The Left and Archipelago by Boris Frankel

7/28/2019 The Left and Archipelago by Boris Frankel

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The "Gulag Archipelago" and the LeftAuthor(s): Boris FrankelSource: Theory and Society, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter, 1974), pp. 477-495Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/656913 .Accessed: 02/01/2011 02:57

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477

Review Article

THE "GULAGARCHIPELAGO"AND THE LEFT

BORIS FRANKEL

1One can wholeheartedly sympathize with Roy Medvedev'sprefatory com-ment that this is a "provisionalopinion" on the GulagArchipelago."No onewill," Medvedevbelieves, "rise from his chair after reading his book the sameas he sat downto open it at page 1. In this sense there is quite simply nothingin either Russian literatureor the literatureof the world with which I cancompare Solzhenitsyn'sbook."' While Medvedev s undoubtedly correctinhis estimation of the traumatic consequenceswhich a readingof the Gulagwill induce for Soviet readers, he over-estimatesthe sensitivity of mostWesternreaderswho haveeither not experiencedSoviet conditionsor who donot care about the meaningof the October Revolution because they havealways opposed it, or because they grew to oppose it. Solzhenitsyn'sbookshave been evaluatedby non-Sovietcritics largely n termsof literarystyle andquality, and not enoughin terms of what social repercussionswould followfrom the publicationwithin the U.S.S.R. of works such as The First Circle.Withthe Gulagit is different. Everywhereduringthe last year, governments,the media, critics, all have been endorsingor condemningthe book. There sno doubt about the massive anti-communistpropaganda ampaignwhichhasbeen associatedwith Westernpublication,just as thereis no doubt about thepolitical capitalwhich Sovietauthoritieshavemanipulatedby pointingto theGulag'spromotionin the capitalistworld.But the aftermath of Solzhenitsyn'sexpulsion, the rockingof detente, etc.,witnessed the absorption of the Gulag into the accumulated repertoire ofanti-communist"totalitarian" iteraturemuch to the smugsatisfactionof thepolitical Right. After being momentarily sickened by the horrendousdetails,Western iberalstoo will not be greatly touched by the political implicationsof the Gulag;most havelong ago disassociated hemselves rom the repressivequality of Soviet practice, even if they are still sympathetic to the SovietMonash University, Melbourne, Australia


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478Union's great material achievements. Moreover,liberals have increasinglyrevealedtheir affinity with conservativeviews of "human nature."Whereasmany pre-warliberals could still believe in the ideal of the Enlightenmentbecause the U.S.S.R. was implementingscientific planningfor the improve-ment of humanity (as opposed to Nazi Germany), Solzhenitsyn'srevelationsabout Soviet history have only compounded the post-wardisillusionmentwith technology and the possibilityof movingtowardsthe "perfectibility"ofman. While one can endorse their rejectionof the Enlightenment's cientism,liberals have unfortunatelyreplacedone ontology-progress-with another:the conviction that man will alwaysbe inherently"defective."The Gulagwillthus enforce all those who seek evidenceof "man'seternaldepravity,"andcomfort those who knew all alongwhatcould happen f people subscribed oholisticandmessianicdoctrines.2But even if various conservativesand liberalsdispute the theses presented nth Gulag, it is my belief that they are alreadytoo favourably disposed toSolzhenitsyn'sarguments o derivethe benefitof criticalself-reflectionwhichthe book should hopefully instigate. The only audience which can have acriticallymeaningfulrelationshipto Solzhenitsyn'sdocument is the MarxistLeft. However,it is clearthat not all the variousMarxistgroups,partiesandindividualsare disposed to examine criticallySolzhenitsyn'sbook, let aloneacknowledgehis theses. By concentratingon Solzhenitsyn'shistoriographicalmethod I hope to comparethe Gulagwith variousMarxist nterpretations fSoviet history, and, at the same time, show the interrelationshipbetweenhistoriography nd politicalpractice.

2It is importantto keep in mind the fact that Solzhenitsyn'sworkbelongstothe first generation of non-Western including Russian emigre), and non-Party, post-1953 historiography.In contrast to the work of exiled Trots-kyists, Mensheviksand other Russianparticipants f the RussianRevolution,Solzhenitsyn's generation is not interested in merely cleansingthe grosslydistortedaccount given by Partyhistory books. Althoughtherearecertainlyenoughdifferencesbetweenthe Solzhenitsyns,Medvedevs nd Sakharovs,hisnew generationof Partycritics s no longerdefinedby theirrespectivebeliefsand practices in 1917. Solzhenitsyn did not have the luxury of being incontact with alternativesocio-cultural ourcesand material ife as did otherRussian emigresor Westernacademics.His dialecticwith Soviet authorities sthe dialectic of one who was socialized and educated within the sphereofdominant Soviet norms: and while Solzhenitsyn attempts to transcendthenorms of Soviet culture and legality, his very criticismsare often in them-


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479selves perverted reflections of the very logic and practicewhich he abhors.Insofar as Solzhenitsyn is a total victim (and product) of the Soviet "ex-perience," the strengthsand weaknessesof his appraisalare in proportion ohis empathy with contemporary Soviet "populist"perceptionsof, and rela-tions with, Soviet institutions.The Gulag is written as half documentaryand half autobiography.By usinghis own experiencesas focal points for the elucidationof the collective ex-perience,Solzhenitsyn'svery sensitivity eaves him open to attack.Writtingnthe GuardianIrwin Silberexpresses"methodological"disbelief: "I was pre-pared to defend 'The GulagArchipelago' he states), if it offered us reason-able documentation, let alone punctilious proof, of the gross violations ofsocialist legality of the Stalin era.For therecanbe little question,it seemstome, that grave distortions of proletariannormsand widespreadmiscarriagesof socialist justice took place in those years. But both 'The Gulag Archipel-ago' and the incrediblepublicitycampaign upporting t are,to put it bluntly,frauds."3 In his preoccupation with exposing the political ramificationsofthe book's receptionin the West, Silberbecomes blindand insensitive o whatSolzhenitsyn s exposing.It is relativelyeasy to point to Solzhenitsyn'spartialreliance on rumours and exaggerated statistics (e.g., his account of theLeningrad purges) as a means of substantiatinghis failure to produce"punctiliousproof." The Gulagis not lackingin numerousweaknesses(as Iwill discuss later on), but it is hardlya fraud. Unfortunately,the Silbersofthis world can only comprehend the dehumanizingatrocities depicted bySolzhenitsyn as "gravedistortionsof proletariannorms."Silber is so caughtup in the use of reified euphemismssuch as "proletariannorms" and the"widespreadmiscarriages f socialist justice" that he fails to see that he isdirectly affirming Solzhenitsyn's worst accusations against the Party. "IsSolzhenitsyn a deliberate liar?" Silber asks with incredible opaqueness,"Probablynot. He seems to be of that breed of self-pitying petty bourgeoisintellectual who is constantly reproducingthe entire universe in his ownimage." At last we have the Maoist prognosisof Solzhenitsyn and his 227"informants,"they are suffering from severe petty bougeois subjectivism,and have thusmisconstrued he objectiveworldof "socialistconstruction"bycreating"images"of masssufferingandbrutality.But then Solzhenitsyn understandswhy the Silbers are imperviousto the"unbelievable"events he depicts. "From childhood on," he notes, "we areeducated and trained-for our own profession; for our civil duties, formilitary service; to take care of our bodily needs; to behave well; even toappreciatebeauty (well, this last not really all that much! ). But neitheroureducation,nor our upbringing,nor our experiencepreparesus in the slightest


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480for the greatesttrial of our lives: being arrested or nothingand interrogatedabout nothing."4The truth of the Gulaglies in Solzhenitsyn'saccumulationof personal and mass experiences of arrest, interrogation, torture andincarceration.In the first four chapters of "The Prison Industry"Solzhe-nitsyn vividly depicts all those formerly cold and lifeless sociological cate-gories such as atomization which theorists of totalitarianismmainly used formodel building.One identifies with Solzhenitsyn'sdescriptionof arrestas "aninstantaneous, shatteringthrust, expulsion, somersaultfrom one state intoanother."5 Just as "both the most sophisticatedand the veriest simpletonamong us, drawingon all life's experience, can gaspout only: "Me? Whatfor?,"6 so too, the most sophisticatedand the veriest simpletonof readers sdraggedby Solzhenitsynin a dazed state throughthe "Sewage DisposalSys-tem." Even the readerwho is most familiarwith the Soviet terrorcannothelpbut still be shakenby the numerous ncidentswhich Solzhenitsynrelates.Thecountless petty frame-ups, rrationalitiesassociatedwith the cult of personal-ity, the imaginationand deviousnessof the Bluecapsin staging arrestsandthen providing he appropriate ortures, and accommodation."Arrests olledthrough the streets and apartmenthouses like an epidemic. Just as peopletransmitan epidemicinfection from one to another without knowing it, bysuch innocent means as a handshake,a breath, handingsomeone something,so too, they passedon the infection of inevitablearrestby a handshake,by abreath, by a chance meeting on the street."7Pageafterpageis full of endlesslists of victims of every conceivablevariety. But just as the long-seasonedprisonerprobablyceased to be surprisedabout the scopeor natureof Sovietrepression,so too, the readerbecomes hardenedby the middle of the book.Solzhenitsynhas strippedbarewhatever nnocencewe initially possessedandnow proceedsto document the institutionalizationof variousnormsof Sovietlegality. However, at that point when our attentionhas flagged hroughsheerexhaustion, Solzhenitsynunveilsall the horrorsof the transportation ystemand the ports of the Archipelago. "The prisoners considered April andSeptemberthe best months for transports.But even the best of seasonswastoo short if the train was en route for three months."8 Will geographyteachers ever be able to analysethe one-sixth of the world's land surfaceinthe same way again? And what about Solzhenitsyn'seffective method ofdispellingconventional magesof prisonlife. "In literature he latrinebuckethas become the symbol of prison,a symbolof humiliation,of stink.Oh,howfrivolous can you be? Now was the latrine bucket really an evil for theprisoner? On the contrary, it was the most merciful device of the prisonadministration.The actual horror began the moment there was no latrinebucket in the cell."9Because Solzhenitsynis totally preoccupied n the task of guaranteeing hat


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481none of us forget all the atrocitieswhich Soviet authoritiesdo not want us toremember-let alone discover-the historicaltruthsof barbaric epression an-not be denied. As BarringtonMoore Jr. put it, "sympathywith the victims ofhistorical processes and skepticism about the victors' claimsprovideessentialsafeguards against being taken in by the dominant mythology."'10WhileSolzhenitsynhas been fightingthe "dominantmythology"for years,this verystrugglehas blindedhim in his analysisof "historicalprocesses."If the Gulagwas simply an answer to Khrushchev'sdistortion that "from approximately1934, violations of Leninist norms of legality began,"'1 then one couldreadily dentify with the book. But then Solzhenitsyn s not merely interestedin showing that "violationsof Leninistnorms of legality" beganas early as1918. The truth of Solzhenitsyn'sdocumentationof pre-andpost 1934 terroremerges despite all his own distortions of history. How paradoxical(yetunderstandable) hat Solzhenitsyn should unwittingly resort to the use ofStalinist historiographicalmethods as a means of exposing the dehumanizedbase of "socialist construction." Thus it is necessary to identify Solzhe-nitsyn's weaknessesbefore comparinghis truthswith other analystsof Soviethistory; only then can the myths attachedto "Leninism"and "Stalinism"beconfronted.3Just as Soviet authorities have largely obliterated historical accounts ofgroups or individuals who held opposite views to the Party, so too, hasSolzhenitsyn totally ignored the views and actions of the Bolsheviksby ap-plying in reverse the Party's"control over the past." Becausehe is so intenton cataloguingall the victimsof the "SewageDisposal System,"Solzhenitsynis almost totally obliviousof the historicallyspecific conditionsin which masssuffering occurred.I will not repeat all the glaring nadequaciesof the Gulagwhich have been coveredby variousreviewers especiallyErnestMandel)' inconnection with the thoroughlyone-sidedaccount offered by Solzhenitsyn.But it is important that readers refer to Solzhenitsyn's Letter to SovietLeaders in order to comprehendmore fully his brief but disturbinglycon-fused Weltanschauung.One could not say that Solzhenitsyn is simply ananti-Sovietreactionary n the classicalsense of the word; there is too much ofthe Stalinistheritageleft in his thought. The statisticaldocumentationof theGulagis related to Solzhenitsyn'sconcernfor "sufferingRussia."Sixty-sixtoninety million deaths are somehow all layed at the door of Soviet ideology.Although he mentions two world wars, Solzhenitsyn ultimately blamesMarxism or bearing"the entire responsibilityfor all the blood that has beenshed."'3 Amidst the revelation of the most obnoxious chauvinistic, xeno-phobic and racist ideas, Solzhenitsyn championsa perverted orm of "social-


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482ism in one country." "Throw away the dead ideology that threatens todestroy us militarily and economically," he appeals, "throw away all itsfantastic alien global missions and concentrateon opening up (on the prin-ciples of a stable, non-progressive conomy) the RussianNorth-East." 4 Hissexism also shines throughhis isolationistrecommendationof the abandon-ment of financingSouthAmericanrevolutionaries o that Russianwomen canbe relievedof doing heavyroadwork:"internalgrowth"requires hat womenconfine their "slavery" o the domestic sphereso that good Russian amilieswill flourish.'5To help understandSolzhenitsyn'sposition we can profit from MaxWeber's1905 analysis of the capacity of Russiato develop bourgeoisliberalinstitu-tions. One of the reasonshe doubted the ability of Russiansociety to pro-duce liberalismwas the crucial difference between Roman Catholicismandthe RussianOrthodox Church.According o Weber, he RussianChurch"hasno Archimedianpoint outside the sphereof the state, in the form of a pope,and will never get one."' 6 Becauseof this dependenceupon the state,Weberarguedthat "the history and form of organizationof the OrthodoxChurchmakes it quite improbable hat, howevertransformed, t could everset itselfup as a representativeof civil liberties against the power of the policestate."'7 This authoritarianquality of Russian orthodoxy is amply mani-fested in Solzhenitsyn'spraise of a thousand years of strongmoral author-itarianism.Thus it is not authoritarianismwhich is intolerable, but onlyauthoritarian egimeswho lie to the people. Solzhenitsyncravesso muchfora returnto the spiritualdependenceof the past,that his embarrassing aiveteleads him to believe that a morally upright authoritarianismwill protectfreedom and cultivate"love of your fellow men" insteadof "classhatred."'8It is importantto recognizeSolzhenitsyn'sconfused beliefs in orderto com-prehend his historiographicalmethod in the Gulag. There are numerousentries scatteredthroughoutthe book which do considerablenjusticeto thehistorical record and confirm Solzhenitsyn's intense chauvinism,religiousauthoritarianism,exist perspectiveand compromisedattitudeto the strugglefor freedom. By comparingthe barbarityof Soviet repressionwith TsaristRussia, Hitler'sGermany,South Africanracists,etc., Solzhenitsyn'smethodresults in the depiction of the latter in a favourable ight-even though arelativeone. Moreover,Solzhenitsyn's ustifiableanguishoverthe sufferingofSoviet citizenshasresulted n his supportof a whole rangeof anti-Communistpolicies and beliefs simply because he detests the Soviet Government.Endorsementof WesternCold Wartheories about internationalevents, andthe U.S. position in Indo-China, s well as mockeryof BertrandRussell'sWarCrimes nvestigationarejust some of the moreglaringexamples.'9 In general,


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483Solzhenitsyn (for all his moral rhetoric), is incrediblyinsensitiveand incon-sistent when it comes to opposingrepression n countriesoutside the SovietBloc.But not only does Solzhenitsyn adopt the Party's attitude of evaluatingevents in terms of "who is not wholly with us must be against us," hisanalysis of historical processes also suffers from lack of rigour (not due tolack of sources), and more importantly,a fundamentallyahistoricalvision ofthe world. Let me illustrate his with a few excerpts.Revealing his ascetic prescriptions and reliance on "populist" wisdom,Solzhenitsyn states that "there is a simple truth which one can learnonlythroughsuffering: n war not victories are blessed but defeats. Governmentsneed victories and the people need defeats.Victory givesrise to the desireformore victories. But after a defeat it is freedom that men desire-and usuallyattain. A people needs defeat just as an individualneeds sufferingand mis-fortune: they compel the deepeningof the inner life andgeneratea spiritualupsurge."20 Apart from the fact that Solzhenitsyn does not distinguishhistoricallybetweenbattles fought for the glory of kingsand those fought forthe mass protection or improvement of human life (e.g., the victory ofPoltavacomparedwith the victory over Hitleror the victoryoverChiangKaiShek-the latter being an event which Solzhenitsynlaments! ), his endorse-ment of the necessity of sufferingfor the generationof "aspiritualupsurge"leads to a curiously contradictory position. As "defeats" are more "benefi-cial" than victories, Solzhenitsyn argues that "the CrimeanWar,and theJapaneseWar,and our war with Germany n the First WorldWar-all thesedefeatsbroughtus freedomand revolution."2If 1917 ushered n "freedom and revolution," how does Solzhenitsynrecon-cile this favourablestatement with his accusationconcerning he responsibil-ity for over sixty-six milliondeaths? In the Gulaghe beginsto document the"Sewage System" from November 1917 with the outlawing of the Cadets(whom he tries to convinceus were "the most dangerous anksof revolution"underthe Tsar!). But in Letter to Soviet LeadersSolzhenitsyndeclares hat"the Soviets, which gave their name to our system and existed until 6 July1918, were in no way dependent upon ideology: ideology or no ideology,they always envisaged the widest possible consultation with all workingpeople."2 Leavingaside the question of ideology until later, it is clear thatSolzhenitsyn cannot have it both ways. If the "GulagArchipelago"was in-stituted in November1917, then Solzhenitsyncannot ignore all the BolshevikParty activities within the Soviets before November 1917 and up until July1918. It was many of these sameSovietswhich endorsed he Bolsheviks'early


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484policies creatingthe "SewageSystem"-the Soviets which also partiallysup-ported an ideology that Solzhenitsynsimultaneouslycondemnsbut depicts aspart of the "spiritualregeneration!" It also appearsthat Solzhenitsynop-poses the "defeat" at the Brest-Litovskpeace treaty because Russia wasobliged to provideGermanywith many carloadsof food supplies-from aRussiahe says "which had been deprivedof a protestingvoice, fromthe veryprovinceswhere famine wouldstrike-so that Germanycould fight to the endin the West."23 Solzhenitsyn is so historicallyconfused with his analogies,that his attempt to imply similaritybetween Brest Litovskand Stalin's andKhrushchev'ssupport of external anti-Western orces (at the expense ofRussianconsumers),even goes againsthis own moralevaluationof "victories"and "defeats." Or would Solzhenitsynhave preferredno peace treaty and areturn to mass slaughterand sufferingwhich Germanarmies had earlier n-flicted upon the Tsar who was in quest of "Governmentvictory?" Whichprovinces "deprivedof a protestingvoice" would have rushed to man thearmies(in 1918) following so soon after the mass desertionsfrom the anti-German front lines! There is little doubt that the food requisitionedbyGermanycontributedto the overallscale of the famine. But Solzhenitsynischaracteristicallyoblivious of the historical context of Brest-Litovskandmanyother events.It is importantto emphasizeSolzhenitsyn'sahistoricalmethodologybecauseit is vital when one is forced to confront his frequent comparisonsof the"Sewage System" with Tsarist Russiaand Hitler'sGermany.If one were tomerely compute the numberof victims, tortures,generalsuffering,etc., thenhistorical meaningwould be an unnecessaryburden: computerscould easilyshow that the numberof deaths and sufferingwithin the Soviet State wasquantitativelyas greator greater han within Nazi Germany.At one level ofanalysis Solzhenitsyn's comparative approach is valid; there is enoughevidenceto show that Sovietmethodsof terrorwereof sufficientvarietyandscope to rival he Nazis.But the "technique"of terroronly tells us somethingabout the materialand intellectual capacitiesat the disposalof a particularhistorical epoch. Documentingthe systematicand randomnatureof particu-lar manifestationsof social and individual rrationalitydoes not, in itself, tellus enough about the rationale (or lack of it) behind the irrational.Terror snot ahistorical.Only those who ignorethe objectivesof the terroristsas wellas the specific historical conditions which allow terror to be inflicted, andpassivelyreceived,will arriveat somethingmore than a merecomprehensionof the quantitative.Insofaras Solzhenitsynis quite explicit in his evaluationof who is guilty, there is no pretenceof beinga dispassionate omputer.Butto the extent that Solzhenitsynhas almost no time or space for historicity,his analysisbarely surmountsthe positivismof "totalitarian"models which


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485evaluate pure technique. It is only his literaty synthesis of personal andcollective experiences that preservesthe truth of events depicted. Thus theold conflict between literary and scientific truths emergesonce more. WithSolzhenitsynthe problem s associatedwith the veryconcept of an "Archipel-ago." From actualgeographical ocations, Solzhenitsynextends the realityofSiberian camps to a "national Archipelago"-"'inthe psychological sense,fused onto a continent-an almost invisible, almost imperceptiblecountryinhabitedby the zek people."24 Thissymbol of the Soviet terrorsystemonlycompounds Solzhenitsyn's historical distortions. Whilea literary metaphorcan encapsulatethe accumulatedfeelings and events of a generation,closerexamination also reveals he majorshortcomingswhichgeneralized xtrapola-tions such as the "GulagArchipelago"create. By using the concept of an"Archipelago"Solzhenitsyn arguesfor the continuity of a system of terrorfrom 1918 to the presentday. But neither the victims of the "Sewage Sys-tem" nor the extent (or very systematic nature) of its operations was thesame in 1918, 1938, or 1958. Solzhenitsynattributesa certainhomogeneityof objectivesand logic to the "Gulag"even though he clearly recognizes hedifferences between victims such as kulaks, party chiefs, church leaders orCrimeanTartars.Onlydetailedhistoricalanalysiscan adequatelydifferentiatethe victims and methods of Soviet repression from one another and frompre-Sovietandnon-Sovietterror.In short, Solzhenitsyn'smethodologymakesit impossible to distinguishbetween that historical form of violence wagedout of social necessity (no matter how far it got out of control of explicitinstructions from the Party or its opponents, e.g., the CivilWar),and thatterror which was used indiscriminately n the 1930's, or is being used forselectiverepressionof dissidentsat the moment.

4Up to this point I have been quite criticalof Solzhenitsyn'smethodologicalapproach to Soviet history. But despite his glaringinconsistencies,Solzhe-nitsynprovidesa greatdealof materialwhich canbe fruitfullycomparedwithMarxist historical accounts. Generally, Solzhenitsyn is not interested indepicting Stalin as a super-monster. f anything, there is an obvious under-statement of Stalin's importance or responsibilitycomparedwith accountsgiven by Roy Medvedev or a whole range of WesternMarxistsand non-Marxists. According to Solzhenitsyn, the BolshevikParty was a necessaryaccomplice: "the majorityof those in power, up to the very moment of theirown arrest,were pitiless in arrestingothers, obediently destroyedtheirpeersin accordancewith those same instructions and handed over to retributionany friend or comrade-in-arms f yesterday. And all the big Bolsheviks,whonow wear martyrs'halos,managed o be the executionersof other Bolsheviks


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486(not even takinginto account how all of them in the firstplace hadbeen theexecutionersof non-Communists)."25 This thesis is also conciselyphrased nhis now famous comment that Stalin "followed the beatenpath exactly as ithadbeen signposted,stepby step."2 6Insofar as Solzhenitsyn overlooks the many differences between Stalin'spredecessors, uccessorsand contemporaries,his interpretation s not accept-able either as a credibleaccount of the manyPartypersonalitiesnvolved,oras an analysis of the possibilitiesof Soviet development,which is only con-ceded a rigidpredetermined ath.Thisis not the placeto engage n a detaileddiscussionof the perennialquestion-"was Stalinnecessary?". But insofarasSolzhenitsyn exaggerates he homogeneity of Soviet Partyterror,his thesisinstigatesthe need for a brief, but criticalreassessment f Marxistaccountsofpost-1917 history.Except for the variousdefendersof Stalin, there appearsto be substantialunanimity among liberals, Marxistsand conservatives n condemning theperiod of Stalin'spower as being characterized y massslaughter,directedatboth the old Bolsheviksand the greatvarietyof ever increasing"enemiesofthe people." Solzhenitsyn reinforcesthis interpretationof the Stalin yearswith numerous revelations of how irrational, paranoic witch-hunts for"wreckers"and all forms of scapegoats, severely retarded industrial andagrariandevelopments and a whole rangeof social and military goals andcapacities.The new "feudal" laws of punishmentfor absenteeism,failuretowork a set numberof days for the new industrialoverlord,etc., werefelt bycountless numbers.Stalin'sterror s still excusedby apologistswho argue hatHitler would never have been defeated if "forced" industrializationhad notbeen carriedout. Accordingto Silber, ChairmanMao's precept that Partycontroversies hould be settled in a democraticmanner"didnot consistentlyprevailduringthe period of Stalin's leadership.But at the same time, onemust not fall into the trap of seeing such errorsas the principalaspect ofStalin'sleadership.To do so is to deny the realitiesof socialistreconstructionand the heroic achievementsof the anti-Naziwar. 27 Despite Silber'scon-tinued belief in the Stalinist propagandamachine, substantial historicalevidence has been accumulated o show that not only "socialistreconstruc-tion" but also the "heroic achievements"of the anti-Naziwar were wondespite Stalin's government.The purgesof militaryranks, he costly blundersof unpreparedness ndincompetenceduring he crucialearly yearsof the warare only one side of Stalin's tarnished mage.The myths of his "leadership"qualities were accentuated by a combination of the patriotismignited byHitler'sbrutal treatmentof the Soviet population, the ruthlesscommandsofgeneralssuch as Zhukovwho absolutelyforbaderetreat n key battles, andof


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487course the large punishment battalions which were used as cannon fodderagainst superior German technology. While one should never discount theimportanceof the build-upof industrybefore 1941, it would be a completewhitewash of Stalin'spolicies to let the myth of "socialistconstruction"bedoubly vindicatedby the non-socialistconduct of the anti-Naziwar.Given the growing (but not unanimous)consensusoverStalin'srole in Soviethistory, the dispute between Solzhenitsyn and Marxists is over Stalin'spredecessorsand contemporaries. f Solzhenitsynwants to establishcompletecontinuity of government rom 1917 on, Marxistsare anxious to show a cleardiscontinuity of development.Dependingon whether you follow Lenin orTrotsky, discontinuity will be establishedwith Stalin in the period between1921 and 1929; if one follows Luxemburg, the Council Communists,anarchists,etc., the discontinuityof 1917 with Stalin (and Lenin)will beginin the period between 1918 and 1921. Each group subscribesto differentreasons for the betrayal of the revolution, but yet also ignores(to a lesser orgreaterdegree)the historicalcontext andcapacitiesof the actorsinvolved.Because of their interest in apologizing for Stalin, people like Silber linkSolzhenitsyn to the bourgeoisieand Trotskyists.As the largestanti-StalinistMarxistgroups in the West, the variousTrotskyist organizationsarevitallyinterested in refuting Solzhenitsyn and yet defending "Leninism." But theTrotskyists are unable to surmountall of Solzhenitsyn'saccusationsagainstthe BolshevikPartybecauseof their involvement n the defence of the Leninand Trotsky cults of personality. Too much emphasis is placed upon the"bureaucratic ounterrevolution"after Lenin'sdeath, and thus the pre-1924actions of the Party are defended on inadequateor dubiousgrounds. ErnestMandel (in an otherwise reasonable critique of Solzhenitsyn), claims that"our epoch is the epoch of the death agony of the capitalist system. Thelongerthis death agony is prolonged, the morefeaturesof barbarism, loodyrepression,andcontempt for human life will proliferate.In this historicsense,Stalin is a product of capitalism, just as much as Hitler, Auschwitz,Hiroshima,and the bombing and defoliation of Vietnam. He is not the pro-.duct of Soviet society or the October Revolution."28 This projection ofinternal atrocitiesonto the shouldersof capitalism s an historicaldistortionequal to Solzhenitsyn's accusation against Marxistideology. For too longMarxistshave lived off the myth associated with the failureof world revolu-tion to break out. In 1922 Trotsky stated that "if our October Revolutionhadtakenplacea few months,or even a few weeks, after the establishmentofthe rule of the proletariat n Germany, France,andEngland, here can be nodoubt that our revolution would have been the most "peaceful," the most"bloodless"of all possible revolutions on this sinful earth."29 One can cer-


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488tainly agreethat foreign intervention,etc. would havebeen substantially essor non-existent, but to think that socialist revolution would have been ac-cepted or implementedsmoothly without mass internal resistance, s beinghistoricallynaive or blind.In their anxiety to distinguish the "truth" of Leninismfrom the "perver-sions" of Stalinism,contemporaryMarxistsgive too muchammunition o theSolzhenitsyns,because of the reluctance o acknowledge he far from admira-ble role which the Party played in pre-1924 events, While Solzhenitsyn isgrosslyunjust in depictingthe Partyas havingbasicallythe same policiesandattitudes throughout its entire existence, the truth of complicity by Partymembersin their own and national repression s beyond doubt. Just as oneneedsto emphasizeSolzhenitsyn's ailureto consider he historicalcontext ofcivil warviolencecompared o the purgesof the 1930's, etc., so too, one mustavoid the pitfall of historically ocating terror,and thereby usingthis histor-ical context as a means of excusing its excesses away. The reason whydefenders of "Leninism"cannot totally surmount Solzhenitsyn'scritique ofthe Party, is because their defence of the Party is basedon a defence of onlythe smallest part of it-the leadershipand CentralCommittee.Solzhenitsynmay be totally unjust when it comes to evaluatingthe responsibilityofideology, or his quantitativecomparisonof victims, but his sensitivityto theinjustices carried out by the "faceless" lower ranksof the government sconvincing. Discussing the Revtribunalsof the early years, Solzhenitsynobservesthat "everytime a city was capturedduringthe CivilWar he eventwas marked not only by gunsmokein the courtyardsof the Cheka,but alsoby sleepless sessions of the tribunal.And you did not have to be a Whiteofficer, a senator,a landowner,a monk, a Cadet, an SR, or an Anarchist norderto get your bullet."30 Duringthe Stalin yearsthe Bluecapswere evenmore ruthless n their enforcementof policy. The Civil Wartribunals ackedthe systematic quality of the 1930's Bluecapdivisions-there were no quotasandplannedallocationsof arrestsaccording o cities anddistricts.But Solzhe-nitsyn's descriptionof the security serviceas not being populated by "edu-catedpeopleof broad cultureandbroadviews . . ." and that "Theirbranchofservice requiresonly that they carryout ordersexactly and be impervious osuffering . .,3 is anhistoricalfact whichhasto be confronted.The divisionbetween broadlyeducated men of cultureand a semi-illiteratepopulation,isthe realityof the Partyhistory which Marxistsarestrangely low to acknow-ledge. ArthurRosenberg gnoresthe "manywild tales" told about the Chekabecause "the Chekais only an executiveorganof the Government, .e. of theBolshevik Party. On no single occasion has the Cheka pursueda differentpolitical policy from that of the Government,and at no time has it been inpossessionof a politicalauthoritydifferentfrom that of the Partyleaders."3


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489Writing n 1932, Rosenbergwas eagerto defendthe Chekaagainstchargesofbeing an autonomous secret body, and thus inadvertently ends support toSolzhenitsyn's hesis of the "impervious o suffering"personalities.Moreover,his adherence o the principleof Party disciplineresults n Rosenbergnaivelyoverlookingthe quality of many rank and file Party memberswho did notsharethe ideals of the Bolshevik eadership.WithIsaacDeutscher, he Party'shistory is not so clearcut. Onthe one handDeutschergivesmuch supporttothose aspectsof the Gulagwhich document the mass sufferingof innocents.Trotsky is criticized by Deutscher for his militarizationof labour,his con-tribution to the growthof strongbureaucratic entralistorgansand attack onintra-Partydemocracy before 1921. "No body politic can be nine-tenthsmute and one-tenthvocal. Having mposed silence on non-BolshevikRussia,Lenin'spartyhad in the end to impose silenceon itself as well."33 Deutscheralso recognizedthat between 1917 and 1922 the membershipof the Partyhad risen from about 23,000 to 700,000. Most of this growth,he says,"wasalready spurious. By now the rush to the victor's bandwagonwas in fullprogress.The party had to fill innumerableposts in the government, n in-dustry, in tradeunions, and so on; and it was an advantage o fill them withpeople who accepted party discipline.In this massof new-comers he authen-tic Bolshevikswere reducedto a small minority."3Although Deutscher's account of the rise of "non-authentic" Bolsheviksmakes Solzhenitsyn'sdepiction of the early "Gulag"comprehensible n termsof the wide abuse of power (in the formof unwarranted laughter, capegoatarrests,etc.) applied by an opportunistic, revengefuland intolerantrankandfile, Deutscher is not consistent when he claimsthat the "authentic Bolshe-viks" were less subjectto acceptingParty discipline(because they comprehen-ded the goals of the revolution) comparedto these new "inauthentic"Partymembers.The abuseof power among23 to 250,000 membersmust have beensufficiently high given the extraordinarycrisis of the civil war which oftendemandedan on-the-spot interpretationof what "discipline"meant and howimperative t was that it be maintainedat all costs.Closer examinationof the Party underLenin and Trotsky raises the funda-mental question about what aspect of the Bolshevikrecordneeds no apologywithout compromisingone's adherenceto "Leninism."Withthe currentcallof "return o Lenin"by variousLeft groups, "Leninism"s usually contrastedwith "Stalinism" by pointing to all those quotes in Lenin's or Trotsky'sworks, etc., which advocate anti-bureaucratic arty democracy, yet enoughdisciplinefor an organizedbut flexible struggle.Perhaps he problem s that itis too easy to find passages n Lenin's works which condenm abuse of powerby bureaucrats.After all, the early years of the new Soviet state were full of


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490mistakesand anti-democratic racticeswhichconcerned eaderssuch as Leninor Trotsky would have noticed. But Deutscher says that by 1921 theBolshevik Party representedonly itself; it "maintained tself in power byusurpation.Not only its enemiessaw it as a usurper-the party appearedas ausurpereven in the light of its own standardsand its own conceptionof therevolutionarystate."3-' As a result, all the "temporary"measuresbroughtdown by the Partyleaders n orderto maintainpower,became"permanent"as both precedents or the future,and recordsof the past.Thisis not to arguethat democratic centralismleads inevitably to the type of terror presentduringStalin'sgovernment.There are numerousapplicationsof "Bolshevik"organizational tructures ntwentieth-centuryhistory which did not result n similardevelopmentsas theSoviet Union experienced.Criticswho establishthe continuity of terrorbe-tween Lenin and Stalineliminatethe subjectivewill and praxisof particularhistorical party members,and attribute an inexorable life to the objectivestructuresof the organization.On the other hand, many Marxistsdefend"Leninismby actually defending only the praxisof Lenin as an individual.The often-coupled banner of "Marxism-Leninism"verlooks the vital factthat "Leninism"cannot be reducedto the praxisof a singlemanin the sameway that historicalmaterialismcan be accepted as Marx'sanalysisof capital-ism. "Leninism,"as the thought and action of Lenin, is not separable rompartyactivity and organization;t is not simply an interpretationof society,but the sum total of manyotherpeoples'activity.Yet, Marxists all into two basic errorsof elitist analysiswhen they evaluatethe Secondand ThirdInternationals.Onthe one hand,there is the theoreticalanalysis which mainly concentrates on debates between Lenin, Kautski,Luxemburg, etc., and reduces problems of organizationand strategy tophilosophicalproblemsposed by Kant, Hegel, and others. This "historyofideas"approach s basedon a partialcomprehensionof "Leninism" imilar othat which the non-theoreticalactivistshold. Just as earlierhistorianswroteabout the history of a nation or empirein terms of the history of its kings,emperors and princes, so too, do many Marxists conceive of their Inter-nationals in terms of "kings" and "princes"of theory and organizations.Somehow the hundreds of thousands of party members are given tokenacknowledgement,but the party's role is really conceived as the role ofBernstein,Lenin or Trotsky and their central committees.Whilethe domi-nance of these men is not disputed, the identificationwith leader'spoliciescan only be complete if one need not constantlyrescuetheirpraxisfromtheactual praxis of the rank and file. Lenin and Trotsky may have genuinelydesired to educate the rank and file againstbureaucraticdegeneration;but


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491there is also enough evidence to show that both men valueddisciplineandefficiency more than they valuedmass democraticparticipation n decision-making.If "Leninism" mbodiesthe notion of powerto the Soviets, then thiswas crushedby the Party long before any bureaucraticdegenerationset in.This is why the callby Medvedev,Mandel,etc. of a return o "Leninism" s soambivalent.Just which aspect of pre-1921 or pre-1924 Bolshevismdo theywantto return o?

5Trotsky said that Lenin thought "in terms of continents and epochs," butSolzhenitsyn writes about the everydaylife of experienceunderParty rule.The problemassociatedwith readingthe Gulagis to be able to acknowledgeits truths, and yet defend the Russian Revolution without accepting thevested interests of either Solzhenitsyn or his "Leninist" critics. To Solzhe-nitsyn, Russia, even before the civil war, "was obviously not suited for anysort of socialismwhatsoever."36 As Mandelreplies,

But what was it ripe for? For Tsarist barbarism? For eternal famine,poverty, and illiteracy? By challengingthe legitimacy of the OctoberRevolution-and the legitimacyof revolution in all relativelyundevelopedcountries as well-Solzhenitsyn reveals yet another contradiction inmoralistic politics. Should we weep only for the dead assassinatedbyterror? Whatabout the deaths causedby inhumansocioeconomicregimes,the tens of millions who died of hunger duringthe great famines n IndiaandprerevolutionaryChina? 7

Max Weber also arguedthat the Russian revolution was doomed to failurebecausethe Bolshevikshad been forcedto preserveor reintroduceabsolutelyall the Tsaristand bourgeois things which they fought against.38 But thisobservationignores substantialdifferences and over-emphasizes he similari-ties. Even Solzhenitsyn recognizes that Soviet Russia totally uprooted anddestroyed most of the institutions and practicesof TsaristRussia.It is pre-cisely the thoroughness, he completely new applicationof terror,discipline,etc., which Solzhenitsyn contrasts with Tsarismand rejectsas a mere Ther-midorianreaction. Weber'sprojection of technical rationalitypreventedhimfrom recognizingthat the partial Soviet application of bourgeois techniquedid not meanthat Soviet Russiawas simplydestinedto continue the rational-ity of the past.This ahistoricaleternalizationof Westerncategories overlooks the historicalnature of rationality-even formal rationality. Unfortunately, Marxists also


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492extend categoriesapplicableto Westerncapitalist society, and thus blur thedifferencesbetween the Soviet Union andthe West.In trying o accountfor thefailureof socialism o emerge n the SovietBloc,Bettelheimand Sweezysituatethe Soviet Union in that ahistoricalposition of "a society in transition."Soviet history is not conceivedas somethingdevelopingfrom its own logic,materialresources,and interaction with the externalworld. Rather, Marx'scategories,which he used to analyse capitalism(and not "the generalpathalong which all mankind develops"), are artificially affixed onto Sovietreality. Therefore,the differencebetween Lenin and Stalinand their succes-sors is linked to the notion of the emergenceof a "statebourgeoisie"and therestoration of a capitalistmarket economy. Space does not permit me toelaboratewhy the use of notions such as "bougeoisie" to describethe Sovietadministration)are fundamental distortions of Marx's conception of theobjective role of the bourgeoisie in the accumulationprocess of capital,especiallyforeignexpansion.39It is difficult for Marxists o confrontthe realityof the Soviet Union,becausethey are only in recentyearsdiscovering he meaningof historicalmaterialismwhich the Soviet Party repressedand distorted. Solzhenitsyn'sunderstandingof Marx is a product of all the mechanisticand reductionistqualitieswithwhich Soviet Marxism s permeated.It is little wonder, then, that his diatribeagainstMarxist deology is misdirectedand confused.4 But it is preciselythisunderstanding f Marxismwhich makesit important o rescuethe Gulagfromthe chargemadeby Silberthat it is a fraud.All the grosshistoricaldistortionsmade by Solzhenitsyn are genuine products drawn from the experienceofSoviet society, and areunfortunatelysharedby many people livingwithintheSoviet Bloc. The reductionof Marx's heory to an instrumentwhichjustifiessocial control and repression, s the Marxismwhich millions of people growup with daily. Solzhenitsyn forces us to confront the fact that the SovietUnion will not turn socialist in the event of revolutionbreakingout in theWest. This mechanistic illusion is perpetratedby many groups (especiallyWesternCommunistParties),and flows from a failure to appraisecriticallythe historically specific non-socialistand non-capitalistdevelopment of theSoviet Union.Together with the Chinese, Bettelheim and Sweezy see EasternEurope ashavingtaken the "capitalistroad," by claiming hat the Soviet Bloc maintainsa non-socialist"base" of commodity production, the "new economism"isforced into conceivingclass relationsas being objectively similarto those inthe West. But the rise of the proletariatin the West will not have similarrepercussions n Soviet countries because the "proletariat"and the "statebourgeoisie"are not interrelated n any sense with their Westerncounter-


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493part-either objectivelyor subjectively-their relationsarevirtuallya lawuntotheir own. Bettelheim and Sweezy are arguingagainstthose people who seethe Soviet Bloc as having an essentially socialistbase with a parasiticStatebureaucracy ppressing he workers.Both conceptionsof the Soviet Unionarefundamentallywrong. If Bettelheim and Sweezy fail to. see the basic differ-ences between the capitalist bourgeois order and the Soviet society, otherMarxists gnore the non-socialistquality of all aspects of Soviet life. Just asthe continuity of capitalist production can no longer be accepted as thematerial base for socialism, so too, the Soviet mode of productioncannotsimply be taken overand democratized.When Stalin characterizedLeninism as "the combination of the Russianrevolutionarysweep with American efficiency,"4 1 he was not far off themark. It was these qualities which enabled him to lead the revolutionforward,but also to hold it back. The truth of the matter is that Leninwasnot revolutionary enough for the Russia of post-1917, let alone for thechangesneeded today. Therefore,the ambiguityof "Leninism"ustifies massnon-participation, onformism and bureaucraticdiscipline n Westernparties,tradeunions,etc.Solzhenitsyn'sGulag inevitablyraises he questionof whether the Revolutionwas worth all the slaughter and repression. This question is an irrelevantacademicpoint. It is only scholarswho sit aroundcontemplating n the midstof social crises;regardlessof whether they supportor oppose the statusquo,events areusually pushed along by socialgroupswith less complex, andmoreimmediate needs on their mind. The Max Webersof this world will nevermake or support a revolution, because they are at the same time too pes-simistic andlofty in theirevaluationof the capacitiesandneedsof the man inthe street. But, while Georg Lukacstook the opposite path from his friendMax Weber and ended up creatinga revolution,his optimistic activismwasbasedon a similarpaternalistand elitist attitudeto the masses.WhereasRosa Luxemburgattacked Leninand the Bolsheviks or crushing hemass participationof workers and peasants in the Soviets, LukaicsbrandedLuxemburgas a utopian who was becomingmore and more remotefrom anunderstanding f the real structureof events.42 According o Lukacs,

duringthe period of the dictatorship (of the proletariat) he nature andthe extent of freedomwill be determinedby the state of the classstruggle,the power of the enemy, the importanceof the threatto the dictatorship,the demands of the classes to be won over, and by the maturityof theclasses allied to and influencedby the proletariat.Freedomcannotrepre-


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494sent a value in itself (any more than socialisation).Freedom must serve therule of the proletariat,not the other way round. Only a revolutionaryparty like that of the Bolsheviks is able to carry out these often verysudden changesof front.4 3

Here lies the crux of the matter. The massescould not be left to judge thenature and power of the enemy; they lacked the "maturity"and the effi-ciency of the Party-they must be led to freedom n spite of themselves.Marxanalyzedcapitalistsociety both in termsof its dehumanizingqualitiesaswell as the contributions t madeto material mprovements nd the universali-zation of ideas and knowledge.Oneneed not identify with the Party n orderto acknowledge similar positive and negative aspects of Soviet history.Solzhenitsynamd his "Leninist"critics are all too involvedwith attackingordefending the Party'srecord to be in a position to providea consistentguideto contemporaryproblems.But the situation of the RussianRevolution is notrelevant to non-Soviet countries, because historical conditions are so dif-ferent. The Gulag Archipelago is an important work in spite of its grossdistortions. For, in orderto honestly reject Solzhenitsyn'stheses, one mustalso be able to reject those dubious "Leninist"principleswhichmanyof theLeft are not prepared o reflectupon. Ratherthangoingback to the "goldenand virtuous" days of pre-Stalinism, oviet and Western itizenswould profitmore by reviving,not the "Leninist"Party, but the massparticipatorycon-trol and decision-making outside the Party), which also existed in the earlyyearsof the Revolution.

NOTES

1 See R. Medvedev, "On Solzhenitsyn's 'Gulag Archipelago'," in Index, No. 1974, p.65.2 During the last thirty years there have been numerous attempts to debunk Marxismby over-emphasizing it as simply another messianic religion. Michael Barkun's"Millenarianism in the Modern World," in Theory and Society, Summer, 1974, isone of the most recent attempts in this polemical school, and is riddled withnumerous fallacious assumptions about the nature and role of Bolshevism inRussian society, to mention only one of the movements he covers.3 See Guardian, January 30, 1974.4 The GulagArchipelago (Collins/Fontana, 1974) p. 121.


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4955 Ibid., p. 4.6 Ibid.7 Ibid., p. 75.8 Ibid., p. 574.9 Ibid., p. 540.10 The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, (Beacon Press, Boston, 1966),p. 523.11 The Gulag, p. 408.12 See E. Mandel, "Solzhenitsyn's Assault on Stalinism ... And the October Revolu-

tion," reprinted in the Australian Militant, 22 July 1974.13 Letter to Soviet Leaders (London, 1974), p. 47.14 Ibid., p. 28.15 Ibid., p. 40.16 Quoted in D. Beetham, Max Weberand the Theory of Modern Politics, (London:

George Allen & Unwin, 1974), p. 186.17 Ibid.18 See Letter to Soviet Leaders, p. 55.19 e.g., See The Gulag, pp. 259-260, 537, and Letter to Soviet Leaders, pp. 11-15.20 Ibid., p. 272.21 Ibid.22 Letter to Soviet Leaders, p. 53.23 The Gulag, p. 343.24 Ibid., Preface p. X.25 Ibid., p. 129.26 Ibid., p. 613.27 See Guardian,January 30, 1974.28 E. MandeL"Solzhenitsyn's Assault on Stalinism."29 L. Trotsky, "Terrorism and Communism," in I. Howe, (ed.) The Basic Writingsof

Trotsky (London, 1964), p. 145.30 The Gulag, p. 302.31 Ibid., p. 145.32 See A. Rosenberg, A History of Bolshevism (New York, 1965), p. 120.33 See The Prophet Unarmed Trotsky: 1921-1929 (London, 1970), p. 16.34 Ibid., p. 17.35 Ibid., pp. 9-10.36 The Gulag, p. 26.37 Mandel, op. cit.38 See "Politics As a Vocation," in Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in

Sociology (New York, 1958), p. 100.39 See P. Sweezy and Charles Bettelheim, On The Transition to Socialism (MonthlyReview Press: 1971). The authors have yet to show that Soviet production ofsurplus value could return to a similar form of monopoly capitalism with all theproblems associated with consumption, markets, imperialist policies, etc. Moreover,

the relations to production have only superficially resembled bourgeois and prole-tarian relations to the capitalist mode of production. Non-control by the Sovietpeople does not make their rulers bourgeoisie!

40 See Letter to Soviet Leaders, pp. 42-49.41 See Foundations of Leninism (International Publishers,New York, 1939) p. 127.42 See "Critical Observations on Rosa Luxemburg's 'Critique of the Russian Revolu-tion'," in History and Class Consciousness (London, 1971), p. 291.43 Ibid., pp. 292-293.

Theory and Society, 1 (1974) 477-496? Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam - Printed in The Netherlands

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The Left and Archipelago by Boris Frankel

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