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r o f i l e

T H E L E G C Y O F N IK L S

L U H M N N

G o t t h a r d e c h m a n n a n d N i c o S t eh r

'n some of the many and extensive obituaries

.published in European newspapers and maga-

zines in 1999, Niklas Luhmann is remembered as

the most i mportant social theorist of the 2 0th cen-

tury.Yet in much of the Anglo-Saxon world he is

vir tually unk now n among professional social sci-

entists. Luhm ann was b orn into a middle-class fam-

ily in Liineburg, Germany on December 8, 1927.

Fol lowing ear ly graduat ion f rom high school

Notabitur) , he was conscripted briefly in 1944

and taken prisoner of war b y the American Forces.

From 1946 to 1949, he studied law in Freiburg,

entered public administration and worked for ten

years as an administrative lawyer in Hanover. In

1962 he received a scholarship to Harvard and

spen t a year withT alcot t Parsons. In 1968, he was

appoi nted professor of sociolo gy at the newly

estab lishe d University of Bielefeld, wh ere he

worked until his retirement. Shortly before his

appointment he was asked on what subject he

wish ed to work at university. His reply was: The

theor y of mod ern society. Duration 30 years; no

costs. He cons eque ntly realised exactly this theo-

retical program . At the time of his dea th in De-

cember 1998, at the age of 70, he had published

an oeuvre of over 14,000 print ed pages.

Luhmann's journey toward a theory of mod-

ern societ y has taken a dual appr oach : first, in the

form of essays since the end of the 1960s; and

second, in the form of mono graph s since the

1980s, dealing with the individual function sys-

tems of society, such as law, science and art .

Luhmann's intellectual evolution culminated in

1997 with the publication of his magnum opus

The Society of Society. Anyone suspec ting redun-

dancy and repetition here might feel at first glance

that their scepticism is confirmed.This two-vol-

ume work contains no new subjects, let alone any

previously unpublished approach.To this extent

it is more a completion, a recapitulation, than an

advance into new terri tory. However, a second,

reassuring look reveals much that had not been

said bef or e- -o r at least n ot in this way. In contrast

to the essays, which are sometimes experimental

and even playful in tone, and which occasionally

close on a question mark, the b ook format requires

a more systematic presentation. The Society of

Society is the final stone to his theoreti cal cathe-

dral and provides a map for, and a guide to, the

understanding of modern systems theory.

Around this principal work are clustered ear-

lier, individ ual analyse s: The Scie nce o f Society,

The Econ om ics of Society, The Art of Society,

The Law of Society and the two pos thum ousl y

published bo oks: The Politics of Society and The

Religion of Society. The introduction to this se-

ries of analyses took the form of a 674-page book

bearing th e title Social Sy stems:The Outline o f a

General Theory. This wor k is still the mos t con-

centrated, abstract , and-- if one takes the trouble

to work through it--also most rewarding presen-

tation of the theoretical core.

We now have a first overall picture at our dis-

posal. If one wis hes to do Luh mann justice, one

has to find one's bearings within the architecture

of his general approach .Apart fro m these systemic

studies, Luhmann also published a slightly less

voluminou s series of sociological and historical-

seman tic analyses. They c onsist of the fou r vol-

umes of Societal Structure and Semantics and

the six volumes of Sociological Enlightenment.

These studies show Luhmann as a universal

scholar, wh o loc ates his theo ry within the histori-

cal contex t of enlightenmen t and Europ ean phi-

losophy.Apart from this far-reaching research, he

also pro duc ed a range o f political and social analy-

ses of modern society, commenting on pressing

public problems.We men tion only his books So-

ciology of Risk, Ecological Communicati on, The

Reality of the Mass Media and The Political

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Theory of the Welfare State." In all, his work con-

sists of some 700 publica tions an d countless trans-

lations into English, French, Italian,Japanese, Rus-

sian and Chinese.

In almost all of his work, Luhmann makes ref-

erence to the operative logic of George Spencer

Brown and radical constructi vism.These are treated

in summary fashion in order to sketch the layout

and the c once ptua l structure of his super-social sys-

tems theory, endo wed with a range of method ologi-

cal inst rumen ts wo n in this way. The t heo ry of

politics, sociol ogy of religion, sociology of art, and

moral sociology are de veloped subsequently.

In our br ief in tel lectual por t rai t of Niklas

Luhmann, we first deliberately focus on the sub-

stance of his social theory, especially the ideas

found in his last publication; and we refrain from

advancing a sociology of knowle dge p erspectiv e

that a t tempts to come to gr ips wi th- - for ex-

am pl e- th e reluctance of Anglo-Saxon social sci-

ence to engage Luhmann's notions as vigorously

and promine ntly as has been the case not only in

his ow n country , but also in Italy, France, and man y

othe r non-English-speaking societies. This is a

story, and a challenge, that must be left op en at

this time. Second, onc e we have outl ined the ma-

jor features of Luhmann's novel system-theoreti-

cal approach, we offer various critical observa-

tions and reflections.

The Characteristics of Moder n Society

For Luhmann, social differentiation and system

formation are the basic characterist ics of modern

society.This also means that systems theory and

the the ory of society are mutually dependen t. In

these terms, a socie ty is not the sum of all current

interactions, but rather a system of a higher order,

of a different type, determined by the differentia-

t ion between system and environment; and i t is

exactly this distinction which is the subject of

Luhmann's two-volume The Society of Society

Luh man n's key messa ge is this: soci ology is ulti-

mately a theory of society, or it is not a science. If

we look back at the his tory of sociology, this is by

no means self-evident. On the contrary, at the start

of the last century--and particularly after 1945

in Germany and elsewher e--sociol ogy derived i ts

identity by conceal ing its relationship with society.

It was mainly a theory of social entities, with such

categorie s as roles, interaction, inten tion and social

action forming the basic co ncep tual framew ork for

a sociol ogy whi ch was increasi ngly empirical and

theoretica lly inclined to follow the m odel of the

natural sciences, with their emphasis on causality

and the discovery of laws.

The c onc ept of society, however, retained i ts

holistic claim; emphatically defended, for example,

by cr i t ical theo ry and dev elo ped by J/ .i rgen

Habermas into a theor y of communicative reason.

This claim clashed with the unde rstand ing of so-

ciology as a universal and inde pend ent theo ry of

social entit ies.Would the mainstream per spectiv e

within sociology turn society into a social system

like any other, but at the same time an all-embrac-

ing and fundamental system? Sociology has bee n

unable to escape from this paradox, whi ch it has

count ered by repression and historicisation: Social

theory, and particularly critical social theory, has

largely been left to the disciplinary concerns of

philosophy , whi ch is believed to have the special-

ists in holistic claims for the ultimate, fundamen-

tal structures of thought and relationships with the

world. If social scientists dealt with the theory of

society, then they did so typically through exegesis

of the classics, as if the history of their own disci-

pline had the ability to preserve and recall claims.

Today the exclusion of society from socio logy

seems to be e xacti ng its revenge. Like Max Weber 's

repressed worl d of the gods who celebrate their

return to the mod ern world in the form of inces-

sant conflicts of values, the con cep t of society is

returning today in a wide diversity of terms, such

as "post-industrial society" (Bell),"society of risk"

(Beck)," socie ty of kn owle dge" (Stehr), and "post-

mod er n society" (Lyotard); as if one aspe ct of so-

ciety is capable of standing in for the wh ole. Such

ad hoc fabrication of terminolo gy reveals what is

being suppressed: namely, the claim to compre-

hend socie ty in its totality.

So wha t exa ctly does this mean for sociology,

Luhmann asks, if we wish to avoid the trap o f naive

objectivism, which views society as a given ob-

ject that effectively pre ced es all scientific obser-

vation? The implication of the objective poin t of

view would be that we have to observe society

from a point outside of society.There is no such

point. Science and society are both an expressio n

of social reality.This is precisely the point where

classical soci ology of knowledge, for example , has

broken down. I t was forced to delegate the ob-

servation of knowledge to a hypothetical , free-

floating intell igence that was not subject to any

distortion of perc epti on due to interests or ide-

ologies. More recently, a number of perspecti ves

have come to accept the idea that the act of cog-

nition is always itself a moment in the totality of

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cognition. Luhmann shares this app roa ch- -an d at

the same time pushes beyond it by arguing that

there cannot be an object society accessible to

independent observation.

As soon as we cease to regard societ y as merely

another sociological object of research and in-

stead focus on its operational significance as a

condition for the possibil i ty of sociological cog-

nit ion i tself , then sociology beco mes a subject

dealing with itself in exactly the sense in which

the subject matter of philosoph y speaks of reflec-

tion. Luhma nn transfers the struc ture of the self-

referential mo de of operation by the subject to

the theory of social systems.At the same time, he

answers the question: How it is possible to prac-

tice sociology as a theory of society that does not

prematurely screen out the conne ct ion between

theory and subject? This, accordi ng to Luhmann,

requires a radical rejection of epistemolo gical

posit ions based on the di chot omy of the subject-

object paradigm. Sociology is conf ront ed with

society as a subject. Luhmann therefore argues

that this requires research into characterist ics that

it has always generated itself. Luhmann consis-

tently posits a radically anti-humanist, non-onto-

logical and radical-constructivist idea of society.

The most radical assumpt i on of Luhmann's

mature theoretical approach is his emphasis on

differences, more precisely on distinctions that

are no longer seen as objective differences but as

constru ctions. The substitution of the subject con-

cept and the transfer of the subject /object differ-

entiation into the distinction between system and

environment take Luhmann to a post-ontological

theo ry of society, deve lope d on a naturalistic and

empirical basis as a the ory o f observation.This fun-

damental questioning of the modern philosoph y of

the subject and the resulting distinction betwe en

the natural sciences and the humanities ( together

with the associated rejection of a humanistic-an-

thropocentric concept for defining society) have

attracted a great deal of criticism, and even more

incomprehension, of Luhmann's approach.

T h e G e n e a l o g y o f L u h m a n n s S ys t e m T h e o r y

The c once pt of the system is Luhmann's essen-

tial starting point. In this respect he is exceptional

in German sociology, whi ch at least since Max

Weber has mainly been ac tion theory. Luhmann's

proposal to describe social phenomena like in-

teractions, organization s or societies as systems,

possibly marks this categorical break most em-

phatically.To think in terms of systems first ira-

plies that we are no longer speaking of objects,

but of differences and furth ermo re that differ-

ences are not conceived as existing facts (distinc-

tions), going back instead to an imperative to ex-

ecu te them, s ince one cou ld o therwi se g ive

nothing a name, thus having nothing to observe

and would thus also not be able to continue any-

thing (Luhmann, 1997:60).

The text of the social (like all oth er texts) is

neither self-explanatory nor is it deposited in dis-

crete writ ing. And it does not posses s any consis-

tent meaning which is identical with i tself , and

which one could trace back to any specific in-

stanc e of its creation. Sociology has to labo r with-

out con ceivi ng its domain of objects as a conglom-

erate of things, analogous to facts possessing a

fixed shape--whose inter-relationship, moreover,

is ensured in an uniform principle (be i t nature,

divine will, morals or a transcendental subject).

Under the metaphysica l conditions of the mod-

ern, a meta-perspec tive that permits the recogni-

t ion of somethi ng resembling the natural as the

invariable ess ence or the totality of society is no

longer available to the observer.

According to Luhmann's system-theory ap-

proach, the world (as the ho rizon of possible de-

scriptions) is expressed by means of a network

of contingent distinctions and labels that always

have to be understood in context.That an observer

may label this as this (and not as that) is due to a

dist inct ion in which both mom ents, separated

from each other, can only be understood in rela-

t ion to each other; the distinctive units only pos-

sessing their own identity in the difference to the

other. To be able to chara cterise some thin g as

something, one has to have already distinguished

it from its distinctive other: what deserves to be

called true, for example, is measured by the dif-

ference from appearance; and to speak of the past

makes sense only with referenc e to a present that

can be distinguis hed (con stitutively) f rom it. Even

if it is not explicitly raised as an issue, this other

side of something termed as this or that is always

presen t in every determination of spee ch or ges-

ture we make. It is a pe rma ne nt horiz on. It is pos-

sible to change sides at any time and to bring the

dist inguished moment of form (appearance for

truth, or the present for the past) into the focus

of attention, making it the point of departur e for

furth er deliberat ions. In the interest of a deliber-

ate treatment of self and world, it is inevitable

that we distinguish and label. Such operations are

the start of all perce ption and recognition.

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Why distinctions and labels in different con-

texts are made in a certain way and not in others

is impossible to determine from the perspective

of systems theory. Distinguishing always takes

place in a medium of lack of foretho ught and pre-

vious indeterminacy, endowing each form with

the seal of indelible conti ngen cy: in principle one

could have ma de c ompletely different distinctions.

To speak o f systems t hus m eans to establish a dif-

ference: that between system and environme nt.

By system, Luhmann means a chain of events

related to each other, or of operations. In the case

of living creatures, for instance, these are physiologi-

cal proces ses;f or psyc hic systems, ideas; and in rela-

tion to social relationships, communic atio ns. Systems

are formed by distinguishing themselves from an

environment of such events and operations that

cann ot be integrated into their internal structures.

In contrast to his early mentorTalcott Parsons,

who defined systems by means of the presence

of collectively shared nor ms and value patterns,

Luhmann proceeds from a system concept shaped

in a strictly relational manner. His notion relies

on the idea of a constitutive boundary that per-

mits the distinction between inside and outside.

Each operation of a system (in the case of social

systems: each communi cati on) (re)p roduces this

boundary by embedding i tself in a network of

further operations, in which it at the same time

gains its own unity/identity.Therefore, such a con-

cept of boundary--above all in relation to psy-

chic and social systems--is not to be understood

spatially, but rather operatively: The boundary of

the system is nothing but the type and concre-

tion of its opera tions w hic h individualise the sys-

tem. I t is the form of the system who se other side

t h us b e c o m e s t h e e n v i r o n m e n t ( L u h m a n n ,

1997:76-77.) . This operative unde rsta ndin g re-

quires the insight that systems are unable to tran-

scend their own boundaries.

Such a research strategy is due to an elemen-

tary conviction of the improbabili ty of the emer-

gence of social order. Everything could in prin-

ciple be different. From Luhmann's perspective,

social structures have nothing self-evident to

them: they require permanent new social con-

struction from the view of their existence and of

their determined shape. In contrast to the func-

tionalism of the Parsonian persuasion, Luhmann

is not c ommit ted to the pre servation of social

systems. On the contrary, the cont inge ncy and

compl exit y of the social is the starting po int of

all of his theoreti cal efforts.

The complexi ty of the design of Luhmann's

theory expresses i tself not only through the di-

versity of the sociological issues which he is able

to tackle with the help of the syste m-theory ap-

proach, but also in the way that the perspectives

vary in their emphasis when eve r he presen ts his

general theoretical approach. His Social Systems

is writ te n primarily from the poin t of view of the

dist inct ion between system and environment ,

while The Science of Society takes the theory of

observable systems as its starting point, leading

to more epistemological debates about obse rving

observation. If one had to choose such a central

point of view for The Society of Society the focus

would clearly be on the social system, in contrast

to all social subsystems formed through social

operations within society.

T h e i f fe r e n c e o f i f f e r e n c e s

Luhmann distances himself from what he calls

the old Europea n ontolo gical theore tical tradi-

t ion, hopelessly out mode d in i ts potential for cap-

turing m ode rn society in all i ts complexity. In

doing so, he is trying to overcome two thousand

years of tradition that, in his view, have been tran-

scend ed by the process of functional differentia-

t ion. He descr ibes the old European style of

thought as concerned with the identif ication of

the unity unde rlyi ng diversity. Society, in the clas-

sical view, consists of subjects of action whose

fundamental unity is based on sharing a comm on

understanding. Ontolo gy refers to a world exist-

ing objectively in separation from the subjects

aware of i t , capable of unambiguous l inguistic

representation.

Against this, Luhmann sets a view of a world

that temporalizes, differentiates and decentralizes

all identities. Identities are pro duc ts o f past ev ents.

Unity is no longer the ult imate p oint of reference

of the th eory. By relativizing even the o ntol ogica l

scheme of existence/non-existence as but one of

many observational schemata, Luhmann attacks

the foundations of powerful tradit ions of thought.

The paradox, according to Luhmann, is that the

old European tradit ion em erged in a society that

no lo nger exists today, either in terms of the sys-

tem of communication or in terms of forms of

differentiation. Even so, this tradition remains part

and parcel of our historical heritage, and in this

sense a part of the culture that is relevant for ori-

entation. I t cannot disappear bec ause i t no longer

fits; it is constantly negated, and has to be avail-

able for this purpose.

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T h e o r i e s o f T h e o r i e s

But how can society document i tself without

comi ng into contra dicti on with itself, and particu-

larly with out recourse to transcend ental refer-

ences outside itself?. In the last chapter of The

Society of Society und er the title Self-descrip-

tions, Luhma nn deals with the intrica te relation-

ship betwee n theor y and subject. Can theo ry ex-

plain i t s own locat ion wi thin the process of

society? And if it can, does it not regard socie ty to

a certain extent from without, al though this is

possible within society in the capacity of com-

munication? Here, we are reminded (not entirely

inappropriately) of Escher's hand drawing itself,

generating itself and its own image in the course

of its own op eration . Luhma nn follows a similar

line: Just like self-observations, self-descriptions

(generation of texts) are individual oper ations of

the system. In fact, descriptions and what is de-

scribed are not two separate objects which are

only externally l inked--with a self-description,

what is desc ribed is always part of what it is de-

scribing and it changes it simply by the fact that

it appears and subjects itself to observation.

Sociology, then, is always the con str uct ion of

the unity of the system within the sys tem itself,

never reaching an end to this process.This insight

prompts Luhmann to avoid any conclusions for

his own theory.Although there is a particularly

close relationship here with Hege l,who also gave

the absol ute a self-referential chara cter by regard-

ing the system as entirely self-referential--where

nothing can be external because everything ex-

ternal has be co me an aspect of its self-differen-

tial--Luhmann leaves this tradition exactly at this

point by translating i t into a cybernetic vocabu-

lary and hence overcoming it . Nor is society a

subject in the anthropological- interactive sense,

as Adorn o still view ed it despite all his criticism

of phil osop hy: Society is a coagu lated relation-

ship betwe en people. Humani ty is not the ulti-

mate elem ent in society, nor ca n soci ety still be

described within the classical cognitive model of

subject-object ; beca use the self-referentiality of

society itself causes this duality to collapse, since

cognition seeks intersubjective certainty on the

part of the subject and presup poses stable objects.

Society is in any case not such a stable object.

Critical e f l e c t i o n s

According to Luhmann's approach, only radi-

cal constructive semantics provide sufficient dis-

tance to prevent succumbing to the suggestions

inherent in tradit ional terminology. Luhman n's

terminology in the theoretically most demanding

part of this wor ks is devoi d of classical associa-

t i o n s a n d c o n n o t a t i o n s . I f t h e r e a d i n g o f

Luhmann's studies is not be abandoned due to

sheer resignation, frustration or even anger, then

his terminology requires considerable tolerance

from readers not familiar with the terminology

of systems theory.

Luhmann's strict, austere artificial language is

not due to any affectation but rather to the strin-

gency of his theoret ical p rogr am-- and this pro-

gram has to keep its distance from the implica-

tions of the seman tics of tradit ional Europea n

social theory. In this respe ct one s hould take seri-

ously the penultimate sente nce of the Society of

Societies, accor ding to whi ch an adequat e mod-

ern t heory of society requires the sacrif ice of the

mere pleasure of recogniti on and the judging of

theory construction on i ts own merits.

This does not imply that reading Luhmann's

theo ry is simply a struggle with nomi nal cons truc-

tions and cascades of abstract terms; in betw een

one finds analyses of traditional European seman-

tics, in which Luhmann attempts to clarify why

they are no longer adequate for the structural facts

of mod er n society. Again and again ther e are

pointed and paradoxical formulations, in which

the fruits of the switch in theory formatio n from

first-order observation to second-order observa-

tion are bundled as under a magnifying glass.An

example of this would be when Luhmann says of

memo ry that i ts true function for society consists

not of storage, but rather of forgett ing; or wh en

he conceives of information as a product of de-

cay that disappears by being updated.

Such paradoxes are more than skilful plays on

w o r d s : t h e y p r o v i d e e n t r y p o i n t s t o t h e

constructivist co re of Luhmann's societal theory,

which consists of the fact that all observation is

based on paradox to the extent that i t relies on

distinctions upon which i t cannot reflect as a

uniform whole.The unity of the world as the unity

of society, according to Luhmann, cannot be as-

serted as a principle but simply as a paradox--

this too is a consequence of the loss of meaning

of traditional semantics.

But is the loss of meaning of old European se-

mantics truly compell ing in the face of the four

volumes by Luhmann on the subject of structure

of society and semantics ? Or, is it at least rein-

forced wel l by methodology? One can doubt that

this is so, since Luhm ann is forced to fall back on

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socio-structural developments to be able to es-

tablish the loss of significance of socio-political

semantics.This circularity is probably the weak

point in Luhmann's theory of society. Of course,

this did not escape Luhmann, but the solutions

he suggested were not particularly consistent.

They stretch from the admittance of circularity as

an inevitable pre-requisite of theory formation--

which traditional European semantics were only

able to avoid by recourse to metaphysical construc-

tions, such as God, nature or re aso n-- to the claim

that semantic changes were subject to structural

change at considerable distance, as a result of

which semantics are suddenly again in the posi-

tion of verbally depic tin g facts. But is it really true

that social change precedes cognitive change, or

are there also cases where the opposite is true?

Luhmann analysed the change from traditional

European society to modern society by using

three dimensions, to each of whi ch he dedicates

three main c hapters of his societal theory ("The

Society of Society"): first, the social di mension ,

which Luhmann conceives as that of communi-

cation and media, consti tuted only by the distinc-

tion be twe en Ego and Alter (deliberately avoid-

ing the tradit ional European semantics of perso n

and subject) ; second, the temporal dimension, in

which past and future are separated, and which

L u h m a n n t e r m s e v o l u t i o n - - d e f i n i t e l y n o t

progress, since there is no guiding medi um am ong

the various media and the functional differentia-

tion of society has no guiding system; and third

and finally, the factual dimens ion ,wh ich Luhman n

comp rehe nds as functional differentiation, and in

which we are concerned wi th determining the

system and the environme nt.These are not, how-

ever, stable distinctions, that which constitutes

environment depending instead on the compo-

n e n t s y s t e m c o n c e r n e d , o n s c i e n c e o r th e

economy, law or education.And this also changes

during the evolution of the co mpo ne nt systems.

Decisive for Luhmann' s the ory of society is the

assertion that there is no do minan ce of any com-

pone nt system in the dimension of functional dif-

ferentiation, for instance of politics; that in the di-

mension of communication, no dominant med ium

may be recognised; and furthermore, that the lack

of guiding systems and dominan t media is the de-

finitive characteristic of mode rn society.This is also

the reason why traditional European semantics can

no longer adequately describe a modern society.

But is the loss of measure due to the c onver-

sion of norms and values into forms of societal

commun icati on, as describe d by Luhmann, really

plausible? Unfortunately, Luhmann at no point

makes reference to Michael Walzer's conc ept of

spheres of just ice: Within th is conc ept , wha t

Luhmann has described as the appropriate self-

descripti on of mode rn societies is describ ed as

thei r permanent ly- to-be-achieved norm, as the

measure of justness that is perma nent ly threat-

ened by the dominat ion of - - to use Luhmann's

t e rm- - compon en t sys tems .

This closes the circle for a major train of

thought, so that what initially appeared a para-

do x- na me ly , that the self is at the same time what

is d i f ferent- -emerges as a complete theory of

society that also includes reflection on i ts own

location in society, and regards society in this

sense as a unity capable of self-modification. If

we take this strictly intra-social perspective seri-

ously, accept ing that any commu nic atio n about

society can only take place within society, then

there is no location for critical reflection on soci-

ety external to society, whe re socie ty can be re-

garded as an object.This descripti on of society in

society is no longer based on the con cep t of the

subject or seen from the standpoint of transcen-

dental rationality. It is the tautological operation

of communication itself. Society is society's for-

mula for the self-desc ription of social unity. An

emphatic definition of sociology would here seek

the unity of this difference in order to distinguish

wha t is actual, wha t is essential.The unity of soci-

ety would then be a society that has arrived at

itself, corresponding to its ideal.Tradition has re-

served the label "enlightenment" for this, and

measured existing society against this claim. So-

ciological explanat ion of enl ighte nment must

abandon these claims, since this position can still

be observed, even if only from the po int of view

of second-order observat ion.The cont ingency of

the world cannot be reversed in this sense, be-

cause sociological theory belongs to the very

thing that it is analysing, name ly society.

The t rue meaning of sociology would hence

be that it is set free to engage in this type of self-

descripti on in order to modify the semantic lega-

cies of tradit ion to the chang ed social structural

relationships in the p rocess of "re-description."

This bridges the second major distinction be-

tween semantics and social structure. Modern

society, throu gh functional differentiation, gener-

ates the compulsion to self-observation and so

changes all the themati c elements. This brings

postmodernism to the point where the past be-

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