowsulphurfueloilsineachtankaswellasthe date, time, and position of the shipwhen any fuel-oil-change-over operation is completedpriortotheentryintoanEmissionControlAreaorcommencedafterexitfromsuchanarea,shallberecordedinsuchlog-bookasprescribedbytheAdministration."34EuropeanMaritime Safety Agency, Sulphur Inspection Guidance, 6thMay, Version: 1st June2015,availablee.g.atwww.emsa.europa.eu/work/jobs/download/3503/2407/23.html.35IMOCircularMEPC.1/Circ.864entitled“Guidelines forOnboardSampling for theVerificationoftheSulphurContentoftheFuelOilUsedOnBoardShips”,adoptedinOctober2016.
3.1GeneralIt follows from the foregoing that the more precise limits of jurisdiction toimplement and enforce the air emission standards are to be sought ininternational law and, in particular in the law of the sea. This body of law iscurrentlyauthoritativelyregulatedinUNCLOS,whichiscommonlylabelled‘theConstitution for the Oceans’. The convention is widely ratifiedworld-wide, by168 contracting parties, including all Northern European SECA States and theEuropean Union. 36 Its provisions on vessel-source pollution are widelyconsidered to represent customary international law and hence to be bindingeven for states that are not parties to it. To the extent questions relating tojurisdictionalmattersoftheoceansarenotaddressedintheconvention,thelastparagraphofitspreambleaffirmsthat“mattersnotregulatedbythisConventioncontinuetobegovernedbytherulesandprinciplesofgeneralinternationallaw”.Thesurveyof jurisdictional rightsand limitationsbelow isdoneseparately forflag states, port states and coastal states, but with a particular focus on portstates,which is alsowhere the emphasis of the enforcement of the sulphur infuelrequirementsliesinpractice.Afirstcomplicationthatariseswhenseekingtoanalysethejurisdictionalrightsandobligationsrelatingtoships'airemissionsisthatUNCLOSisnotdraftedwiththis kind of pollution in mind. The convention's detailed provisions on ship-sourcepollutionaddress'pollutionfromvessels'whichisnotdefinedbutbroadenough to encompass any type of pollution from ships. However, the rulesreferred toare thoseaimedatpreventing, reducingor controlling 'pollutionofthemarineenvironment',whichisbroadlydefinedinUNCLOSarticle1(4),37butstill only encompass pollution that ends up in themarine environment. Apartfrom this, the convention includes two specific articles in Part XII which dealwith‘pollutionfromorthroughtheatmosphere’.An initial task is therefore to establish the regulatory framework of UNCLOSwhen it comes to air emissions from ships. Is the matter governed by theprovisionsonvessel-sourcemarinepollutionorbytheruleson ‘pollutionfromorthroughtheatmosphere’intheconvention’sarticles212and222?
3.2Pollution'fromorthroughtheatmosphere'UNCLOSarticles212and222arenotveryprecise,buttheycouldbeunderstoodasofferingawiderdiscretionforcoastalstatestoadopttheirownnationalrules36Seeatwww.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm37 UNCLOS article 1(4) reads in full: "'pollution of the marine environment' means theintroductionbyman,directlyorindirectly,ofsubstancesorenergyintothemarineenvironment,includingestuaries,whichresultsorislikelytoresultinsuchdeleteriouseffectsasharmtolivingresources andmarine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities, includingfishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water andreductionofamenities."
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(goingbeyondIMOrules)thanthe‘regular’jurisdictionalrulesonvessel-sourcepollution, when prescribing and enforcing rules air emission rules for foreignships.38 On the other hand, they are limited to the ‘air space under theirterritory’,whichlimitstheirgeographicalscopeofapplicabilitytotheterritorialsea of coastal states.39Should air emissions from ships be regulated by theserules only, the coastal states' jurisdiction would therefore be limited to theterritorial sea. For several reasons, however, these articles are unlikely to bedecisiveforgoverningtheextentofstates'jurisdictionwithrespecttoMARPOL’sairemissionsandfuelqualityrequirements.Tobeginwith,itisuncleartowhatextentthosetwoarticlesapplytothesulphurin fuel requirements. While their wording suggests that they are intended tocover regulation of ship-source air pollution, these articles, too, only refer topollution of themarine environment, which is not the primary target of theMARPOLsulphurrequirements.Airemissionsthataffectairqualityorpollutionoverlandaretherefore-strictlyspeaking-notcovered.Substance-wise,too,thetwoarticlesseemincomplete.Forexample,incontrasttothemorespecificrulesonat-seaenforcementagainstshipsinUNCLOSPartXII,theenforcementregimeoutlined in article 222 contains no guidance as to how the enforcementjurisdiction is to be exercised, which in itself suggests that it is not apt fordecidingthemoreprecisejurisdictionallimitsofcoastalStateenforcement.Thedrafting history, too, illustrates that very little reference was made to ship-source air pollution when these articles were being drafted, the focus beingmostlyonpollutioncausedbyairtraffic.40Finally,thetwoarticleshavenotbeenrelevant in inpracticewhen air emission rules havebeendeveloped.Both theinternationalnegotiationsonMARPOLAnnexVIaswellastheEuropeandebateon the Directive have largely ignored the two articles when the jurisdictionallimitsontheregulationofshipemissionshavebeendiscussed.In order to clarify the relationshipofMARPOLAnnexVI toUNCLOS, a specificprovisionwasintroducedtotheAnnexin1997.Regulation11(6)specificallytiestheAnnex to the jurisdictional regime for ship-source pollution rather than tothatforatmosphericpollution:
[t]heinternationallawconcerningtheprevention,reductionorcontrolofpollution of the marine environment from ships, including that lawrelatingtoenforcementandsafeguards,inforceatthetimeofapplicationorinterpretationofthisAnnex,applies,mutatismutandis,totherulesandstandardssetforthinthisAnnex.
38See e.g.Molenaar (1998), pp. 501—504. A study prepared for the European Commission in2000 has also addressed this relationship in some detail (the BMT Study (2000), Appendix 4,paras.76—87).39Ibid.40SeeUNCLOSCommentary,VolumeIV(1991),pp.208—213.
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For these reasons, the remainder of the chapterwill assess the law of the seaaspectsofaprospectiveairemissionfeethroughthe‘regular’UNCLOSrulesoncoastalstatejurisdictionovership-sourcepollution.41
3.2FlagstatejurisdictionInternational lawdoes not limit a state’s jurisdiction over ships flying its ownflag. The flag state obligations provided in UNCLOS articles 94(5) and 211(2),with respect to, inter alia, the duty to ensure that its ships comply with“generallyaccepted”rulesandstandardsonmaritimesafetyandenvironmentalprotection, are laid down in the format of minimum requirements. Thoseinternational standards may accordingly be exceeded by flag states, e.g. byrequiringtheirshipstouseSECA-compliantfuelevenbeyondSECAareas.Flag states’ jurisdiction over their ships is not limited in geographical terms,meaning that laws and standards laid down by the flag state as a rule applywherevertheshipislocated,includinginforeignstates’portsandcoastalwaters(alongside applicable standards imposed by the coastal/port state). It wasalreadynotedthattheMARPOLstandardsapplyworldwideandunderitsarticle4(1), flag statesareunderanobligation toestablish sanctions forviolationsofthe convention “wherever the violation occurs”.42By contrast, the Directive’srequirementsaregenerallylimitedtothecoastalwatersofthememberstates.43ItseemslargelyuncontestedthatthestandardsintroducedinMARPOLAnnexVIbynowrepresent'generallyaccepted'internationalrulesforthispurpose.44Thesignificanceofthisliesinthatanyflagstate,atleasttheonesthatarepartiestoUNCLOS,45needs to implement theMARPOLAnnex VI requirements, includingthe SECA requirements, irrespective of whether it has formally ratified theAnnex.ThemorestringentsulphurinfuelrequirementhenceapplytoallshipspresentintheSECA,irrespectiveoftheirflagstate,destinationormaritimezoneconcerned.As regards enforcement, UNCLOS imposes obligations on flag states to ensurecompliancewiththe“applicable internationalrulesandstandards”and, incaseof non-compliance by ships, to take undertake a variety of enforcement
41See e.g. IMO Doc. MP/CONF.3/RD/3, para. 6, Molenaar (1998), p. 512 and the BMT Study(2000),Appendix4,paras.108,113—115.42Seenote21above.43Seetextrelatingtonote28above.44Seee.g.IMODoc.LEG/MISC/8,pp.9-12.ThefinalreportoftheInternationalLawAssociation’sCommitteeonCoastalStateJurisdictionRelatingtoMarinePollution(2000)concludedthatthepurpose of the reference to 'generally accepted' rules is “to make compulsory for all statescertainruleswhichhadnottakentheformofaninternationalconventioninforceforthestatesconcerned,butwhichwereneverthelessrespectedbymoststates”(ConclusionNo.2).Whiletheprecisereferenceofthestandardmaybedebated,itseemsbeyonddoubtthatnumberofpartiesand tonnage coverage that MARPOL Annex VI now entails (see at note 7 above) qualifies as‘generallyaccepted’forthispurpose.SeealsoMolenaar(1998),pp.157-158andJohnson(2004),pp.75-77.45Aswasnotedaboveatnote36above,UNCLOSenjoysverywidespreadformalratification.Inaddition,itsprovisionsonvessel-sourcepollutionwidelyconsideredtorepresentcustomarylaw,andhencerepresentbindinginternationallawevenonthenon-partiestoUNCLOS.
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measures, including investigations, institutionofproceedings incaseofallegedviolations,penalties forviolations,prohibitionfromsailing incertaincasesandco-operationwithotherstates.46It is for the flagstate todecideon thepreciseenforcementmeasuresforships,butunderUNCLOSarticle217(2)theflagstate"shallprovidefortheeffectiveenforcementofsuchrules...irrespectiveofwhereaviolationoccurs."Flag states have a general right to take measures against ships flying its flagaccordingtoitslaws,irrespectiveofpriorproceedingsbyanotherState,47butinthe case of proceedings to impose penalties in respect of violations ofinternationalpollutionrules,thereisaspecialprocedureallowingtheflagstatetosuspendanyproceedingsinitiatedbytheportorcoastalstateswithrespecttoviolations committed beyond their territorial sea within six months of theinstitution of the proceedings. However, this right does not apply to cases ofmajordamagetothecoastalstateoriftheflagstate"hasrepeatedlydisregardedits obligation to enforce effectively the applicable international rules andstandardsinrespectofviolationscommittedbyitsvessels."48DespitethestringencyofflagstatedutiesassetoutinUNCLOS,theconventionisalmostsilentonthelegalconsequencesforastateincaseit failstomeetthoseduties. The only immediate remedy which is provided for any state “that hasclear grounds to believe that proper jurisdiction and controlwith respect to ashiphavenotbeenexercised”isaformalfactualreport,whichtheflagstatehastoinvestigateandactuponasappropriate.49
3.3Coastalstatejurisdiction
3.3.1IntroductionA‘coastalstate’herereferstoastatewhosecoastalwatersaforeignshippasseswithoutcallingintoanyofitsports.Asopposedtoflagstates,coastalstatesareundernoobligationinUNCLOStoimplementmaritimesafetyorenvironmentalrules,butonlyhavearighttodoso.Thatrightissignificantlycircumscribedbyships’navigationalrightsintheterritorialseaandtheEEZ.Thebalancebetweenthe right of coastal states to protect itswaters and coastline against pollutionfromshipsandthenavigationalrightofshipsislaiddowninsignificantdetailinUNCLOS Part XII, separately for prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction,differentlyforeachmaritimezone.
3.3.2TerritorialseaThe territorial sea is subject to the territorial sovereignty of the coastal state,subjectonlytospecificexceptions.Themainexceptionisthatforeignshipsenjoyarightofinnocentpassagethroughtheterritorialseaofotherstates.50Iftheship46UNCLOSarticle217(1)and(2).47UNCLOSarticle228(3).48UNCLOSarticle228(1).49UNCLOSarticle94(6).50The passage shall be “continuous and expeditious” (UNCLOS article 18(2)) andmust not be“prejudicialtothepeace,goodorderorsecurityofthecoastalState”(article19).
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isnotininnocentpassage,theshipisinprinciplesubjecttothefullprescriptiveandenforcementjurisdictionofthecoastalstate.Thatrightisnoteasilylostonenvironmental grounds, however. UNCLOS article 19(2)(h) contains a list ofactivitieswhichrenderpassagenon-innocent,which includes“anyactofwilfulandseriouspollutioncontrarytothisConvention”.Whatamountstowilfulandseriouspollutionmaybedebated,51butitseemsclearthatmerenon-compliancewiththeemissionrulesofMARPOLAnnexVIwillnotnormallyamounttolossoftherightofinnocentpassageunderUNCLOS.52The jurisdiction of coastal states to regulate ships that exercise their right ofinnocentpassage is laiddown inUNCLOSarticle21.This includes the right toadopt laws and regulations regarding, inter alia, “the preservation of theenvironment of the coastal State and the prevention, reduction and control ofpollution thereof”. 53 An important limitation of this right is introduced inparagraph2,providingthatthenationallawsandregulations“shallnotapplytothedesign,construction,manningandequipmentofforeignshipsunlesstheyaregivingeffecttogenerallyacceptedrulesorstandards”.Theremaybedifferentopinionsastowhetherfuelqualityrequirementscanberegarded as representing 'design' or 'equipment' requirements under article21(2).54However,aswasnotedabove,thereislittledoubtthatMARPOLAnnexVI by nowqualifies as ‘generally accepted’,whichmeans that coastal states inanycasehaveanundisputedjurisdictiontoimposerulesimplementingtheseairemission standards, including fuel standards and equipment requirements, onforeign ships exercising their right of innocent passage passing through theirterritorialseas.While there iswide-ranging prescriptive jurisdiction for coastal states in theirterritorialsea,someadditionalsafeguardsapply.Notably,alllawsofthecoastalstateshouldbe“inconformitywiththeprovisionsofthisConventionandotherrulesofinternationallaw”andmustnot‘hamper’theinnocentpassageofforeignships otherwise than in accordance with UNCLOS (article 24(1) and article211(4)). Nor may the coastal state apply discriminatory rules or “imposerequirements on foreign ships which have the practical effect of denying orimpairinginnocentpassage”.55Enforcement
51ILAReport,note44above,atpp.493-496.52Inthedecadesthathavepassedsincetheconventionwasnegotiated,alowerthresholdforthelossoftherightofinnocentpassageappearstohavegainedground,inlegalliteratureaswellasinstatepractice.SeeHakapää(1981),p.197,Hakapää&Molenaar(1999),theILAReport,pp.493-495; and Johnson (2004), at p. 64-66. See also Tan (2006) at p. 208. However, for air emissioninfringementsthisdevelopmentisoflesserrelevance,astheenvironmentaleffectsresultfromthecollective behaviour of ships, thereby reducing the 'seriousness' of individual violations inenvironmentalterms.53UNCLOSarticle21(1)(f).54 While exhaust gas cleaning systems, including 'scrubbers', would presumably representequipment rules,merely requiring a certain typeof fuel to beused is less certain. For variousconsiderationsonthismatter,seee.g.Ringbom(2008),pp.433-435andBMTStudy,para.72.55UNCLOSarticle24(2).
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With respect to the enforcement of such rules, UNCLOS article 220(2)differentiatesthepermissibleactionsonthebasisofthedegreeofsuspicionandevidence.Ifacoastalstatehas‘cleargroundsforbelieving’thatashipnavigatingin the territorial sea has violated the national or international rules on theprevention,reductionandcontrolofpollution,theauthoritiesofthecoastalstatehavetherightphysicallytoinspecttheship,whichincludestherighttostopthevesselandboard it, andpossibly theright toorder it toport.Theactionmust,however, bewithout prejudice to the application of the provisions of UNCLOSPartIIoninnocentpassage.Iftheevidenceindicatesthataviolationoftheruleshas taken place, the ship may be detained and legal proceedings may beinstituted.56Outside the scope of vessel-source pollution, UNCLOS article 27 places certainadditional limits on the coastal states’ exercise of criminal (enforcement)jurisdiction over foreign ships passing through their territorial seas. Inparticular,thearticleprovidesthattheexerciseofcriminaljurisdictiontoarrestpersonsonboardor to conduct investigations related to crimes committedonboardduringtheship’spassage,shouldonlybeundertakenunderveryspecificconditions. The conditions listed may be of some relevance in cases of majordischarges by ships, but are unlikely to be applicable to violations of the airemissionsandfuelqualityrequirements.
3.3.3StraitsusedforinternationalnavigationAspecificcategoryofseaareasbelongingtotheterritorialseaarethestraitsusedfor international navigation. UNCLOS Part III contains different jurisdictionalregimes for different types of straits. For thepurpose of theNorthernEuropeanSECA, two types are particularly relevant. First, UNCLOS introduces a new legalregimeforinternationalstraitstocovernavigationalconcernswhichfollowedfromtheextensionoftheterritorialsealimitto12nauticalmilesandtheconsequential‘territorialization’ ofmany key international straits, including the Dover Strait.57The(non-suspendable)rightof ‘transitpassage’insuchstraitsappliestoshipsin‘continuousandexpeditious’passageinstraitsbetweentwoareasthatformpartofthe high seas or an EEZ. 58 The right of transit passage includes strongernavigational rights than the right of innocent passage and, among other things,allows submarines to navigate submerged.59Rights of transit passage are alsoenjoyedbyaircraftinsuchstraits.States bordering these straits have jurisdiction to adopt laws,which are “givingeffect to applicable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil, oilywastes andothernoxious substances in the strait”.60Ships in transit passage, ontheir part, shall comply with “generally accepted international regulations,procedures and practices for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution56SeeMolenaar(1998),p.246;andJohnson(2004),p.84.57For an overview on the jurisdictional claims affecting navigation in the European straits, seeMolenaar(2000),pp.31—43.58UNCLOSarticle37,asspecifiedinarticle38(1).59This is implicit in the reference in article39(1)(c) to "activities other than those incident totheirnormalmodesofcontinuousandexpeditioustransit".60Article42(1)(b).
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from ships”61andwith “generally accepted international regulations, proceduresand practices for safety at sea, including the International Regulations forPreventingCollisionsatSea”.62It isnot immediately clear from thewordingwhether statesbordering the straithave jurisdiction to implement theMARPOLAnnexVI standardswith respect toships exercising their right of transit passage through the strait. That questiondependsonwhethersulphuroxidesandparticleswouldqualifyas"othernoxioussubstances"underarticle42(1)(b).63However,inviewofthebroaderobligationofshipstocomplywithanykindofinternationalpollutioncontrolrulesandpracticesunderarticle39(2)(b),andclarificationmaderegulation11(6)ofMARPOLAnnexVI,64itseemsjustifiedtounderstandtheprescriptivejurisdictioninbroadterms.65This interpretation would also remove the anomaly that jurisdiction of coastalstatesoverstraitswouldbeweakerthanthatovershipsintheirEEZ.Inanycase,thejurisdictionoftheborderingstatestotakeenforcementmeasuresin the strait is strongly circumscribed. Article 233 allows the bordering state to“takeappropriateenforcementmeasures”atseaonlywhereaviolationcausesorthreatens‘majordamage’tothestrait’smarineenvironment.Sinceairemissionsbyan individual ship will not normally give rise to such threats, the qualificationservestoexcludemostinstancesofenforcementmeasuresagainstshipsintransitthroughsuchstraits.That,however,doesnotruleoutsubsequentenforcementforbreachesthathavetakenplaceinthestraits.Article220(1)specificallypermitsin-port enforcement of national rules and standards in the case of shipswhich arevoluntarilyinport.Thesecondrelevanttypeofstraitsarethoseinwhichpassageisregulatedinwholeorinpartbya“long-standinginternationalconventioninforcespecificallyrelatingto such straits”. UNCLOS clarifies that in such straits the specific treaty regimeprevails.66In the Northern European SECA, the Danish Straits belong to thiscategory, due to the 1857 treaties on passage through the Sound and the Belts,whichgrant'freepassage'to(merchant)shipstransitingthestraits.67Suchtreatiesobviouslydonotregulateairemissionsfromships,andmattersthatfalloutsidethescopeof thetreatieswouldhencebegovernedbythegeneralUNCLOSregimeof
61Article39(2)(b).62Article39(2)(a).63UNCLOSCommentary,VolumeII,pp.XX.64Quotedinsection3.2below.65See also the cooperative arrangements to address (any kind of ) ship-source pollution,providedforinarticle43.66Article35(c).Forfurtherreferences,seee.g.Roach&Smith(1996),pp.297—301and353—356andMolenaar(1998),pp.308—315.67SeeTreatybetweenGreatBritain,Austria,Belgium,France,Hanover,Mecklenburg-Schwerin,theNetherlands,Oldenburg,Prussia,RussiaandSweden,andNorwayandtheHansaTowns,ontheOnePart,andDenmarkontheOtherPart, fortheRedemptionoftheSoundDues,signedatCopenhagen and Convention between United States of America and Denmark for theDiscontinuanceoftheSoundDues116PCTS357.TheÅlandStraitisanotherexampleofastraitwhich is commonly referred to as an UNCLOS article 35(c) strait. See e.g. Kleemola-Juntunen(2017).
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innocentpassageand'regular'territorialsea.68TherelationshipbetweenUNCLOSand such conventions is also governedbyUNCLOSarticle311,which essentiallypresupposesthatsuchlong-standingconventionsarecompatiblewithUNCLOS.69
3.3.4ExclusiveeconomiczonePrescriptionThe EEZ does not form part of the coastal state’s territory, but grants certain‘sovereign rights’ for coastal states.All states enjoy freedomof navigation in theEEZ,while coastal states are granted certain jurisdiction to regulate and enforceshipping-related laws in the zone.70The general principle as regards of coastalstates’jurisdictiontoprescribeenvironmentalrulesforinternationalshippingintheirEEZ is laiddown inarticle211(5),71which limitsprescriptive jurisdictionto the adoption of “generally accepted international rules and standardsestablished through the competent international organization”. The samestandardswhichconstitutetheminimumrequirementsforflagstates,discussedabove, accordingly represent themaximum level for coastal state regulation inthe EEZ. Extending the requirements of MARPOL Annex VI to foreign shipsnavigating in the EEZ is therefore unproblematic from the point of view ofinternationallaw.EnforcementA coastal state’s right to take enforcement measures in respect of ship-sourcepollutionintheEEZislimitedtocaseswherethepollutionhasalreadytakenplaceandvarieswiththeseverityofthedamagecausedorlikelytobecaused.InthecaseofaviolationofinternationalrulesintheEEZ,thecoastalstatemayonlyrequireaforeign ship to provide certain basic information about its identity and route(article 220(3)). Where that violation or suspected violation results in a“substantialdischargecausingorthreateningsignificantpollution”,thepowersofthecoastalstateextendtoundertakingaphysicalinspectionoftheshipinrespectof matters relating to the violation (article 220(5)). If there is “clear objectiveevidence”thatthedischargeiscausingorthreateningtocause“majordamagetothe coastline or related interests of the coastal State” or to the resources in itscoastal zones, the statemay, “if the evidence sowarrants”, institute proceedingsincludingdetentionoftheship(article220(6)).68It may be noted that under article 35(c), nothing in UNCLOS Part III (on straits used forinternationalnavigation)shallaffect"thelegalregimeinstraitsinwhichpassageisregulatedinwholeorinpartbylong-standinginternationalconventionsinforcespecificallyrelatingtosuchstraits."(Emphasisadded).69SeeMolenaar(1998),p.286withfurtherreferences.70Article56(1)(b)(iii).Thecoastalstateshall,inexercisingitsrightsandperformingitsobligations,have‘dueregard’totherightsanddutiesofotherstates.Thoserightsanddutiesincludethefreedomof navigation of all states in theEEZ, subject to a correspondingduty to havedue regard for therightsanddutiesofthecoastalstate(article58(1)and(3)).71Twomain exceptions to this rule exist. First, article 211(6) contains specific provisions foradditionalmeasuresin‘specialareasoftheEEZ,whichplacesakeysignificancetoacceptanceofthe rules by the competent international organization, i.e. the IMO. It has beenof very limitedrelevance in practice. Second, article 234 offers the right to prescribe more stringent rules,independentofinternationalrules,forcoastalstatesborderingseaareasthatarecoveredbyiceformostoftheyear.
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Inviewofthestringencyofthewordingoftheseprovisions,jurisdictionforat-seaenforcementmeasureswith respect to air emissionswill generally be limited tocertainbasicinformationrequestsunderarticle220(3).Physicalinspectionunderarticle220(5)willnormallyberuledout,astheairemissionbyanindividualshipisunlikely to meet the requirement of ‘substantial discharge’ and ‘significantpollution’.
3.3.5HighseasThehighseasareopentoall statesandall stateshavecertain freedoms in thehighseas,includingfreedomofnavigation.72Asastartingpoint,shipsaresubjecttotheexclusive jurisdictionoftheflagstate inthehighseas,whichmeansthatstates do not have prescriptive or enforcement jurisdiction over foreign shipsthehighseas,“saveinexceptionalcasesexpresslyprovidedforininternationaltreatiesorinthisConvention.”73Twosuchexceptionsparticularlydealwithvessel-sourcepollution.Thefirstoneis less relevant for air emissions as it concerns special jurisdiction rights forcoastal states in case of ‘maritime casualties’ or related acts which mayreasonably be expected to result in major harmful consequences for it.74Thisprovision sets aside the general jurisdictional regime in casesof pollutionof agiven severity and provides a more extensive jurisdiction by coastal states toprotect its interests, including in the EEZ and the high seas.75However therequired degree of environmental harm and other "major harmfulconsequences"areunlikelytoarisefromtheviolationofairemissionstandardsbyanindividualship.Secondly,andmuchmoreimportantlyforpresentpurposes,animportantnovelprovisionwasintroducedinUNCLOStopermitportstatestotakeenforcementmeasures against foreign ships for violations of international dischargestandards, even if thedischarge tookplace in thehigh seasor inother states’coastalwaters. Even if labelled an article on enforcement, themain novelty ofarticle 218(1) lies in the extensive prescriptive jurisdiction that it entails. ItdepartedfromtherestofUNCLOSandfromprevailingtheoriesofjurisdictionasitdidnotconditiontheenforcementactionstoanyeffectofthepollutiontotheenforcing(port)state.7672UNCLOSarticle87(1).73UNCLOSarticle92(1).74Under UNCLOS article 221 the coastal statemay in such cases “take and enforcemeasuresbeyond the territorial sea proportionate to the actual or threatened damage to protect theircoastlineor related interests, including fishing, frompollutionor threatofpollution”.Therule,which representsamaritimeapplicationof thedoctrineofnecessityand isbasedon the1969International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil PollutionDamage,Brussels1969.75Whilethe1969InterventionConventiononlyreferredtothehighseas,itseemsacceptedthatthearticle221alsoencompassesenforcementmeasuresintheEEZ.Seee.g. IMODoc.LEG/MISC.8,p.70,Molenaar(1998),p.388.Insuchcases,article221presumablyoverrulesarticle220(6),whichlays down a seemingly more restrictive enforcement regime in respect of the same types ofincidents.SeealsoFalkanger(2011).76Ref. e.g.McDorman (1997), p. 315,Molenaar (1998), pp. 105-108 and Ringbom (2008), pp.215-216and332.
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Even in there is limited evidence of the application of article 218 in statepractice,thereislittlegroundstoquestionthatthearticleprovidesthenecessaryjurisdictionforportstatestotakejudicialenforcementactionagainstviolationsofthesulphuremissionrequirementsofMARPOLAnnexVIonthehighseasorinotherstates'coastalwaters.Thisconclusion,whichconformstothewordingofthetwoconventions,willbediscussed inmoredetailbelowinsection3.4.2onportstatejurisdiction.Rather, themain difficultywith applying UNCLOS article 218 to air emissionsrelates to issues of evidence and proof, as it will inmost cases be difficult toestablish a violation on the high seas with sufficient legal certainty withouthaving access to the ship itself. 77 In the absence of jurisdiction to takeenforcementmeasuresagainstforeignshipsonthehighseas,theavailabletoolshave to rely on remotemeasurements, from ships, aircraft or, possibly in thefuture,fromsatellites.Aswillbediscussedinsection4.2.2below,proceduresintheNorthernEuropeanSECAstatesdonotcurrentlypermittheestablishmentofan infringement of theMARPOL standards on thebasis of suchmeasurementsalone.Further investigationswill thereforebenecessarytoverifytheviolation,andforjurisdictionalandpracticalreasonsthoseinvestigationswillnormallybeundertakeninasubsequentport.Itmay finallybenotedthatwhile the jurisdictionofaircraftandotherships tomeasure emissions from ships on the high seas is not as such in doubt,78anysuchactivitiesneed tobeexercised "withdue regard for the interestsofotherStates in theirexerciseof the freedomof thehighseas", includingthesafetyofnavigation.79Therearenolegalguidelinesonwhatthisentailsmoreconcretely,but in the context of aerial monitoring of spills of oil and other hazardoussubstances into the sea, practical guidelines have been developed at regionallevel.80UNCLOS article 224 provides that "the powers of enforcement againstforeign vessels under this Part may only be exercised by ... aircraft clearlymarkedandidentifiableasbeingongovernmentserviceandauthorizedtothateffect",butmerelymeasuringairemissionsfromashipfromadistancewithoutanyinterference-oreveninteraction-withtheshipcanhardlycountasexercise
77Itmaybenotedthatthejurisdictiontoinstituteproceedingsunderarticle218(1)onlyapplies"wheretheevidencesowarrants".78UnderUNCLOSarticle87(1)(b)thefreedomofthehighseasincludesthefreedomofoverflight.Through article 58 the freedom of overflight extends to the EEZ of other states, but here thefreedomissubject tocompliancewith the lawsandregulationsadoptedby thecoastalstate inaccordancewithUNCLOS.79Article87(2). Seealso article225: "In theexerciseunder thisConventionof theirpowersofenforcement against foreign vessels, States shall not endanger the safety of navigation orotherwisecreateanyhazardtoavessel...orexposethemarineenvironmenttoanunreasonablerisk." See also Warner & Kaye (eds.) Routledge Handbook on Maritime Regulation andEnforcement,2015,pp.XXandUNCLOSCommentaryVolumeIV,pp.329-333.80 See notably the Bonn Agreement Aerial Operations Handbook, 2009 (available athttp://www.bonnagreement.org/site/assets/files/1081/ba-aoh_revision_2_april_2012-1.pdf).InthisdocumentitisacknowledgedinPartIIp.17,para8.3that"therearenosetBonnAgreementproceduresfortheconductofsurveillanceflightsbecauseaircrewaloneareresponsiblefortheirownflightsafetyandsafenavigation."
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of'powersofenforcement'.81
3.4Portstatejurisdiction
3.4.1Generallyonportstates’prescriptiveandenforcementjurisdictionIncontrasttotherigidlimitationsofcoastalstatejurisdictionoverforeignships,portstatesarelargelyleftoutsidethespecificjurisdictionalrulesofUNCLOS.Yetit is well-established that internal waters for jurisdictional purposes may beassimilated to the land territory of the state. Ships, through their voluntarypresence in theport or internalwatersof another state, subject themselves tothe(sovereign)territorialjurisdictionofthatstate.82Evenwithrespecttoshipsindistressthatrequestpermissiontoaccessaportorotherplaceofrefuge,theprevailingviewseemstobethatsuchshipsdonothaveageneralrightofaccessundercustomarylaw,butthateachrequestneedstobeassessedseparatelyonitsmerits.83Asastartingpoint,aportstate ishencefreeto imposeitsnationalrulesonforeignshipsandtoenforcethoserulesby(reasonable)meansoftheirchoice, at least as far as they do not relate to matters which are completelyinternal to the ship.84Potential enforcementmeasures include thedetentionofthe ships or the imposition of other conditions for departure 85 and theapplicationofnationallawsbyjudicialorotherprocess,includingtheimpositionof various typesof sanctions.86It is alsowidely recognised that ships enjoynogeneralrightofaccesstoforeignportsunderinternationallaw.87Thisimplies,afortiori, a right for the port state to make access to its ports conditional oncompliancewithspecificrequirements.88Theextentofportstates’ jurisdictionmaydifferdependingonthecharacterofthe requirements at issue. On the one hand, there are rules relating to ‘static’featuresofships,suchasitsdesign,construction,equipmentormanning.Thesefeatures‘follow’theshipwhereveritis;iteithercompliesornot,irrespectiveofitsgeographicallocation.Sinceashipoperatorcannoteasilychangethistypeoffeaturesduringa voyage, this typeof requirements areoften considered tobemost intrusive ones with respect to ships’ navigational rights. Paradoxically,however, static port state requirement are easier to justify in jurisdictionalterms.Ifashipfailstocomplywithaportstate’srequirementonstaticfeatures
81UNCLOSCommentaryVolumeIV,p.328XX82SeealsoUNCLOSarticle2,and,e.g.,Hakapää(1981),p.169;Jennings&Watts(1992),p.622;Molenaar(1998),pp.105,187;andChurchill&Lowe(1999),p.65.83Seee.g.Chircop&Lindén(2006).84SeeChurchill&Lowe(1999),pp.65-69.85The jurisdictiontocloseportsto inwardtraffic iswidelyunderstoodto includethepowertoprohibitoutwardtraffic.Seee.g.Johnson(2004),pp.35—36;andChurchill&Lowe(1999),p.64.86While the jurisdiction to institute judicial proceedings is sometimes separated from othertypesofenforcement jurisdiction,expertsonthe lawof thesea tendto followthedivision laiddowninUNCLOSbyincludingadjudicationwithintheenforcementjurisdiction.Seee.g.Hakapää(1981),p.156,Molenaar(1998),pp.75—76andTan(2006),p.177withfurtherreferences.87Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.United States of America), 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, para 213. MARPOL article 5(3)specificallyrecognisestheoptionofstatesnottoallowaccesstotheirportsifshipsfailtocomplywithitsprovisions.SeealsoLowe(1977),pp.597-622,delaFayette(1996),pp.1-22.88ThisrightisspecificallyrecognisedinUNCLOSarticles25(2)and211(3).
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itwillbeinviolationevenwhilepresentwithintheportorinternalwatersofthestate, where the prescriptive jurisdiction of states is uncontested. Failure tocarrycompliantfuelonboardashipis‘static’inthissense,astheviolationtakesplace continuously, includingwhile the ship is in the port. The presence of anexhaustgascleaningsystemisanotherexample.89Portstaterequirementsofa‘non-static’nature,whichrelatetospecificconductor other operational requirements on foreign ships, raise somewhat differentquestions. Examples in the field of air emissions are the obligation to use aparticularfuelonboardortooperatethecleaningsystem.Compliancewithsuchobligations may change during the voyage of a ship which calls for adeterminationofthescopeoftheobligationingeographicalterms.Forthesecasesitcannotbeassumedthataviolationintheporthasnecessarily(also)persistedduring thepassageof theships. Incase theportstateseeks toregulate conduct that takes place beyond the areas over which it has explicitprescriptive jurisdiction (in UNCLOS), the requirement has extra-territorialfeatures, and the jurisdictional foundation for the requirement may bequestioned.Anexamplewouldbeaport state in theNorthernEuropeanSECAthatprohibitstheuseofnon-compliantfuelsevenbeyondtheSECAforshipsofanynationalityenteringitsports.Even for such cases, it is at least theoretically conceivable that the required(prescriptive) jurisdictional basis for port state requirement could be foundoutside the realm of UNCLOS, notably in the principles of extra-territorialjurisdiction under general international law.90Those principles, however, areunlikelytoclarifythelimitsofhowfarstatesmayregulatetheconductofshipspriortoenteringtheirports.Internationallawonextra-territorialjurisdictionisnotoriouslyimprecise.91Thestateoffluxinthisareaofinternationallawhasledcertain legal scholars to settle for a rather more generic single jurisdictionalprinciple“ofsubstantialandgenuineconnectionbetweenthesubject-matterofjurisdiction, and the territorial base or reasonable interests of state inquestion”.92 Thejurisdictionalacceptabilityoftheportstate’srequirementsalsodependsonthe enforcement measure taken. Enforcement measures which are
89SeealsoSwedishCaseNo.M8471-03, SveaCourtofAppeal,EnvironmentalCourtofAppeal(Miljööverdomstolen), Judgment of 24 May 2006, where the Court confirmed that therequirement of the port of Helsingborg for ships to be equipped with selective catalyticconverterstoreducenitrogenemissions,wasconsistentwithinternational law,evenifnosuchrequirementshadbeenestablishedbyIMO.90SeealsotheeighthparagraphofUNCLOS’preamblequotedinsection3.1above.91See,e.g.,theFinalReportoftheILA’sCommitteeonExtra-territorialJurisdiction,InternationalLaw Association, (the ILA Jursidction Report 1996), pp. 521–522. The Committee’s Chairmanconcludedthat“itwasimpossibletodrawupadraftconventiononextra-territorialjurisdictiongiven the great differencesof opinionwhich existed in this areaof international law.” (Ibid. at525.)92Crawford-Brownlie(2012),p.457.Seealsoibid.at477;Lowenfeld(1996),pp.228–232;andJennings andWatts (1992), pp. 457–458 and 468 and the US Restatement (Third) of ForeignRelationsLaw(1987),subsection403(2).
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unproblematic from a point of view of international law, such as denying thenon-complyingshiptherighttocertainservicesinport,oreventheaccesstotheport, may be justified even if the prescriptive basis for extra-territoriality isweak, while punitive measures, such as sanctions, may require a firmerprescriptivejurisdictionalbasis.93In the absence of specific limitations, therefore, a port state enjoys a widediscretiontoimposeaccessconditionsandotherrequirementsonforeignshipsthatvoluntarilyenter itsports.94Thisdiscretion isnotwithout limits,however.Limitations to thisapriori unlimited jurisdiction of port states include, firstly,the restraints thatmay follow from treaty commitments,whether imposed bybilateral or multilateral, maritime, commercial or other treaties. For example,bilateral andmultilateral treaties on trade and commerce commonly include arequirement of national treatment, limiting the rules of that (port) statesmayapply toshipsofothercontractingparties to thosewhichareapplied forshipsflying their own flag.95The national treatment principle is also a key principleundertheWTOagreements.96Secondly,restraintsmayfollowfromtheapplicationofmoregeneralprinciplesofgeneralinternationallaw,suchastheprohibitionofdiscriminationorofabuseof rights.97 Proportionality requirements may also place limitations on theenforcementmeasureswhichmayreasonablybetakenagainstshipsthatfailtocomply with the port state’s requirements, or if the sanction would becompletely out of proportion with the aim it seeks to achieve.98This type oflimitations, which may be grouped together under the general heading of‘reasonableness criteria’, are clearly less specific and more dependent on thecircumstances of the individual case than the relatively clear-cut, maximum
93SeeinparticularMolenaar,(2007)andid.(2010),p.379.94Generally,seeMarten(2014),Molenaar(2007)andRingbom(2008),Chapter5.AninterestingjudgmentinthisrespectisCaseC-366/10,wheretheEuropeanCourtofJusticeconsideredthatthe implementation of an emission trading scheme that covered emissions by foreign aircraft,wherevertheoperated,couldbejustifiedonthebasisthatthevoluntarilysubjectedthemselvestothejurisdictionofEUmemberstatesbylandingattheirairports:“applicationoftheemissionstrading scheme to aircraft operators infringes neither the principle of territoriality nor thesovereignty of third States, since the scheme is applicable to the operators only when theiraircraftarephysicallyintheterritoryofoneoftheMemberStatesoftheEUandarethussubjecttotheunlimitedjurisdictionoftheEU.”95Forexample,article2(1)ofthe1923StatuteoftheInternationalRégimeforMaritimePorts,towhich, forexample,Sweden,Norway,Denmark,EstoniaandGermanyarestillparties,providesthat ”every Contracting State undertakes to grant the vessels of every other Contracting Stateequality of treatment with its own vessels, or those of any other State whatsoever, in themaritimeportssituatedunder itssovereigntyorauthority,asregards freedomofaccess to theport, the use of the port, and the full enjoyment of the benefits as regards navigation andcommercialoperationswhichitaffordstovessels,theircargoesandpassengers.”96National treatment refers to “treatmentno less favourable than [theMember] accords to itsown like services or service suppliers” (GATS article XVII). See also article III of GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and article 2(1) of theWTOAgreement on TechnicalBarrierstoTrade(TBTAgreement).97SeealsoUNCLOSarticle300.98A proportionality requirement exists explicitly in some UNCLOS provisions relating to theenforcementofnationalrulesagainstforeignships.Seee.g.articles221and232.
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limits imposed on coastal states for regulating ships transiting theirmaritimezones.
3.4.2Thespecialrulesonvessel-sourcepollutionWith respect to the enforcement of the rules relating to ship-source pollution,PartXIIofUNCLOSincludescertainspecificruleswhichclarifythegeographicalreach of port states’ (prescriptive and enforcement) jurisdiction. First, article220(1)providesthataportstatemay
institute proceedings in respect of any violation of its laws andregulations adopted in accordance with this Convention or applicableinternational rules and standards for the prevention, reduction andcontrolofpollutionfromvesselswhentheviolationhasoccurredwithintheterritorialseaortheexclusiveeconomiczoneofthatState.
This jurisdiction includes the jurisdiction to enforce national rules of the portstates, i.e. including rules that do not have a counterpart in the internationalstandards.On the other hand, the geographical extent of such requirements islimited toviolations thathaveoccurred in the territorial seaor theEEZof theportstate.Where the rule which is enforced by the port state has an internationalfoundation, UNCLOS article 218(1) offers an additional, unusually broad,geographicalbasisforportstates’jurisdiction,byincludingtherighttopenalisedischargeseven if thedischarge tookplace in thehighseasor in themaritimezonesofotherstates,irrespectiveofwhethertheportstateitselfwasaffectedbyit.99Thisprovision,whichrepresentedoneofthemaininnovationsinUNCLOSin1982,100has been sparingly used in practice, but gained renewed prominencethrough its collective application by the EU Member States through Directive2005/35.101However, this Directive only covers discharges of oil and noxiousliquid chemicals anddoesnotprovidea remedy for takingenforcementactionagainstviolationsofMARPOLAnnexVI.Article218(1)reads:
Whenavesselisvoluntarilywithinaportoratanoff-shoreterminalofaState,thatStatemayundertakeinvestigationsand,wheretheevidencesowarrants, institute proceedings in respect of any discharge from thatvessel outside the internalwaters, territorial sea or exclusive economiczone of that State in violation of applicable international rules andstandards established through the competent international organizationorgeneraldiplomaticconference.
99It is added in article 218(2) that proceedings should not be instituted with respect todischarges in other states’ coastal waters, unless the port state is concerned by the spill orrequestedtoactbythatotherstate,theflagstateorastatewhichisthreatenedbythedischarge.100Hakapää(1981),p.178,UNCLOSCommentaryVolumeIV,pp.pp.261-270.Seealsoatnote76above.101 Directive 2005/35 on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties forinfringements,OJ2005,L255,p.11.
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It seems clear that MARPOL, including its Annex VI, meets the criteria for"applicableinternationalrulesandstandardsestablishedthroughthecompetentinternational organization" as referred to in the paragraph. 102 The cross-referenceintheotherdirectionisequallyclear.ItwasalreadynotedabovethatMARPOL Annex VI itself declares that "the international law concerning ...pollutionofthemarineenvironment,includingthatlawrelatingtoenforcementand safeguards, in force at the time of application or interpretation of thisAnnex" applies mutatis mutandis to its requirements. There is no reason toexclude the jurisdiction under article 218 from this reference.103Even if thelimited application of article 218 in practice could cast doubts on its status ascustomary law, its applicability as "international law in force at the time ofapplication" cannot be disregarded as between parties to UNCLOS, whichincludestheoverwhelmingmajorityofstates.Onthatbasis,itmustbeassumedthatthegenerousenvironmental jurisdictionofportstatesoverforeignvesselswhichisgrantedinUNCLOSarticle218extendstoviolationofMARPOLAnnexVIincluding its fuel quality requirements.104This, however, applies only to theextent that that theotherconditionsofarticle218andUNCLOSsafeguardsaremet,whichcallsforaclosecooperationbetweenthestatesinvolved.105Inconclusion, itseemsclearthataportstateunderUNCLOSarticle220(1)hasprescriptive jurisdictionover-andmayimposepenalties for-violationsoftheMARPOL requirements that have been committed in the port, and in its ownterritorial sea and EEZ. A limitation towaters under national jurisdiction alsocorresponds to the enforcement obligation in MARPOL article 4(2).106 TheDirectivedoesnotextendprescriptivejurisdictionoverforeignshipsbeyondthisareaandthesameseemstobetrueformany,thoughnotall,nationalrulesintheNorthernEuropeanSECAstates.107
102Seeatnote44above.103Onepotentialreasoncouldbedoubtsastowhetherairemissionscouldbeconsideredtobe'discharges'withinthemeaningofArticle218.However,thisdifferenceinterminologywouldbecapturedbythemutatismutandisprovisionofMARPOLAnnexVIRegulation11(6).Apart fromthat, itmay also be noted thatMARPOLArticle 2(3)(a)contains a very broad definition of theterm‘discharge’,covering“anyreleasehowsoevercausedfromashipandincludesanyescape,…emittingoremptying”.104ThemostthoroughanalysisofthisissuetodatehasbeenmadebyMolenaarin1998,whereheconcludedthatarticle218(1), throughRegulation11(6)ofAnnexVI,extendstoship-sourceairpollution,atleastbetweenthepartiestoMARPOL.SeeMolenaar(1998),pp.506-510.105The second paragraph conditions legal action by a port state against violations in anotherstate'scoastalwatersuponaspecificrequestbythatcoastalstate,theflagstateoranotherstatethreatened by the discharge. Paragraph 4 gives precedence to the coastal state where thedischarge violation has taken place, by providing that the port state proceedings shall besuspendedattherequestofthecoastalstate.Seealsosection3.5belowonsafeguards.106Seenote149below.107Seee.g.theFinnishActonEnvironmentalProtectioninMaritimeTransport(Act1672/2009,hereinafter'theFinnish2009Act'),section3.Forabroaderapproach,seechapter2section3ofthe Swedish Act 1980:424 on Measures Against Water Pollution from Ships, which includes'Baltic Sea areas' beyond Swedish coastal waters within its scope. Section 3(2) of the 2007NorwegianShipSafetyandSecurityActpermitstheKingtoadoptmeasuresagainstforeignshipsthatextendbeyondNorwegiancoastalwaters,"insofaras it is incompliancewithinternationallaw".
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Shouldaneed for it arise,however, the jurisdictionoverviolations in theportstate's coastal waters could also be extended to cover violations outside thisarea, including thehighseasandcoastalwatersofotherstates,on thebasisofUNCLOSarticle218.Toincreaseclarityinthisrespect,nationallawsthatapplythis jurisdiction for the air emissions rules in this broad geographical senseshould made explicit in the legislation that the material obligation to complywiththerequirementsappliesgenerallyintheSECAarea,withoutregardtothestateormaritimezoneisinvolved.
3.5SafeguardsThemostobviouslimitationsofthebroadenforcementjurisdictionofportstatesover foreign ships are those that follow from UNCLOS Chapter XII section 7,which includes a variety of ‘safeguards’ to ensure that port and coastal statesrefrain from abusive enforcement measures. With respect to proceedingsrelatingtopenaltiesfornon-compliance,themostimportantsafeguardsarethefollowing:
1) Only monetary penalties shall be imposed. The only exceptions areviolations that have taken placewithin the internal waters of the stateandviolations in the territorial sea thatamount to “awilfulandseriousactofpollution”(UNCLOSarticle230).
2) Proceedings relating to pollution violations committed beyond theterritorialseaof thestate institutingthemshallbesuspendedif the flagstate takes proceeding to impose penalties in respect of correspondingchargesagainsttheshipwithinsixmonths.Thisrightofpre-emptionbyflag state is limited by certain exceptions, notably if the violation inquestionrelatestoacaseof“majordamage”tothecoastalstateoriftheflagstate“hasrepeatedlydisregardeditsobligationstoenforceeffectivelythe applicable international rules”. It is also clarified that this does notprevent theportorcoastal state frommaintaining the financial securitythroughoutthedurationoftheflagproceedings(article228(1))
4) In such proceedings the “recognized rights” of the accused shall beobserved(article230(3))
In addition to these, UNCLOS reiterates some more general principles ofinternational law, such as the obligation of states to act in good faith and torefrain fromtheabuseofrightsgranted intheconvention(article300).Article227addsthatstates“shallnotdiscriminateorinfactagainstvesselsofanyotherstate.”
3.6QuestionsrelatingtocontrolandenforcementofthestandardsEven ifUNCLOS,aswasnoted insection3.3above,offerssomepossibilities totake enforcement measures at sea against ships that are only transiting the
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watersofacoastalstate,108the implementationofMARPOLAnnexVI ismainlydone in ports. In-port enforcement represents a lesser interference withnavigation and is subject to less legal constraints. In-port enforcement is alsomorepracticalfromthepointofviewofauthoritiesinthiscaseasverificationofaviolationusuallyrequiressamplestobetakenfromtheship’sfuelstanksandpipesandasubsequentdetailedanalysisofthosesamples.Both UNCLOS (article 226(2)) and MARPOL encourage co-operation amongstatestominimiseat-seainspectionsofshipsandMARPOLAnnexVIforeseesnosuch inspections. While coastal states may perform an important role indetecting suspected violations at sea,109the responsibility for verifying non-compliance and taking the necessary enforcement measures against foreignships rests with port states. Since this is likely to remain the case in theforeseeable future,110the remainder of this section is limited to discussing themainaspectsofin-portenforcement.Verification of foreign ships’ compliance with international safety andenvironmental standards rules, includingMARPOL and its Annex VI, ismainlycarried out by port state control (PSC). The international legal basis for suchcontrolsliesintheterritorialsovereigntyofstatesovershipsvoluntarilyintheirports, but PSC is also specifically provided for in many IMO Conventions,including MARPOL111 and its Annex VI.112 MARPOL, like several other IMOconventions, provides that states, when exercising such controls, shall notdifferentiatebetweenparties andnon-parties to the convention inquestion,113whichinitselfrepresentsanacknowledgmentofthejurisdictionofportstatesinthisregard,irrespectiveofformalparticipationtothetreatyinquestion.InEuropePSCisharmonisedandcoordinatedthroughaspecificEUDirectiveonthematter114and through theParisMOUonport state control,which coversabroader range of parties, including the Baltic Sea ports of the RussianFederation.115Forinspectionsanddetentions,too,UNCLOSincludescertainsafeguards:
108In particular ships in passage through the territorial sea may in certain cases be stopped,inspected and asked to provide financial security, provided that the necessary safeguards onreleaseetc.aremet.109Seesection4.2.2below.110 But see the action plan adopted by the Danish Maritime Authority and the DanishEnvironmentalProtectionAgencyin2014,updatedin2016,whereitisheldthatenforcementofthe fuel quality requirements on transiting ships should be explored. 'Handlingsplan 2016 foreffektiv håndhævelse af regler for skibes svovludledning', Seehttp://mst.dk/media/151445/handlingsplan-2016-for-effektiv-haandhaevelse-af-regler-for-skibes-svovludledning.pdf.111Articles5and6.112AnnexVI,articles10,11and18.113MARPOLarticle5(4)providesthat“Withrespecttotheshipofnon-PartiestotheConvention,Parties shall apply the requirementsof thepresentConventionasmaybenecessary toensurethatnomorefavourabletreatmentisgiventosuchships.”114Directive2009/16onportstatecontrol,OJ2009L131/57.115Seewww.parismou.org
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1) Ships shall not be delayed more than is essential for the purpose ofinvestigationunderarticles218and220(article226(1)(a)).
2) Inspections of ships should be limited to an examination of documents.More detailed physical inspection should only be undertaken if anassessment of the documents is not sufficient or if there are ‘cleargrounds’ for believing that the ship’s condition or equipment does notcorrespondwithwhatisstatedinthedocuments(article226(1)(a)).
3) Even if the investigations indicate violation, the ship shall be releasedpromptly “subject to reasonable procedures such as bonding or otherfinancialsecurity”(article226(1)(b)).
4) Releasemayberefusediftheship“wouldpresentanunreasonablethreatofdamagetothemarineenvironment”.Ifashipisdetained,theflagstateshall be notified and the prompt release procedure under article 292applies(article226(1)(c)).116
To reinforce these safeguards, it is also provided that states shall be liable fordamageor lossattributable to themarising fromenforcementmeasureswhichare unlawful or exceed those reasonably required in the light of availableinformation(article232).MARPOL Annex VI does not explicitly state that a ship can be detained ongroundsoffailingtocomplywiththeairemissionsstandards.Instead,regulation11 which deals with inspections and enforcement, highlights flag states'enforcement responsibilities.However, neither this nor any other provision ofMARPOLisintendedtoaffectthejurisdictionalpowersofstatesaslaiddowninUNCLOSandgeneralinternationallaw.117OtherprovisionsoftheAnnexincludespecificreferencestoenforcementthroughPSC.118Aportstate'srighttodetainaship follows from general international law, as outlined above, and it isestablishedinpracticethatviolationofMARPOL'sfuelqualitystandardsmaybeagroundfordetention.119TheguidelinesissuedbytheParisMOUonthismatterareparticularlyclearonthispoint:
116Thisarticleapplies“withoutprejudicetoapplicableinternationalrulesandstandardsrelatingtotheseaworthinessofvessels”,whichindicatesthatfurtherdevelopmentsinIMOConventionsandportstatecontrolmayaffectthescopeofthissafeguard.117Seenotes25and26above.118E.g.MARPOLAnnexVI,regulations10and18(7)and(10).119Seee.g.the2009IMOGuidelinesforPortStateControlundertheRevisedMARPOLAnnexVI(IMO Resolution MEPC.181(59)), which lists ”non-compliance with the relevant requirementswhile operating within an Emission Control Area for SOx” among the detainable deficiencies(para.2.3.2.5).120Paris MOU Guidelines on Application of MARPOL Annex VI regulation 18 in an EmissionControl Area (ECA), available athttps://www.parismou.org/sites/default/files/Guidelines%20on%20fuel%20availability.pdf.Similarly,theEUguidanceoninspectionreferredtoinnote30above.
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However, it is uncertain how long the ship may be detained on this ground.Presumably,oncethevesselhasrefuelledandcandemonstrateithassufficientcompliant fuel to exit the SECA area, it no longer presents an "unreasonablethreat" under UNCLOS article 226 and the Paris MOU guidelines, and shouldaccordinglybereleased.Thedetentionofships,asprovidedforinUNCLOSandsubsequentlyelaboratedinPSCpractice,ishenceanessentiallypreventivetool,whichisnotdesignedforpenalizingviolationsofanoperationalnature.121For suspected fuel quality violations, the requirements of prompt release ofdetained ships may be conflicting with the needs of authorities for in-depthinvestigationsonthenatureandextentoftheviolation.For balancing the interests between the port state and the ship in suchsituations, UNCLOS article 226(1)(b) provides a solution, which has not beenusedinPSCpractice,atleastinthisarea.122Thesubparagraphreads:
Iftheinvestigationindicatesaviolationofapplicablelawsandregulationsor internationalrulesandstandards fortheprotectionandpreservationof the marine environment, release shall be made promptly subject toreasonable procedures such as bonding or other appropriate financialsecurity(emphasisadded).
The emphasized text illustrates that the release of a ship that has violated thesulphurinfuelrequirementscouldbemadeconditionalonthepresentationofasecuritythatcoversapotentialfineorothersanction.123
3.7ConclusionLawful enforcement presupposes that there is both prescriptive andenforcement jurisdiction. These two aspects of jurisdiction are consideredseparatelyinPartXIIofUNCLOS.Withrespecttocoastalstates,theprescriptivejurisdiction to require compliance by foreign ships with the MARPOL's fuelquality requirements is not in doubt (with a small question mark for statesbordering straits subject to the regime of transit passage). However, states'rightstoexerciseenforcementjurisdictionoverforeignshipsthatmerelytransittheirwatersisheavilycircumscribedinallseaareasexcepttheirinternalwaters.For this andanumberofpractical reasons, enforcementof the sulphur in fuelrequirementwillprimarilybeexercisedbystateswithrespecttoshipsthatare
121MARPOL Annex VI regulation 10 includes specific provisions on port state control onoperationalrequirements."Wheretherearecleargroundsforbelievingthatthemasterorcrewarenot familiarwithessential shipboardproceduresrelating to thepreventionofairpollutionfromships"theportstate"shalltakesuchstepsaswillensurethattheshipshallnotsailuntilthesituationhasbeenbroughttoorderinaccordancewiththerequirementsofthisAnnex."122ParisMOUincludesrequirementsoffinancialsecuritydocumentationforvarioustypesofcivilliabilities in relation to repatriation of seafarers, pollution damage and general limitation ofmaritime liability. These documents are based on documents or certificates provided for ininternational conventions. See points 73-78 of Annex 10 to the Paris MOU ('Examination ofCertificatesandDocuments').123Onthis,seesection4.4.6below.
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voluntarilypresentintheirports.Sinceenforcementtakesplaceinport,theportstates have wide enforcement powers, limited mainly by various safeguardsenumerated inUNCLOS.Amorecomplexquestionrelates to theextentofportstates' prescriptive jurisdiction, i.e. how far from the port state may therequirements to complywith the rules extend. Is the port state's enforcementlimitedtoviolationsthathavetakenplaceinthestate'sownmaritimezonesormayitsmeasurescovertheentireSECA?TheSulphurDirectiveonlyrequiresapplicationoftheruleswithintheindividualmemberstates'coastalwaters.124Thisscopeisunproblematicfortheportstateto maintain in view of inter alia UNCLOS article 220(1) and the relatedprescriptive rules in article 211. However, thanks to close link to theinternationallyacceptedMARPOLAnnexVIstandards, theobligationtocomplywiththerulescangobeyondthattobeextendedtocoveranypartoftheSECA.Themostobviousjustificationforsuchabroadgeographicalcoverageoftheportstate requirements isUNCLOS article 218(1)which establishes jurisdiction forport states to prosecute ship-source pollution offences, almost wherever theyoccur,aslongasthereisastronginternationalfoundationoftherequirementinquestion. A question mark still relates to the reference to ‘discharges’ in thatarticle, but that the drafters of MARPOL Annex VI seem to have settled thatquestion by introducing regulation 11(6), which serves to ensure a closejurisdictional link air emissions and other forms of ship-source pollution and,henceabroadunderstandingofthetermtoincludeemissions.Moregenerally,too,abroadprescriptivejurisdictionmaybearguedonthebasisofthegeneraljurisdictionthatportstateshaveundergeneralinternationallawto impose requirements on ships that voluntarily visit their ports, even if therequirements in question extend beyond the coastal waters of the port state.This includespowerfulenforcementmeasuressuchasdenialof (future)accessoftheshipinquestion, limitedonlybymoregeneralprinciplesof internationallaw aimed at ensuring reasonable and proportionate enforcement. Ifenforcement takes the form of penalties, the requirements for a solidprescriptivejurisdictionarehigher,buteventhere,jurisdictionmaybefoundintheprinciplesofextra-territorialjurisdictionininternationallaw.Itmayalsobenotedthateveniftheprescriptivejurisdictionwasconsideredtopreventageographicextensionoftherequirement,thehurdlecouldpossiblybecircumventedbymeansofdrafting.Byalteringthewayinwhichtheviolationisdefineditmaybequitepossibleto‘territorialize’theviolationoftheairemissionand fuel quality standards. For example, a rule imposing an obligation on allshipsenteringportstopresentarecordintheportoftheactualemissionslevelsthroughouttheirpresenceintheSECA,orforthelast10days,orotherwisefaceafine,wouldtechnicallybeviolatedintheportevenifitwouldineffecthaveaverywidespreadgeographicalcoverage.125124Article6(2).125Techniques for territorializingship-sourcepollutionoffenceshavebeenparticularlyused inthe United States, for example relating to sanctions concerning failure by the crew to provideadequaterecordsof fuelconsumption, inadequateorfalsificationofoilrecordbooksorbunker
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Finally, it should be highlighted that even if the port state's jurisdiction toprescribe the sulphur in fuel requirements for the high seas or other statescoastalwaterswouldbeindoubt,thatwouldnotinitselfruleoutthatapenaltyforanyviolationtakesintoaccount(supposedorreal)non-compliancesinsuchsea areas. UNCLOS and MARPOL leave considerable discretion for states toestablish their own principles for penalties and taking into account violationsbeyond the own sea areas as a mechanism to ensure the effectiveness anddissuasivenessofthepenaltywouldclearlyappeartofallwithinthisdiscretion.Anyfinalassessmentonthelegalityofportstates’enforcementmeasures,intheform of penalties or otherwise, is ultimately likely to boil down to questionsrelatingthereasonablenessandlegitimacyofthestate’sclaimtojurisdictionandthebalancingof interestsbetweenthecompetingjurisdictionsoftheportstateandtheflagstate.Thesemattersarerevertedtoinchapter5.
delivery notes, failure to co-operate with port State enforcement officials, etc. See also Udell(2010),pp.269–290.
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4.Enforcementatnationallevel–selectedissues
4.1GeneralEven if the main rules governing ships' air emissions and fuel standards areinternationalinoriginandscope,it isforindividualstatesorgroupofstatestoimplementandenforce them.Thischapteraddressesvariouschallenges linkedto the enforcement of the air emissions requirements which have to beaddressedatnationallevel.Section4.2dealsbrieflywiththeelementsinvolvedin establishing that a violation has occurred, section 4.3 addresses variousfeaturesofsanctionstobe imposed incasesofnon-complianceandsection4.4reviewscertainotheravailableenforcementmeasures.Nationalrulesonthesemattersdifferwidelyanditisnotwithinthescopeofthisstudytoundertakesurveyofthelegalsituationinindividualcountries.Instead,thechapteridentifiescertainofkeychallengeslinkedtoenforcementoftherulesand discusses the related international and EU law framework, sometimes byreferencetoexamplesinindividualSECAcountries.IntheabsenceofacompleteandupdatedcompilationoftheapplicablelawsorpracticeintheSECAcountries,thestudyreliesoninformationonnationalrulesprovidedtotheBalticnetworkof environmental prosecutors ENPRO,126 HELCOM,127 North Sea Network ofInvestigatorsandProsecutorsandtheBonnAgreement,128EMSA,129theTridentindustryalliance130andsomespecificenquiriesmadeinthecontextofthisstudy.
4.2Establishingtheviolation
4.2.1GeneralA first step in any type of enforcementmeasure for violations of theMARPOLAnnexVIrequirementsistoverifythattheshipinquestionhasactuallyactedinviolationoftherules.Thisisfortheauthoritiestodemonstrateandwithoutthepresence of proof that a violation has taken place, there will be no case forenforcement, independently of the procedure involved. Exactly what level ofproof is required to demonstrate the violation varies from one state to
126ManualonProsecutingEnvironmentalCrimeintheBalticSeaRegion,ENPRO,2016,availableatwww.helcom.fi/Lists/Publications/Manual%20on%20prosecuting%20environmental%20crime%20in%20the%20Baltic%20Sea%20region,%20ENPRO%202016.pdf127Notably Helcom Recommendation 19/14 ('A Harmonized System of Fines in Case a ShipViolatesAnti-PollutionRegulations')andrelateddocumentation.128 In particular, the North Sea Manual on Maritime Oil Pollution Offences, available atwww.ospar.org/site/assets/files/1237/north_sea_manual_on_maritime_oil_pollution_offences.pdf129EMSAPublication'AddressingIllegalDischargesintheMarineEnvironment',2013,availableat www.emsa.europa.eu/publications/guidelines-manuals-and-inventories/item/1879-addressing-illegal-discharges-in-the-marine-environment.html(hereinafter, the 'EMSAPollutionManual')130Theindustryalliance(www.tridentalliance.org)haspreparedaninformalsurveyofnationalpenaltiesapplicable in theNorthernEuropeanSECA,acopyofwhich (dated1February2016)waskindlymadeavailabletotheauthorofthisstudy.
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another131and there is limited guidance on this matter in the internationalconventions.Theenforcement chain formarinepollutionviolations consistsof several linksandmany authoritiesmay be involved in establishingwhether a violation hastakenplace,includingcoastguard,police,portstatecontrol,environmentalandjudicial authorities. The emphasis given to the different steps depends on theprocedure involved and is not identical in Northern Europe. To simplify thediscussionbelow,theprocedureforestablishingtheviolationisdividedintotwomain groups: the initial detection of the (suspected) violation and the moredetailedexamination.
4.2.2InitialdetectionThe first indications of violations of the fuel quality requirements may bebrought to the authorities attention in several ways. Information of potentialnon-compliancemay,forexample,beobtainedfromcrewmembers,pilots,portauthorities etc.132New tools and technologies are increasingly being used foridentifyingsuspectednon-compliancesbymeansofremotesensing.ThistypeofdevicestypicallyidentifyhigherSOxconcentrationsintheexhaustgasstreamofships through optical or chemical sensing of the emitted gas plume and suchsensors may be placed on aircraft, other ships, fixed installations on bridges,piersetc.orusedondrones.133Whileremotesensing,includingairborneandsatellite-basedtechnologies,havebeeninuseforidentifyingoilspillsforseveraldecades,itsusefordetectingairemissionviolationsincludesanumberofchallengesthatarespecifictothistypeof violation. Normal visual observations or photographs are not reliable fordemonstrating that the fuel quality requirements have been violated. Moresophisticated equipment is necessary to provide even an indication of thesulphur content in the fuel.Not even such equipmentwill normally be able todemonstratetheexactsulphurcontentofthefuelusedor,whether,intheoverallplume, diesel engine andboiler exhaust gases aremixed orwhich combustiondevice(s)onboardhavebeenusingnon-compliantfuelsetc.131Seee.g. theEMSAPollutionManualp.62:"Inmost legalsystems, it ispossible topresent incourt any type of evidence that is deemed useful to support the case. Depending on the legalsystem and practices, some types of evidence carrymoreweight, and somemay have specificlegalconsequencessuchasreversingtheburdenofproof."132Foranoverviewseee.g.EMSAPollutionManual,pp.51SeealsoMARPOLarticle6(1)andthealmost identical Regulation 11(1) in Annex VI: "Parties shall co-operate in the detection ofviolations and the enforcement of the provisions of this Annex, using all appropriate andpracticable measures of detection and environmental monitoring, adequate procedures forreportingandaccumulationofevidence."UnderthePSCDirective,article23(2),portauthoritiesandpilotshaveobligationstoreporttothecompetentauthoritiesiftheydiscoverthataship"hasapparentanomalieswhichmayprejudicethesafetyoftheshiporposesanunreasonablethreatofharmtothemarineenvironment".133SeeW. Van Roy & K. Scheldeman,' Best Practices AirborneMARPOL Annex VIMonitoring',CompMonstudy,December2016,availableathttp://compmon.eu/reportsand'Remotesensingof sulphur and particle emission from ship', Danish Environment Protection Agency,Environmental project No. 1835, 2016, available athttp://www2.mst.dk/Udgiv/publications/2016/02/978-87-93435-40-7.pdf.See also www.mpropulsion.com/news/view,drones-lead-the-way-in-emissions-compliance_39183.htm
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From a legal point of view, the relevance of the above is that neither thetechnology nor the procedures linked to remote sensing of air emissions havecurrently developed to the extent that such measurements alone can proveviolations of the fuel quality requirements.134In most states in the NorthernEuropeanSECAarea,thequestionofevidenceisbasedonanoverallassessmentandwhileremotemeasurementsmayplayaroleinthatassessment,noneofthestatesaccordinglypermitthatviolationscouldbeestablishedexclusivelyonthebasis of remote measurements. 135 The experience from oil spills remotemonitoring suggests that there is still someway to go before this will be thecase.136Thatsaid, remotesensingdatacanbeavery importantcomplementary tool intheoverallenforcementofMARPOLAnnexVI.Apart fromthepossibilitythataship operator might admit the infringement on the basis of such informationalone, an effective at-sea monitoring system can in itself be a significantdeterrent and hence promote compliance with the rules. In addition, remotesensingmayhaveamoredirectimpactonthejudicialprocedure.Firstly,theresultsofremotemeasurementscanbepresumedtohavesignificantweightintheoverallassessmentofevidencewhencombinedwithothertypesofevidence.Withmore reliable remote sensing technologies andprocedures, thecasegrowsforincreasingtheweightgiventoevidenceobtainedthroughremotesurveillanceintheoverallassessment.Acertificationschemeforthetechnologyand standardization of the procedures involved, which is currently missing,would strengthen that case further.137In the longer run, it is conceivable thatremotemeasurementsaffecttheburdenofproof.InFrance,forexample,officialstatements from government aircraft observers of oil spills have the effect ofshiftingtheburdenofproof.Ifsotheviolationbytheshipisconfirmedunlessitcanbedemonstratedfromtheship'ssidethatitwasnotthecauseofthespill.138Secondly,evenintheabsenceofaroleinprovingtheviolationassuch,remotemeasurements may play an important role in supporting other investigationsrelatingtotheextentandseverityoftheviolation.Theymaytherebyberelevantforassessingthelevelofthepenaltytobeimposed.134At international level there is a standardisedmethod for the determination of the sulphurcontentofpetroleumproducts (ISO8754:2003)which isbasedon fuel samplinganddoesnotextendtomeasurementsofexhaustgases.135SeealsotheENPROManualreferredtoinnote126above,atpp.80-82.InthereportbyWard&Scheldeman(note133),itisstatedatp.20that"theultimatelongtermobjectiveforairborneMARPOL Annex VI monitoring is to achieve a legal status for airborne (sniffing) FSCmeasurementssothatoffenderscanalsobeprosecutedbasedonairbornemeasurements."136The experience to date illustrates that while such sensing results may play a key role injudicial proceedings, identifications made in the basis of remote technologies alone will notgenerallyconstituteproofofaviolation.Seee.g.theEMSAPollutionManual(note129),chapters6and7.137Whileregionalgroupingshavegonetogetherinoil(procedures,),nosimilarforair.Forsomeguidance on evidence collection on aerial surveillance flights regarding oil pollution, see e.g.www.bonnagreement.org/site/assets/files/1076/ba-aoh_revision_2_april_2012.pdf, Part 3, pp.8-10138EMSAPollutionManual,note129,p.62
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Thirdly,evenwithoutanyof those functions,remotesensingresultscanplayakeyroleintargetingwhichshipswillbeselectedforfurtherin-portinspections.Using remote sensing data for this purpose is legally unproblematic. Indeed itrepresentsbothgoodpractice,effectiveuseofresourcesandanexerciseof thevarious duties of multilateral enforcement cooperation which is called for inbothMARPOLAnnexVIandUNCLOS.139EUPSCalreadyincludesaprocedureforthistypeofnotifications,underwhichtheidentifiedshipbecomesapriorityfora'more detailed inspection'.140The process could easily be further strengthenedbyincludinganotificationonthebasisofremotesensinginformationamongthe'overridingfactors'whichentailmandatoryinspectioninthenextport.141Suchastrengthening of the inspection priority and obligations would also beunproblematic in terms of international law, but should be done in closecooperation with Paris MOU,142which is very closely calibrated with the EU’sPSC legislation, but includes the Russian Federation and certain other non-EUstates.However, in order toperform this targeting functionwell, the technicalrobustnessoftheremotesensingneedstobeofagivenqualityandinformationneedstobetransferredrapidlybetweentheauthoritiesconcerned.143
4.2.3FurtherinvestigationsConfirming a violationwill thusnormally require further investigationsby theauthorities. These may be divided into three main categories: ship-boardinvestigations,shore-basedverificationandadditionaljudicialinvestigations.First,itwillgenerallybenecessaryfortheauthoritiestoperformanormoreon-board investigations of the ship while in port. The intensity of theseinvestigations depends on the procedure used and the authority in charge. AstandardPSCinspectionwillnormallycoveratleastaninspectionoftherelevantdocuments discussed in section 2.3, i.e. the IAPP certificate, BDN, written
139SeeMARPOLreferencesinnote132aboveandUNCLOSarticles123,197and226(2).140Annex I II.2.BofDirective2009/16 ('unexpected factors'), see inparticular the thirdalinea,referring to "shipswhichhavebeen reportedbypilots orport authorities orbodies ashavingapparent anomalieswhichmayprejudice their safenavigationorposea threatofharm to theenvironment". Under this procedure, however, "the decision to undertake such an additionalinspectionislefttotheprofessionaljudgementofthecompetentauthority".141Under ibid.AnnexIII.2A.Itmaybenotedthatshipswhich"havebeenaccusedofanallegedviolation of the provisions on discharge of harmful substances or effluents" already represent'overridingfactors'entailingthattheshipshallbeinspectedregardlessoftheperiodsincetheirlastperiodicinspection.142ParisMemorandumofUnderstandingonPortStateControl,1982,latestamendmentfrom27May2016.Seewww.parismou.org.143This,however,presumesthattheinformationtransferisfast,astheresultsshouldideallybeavailablefortheauthoritiesinthenextportofcall.ProceduresandstandardizedformsforthiskindofinformationtransfershavebeendevelopedfordischargesofoilandothersubstancesinHELCOM,BonnAgreement,andIMO,buttherearenocorrespondingmechanismsinplaceforairemissions.TheFinalReportSubmissionfromtheESSFSub-GrouponImplementation,Brussels,4th Plenary Meeting, June 2015 (available athttp://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetailDoc&id=30044&no=5),para.4.2.2.1,agreedthatitwouldbeusefultosharetheresultsofremotesensingonThetis-EU, the EU's port state database. See also SeeW. Van Roy & K. Scheldeman, note 133above,p.20.
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proceduresforfueloilchange-over,theship’slogbooks,andoilandotherrecordbooks,tankplansanddiagramsetc.However, if needed,144the PSC inspection may also go beyond documentarychecks to include a physical investigation of fuel tanks and piping, includingsamples from the fueloil supply linesor tanksandanexaminationof relevantequipment (including scrubbers).145On-board investigations may also coverenquiriesintotheactionstaken,ornottakenbytheship’screw,theproceduresfollowedwhichrequiresformalstatementsbycrewmemberstoberecorded.Second, further investigations ashore are usually required to back up theonboard investigations, such asnotably analysesof fuel samplesby accreditedlaboratories. In certain cases it may also be necessary to undertake furtherinterviews and recording of statement of land-based persons representing theship'sownerandcharterer(s)orexpertwitnesses. Third, in some states, criminal proceedings call for separate investigationsundertakenby thepublicprosecutor,once thecasehasbeensubmitted to thatauthority.Thepurposeofsuchinvestigationistoestablishmorethoroughlytheramificationsofthesupposedviolationbyfindingoutwhatotherfuelswereonboard,wheretheywerepurchased,whetherthesamplewastakenaccordingtoapplicable procedures and whether the crew member(s) actually knew whatstatements they gave or what documents they signed at the initial on-boardinspection.Suchacriminalinvestigationmaysometimesoccurwithasignificantdelay,meaningthatneithertheshipnorthecrewislongeravailablewithinthejurisdictionofthestateconcerned.146It is thecombined,overalloutcomeof these investigationswhichwill formthebasisforassessingwhetherornotaninfringementoftheruleshastakenplace.WhilethereislittleformalguidanceforcourtsonhowtoproveMARPOLAnnexVI infringements, and little experience to date, it must be assumed that aparticular emphasiswillnormallybegiven to the fuel samples takenonboardtheshipsasfurtheranalysedbytheportstateandexpertstatementsrelatingtothem.Itshould finallybenotedthateven if fuelsamples,ascarriedoutbasedontherelevantguidelines,willnormallysufficetoverifythepresenceorusageofnon-compliant fuel, itwill not always be possible to establish exactlywhere or forhow long the non-compliant fuel has been used. In particular where several
144Inthewordsofarticle13(3)ofthePSCDirective,"moredetailedinspectionshallbecarriedout...whenevertherearecleargroundsforbelieving,aftertheinspection(ofthecertificatesanddocuments),thattheconditionofashiporofitsequipmentorcrewdoesnotsubstantiallymeettherelevantrequirementsofaConvention. ‘Cleargrounds’shallexistwhenthe inspector findsevidencewhichinhisprofessionaljudgementwarrantsamoredetailedinspectionoftheship,itsequipmentoritscrew."145Seesection2.3aboveonthetechnicalinspectionguidelinesdevelopedbyIMOandEMSAforthispurpose.146AccordingtothestudypreparedbytheSwedishTransportAgencyreferredtoatnote167,p.49, it is not uncommon that a year has passed from the alleged infringement at the time thepublicprosecutordecideswhetherornotbringthecasetocourt.
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kindsof fuelsareonboardandoilrecordbookrecordsare inconclusive,othersupportive tools, such as fuel usage calculation models, can be used for thispurposetoestimatetheextentoftheviolation.
4.3Thesanction
4.3.1GeneralProof that a ship has violated the air emission standards is not necessarilyenough for the coastal or port state to impose sanctions for the violation. Thenational requirements on persons that can be held liable and the acts oromissions that count for the purpose also need to be satisfied, along withapplicableexceptionsanddefences.AsastartingpointitisrelevanttonotethatthereisnointernationalorEUlawobligationforstatestoactuallyimposepenaltiesinanindividualcase,eveniftheviolation has objectively been confirmed. The rules oblige states to have asanctionsregimeinplacetodealwithviolations,butdonotoffermuchguidanceon how or when to use that regime. Complementary national rules are thusalwaysneededtoaddressissuessuchaswhentoimposeasanction,whoshouldbe the liableperson,what standardof care is required from thatperson,whatevidenceisneededtoprovethatthoserequirementshavenotbeenmetandhowshouldthesanctionsbecalculated.Thedutytoimposesanctionsfornon-complianceisstrongestfortheship'sflagstate. Both UNCLOS and MARPOL require that flag states have procedures inplacetodealwithviolations,wherevertheviolationoccurs.WhileUNCLOSonlyrequires that flag states "shall provide for the effective enforcement of(applicable international or national) rules, standards, laws and regulations",MARPOL is somewhat more specific on sanctions. It provides that "sanctionsshall be established therefor under the law of the Administration of the shipconcerned" and that if the flag state is informed of a violation and sufficientevidence is available "it shall cause such proceedings to be taken as soon aspossible,inaccordancewithitslaw".147Astootherstates,theenforcementprovisionsforcoastalandportstatesarelaiddown inpermissive terms inUNCLOS in the sense thatport and coastal statesmay institute proceedings with respect to violations by foreign ships of theinternational rules.148 There is no obligation for them to do so. Here, too,MARPOL is more demanding as its article 4(2) specifically provides thatviolationswithintheirjurisdictionshallbeprohibitedintheirlegalsystemsandthat sanctions shall be established for violations. Moreover, port and coastalstates shall,whenever a violationoccurswithin their jurisdiction, eithernotifytheflagstateor"causeproceedingstobetakeninaccordancewithitslaw".149147Article4(1)148Articles218(1)and220(1)149ThefulltextofMARPOLarticle4(2)reads:“AnyviolationoftherequirementsofthepresentConventionwithinthejurisdictionofanyPartytotheConventionshallbeprohibitedandsanctionsshallbeestablishedthereforunderthelawofthatParty.
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While the chosenwording falls short of requiring a sanction to be imposed, itclearlyinvolvesadutytofollowupcasesofnon-complianceandeventoinitiateproceedingsincertaincases.Thefinaloutcomeofthatprocessandtherelevantprocedurestobefollowedarelefttothenationalauthorities.TherelevantEUrulesarelessdemandinginthisrespect.TheSulphurDirectiverequiresmemberstatesto"determinethepenaltiesapplicabletobreachesofthenationalprovisionsadoptedpursuant to thisDirective"andestablishes certainmain principles for such penalties. The EU Directive on the protection of theenvironmentthroughcriminallawrequiresmemberstatestoensurethatcertainconduct (including violation of the fuel quality requirements committedintentionallyorwithat leastseriousnegligence)constitutesacriminaloffence,and include certain main principles and requirements with respect to thepenaltiestobeapplied,butalwaysleavesthedecisiononwhethertoprosecuteinanindividualcasetothenationalauthorities.150Theinternationalrulesthusrequirethatsanctionsareinplaceforviolationsoftheairemissionsstandards,buttheydonotincludemuchguidancewithrespecttothedetailsofhowthosesanctionsshallbedesigned.Assumingthatthestatehasjurisdictiontoimposethepenalty,andthattheUNCLOSsafeguardsaremet,thedesignorlevelofthesanctionislargelyamatterwhichislefttoberesolvedbytheindividualstatespartiesinaccordancewiththeirdifferentlegaltraditions.Thesanctionsaccordinglydifferwidelyfromonecountrytoanother.The following sections discuss certain main features of any sanction regime,irrespectiveofdesign.Followingsomepreliminaryobservationsonthenatureofthesanctioninsection4.3.2,questionslinkedtotheliablepersonaredealtwithin 4.3.3, the requiredduty of care in 4.3.4 and the level of the fines in section4.3.5. Some additional issues which relate to the imposition of administrativefinesarereviewedinsection4.3.6.
4.3.2Whattypeofsanction?
4.3.2.1GeneralA firstquestion,which isdecisive for theproceduresandevidencerequired tobringacaseofnon-compliancetoconclusioniswhetherthesanctioniscriminaloradministrativeinnature.Internationallawdoesnotindicateapreferenceonthismatter.UNCLOS,aswasnoted in section 3.5 above, requires that "monetary penalties only may beimposed" with respect to pollution violations by foreign ships (the only
Wheneversuchaviolationoccurs,thatPartyshalleither:(a)causeproceedingstobetakeninaccordancewithitslaw;or(b) furnish to the Administration of the ship such information and evidence asmay be in itspossessionthataviolationhasoccurred.”150Para.10ofthepreambleofDirective2008/99specificallyprovidesthat"thisDirectivecreatesnoobligationsregardingtheapplicationofsuchpenalties,oranyotheravailablesystemof lawenforcement,inindividualcases."
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exceptionbeingpollution in internalwatersandwilfulandseriouspollution intheterritorialsea),butthemorespecificnatureofthemonetarypenaltiesisnotaddressed.151MARPOL is similarly silenton thematterandan IMOpublicationwhich is specifically intended to provide guidance on the implementation ofMARPOLfor itscontractingstatesconfirmsthatthismatter is left to individualstates and adds that “[s]anctions, be they administrative or penal in nature,would,byandlarge,consistoffines.”152The Sulphur Directive includes a general obligation in article 18(1) for EUmemberstatesto"determinethepenaltiesapplicabletobreachesofthenationalprovisions adopted pursuant to this Directive," but does not place furtherrequirements on the nature of penalties. However, the EU Directive on theprotection of the environment through criminal law requires criminalprocedurestobeinplaceforarangeof'unlawful'acts,whichincludesviolationof the air emission requirements of the sulphur directive. 153 These rulesspecifically require criminal liability to be introduced for the listed offences,potentiallyanotherformofliabilityforlegalpersons,154butdonotruleouttheavailability of parallel administrative sanctions. In this regard, EU law issomewhatmore flexible for violations of the air emissions standards than forviolationsofMARPOLAnnexesIandII.155
4.3.2.2EUcompetenceIt issometimesstatedthatEUlawdoesnotconfercompetencetotheUniontoregulatepenaltiesandsanctionprocedures, inparticular if theyareofcriminalnature,andthatharmonisationofsanctionsforairemissionviolationsthereforeis ruled out.156However, as the presence of two directives specifically dealingwithcriminalpenaltiesformarinepollutionalreadyindicate,thereisbothscope151UNCLOSarticle230.SeealsoILAReport,note44,atp.496.152MARPOL–Howtodoit,IMO,2013,para.4.7.153Directive 2008/99 on the protection of the environment through criminal law, OJ 2008 L328/28. Under article 3(a), member states shall ensure that "the discharge, emission orintroductionofaquantityofmaterialsorionisingradiationintoair,soilorwater,whichcausesorislikelytocausedeathorseriousinjurytoanypersonorsubstantialdamagetothequalityofair, the quality of soil or the quality of water, or to animals or plants" constitutes a criminaloffence,"whenunlawfulandcommittedintentionallyorwithatleastseriousnegligence".Annex1ofthedirectiveincludesthesulphurinfuelrequirements,whichmeansthatinfringementsofthesulphurinfuelrequirementsis"unlawful"underarticle2(1).Thedirectivealsoprovidesthatliability shall extend to legal persons and that offences shall be "punishable by effective,proportionateanddissuasivepenalties".(Articles5,6and7).154Ibid.,article7.155Underarticles4,5aand5bofDirective2005/35,asamendedbyDirective2009/123,memberstates shall ensure that violationsof thedischarge standardsofMARPOLAnnexes I and II, areregardedascriminaloffencesifcommittedwithintent,recklesslyorwithseriousnegligence.Theexceptionis"minorcases,wheretheactcommitteddoesnotcausedeteriorationinthequalityofwater".Underarticle8b,thecriminalnatureoftheoffencespecificallyextendstolegalpersons.156Seee.g.theFinalReportSubmissionfromEuropeanSustainableShippingForum,Sub-GrouponImplementation,note143,atpp.13-14.Atp.26itisfurtherstatedthat"underEUlegislation,penaltiesareacompetenceof theMSand it isentirelyon theirdiscretion tocooperateon thisaspectsincethereisnoEUlegalmandatetosuggestneitherharmonisationnorthedevelopmentofsuchmethodsotherthanremindingthegeneralguidingprinciplesonhowpenaltieshavetobecalculatedundertheDirectiveor,ifrequested,tofacilitateacommonunderstandingamongtheMembers."
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for and precedents of harmonization in this area. In seeking to determine thelimitsoftheEUcompetenceinthisarea,themostrelevantconsiderationsrelatetowhether such harmonisation is necessary to obtain a specific objective andmattersrelatingtotheeffectivenessofimplementation.Firstofall,whendiscussingthelimitsofEU'scompetences,referenceshouldbemade to article 352 of the TFEU and its predecessors in previous foundingtreaties. This article stipulates that areas covered by the treaty may beharmonisedevenifthetreatyhasnotprovidedthenecessarypowers“ifactionbytheUnionshouldprovenecessarytoattainoneoftheobjectivessetoutintheTreaties”.TheprocedureforusingthisarticlerequiresunanimitybytheCounciland consent by the European Parliament and national parliaments' attentionshallbedrawntoinitiativestakenonthisbasis.Theprocedureisnotfrequentlyputintopractice,buttheneverthelessdemonstratesthatwherememberstatesagree on the desirability of further harmonisation, there is considerable scopeforflexibilityasregardsEUcompetence.Second, even before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (Treaty on theFunctioning of the European Union, TFEU) in 2009, there were certaincompetencesfortheUniontoactinthefieldofcriminallaw.TheprecisedivisionofcompetencebetweentheUnionanditsmemberstatesinthisfieldhasbeen–andcontinuestobe–amatterofdebate.However,considerableclarificationwasgiventothematterbyCourtofJusticein2005inajudgmentclarifyingthemainprinciples regarding the competences in criminal law in the field ofenvironmentalprotection. In Case C-176/03, the Court ruled that even though, as a general rule, neithercriminal law nor the rules of criminal procedure fall within the Community’scompetence that did not “prevent the Community legislature, when theapplication of effective, proportionate anddissuasive criminal penalties by thecompetent national authorities is an essential measure for combating seriousenvironmentaloffences, fromtakingmeasureswhichrelate to thecriminal lawof theMemberStateswhich it considersnecessary inorder to ensure that theruleswhichitlaysdownonenvironmentalprotectionarefullyeffective”.157Third, theTFEUprovided foranew legal framework forcriminal legislation inthe EU. It clarified the extent of the EU's competences in both substantivecriminal law and criminal procedure at treaty level. It did away with theseparationof acts on thebasis of 'pillars' andprovided a stronger role for theEuropeanandnationalparliamentsaswellascomprehensivejudicialcontrolbytheEuropeanCourtofJustice.Underitsarticle83,theUnioncanadoptdirectivesproviding for minimum rules for "areas of particularly serious crime with across-border dimension". Those crimes do not currently include anyenvironmentaloffences,158butarticle83(2)clarifiesthatthereissomescopefor
157CaseC-176/03,para48.SeealsoCOM(2005)583final,'CommunicationfromtheCommissionto theEuropeanParliament and theCouncil on the implicationsof theCourt’s Judgmentof13September2005(CaseC-176/03)'.158Underarticle83(1), therelevantareasof crimeare: "terrorism, trafficking inhumanbeingsand sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking,
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criminal law harmonization in other EU policy areas too, notably on theestablishment of “minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminaloffences and sanctions”, if such harmonization “proves essential to ensure theeffectiveimplementationofaUnionpolicyinanareawhichhasbeensubjecttoharmonisationmeasures”.159Itisstillopenhowfarsuchminimumrulesmayextendinharmonisingoffencesandsanctions.InthefieldofshippingtheexistingmeasureshavenotyettoEUobligationsofacertainresultincriminalproceedingsnorhavetheyspecifiedthelevel of penalties to be imposed. Reference is only made to the 'standard'requirement of effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.160In otherpolicyareas,however,harmonisationhas sometimeextended to sentencing, inthe form of specifiedminimumpenalties for selected crimes.161Itmay also benoted that EU law includes certain older examples of quite far-reachingharmonizationofinfringementsandpenaltiesinrelationtotheimplementationofinternationalconventions.162SincethereductionofairemissionsfromshipsclearlyformspartofexistingEUpolicies and since effective sanctions are essential to ensure the effectiveimplementation of existing EU legislation, it is not difficult to justify theavailabilityofcriminalcompetenceinthisfield.Indeed,aswasalreadynotedinsection4.3.1,aduty tocater forcriminalsanctions forviolationof theSulphurDirective already exists under Directive 2008/99. The extent to which EUcompetence extends to developing those rules further, notably in the form of"minimumruleswithregardtothedefinitionofcriminaloffencesandsanctions",dependsonhowcriticalthatdevelopmentisfortheeffectiveimplementationoftheSulphurDirectiveandmoregeneralenvironmentalpoliciesoftheEU.As will be further discussed below, however, criminal sanctions is notnecessarilytheonlyorevenmosteffectivemeansofensuringimplementationinthisparticularcase.AmorehelpfullegaldevelopmentatEUlevelinthepresent
money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime andorganisedcrime."Additionalcrimesmaybeadded,butrequiresunanimity.159Thefulltextoftheparagraphreads:"IftheapproximationofcriminallawsandregulationsoftheMemberStatesprovesessentialtoensuretheeffective implementationofaUnionpolicy inanareawhichhasbeensubject toharmonisationmeasures,directivesmayestablishminimumruleswithregardtothedefinitionofcriminaloffencesandsanctionsintheareaconcerned.Suchdirectivesshallbeadoptedbythesameordinaryorspeciallegislativeprocedureaswasfollowedfortheadoptionoftheharmonisationmeasuresinquestion,withoutprejudicetoArticle76."160Seealsopara4ofthepreambletodirective2005/35:"Measuresofadissuasivenatureforman integral part of the Community'smaritime safety policy, as they ensure a link between theresponsibilityofeachofthepartiesinvolvedinthetransportofpollutinggoodsbyseaandtheirexposure to penalties; in order to achieve effective protection of the environment there isthereforeaneedforeffective,dissuasiveandproportionatepenalties."161Seee.g.article3(6)oftheDirectiveoncombatingthesexualabuseandsexualexploitationofchildren and child pornography: "Coercing, forcing or threatening a child into sexual activitieswithathirdpartyshallbepunishablebyamaximumtermofimprisonmentofatleast10yearsifthechildhasnotreachedtheageofsexualconsent,andofatleast5yearsofimprisonmentifthechildisoverthatage."162Seee.g. theelaborate sanction regimeoutlined inArticle16ofRegulation338/1997on theprotectionofspeciesofwildfaunaandflorabyregulatingtradetherein,OJ1997L61/1.
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case would appear to be the establishment of common principles for thesanctions, includingdefinitionofkeyfeaturesofinfringements,regardingliablepersons, standardof care,proof and calculationofpenalties, but leave it up toindividual member states to decide whether a criminal or administrativeframeworkisbettersuitedforthepurpose.
4.3.2.3CriminalpenaltiesCriminal penalties represent the most powerful form of sanction available toauthorities. They are essentially punitive in nature and represent a strongmanifestation of social disapproval.163In extreme cases, penaltiesmay involveimprisonment, confiscation of property etc., but in the present context therelevantformofcriminalsanctionisfines.Incriminalproceedings,thestartingpoint is presumed innocence and it is accordingly for thepublic authorities todemonstrate that a violation has taken place and to establish that the personconcernedisresponsiblefortheviolationandthathe/shehasactedintentionallyor with the required degree of negligence. Criminal penalties can only beimposedbyacourt.Criminal penalties is the traditional penalty used for non-compliance withMARPOL standards. All Northern European SECA states accept this type ofpenalties for violations of the fuel quality requirements in their nationallegislation, through their criminal codes or through specific legislation,164as isindeedrequiredbyEU law.165TheRussiancriminalcodesimilarlyprovides forcriminalsanctionsformarineandatmosphericpollutionoffences.166Even if criminal fines therefore represent the typical form of sanctions forviolation of the air emission standards in theNorthern European SECA states,there is not much practical experience of awarding criminal penalties forviolationsoftheairemissionstandards.Asfarasisknown,notasinglecriminalcase on the fuel quality requirements of MARPOL Annex VI has resulted inconvictiontodate.Theabsenceofsuccessfulprosecutionsofviolationsofthefuelqualitystandardswas subject to a studyby the SwedishTransportAgency in 2014.167Out of 31notifications bymaritime administration to the prosecutor between 2010 andMay2014,onlyoneledtoadecisiontoinitiateacriminalinvestigationandnota163As stated in the third preambular paragraph of Directive 2008/99, "criminal penalties ...demonstrateasocialdisapprovalofaqualitativelydifferentnaturecomparedtoadministrativepenaltiesoracompensationmechanismundercivillaw".164For the Baltic Sea countries, a particularly helpful review is the 'Manual on prosecutingenvironmentalcrimeintheBalticSeaRegion',referredtoinnote126. Pp.55-92ofthereviewdealswithoilpollutionfromships.FortheNorthSea,asimilarmanualwithaspecificfocusonoilpollutionisadoptedintheOSPARframework,asreferredtoinnote128.SeealsothesummaryofEUcountriesinM.G.Faure&G.Heine(2006),Annex2.165Seeatnotes153-155above.166CriminalliabilityinRussiaisexhaustivelylaiddownintheCriminalCode(FederalLaw#63Fz of 13 June1996, as amended),which contains exhaustive provisions on criminal sanctions,including sanctions for marine and atmospheric pollution (articles 250-252). However, thesesanctionsonlyapplytonaturalpersons.SeealsoPozdnakova(2013),p.289.167SwedishTransportAgency(2014)
4.3.2.4AdministrativepenaltiesIn contrast to criminal penalties, administrative sanctions represent a lighterform and procedure for penalising violations.169While criminal penalties areissuedby courts at the initiativeof on thebasis of a process ledby thepublicprosecutor, which in turn is based on prior investigations by the prosecutor,police and other competent authorities, an administrative penalty is typicallyissuedbytheauthoritieswithinashorttimespanandwillendupincourtsonlyincasetheallegedoffenderappealsagainstthepenalty.Similarly,withrespecttotheculpabilitythreshold,thegeneralstartingpointisthatcriminallawrequiresproof or intent or (serious or gross) negligence of the responsible person,administrative penalties are more flexible and may be based on simplenegligenceorevenastrict liabilityandmayinvolveareversaloftheburdenofproof.Administrative penalties have traditionally been used with respect to minoroffences, suchas trafficoffences,buthave increased inpopularity inEurope inthe past decades, in particular thanks to their effectiveness in dealing withcertain types of infringements. Compared to the time and resource intensivecriminal procedure, administrative penalties may be imposed quickly and theleaner procedure also entails economic benefits for all parties. This type ofsanctions have increasingly replaced criminal fines in several states and havehencealsooffloadedcourts,whichhavebeenconsideredtospendtoomuchtimewithmattersthatdonotrepresentseriousviolations.In view of the heaviness of the requirement of criminal investigation andprocedure, it isbecoming increasinglycommontouseadministrativesanctionsasacomplementtocriminalsanctions.170Suchsanctionsareusuallyjustifiedbyeitheroftworatherdifferentconsiderations.Ontheonehand,theinfringementinquestionmaybesominorthat itcanbe ‘decriminalised’,bothasamatterofprincipleandforpracticalreasons.Itisnotconsideredjustifiedtousetheheavyinvestigation and preparation procedures of criminal law for minorinfringements. On the other hand, administrative sanctions are increasinglyresorted to for reasons of effectiveness in relation to commercial activities. Incertain areas of law, criminal penalties have been considered insufficient todiscourageviolations;theriskofbeingcaughthasbeentoolowashastheleveloffinesactuallyimposed.Inaddition,thecriminalprocedureisconsideredtobetooslowand theproof requirements tooonerous tobeuseful incertaincases.For such situations, administrative sanctions are considered to offer a flexibleprocedure,forinstancebyenablingastrictbasisforliability,allowingexpertsin168Ibid.pp.49-50.Seealsosection4.3.4.1below.169Whileadministrativemeasures,aswillbediscussed insection4.4below,may includeotherformsofenforcementaction,suchaswithdrawalofcertificates,detentionortherefusalofaccesstoport,thefocusinthissectionisexclusivelyonadministrativefines.170For an overview of the use of administrative sanctions in the Nordic states, see Halila &Lankinen(2014).
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the field evaluate the scope of the infringement, and the possibility to imposehigherfinancialsanctions.In line with this development, some states bordering the Northern EuropeanSECA areas have introduced specific administrative sanctions for ship-sourcepollution.171Two example are the Swedish and Finnish oil discharge fees. TheSwedishwaterpollutionfeewasintroducedalreadyin1984172whiletheFinnishoildischargefeewasintroducedin2005.173Bothwerespecificallyintroducedtoimprove the efficiency of sanctions for illegal oil spills, both in relation to theswiftproceduresforapplyingthepenalties,theproofstandardsandthelevelofpenalties.174Thetwofeesonlyapplytooilpollutionandhencedonotextendtoair emission violations, though in both countries studies prepared for thegovernments have indicated benefits of applying a similar fee to thoseinfringements.175The Norwegian example as set out in chapter 9 of the 2007 Ship Safety andSecurityActisinterestinginthepresentcontext,asitcoversanyspillinviolationofMARPOL,176andhenceincludesviolationsofthesulphurinfuelrequirements.Sections55-57oftheActdealwitha'violationfine'whichmaybeimposedonnaturalaswellaslegalpersons.Itis,alongsideGermany,177amongthefewlegalsystemswhere fines have for violation of the sulphur in fuel requirements inMARPOLRegulationVI/14haveactuallybeenissued.178ThefinesissuedtodatehaverangedfromNOK100.000to500.000(correspondingtoroughly€11.000-55.000).ThemostrecentadditionistheBelgianfederal lawonadministrativepenaltiesforviolationofapplicableshippinglaws,whichenteredintoforceon19January
171ItisconcludedinENPROManual,note126,atp.26,thatthenationallawsofallcoastalstatesof the Baltic Sea except Finland implement a system of administrative penalties againstenvironmentaloffences.HELCOMhasmadesomeeffortstoharmoniseadministrativesanctionsin theBaltic Seabyproposingaminimum level for such sanctions inRecommendation19/14,referred to in note 127. This recommendation does not currently extend to air emissionviolations,althoughacorrespondencegrouphasbeentaskedtostudythismatter.SeeHELCOMDoc.MARITIME15,8-3-WP.1.172Chapter8ofAct1980:424onMeasuresAgainstWaterPollutionfromShips173Act1163/2005availableinFinnishatwww.finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/2005/20051163174SeeFinnishGovernmentBillHE77/2007,atp.7.175SwedishTransportAgency(2014)andH.Ringbom,'AdministrativeSanctionsforViolationsofShips’ Air Emissions and Fuel Quality Standards – International Law Considerations', StudypreparedfortheFinnishMinistryofTransportandCommunications,BALEX,Finland,November2014.176Actof16February2007No.9relating toshipsafetyandsecurity(ShipSafetyandSecurityAct), available in English atwww.sjofartsdir.no/contentassets/a7a1a5cc4998405286e99c6fbccc5c8a/ship-safety-and-security-act.pdf177Based on information obtained for the purpose of this report, on-board inspections by theWaterwaysPolice inGermanyin2015indicated430casesofnon-compliance,which ledtotheinitiation of 175 infringement procedures and 2 criminal procedures. Until July 2016, 48penaltieshadbeenimposedagainstshipoperatorsormarinefuelsuppliers.Allthesenumbers,however, includeany infringementsofMARPOLAnnexVI, including failings inbunkerdeliverynotesorfuelchange-overdocumentationetc.178Violationfineshavebeenissuedinsevencasesintheyears2015and2016.
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2017. 179 It represents a speedy process for issuing a fine, based on thecorrespondingsubstantiverulesofthecriminalsanctions.TheenforcementwillbecarriedoutbytheFederalshippingdirectorateifthepublicprosecutordoesnot act within one month, which is expected to speed up the procedureconsiderably. Inmonetary terms, too, thenewadministrative finematches theapplicablecriminalsentences,whichinthecaseofairemissionsmayextendupto€8million.180
4.3.3Liableperson
4.3.3.1GeneralAsregards thepersononwhomthesanctionor fee is tobe imposed,MARPOLrequiresthatanyviolationshallbeprohibitedandsubjecttosanctions,withoutfurther guidance as to who the liable person should be.181The only provisionwhichmentionsspecificpersons inMARPOLAnnexVI isregulation3(1)whichcontains certain exceptions, under which air emissions in violation of therequirements are allowed. These exceptions, however, concern emissions“resulting from damage to a ship or its equipment” and include a number ofadditionalconditionsandisthereforeunlikelytobeofrelevanceinthepresentcontext.182The Sulphur Directive contains similarly limited guidance with respect to theliable person. The Directive generally requires, flag coastal and port states totakeallnecessarymeasurestoensurethatnon-compliantmarinefuels"arenotused"183and places the corresponding obligations on the "ship", rather thanindividualpersons.184Inthesanctionspart theDirectiverequiresthat finesarecalculated in such a way that they "at least deprive those responsible of theeconomicbenefitsderivedfromtheinfringement",whichindicatesthatat leastthe person who are making economic benefits should be among the liablepersons.
179'Loi instituant des amendes administratives applicables en cas d'infractions aux lois sur lanavigation'of25December2016.180Ibid. article7.Personal communicationwithLegalPolicyAdvisorMrStevenWerkersat theBelgianFederalShippingDirectorate-General,April2017.181Article4(2)quotedinnote149above.182ThefulltextofMARPOLAnnexVI,regulation3(1)(2)readsasfollows:“RegulationsofthisAnnexshallnotapplyto…anyemissionresultingfromdamagetoashiporitsequipment:
.2.1providedthatallreasonableprecautionshavebeentakenaftertheoccurrenceofthedamage or discovery of the emission for the purpose of preventing orminimizing theemission;and.2.2 except if the owner or the master acted either with intent to cause damage, orrecklesslyandwithknowledgethatdamagewouldprobablyresult.”
183Article6(2).184Article6(8)includesanumberofobligationsplacedontheship,e.g.:"IfashipisfoundbyaMemberStatenottobeincompliancewiththestandardsformarinefuelswhich comply with this Directive, the competent authority of theMember State is entitled torequiretheshipto...presentarecordoftheactionstakentoattempttoachievecompliance...";and "a ship shall notify its flag State and the competent authority of the relevant port ofdestination".
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4.3.3.2CriminalsanctionsForcriminalsanctions,Directive2008/99includessomemoreguidance.Itdoesnot specify the identity of the liable person either, but clarifies that that bothnaturalandlegalpersons("committedfortheirbenefitbyanypersonwhohasaleading position within the legal person"), shall be potentially subject to thepenalty (article 6(1)), that penalties shall extend to the lack of supervision orcontrol (article 6(2)), and that "inciting, aiding and abetting criminal conductshall also be punishable as a criminal offence" (article 4). Article 6(4) clarifiesthatliabilityoflegalpersonsonthisbasisdoesnotexcludecriminalproceedingsagainst natural persons. The corporate sanctions need not be of a criminalnature.185The reference to the deprival of economic benefits in the Sulphur Directive,together with article 6 of Directive 2008/99, calls for including companiesamong the potentially liable parties for air emission violations and eventargeting them. The economic benefit of cheating with the fuel qualityrequirements will normally lie with the owner or charterer, rather than withindividualson-boardorashore.Yet, theresponsibility foroperations inshippingcanbenotoriouslydifficult toidentify, as theremay be awhole range of parties, including owner,manager,different layersof charterersetc.whose internaldivisionof responsibilitymaybe both complex and opaque. Moreover, if the violation consists of anoperationalfailureonboard,suchasafailuretomakethecorrecttankandpipeswitches or a malfunctioning scrubber, it may well be that that the personresponsiblefortheactoromissionin questionisoneofthecrewmembers.Insuchcases itwouldat leastbepossible fortheownertoarguethathewasnotawareof the infringementandhencenot culpableunder thisprovision. Inanycase,thekindofwordingusedhererequiresproofthatthestandardofcarehasnotbeenmetbyaparticularnaturalorlegalpersonandtherebypresupposesareasonablythoroughinvestigation.186
4.3.3.3AdministrativesanctionsThe available examples of administrative sanctions for violations of the airemissions requirements indicate a somewhat broader approach to the liableperson.TheNorwegianShipSafetyandSecurityAct,2007,includesseparatesectionsforfines tobe imposedon individualsandthose imposedonthecompany(i.e. themanaging company indicated in the Safety Management Certificate187) withsomewhat different thresholds of negligence. 188 As to individuals, theadministrative fines may be imposed on: a) "anyone who, on behalf of thecompany"commitsaviolation;b)themaster;andc)otherpersonsworkingon185Seee.g.http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/crime/186Seeaboveinsection2.1.187While section 56 does not include a possibility to impose the corporate sanctions on otherlegal persons than the 'company', as defined in section 4 of the Act, the fourth paragraphprovides that "the Ministry may issue regulations containing further provisions relating toviolationfinesagainstthecompany".188Onthedifferences,seesection4.3.4.3below.
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board.189If anyof thosepersons actedonbehalf of the company, the finemayalsobeimposedonthecompanyassuch,evenwherefinescouldnotbeimposedon any of those persons (e.g. in the absence of proof of negligence).190Section56(3) provides that the company is also jointly and severally liable for finesimposedonthemasterorotherpersonsworkingonboard.In another example of a flexible approach to administrative sanctions, theFinnish oil discharge fee case illustrates thepossibilitieswith respect to liablepersons. Chapter 3, section 1(2), of the 2009 Act focuses on the registeredshipowner, but includes other possibilities too, shifting the burden to identifysuchotherpersonstotheowner:
a natural person or a legal person,who is the owner at the timeof theoffence.Theoil discharge fee cannotbe imposedon theowner, if heorshe canprove that amanager, operatororbareboat chartererhasbeenoperatingtheshipintheowner’sstead.
This option takes the specificities of maritime operations into account. Inaddition itoffersaverystraightforwardsolutionwhichminimizestheneedforinvestigation. It identifiestheregisteredownerastheparty liable forpayment,whichiseasilyidentifiableforeachship,throughits(flagstate)register.Inmanycases, the registered owner of a ship has very little to do with the actualoperation of the ship. For these cases it is for the registered owner, not theauthorities,toidentifythepartyresponsiblefortheoperation.Theowneroranyof these parties may be liable for payment, but not both.191The provisionindicatesnoparticularpreferencebetweenthetwocategories.192Ifasimilarruleweretobeappliedtoairemissions,it ispossiblethattheship’stimecharterer,who is normally responsible for the fuel purchases, should also be includedamongthepotentiallyresponsibleparties.
4.3.4Dutyofcare
4.3.4.1GeneralAnother relevant question relating to the penalty to be imposed for non-compliancewith theMARPOL standards is the level of culpability required forthepenaltytobeactivated.Must,inotherwords,theinfringementbeintentionalor the result of some degree of negligence, or can sanctions be imposed onobjectiveterms,onthebasisthataviolationhasoccurred?Generally speaking, MARPOL regulates discharges and emissions in objectiveterms. Unless specifically permitted or exempted, any discharge of thesubstances concerned, or air emission exceeding the required standards isprohibited193and shall, as such, be subject to sanctions under article 4. The
formulations chosen in the convention, together with the level of detail ofregulation14, suggesta regimeof ‘strict’ liability, inwhichmereevidenceof aviolationsufficestotriggerthesanction,withouttherebeinganyneedtoanalysethesubjectivedegreeoffaultorculpabilityonbehalfofthepersonresponsible.However, inpracticeMARPOLhasbeenconsidered to leave room fordifferentnationalsolutionsinthisrespect.194On thismatter, too, differences apply between the procedures involved.Whilevariations exist, the general position is that criminal law procedures requireprooforintentoratleast(gross-criminal)negligenceoftheresponsiblepersonwhile administrative penalties aremore flexible andmay even be based on astrictliabilityorareversedburdenofproof.
4.3.4.2CriminalsanctionsUnder the criminal procedure it will usually be necessary to show that theallegedoffenderdeliberatelyornegligentlycausedthepollution,oratleastknewthatthepollutionwastakingplaceanddidnothingtopreventit.Inotherwords,it is necessary to demonstrate the alleged offender’s intentions and/orknowledgeofthecircumstances,whichsignificantlyextendstheevidencethatisneededtoprovetheoffence.The twoEUdirectivesoncriminalpenalties for ship-sourcepollutionestablishintent or (at least) ‘serious negligence’ as the relevant thresholds.195'Seriousnegligence'hasbeendiscussedbytheEuropeanCourtof Justiceandconfirmedas "entailinganunintentionalactoromissionbywhich thepersonresponsiblecommitsapatentbreachofthedutyofcarewhichheshouldhaveandcouldhavecomplied with in view of his attributes, knowledge, abilities and individualsituation."196Even if the standard of care imposed by the directives is not as high as thestandardterminologyusedasthethresholdforliabilityorlossoflimitationrightin the international maritime civil liability conventions,197it still imposes a194In an IMO publication dealingwith the implementation ofMARPOL, it is held that “[w]hileStates Parties are required to provide adequately for the prosecution of MARPOL 73/78violations,theredoesnotappeartobeanyconsensusinternationallyastothecharacterizationofMARPOL offences. Civil law jurisdictions usually treat such offences as ‘minor’, ‘serious’ or‘aggravated’ according to the severity of the damage caused. Some common law jurisdictionstreattheseas ‘strict’or ‘absolute’ liabilityoffences.Somejurisdictionsadopttheso-called ‘half-wayhouse’approachforMARPOLoffences.Inthischaracterization,theoffencewouldbetreatedas one of ‘strict liability’, subject to affording the violator the defence of due diligence, i.e. theonuswould be on him to show that he took all reasonable precautions and exercised all duediligencetoavoidthecommissionoftheoffence.”MARPOL–Howtodoit(2002),pp.24—25.195Directive2005/35article4(1)andDirective2008/99,article3196CaseC-308/06,Interankoandothers,para.77.SealsotheopinionbyAdvocate-GeneralKokottinthesamecase,wheretheconceptisanalysedinrelationtothewordingofMARPOL,atparas.102-112and139-156.197Seee.g.article III(4)of the1992InternationalConventionforCivilLiability forOilPollutionDamage: "noclaim forcompensation forpollutiondamageunder thisConventionorotherwisemay be made against [a range of parties, including charterers, crew members, salvors etc.]:unless the damage resulted from their personal act or omission, committedwith the intent tocausesuchdamage,orrecklesslyandwithknowledgethatsuchdamagewouldprobablyresult."
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significant burden of proof on the authorities in view of the easy access toevidence to support the shipoperator’s innocence, suchas theavailabilityof abunker delivery note (BDN) indicating that the purchased fuelwas compliant.Crewmembersaresimilarlyunlikelytoconfirm(seriously)negligentconductintheirstatementsandeveniftheydidatthetimeofinvestigation,theymayhaveretractedsuchstatementsatthetimeatrialbegins.A report from Sweden in 2014 indicated that the main reasons for failing toimposecriminalpenalties forairemissionviolations is that theprosecutorhasdecidedtodiscontinuethecaserinviewofthedifficultiestoproperlyinvestigatethe alleged infringement and to prove the required negligence. Even in caseswhere the violation has been proved in objective terms, prosecutors hadrepeatedly decided not to proceed to prosecution in cases where the BDNindicates that the fuel is compliant. Divergences between the actual sulphurlevelsandthose indicated intheBDNmaybeduetoseveralreasons, includingfailure toempty tankbefore fuelling, subsequent switchingbetween fuel tanksetc. In view of this uncertainty facing the prosecutor, proving a breach of therequireddutyofcarewouldrequire further investigationwiththecrew,butatthattimetheshiphaslongsinceleftthejurisdiction.198Whileseveralstateshavesought to 'objectify'vessel-sourcepollution incidentsby accepting 'strict' liability or 'absolute' offences in case of violation ofinternationaloilpollutionstandards,199similardevelopmentshavenotyettakenplaceinthefieldofairemissions.
4.3.4.3AdministrativesanctionsAdministrative penalties involve more flexibility in this respect. They permitlinkingtheviolationmorecloselytotheexistenceoftheviolationratherthanthepotentialreasonsforitandhenceallowsimplifiedproceduresandinvestigationroutines.Theexamplesthatcurrentlyexistinthefieldofairemissionviolationsindeedindicateatendencytodoawaywiththesubjectiveelementofculpability.The Norwegian 'violation fine' distinguishes between sanctions imposed onindividuals and those imposed on companies. While the former still requireintent or (simple) negligence, fines imposed on companies may be imposedwithout any such intent or negligence, provided only that the person whocommitted the violation "has acted on behalf of the company".200The selectedwording suggests that it is not necessary to know exactlywho committed theviolation,orevenifanyonedid,aslongasthereiscumulativebehaviourleadinguptoaviolation.201Insteadthequestionofwhetherafineshallbeimposed,anditsmagnitude,shallbebasedonotherspecifiedcriteria.202Theselectedwording,whichiswidelyusedinshippingliabilityregulation,impliesthatinordertoestablish liability, theremustbeproofof theperson's intentorknowledge,neitherofwhichcanbeestablishedbymeansofobjectivecriteriaonly.198SwedishTransportAgency(2014),pp.49-51.Seealsonote146above.199SeealsotheNorthSeaManual,note128above,atp.55200Section56(1)201Pettersen&Bull(2010),p.746.202Section56(2)readsinfull:
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TheFinnishandSwedishoildischarge/waterpollutionfeesarebasedonastrictliability,whichmeansthatthereisnoneedfortheauthoritiestoproveintentornegligence; it suffices that it canbeshown that theoil spill emanates fromtheshipinquestion.However,feesshouldnotbeimposedincaseitisdeemedtobe“minor” in size and impact andmaybe reducedorwaived in certain specifiedexceptions.203
4.3.5.1GeneralFrom the authorities' point of view, administrative sanctions entail severaladvantages compared to criminal sanctions, in terms of identification ofresponsibleperson,standardofcare,proofrequirementsandgeneralpaceoftheprocedure. Yet such penalties are not legally unproblematic and the risksinvolvedintheirapplicationtendtogrowwiththeirfinanciallevels,whichinthecaseofairemissionsanctionswouldhavetobequitehigh.Inthissection,somegeneralissuesthatareraisedbyadministrativesanctionsofapenalnaturewillbe briefly discussed. The discussion is not exhaustive and only focuses onmatters with an international or EU law dimension to them, notably thoserelatingtorightstoafairtrialinviewoftheconfirmationbytheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights(ECtHR)thatadministrativesanctionsofapunitivenaturemaycomewithinthescopeof“chargedwithacriminaloffence”underarticle6oftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights(ECHR).204Theexamplesused in thissectionare limitedto theFinnishoilspill fee,as therelationship between criminal and administrative penalties was subject to aparticularlydetailedelaborationwhilethatlawwasbeingadopted.205Followingextensive deliberation in the Parliament itwas eventually considered that theproposed solutions didmeet the constitutional requirements of legal certainty
"Indecidingwhetheraviolationfineshallbeimposedonthecompany,andinassessingthefine,particularconsiderationshallbepaidto:a)theseriousnessoftheviolation;b) whether the company could have prevented the violation through the Safety ManagementSystemorbyinstruction,training,controlorothermeasures;c)whethertheoffencewascommittedtopromotetheinterestsofthecompany;d)whetherthecompanyhashadorcouldhaveobtainedanyadvantagebytheoffence;e)whetherthisisarepeatedoffence;andf)thecompany’sfinancialcapacity"Practice based on this provision, including cases involving violations of the fuel qualityrequirements,havesubsequentlyconfirmedthatthelistisnotexhaustive.203Chapter3,section1ofthe2009ActandChapter8,section1ofSwedishAct1980:424.204Seee.g.CaseJanosevicvSweden,2002,Reports2002-VII.Articles47and48oftheCharterofFundamentalRightsof theEuropeanUnion,whichbecamebinding in2009,donotdistinguishbetweenthenatureofthesanctionsingrantingcertainkeyrightsofafairtrial.205See in particular Government Bill (HE 77/2005), the related opinion by the ConstitutionalCommitteeoftheFinnishParliament(PeVL32/2005)andtheexperts’opinionsgiventothat.
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and due process as well as the country's international human rightsobligations.206
4.3.5.2RelationshiptocriminalpenaltiesItwasalreadynotedthatthepurposeofanadministrativesanctionaddressinginfringementsof thefuelqualityrequirementswouldnot(andcouldnot)betoreplace criminal sanctions in this area. Decriminalising such infringementswouldarbitrarilylimitthescopeofapplicationofcriminallawandwouldalsodoaway with the availability of prison sentences and other deterrent forms ofcriminal penalties, such as confiscation, which would send a wrong messageabout the severityof the violation.207Itwas alsonoted thatDirective2008/99specificallyobligeEUmemberstatestomaintainasystemofcriminalpenaltiesfor infringements of the Directive, provided certain criteria have been met.Rather, theadministrative feewouldcomplement thecriminal sanctions in thesensethatthetwosanctionschemesexistinparallel,sidebyside,andeitherofthem(butnotboth)couldbeimposedfortheoffence.208Inviewofthepunitivecharacter of the administrative sanction, however, it is particularly importantthattherelationshiptocriminallawismadeclear.
IntheFinnishsolution,thecriminalandadministrativesanctionsapplyinparallel, but criminal penalties are given explicit precedence over theadministrativefee.209Thepracticalapplicationofthisrelationshipisquitecomplex.210As soon as the enforcement authority is confronted with acase of non-compliance, it should ensure that the investigation forboththe administrative and criminal sanctions is commenced. Theadministrative fee will usually – thanks to the lighter proceduralrequirementsandlesserstandardofproof-beimposedbeforeacriminalinvestigationhasbeencompleted,andinanycasebeforeprosecution.Theprimacy of the criminal penalty implies that the prosecutor is free todecide on whether to prosecute or not, independently of whether thesamepersonhasalreadybeensubjecttoanadministrativefee.However,iftheadministrativesanctionwhichhasbeenissuedisconsideredtobeasufficientpenalty,prosecutionshouldnotbenecessary,basedonexistingcriminal law procedures.211 If prosecution is considered justified, forexampleiftheenvironmentalcrimeissoseriousthatimprisonmentcouldbeinvoked,thecriminalcaseshouldproceedasnormal.If,however,the-naturalorlegal-personthathasalreadyreceivedanadministrativefee,is
206Itshouldbenoted, though, that thesolutionadopted in theoildischarge feehasnotpassedwithout criticism. See e.g. the opinion of the Legal Affairs Committee of the Parliament (LaVL21/2005)andKiiski(2009),pp.52-58,id.(2011),pp.23-25.207Cf.GovernmentBillHE77/2005,p.8.208Seealso theBelgian lawreferred to innote179above,providing in itsarticle3(1) that theadministrative fine is "without prejudice" to other disiplinary sanctions. The procedurerelationshiptocriminalprocedureislaiddowninarticles4-7.209Chapter 3 section 4(1) of the 2009 Act secures this by providing that “[o]il discharge feescannotbe imposedon apersonwhohas received a legally valid sanction for theoil dischargeincidentinquestion.210DescribedinGovernmentBillHE77/2005,pp.8-9.211Notablychapter1,section8oftheCriminalProceduresAct(689/1997)andchapter6section12oftheCriminalCode.Forlegalpersonstherelevantprovisionsarechapter9sections4and7oftheCriminalCode.
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subject to criminal penalties for the same violation, the administrativesanction shall be waived, and the amount of the fee returned to thatperson.212
The Finnish system thereby avoids the problems related to ‘double jeopardy’,according towhich nobody should be sentencedmore than once for the samecrime (ne bis in idem).213However, there is nothing to prevent that differentpersonsmaybesubjecttodifferentcategoriesofpenaltiesforthesameviolation.Anexampleinthefieldofairemissionscouldbewherethemasterand/orchiefengineerwhoisheldresponsibleforthefuelswitchingoperationsissubjecttoacriminalsanctionwhiletheownerorchartereroftheship,whoisresponsibleforfuelpolicyandpurchasesissubjecttoanadministrativefee.
4.3.5.3DueprocessThebacksideofaspeedyandefficientprocedureforimposingaprospectiveairemission sanctions is that the legal security of the liable persons may becompromised.Inviewofthepunitivecharacterandtheeconomicimportanceofsuch a sanction, it is particularly important that the rights of the person onwhomthefeeisimposedareensured.Article6oftheECHRincludesimportantobligationsonstatestoensureacertainminimumprotectionoftherightsoftheaccused, whether natural or legal persons. 214 Certain provisions aimed atensuringtherightofadueprocessalsoexistinUNCLOS.215In the case law of the ECtHR specific criteria have been developed forestablishingwhenadministrativepenaltiesfallwithinthescopeofarticle6.216Inthe absence of a judgment on that specific question, it is not entirely clearwhethertheadministrativeoildischargepenaltiesinFinlandmeetthosecriteria,
212Seechapter3,section4(2)ofthe2009Act:“Theauthoritythathasimposedtheoildischargefeeshall,uponapplication,waivethefee,ifthepersonuponwhomtheoildischargefeehasbeenimposedissubsequentlysubjecttoasanctionforthesameoildischargeincident.”213Itshouldbeobserved,however,thattheprocedurefollowedintheoildischargefeereduces,butdoesnot eliminate, the risk that the liablepersonvoluntarily accepts tohave committedacrimeinthehopethatthelevelofsanctionsunderthecriminalprocedurewouldbelighter.214Paragraph3ofthearticleprovides:"Everyonechargedwithacriminaloffencehasthefollowingminimumrights:to be informedpromptly, in a languagewhichheunderstands and in detail, of thenature andcauseoftheaccusationagainsthim;tohaveadequatetimeandfacilitiesforthepreparationofhisdefence;to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has notsufficientmeans topay for legal assistance, tobe given it freewhen the interests of justice sorequire;to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance andexaminationofwitnessesonhisbehalfunderthesameconditionsaswitnessesagainsthim;tohavethefreeassistanceofaninterpreterifhecannotunderstandorspeakthelanguageusedincourt."215Article 230(3) provides that ”[i]n the conduct of proceedings in respect of such violationscommittedbyaforeignvesselwhichmayresultintheimpositionofpenalties,recognizedrightsoftheaccusedshallbeobserved.”216The so-called Engel criteria from a case in 1976 are: a) the classification of the offenceaccording to domestic law; b) the nature of the offence; and c) the nature and gravity of thepenalty.SeeCaseEngel,1976,A.22,andPellonpää(2007),p.423-428.
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but fact that the fee is enforced through the Enforcement of Fines Act(2002/672), rather than the regular law on administrative charges, supportssuch an interpretation,217as does its drafting history. In the Government Billintroducing the sanction it was explicitly stated that the discharge is to becompared to a criminal sanction218and the Constitutional Committee of theParliament emphasized that even if the fee is an administrative measure, theprovisions of ECHR Article 6 have to be met.219A prospective air pollutionsanction is evenmore likely to qualify under the Engel criteria in view of theemphasis the ECtHR has placed on the ‘punitive and deterrent’ effect of thesanctionaswellasthelevelofthefine.220PresumptionofinnocenceParagraph 2 of article 6 of ECHR provides that “[e]veryone charged with acriminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according tolaw”. The observance of this fundamental principle of criminal law may bequestionedwhen it comes to theoildischarge fee,which isbasedonobjectiveconsiderations alone. The authority has no obligation to prove the guilt orotherwiseblameworthinessof the liableparty.For issuing the fee it suffices toprovethatthedischargeemanatesfromthatshipandthatthedischargeisnotofaminornature.221However, the ECtHR’s case law includes exceptions to the presumption ofinnocenceandacertaindegreeofthestatestoregulatethisatnationallevel.Inparticular,theimpositionofchargesorfeeswithoutpriorproofofguilthasbeenacceptedincasesoftaxesandcustomcharges.222Towhatextentthatflexibilityextendstoadministrativesanctionsofthetypediscussedhereisstillopen.The effect of the absence of a requirement to prove guilt is to some extentmoderated by chapter 3, section 3, of the 2009 Act. Under this section theimpositionofthefeemaybewaivedoritsamountreduced“ifthepartyliableforpaymentshowsthattheimpositionofthefeewouldbemanifestlyunfairduetoanemergencyoraccidenttowhichthespecialprovisionsofChapter2,section2,cannot be applied, or due to some other comparable reason”. This exception,together with the consideration that the primary investigation and burden toprove the violation still rests with the administration, albeit on the basis ofobjectivecriteria,havebeenconsideredtojustifythesolutionadoptedintheoildischarge fee.223Asimilarexception, thoughsomewhatbroader,alsoapplies in
217SeealsoRaitala(2009),p.296-297.218GovernmentBillHE77/2005,p.30.219OpinionbytheConstitutionalCommitteePeVL32/2005.220Seee.g.CasesÖtztürk,1984,A.73,para53and JanosevicvSweden,2002,Reports2002-VII,para.68.SeealsoPellonpää(2007),pp.424-428.221Chapter3,section1.222E.g.JanosevicvSweden,2002,Reports2002-VII,paras.94-110.SeealsoPellonpää(2007),pp.455-458. Raitala (2009), at pp. 311-312, notes that the increased usage of administrativesanctionsmayaffecttheECtHR’sinterpretationsinthisfieldtowardsamorepermissivestancetowardsexceptionofthepresumptionofinnocence.223On this basis, it was considered in Government Bill HE 77/2005, p. 31, that the schemerepresentsareversedburdenofproof.TheConstitutionalCommittee,onitspart,tooktheviewthatitisnot(inviewoftheauthorities’responsibilitytoestablishaviolation),butthedecisionis
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Swedishlaw.224However,itappearsthatithasnotbeenmuchusedinpracticeineithercountry,whetherforwaivingnorforreducingthefee.225TheculpabilityoftheresponsiblepartyArelatedquestionistheeffectofthestrictliabilityonthecriminallawprinciplethat no one shall be penalised unless he has done wrong (nullum crimen sineculpa). One of the main purposes of introducing strict liability in theadministrativesanctionsispreciselytoavoidtime-consuminginvestigationsandassessments on this matter and hence to increase the effectiveness of themeasurecomparedtoregularcriminallaw.Thismatterwasnotdiscussedingreatdetailinthepreparatoryworkfortheoildischargefee.ItwassimplynotedintheGovernmentBillthatthisrepresentsanexceptiontoordinarycriminalprocedureandthatitissimilarlyregulatedintheSwedishwaterpollutionfee.226TheConstitutionalCommitteeoftheParliamentconsidered that the fee should be assessed against the legality principle, butconsidered that its format in this respect met the requirements of thatprinciple.227 TherighttobeheardInchapter3,section7,of the2009Act there isspecificmentionof therightoftheliableparty(representedforthispurposebytheship’smaster)tobeheardinthe process, a requirement which follows both from the Constitution section21(2) and section 34 in the Administrative Procedures Act (434/2003). Anexception is foreseen inurgentcaseswhere thedetention ismadeofapassingshiptosecureaguaranteepayment.228Independentcourt/appealprocessThecircumstancethatitisthesameadministrativebody(BorderGuard)whichperformstheinvestigationand,onthatbasis, issuestheoildischargefee,couldbe seen as challenging the right to a fair hearing “by an independent andimpartial tribunal established by law”, under article 6(1) of the ECHR. Thisaspectof theoildischarge feewasaddressed inparticular throughtheappealsprocedure which, unusually, crosses the border between administrative and
governedbyadministrativeprocedures,whicharelessstringentinthisregard.Nevertheless,theCommitteeacknowledgedthatthecaselawonArticle6(2)needstobefollowed.(HE77/2005,p.8,11andPeVL32/2005).SeealsoKiiski(2001),p.24andSalmi(2012),p.71.Theapplicabilityof these principles in the context of the oil discharge fee has been confirmed by the SupremeCourt(KKO2014:37,judgmentof4June2014,paras9and10).224The Swedish exception, laid down in Chapter 8, section4, thePrevention of Pollution fromShips Act, is broader than the Finnish one. A similarly generic exception also applies toenvironmentalinfringementfeesundersection30oftheSwedishEnvironmentalCode.225Raitala(2009),p.310.226EUDirective2005/35,discussedaboveinsection4.3.2,whichwasadoptedaroundthesametime, was limited to ship-source pollution (of oil and hazadous noxious substances) causedintentionallyorbyseriousnegligence.227OpinionofConstitutionalCommittee,PeVL32/2005.228Section 7(2). According to Government Bill 77/2005, pp. 13-14, this exception is to benarrowly interpreted and the party shall ”in principle” always be given the right to be heardbeforethedecisiononthefeeismade.
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criminal procedural law.229The appeals procedure provided for in Chapter 3,section10(1),establishesthatappealsagainst theadministrativedecisionshallbemadetothetothemaritimecourtoperatingwithintheHelsinkiDistrictCourt.The Court is specifically tasked to examine whether the prerequisites forimposing the fee exist and “must ensure that the case is processedthoroughly”.230At this stage of the process normal court procedures apply,includingtheregularappealsprocess(CourtofAppealandSupremeCourt).231A variety of arguments have been considered to justify that the criminal lawcourts are better placed for appeals than the administrative route, commonlyapplied to administrative sanctions.232The arguments include the presumedhigherexpertise inmaritime lawof themaritimecourts,greaterconsistency inapplication of the law and the similarity to the system of the Swedish waterpollution fee. In view of the international nature of the matter and manynationalitiesoftheliableparties,importancewasalsogiventotheapplicabilityofEUrulesonrecognitionoffinancialpenaltiesbetweenmemberstates,whichstrengthenstheenforcementoftherules.233
4.3.6Thelevelofthesanction
4.3.6.1GeneralThe level of the penalties to be imposed for violations of the air emissionstandardsvarylargelybetweentheNorthernEuropeanSECAstates.Thereisnodefinitivecorrelationbetweenthelevelofpenaltiesandtheprocedureinvolved.As was noted above, in some states administrative penalties may amount tosignificantsums,whiletheapplicationofcriminal finessometimes leadtoverylimited financial penalties. Indeed, for some countries a main reason forexploringtheneedforadministrativesanctionsforviolationsofthefuelqualitystandards relates to the level of the sanction, as criminal penalties areconsidered to result in fines which are too low to match the economic gainsinvolved.234Thematter goes beyond the establishment of a particular sum fortheviolation,butalsoincludesquestionsrelatingtowhatcriteriashallapplyforsettingthelevelofthepenalty,whatperiodoftimeshouldbetakenintoaccountandwhatexceptionsshouldbeallowed.
229Thismatterwassubjecttoconsiderablescrutinyduringthepreparationoftheoilfeein2005,including by the Constitutional Committee of the Parliament and the experts it sought advicefrom(PeVL32/2005).Thecommitteeemphasizedthatthissolutionisexceptionalandthatthecleardivisionofproceduresforadministrativeandcriminalmattersshouldnotbedepartedfromlightly.However,inviewofthecircumstancesoftheoildischargefeeconsideredthissolutiontobejustifiable.230Chapter3section11and12231Chapter 3 section 13(1), which however, makes an exception for appealing the maritimecourt’s judgment concerning the detention of a ship and cash deposits. Justified by timingconsiderationsGovernmentBillHE77/2005,p.29.232GovernmentBillHE77/2005,pp.14-15233Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA on the application of the principle of mutualrecognitiontofinancialpenalties,OJ2007L76/16.234GovernmentBillHE86/2014, p. 10 and SwedishTransportAgency (2014), p. 63. Thiswasalsoajustificationforintroducingtheoildischargefee.SeeFinnishGovernmentBillHE77/2005,p.7.
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UNCLOS,aswasnotedinsection3.5,includesitsgeneralsafeguardsinPartXII,section 7, which call formonetary penalties to be imposed inmost cases, butdoes not address the level of these penalties.235Certain general principles ofinternational law, including the requirement of non-discrimination, andproportionality, suggest that that there cannot be a difference between thesanctionsthatapplytoforeignshipsandthosethatapplytotheportandthatthesanctionshouldnotexceedwhatisreasonablyrequiredtoachieveitsaim.MARPOL article 4(4) requires that penalties “shall be adequate in severity todiscourage violations of the present Convention and shall be equally severeirrespective ofwhere the violations occur.” In an IMO guide for states partiesimplementingtheprovisionithasbeenconsidered"reasonabletoprovideforarangewith aminimum andmaximum level,with the exact amount of the finebeingdependentontheseverityoftheoffence.”236EUlawsrelatingtocriminalsanctionsaresimilarlygeneral intheirwording,237butarticle11(2)oftheSulphurDirectiveissomewhatmoreconcrete:
Thepenaltiesdeterminedmustbeeffective,proportionateanddissuasiveandmayincludefinescalculatedinsuchawayastoensurethatthefinesatleastdeprivethoseresponsibleoftheeconomicbenefitsderivedfromtheir infringement and that those fines gradually increase for repeatedinfringements.
It is hence at least implicit in both instruments that the sanctions, in order toachieve their aims, shoulddeprive theperpetrators of the economic benefit ofnon-compliance and even go beyond that in order tomeet the requirement ofdissuasiveness or discouraging violations. In view of the very importanteconomicbenefitsofnon-compliancewiththesulphurinfuelrequirements,itisclear that thesanctionwillhave tobeofasignificantmagnitudetomeet thoseobjectives.Yet,thequestionremainsastohowthesefeesshouldbecalculated;onthebasisofwhatcriteria,forwhatperiodoftimeandatwhatamount.Theseissueswillbeaddressed in turnbelow.To illustratewhatapenaltycalculationschemecouldlook like inconcrete terms,aproposal,which isbasedondiscussionswith theFinnishShipowners’Associationin2014,isenclosedintheAnnex.
235Seealsop.2of thedissentingopinionof ITLOS JudgeAnderson in theMonteConfurcoCase(ITLOS Case No. 6, 2000), relating to the prompt release of a fishing vessel and thereasonableness of the requested security: “The Convention does not limit the size of fines,although it does exclude generally imprisonment for fisheries offences. It is for the legislatorsand the courts of States Parties to lay down fines for illegal fishing.Where there is persistentnon-observance of the law, deterrent fines serve a legitimate purpose.” See also para. 7 of hisdissentingopinionintheVolgaCase(CaseNo.11,2002).236MARPOL–Howtodoit,IMO,2013,para.4.7.237Article5ofDirective2008/99provides:"MemberStatesshalltakethenecessarymeasurestoensurethattheoffencesreferredtoinArticles3and4arepunishablebyeffective,proportionateanddissuasivecriminalpenalties."Seealsoart8ofdirective2005/35asamended.
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4.3.6.2Whatcriteria?Astraightforwardandquickprocedure for the impositionof the feerequiresapenaltysystemwhich iseasy for theauthorities tocalculateanduse.Similarly,theprincipleoflegalitycallsforclear,transparentandpredictablerulesforthebenefitofshipoperatorswhomaybesubjectedtothesuchsanctions.238In theFinnishoil discharge fee, these considerationshavebeenmet throughasysteminwhichthelevelofthefeeisestablishedonthebasisoftwoparametersalone: the size of the ship and the size of the spill. A pre-made table whichcalculatesthefeesforvariousscenarios isannexedtothe2009Act foraneasyreferenceforboththeauthoritiesandshipoperators.Inthecaseofairemissions,however,neitherofthesecriteriaseemrelevant.Thesizeoftheshipisnotdeterminingtheeconomicbenefitsofnon-compliance,anditisdifficulttospeakintermsofanindividual‘spill’or‘discharge’incaseofairemissions, where the rationale of non-compliance is based on a continuousviolationthatstretchesoveralongerperiodoftime.Ratheritwouldseemthatthebenefitofnon-complianceisexclusivelylinkedtotheship’sfuelconsumption.This iswhatdetermineshowmuchistobegainedbyusingnon-compliantratherthancompliantfuel,irrespectiveofthesizeoftheship or any operational considerations. For enforcement purposes, thisparametermaynotalwaysbeeasy to identify,however.The fuel recordbooksfilledinbythecrewmaynotbesufficientlyreliableforthispurposeandthereiscurrentlynootherinternationalrequirementforshipstohaveafuelflowmeteron board to register the consumption.239A somewhat less accurate, but moreeasily identifiable, indication of a ship’s fuel consumption is the size of itsengines. The table in the Annex to this study indicates both the (combined)enginepowerandapproximatefuelconsumption.Anotherelementthatshouldbetakenintoaccountwhenestablishingthelevelofthe sanction is the severity of the violation. It is a significant difference, botheconomically and from the point of view of the environment, if the violationconsistsofusingafueloilwithonlymarginallyhighersulphurcontentthantherequired0.1%,oraheavyfueloilwith,say,3,5%.Finally, the Directive specifically suggests that repeated offences should besubjecttomoreseverepenalties.
238See also 'Guide on Article 7of the European Convention on Human Rights: No punishmentwithoutlaw:theprinciplethatonlythelawcandefineacrimeandprescribeapenalty',Councilof Europe, 2016, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_7_ENG.pdf, inparticularatpp.10-14.239ButseeRegulation2015/757onthemonitoring,reportingandverificationofcarbondioxideemissionsfrommaritimetransport,referredtoatnote290below,inparticulararticle9thereof.Also in the context of CO2 emissions, theMARPOLAnnexVIwas amended inOctober2016 toincludemandatoryrequirements forshipsofabove5,000GTtorecordandreport their fueloilconsumption. A new regulation 22A is added to set the collecting and reporting datarequirementsalongwith twonewappendiceson ‘Informationtobesubmittedto the IMOShipFueloilConsumptionDatabase’(AppendixIX)and‘FormofStatementofCompliance–FuelOilConsumptionReporting’(AppendixX).Thereportingrequirementswilltakeeffectasfrom2019.
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4.3.6.3Whatperiod?Unlikedischargesofoilorchemicalsatsea,aviolationofMARPOL’sairemissionandfuelstandardrequirementstypicallyextendsoveralongerperiodoftime.Itis only through a continuous violation that the economic benefits of non-compliancecanberealised.Inviewofthis,acertainperiodoftimeneedstobedeterminedonwhichthebasisoftheeconomicbenefitsistobecalculated.In its most extreme format, the sanction could theoretically be based on theentiretimetheshiphasspentinaSECAsincetherequirementswereusedin1January2015.Thatsolutionwould,however,bothdefeatthepurposeofaneasilyadministeredfeeandwould,certainlyovertime,putstrainsontherequirementsofproportionality.The other extreme is to limit the sanction to the period for which there isevidencethattheshiphasnotcompliedwiththerequirements.Thisoption,too,would fit uneasily with the intended simplicity of the application of the fee.Moreover, itwouldnotmeettherequirementthatsanctionsaredissuasiveandservetodiscourageviolations.Apartfrominthe-presumablyrare-casewherea ship has been found to have only non-compliant fuel on board and can beshowntohavebeenusing this fora longperiodof time, thissolutionwould ineffect encourage non-compliance with the SECA standards. For all casesinvolving switching between compliant and non-compliant fuels, this solutionwouldencourageshipoperatorstoavoidusingcompliantfuelanywherewheretheriskofbeingcaughtislow.Another option, which would certainly be simple, would be to pick a randomentityoftime,suchasacertainnumberofdays,forthepurposeofachievingthedissuasiveeffect.240Inthepresentcontext,thelinktotheactualviolationmaybetooweaktosatisfytheproportionalityrequirement.Inviewoftheinternationalnature of shipping, the solution also involves risks of multiple sanctions (indifferentstates)forthesameviolation.Whilethereisnoobvioussolutiontothisquestion,oneproposalwhichseekstobalance the different considerations involved could be to limit the economicbenefit calculation to the voyage preceding the ship’s entry to the port inquestion. It is true that thissolution,at least in theory,wouldpromotemakingartificial stops inanearbyportoranchoragebeforeentering theport,but thisriskcouldbereducedbymeasuringthetimeinentities,suchasforexample24hours.TheexampleintheAnnextothisstudyisbasedonthenumberofdaystheshiphasspentinaSECAduringitsvoyagetotheportinquestion.Theminimumtime
240AnexampleofthisisfoundintheFinnishlawrelatingtosanctionsforfailingtocomplywithroad fuel tax requirements,where the fees are based on a daily chargewhich depends on thetype of vehicle, coupledwith amaximumnumber of 20 days for each identified violation. Seesection 8 of the Fuel Fee Act (1280/2003) andwww.trafi.fi/tieliikenne/verotus/polttoainemaksu/yleista_polttoainemaksusta
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counted for this purpose is 24 hours and it is calculated based on eachcommenced24hperiod.Apartfromthat,theproposaldoesnottakeintoaccounttheship’searliermovementsinaSECA.
4.3.6.4Whatamount?In order to be effective, the level of the sanction needs to be of a magnitudewhichmakesaneconomic impact forthe liableperson.Thesignificantbenefitsinvolved with non-compliance 241 accordingly call for penalties of quiteconsiderableamounts.Notevenmatching thepenaltywith theeconomicgains(for the chosen period) would amount to effective dissuasion. The text of theDirective’sarticle11(2)accordinglyreferstofineswhich“atleastdeprivethoseresponsibleoftheeconomicbenefitsderivedfromtheirinfringement”.242Thereisnoguidanceastowhatcoefficientcouldbeappliedontopofeconomicbenefitsforachievingtherequireddissuasiveeffect.Presumablythismatterisatleastinpart linked to the general state of the enforcement system and, thus, thelikelihoodofbeingcaught:iftheenforcementsystemiswelldevelopedandtheriskofbeingfinedbig,alowercoefficientwillsufficeforthedeterrenteffectandviceversa. That considerationwould favour a higher coefficient, at least in theearly period of enforcement where at-sea monitoring techniques andinternationalcooperationhavenotyetfullydeveloped.In addition, article 11(2) of the Directive suggests that fineswould “graduallyincrease for repeated infringements”. Here again, a factor is needed andprecedents are probably best looked for in comparable national laws. 243Repeated infringements could, andarguably should, also triggerother typesofsanctions, includingthoseavailableunderportstatecontrol.244The levelof thefines,ifpre-calculatedinadvanceinamatrix,needstobeupdatedfromtimetotime to actually reflect the difference in price between compliant and non-compliantfuels.For the purpose of providing an example of what a scheme could look like, aproposal, which is based on discussions with the Finnish Shipowners’Associationin2014, isenclosedintheAnnextothisstudy.Theexampleusesastagedcalculationmodel.Forviolationsthatareof lessermagnitude, i.e.wherethesulphurpercentageisonlyslightlymorethan0.1%(somestatisticalmarginof error of the sample probably needs to be accommodated for), the basis forcalculation is essentially the difference in price between heavy fuel oil andcompliantfuel.The model does not necessarily represent a true description of the economicgains involved. However, it is clear, easy for authorities to use and offers241Seeexampleinnote1above.242Thewordingchoseninthispartofthesentencesuggeststhatthethisisnotastrictobligationofmemberstates,butMARPOLarticle4(4)createsaclearobligationforstatestoensurethatthepenalties"shallbeadequateinseveritytodiscourageviolationsofthepresentConvention".243Forexample,section10oftheFinnishFuelFeeAct,referredtoaboveinnote240,referstoacoefficientof1.5incasethenon-complianceisrepeatedandacoefficientof2ifitisparticularlygrave.244Seesection4.4below.
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predictabilityonthelevelofsanctionsfortheindustry.ThetableintheAnnexiscompletely linear, which means it can easily be continued beyond the valuesshown, and it caneasilybe replacedwith someotherbasis for the calculation.For example, if it was considered that the current starting point in the‘innermost’fieldofthetable,thecurrent300€/m3pricedifference,istoolowinview the financial gains and the limited risk to be caught, it may easily beincreased,whichwouldraiseallotherfieldsinthetablecorrespondingly.
4.3.6.5ExceptionsAparticularkindofviolationoftheairemissionandfuelqualityrequirementsiswheretheshipburnsnon-compliantfuel,butexceedstheemissionrequirementsbecauseofafailingexhaustgascleaningtechnology(scrubber)whichisinstalledon the ship. This particular form of non-compliance may call for a differentapproach to sanctions. First, since the failure of a scrubber represents anequipment failure which should be rectified at the first port of call, normallythrough a detention of the ship. 245 This in itself represent a significantdeterrence,astherepairworkmaytakeconsiderabletimeandthesedetentionsdonothaveamaximumduration.Second,whilethistypeofviolationisasbadasany other violation from the point of view of environmental protection or airquality, the financialbenefit isnot comparable to the ‘regular’ violationof fuelquality standards. The economic logic of scrubbers is essentially that byinstalling a scrubber on a ship a significant investment is made which issupposed to pay back over a certain period of time and from that day ongeneratesavingsintheformofreducedfuelcosts.Theeconomicbenefitofnotusingtheinstallationonceitisinstalledduringanindividualvoyageishencenotofthesamemagnitudeasinthecasewherenoscrubberisinstalled.Repeated failings of a scrubber by the same ship, could of course createsuspicions of a systematic failure to use the equipment. There is nothing toprecludethatinsuchcasestheregularsanctionsasdiscussedaboveareapplied.Thesameprovisioncouldalsobeusedforthecasewheretheshipcanprovethatit has tried, but not been able to purchase compliant fuel on its way to thedestination.ThisexceptionissubjecttospecificregulationsinMARPOLAnnexVIregulation 18(2) and the almost identical article 6(8) of the Directive. Theserulesestablishasignificantburdenfortheshipoperatortoprovehiscase,andisbasedonanadvancenotificationofthisstateofaffairstotheportofdestination.Still the provisions leave a significant discretion of the port state to decide onwhatenforcementmeasures,ifany,toimposeinsuchcases.Athirdexampleofwhereanexceptionwouldseemnecessaryiswheretheshipoperatorcanprove thatheorshehasbeensubject toanothersanction for thesame violation in the covered period of time. For these cases a provision
245See at note 269below.But see the discussions referred to inHELCOMDoc.MARITIME14-2014, 4-1 (Report from the Correspondence Group concerning enforcement of the morestringentlimitsforSOxemissions(HELCOMCGSECA)),atpp.7-8.
4.3.7ConclusionUNCLOS, MARPOL and international law more generally leave significantdiscretion forstates toestablishtheirownsystemofpenalties forviolationsofthe MARPOL Annex VI standards in a way that best suits their internal legalsystem. This discretion is not without limits, however. In particular, thesafeguardsofUNCLOSprovidethatonlymonetarysanctionsmaybeimposedformostviolationsandprovidesforaflagstatepre-emptionincertainsituationsforviolations that have been committed beyond the territorial sea of the stateinstituting the proceedings. Apart from that, limits are posed bymore generalprinciples of international law such as non-discrimination and proportionalityrequirements.While international law does not take a stance on the nature of the penaltyimposed,EUlawspecificallyrequirescriminalsanctionstobeinplaceforcasesof intentional or seriously negligent infringements. The availability of criminalsanctionsdoesnot,however,amounttoanobligationtoimposesuchsanctionsin individual cases of violations, nor does it rule out the parallel existence ofsanctionsofanadministrativecharacter.Themosttangibleobligationsrelatingto penalties are the requirements laid down in article 11(2) of the SulphurDirective,whichapplyirrespectiveofthenatureofthepenaltyconcerned.Thekeycriteriaguidingsanctions,independentlyoftheirnature,areaccordinglythat theyshallbeeffective,proportionateanddissuasive.247Whilevague, thesecriteriaplacesomeouterlimitsforthesanctionstobeappliedintheEUmemberstates.Thoselimitsareprimarilybetakenintoaccountbymemberstatesatthelegislativelevel,butcouldalsobeofrelevancefornationaljudgesorauthoritieswhendecidingconcretecases.248Effectivenessreferstothecapabilityofthesanctiontoadvancetheobjectiveofthe regulation which, according to article 1(1) of the Sulphur Directive is "toreducetheemissionsofsulphurdioxideresultingfromthecombustionofcertaintypesofliquidfuelsandtherebytoreducetheharmfuleffectsofsuchemissionson man and the environment." Effective penalties accordingly promote
246Therelevantsubsectionprovides:"Oildischargefeescannotbeimposedonapersonwhohasreceivedalegallyvalidsanctionforthesameviolation."247InCase68/88CommissionvGreece[1989]ECR2965,theCourtheldthatevenintheabsenceofaspecificreferencetosuchsanctions,Article5oftheEECTreatyrequiredmemberstatestotakeallmeasuresnecessarytoguaranteetheapplicationandeffectivenessofEU law."Forthatpurpose, whilst the choice of penalties remains within their discretion, they must ensure inparticularthatinfringementsofCommunitylawarepenalizedunderconditions,bothproceduraland substantive,whichareanalogous to thoseapplicable to infringementsofnational lawof asimilarnatureandimportanceandwhich,inanyevent,makethepenaltyeffective,proportionateanddissuasive."(Para.24)248Seee.g.Asp(2013),p.57
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compliancewiththerules,encouragepartiesinvolvedtoavoidpenaltiesand,ifapenaltyhasbeenimposed,encouragesthemtopayitasquicklyaspossible.249TheexperienceinsomeoftheNorthernEuropeanSECAcountriessuggeststhattraditionalcriminalpenaltiesmaynotsatisfy thoseeffectivenesscriteria. Ithasbeenshownabovethatadministrativepenaltiescouldprovideacomplementtoenhance effectiveness. A different type of penalties do not do away with theduties of states to ensure a fair trial and ensure rights of the accused, butexperience from other areas of marine pollution law indicates that concernsrelated toEuropeanhumanrights lawcanbeaccommodatedthroughacarefuldesignofthesanctionregime.The effectiveness of the sanctions is closely related their dissuasiveness ordeterrenteffect.Bothcriteriahaveimplicationsonthechoiceofliableparty,asthepenaltyfailstopromotecomplianceifitdoesnottargetthepersonswhoareinvolvedinthedecisionsrelatingtonon-complianceandwhobenefitfromit.250Unlikethe'standard'provisionofpenaltiesforviolationsofEUlaw,article11(2)of the SulphurDirective specifically refers to calculationof fines in away thatdeprive those responsible of the economic benefits derived from theirinfringement. That, in turn, suggests that it is more relevant to target thecompaniesoperatingtheshipandresponsibleforthechoiceoffuelitusesthantoaddressindividualcrewmembers.Dissuasionandeffectivenessalsocallforpenaltiestobeofacertainlevel.Inthewords ofMARPOL article 4(4), the penalties shall be "adequate in severity todiscourage violations".251In view of the important economic benefits of non-compliancewiththefuelqualitystandards,thiscallsforpenaltiesofasignificantmagnitudeinthepresentcase.Theceilingonhowfarpenaltiescangointhisrespectisplacedbytheprincipleofproportionality.Theproportionalityprinciple, theCourt of Justiceof theEUhasheld,applies "notonlyas regards thedeterminationof factorsconstitutingan infringement and the determination of the rules concerning the severity offines,butalsoasregardstheassessmentofthefactorswhichmaybetakenintoaccountinthefixingofafine".252InEUcaselaw,proportionalityconsiderationshave, for example, ruled out a penalty system imposing a flat-rate fine for alloffences,whatever their nature and gravity253or tooweak a link between the
249SeealsoCaseC‑501/14EL-EM-2001(EU:C:2016:777),para47.250 See also Case C-501/14, EL-EM 2001, paras 45-49, where the deterrent effect of theenforcementmeasure(immobilisationofthevehicle)wasquestionedasittargetedthevehicleassuch, and thereby theoperating company,while itwasonly thedriverwhowasbeen chargedwithcommittingtheinfringement.251InthewordsoftheCourtofJustice,"theseverityofpenaltiesmustbecommensuratewiththeseriousness of the infringements for which they are imposed, in particular by ensuring agenuinelydeterrenteffect".Seee.g.JoinedCasesC‑497/15andC‑498/15Euro-Team&Spirál-Gép(EU:C:2017:229),para.42.252Ibid.para43.253Joinedcasesreferredtoinnote251above.
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personwhohascommittedtheinfractionandthepersonwhobearstheeffectofthepenalty.254Strict liability isnot in itself incompatiblewithEUproportionalityrequirementon penalties, even for criminal penalties.255In particular, a sanction systembased on strict liability "is not disproportionate in relation to the objectivespursuedifthatsystemissuchastoencouragethepersonsconcernedtocomplywiththeprovisionsofaregulationandwheretheobjectivepursuedisamatterof public interest which may justify the introduction of such a system".256Violations of the fuel quality standards is likely to pass this test. The publicinterest of the matter is emphasised by the international requirement tomaintain severe sanctions for air emissions and by the existence of arequirementinEUlawtohavecriminalpenaltiesinplaceforthepurpose.Yet,ashasbeenillustratedabove,thehighrequirementsof(proofof)negligencehavein many instances just had the effect that no sanctions are applied for theseviolations.As to the level of penalty, the principle of proportionality includes severalelements. First, "measures imposing penaltiesmust not ... exceed the limits ofwhat isnecessary inorder to attain theobjectives legitimatelypursuedby thelegislationinquestionorbedisproportionatetothoseaims."257Inthisregard,itseems obvious that a penalty that matches the financial benefits involved isrequired to attain the objective of the Directive as quoted above. The moredifficult question is how far the sanction can extendbeyond that and onwhatbasis.Drawingthelinebetweenwhatisnecessaryforattainingthepurposeandwhat is disproportionate appears excessively difficult in an individual case,which favourspriorestablishmentof the levels.Since thebenefitsaremoreorless the same irrespective of which of the SECA states the ship will use,establishment of those levels in thewhole area, or at EU-level seems justified.Proportionalitywouldalsoseemtorequirethattheseverityoftheinfringement(in termsof sulphurcontent in the fueland in termsofduration) is taken intoaccountwhensettingthepenaltylevel.258Second, theCourthasconsideredthat"whenthere isachoicebetweenseveralappropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and thedisadvantagescausedmustnotbedisproportionatetotheaimspursued".259Aswillbediscussedbelow,thereisalimitedrangeofmeasuresthatcouldserveasalternatives to fines for penalizing violations of the air emission standards.Among those discussed in section 4.4 below, some seem too soft for beingeffective while others are too broad-brushed for creating the necessary link254Seenote275below.255Seee.g.CaseC-326/88Hansen,wheretheCourtconsideredthattheimpositionofasystemofstrictliabilityforcriminalpenalties"isnotdisproportionateinrelationtotheobjectivespursuedifthatsystemissuchastoencouragethepersonsconcernedtocomplywiththeprovisionsofaregulationandwheretheobjectivepursuedisamatterofpublic interestwhichmayjustifytheintroductionofsuchasystem"(para19).SeealsoCaseC‑210/10Urbán(EU:C:2012:64),para48.256Ibid.para54.257Ibid.,p.58.258Seenote253above.259C‑210/10Urbán,(EU:C:2012:64),para.24
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between the infringement and the penalty. Yet this aspect of proportionalitymight be relevant where other measures are introduced to complementsanctionsintermsofpunitiveeffect.Finally, it followsfromtheEU'sownCharteronFundamentalRightsthat theremust be proportionality between the level of the penalty and the offence inquestion, toexcludepenaltieswhichdonotstand inanyreasonablerelationtothecommittedviolation.260Airemissionsmayposeaparticularchallengeinthisregard for judges and other authorities deciding on penalties, given that theindividualoffencemaynotbeparticularlysignificantinenvironmentalorhealthterms.Rather,thereareparticularlystrongargumentsinthiscasetorelatethepenaltytotheeconomicbenefitsofnon-compliance,butsuchapreferencedoesnot follow automatically existing requirements, despite the acceptance of thismethod in principle in article 11(2) of the Sulphur Directive. The absence ofharmful environmental or health impacts of the individual infringement of theair emissions requirements represent another argument in favour of closer exanteharmonisationofthepenaltylevelsatnationalorEUlevel.In summary, existing international and EU laws do not entail significantrestraints for states in the SECA region to develop a sufficiently strongersanctions regime thanwhat is currently inplace.Rather to the contrary,whileleavingimportantdiscretionforstatestodesigntheirsanctionsystemaccordingtotheirownneeds,theexistingrulesrequireeffectiveanddissuasivepenaltiestosupporttheobjectivesofthematerialrules.Thereislittletosuggestthatthoserequirements,howevergeneric,arecurrentlymetwhenitcomestoviolationsofthesulphurinfuelrequirementsintheNorthernEuropeanSECA.
4.4Otherenforcementoptions
4.4.1GeneralWhile fines is commonly regarded as the main sanction to be used for non-compliance with MARPOL Annex VI a brief review of other availableenforcementmeasuresisjustified.Otherformsofcriminalsanctions,suchasimprisonment,confiscationoftheshipetc.aregenerallyruledoutbythenatureof theairemissionviolation,butalsothrough the requirement inUNCLOS article 230 that "monetary penalties onlymaybeimposed"withrespecttopollutionviolationsbyforeignships(theonlyexceptionbeingpollutionininternalwatersand'wilfulandserious'pollutionintheterritorialsea261). Itappearsfromthenegotiationhistoryofthearticlethatitsmainpurposeistoavoidtheuseofprisonsentences,henceleavingthedooropenforothertypesof(administrative)enforcementmeasures.262260 See also the general proportionality requirement in Article 49(3) of the Charter ofFundamental Rights of the European Union: "The severity of penalties must not bedisproportionatetothecriminaloffence."261Seesection3.5above.262SeeUNCLOSCommentaryVol.IV,pp.363-370.SeealsoRingbom(2008),p.335andMolenaar(2007),p.237.
4.4.2NotificationofflagstatesPortandcoastalstatesmayalwaysopttotransfertheenforcementofaviolationtotheship'sflagstate.Thiswayjurisdictionwouldnotdependonthecontinuedpresence of the ship in the port or coastal state and more time would beavailable for investigations.Thiswayofproceeding is foreseen,e.g. inUNCLOSarticles94(6)and231andinMARPOLarticle4(2)(b).Underthelatter,thistypeofnotificationshallbemadetotheflagstateifthecoastalstatedoesnotinitiateits own proceedings against a (confirmed) violation within its jurisdiction.MarpolAnnexVIregulation11(2)providesthatnotificationoftheflagstateforfurtheractionalwayshastobemadeifaninspectionindicatesaviolation.263Notification is not a sanction in itself, but rather amechanism for transferringinformation. Under international law the flag state is not strictly required toimpose a penalty even if it is notified about a violation, but bothUNCLOS andMARPOL include certain general follow-up duties. 264 National pollutionenforcement laws commonly include a duty to inform the flag state,irrespectively of whether or not proceedings are instituted within thatcountry.265Theobviousdraw-backofthisapproachisthatdifferentflagstatesarelikelytoprioritizesuchnotificationsverydifferentlyand that the likelihoodofhavingasanctionimposedisquitelowforcertainflagstates.ThisconcernisparticularlyrelevantwithrespecttoviolationsoftheSECAstandardsastheyapplyonlytoalimitedpartof theworldand is therefore less likelytogenerateunderstandingfromflagstateswheresuchrulesdonotapply.
4.4.3'Namingandshaming'Another measure outside the realm of legal procedures could be to providewidespread publicity to established cases of non-compliance. Once it isestablished that the emission standards have been infringed by a certain ship,263Theparagraphincludesthefollowingsentence:“Ifan inspection indicatesaviolationof thisAnnex,areportshallbeforwardedtotheAdministrationforanyappropriateaction.”264Under MARPOL article 4(3) the flag state shall in such cases "promptly inform" the statewhichfurnishedtheinformationorevidenceoftheactiontaken.Para1,onitspartprovidesthat"If theAdministration is informedofsuchaviolationand issatisfied thatsufficientevidence isavailable to enableproceedings tobebrought in respect of the allegedviolation, it shall causesuchproceedingstobetakenassoonaspossible,inaccordancewithitslaw."MARPOL Annex VI, regulation11(4) similarly provides: “Upon receiving such evidence, theAdministration so informed shall investigate the matter, and may request the other Party tofurnishfurtherorbetterevidenceoftheallegedcontravention.IftheAdministrationissatisfiedthatsufficientevidenceisavailabletoenableproceedingstobebroughtinrespectoftheallegedviolation, it shall cause such proceedings to be taken in accordance with its law as soon aspossible.”265Seee.g.SwedishAct1980:424onMeasuresAgainstWaterPollutionfromShips,Chapter11,sections 15 and 16. The Finnish 2009Act, chapter 13, section 4 differentiates the notificationobligationdependingonwhethertheincidentinquestionhastakenplaceinnationalwatersorbeyond.
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whatever the reason for the infringement, the identity of the ship could bepublished and statesmay choose to operate a 'black-list' for the purpose. Theeffectsofsuchmeasurescanbesignificantand in theparticularcontextof fuelquality infringements, a study prepared by the Swedish Transport Agencyconsideredthatpublicationofoffenderscouldrepresentapotentiallypowerfulsanction.266However, it was acknowledged that the full legal ramifications forexercising this type of 'naming and shaming' are not known and that thepossibilityshouldbefurtherstudied.Theeffectivenessofthismethod,too,differsdependingonthepartiesinvolved.Such bad publicity may not have a strong impact with respect to ships thatdeliberately and systematically flout the rules, whereas it may hitenvironmentallyconcernedaccidentalpollutersveryhard.Themeasure isalsoimprecise in that it targets theshipasawholeoveran (unspecified)periodoftime. The 'sanction', therefore,may not capture its target, i.e. the personwhobenefittedfromtheinfringementinquestionandisinanycaselikelytoaffectabroader range of companies linked to the ship, including companies that havenothingtodowiththeinfringement.This type of remedy could well be used jointly among a group of states whocould share their lists on a regional basis and could also be accompanied bysupplementarymeasures,suchas inspectionprioritizationorconditions linkedtofuturevisitsofthesameshiptothestateorregionconcerned.
4.4.4PSCdetentionTheprincipalremedyappliedtonon-complyingshipsunderPSCisdetention.Adetention targets the ship as such, without a need for singling out individualpersonsbehindtheviolation,andaffectsthosewhoareoperatingtheshipatthetimeof the infraction. It isa relatively simpleadministrativemeasurewhich ishighly coordinated at EU-level and could hence be attractive for enforcinginfringements of theMARPOL Annex VI requirements. This is not least so asfailuretocomplywiththesulphurinfuelrequirementsofMARPOLAnnexVIisspecifically clarifiedasbeingadetainabledeficiency in theNorthernEuropeanSECA. 267 Detention is a very effective measure thanks to the importantconsequencesitentailsfortheship’soperator.Apartfromthetimelossinvolved,which in itself is very costly, detentions may involve a wide range of otherfinancial repercussions, for example in termsof trade interruptions, claims fordamagesbycontractualpartners, implications for insurance (hull&machineryandP&IClub)cover,classconditionsandnegativePRfromthepublicitythatadetentionentails.268However,evenifadetentionunderPSCisaneffectivemethodforbringingshipsintocompliance,andhencetopreventdamagefromoccurringinthefuture,itis
266SwedishTransportAgency(2014),p.59.267Seeatnote120above.268 See also the OECD Doc. OCDE/GD(96)4 (Competitive Advantages Obtained By SomeShipownersasaResultOfNon-ObservanceofApplicableInternationalRulesandStandards),atpp.20—21.
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of limited use as a sanction for past infractions. The design of themeasure isbasedonthepremisethatthedeficienciescanberectifiedduringthedetentionandisthusbettersuitedforinfringementsofastaticnaturethatcanberepaired,such as malfunctioning equipment. This starting point is also reflected inUNCLOS,where the right to prevent a ship from sailing is linked to the ship’sseaworthinessandenvironmentalrisks.269Inthecaseoffuelqualitystandards,ashipmayverywellbedetainedforhavingthewrongtypeof fuel in its tanks,butonce ithasrefuelledcompliant fuelandthe ship is technically fit to continue the voyage thegrounds for thedetentionhavedisappearedandtheshipshouldaccordinglybereleased.270Yet itmaybenoted that in European PSC, including in the Paris MOU, there are severalexamples where detentions have been used in a more punitive manner thanforeseenintheIMOconventions.271
4.4.5OtherformsofdetentionsThedetentionofshipsasanadministrativemeasuresisnotconfinedtoPSC.Itisperfectlypossible for aport state to limit a ship’s right to leave theport, evenoutside matters that are regulated in PSC. This follows from generalinternational law, i.e. theport state’s sovereigntyoverships thatarevoluntarypresent in their ports, but is also specifically foreseen in UNCLOS. Article226(1)(b),which dealswith violations of applicable rules and standardsmoregenerallythanthosereferredtointheprevioussection,implicitlyrecognisesthe
269Articles219and226(1)(c),whicharetheonlyonesthatexplicitlydealwith(administrative)measurestopreventtheshipfromsailing,refertoviolationsofrules“relatingtoseaworthinessof vessels” and, more particularly, to cases where the release of the ship would present an(unreasonable) threat of damage to the marine environment. The word ‘unreasonable’ onlyformspart of the latter article. There appears to be no particular reason for this difference inwordinginthetwoarticlesand,giventhecloselinkbetweenthetwo,theymaypresumablybetreated as imposing identical standards, (referring to any threat to of damage to the marineenvironment), not least since it is increasingly uncertain what sort of damage to the marineenvironmentmaybeconsideredtobe‘reasonable’.Similarly,seeMolenaar(1998),pp.189—190andTreves(1996),p.185.SeealsoMARPOLarticle5(2).270UNCLOSarticle226(1),MARPOLarticle7.SeealsotheESSFSub-GroupReportreferredtoinnote143,p.13:"SomeMemberStates foreseedetainingships incaseswhere there isaclearlydemonstrated non-compliance of the sulphur regulation. Detention can however not beconsideredasapenalty.Ashipcanonlybedetaineduntiltheshiphasrectifiedtheconditionsbybunkeringtherequiredcompliantfuel."271While the IMO instruments are still focused on the traditional rule that a ship shall bedetainedonlywhereitsreleasewouldposeaseriousorunreasonablethreattomaritimesafetyor the marine environment, the EU (and Paris MOU) regimes have sometimes provided fordetentionevenintheabsenceofanestablishedimmediatethreat,andevenintheabsenceofamoredetailedinspection.Certainamendmentshaveintroducedprovisionsthattriggermore-or-lessautomaticdetentiononthebasisoffailuretocomplywithaspecificprovision.Forexample,anamendmentin1998introducedanobligationforportstatecontrolauthoritiestoensurethedetention of ships that lack valid ISM Code documentation (Commission Directive 1998/25,article9a,whichhassincebeendeleted),whileanamendmentfrom2002providedthat“theshipshallbedetained,ifnotequippedwithafunctioningvoyagedatarecordersystem,whenitsuseiscompulsory in accordance with Annex XII” (PSC Directive article 9(3)). Moreover, as will bediscussed below, detentions in European PSC have increasingly been introduced as a keycriterionfortriggeringother,evenmoredrastic,consequencesinrespectofshipstradingtoEUports,suchasbanningtheaccesstoEUports.
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possibilityofdetainingnon-complyingships,butprovidesthattheshipshallbepromptlyreleased“subject toreasonableprocedures,suchasbondingorotherappropriate financialsecurity”.Thisarticle, togetherwitharticle220(1),whichprovides for the institution of proceedings in relation to ships which haveviolated (national and international) rules and standards adopted for theprevention, reduction or control of ship-source pollution in the port state’scoastal waters, leaves the door open for detentions of a more punitive orcompensatorynature,butprovidescertainadditionalsafeguardstoensurethatshipsarenotprevented fromsailingoncea reasonableamountof securityhasbeenpostedbytheflagState.272In practice, various types of pre-departure conditions which are not PSCdetentions have been implemented by the EU in a number of differentcircumstances,alsowithrespect torequirement thatareofregionaloriginandscope. Examples include prohibiting a ship from leaving the port until it hasfulfilleditswastedeliveryobligations,273orresteditscrew.274Suchmeasuresdonot amount to a detention of the ship in the meaning of the PSC Directive,althoughthepracticalconsequencesmaybelargelysimilar.Yetthosemeasuresdonottriggerthetransparencysanctionsthatareassociatedwithdetentionsinarticle 26 of the PSC Directive nor do they affect the inspection priorities orcount as a detention for the purposes of banning ships from EU ports underarticle16.Ifthistypeof’non-PSCdetention’weretobeappliedwithrespecttosulphurinfuelrequirements,thereisaneedforaspecifiedpointintimebywhichtheshipshouldbereleased.Sincethemainformofsanctionwillbeafine,this junctureshouldpresumablybethepaymentofthefine.275However,detainingashipuntila fine has been paid would involve significantly longer time period than theexamplesaboveandthereforegiverisetostrainswithrespecttotheobligationofstatesnottocauseunduedelaytoships.Onlyestablishingwhetheraviolationhastakenplacewillnormallytakeseveraldays,tobeaddedbythetimeneededfortheprocedurestoimposethepenalty.
4.4.6ConditioningdepartureonprovisionoffinancialsecurityTo avoid such strains between the need for time for proper enforcementprocedures and the obligation to avoid undue delays, UNCLOS provides asolutionunderwhichtheshipisallowedtosailsubjecttopresentingappropriate272See e.g. Treves (1996), p. 184. Molenaar (1998), p. 462, notes that nothing in Article 226preventsthetwoformsofdetentionbeingappliedconcurrently.273Directive2000/59onportreceptionfacilitiesforship-generatedwasteandcargoresidues,OJ2000L332/81,articles7(2)and11(2)(d).274Directive1999/95concerningtheenforcementofprovisionsinrespectofseafarers'hoursofworkonboardshipscallingatCommunityportsOJ2000L14/29,article5.275SeealsoCaseC-501/14,EL-EM2001,asreferredtoinnote250.Whilefindinginpara.45thatimmobilisationofavehicleasaprecautionarymeasure,"is,inprinciple,appropriateandeffectivetoachievetheobjectives...,theimmobilisationofavehiclebelongingtoatransportundertakingwhichhasnotbeenfoundliableinadministrativeproceedingsgoesbeyondwhatisnecessarytoachievethoseobjectives."ThecasesuggeststhatthistypeofdetentioniseasiertojustifyunderEUlawincaseswherethefinehasbeenimposedontheshipoperatorratherthanonindividualcrewmembers.
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financialsecurity.Inthewordsofarticle226(1)(b),”iftheinvestigationindicatesaviolationofapplicablelawsandregulations,….releaseshallbemadepromptlysubjecttoreasonableproceduressuchasbondingorotherappropriatefinancialsecurity.”Onthisbasis,theshipcouldbedetaineduntilthefinehasbeenpaidoranappropriatefinancialsecurityforthefinehasbeenissued.Thequotedwordingsuggests that the fineneednothavebeen issuedonce thesecurityisrequired.Itsufficesthattheinvestigationindicatesaviolation.Still,acertain swiftness in the procedure to establish the fine is required for thisenforcement method to work, which probably makes it more suitable foradministrativefinesthancriminalones.Thegeneral considerationsof reasonablenessdiscussed in section3.4apply tothiskindofdetentionsaswell,asdothegeneralsafeguardsofUNCLOSPartXII.Port statesmay also face liability formeasureswhich are unlawful or "exceedthosereasonably required in the lightofavailable information"underUNCLOSarticle232andMARPOLarticle7(2).InadditiontotheothersafeguardsofUNCLOSPartXII,detentionsonthisbasisaresubjecttothepromptreleaseprocedureunderUNCLOSarticle292.InviewofthisthereisalreadysomepracticewithregardtohowthereasonablenessofthesecurityhasbeenassessedbytheInternationalTribunal fortheLawoftheSea,which is interesting to study even if it is not comprehensive and has notdealtwithpenaltiesforviolationofMARPOLdischargeoremissionstandardsasofyet.In its practice comprising four cases, the Tribunal has elaborated fourconsiderationsforassessingthereasonablenessofthebondorsecurityrequiredby the port state: 1) the gravity of the offence; 2) the penalties imposed orimposable under the laws of the detaining state; 3) the value of the detainedvessel and cargo; and 4) the amount and form of the bond imposed by thedetaining state.276The case law on these considerations hasmostly concernedfishing vessels and is far from conclusive, but with regard to the secondconsiderationitappearsthatcalculatingtheamountofthebondonthebasisofthemaximumimposablepenalty isacceptable.277Whether thebondmaycoverpurelypunitiveordeterrentelementsofpenaltieshasonlybeenaddressedinacoupleofdissentingopinionstodate.278Neither MARPOL nor EU law specifically provide for enforcement based ondetention, subject toprovisionof financial security,butneitherrule themout.276See in particular Camouco (ITLOS Case No. 5, 2000), paragraph 67. The Tribunal hassubsequentlyemphasizedthatthisisnotanexhaustivelistandthat(seeMonteConfurco,ITLOSCaseNo6(2000),para76andVolga,ITLOSCaseNo.11(2002),para64.277Seee.g.theCamoucocasereferredtointhepreviousnote.278Thedissentingopinionof JudgeAnderson in theMonteConfurcoCase,quotedabove innote235, supports the inclusion of deterrent elements. Conversely, Judge Ndiaye considered in adeclarationinthesamecasethatthebondshouldnottakeonapunitiveordeterrentcharacter.The (unconvincing) reason givenwas that ”[o] therwise, the challenging of the amount of thebond would turn the Tribunal into a forum for appealing against the decisions of nationalauthorities,whichitisnot.”
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Suchmechanismsdoexistatnationallevel,forbothcriminalandadministrativepenalties,andsomeofthemareapplicabletoinfringementsoftheairemissionsstandards. A pertinent example279is Norway’s Ship Safety and Security Act,whichallowsauthoritiesto"prohibittheshipdeparturefromaport,orderittocall at a port or stipulate other necessarymeasures until the ... fine is paid orsufficient security for the amount has been provided".280The measure coversbothadministrativeandcriminalfinesbymeansofidenticalprovisions,withthedifferencethattherequestinrelationtocriminalfinesistobemadebythecourt,while in administrative procedures the prohibition will be ordered by the'supervisoryauthority'.The Norwegian example is also interesting as it permits the security to berequiredwithrespecttofinesthathavealreadybeenissued,butalsoextendstocasesofwhere they"areexpected tobe imposed".281Themoreprecise levelofexpectation required is not specified in the preparatory documents, but it hasbeen considered that a greater likelihood than not may suffice.282It is finallynotablethattheNorwegiandetentionmeasuresmaybeappliedevenifthefineandrelatedsecurityonlywereimposedonthemasterorotherpersonsworkingon board. In practice, the Norwegian guarantees are routinely required forforeigncompaniesandthesystemhasreportedlyworkedwellinthesensethatthe fines have so far been paid by companies without a need use theguarantee.283
4.4.7BanningSections 4.4.4-4.4.6 above have addressed enforcementmeasures thatmay beimposed on a shipwhich is present in the port, in the formof conditions thatmust be fulfilled for it to continue its voyage. In order to strengthen theenforcementregimefurther,thosemeasureshavesometimesbeencoupledwitha refusal of (future) access to ports by ships which fail to comply with therequirements.UNCLOS includes no provision on this enforcement option and the matter isaccordinglygovernedbygeneralinternationallaw,asdiscussedinsection3.4.1above. Certain more recent IMO conventions have occasionally included
279SeealsotheFinnish2009Act,wheredetentionforthepurposeofobtainingfinancialsecurityisspecificallyauthorisedforimplementingtheoilpollutionfee(chapter3subsection6(2)),evenwithrespecttosuspectedshipsinthataremerelytransitingthroughtheFinnishterritorialseaandEEZ. Insubsection3 it isprovidedthat themaximumdurationof thedetention is14days.Article 17 of the Belgian law referred to in note 179 also includes right for the authorities todetain a ship until a financial security that covers the entire fine has been issued. In this casethereisnospecifictimelimit.280ShipSafetyandSecurityAct,sections57(2)and70(1).TheBelgianlawreferredtoinnote179above similarly allows the authorities to detain a ship in case of serious suspicion("présomptionssérieuses")ofaninfraction(article17).281Ibid.282Pettersen&Bull(2010),p.874.283Personal communication with Kjetil Bruland Sørensen, Senior Adviser at the NorwgianShippingDirectorate,April2017.
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references todenial of access as ameansof enforcement,284but this isnot thecasewiththemainbodyofMARPOLoritsAnnexVI.285Rather, this isadevelopment instatepractice thathasbeendrivenat regionallevel,notablybytheEU(largelyfollowedbytheParisMOU).Whilecontroversialinthebeginning,thistypeof ‘banning’ofshipshasbecomeakeyfeatureoftheenforcementoftheEU’smaritimesafetypolicy.286Under current rules it is possible to ban all classes of ships, that have beensubjecttorepeateddetentionsaminimumperiodforaban(3,12or24months)isapplied,differentlydependingontheperformanceofitsflagstateandcertainothercriteria,togetherwiththeintroductionofapermanentbaninthecaseofrepeated bans.287In the time-limited bans, the lifting of the access refusal islinkedtocompliancewithanumberofsafetyconditions,someofwhichextendbeyondthemattersthatoriginallygaverisetotherefusalofaccess.Thistypeofmeasureisobviouslymorepowerfulthanadetention,butalsomoreintrusiveforshipsandtheirowners.288Inaddition,refusalofaccessonthisbasisconsiderablymagnifies theconsequencesof individualdetentions.Through theclose linkageof the refusalof access to thenumberof (butnotnecessarily thereasonsfor)detentions,theeffectsofadetentionareextendedwellbeyondtheindividualport call andarevery closely linked to the ship’s ability to continuetradinginthewholeregion,furtherincreasingthesanction’spunitivecharacter.In quantitative terms, the change of policy represents an increase fromonly afewbannedshipsinthefirstyearsfollowingtheintroductionofthemeasuretosome80shipsatpresent.289RefusalofaccessofshipshasalsobeenusedasamechanismsoutsidePSC.InEURegulation 2015/757 on the monitoring, reporting and verification of carbondioxide emissions frommaritime transport,290which establishes obligations tomonitoringandreportCO2emissionsfromshipsforallshipsaboveacertainsizeboundforEUports.Underarticle20(3)oftheRegulationshipsthathavefailedto comply with the monitoring and reporting requirements for two or moreconsecutive reportingperiods “where other enforcementmeasures have failed
284See e.g. article 11(3) of the 2001 International Convention on the Control ofHarmful Anti-foulingSystemsonShips;InternationalConventionfortheSafetyofLifeatSea(SOLAS),ChapterXI-2('SpecialMeasurestoEnhanceMaritimeSecurity'),regulations9(1)(3)and9(2)(5).SeealsoArticle 4(1)(b) of the 2009 FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter andEliminateIllegal,UnreportedandUnregulatedFishing.285ButseeMARPOLAnnexIregulation21(8)(2)(adoptedin2003):"Subjecttotheprovisionsofinternationallaw,aPartytothepresentConventionshallbeentitledtodenyentryofoiltankersoperatinginaccordancewiththeprovisionsofparagraph5or6ofthisregulationintotheportsoroffshore terminalsunder its jurisdiction ... exceptwhen this isnecessary for thepurposeofsecuringthesafetyofashiporsavinglifeatsea".286SeeRingbom(2008),pp.310-317.287PSCDirective,article16,annexVIII.288AsisnotedbytheCommission,inCOM(2005),588,p.8,“[r]efusalofaccessisaveryeffectivedissuasivetoolinthecampaignagainstsubstandardvessels.”289 See the list of banned ships at https://www.parismou.org/detentions-banning/current-bannings.290OJ2015L123/55.
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toensurecompliance”,theportstatemayissuean‘expulsionorder’,asaresultofwhich“everyMemberStateshallrefuseentryoftheshipconcernedintoanyofitsportsuntilthecompanyfulfilsitsmonitoringandreportingobligations”.Prohibiting the access of ships to all ports of the region no doubtsmeets therequirementsofdissuasivenessandeffectivenessandmayappearattractiveasitcanbeimplementedevenwithoutenteringthecomplexitiesrelatedtosanctionsas discussed above. Indeed, even if banning of ships is among the harshestenforcementmeasures available, it is inmany respects easier to justify fromalegalpointofviewthantheimpositionofsanctions.Byonlytargetingtheaccessofships toports, themeasurehas its legal foundation in theabsenceofsucharightunderinternationallaw.291Theabsenceofarightofshipstoaccessforeignports,whichisnotatdispute,afortioriimpliesrightsfortheportstatetoplaceconditionsonsuchaccess.Byonlyaddressingshipsthatarenotpresent in theterritory, the measure bypasses a number of safeguards which have beenincludedintoUNCLOSforsecuringtheinterestsofshipoperators.Yet theuseof banning as a tool for enforcing air emissionviolationsmay faceissues regarding proportionality. Like the ‘naming and shaming’, its suitabilitymaybequestionedasittargetstheindividualshipforan(unspecified?)periodoftimewithoutregardtowhetherthepartiesbehindtheoriginalinfringementsarestillinvolved.Moreover,intheabsenceofstaticmattersthatcanberepairedforthebantobelifted,292itisunclearhowthebancouldbemotivatedinpreventivetermsandhow the conditions for lifting thebancouldbe formulated inawaythatestablishesa linktotheoriginal infringement.Themeasuremaythereforeseemexcessivelyimpreciseforitspurpose.
4.4.8ConclusionThereviewofpotentialalternativestosanctionsforenforcingthesulphurinfuelrequirements indicates that there is no obvious alternative to monetarypenalties.Noneofthemeasuresaddressedaboveisaspreciseasafineandnoneofthemisasopentoaccommodatingthecircumstancesoftheindividualcase.All alternatives reviewed include shortcomings in terms of being either tooineffective for constituting a genuine deterrent or disproportionately punitive.Moreover, all alternatives represent broad-brushed measures that affect thewholerangeofplayersinvolvedintheoperationoftheship,foranextendedbutunspecified period of time, rather than only the one party responsible for theinfringementatthetime.Neithernotificationofflagstatesnorthe‘namingandshaming’ofnon-complyingshipsislikelytomeettherequirementsofdissuasivenessandeffectiveness.PSCdetentions, inturn,arenotsuitableoncetheshiphasrefuelled.Prohibitingtheaccessof,or‘banning’,shipsfromportsinthestateorregionisaverypowerful
291Seeatnote87above.292TheprocedureforliftingthebanisoutlinedinAnnexVIIIofthePSCDirectiveandincludesinpara. 3 evidence ”showing that the ship fully conforms to the applicable provisions of theConventions”.
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measure that avoids several of the complexities linked to sanctions, but isimpreciseandraisesquestionsofproportionality.Yet, even if they may not be appropriate as an alternative to sanctions, themeasuresreviewed,whichcouldwellbeappliedcumulatively,mayneverthelessprovide a useful complement to sanctions which fail to meet the requiredstandards of effectiveness, dissuasiveness andproportionality.293At least in aninterim period, such alternatives offer a reinforcement of the sanction regimewhichisprocedurallylightandeasytoimplementinpractice.Inthelongerrun,theoptionoflinkingthedepartureoftheshiptoprovisionofafinancial security for a potential fine would seem to be the most promisingoption, irrespective of the nature of the underlying sanction. This, however,requires that at least the initial procedure for imposing the sanctions isreasonablyswift.
5ConcludingremarksEnforcementoftheairemissionstandardsBasedontheexperiencetodateitappearsdifficulttoimplementproceduresandpenalties that have been designed to enforce other forms of ship-sourcepollutionincidents,typicallyoildischarges,analogouslytoviolationsofthefuelqualityrequirements.Anumberofelementsdistinguishairemissionviolationsfromotherformsofpollution.Firstly, detecting and establishing a violation of the air emission standardsdiffers fromother typesofdischarges.Aship thatviolates theSECAsulphur infuel requirements is unlikely to be caught 'red-handed' in a sense thatmerelyvisualobservationsorphotographswouldsufficetodetecttheviolation.Instead,moresophisticatedtechnicalmethodsareneeded.Thosemethodsallentailtheirown weaknesses and they all place significant strains on governments'resources,butare insufficient forverifying theviolation.Forverification,morecomprehensive investigations, involving both on-board inspections andsubsequent shore-based analyses are usually required. Moreover, since theillegalairpollutionistypicallycontinuousinnatureinthatittakesplaceoveraperiod of time, rather than as an instant event, proof of violation at a givenmomentdoesnotnecessarilysaymuchaboutthedurationoftheviolation.Secondly, proving the subjective element of the violation is generally quitedemanding.Incriminalproceedingsinparticular,whichstillrepresentthemainform of sanctions in the SECA states, it has to be shown that the violation iscausedintentionallyorresultingfrom(serious)negligenceonbehalfoftheliableperson. Even identifying the person responsible for the violation can bechallenging, let alone to prove their negligence in view of the commonavailabilityofdocumentaryevidencethatcompliantfuelhasbeenpurchasedingoodfaithetc.Administrativepenaltiesnormallyprovideformoreflexibility inthisrespect,buttheyarenotwidelyinuseforairemissionviolationsand,evenwhereapplied,mayfaceissuesinrelationtodissuasiveness.Thirdly,inviewofthelargefinancialgainsinvolvedinnon-compliancewiththeairemissionsstandards,thesanctionsimposedonviolationscall formonetarypenaltiesofasignificantlevelinordertobeeffectiveanddissuasive,asrequiredbybothMARPOLandtheSulphurDirective.Yetthelevelofthepenaltymaybehelddownbythecircumstancethatairemissionsrepresentenvironmentalandhealth hazards at aggregated level rather than in the individual instance.Common principles for addressing the size of the penalty for environmentalinfractions,basedontheenvironmentalharmorthelevelofdangerforhumansor the environment, are therefore not suitable for this kind of violations. Theabsenceof significantenvironmentaldamage in the individual casealsomeansthatotherliabilitymechanisms,suchascivilliability,isnotavailableforuseasacomplementarydeterrentinthecaseofairemissions.Tomeettheirobjectives,sanctionsshouldthereforebelinkedtotheeconomicbenefitsofnon-compliance,
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which suggests that liablepersons shouldbe the corporations in chargeof thedecisionsonfuelusageratherthancrewmembers.Such differences place special demands on the legalmechanisms for enforcingthe rules. As of now, however,most Northern European SECA states have notintroducedseparateenforcementmechanismstodealwithviolationsof theairemissionstandards.Theycommonlyrelyonthe'regular'MARPOLenforcementprocedures for dealing with these matters which, in turn, is reflected in therelativeabsenceofsuccessfulapplicationofpenaltiesinpractice.If the enforcement fails to generate the required dissuasion, other efforts topromotecompliancewiththerequirementswillalsobefruitless.Overtimethisrisks to weaken implementation, which would not only undermine theeffectivenessofinternationalandEUfuelqualityrules,butwouldalsobeatoddswith their requirements that non-compliance shall be met by effective anddissuasive sanctions. Apart from such legal considerations, incompleteapplication of the rules would also result in important competitivedisadvantagesfortheoperatorswhocomplywiththerules.Certainrestraintsonenforcementmeasuresfollowfromthelawofthesea.Astothe geographical coverage, the solid international foundation of the sulphur infuelrequirementsremovesanydoubtthatportstatescanrequireforeignshipstransitingtheterritorialseaandtheEEZtocomplywiththerules.However,theright to take enforcement measures at sea against such ships is significantlylimited. This, togetherwith a variety of practical considerations, suggests thatmostenforcementmeasureswillbeundertakenbyport states,possiblyon thebasisadvanceidentificationofshipsonthebasisofremotemeasurementsatsea.SanctionsMonetary penalties probably represent the most appropriate enforcementmeasure for targeting themost relevant persons involved in the violation andtaking the individual circumstances into account in each case. It is alsospecificallymandatedinUNCLOSarticle230.TheremaynotbeasingleidealtypeofpenaltiesthatfitsthelegalsystemsofallNorthern European SECA states. Already the very limited number of nationallaws that havebeen referred to in this study illustrate that several alternativesolutions apply regarding all key aspects of the sanction. The most effectiveformat of sanctions, in terms of successful application, appears to be theadministrativepenalties,actingasacomplementtocriminalpenalties.Inmanystates,however,thelevelofadministrativepenaltiesistoolowtobeeffectiveinthepresentcontext.In order to ensure the effectiveness, consistency and proportionality ofsanctions, key principles should be established in advance, at national orregionallevel.Inthiswaypenaltiescouldbeharmonizedanddetachedfromtheimpact of the violation in the individual case. Furthermore, it seems moreimportantthatcommonprinciplesgovernthemainfeaturesofthesanctions,interms of liable persons, proof, culpability thresholds and the mechanisms for
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calculating them, than specifying their legal format. A key to successfulenforcementof sanctions is that theprocessoperateswitha certain swiftness,whichallowsothermeasurestobetakentosupporttheeffectiveenforcementofthe sanction.Anexampleofhowpenalties for air emissionviolations couldbecalculated inaexpeditiousmanner isprovided in theAnnex.Harmonisationatregional - orEU - level is supportedby consistencyarguments andby the factthattheeconomicbenefitofnon-compliance,whichiswhatthesanctionneedstoaddresstobeeffective,doesnotdifferbetweenportstates.InternationalandEUlawdonotstandinthewayformorepowerfulsanctions.The jurisdictional rules provide certain safeguards to protect the interests ofships,notablybylimitingsanctionstomonetarypenalties,byproviding(inmanycases)forarightofflagstatepre-emptionintheproceedingsandforapromptrelease of ships that are held back during the investigations. Apart from suchexpresslimitations,itisclearthatportstates,throughtheprincipleofterritorialsovereignty and the status of internal waters, have an in principle unlimitedjurisdictionoverforeignvessels,intermsofprescriptionaswellasenforcement.Thispositionisfurtherreinforcedbytheabsenceofarightforcommercialshipsto access foreign ports in general international law, which a fortiori impliesbroadrights forportstates toplaceconditions foraccess.UNCLOS isrelativelysilent on the balancing of the interests involved in the exercise of port statejurisdiction and apart from some generic rules on the prohibition ofdiscriminationorabuseofrights,essentially leavesthemattertomoregeneralprinciplesofinternationallawthatarenotveryhelpfulforestablishingthelimitsforhowonerousthepenaltiescanbe.The relevant technical rules purposely leave significant discretion to states toadopttheirownsanctionsystemastheyseemostappropriateforthepurpose.Yettheyrequirethatsanctionsbeeffective,proportionateandsufficientlysevereto discourage violations. Neither MARPOL nor the Directive, or subsequentguidance documents to support their implementation, offermuch guidance onthe design of the penalties, but certain principles can nevertheless be inferredfromtherequirementsofeffectiveness,dissuasivenessandproportionality.Effectiveness and dissuasiveness are closely related. They both call for arelativelyswiftprocedurewhichinturnarguesinfavourofreducingtheonusofauthorities of proving the subjective elements of the infringement. Therequirements also imply that it should be the economic benefit of theinfringement, rather than its effect on the port state or the environment, thatshouldguidethesizeofthepenalty.Thisinturnsuggeststhatthetargetofthesanctions shouldbe thecorporationswhoprofit from the infringement.Ahighpenalty is called for by the significant economic gains of non-compliance andsupported by the absence of other mechanisms to deterrence, such as civilliability. Linking the penalty to the profits also suggests that the size of thepenaltyshouldbelinkedtotheseverityoftheviolation,ingeographicaltermsaswell as in terms of actual sulphur content. Purelymatching the financial gainwouldnotamount todeterrenceand thestatehasa largediscretion toexceedthis. It may also be noted that even if the obligation to comply with the airemissionrequirementsonlyextendedtothecoastalwatersoftheportstate,asis
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the requirement under the Sulphur Directive, a port state may still imposesanctionsonnon-complyingshipsinamannerthattakesintoaccounttheship'soperations (and financial benefits) beyond those waters. The basis forcalculatingtheeconomicbenefitoftheviolationis,inotherwords,notlimitedtotheareainwhichtheobligationapplies.The limits for how onerous the sanctions can be will mainly placed by therequirementofproportionality,whichfeaturesbothingeneralinternationallawand, inasomewhatmoreelaborated form, inEU law.This requiremententailsseveral elements, but in essence boils down to the principle that enforcementshould not exceedwhat is necessary tomeet the objectives of the underlyingmeasure.Whilethethresholdofwhatisnecessarytomeettheobjectivesofthesulphur requirements, as was noted above, is quite high, proportionalitysuggests,interalia,thattheindividualcircumstancesofthecaseshouldbetakeninto account. A flat fee sanction, which is imposed independently of severity,duration or level of negligence, is, for example, unlikely to satisfy theproportionalityrequirement.OtherenforcementmeasuresApartfromsanctions,internationallawofferscertainothermechanismsforportstatestoenforcetherelevantrulestocomplementthesanctions.Someofthesemeasures have been reviewed in chapter 4.4 of the study, concluding that theeffectiveness of the sanctions could be improved relatively easily bycomplementarymeasuresofanadministrativenature.Aviableexample,whichisalready inplace incertainstates in theregion, is tocondition thedepartureofthe ship on payment of the fine or issuing a reasonable financial security. Aneven strongermeasurewouldbe topenalise confirmedviolationsby imposinglimitationsontheship'srightof(future)accesstoportsinthestateorregionashasbeendoneinthecaseof(repeated)violationsofsafetystandardsunderPSC.The jurisdiction of the port state to impose sanctions or other enforcementmeasuresonforeignshipsisnotunlimited,however.ThemainlimitationsoftheenforcementmeasuresarefoundinthegeneralsafeguardslistedinUNCLOSPartXIIsection7andincertainkeyprinciplesofgeneralinternationallaw.Apartfromthat,moregeneral imitationsthatapplytoanytypeofenforcementmeasuresfollowfromotherprovisionsintheUNCLOSsafeguardssectionaswellas fromgeneralprinciplesof international lawsuchasnon-discriminationandproportionality requirements. Among other things, ships may not be undulydelayedandshallbepromptlyreleased,evenifaviolationhasbeenconfirmed,unless they represent an "unreasonable threat of damage to the marineenvironment".The eventual balancing of the reasonableness of a particular enforcementmeasuretodealwithnon-complianceswiththesulphurinfuelrequirements,itwillbeofrelevancethattheenforcementinthiscaseisintimatelylinkedtotheeffectiveapplicationof internationalruleswhicharewidelyaccepted in formalterms and in practice. There is accordingly no ‘unilateralism’ involved in theapplicationofsizeablepenaltiesorotherenforcementmeasuresforviolationsof
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thefuelqualitystandards.Onthecontrary,effectivesanctionsinthisfieldaimatstrengthening existing international regulation and arguably represent anecessary element to ensure their effectiveness. Enforcementmeasures in thisarea,evenifadoptedatregionallevel,donotaddtotheregulatoryburdenofflagstates, even with regard to non-parties to MARPOL Annex VI,294nor do theyquestiontheauthorityofIMOorotherwisechallengethefreedomofnavigationas laiddown inUNCLOS.Measureswith importanteconomic impact caneasilybejustifiedbythestrongincentivesforoperatorstodefytherules.Here, too, the real test will presumably centre on the proportionality of themeasure in question, in relation to whether the measures imposed areproportionalinrelationtotheobjectivestherulesseektoachieveandinrelationto the infringement committed by the ship, and on the related question as towhetherthemeasuremightconstitutesanabuseofrightunderUNCLOSarticle300.Proportionality considerationscouldverywell ruleoutmeasures thatarevery broad-brushed in that they affect a wide range of persons, includingpersons thatarenot involved in the infringement. In theavailabilityofamoretargetedandpotentiallyveryeffectivemeasureintheformoffines(ifnecessarycoupled with detentions and financial security requirements), it is hencepossible that a measure like the banning of the ship from the region's portsmightoverstepthelimitsofproportionality.To date there is no known international, EU or even national, case lawwhichwould help to indicate where the borders of reasonableness might lie for airemission violations. In view of thewide variety of enforcementmeasures andsanctionsthatcurrentlyapplyindifferentstates,itislikelythattheoutcomeofsuch judgments, too,willdivergewithintheSECA.Whatappearsentirelyclear,however, is that individual states and the EU have considerable scope forimplementing stronger enforcement measures to improve the effectiveness ofthesulphur in fuel requirements thanwhat theyhavebeenapplying todate.AnumberofconsiderationshighlightedinthisstudywouldfavourtheelaborationofcommonprinciplestothisaffectatEU-level.
