Studies in Intelligence (1995) Creating Covert Warriors DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED ey CENTRAL I NTELLIGENCE ARENtY SOURCES mETHODSEXEMPT ION JOH NAZI MAR CRIMES el SUOMI AC1 DATE 2007 Nakano School The Japanese Army's Nakano School, 1938-45 Stephen C. Mercado The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) established in 1938 an institution to train personnel in clandestine opera- tions. The Nakano School produced some 3,000 intelligence officers in seven years. Its graduates assumed a wide variety of duties. Some joined the Army General Staff (AGS) in Tokyo as analysts. Others conducted numerous operations in China and Southeast Asia, including the "libera- tion" of Burma. As the war's tide turned against japan, the school opened a branch center dedicated to producing commandos and concen- trated its training on guerrilla tactics. The school's graduates, originally expected to gather intelligence throughout the world on long-term assignments, were then ordered to lead popular guerrilla bands as part of the anticipated final battle for the Japanese home islands. The Nakano School's last commandant ordered all documentary evidence of the school destroyed and dismissed its members when Japan surrendered in August 1945. Upgrading Covert Capabilities Imperial Japan by late 1937 was wag- ing war in China and preparing to fight one or more of the major pow- ers. The Japanese Empire had been on a collision course with the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States since 1931, when the IJA seized Manchuria as a forward Stephen C. Mercado is with the For- eign Broadcast Information Service. base against Soviet Russia. Tokyo rec- ognized the resulting puppet state of Manchukuo the following year. Japan, seeking to blunt the growing Nationalist Chinese challenge to its grip on Manchuria and interests throughout China, moved after fight- ing first broke out near the Marco Polo Bridge near Peking (Beijing) in July 1937 to resolve the issue on the battlefield. Army officers in Japan were taking steps to upgrade clandestine capabili- ties. In November 1937 the IJA expanded its covert warfare weapons program, moving its 9th Technical Laboratory from Tokyo to nearby Noborito. The same month saw the birth of 8th Section (Clandestine) in AGS 2nd Bureau (Intelligence).' The next logical step was to create a center to train the personnel needed to conduct the operations devised in 8th Section and use the special devices developed at the Noborito Laboratory. In December 1937 the War Minis- try's Military Administration Bureau formed a preparatory committee to establish a covert operations training center. Before joining the committee, Lt. Col. lwakuro Hideo, 2 a tireless advocate of intelli- gence, had written a memo calling for a training center as part of a pro- gram to build a more "scientific" basis for Army clandestine opera- tions. The Facility he envisioned would instruct candidates in intelli- gence gathering, counterintelligence (Cl), covert warfare, and propaganda. 3 Joining him was Lt. Col. Akikusa Shun, an expert on Russia who had cut his teeth on covert activities as an intelligence officer in Japan's Siberian interven- tion of 1918-22. Lt. Col. Fukumoto Ryuji, a third member, was a CI vet- eran of the Kempeitai military police. In an army notorious for "operations first" thinking that slighted intelli- gence, the three officers were remarkable. lwakuro, assigned co the Japanese Embassy in Washington in the months before the attack against Pearl Harbor, gathered intelligence and conducted operations related to the negotiations between Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Amb. Nomura Kichisaburo. 4 Following Japan's invasion of Southeast Asia, Iwakuro, as chief of his own clandes- tine organ, directed covert operations to overthrow British rule in India.5 Akikusa had joined the committee soon after working for nearly four years in the IJA's Harbin Tokumu Kikan (Special Services Organ), which oversaw the Army's anti- Soviet operations throughout Manchukuo. 6 He would become the Nakano School's first commandant. Fukumoto would serve as his deputy and right-hand man.7 The three men had to overcome the initial opposition of all but a few IJA officers. Lt. Col. Usui Shigelci, chief of 2nd Bureau's Russia Section, was one of their few backers. 8 Other intelligence officers worried the plan would end the system of overseas Army attach6 directly reporting intelligence to them.9 All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations. 97
Transcript
Studies in Intelligence (1995)
Creating Covert Warriors
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED eyCENTRAL I NTELLIGENCE ARENtYSOURCES mETHODSEXEMPT ION JOHNAZI MAR CRIMES el SUOMI AC1DATE 2007
Nakano School
The Japanese Army's Nakano School, 1938-45Stephen C. Mercado
The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA)established in 1938 an institution totrain personnel in clandestine opera-tions. The Nakano School producedsome 3,000 intelligence officers inseven years. Its graduates assumed awide variety of duties. Some joinedthe Army General Staff (AGS) inTokyo as analysts. Others conductednumerous operations in China andSoutheast Asia, including the "libera-tion" of Burma. As the war's tideturned against japan, the schoolopened a branch center dedicated toproducing commandos and concen-trated its training on guerrilla tactics.
The school's graduates, originallyexpected to gather intelligencethroughout the world on long-termassignments, were then ordered tolead popular guerrilla bands as partof the anticipated final battle for theJapanese home islands. The NakanoSchool's last commandant orderedall documentary evidence of theschool destroyed and dismissed itsmembers when Japan surrendered inAugust 1945.
Upgrading Covert Capabilities
Imperial Japan by late 1937 was wag-ing war in China and preparing tofight one or more of the major pow-ers. The Japanese Empire had beenon a collision course with the SovietUnion, Great Britain, and theUnited States since 1931, when theIJA seized Manchuria as a forward
Stephen C. Mercado is with the For-eign Broadcast Information Service.
base against Soviet Russia. Tokyo rec-ognized the resulting puppet state ofManchukuo the following year.Japan, seeking to blunt the growingNationalist Chinese challenge to itsgrip on Manchuria and intereststhroughout China, moved after fight-ing first broke out near the MarcoPolo Bridge near Peking (Beijing) inJuly 1937 to resolve the issue on thebattlefield.
Army officers in Japan were takingsteps to upgrade clandestine capabili-ties. In November 1937 the IJAexpanded its covert warfare weaponsprogram, moving its 9th TechnicalLaboratory from Tokyo to nearbyNoborito. The same month saw thebirth of 8th Section (Clandestine) inAGS 2nd Bureau (Intelligence).'The next logical step was to create acenter to train the personnel neededto conduct the operations devised in8th Section and use the specialdevices developed at the NoboritoLaboratory.
In December 1937 the War Minis-try's Military Administration Bureauformed a preparatory committeeto establish a covert operationstraining center. Before joining thecommittee, Lt. Col. lwakuroHideo, 2 a tireless advocate of intelli-gence, had written a memo callingfor a training center as part of a pro-gram to build a more "scientific"basis for Army clandestine opera-tions. The Facility he envisionedwould instruct candidates in intelli-gence gathering, counterintelligence(Cl), covert warfare, andpropaganda. 3 Joining him wasLt. Col. Akikusa Shun, an expert on
Russia who had cut his teeth oncovert activities as an intelligenceofficer in Japan's Siberian interven-tion of 1918-22. Lt. Col. FukumotoRyuji, a third member, was a CI vet-eran of the Kempeitai military police.
In an army notorious for "operationsfirst" thinking that slighted intelli-gence, the three officers wereremarkable. lwakuro, assigned co theJapanese Embassy in Washington inthe months before the attack againstPearl Harbor, gathered intelligenceand conducted operations related tothe negotiations between Secretary ofState Cordell Hull and Amb.Nomura Kichisaburo. 4 FollowingJapan's invasion of Southeast Asia,Iwakuro, as chief of his own clandes-tine organ, directed covert operationsto overthrow British rule in India.5
Akikusa had joined the committeesoon after working for nearly fouryears in the IJA's Harbin TokumuKikan (Special Services Organ),which oversaw the Army's anti-Soviet operations throughoutManchukuo. 6 He would become theNakano School's first commandant.Fukumoto would serve as his deputyand right-hand man.7
The three men had to overcome theinitial opposition of all but a few IJAofficers. Lt. Col. Usui Shigelci, chiefof 2nd Bureau's Russia Section, wasone of their few backers. 8 Otherintelligence officers worried the planwould end the system of overseasArmy attach6 directly reportingintelligence to them.9
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of theauthor. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying USgovernment endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.
97
Nakano School
Rigid career progression also posedan obstacle. Most Army intelligenceofficers moved through a set course:the IJA War College, initial postingto AGS, overseas study, militaryattachf or deputy attacW, clandes-tine organ chief, and 2nd Bureausection and branch chief. As commis-sioned officers, they were alsoexpected at some point to commanda battalion or regiment. Willing nei-ther to promote regular officersserving overseas in long-term clandes-tine assignments nor to use civilians,the IJA turned to its reserve officerpool. 10
Opening the School
Iwakuro, Akikusa, and Fukumotoworked throughout early 1938 to selltheir proposal to top War Ministryand AGS officials. In July, 19 reserveofficers became the first class of thetraining center, operating in a rentedbuilding of a women's patriotic orga-nization in Tokyo. The school thenmoved in March 1939 to the westernsuburb of Nakano. In August 1940the center was formally inauguratedas an IJA school. Known in Tokyo asthe Rear Service Personnel TrainingCenter, the Nakano School took thecovername of Eastern Unit 33.11
From the start, the Nakano Schoolhoused two competing outlooks.lwalcuro, Akikusa, and Fukumotosaw the center applying the latesttools and techniques of clandestineoperations to train professional intel-ligence officers.
But joining Akikusa and Fukumotoas the third-ranking officer was Maj.Ito Samara, an officer of a decidedlymore "spiritualist" cast.
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66Reflecting its scientific
vision, the Nakano Schooltrained its students to
speak foreign languages,break codes, wear
disguises, infiltrate, usefirearms, handle
explosives, operateautomobiles and aircraft,and use guerrilla tactics.
,99The rational Akikusa saw EmperorHirohito as an ordinary man ratherthan the "living god" depicted in gov-ernment propaganda. Ito, however,was a descendant of the "revere theEmperor, expel the barbarians" nativ-ists who had opened Japan tocontact with the West in the mid-19th century. The nativists had beenmore interested in learning thesecrets of modern technology than inembracing its underlying spirit of rea-son and democracy. 12
Reflecting its scientific vision, theNakano School trained its studentsto speak foreign languages, breakcodes, wear disguises, infiltrate, usefirearms, handle explosives, operateautomobiles and aircraft, and useguerrilla tactics. 13 The !nada Fac-tory, a small campus facility run byLt. Col. Inada Yuichi, developeddevices for clandestine operations.Many instructors came from AGS2nd Bureau's Russia and Clandestinesections. 14 Members of the NoboritoLaboratory also visited to offer guid-ance in the covert warfare devicesthey were developing, including pis-tols disguised as cigarette lighters,incendiary bricks, explosives made toresemble coal, miniature camerasmounted in briefcases and lighters,
delayed-fuse rear gas, poison gas, alother special weapons. 15
Akikusa, known for his ease in mixing with Westerners, would at timttake students to the top-class Imperial Hotel for meals to hone theirsocial skills before placing them owseas. He also encouraged them tolearn through self-initiative. The stidents, sporting civilian clothes andhaircuts, were free in the evenings tgo out on the town and even stay oovernight.
For the school's "textbook," Akikusturned to the secret operationsreports of Col. Akashi Motojiro froithe Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05Akashi supplied funds and arms toLenin's Bolsheviks and other anti-Tsarist movements of all stripesthroughout Europe in an effort tocheck reinforcements to the battle-front in Manchuria by underminingMoscow. The Japanese equated hisactions as equivalent to three armydivisions. 16
Major Ito, a skilled swordsmanrumored to have cut down morethan 80 guerrillas and spies inManchuria during the IJA's takeovetin 1931, had first opposed creatingthe Nakano School. Once appointedto oversee the training there, how-ever, he dedicated himself to drillinginto its students a "spiritual" educa-tion. The campus featured hallswhere students honed their skills attraditional fencing (kendo) and suchmartial arts as aikido. Ninja masterswere invited to impart their ancientsecrets. Instructors drummed intostudents the spirit of enduranceagainst all hardships to execute theirmissions. 17 Lt. Onoda Hiro, oneNakano School graduate, displayed
Nakano School
in the extreme the effects of hisschooling, surrendering in the Philip-pines only in 1974. 18 Sgt. SakaiKiyoshi, a graduate who appeared onthe remote island of Yaeyama nearTaiwan late in the war as a school-teacher named Yamashita Torao,spent his evenings there teaching thechildren kendo and exhorting theislanders not to fear death. 19
The school's clash between reasonand spirit resulted in early casualtieson both sides. Ito, who believedGreat Britain was manipulating to itsown advantage the fighting betweenJapan and China, decided to insti-gate an anti-British campaign. Heconspired with two members of theNakano School's first class to seizeGreat Britain's consulate in Kobe,Force the officials to confess to Brit-ish meddling, and find documents toprove that Japan's liberal statesmenand business leaders had beenbought. Ironically, a member of thefirst class from Akikusa's factiondetected the plot.
The Kempeitai in January 1940arrested Ito and his followers inKobe. The IJA quietly put Ito on thereserve list and sent the other plotterson overseas assignments in order tokeep the affair quiet. Akikusa,although not involved in the plot-ting, took responsibility ascommandant by resigning inMarch."
Working in Intelligence
The Nakano School's first class grad-uated in July 1939. 21 AGS 2ndBureau's Russia Section had first pro-moted the Nakano School as asource of recruits for its operations.
66Once Japan decided
to strike south againstthe United States andEuropean colonies in
Southeast Asia, the NakanoSchool's graduates workedin a number of operations
to "liberate" Asia.
But the graduates were sent through-out the world to gather intelligenceagainst all Japan's hypothetical ene-mies. The first class thus operated inHawaii, the Philippines, the WesternHemisphere, Southeast Asia, India,and China as well as the Manchukuo-Soviet border and Europe. 22 Theofficers posed as newspaper report-ers, Chinese citizens, Buddhistpriests, trading company employees,diplomats, servants, and sailors.23
Nakano School officers also workedas analysts throughout AGS 2ndBureau. Three officers withdrawnfrom their covert assignments in theWestern Hemisphere and India atthe onset of the war assumed newduties following US and Britishdevelopments in 6th Section (USA,Bricain). 24 Maj. Hata Masanobu, agraduate of the school's second class,served in the bureau's RussiaSection. 25 Other graduates served inother parts of the Army Section,Imperial General Headquarters(IGHQ), in Tokyo and as staff intel-ligence officers in the field armies.
"Liberating" Asia
Once Japan decided to strike southagainst the United States and Euro-pean colonies in Southeast Asia, theNakano School's graduates worked
in a number of operations to "liber-ate" Asia. One of the most famousclandestine groups involved was theMinami Kikan (Southern Organ).The organization was established inFebruary 1941 under the commandof Col. Suzuki Kenji, who had firstentered Burma in June 1940 togather intelligence as a Japanesereporter named Minami Masuyo. 26
Most IJA members of the MinamiKikan--which also included Impe-rial Japanese Navy (IJN) officers,Japanese civilians with experience inSoutheast Asia, and Burmese activ-ists—were Nakano School graduates.One such officer, Capt. KawashimaTakenobu, was Colonel Suzuki's"right-hand man" in the organ,according to Nakano School class-mate and fellow organ member Lc.lzumiya Tatsuro. 27 In the monthsleading to the war, the organ wastraining Burmese operatives, includ-ing postwar Burmese strongmanGen. Ne Win, in occupied China'sHainan Island and collecting foreignweapons for the Burmese to lead anarmed uprising against British rule.Nakano School members worked inHainan, Guangdong, and the organ'sheadquarters in Thailand to lay thegroundwork.
Japan's surprise attack against GreatBritain in December 1941 drasticallychanged the operation. The Minamiorgan responded by establishing theBurma Independence Army (B1A)that month in Bangkok. SuchNakano School graduates as Lt.lzumiya Tatsuro then trained andled BIA units into Burma under theoverall command of Lt. Gen. lidaShojiro's 15th Army. With the con-quest of Burma, the BIA grew fromits initial 200 Burmese recruited in
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4
Nakano School
Thailand to 100,000. The Burmesewelcomed as liberators the Japaneseand the 2,000-strong BIA unit thatmarched into Rangoon.28
In another operation, NakanoSchool officers constituted the coreof the Fujiwara Kikan (FujiwaraOrgan). In September 1941 Maj.Fujiwara lwaichi, a staff officer inAGS 2nd Bureau's Clandestine Sec-tion, established his organization toenlist the support of anti-Britishactivists among colonial Malaya'sIndians, Malays, and Chinese to facil-itate Japan's invasion of thepeninsula. He first took his half-dozen Nakano School graduates andother members to Bangkok.29
Fujiwara went as a Foreign . Ministryofficial. The others entered Thailandas government officials, traders, andeven a hotel bellboy. They contactedmembers of the Indian Indepen-dence League and other anti-Britishactivists to prepare fifth-columnactivities. The organization, thencalled the F Kikan ( H r standing forFujiwara, friendship, and freedom)participated in the IJA's campaignfor Singapore under Lt. Gen.Yamashita Tomoyuki's 25th Army.
The Nakano School graduatesworked with other members to per-suade Indian officers and soldiers inthe British Army to surrender. Fuji-wara's organization then turnedthem and others detained after thefall of Singapore into the IndianNational Army (INA). NakanoSchool officers remained core mem-bers in the expanded efforts to wrestIndia from British rule under the suc-cessor organs led by Iwakuro--
66The Nakano Schoolthus constituted an
important element in themilitary-industrialcomplex Japan was
assembling to fight thefinal campaign in the home
islands.
99Fujiwara's replacement—and thenby Maj. Gen. Yamamoto Hayashi.3°
Turning To Guerrilla Warfare
The war's outbreak so soon after theNakano School's first class hadgraduated reduced its field of opera-tions from the entire world toJapanese-occupied areas in Asia. Theaccelerating tempo of the Alliedcounterassault led the IJA to aban-don all training but instruction inguerrilla tactics. The NakanoSchool's mission was to produceoperatives who would wreak havocbehind enemy lines in the SouthernFront and, in the end, lead theJapanese people in a guerrilla war inthe final battle for the home islands.
The Nakano School opened itsFutamata Branch for guerilla warfarein 1944. The foreign-languageclasses and other training unrelatedto guerrilla tactics were gone. Thetraining period was reduced fromtwo years to six and then threemonths. 31 A central communica-tions unit was established withinIGHQ to coordinate the activitiesof:commandos working behindenemy lines and communicateintelligence. 32 In this later period,over 2,000 graduates were assigned
to outposts in the Southern Frontthroughout Japan, generally in thehome prefectures, to organize guerrilla units.
The Nakano School was an essentipart of the IJA's plans for the finaldefense of Japan, as indicated by tiwithdrawal of the main facility frotsuburban Nakano to Tomioka,Gunma Prefecture, in 1945. Thenew location, further inland amonjthe mountains, offered greater prottion than the Tokyo area. Moreimportant, the school was close tothe vast underground IGHQ undelconstruction in neighboring Mat-sushiro, Nagano Prefecture. TheNoborito Laboratory had also withdrawn to Nagano, as had such keyweapons manufacturers as Mitsub-ishi Heavy Industries and Toshiba.
The Nakano School thus constitutean important element in the militalindustrial complex japan was assembling to fight the final campaign inthe home islands. The governmentexhorted the entire population tofight to the death. Even military lea,era considering surrender demandeCthe opportunity to deal a major blo,to the invading US forces beforenegotiating an end to the war.
The End of the School
The atomic bombing of Hiroshimaon 6 August, the Soviet invasion ofManchukuo and Japan's northernislands on 9 August, and the destrucdon of Nagasaki by an atomic bombthe same day precipitated Japan's suirender without the climactic battlefor which the IJA had been prepar-ing. Emperor Hirohito's recorded
100
Tokyo: Bungei Shunju; 1989; p. 77.and Matsushima, p. 5.
23. Matsushima, p. 5
24. Ron, p. 77.
25. Hata, Showa, p. 114.
26. lzumiya, Tatsuro. The MinamiOrgan. Translated by U Tun AungChain. Rangoon: Universities Press;1981; p. 14.
27.Ibid., forward.
28. Imai, p. 221, and lzumiya, pp. 168-70.
29. Fujiwara, lwaichi. F IGkan: JapaneseArmy Operations in Southeast AsiaDuring WWII. Translated by AkashiYoji. Hong Kong: Heinemann'sAsia; 1983; p. 11, and 'mai, p. 232.
30. [mai, P. 254.
31. Onoda, pp. 31-32.
32. Hata, Showa, p. 152.
33. Kinoshita, p. 312.
34. Arisue, pp. 114-16.
NOTES
1. Kinoshita, Kenzo. Kiesareta HimitsuSen Ke (Vanished CovertWarfare Laboratory). Nagano:Shinano Mainichi Shimbunsha;1994; pp. 47, 66, 194-96, 5-17(reference section).
2. All Japanese names are given in theJapanese form: surname followed bygiven name.
3. Kinoshita, pp. 194-99.
4. Department of Defense. Vol. 5 ofThe Magic Background to PearlHarbor. Washington, DC; 1978;pp. 1,3, 8, 12.
5. Imai, Takeo. Showa No Botyaku(Showa Plots). Tokyo: AsahiSonorarna; 1985; pp. 247-51.
6. Hata, Ikuhiko. Showashi NoGunjintachi (Military Men of ShowaHistory). Tokyo: Bungei Shunju;1989; pp. 313-15.
7. Ibid., p. 317.
8. Usui lacer assumed command ofAGS 2nd Bureau's 8th Section(Clandestine). See Kinoshita, p. 195.
Nakano School
speech declaring an end to the warwas broadcast on 15 August.
Four days earlier, the IJA had orderedMaj. Gen. Yamamoto Hayashi, thelast commandant, to begin burningdocuments and making otherpreparations to close the NakanoSchool. On IS August, Yamamotoassembled the school's members tolisten to the broadcast. Afterwards, heordered the torching of the campusShinto shrine, led the assembledmembers in a final singing of theschool song, and then dismissedthem. The Nakano School had closedits doors after only seven years-34
9. Ibid., pp. 194-99.
10. Hata, pp. 316-17.
11. Kinoshita, p. 12 (reference section)
12. Hata, pp. 317-18.
13. Meirion and Susan Harries. Soldiersof the Sun: The Rise and Fall of theImperial Japanese Army. New'YorkRandom House; 1991; p. 378.
14. Arisue, Seizo. Shusen His/n.' ArisueManche No Shuki (Secret Historyof the War's End: Memoirs of theChief of the Arisue Organ). Tokyo:Fuyo Shobo Shuppan; 1987; pp. 50-52, and Matsushima Keizo, ChohoTaihes:yo Sasso (Covert IntelligenceWar in the Pacific). Tokyo: AsahiSonorama; 1985; p. 55.
15. Hata Ikuhiko. Showa Tenno NoKetsudan (The Emperor Showa'sFive Decisions). Tokyo: BunshunBunko; 1994; p. 152, and Kinoshita,p. 197.
16. Hata, Gunjin, pp. 320-21. For acolorful history of Alcashi'soperations, see Toyoda Jo'sloheShogun Akashi Motojiro: Roshia WeTaoshita Supai Taisho no Shogai(Intelligence General AkashiMotojiro: The Life of the SpyGeneral Who Brought DownRussia). Tokyo: Koj insha NFBunko; 1994.
17. Kinoshita, p. 198.
18. Onoda, Hiroo. No Surrender:My Thirty-Year War. Trans. byCharles Terry. Tokyo: KodanshaInternational; 1974.
19. Ishihara, Masaie. Mo Hitonu NoOkinawa &is (Another Account ofthe Battle for Okinawa). Naha:Okinawa Bunko; 1992; p. 50.
20. Hata, Gunjin, pp. 317-21.
21. Ibid., p. 321.
22. Hori, Eizo. Daihonei Sanbo No JohoSenki (An (CHQ Staff Officer'sRecord of Intelligence Warfare).
