The Legitimation of Capitalism in the Postcommunist Transition: Public Opinionabout Market Justice, 1991-1996

James R. Kluegel; David S. Mason; Bernd Wegener

European Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 3. (Sep., 1999), pp. 251-283.

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European Sociological Review,Val. 15 No. 3, 251 -283

The Legitimation of Capitalism in the Postcommunist Transition Public Opinion about Market Justice, 1 991 -1 996

James R. Kluge& David S.Mason, and Bernd Egener

This paper examines change in economic justice attitudes in five former communist states (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, eastern Germany, Hungary, and Russia), using data from opinion surveys conducted in 1991 and 1996.We examine the implications of theory and research concerning the popular legitimation of western capitalism for change in support for 'market justice' beliefs and norms among postcommunist publics. Our analyses show: first, that in the Czech Republic and eastern Germany, public opinion is moving closer to market justice as found in western capitalism, but socialist justice remains strong or is increasing in the other three countries; secondly, that in postcommunist countries correlations between support for market justice norms and the perceived fairness of the existing economic order have become stronger over time; and thirdly, that private- sector employment, and retrospective, current and prospective standard-of-living evaluations each shape market justice beliefs and norms. We conclude that (1) theory of the public legitimation of capitalism in the West does apply in postcommunist states; (2) change in market/socialist justice is a function of both collective and individual level factors; and (3) we have entered a second stage of the transition where popular economic justice evaluations are more clearly subject to 'empirical test'.

Students of the double transition in postcommunist market economy to be accompanied by a supporting Europe often stress the importance of the popular set of beliefs and values. legitimacy of market economies for the develop- It is not sufficient, however, that the citizens of ment of stable democracies (Centeno, 1994; the postcommunist public \velcome the efficiency Prze\vorski, 1991). Lipset (1993: 13), for example, and tolerate the warts of free-enterprise capitalism. writing of the requisites for democracy, proposes They also have to believe that, all things con-that: sidered, it is fundamentally just. Lane (1986)

argues that capitalism is supported in the United

The success of democracy in these [post- States because of a \videspread sense of 'market communist] countries depends in large part on justice'. Market justice, as defined by Lane (1986), their populations' ability to adapt to freedom, to is an inter-related set of norms and beliefs. Key break away from their former views on the role of market justice norms involve preferences for the the state, and their willingness to accept the cyclical inegalitarian criteria of earned deserts over the cri- nature of the free market system, and, of course, on teria of equality and need, and for limited or no successful economic performance. government direction of the economy. Key market

justice beliefs concern the availability of economic Others (Duch, 1993; Roller, 1994) call attention to opportunity and equity in the distribution of the need for structural change implementing a income.

0Oxford Unlverslty Press 1999

JAMES R. KLUEGEL ETAL

It would seem, then, that if the postcommunlst states are to successfully navigate the transition from state socialism to capitalism, their populations will also have to develop a sense of 'market justice' and to abandon, in part at least, their former beliefs in 'socialist justice'. Opinion research (Denisovsky et al . , 1993; Duch, 1993; Finifter and hlickiewicz, 1992; Gibson, 1993; Kluegel et al., 1995; hfcIntosh eta/ . , 1994; Roller, 1994), however, has shown that in important respects market justice beliefs aere not prevalent among postcommunist publics in the early transition years, Although citizens of post- communist states favoured the creation of market economies in principle, they also widely endorsed many 'socialist justice' norms and beliefs that pre- vailed in the Communist era. That is, such studies found the publics of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to be much more egalitarian and to favour a much stronger role for the state in directing the economy and ensuring the social safety-net than their counterparts in democratic capitalist states. In the early years of the transition, the postcommunist public also perceived much more restricted oppor- tunity and inequity in the distribution of economic goods than did the public in the Rest.

How has the popular legitimacy of market econo- mies among postcommunist publics changed over the first several years of experience with market economies? In other words, how far, if at all, has public opinion in eastern and central Europe travelled the road from socialist to market justice? Addressing this question contributes to our under- standing of the course of the postcommunist transition, and to policy aimed at strengthening democracy in the region. hiarket justice beliefs and norms haxre increasingly come to affect politics in postcommunist states. Public opinion about aspects of socialist justice played a role in the Hungarian 'left turn' of 1994 (Szeleny et al., 1996). Market: socialist justice norms are also key elements of a crystallizing leftright political continuum in the Czech Republic (Metaju and Rehakova, 1998). Efforts to build a theory of economic and political transitions, however, have given much more atten- tion to institutional or 'macro' level change (Nee and Matthews, 1996) than individual, 'micro' level change (cf. Centeno, 1994). In addition, research on this question contributes to theory regarding the legitimation of economic systems more

broadly, and capitalism in particular. Theory on the popular legitimation of capitalism has been developed and tested in stable western demo-cracies. Does it also apply in the transition context of eastern Europe?

In this paper, we examine change in public opi- nion concerning the complex of norms and beliefs constituting socia1ist:market justice over the period from 1991 to 1996. We use data from representative surveys of the populations of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, (former) East Germany, Hungary, and Russia first conducted in 1991 as part of the broader, thirteen-nation International Social Justice Project (Kluegel et a/., 1995), and then replicated fully in the autumn of 1996. To address certain questions about change, we also employ data from three aes- tern countries that aere among the 1991 surveys: Great Britain, the USA, and (former) K'est Germany.

Theoretical Background Analyses of economic system legitimation point to elements of an inter-related system of norms and beliefs about the economic order that serves to legit- imate capitalism in western public opinion. As noted above, Lane (1986) has applied the label 'market justice' to this system. In addition, social science research points to key factors that shape adherence to these norms and beliefs among the citizens of western states. Below, we discuss this analysis and research, and its application to the postcommunist transition.

Market Justice Norms and Beliefs

In addition to the preference for equity over equality and opposition to government direction of the economy noted above, analyses of the market justice complex have pointed to the fairness of profits, and the need for inequality to motivate effort and contri- bution as major norms supporting capitalism in public opinion (Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Lane, 1986; hIcCloskey and Zaller, 1984; Roller, 1994). Commitment to these norms is buttressed bv beliefs about opportunity and equity of economlc out- comes. For the market to be judged fair, according to Lane (1986), two procedural requirements must be met: first, opportunity must be seen as open (if

THE POSTCOMMUNIST LEGITIMATION OF CAPITALISM

not equal), and secondly, the market must be seen as responsive to hard work, i.e. that equity prevails. If the public perceives that such conditions hold, according to Lane (1986), inequality is preferred because it is thought to further productivity and contribute to collectis~e gain. In the USA, Kluegel and Smith (1986) have shown that a popular 'opportunity syllogism' functions to justify eco-nomic inequality. That is, belief in the widespread availability of opportunity encourages people to deduce that individuals are responsible for their own economic fates, and conclude that inequality in general is fair. -

From one perspective on the legitimation of social inequality (Della Fave, 1980, 1986a, 198612), beliefs about the aealthy are given special impor- tance. Through a process of status attribution, the wealthy in capitalist societies come to be seen as deserving of their status - i.e come to be seen as equitably rewarded. Correspondingly, according to Della Fave, the 'non-wealthy' by self-comparison to the aealthy also come to see their status as equitable. In addition, the rich and the poor are visible mani- festations of the abstract idea of distributive justice applied to a society as a whole (Kluegel etal., 1995), and are often used as political symbols. Aperception that wealth is equitably determined encourages the broader belief, as Lane puts it, that the market is responsive to hard work.

If the market justice complex functions to shape public opinion about capitalism in postcommunist Europe as it does in the West, then we expect to find that over time the ties between beliefs and norms in postcommunist states will grow stronger and match those found in the West. That is, there is reason to believe that in the early transition ties were not made between market justice beliefs and market justice norms. In the early years of the transition, many citizens of postcommunist states may have supported market justice norms in simple opposi- tion to the socialist justice norms of the Communist era. As the years pass, however, the influence of such 'revolutionary zeal' may decline, opening these beliefs to scrutiny on the grounds of opportunity and equity. Further, in the early transi- tion, perceived problems with the economic order were likely to be attributed to prior Communist regimes. Later in the transition, however, such pro- blems are more likely to be attributed to the current

regimes, including to a perceived failure of capitalist economic orders.

If the link in public opinion betaeen market jus- tice beliefs and norms has become established in postcommunist Europe, then change in beliefs about opportunity and equity takes on a special importance in the region. In opposition to prevail- ing positive beliefs in the West (Alain etal, 1995), studies of public opinion in eastern Europe during the period from 1980 to 1991 revealed widespread negativism about opportunity and equity (Kluegel e t al., 1995; Mason, 1985; RTillerton and Sigelman, 1993). hioreover, a 1991 study (Kluegel etal., 1995) showed that the view of wealth as a product of hard work and ability dominant in western capitalism was not prevalent in postcommunist states. Rather, dur- ing the early years of the transition wealth was seen as the product of personal dishonesty and an unfair economic system.

As countries move further into the postcommu- nist era, one might well expect beliefs about opportunity and equity to be open to change. Again, in the early transition perceived limits to opportunity and inequity in the distribution of income may have been seen by many as due to prior Communist regimes. With political change and the passage of time comes at least the possibility that the public will adopt a more optimistic view of the economic order. In the following section of this paper we examine potential factors that may have shaped change in these beliefs and the direction it may have taken furthering socialist or market-

justice.

Sources of Market Justice Norms and Beliefs

Broadly viewed, we may differentiate betaeen collectis~e and individual level determinants of market justice norms and beliefs. The former deter- minants are factors that uniformly influence public opinion across different social groups within a given country The latter determinants are factors pro- ducing differential change among groups of individuals.

Collective Determinants K'e may distinguish betaeen non-economy-related and economy-related collective level forces shaplng the course of market justice norms and beliefs over

JAMES R. KLUEGEL ETA1

the postcommunist transition. One non-economic force is geographic and cultural proximity to the \Xest. Market justice norms in eastern Germany, especially, but also in the Czech Republic may be strongly shaped by what Roller (1984: 107) has called the 'outside-learning model'. In this model, people have information readily available about other coun- tries and use a more prestigious country as a reference point. In the years prior to the transition, citizens of former East Germany and the Czech republic had ready access to information about for- mer \Yrest Germany through the media and personal contacts (notablj-, family ties in eastern Germany). This may have encouraged Czechs and eastern Germans to more strongly adopt market justice norms in the years before the transition, and may function to further reinforce such norms over the course of the transition.

Certainly, one must attend to the state of the econ- omy as a whole over the transition period. Our five countries have had quite different recent economic histories. At the outset of the transition, eastern Germans and Czechs enjoyed the highest relative standards of living among the former Soviet states (Rose and Haerpfer, 1996:Table2). Perhaps as a result of this relative affluence, in the early transition their beliefs and norms about economic justice were on average closer to those found inWestern public opi- nion (Mason, 1995). In addition, with unification, former East Germans gained a 'ready made'affluent economy Although their incorporation into the unified German economy has had problematic elements (Offe, 1997), a 1993 survey (Seifert, 1994) showed that during the initial transition years eastern Germans saw their personal standards of liv- ing as much improved over the last years of the Communist era. Four of the five countries under study here experienced difficult economic times during the early transition (World Bank, 1996). The Czech Republic, however, has experienced strong economic growth in the past few years. Bulgaria and Russia experienced the greatest economic diffi- culty over the period from 1990 through 1993, with declining gross domestic products and double- to triple-digit inflation on average over these years. Both countries have seen small recent improve-ments, but overall conditions remain stagnant or in decline. The Hungarian economy has largely been in stasis. It suffered the least difficulty of these four

countries in the early transition, but has seen little overall economic growth to date.

Economic conditions may have a collective influ- ence on market justice beliefs and norms, and on evaluations of status. In particular, research on the economic basis of political public opinion under- scores the influence of 'sociotropic' evaluations of the economy (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981). The pub- lic's evaluation of political candidates and political outcomes, it is argued, is influenced by overall eco- nomic conditions, independent of how people are affected by economic conditions as individuals. One maj- apply the same reasoning to the effect of the economy on market justice norms and beliefs. A sociotropic evaluation would push economic justice beliefs towards greater support for market justice during periods of increasing economic prosperity even among those who do not see them- selves as having personally benefited from it. O n the other hand, a sociotropic evaluation would push economic justice beliefs towards greater support for socialist justice during periods of increasing eco- nomic austerity even among those who do not see themselves as having personally suffered from it. On sociotropic grounds we e~pect to find the largest change towards market justice in public opinion to haue occurred in eastern German_): followed in order b3, the Cxech Republic, Hungav, Russia, and Bulgaria. Indeed, on sociotropic grounds, we expect the latter two countries to have made no progress towards marketjustice, and injkct to bane moued in the opposite direction, i. e. towards socialis( justice.

Many of the neo-liberal economic and political reformers in the post-communist states (and their advisers in the West) indeed appear to believe in a sociotropic basis to market justice norms and beliefs (Sachs and Lipton, 1990). Part of the strategq. behind economic 'shock therapy'is to push through market- oriented economic reforms quickly enough to avoid a potential popular and electoral backlash against the dislocations of such reforms (Ost, 1995). The hope and expectation are that once the newly privat- ized economies begin to generate growth, wealth, and consumption, popular attitudes would then begin to shift generally in favour of 'market justice' over 'socialist justice'.

'Shock therapists' have focused on the effect of absolute economic growth. The market justice model, however, argues that economic growth must be seen by the public as enhancing opportunity

THE POSTCOMMUNIST LEGITIMATION OF CAPITALISM

and as proceeding in an equitable manner if it is to further acceptance of market justice norms. Two related features of the transition to a market econ- omy need to be considered in this regard -corruption and the privatization process. Corruption in the form of organized crime and bureaucratic graft may strongly taint public opinion about the legitimacy of wealth, but also may more generally lead the public to question the availability of opportunity and equity in the distribution of income (Goldman, 1995; Holmes, 1993). Corruption is perceived to be especially widespread by the Rus- sian public, but is perceived to be prevalent in other postcommunist states as well (cf. Miller eta/.,1998).

The process of privatization may also play a key role in public perceptions of opportunity and equity. A particular issue for justice beliefs involves suspi- cion of 'nomenclature privatization' - i.e. that the Communist old guard controlled the process to their benefit (Kiss, 1994). In general, public distrust of the privatization process has risen over time, as Kiss (1994: 143-44) describes:

At the beginning privatization and social justice were automatically related both in political plat- forms and public opinion; privatization (and the full-fledged market economy it was supposed to create ox-ernight) was expected automatically to yield democracy and general welfare. Two years after the radical turnabouts it became evident that what was taking place in the region is a sort of Eastern Europe 'original capital accumulation: a

fairly 'unfair'game that leads to injustice, gaping economic inequalities, and social tensions, and creates more losers than winners, at least for the time being, h'umerous scandals, cases of corrup- tion and abuse, undermine further the credibility of the process.

In all five of the postcommunist countries uJe study here, perceived corruption and the distrust of privatization probably fostered distrust of wealth, a belief that the income distribution is inequitable, and a perception that opportunity is limited. These five countries, hourever, differ in important ways that may limit or heighten the effects of corruption and distrust of privatization. R? anticipate that the effects of perceioed corrtlptian and dirtrmt of priz'atiption an market jtlstice Delzffi and norm are weaker in eastern Germay and the Crech ReptlDlic than in Btlkaria, Htlngac); or Rzissia. With unification, former East Germany 'inherited'

an established capitalist elite. They, of course, are not tainted by association with the former Commu- nist -"lbmenklattlra, as in other postcommunist countries. Voucher privatization and property resti- tution processes were formulated in the Czech Republic with explicit concern for maintaining social justice (Appel, 1994). Accordingly, the Czech public may view newly formed wealth with less dis- trust or suspicion than do the citizens of other postcommunist states. Although elements of market economies were introduced earlier in Hungary than in other postcommunist states, privatization was initiated only in the late 1980s and uras highly con- troversial, often seen by the public as a means of ensuring the survival of the Communist elite (Kiss, 1994).

Individual Determinants Market justice norms and beliefs may be seen as the product of a person's structural location, and by her or his evaluations and expectations regarding material living conditions. \Ve use the term 'structural location'as short-hand for the effects of

-sociodemographic factors such as age, educa-tion, income, and gender - and position in the economic order. Ost (1993) has proposed that dur- ing the early years of the transition the public uJas confused about its economic interests. As uJe pro- gress further into the transition, however, it is likely that such interests will become more clearly defined through experience with a market economy. Simply because it is such a short time-period for demographic change, it is unlikely that change in norms and beliefs over the five years of our study were produced by shifts in the distribution of socio- demographic factors. Change in position in the economy is a more probable source of change in norms and beliefs.

Economic events over the course of the early transition have produced major change in t u ~ o areas of the individual's economic position that may shape market justice beliefs and norms. First, u~orkers in most postcommunist countries have experienced historically unprecedented unemployment levels (Offe, 1997). Research on its effects in the West (Kluegel, 1988; Perucci e t al., 1988; Schiozman and Verbs, 1979) has found little influence of unemployment experience on economic justice beliefs. Hourever, because of its pronounced

JAMESR. KLUEGEL ETA1

scope and novelty, unemployment well may have a much more substantial impact in postcommunist Europe. In the early transition, the unemployment rate in eastern Germany reached a level, in OffeS characterization (1977: 153), 'unprecedented in the entire history of industrial society'. In Bulgaria and Hungary unemployment rates of between 10 and 20% have premiled throughout the transition (World Bank, 1996). Full employment was a cornerstone of Communist ideology, and thus unemployment experience is new to the post-communist public. In addition, unemployment increased at the same time as government support for safety-net institutions declined. Its scope and new- ness, and declirzing safely-net s@ort ma_)! combine to waken stipport Jor market justice be/@ and norms irz post-communist countries among people who have e~perienced zmemployent. In contrast, a longer history of unemployment experience plus the presence of safety-net support in the West may encourage accommodation, and mute its potential effect on perceptions of economic justice.

The sector of the economy in which one works may also shape market justice norms and beliefs in turo uJays. First, workers in state-owned industries may resist adopting market justice norms because of the threat further development of a market econ- omy is perceived to pose to their employment and material conditions. Second, working in private industry may encourage people to adopt market jus- tice beliefs and norms out of experience or self- interest. Income, opportunity for advancement, and incentive-based wage structures are all more prevalent in the private sector (Earle and Rose, 1996). Rorkers in the private sector may also come increasingly to oppose socialist justice norms out of the threat the state sector may pose to their con- tinued prosperity. Postcommunist countries differ substantially in the extent to which the economy has shifted from state owned or managed firms to privately owned and managed ones. Correspond-ingly employment sector may play an important role in explaining differences in adherence to socialist/market justice between countries, and across time within the same country.

Research during the early years of the transition showed that aspects of the market justice complex were shaped by people's evaluations and expecta- tions regarding their living standards (Duch, 1993;

McIntosh eta]., 1994; Roller, 1994; Zagorski, 1994). Results of this research are mixed, varying across countries and in terms of the evaluations and expec- tations of living standards considered. However, all studies find evidence for an effect of expectations regarding one's future standard of living, i.e. of prospective evaluations of change in one's personal circumstances. In the early transition, people who expected improvement in their standard of living uJere less egalitarian and more supportive of market principles than are those who foresaw no growth or a decline.

An important question for the future of the tran- sition to market justice concerns the relative influence of contemporary and retrospective versus prospective evaluations of change in personal eco- nomic circumstances. In the early transition, retrospective and contemporary evaluations of l i v ing standards may only have weakly affected market justice norms and beliefs because people lacked suf- ficient experience on which to make such a judgement. hloreover, declining or stagnant living standards may hare been seen by many people as the fault of Communist era regimes. A s the trarzsitionpro- ceeds, we expect that the effect ofretrospective and corztemporav ez:a/uatiorzs o j one? living standard has taken on increasing importance in shapirg marketjustice beli$.

Have prospective evaluations become more nega- tive, and has their influence waned over the first several years of the transition? Sustaining optimism about a better future standard of living in the face of poor economic conditions in the initial stages of establishing a market economy is important in terms of 'political patience' (Rose and hlishler, 1996). That is, if people believe that they will be bet- ter off in the future, they are more likely to grant political regimes implementing market reforms the time needed to institute economic change. As noted above, research in the early transition showed that prospective exraluations favoured market justice. The persistence of such patience over the later tran- sition remains an open question (Przeworski, 1991; Rose and Mishler, 1996; Zagorski, 1994) especially-

within postcommunist countries that have experi- enced marked economic troubles.

To construct a broad picture of the course of pub- lic opinion about market/socialist justice over the recent history of the postcommunist transition, we pursue three analyses. First, we examine aggregate

THE POSTCOMMUNIST LEGITIMATION OF CAPITALISM

change in market justice beliefs and norms over the period from 1991 to 1996. Second, we look at how the inter-correlations among market justice beliefs and norms have changed across time in our t ~ - e post-communist states. In each of these first two analyses we offer comparison with market justice beliefs and attitudes in three western countries: Great Britain, (former) West Germany, and the USA Thirdly, we use the 1996 survey data to estimate a model of the individual-level determination of market justice. By comparing results across these three analyses we can derive rudimentary estimates of the relative effects of collective and individual determinants of market justice beliefs and norms.

Data and Market Justice Measures Data

Our data are from representative surveys of persons aged 18 and older from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, (former) East Germany, Hungary, and Russia. Data were first collected in 1991. Six of the original eight postcommunist countries (excluding Poland and Slovenia) were able to fund a survey in 1996 replicating 80% of the questions asked in 1991 (in the Czech Republic in late 1995).' These five countries differ in ways that span key aspects of change over the transition to-date - in the courses followed by their economies, in closeness to the West, in pri~ratization policies, and so on. Thus, our results apply broadly to the postcommunist experi- ence. For western comparisons, we analyse data from Great Britain, (former) West Germany, and the USA that were collected by means of nationally representative surveys in 1991. Details of sampling and data collection are presented in the Appendix.

Market Justice Measures

Table A1 of the Appendix gives the exact question wordings for the 18 individual items in seven dimen- sions of socialistjmarket ~ust ice .~ We chose these items to represent the central elements of the socia- listimarket justice complex. The selection of these items and the construction of indices is guided by analyses of the factor structures in prior research using these same data (Kluegel et al., 1995).

Unweighted averages of items were constructed to form seven indices:

1. Egalitarian Principles is an index representing commitment to general equality in the distri- bution of income and wealth. It awrages respondents' support for absolute equality with support for need as a justice criteria.

2. Fair P q Ratio is a measure constructed from the ratio of what is considered a fair income for the chairman of 9 Ilry- corporation compared to that for a factory worker. It thus indicates what is considered to be a fair range of inequality.

3. Government Imteruention is an index of support for int. -9ntil .n the economy by the government to provide upper and lower limits to the income distribution. X high score indicates support for guaranteed jobs and a minimum and maximum income.

4. Capital& Principles is an index of support for three tenets of neoliberal capitalism. It indicates support for income as an incentive to effort, the value of profit-making for the long-run benefit of all, and the need to have inequality to moti- vate people to take responsibility.

5. Lgitimate I n e q m l i ~ is an index formed from aver- aging scores for four items. The respective items concern the presence in a society of equality of opportunity, reward for effort, reward for skill, and the satisfaction of need. A high score indi- cates that a respondent perceives that the economic system has legitimacy for people in general.

6. and 7. Xtgatiae and Positille Waltb are two indices formed from questions concerning the perceived causes of wealth. The negative attributions index indicates a belief that wealth is due to the perso- nal dishonesty of the rich, and to an exploitative economic system.The positive attributions index indicates a belief that wealth is due to the greater ability and hard work of the rich.

The first four of the above measures concern cen- tral aspects of marketjsocialist justice principles. The Egalitarian Principles index taps commitment to criteria in support of equality in principle. The official rhetoric of Soviet communism gave much stronger emphasis to criteria of equality and need than is found in western capitalism. Market justice involves rejecting fundamental egalitarianism in

JAMESR. KLUEGEL ETA1

favour of inegalitarian principles based on equity. The radical egalitarianism of early communism was replaced under Stalin with a more meritocratic and incentive-based system, further emphasized under Brezhnev. Nevertheless, in practice, incomes were less differentiated in the communist economies than in the West, and a corresponding tolerance for a limited fair range of inequality prevailed. Related key components of egalitarianism in the communist era in\-olved an emphasis on need as a criteria for a fair income distribution (Mason, 1995), and the idea of 'levelling' (Batygin, 19b,. L.IL3aniel, 1996) - a populist resentment of wealth rooted in an agrarian past. Historically, this sentiment has been wide- spread in Russia (Batygin, 1989) and perhaps other postcommunist states as well (Csepeli and Orkeny, 1992). The Far Pay Ratio measure is included to reflect popular sentiment about the fair range of inequality. Whereas market justice discourages gov- ernment intervention in the economy to correct problems, government intervention to address eco- nomic problems is strongly under- - - ~ ~ ~ l r a v e d socialist justice. Our measure of GG\einment Inter- vention concerns support for an active government role in levelling income, and in ensuring jobs and an income floor. The command economies of the former communist states were justified by means of the 'social contract' (Hauslohner, 1987; Kolarska- Bobinska, 1989; Millar and Wolchik, 1994) in-

exchange for acquiescence to state control, it pro- vided numerous entitlements and a generous 'social safety-net.' In contrast, of course, neoliberal capital- ism emphasizes the role of individual incentives motivated by profit and economic inequality. Popular perceptions regarding the justice of and need for individual incentives are reflected in the index of Capitalist Principles.

The latter three indices involve beliefs about opportunity and equity The Legitimate Inequality index concerns belief in the prevalence of opportu- nity and equity in general in respondents'respective countries. As such, it probably reflects people's assessment of how much opportunity is available and whether equity holds for the average person in a given country. Negativewealth and Positive\X:ealth provide a specific indication of the perceived legiti- macy of wealth in the respective countries. Separate indices were formed for negative and positive attributions concerning wealth - because prior

research has shown that they load on separate dimensions in factor analyses and are affected by dif- ferent variables (Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Kluegel et a/., 1995).

Aggregate Change We consider aggregate change of two kinds. First, we analyse mean or average change across the 1991 to 1996 period. Secondly, we look at group-specific change during this period within the five post- communist countries allowing us to judge if-

change over time has been evenly distributed across key social divisions. In other words, we will assess potential polarization in market justice beliefs and norms over the first several years of the transition.

Mean Change

Table 1 gives means for the above described seven indices of market/socialist justice in our five postcommunist countries in 1991 and 1996. The asterisks in Table 1 denote a statistically significant difference between means for 1991 and 1996. As indi- cated by their prevalence, we see that substantial change has taken place in these five years.

Change over this period is generally consistent with sociotropic expectations. Citizens of the Czech Republic and eastern Germany moved towards market justice. Hungary and Russia are best described as treading water, with some change towards socialist justice and other change in the direction of market justice. In Bulgaria the change has been in the direction of even more prevalent support for socialist justice.

Public opinion in the Czech Republic has shifted significantly towards less support for basic egalitar- ian principles, greater opposition to government intervention to promote social welfare, more toler- ance of a greater range of inequality, greater perceived general legitimacy of the economic system, and a more favourable view of wealth as due to positive personal qualities. Change in eastern Germany is somewhat less extensive, with declining support for government intervention, and an increase in the per- ceived range of fair inequality. Although negative attributions for wealth increased somewhat between 1991 and 1996, other aspects of market justice beliefs

THE POSTCOMMUNIST LEGITIMATION OF CAPITALISM

Table 1. dlean valuesf^ordimensions ofmarketandsockhtjmh - postcommunistcountries, 1991 and 1996

EQUAL CAPITAL GOVT. FAIR PAY LEGIT. NEG.W. POS.w. Bulgarza 1991 2.47 3 73 4.01 1.98 1.90 4 11 h 1277 1317 1376 816 1336 1117 1996 2 92* 3.16* 4.17* 3 97* 1.63* 4 44* r\: 1422 1473 1586 854 1525 1366

Eastern Gerrnav 1991 3.24 3.53 4.32 5 26 2.91 3.08 N 986 1003 1012 791 992 944 1996 3.26 3.29* 4.17* 6.50* 2.84 3.41* Ii 1071 1100 1125 812 1118 1061

Hungary 1991 N 1996 N

Russia 1991 N 1996 N

S o t e : EQUAL is an indexof egalitarian principles; CriPITriL is an index of support for capitallst prlnclples, GO\'T. is an Indexof support fo rgo~ernmen t

intervention to reduce ~nequal~t!-; FAIR P.4Y is the ratio of perceived fair pa!- for a director of a large corporation to that for a factory worker; LEGIT is an

indexof perceived legltimacyof the economic s!-stem; NEG.W: is an Indexof negative explanations for the causes of wealth; P0S.X: lsan indexof positive

explanations for the causes of wealth. See text for details of index construction.

* = p i 0 . 0 5 ,

did not change significantly. Because the perceived perceived legitimacy of the economic order, as east- legitimacy of the economic order was the highest ern Germany effectively 'bootstrapped' legitimate among postcommunist countries by a substantial wealth when it became part of a united Germany. margin in 1991, the absence of change may here be The German situation provides an interesting taken as showing support for market justice.j contrast with that in the Czech Republic. The

At the same time, the pattern of change inTable 1 Czech Republic shared with former East Germany supports an 'outside learning' interpretation (Roller, the advantage of closeness to western capitalism, 1994). Former East Germany was particularly advan- and an economically privileged status relative to taged in making the transition by ha\-ing the highest other former Soviet-bloc states. This is reflected in level of affluence among the former communist its stronger commitment in 1991 to market justice states, and by receiving 'ready-made' economic and norms relative to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia. political institutions from western Germany (Rose However, in 1991 the citizens of the Czech Republic and Haerpfer, 1996). We can see from Table 1 that it did not share former East German citizens'greater also had an advantage in terms of the justice beliefs sense of legitimacy of the economic order, holding held by its citizens in the early years of the evaluations of legitimacy much closer to those of the t r an~ i t ion .~ other three of our postcommunist states. Llovement Its advantage was especially large in the

JAMES R. KLUEGEL ETA1

Table 2. "Llean ~~a/ue~jordimensions - E ~ t e ~ ncapitalirt countries, 1991 4marketand iociali~?ju~ti~~e

EQUAL CAPITAL GOVT. FAIRPAY LEGIT. NEG.W. P0S.W.

Great Bntazn Mean 2.81 3.51 3.55 6.73 2.91 3 37 3.63 S 1244 1294 1309 1090 1307 1192 12'5

r.r--1 Mean ?;

EQUAL 1s an index oiegalltarian principles; C.\PITAL 1s an Indexof support for capitalist principles; GOYT is an ~ndex of support forgovernment

interLention to reduce inequality; FAIR PA\)'is the ratio of perce~ied h ~ rpay for a dlrector of a large corporation to that for a factory worker; ILGIT. 1s an index of perceived legitimac\ of the economic system; SEG.\Y is an ~ndexo inega tne explanations for the causes of e a t ; P . . is an ~ n d e xof posltlr-e explanations for the causes of wealth. See text for details of Index construction.

towards market justice in the Czech Republic has taken place in opposition to a stronger legacy of the perceived illegitimacy of the economic order than in eastern Germany.

Apart from an increase in the perceived fair range of inequality, in the 1991 to 1996 period opinion in Bulgaria moved consistently towards greater sup- port for socialist justice. The Bulgarian public became more egalitarian, less supportive of market principles, more supportive of government inter- vention, and developed a stronger sense of the illegitimacy of the economic system. hloreover, the change is substantial: support for egalitarian princi- ples increased by nearly one-half point on a five- point scale and support for market principles dropped by over one-half point. A belief in the illegitimacy of the economic order was markedly prevalent among Bulgarians in 1991. In this light, the decline in perceived legitimacy of the economic system in general and the increase in the negative view of wealth in 1996 is truly striking.

In Russia, between 1991 and 1996, we see substan- tial movement towards support for socialist justice in principle, but also a small increase in the assessed legitimacy of the economic order. In light of the economic troubles experienced in Russia over the past several years, a small increase from a very low base of legitimacy in 1991 is notable. Hungary some- what reverses this pattern. A movement towards

range of inequality is accompanied by a decline in the perceived legitimacy of the economic order. Between 1991 and 1996, belief in the legitimacy of the economic order in general decreased, and nega- tive attributions for wealth increased.

Consistent with our expectations, we see persis- tent high levels of negative attributions for wealth, and persistent very low perceived general legitimacy of the economic order. In three of the five countries - including eastern Germany, which otherwise moved towards market justice - mean negative attributions for wealth significantly increased from 1991 to 1996. In Russia the mean level significantly decreased, but stayed at an abso- lute high level. In the Czech Republic - again otherwise moving substantially towards market justice - mean negative attributions for wealth did not change form 1991 to 1996, also remaining at an absolute high level.

Perceived general opportunity and equity declined in Bulgaria and Hungary. It increased somewhat in Russia, but to quite a low level in absolute terms. General legitimacy significantly increased in the Czech Republic and remained at a relatively high level in eastern Germany To better evaluate how high the negative attributions for wealth are, and how low the perceived general legiti- macy of economic policy is in postcommunist states, we compare them to the West. Table 2 gives East-

market justice in declining support for government %st comparisons for these beliefs, and for market] intervention and an increase in the perceived fair socialist justice norms.

THE POSTCOMMUNIST LEGITIMATION OF CAPITALISM

In 1996, beliefs about opportunity and equity are substantially more negative across the board in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia than in the three wes- tern countries. O n a five-point scale the overall assessment of opportunity and equity is on average 1 to 2 points lower in these three countries than in the K'est. Negative attributions for wealth average one point higher than in the VFest, again on a five- point scale. The gap in positive attributions for wealth is somewhat smaller, but nevertheless Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Russian citizens are sub- stantially less likely to give positive attributions for wealth.

Two findings fromTable 1 seem anomalous. First, adherence to Capitalist Principles declined in the Czech Republic and eastern Germany, in spite of an overall movement towards market justice norms and beliefs. Secondly, between 1991 and 1996 the per- ceived fair range of income inequality increased in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia, in spite of other indications of a lack of change or change towards socialist justice in these countries.

A comparison with Western means suggests that the first seeming anomaly may be explained by 'revolutionary zeal'. \Y'e see in Table 2 that in the Czech Republic and eastern Germany the average level of endorsement of Capitalist Principles was higher in 1991 than that found in Great Britain, West Germans and the USA for the same year. Between 1991 and 1996 the average endorsement of Capitalist Principles has fallen in the Czech Republic and eastern Germany to levels approximately equal to those in western countries. This suggests that the apparent decline in support for Capitalist Principles is best seen as a cooling of 'revolutionary zeal', or a return to a normal level of support, as defined by average support in the West.

The second anomaly suggests that Homans's dynamic (1974) may be at work. He has proposed that over time the 'ought' is determined by the 'is: We also asked respondents to estimate the income a director and a factory worker actually receive (not reported). The ratio of estimated actual incomes has increased in all five countries, but at a much higher rate than for the ratio of evaluated fair in comes."^ the actual (or at least 'perceived actual') range of inequality in postcommunist countries has increased over time, a larger range of inequality may have come to be considered fair by means of

Homans's substitution of the 'ought' for the 'is: Because the perceived actual ratio is larger than the perceived fair ratio, and because it has increased more rapidly than has the perceived fair ratio, the perceived unfairness of income inequality has also grown between 1991 and 1996. In this respect, the increase in Fair Pay Ratio in countries that otherwise have a sustained or increasing commitment to socialist justice is less of an anomaly.

Group-Specific Change

A potential consequence of growing awareness of one's economic interests is the polarization of opi- nion. Over the early years of the transition groups with different putative economic interests may ha\-e come to hold increasingly divergent market/socialist justice beliefs. Such polarization may have taken place, of course, without resulting in mean or aver- age change in adherence to market/socialist justice beliefs and norms. The extent and nature of polari- zation has important implications for interpreting trends and for the politics of economic change in postcommunist states.

Table 3 provides data for evaluating group-specific change. Rows labelled '1996'give the differ- ences in means for dimensions of market/socialist justice between age, education, gender, economic sector, and occupation groups.6 Rows labelled 'Gap change' provide a measure of polarization over the 1991 to 1996 period. The values in this row equal the difference between the absolute value of the mean difference between categories of a given vari- able in 1996 (shown inTable 3) and the absolute value of the mean difference between categories of the same variable in 1991 (not shown). A statistically significant positive value for 'Gap change' thus indicates that the respective mean differences in market/socialist justice between groups ha\-e grown larger between 1991 and 1996, and implies increasing polarization (and a negative value, of course, implies decreasing polarization).-

In postcommunist countries, age-groups differ markedly in the circumstances prevailing at the time of their political coming-of-age as well in the current and likely future impact on them of the tran- sition to market economies (Rose and Carnaghan, 1994). One contrast of substantial potential importance for market justice beliefs and norms is

262 JAMES R. KLUEGEL ETA1

Table 3. Dzfferences in mean vaiuesjor dimensions ofmarket and socialist;ustice by age, education, gender, economic sector and occupation in 1996, and the 1991 to 1996gap change postcommunist countrie~ -

Bulgarza Young-Old 1996 Gap change College-No College 1996 Gap change Male-Female 1996 Gap change Private-Not-Private 1996 Gap change Manual-Non-Manual 1996 Gap Change

Cxech Repubiir Young-Old 1996 Gap change College-No College 1996 Gap change Male-Female 1996 Gap change Private-Not-Private 1996 Gap change Manual-Non-Manual 1996 Gap change

Eastern Germanq' Young-Old 1996 Gap change College-No College 1996 Gap change Male-Female 1996 Gap change Private-Not-Private 1996 Gap change

EQUAL CAPITAL GOVT. FAIR PAY LEGIT.

-0.30* 0.19* -0.25* -0.71* -0.19* 0.01 -0.09 -0.17* 0.69* -0.05

-0.68* 0.10 -0.41 1.44* -0.08 0.20 -0.07 0.16 0.93* -0.10

-0.18* 0.03 -0.13* 0.64 0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.12 0.62 -0.03

-0.15 0.27* -0.25* 1.55* -0.03 -0.13 0.09 -0.09 1.48* -0.12

0.33* 0.00 0.18* -0.28 -0.02 -0.10 -0.12 -0.03 -0.11 -0.05

THE POSTCOMMUNIST LEGITIMATION OF CAPITALISM

Table 3. Continued

EQUAL CAPITAL GOVT. FAIR PAY LEGIT. NEG.W. POS.W.

Manual-Non-Manual 1996 Gap change

Hungarq' Young-Old 1996 Gap change College-No College 1996 Gap change Male-Female 1996 Gap change Private-Not-Private 1996 Gap change Manual-Non-Manual 1996 Gap change

Ruuta Young-Old 1996 Gap change College-No College 1996 Gap change Male-Female 1996 Gap change Private-Not-Private 1996 Gap change Manual-Non-Manual 1996 Gap change

T o t e : EQLAL 1s an Index of egal~tarlan pnnclples; CAPITAL 1s an index of support for capltallst principles; GC2VT 1s an Indexof support for government lnterventlon to reduce lnequallty; FAIR Pr\Ti~s the ratlo of perceived fair pay for a director of a large corporation to that for a factory ~vorker; LEGIT. 1s an

index of perce~ved legitlmacyofthe economic system; KEG \XI 1s an Indexof negatlve explanations for the causes ofwealth; POS.\X: 1s an indexof pos~t l re

explanations for the causes of~r,ealth. The 'Gap Change'equals the absolute ralue of the 1996 mean mlnus the absolute ralue o f the 1991 mean, for each respective index = p < 0.05.

between people young enough to have or to be able or older in 1991 or 54 or more in 1996. K'e see from to develop skills of value in a market economy, and Table 3 that in 1996 the young in general more people approaching retirement age.Table 3 gives this strongly endorse market justice than do the old. comparison for the 'young' - aged 39 or younger in Hon~ever,we also see that there is little indication 1991 or 44 or younger 1996 - and the 'old' - aged 50 of polarization by age group. Of the 35 comparisons

JAMESR. KLUEGEL ETA1

between young and old in Table 3, only seven of the gap-change values are statistically significant. Furthermore, only for comparisons involving Fair Pay in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia is there an indi- cation of an increasing gap between young and old. The difference between young and old in market justice norms and beliefs found in 1996, then, is generally the same as that found in 1991. Change in support for market/socialist justice over the early transition years has taken place evenly across age- groups.

Is there evidence of polarization along the lines of major group memberships other than age? In 1996 adherence to socialistjmarket justice differed by education, gender, economic sector, and occupa- tion in all five postcommunist countries. Similar divisions have been found in other research on the early transition years (Duch, 1993; McIntosh e t a l , 1994; Mason, 1995; Miller e ta l . , 1996). In the early transition, citizens with a college education were consistently more strongly opposed to socialist jus- tice principles than others. In keeping with a likely attribution of economic problems to the previous communist regimes, the highly educated also had lower mean perceived economic system legitimacy (in all countries save Hungary). Gender differences in 1996 centred on a greater support for equality among than men. Women support egalitar- ian principles and government intervention more strongly than do men, and they hold a smaller range of income to be fair. There were virtually no significant differences between men and women in the perceived legitimacy of the economic system or in attributions for wealth.

At least in the long run, the college-educated have been better able to take advantage of new opportu- nities brought about by the dex-elopment and change of market economies. Research shouls that men have benefited politically and economically more from the introduction of free markets than have women in postcommunist countries (Kligman, 1994). Table 3 shon~s, however, that education and gender differ- ences in socialist/market justice dimensions have changed little between 1991 and 1996. Only in Bulgaria and Hungary has the tendency for the college-educated to see a larger range of inequality as fair than do the non-college-educated become significantly more pronounced between 1991 and 1996. In eastern Germany, however, this same

tendency became significantly less pronounced over the five years. In all countries, except Hungary (where there was no significant difference in 19?1), the education difference in perceived legitimacy of the economic system in 1991 was no longer signifi- cant in 1996.

Here again we have negative evidence concerning polarization. Perhaps, however, we will find evi- dence of polarization in the economic sphere. In 1991, Ost's (1993) 'confusion' may have applied more to people's understanding of how their posi- tion in the economic order relates to their interests than to their understanding of interests based on education or gender. After all, in 1991 the publics of postcommunist countries on average had only a year or two of direct experience with the workings of a market economy to call on in deciding how their interests are shaped by their position in the labour market.

InTable 3, however, we see no systematic increase between 1991 and 1996 in mean differences by eco- nomic sector or occupation. In East Germany only, the gap between manual and non-manual workers in Egalitarianism and support for Government Inter- ventionism became larger. In Hungary only, the gap between manual and non-manual workers in the size of the perceived fair range of inequality increased. In 1991 Bulgarian workers in the private sector did not significantly differ from workers in the non-private sector in their perceived fair range of inequality. By 1996, however, Bulgarian workers in the private sector had a significantly higher per- ceived fair range of inequality than those in the non-private sector. Over the same period the reverse pattern held in Hungary. Our final piece of evidence also argues against increasing polarization along sociodemographic lines.

This has both optimistic and pessimistic implica- tions. For the optimist, the lack of increased polarization implies that the potential for political conflict among key sociodemographic groups over economic justice issues has not grouTn over the initial years ofthe transition. For the pessimist, how- ever, the lack of increased differences between age and education groups in countries where commit- ment to socialist justice remains strong overall does not bode well for future change towards market jus- tice. In these countries, the young and the highly educated share the same lack of change or increase

THE POSTCOMMUNIST LEGITIMATION OF CAPITALISM

Table 4. Correlations among dimensions ofmarket and socialzstjtlstice - %stern capitalist cotlntries, 1991

EQUAL CAPITAL GOVT. FAIR PAY LEGIT. NEG.W. POS.W.

Great Brztazn EQUAL CAPITAL GOVT. FAIR PAY LEGIT NEG \X P0s .x :

1Est Germay EQUAL 1.00 CAPITAL -0.16 1.00 GOITT. 0.46 -0.08 1.00 FAIR PAY -0.11 0.08 -0.20 1.00 LEGIT -0.22 0.38 -0.17 0.02" 1.00 NEG VI: 0.24 -0.16 0.20 -0.11 -0.30 P0S.X: -0.15 0.19 -0.12 0.02% 0.28

VSS4 EQUAL CAPITAL GOVT. FAIR PAY LEGIT NEG POS.VC:

a~ndicatesthat a correlation 1s not statlstically sign~iicant (p < 0.05). All other correlat~ons are stat~sticaliy slgnliicant (p < 0.05). A-oh: EQUAL is an Index of egalltar~an prlnclples; CAPITAL 1s an index of support for capltallst prlnc~ples; GOT'T. 1s an Index of support for government lnterventlon to reduce lnequal~ty; E i I R PAYIS the ratlo of perceived fair pay for a director of a large corporat~on to that for a factory worker; LEGIT. 1s an

indexof perceived leg~tlmacy of the economlc system; XEG \X: 1s an lndexofnegat~ve explanations for the causes ofaeal th; POS.\X. 1s an index ofpositlve explanations for the causes of wealth. See text for details of index constructlon.

in support for socialist justice that has been found requisites for support of market justice. Though over the early transition found among other groups. Lane and others have focused on the USA, we see Neither simple 'cohort replacement' due to the that the market justice model applies to western passage of time nor the greater political influence capitalism in general. In each of these three western of the more highly educated is likely to bring countries, the stronger the perceived availability of increased support for market justice beliefs and opportunity and equity in the income distribution norms to Bulgaria, Hungar~; or Russia in the near (Legitimate Inequality), the greater the support for future. Capitalist Principles and the greater the opposition

to Government Intervention. Other correlations support Della-Fave's proposed importance for mar-

Change in Correlations ket justice of attributing wealth to positive traits. Support for Capitalist Principles increases with

Table 4 gives the correlations among the seven mea- tncreasing positive attributions for wealth, as does sures of socialistjmarket justice beliefs for Great opposition to Government Intervention. Opposi- Britain, former West Germany, and the USA. These tion to Government Intervention also increases correlations support Lane's argument regarding the with increasing negative attributions for wealth.

JAMES R. KLUEGEL ETA1

Correlations among dimensions of justice beliefs -and norms in the five postcommunist countries are given in Table 5. Correlations for 1991 are presented below the diagonal of the matrix for each country, and correlations for 1996 are presented above the diagonal. From the 1991 correlations, we see that in our five postcommunist states key market justice principles were not linked to legitimacy evaluations as strongly as they are in western countries. In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and eastern Germany, in 1991 Capitalist Principles essentially was un-correlated with Legitimate Inequality and with attributions for wealth. In all five countries, there was little to no significant correlation in 1991 between support for Government Intervention and Legitimate Inequality or attributions for wealth.

However, by 1996 the correlation between legiti- macy evaluations and key market justice principles had strengthened in all countries but Hungaq8 Table 5 shou~s that in all countries except Hungary the correlations between support for Capitalist Principles and Government Intervention, on the one hand, and Economic System Legitimacy, Negative Attributions for Wealth, and Positive Attributions forWealth, on the other, became signif- icantly larger in 1996.9 In the Czech Republic, eastern Germany, and Russia, these 1996 correlations closely match the parallel ones in thewest.

As expected, the links between market justice beliefs and norms did become stronger over the 1991-1996 period of the postcommunist transition. Over this period, support for market justice norms became more strongly tied to evaluations of whether or not the economic system is functioning fairly in fact. Lane's procedural requirements for market jus- tice of perceived ax-ailable opportunity and reward for effort clearly had taken hold in postcommunist countries by 1996. As per Della-Fave's contention regarding western capitalism, by 1996 support for market justice in east-central European capitalism became shaped as well by popular views of the legitimacy of wealth.

There are two important implications of these findings for the trends in support for market] socialist justice we observed earlier. First, they suggest that the cross-country decline in support for Capitalist Principles seen in Table 1 resulted from its increasing basis in economic legitimacy perceptions. In Bulgaria, the strengthened influence

of the perceived functioning of the economic order was combined with a persistently high sense of per- ceived economic illegitimav to produce a decline in support for Capitalist Principles to a level sub-stantially below that found in the West. In the Czech Republic and eastern Germanp its strength- ened influence met levels of perceived economic legitimacy in 1996 that are much closer to those pre- vailing in western capitalism. The result was again a decline in support for Capitalist Principles -furthering the cooling of support for capitalism based on revolutionary zeal - but only bringing support to levels near those prevailing in the K'est.

Second, the increased influence of system legiti- macy helps sustain high levels of support for government interventionism. As Lane (1986) notes, in the CSA opposition to government intervention in the ulorkings of the economy stems from a pre- vailing trust of the current economic system to produce fair outcomes. As we have seen, in post- communist countries it is the prevailing distrust of the current economic order that encourages support for an active government role to ensure fair out- comes.

Individual-Level Determinants Economic Position and Economic Evaluations

We employ three measures of a respondent's eco-nomic position, and evaluations of her or his economic experience. Economic position is mea- sured by respondent's reports of holding a manual vs. non-manual occupation, employment in the pri- vate vs. non-private sector of the economy, and having been unemployed or not during the past ten year^.'^ We categorize a respondent as 'employed in the private sector'only if she or he is self-employed or clearly works for a for-profit, privately owned firm. This allouls for a stronger test of how the experience of working in true market-driven circumstances shapes beliefs and norms (cf. Earle and Rose, 1996). Indix-iduals who have not been employed during the past ten years or were never part of the labour force were not included (they were treated as missing data) in forming the unemployment experience measure. This provides an estimation of its effects among peo- ple to whom it is most personally relevant and meaningful.The evaluation ofone's current standard

THE POSTCOMMUNIST LEGITIMATION OF CAPITALISM

Table 5. Correlations among dimensions ofmarket and socialistjustice - postcommunist countries, 1991 (below dkgona4 and 1996 (above diagonal)

EQUAL CAPITAL GOVT. FAIR PAY LEGIT. NEG.W. POS.w. Bzrlgaria EQUAL CAPITAL GOYT. FAIR PAY LEGIT N EG W. P0S.U'.

Cxech Rtpublic EQUAL 1.00 -0.09 0.41 -0.11 -0.03ab 0.09 -0.02b CAPITAL -0.13 1.00 -0.19 0.08 0.24% -0.1 6" 0.27" GOVT. 0.38 -0.14 1.00 -0.11" -0.15% 0.30" -0.14" FA I R PAY -0.19 0.11 -0.27 1 .OO O.lla -0.08 0.02b LEGIT 0.18 O.OOb 0.16 -0.01 1.00 -0.36" 0.29 NEG U[ 0.06b 0.04b 0.06b -0.10 -0.24 1.00 -0.33 POS. U[ -0.03b 0.07 0.02b 0.04b 0.23 -0.30 1.00

East Gprmaq EQUAL 1.00 -0.17a 0.48" -0.19 -0.07" 0.21 -0.07 CAPITAL -0.04b 1.00 -O.2la 0.03b 0.29 -0.21" 0.17 GOVT. 0.26 O.0jb 1 .OO -0.18 -0.16a 0.30" -0.13" FAIR PAY -0.20 0.08 -0.26 1.00 0.09 -0.11 0.07 LEGIT 0.07 0.23 O.OOb O.Olb 1.00 -0.26 0.24 NEGW 0.15 -0.10 0.13 -0.10 -0.19 1.00 -0.20 POS.U! -0.07 0.14 -0.03b O.OZb 0.17 -0.18 1 .OO

Hungav EQUAL CAPITAL GOVT. FAIR PAY LEGIT NEG U[ POS. U!

R ussia EQCAL CAPITAL GOVT. FAIR PAY LEGIT NEG U: POS. U!

a~nd~catesthat a correlatlon between two variables based on 1996 data differs significantly (p < 0.05) from a correlation between the same two rarlables based on 1991 data.

bindimes that a correlatlon 1s not statistically slgn~ficant (p > 0.05). All other correlat~ons are stat~stically slgnlficant ( p i 0.05). X o t e : EQUAL 1s an Index of egalitarian principles; CAPITAL is an index of support for capitalist pnnclples; GOY7 is an index of support for government Intervention to reduce ~nequal~ty; FAIR PAY is the ratio of perceived fair pay for a dlrector of a large corporation to that for a factory worker; LEGIT. IS an Index of perceived Ieglt~macyofthe economlc system; NEG.W 1s an Index of negative explanations for the causes of wealth; POS.\X 1s an Index ofposltlve explanations for the causes of wealth. See text for detalls of index construction.

268 JAMES R. KLUEGEL ET AL

Table 6. Percentage distrihcltionqor economicpositon and standard dlieing (SOL) e~'aluations:postcornmunistcountries,I991 and 1996

Bulgaria Czech Republic East Germany Hungary Russia 1991 1996 1991 1995 1991 1996 1991 1996 1991 1996

Occupatzon 5Ianual 46.2 55.6 51.5 449 36 3 340 627 56.2 40.4 41.6 N 777 50- 437 584 551 421 466 333 1105 750 Significant p <0.01 p <0.05 N.S. p <0.05 N.S

Cn~mplqrnent In past 10 >ears 15.4 43.8 3.6 4.8 8.2 44.4 8.7 36.7 7.1 18.7 h 732 917 391 354 367 505 725 384 1135 1505 Significant p <0.001 X.S. p <0.001 p <0.001 p <0.001

S O L .Sat$faction \'cry satisfied (6,7) 20.6 23.0 Satisfied (5) 18.5 19.8 Xeutral (4) 28.7 26.2 Vnsatisfied (3) 15.2 15.9 \'cry unsatisfied (1,2) 16.9 15.0 5Iean 4.11 4.21 X 809 1240 S~gnificant N.S.

IOL srnce I989 hIuch better 3.2 8.8 21.4 2.2 12.0 Somewhat better 4.7 23.9 32.0 10.2 15.8 Same 6.3 22 9 23.0 17.4 17.9 Somewhat worse 19.4 28.2 15.7 45.3 18.6 lIuch worse 66.4 16.1 79 24.9 35.7 N 599 1190 1108 984 1492

S O L In ?years SIuch better 2.4 2.3 1.5 6.5-

Somewhat better 18.0 - 20.0 19.6 15.5 Same 14.2 - 47.0 19.2 17.1 Somewhat worse 6.6 - 21.0 39.3 6.2 hluch worse 19.6 5.0 9.3 7.4-

Don't know 39.1 - 4.7 11.2 47.3 S 621 - 1131 9 92 1585

Aotr . i : 'h.S.'~nJlcatss no itat~sticallr s~gniticant d~fference [p >0.05) beruzen the 1991 and 1996 dlstrlbutlons of the relevant variable

See the test for questlon wordings and varlable codings.

of living is measured by placement on a seven-point changewas not asked in the Czech Republic in either scale, ranging from completely dissatisfied (1) to year).I2 Each evaluation was made on a five-point completely satisfied (7).11 It was measured in 1991 scale, ranging from much u70rse (1) to much better and in 1996. Evaluations of retrospective and pro- (5).Table 6 gives descriptive data on these measures, spective change in one's standard of living were arrayed separately for each question and year in which obtained in 1996 only (a question about prospective it was asked.

THE POSTCOMMUNIST LEGITIMATION OF CAPITALISM

Matching general economic data, we see a marked change in our respondents'economic positions over the five years from 1991 to 1996.There has been onl!- a little change in the occupational distribution, but a statisticall!- significant increase in employment in the private sector in all of our postcommunist countries, except Hungary The increase has been especially large in the Czech Republic. InTable 6 we also see that respondents'reports of having experi- enced unemployment during the past ten years increased dramatically over the 1991 to 1996 period. Among persons who have been employed during the past ten years, it increased from by two-and-a- half (Russia) to five times (eastern Germany). Onl!- in the Czech Republic did it remain at a low level.

Evaluations of economic experience differ mark- edly among countries, reflecting countr!- differences in the performance of the economy over this period. Satisfaction with one's current material condition in 1991 was substantially higher in the Czech Republic and eastern German5 than in the other three of our postcommunist states. In Bulgaria, respondents' satisfaction with their current standard of living -dropped dramatically - on average by 1.4 points on a five-point scale. Hungary has also seen a decline in satisfaction with the current standard of living, -but the average level has remained nearly constant in the Czech Republic, eastern German!; and Russia.

Bulgarian citizens also give strongly negative eva- luations of retrospective change in their personal standard of living, with two-thirds seeing it as having become much worse between 1991 and 1996. An on-balance negative evaluation of retrospective change is shared by respondents in three of the other four countries. Eastern Germany is the exception, with 'winners' - those seeing their standard of living as improved - outnumbering 'losers' -those seeing it as having worsened over the transition - by two to one. In the Czech Republic this balance only slightly favours 'losers', but it favours them much more substantially in the Hungarian and Russian publics.

The gap in prospective evaluations between east- ern Germany and Bulgaria, Hungary and Russia is as pronounced. In light of the prevailing negative eva- luations of current and retrospective material conditions, a'same'response in the latter three coun- tries concerning expected standard of living in five years is a pessimistic assessment. In contrast, a'same'

response in eastern Germany is an optimistic one. In 1996 Bulgarians, Hungarians, and Russians held much more negative evaluations of their future stan- dard of living than did eastern Germans. Seventy per cent of respondents from eastern Germany saw the future as offering a standard of living the same or better than their current one. In contrast, in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia, 80 per cent on aver- age saw their standards of living remaining the same or getting worse or were uncertain (i.e. said 'don't know').

Recursive Model

We have seen above that the differences among countries and over time argue that economic posi- tion and economic evaluations potentially play a large role in explaining country differences and change over time in market justice beliefs and norms. How strong a role depends, of course, on how much these factors influence market justice beliefs and norms in fact. To analyse the individual- level determinants of market justice norms and beliefs, we emplo!- a three-level recursive causal model. We assume that sociodemographic factors and economic position are causally prior to people's evaluations of their living standards. Each of these, in turn, is assumed to be causally prior to market justice beliefs and norms. Finally, we assume that the primaq- direction of causal influence is from market justice beliefs to market justice norms.

The first two assumptions are commonly made, and are the subject of little dispute. Assuming that the primary direction of influence runs from market justice beliefs to market justice norms is more open to the question. It is quite likely that beliefs and norms are mutually reinforcing in mature capitalist societies under normal economic circumstances. One's beliefs about the economic order may well be shaped by support for capitalist norms as well as shaping such support. For example, someone who believes strongl!. in the fairness of profits may be more likely to see 'real world' wealth in a positive light that someone who sees profits as unfair in prin- ciple. However, u7e propose that the predominant direction of influence in our postcommunist coun- tries is from beliefs about opportunitpand equity to market justice norms. In light of the stark economic troubles of postcommunism and the high salience of

JAMES R. KLUEGEL ET AL

personal economic experience, it seems likel!- that beliefs about the economic order are more experience-driven, and less open to selectively perceived 'evidence' based simply on its consistency with market justice principles. Moreover, in the postcommunist region people have highly meaning- ful personal economic experience, and readily visible indications of the state of the economy and its change in recent years to call upon in forming their beliefs. This, we propose, makes it less likely that people will develop beliefs about the economic order simpl!- out of acceptance or rejection of mar- ket justice principles.

Market Justice Beliefs

To assess the influence of economic position and evaluations, we carried out a set of regression ana- lyses whose results are displayed in Tables 7 and 8. We estimated each of the coefficients in Tables 7 and 8 (except that for Fair Pa!-) using structural equa- tion models with latent traits for the respective indicators of market justice beliefs and norm. Accordingly, the parameters in Tables 7 and 8 are corrected for attenuation due to unreliabilit!. of measurement in the respective dependent variables.

To permit comparisons of the relative strengths of effect within a specific countr!; u7e present standar- dized regression coefficients for the effects of our independent variables. One must, of course, be cau- tious in comparing standardized coefficients among different groups - in this case, among countries. However, corresponding unstandardized coeffi-cients (not presented) tell exactly the same story as the standardized coefficient^.'^ Although there are selected differences among countries in the effects of some variables, overall the size and patterns of effects found in Tables 7 and 8 are verj- much the same among all countries. Thus, the discussion below focuses on the general effects of independent variables across all countries.

To simplify the presentation of a potentially large number of coefficients, we employ a 'condensed' for- mat inTables 7 and 8. Panels I and I1 inTable 7, and I, 11, and I11 inTable 8, give for each country effects of the respective sets of variables under the above causal model. Each panel gives the total effects -direct and indirect through causally subsequent factors - of the respective listed variables. The

partial regression coefficients in each panel are from models controlling for sociodemographic variables (age, education, income, and gender).14 However, to save space we do not present regression coefficients for these variables. The coefficients given in Panel I1 are from regressions including the variables in Panel I (occupation, economic sector, unemplopment experience, and sociodemographic variables) as well as the three standard-of-living eva- luations listed in Panel 11. The coefficients given in Panel 111 are from regressions including the vari- ables in Panels I (occupation, economic sector, unemplopment experience, and sociodemographic variables) and I1 (standard-of-living evaluations) as well as the three measures of market justice beliefs listed in Panel 111.

Table 7 gives regression results for market justice beliefs: as may be seen, of the economic position measures only employment in the private sector has consistent statistically significant effects on market justice beliefs. People employed in the private sector generally evaluate inequality as fairer in fact than those who d o not work in the private sector. Neither occupation nor unemployment experience signifi- cantly shapes market justice beliefs. Contrary to our expectation that unemployment experience has a stronger effect in postcommunist countries, it shares the same lack of influence found in the West.

Personal economic experience has substantial influence on market justice beliefs. The joint influence of retrospective, contemporarj-, and prospective evaluations is much larger than that of sociodemographic variables and economic position measures.15 This is indicated by the marked increase in R-squares for each country that we see when we move from Panel I to Panel I1 inTable 7.

In general, the better people evaluate their retro- spective, contemporar!; and prospective standards of living, the more positive are their beliefs about the justice of the economic order overall, and the legitimacy of wealth in particular. In addition, we see that retrospective, contemporar!; and prospec- tive evaluations each have statistically significant partial effects on market justice beliefs. As we expected, by 1996 retrospective and contemporary evaluations have taken on equal importance to pro- spective evaluations of one's standard of living in shaping market justice beliefs. Prospective evalua- tions also significantly shaped market justice beliefs

THE POSTCOMMUNIST LEGITIMATION OF CAPITALISM

Table 7. Regression coeficientsJordeterminants qfnzarketjuistice beii$:postcommunist countries, 1996

Bulgaria Czech Republic East Germany Hungary Russia

Legztzmate Inequaiz~: I hlanual -0.07 0.01 0 06 0.03 Pr~rate -0.00 0 19** 0.06 0.09** Unemploved -0 09** -0.11** 0.15* -0.22** R2 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06

Legitimate Inequalig: I1 Past SOL Satisfaction with SOL Future SOL R2

Agatice ueaith: I1 Past SOL -0.22** -0.27** -0.04 -0.11** Satisfaction with SOL -0.22** -0.24** -0.16** -0.10** Future SOL 0.03 - -0.21** -0.04 R' 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.17

Porztz~e 2~eaith. I hlanual Pr~vate Unemployed R' Positicp iueaitli: I1 Past SOL Satisfaction with SOL Future SOL R2

iiotes: CoeKic~ents are from structural equatlon models ~71 th latent traits, and are In standard~zed form. hlodels In Panel I also Include age, education,

Income, and gender Models In Panel I1 also Include the variables In Panel 1 'SOL'stands for 'standard ofllvlng:

See test for questlon urord~ngs and varlable cod~ngs

in 1996. However, this finding has mixed implica- Market Justice Norms tions. In eastern Germany, where we have seen that prospective evaluations were quite positive in late Table 8 gives regression results for market justice 1996, it has favourable implications for continued norms. It shows that each of these norms is shaped by support of market justice beliefs and norms. For Bul- economic position, economic evaluations, and mar- garia, Hungary, and Russia, where very negative ket justice beliefs. However, the influence of these prospective evaluations held in 1996, it is a force sus- three factors differs among market justice norms. taining adherence to socialist justice. Egalitarianism and Government Intervention are

272 JAMES R. KLUEGEL ETA1

Table 8. RegressioncoeficientsJordettrmlnantsofmarketjustice norms: postcommunist countries, 1996

Bulgaria

Egalztarzanzsm: I Manual Prtrate Unemployed R2

Egalitarianism: II Past SOL -0.13** Satisfaction with SOL 0.07* Future SOL -0.15** R2 0.20

Egalitarianism: 111 Legitimate Inequalit!. 0.16** Negative Wealth 0.02 PositireUTealth -0.01 R2 0.22

Capitalist Prznczpies: 1 hlanual Pr~ra te Unemployed R2

Capitalist Principles: 1I Past SOL Satisfaction with SOL Future SOL R2

Capitalist Pr~nciples: 111 Legitimate inequality 0.07* Negative wealth -0.19** Positive wealth 0.30** R2 0.35

Government Interventlon: I Manual 0.12** Prlvate -0.17** Unemployed 0.03 R2 0.12

Government Interventlon: II Past SOL -0.09** Satlsfactlon with SOL -0.13** Future SOL -0.19** R' 0.19

Government Intervention: 111 Legitimate Inequality -0.07* Negative Wealth 0.17** PositireK'ealth 0.05 R2 0.23

Czech Republic

-0.10** 0.06 -

0.18

0.06 0.07* 0.03 0.19

0.19** -0.10*

0.25** 0.31

0.44** -0.24**

0.27** 0.34

-0.19** -0.07* -

0.38

-0.02 0.26**

-0.01 0.45

East Germany

0.03 -0.15** -0.12**

0.34

0.03 0.22**

-0.00 0.39

0.28** -0.18**

0.11** 0.38

0.38** -0.12**

0.02 0.20

0.05 -0.20** -0.10**

0.25

-0.06 0.27**

-0.04 0.33

Hungary Russia

0.01 0.03

-0.10* 0.31

0.14** -0.02

0.081* 0.33

0.20** -0.01

0.13* 0.27

0.40** -0.11** -0.07*

0.35

-0.06 -0.09** -0.04

0.37

0.08** 0.00 0.02 0.16**

-0.11** 0.06 0.38 0.40

Continued

THE POSTCOMMUNIST LEGITIMATION OF CAPITALISM

Bulgaria Czech Republic East Germany Hungary Russia

Table 8. Continued

Fazr Pq Ratro: I hIanual Private Unemployed R2

Fair Pq Ratio: II Past SOL Satisfaction with SOL Future SOL R'

Fair Pqy Ratio: III Legitimate Inequality NegativeK'ealth PositireVC'ealth R2

* =p<0.05; ** = p<O.O1.

S o t s : Coeffic~ents for Egalltarian~sm, Cap~tal~st Princ~ples, and Government Intervent~on are from structural equatlon models a l t h latent rralts, and are In

standardized form. Coeffic~ents for Falr Pay Ratlo are from a regresslon model (without a latent tra~t) and are In standard~zed form. Models In Panel I also ~nclude age, education, income and gender. Models In Panel I1 also Include the variables In Panel I. Models In Panel 111 also lnclude

variables In Panels I and II.'SOL'stands for 'standard of Ilv~ng:

See text for questlon wordings and varlable cod~ngs.

more strongly shaped by sociodemographic factors and economic position than is Capitalist Principles. Manual workers and those employed in the non- private sector are more supportive of equality and need principles, and more strongly favour govern- ment intervention to reduce inequality than do non-manual or private sector workers. Support for Egalitarianism and Government Intervention also -

consistently differs across the five postcommunist countries by gender, education, and income, Men are more supportive of each, while the more highly educated and higher-income respondents more strongly oppose egalitarian principles and govern- ment intervention to reduce inequality (coefficients not reported). As for market justice beliefs, unem- ployment experience has little to no statistically significant influence on market justice norms.

Adherence to Capitalist Principles is little affected by sociodemographic variables or economic position. Only employment in the private sector and income have consistent effects across countries, so that people employed in the private sector and with higher incomes more strongly endorse

Capitalist Principles. These findings concerning Egalitarianism, Government Intervention, and Capitalist Principles are consistent with research on western countries showing that egalitarian norms are much more strongly shaped by socio-demographic variables than are inegalitarian norms (Kluegel and Mateju, 1995; Ritzman and Tomaskevic-Devey, 1992).

As for market justice beliefs, we have evidence that all three types of personal economic evaluations significantly shape market justice norms. Satis-faction with current standard of living and positive retrospective or prospective evaluations encourage rejection of egalitarian norms, opposition to government intervention, support for market prin- ciples, and tolerance of a wider range of inequality

Market justice beliefs shape market justice norms, but their influence takes different forms across these norms. As indicated by the change in R-squares going from Panel I1 to Panel I11 in Table 8, market justice beliefs collectively add little to the explana- tion of Egalitarianism or Fair Pay Ratio. Market justice beliefs play a much stronger role in shaping

JAMES R. KLUEGEL ETAL

support for Capitalist Principles and Government Intervention. Capitalist Principles and Fair Pay Ratio are influenced by different dimensions of mar- ket justice beliefs. Capitalist Principles respond to Legitimate Inequality and Positive Wealth attribu- tions. Following the legitimation theories we have discussed, the greater the perceived general oppor- tunity and equity, and the more positive are attributions for wealth, the greater is the support for Capitalist Principles. Support for Government Intervention, however, is only influenced by Kegative Wealth attributions. The more one sees wealth as a product of personal or system-level cor- ruption, the greater the support for government measures to reduce inequality.

The partial effects of market justice beliefs on market justice norms are properly viewed as socio- tropic. They indicate the effects of assessed characteristics of the economic order net of effects of personal retrospective, current, and prospective economic status on market justice norms. In gen- eral, regardless of whether one sees oneself as having gained or lost economically during the tran- sition, seeing the economic order as productive of opportunity and as equitable encourages support for inegalitarian, market justice, norms.

Discussion and Conclusions Taking the results of our three analyses together, we arrive at a composite picture of changing adherence to socialistjmarket justice that involves public response to both collective and individual-level forces.\X'e have seen that, with the exception of east- ern Germany, citizens of postcommunist Europe entered the transition with very negative beliefs about the legitimacy of the existing economy. This applied to beliefs about the economy in general, but also to attributions concerning the rich. These beliefs were markedly more negative than those found in the \West in 1991. In 1991, however, the postcommunist public on average equally or more strongly supported Capitalist Principles and Egalitarianism thanWestern publics. In all countries except the Czech Republic, in 1991 support for Government Intervention to reduce inequality stood at substantially higher levels than in the K'est, and especially than in the USA.

Over the first several years of the transition the courses followed by our five countries have diverged, with the Czech Republic and eastern Ger- many taking a path towards market justice, while Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia have followed a path leading to stronger or sustained strong support for socialist justice. hlovement down these paths has been propelled by collective and individual-level factors.

Our results point to three major collective influ- ences on economic justice beliefs and norms. First, the common embrace of market principles born of early transition revolutionary zeal faded, resulting in reduced average levels of endorsement in all post- communist publics. Second, this decline was furthered by the fact that links between beliefs and norms in postcommunist countries were established over the initial years that compare to those found in the \Yest. Third, at the same time that these links were being forged, public response to corruption and problems of privatization has helped sustain highly negative beliefs about the fairness of the economy in fact. Thus, the strengthening of ties between norms and beliefs met stable or increas- ingly negative beliefs and led to reduced support for market justice principles.

At the individual level we have seen that market justice beliefs and norms are significantly shaped by economic position and personal economic experi- ence. In particular, we have seen that being employed in the private sector of the economy and positive evaluations of personal economic experi- ence encourage support for market justice. Our results clearly show that differences among post- communist countries may to a large extent be explained by country differences in the distributions of economic position and evaluations of personal economic experience. How much of the change in market justice beliefs and norms within each coun- try, though, is due to individual-level factors?

We do not have the evidence needed to give a full account of the amount of change in adherence to market justice within each country due to societal shifts in the distribution of these individual-level factors. We can provide rough estimates, however, by supplementing our data with findings from other research. In doing so, we find that change in support for market justice norms and beliefs in the Czech Republic, eastern Germany, or Russia is

THE POSTCOMMUNIST LEGITIMATION OF CAPITALISM

probably not due to change in evaluations of per- sonal economic experience over this period. K'e have seen in Table 5 that in these countries satisfac- tion with the current standard of living was stable or changed very little from 1991 to 1996. Other research shows that retrospective and prospective evaluations of one's standard of living have been similarly stable over this period (Rose and Haerpfer, 1996; White e t a/., 1997). Among these countries only the Czech Republic has seen growth in employment within the private sector substantial enough to produce change in market justice norms and beliefs over the 1991 to 1996 period. Our best estimate, then, is that change in adherence to market justice in these coun- tries is primarily due to the collective-level factors we discussed above.

We have seen (Table 5) a marked drop in satis- faction with the current standard of living in Bulgaria, and a smaller but nevertheless significant drop in Hungary. Other evidence suggests that in Bulgaria and Hungary prospective evaluations of the standard of living have also become more nega- tive over the period from 1991 to 1996 (Rose and Haerpfer, 1996). Our best estimate, then, is that individual-level factors have played a stronger role in changing adherence to market justice in Bulgaria and Hungary.

What may we conclude from our research regard- ing theory and policy? Concerning theory, our findings have two clear implications. First, that the market justice model of the legitimation of capital- ism applies more broadly than to only mature capitalist democracies. The requisites for market justice of perceived available opportunity and reward to effort that Lane underscored in the Amer- ican case may be viewed as capitalist economy 'universals'. We have also seen that other relation- ships found in western countries - such as the lack of influence of unemployment experience and the stronger effect of sociodemographic characteristics on egalitarian than on inegalitarian norms - are present in postcommunist Europe. Theory of the popular evaluation of economic justice developed in the West may be fruitfully applied to interpreting and understanding the transition in postcommunist Europe. Second, our results show that to under- stand public opinion about economic justice we must look to both collective and individual-level determinants. Further, we have seen that collective

factors shaping the public's beliefs about the avail- ability of opportunity and equity in the income distribution - in general and as it involves the rich in particular - are especially important to the legit- imation of capitalist economies.

Our findings suggest that postcommunist coun- tries are now in the second stage of the transition -

in terms of the public's evaluation of economic jus- tice. In the first stage, support for market justice norms came from rejection of Communism and was buttressed by hope for a better personal eco-nomic future. In the second stage the former source of support has waned in importance, and market justice norms are now more subject to 'empirical test. That is, the postcommunist public in 1996 weighed satisfaction with their present stan- dard of living, as well as past and projected future personal economic gain and loss, in determining their support for market vs. socialist justice. As we have seen, over the 1991 to 1996 period, post- communist citizens increasingly came to base their support for capitalism on perceptions of how well the economy functions to produce the collective goods of opportunity and equity.

Shock therapists, as we noted earlier, stress the role of simple growth in the standard of living. Our results show such growth to be important, at least on the negative side, in the context of economic decline as experienced by Bulgaria. The message to 'radical shock therapists' (cf. Gligorov, 1995) here is a clear one: If economic shocks produce widespread economic troubles, not only 7.vill public opinion fail to move towards market justice, but it may retreat to even stronger support for socialist justice. Our results, however, have another message for policy- makers: Growth in the perceived fairness of the existing economic order is also critical to advancing public support for market justice. The experience of the Czech Republic is instructive. Although stable personal economic evaluations predict little to no change, we have seen clear movement towards increased support for market justice over the initial several years of the transition.The concern for social justice as part of developing a market economy seems to have been important in leading the Czech public to perceive more opportunity and greater equity in the distribution of economic outcomes in 1996 than they perceived in 1991. This suggests that as we enter the next stage in the development of

JAMES R. KLUEGEL ETA1

postcommunist economies, planners need t o pay

attention n o t only t o p romot ing economic growth, bu t also t o p romot ing a n economic order that t he

postcommunist public believes provides oppor tu - nity and equity.

1. Data for Estonia were not ready for analysis at the time we wrote this paper. For con\-enience, we treat the Czech replication as if it were done in 1996. Howel-er, it seems quite likely that data from early to mid-1996 would differ little if at all from data gathered in late 1995.

2. This table also gives the percentage of the population for our five postcommunist and three western coun- tries who agree with each item. Readers are invited to examine them to give a more 'grounded' sense of the meaning of the analyses of means presented sub- sequently.

3. In East Germany, all 'country' referents in questions concerning the justice of the current economic order are to eastern Germany

4. In 1991 eastern Germans more strongly supported government interx-ention and on average held a smal-ler perceived fair range of inequality than did western Germans. On all other dimensions of market!socialist justice, however, mean values among eastern Germans were nearly equal to those of western Germans (see Table 2). These results are consistent with Roller's (1994) finding that in 1990-1991 eastern and western Germans equally supported what she calls the 'achievement principle of the market economy: but that eastern Germans more strongly favoured govern- ment intervention in and direction of the economy.

5. The increase in mean perceived Fair Pay Ratio ranges from roughly 25Y0 (eastern Germany) to 100°/o (Bulgaria). The increase in mean perceived actual pay ratio has the following values: 34?6 in eastern germ an^; 66% in the Czech Republic, 268% in Hungary, 340% in Bulgaria, and 1,110% in Russia.

6. We consider a person to have the equivalent of 'some college'education if he or she is coded in the lower or higher tertiary categories on the Casmin scale of edu- cation. hlany hybrid organizational forms involving joint state and private ownership now exist in post- communist countries. For the purpose of having a clear contrast, we define someone as in the priwte sec- tor if a respondent indicates that @)she or he is self- employed, or (b) that he or she works for an organiza- tion that is exclusively privately om,ned. Slanual vs.

non-manual workers follows the common distinc-tion between blue-collar and white-collar workers.

7. To test the statistical significance of the '1996-1991 Gap Change' we ran regression models with a term for group membership, survey year, and the inter- action of group membership and survey year h statistically significant interaction term indicates that the eEect of group membership changed between 1991 and 1996. Except in the rare case where the sign of the gap between groups changed between years, the absolute 1-alue of the regression coefficient for the interaction term equals the value of the '1991 to 1996 Gap Change'measure.

8. Kote, however, that a statistically significant correla- tion between support for Capitalist Principles and perceixd Legitimate Inequality is present in Hungary in 1991 and 1996. The lack of an increase in the correlation between market justice beliefs and norms may reflect the earlier introduction of ele- ments of a market economy in Hungary than in the other four countries.

9. We use a Z-test for the equality of correlation coeffi- cients estimated from two independent samples (Hays 1963: 529-32).

10. Detailed occupational information was obtained from respondents. h '0,l 'categorical variable was cre- ated, respecti\-ely indicating employment in a non-manual (white-collar) or manual (blue-collar) occu- pation. The private-sector variable is coded '1' if a

respondent indicates that @) she or he is self-employed, or (b)that he or she works for an organiza- tion that is exclusively privately owned. VCbrkers in state or state-private hybrid organizations are coded '0'. Respondents indicating any unemploy- ment experience in the past ten years are coded '1 ', and those indicating no such experience are coded '0'. Further information about these or any other cod- i n g ~of variables may be obtained from the authors.

11. Respondents were asked,'How satisfied are you with your standard of living'. They were asked to place themselves on a scale where 'l'is'completely dissatis- fied', '7' is 'completely dissatisfied', and '4' indicates 'neither satisfied nor dissatisfied:

12. To measure the retrospective evaluation ofone's stan- dard of living we asked the following question: 'Thinking about your overall household financial situation today and comparing it to [the time of the transition], would you say it is now much better, a little better, much the same, a little worse, or a lot worse?' The time of the transition specified corre- sponded to the appropriate date in each country (e.g. eastern Germany is 1989 and Russia is 1991). To measure prospective evaluations we asked,'Thinking

THE POSTCOMMUNIST LEGITIMATION OF CAPITALISM

ahead about five years, how do you expect your over- all household financial situation then to compare to your situation today: to be much better, a little better, much the same, a little worse, or a lot worse'. In Bul- garia, retrospective and prospective evaluations of the standard of living were asked only of roughly a random one-third of respondents.

13. Values of the metric (unstandardized) coefficients and other details of model estimation are available from the first author.

14. Age is in years Education was measured in Casmin categories, then collapsed into three values roughly corresponding to a primar!; secondary, and higher education classification. Income is for the house- hold, measured in the currency of a countr!; and transformed to 20, five-per centile groupings to allow cross-country comparisons.

15. For the regression analyses of Tables 7 and 8, respon- dents who answered 'don't know' to the question concerning their expected future standard of living were assigned the value '3: equal to the value for the 'same' response. We conducted regression analyses using categorical variables for 'don't know' and the other categories of the prospective evaluation, shou- ing that the 'don't know'and 'same' responses have equivalent effects on market justice norms and beliefs.

Acknowledgements

Principal investigators in the 1996 replication project are Ludmila Khakhulina and Svetlana Sidorenko-Stephenson (Russia); Andrus Saar (Estonia); Antal Orkeny (Hungary); Alexander Stoyanov (Bulgaria); Bernd K'egener (Germany); Petr hIateju (Czech Republic); and David Mason and James Kluegel (United States). Funding for the project was provided by the National Council for Soviet and East European Research and by the Open Society Institute. Funding for the German project was provided by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Council).

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Appendix: Methodology Survey Instrument

The questionnaire for the 1991 survey was developed and written in English. It n7as then translated into the respective language of each country (In Czecho- slovakia in 1991 questions were asked either in Czech or Slovakian.) Translations were performed by lead- ing scholars and survey practitioners in each country Back-translations were performed to check on the quality of the original translations. The 1996 questionnaire included roughly 80 per cent of the same questions as initially used in 1991. For new questions, back-translations were also per- formed in 1996.

For the large majority of questions, exactly the same wording and response formats were used in 1991 and 1996. In some cases, minor wording changes were necessitated by changes taking place between 1991 and 1996. (For example, new types of publicl'private organizations were created in post- communist countries between 1991 and 1996.)

Table A1 gives the wording and response for- mats for the questions about market;socialist justice analysed in this paper. They are grouped 'according to the indices formed from them. The per centage 'agreeing' or responding 'often' is given for each country and survey year. The indices composed from these questions were firstly based on conceptual considerations invol- ving the 'socialist justice' and 'market justice' complexes. Factor analyses for each year and coun- try were also run to see if these groupings were valid on empirical grounds. For space reasons, we do not give the very lengthy results from them here. However, they do support our con-ceptual grounds for index construction. Separate

Table Al. Qnrstzon worrlzngfir zt~ms mnsrtr/rsfirtZlmmnstonsc?fmarkrt/ andpercen~agr hgreemng'or re pondzng 'often' (negatztre orp~,smtzr~ra~r~I~nt~onsjor androcza/zs~t~stzce, uleaIth tndzced, by ~ o u n ~ r y year

Bulgaria Czech E. Germany Hungary Russia Britain Germany USA Republic

91 96 91 96 91 96 91 96 91 96 91 91 91

EgaIztarmun Przncqle S, 1. The falrest way of dlstr~butlng wealth and In

come wo~lld be to glve everyone equal shares 2. The most Important thlng 1s that people get

what they need, even lf thls means allocat~ng money from those who have earned more than they need

26

34

34

43

17

45

13

41

24

85

26

66

23

65

19

66

32

46

31

50

30

49

21

77

19

45

(,flpitu/irt principle^',^ 1. There isan incentive for individual effort only if

differences in income are large enough 2. It is all right ifbusinessmen makegood profits

because everyone benefits in the end 3. People would not want to take extra responsi-

bility at work ~lnless they were paid extra for it

69

38

90

46

14

84

71

64

84

51

36

81

65

36

87

60

27

87

34

25

76

30

14

65

78

71

92

46

42

88

66

43

84

69

47

82

63

51

79

Government Inkr~ention",~ 1. The government should guarantee everyone a

minimum standard of living 2. The government should place an upper limit on

amount of money any one person can make 3. The government should provide a job for

everyone who wants one

80

31

74

76

31

72

69

17

58

62

11

50

80

37

84

64

33

73

81

46

80

55

40

78

64

21

77

74

25

77

50

18

37

57

13

46

27

8

38

Fa11 Pay Ratlo 1 Now tell me what you t h ~ n k ay~standfizraverage

(YI-,ARLY/MON'THI>Y) Income 15 for a cha~rmanor manag~ng dlrector of a large corporation

2 Now tell me what you t h ~ n k ajustandfazr (YEARLY/MON'THI>Y) Income IS for an unskilled worker, such as a factory llne worker

-

-

-

-

- -

-

-

-

-

-

-

- -

- -

-

-

-

1,egitirnate Ine4ua/ity"." 1. In (<:OUNTRY), people have equal opportu-

nities to get ahead 2. In (COUNTRY), people get rewarded for their

effort 3. In (COIJN'TRY), people get rewarded for their

~ntelligenceand skill 4. In (COUNTRY), people get what they need

17

13

11

6

7

5

5

1

42

16

16

11

37

17

24

27

25

40

49

41

21

44

51

29

18

33

14

12

I6

30

12

9

24

22

19

4

24

17

19

4

42

48

57

26

55

71

75

54

66

71

75

41

Inyour view, how ofen iseach oft/~efollowin~/actorsa reason wby there are rz~,hpeupple in this county today4 1. Dishonesty 89 89 72 72 31 2. 'The economic system allows them to take 76 77 58 58 34

unfair advantage

40 49

71 54

79 62

84 85

77 85

37 48

34 26

43 40

1n.your vim,how @en iseach ofthe~fi,l/owing~firtorsareason wby therearr richpropple 112 this country toduy ? 1. Ability 55 37 52 61 68 2. Hard Work 61 52 35 51 57

50 56

62 38

55 39

47 25

51 40

55 61

65 58

60 67

'Thr rrsponsc C,rnmar 1s a tivc pulnt scalr: (5) strongly agrcc (I)agrcc (3) nclthrr agrcr nor dlsagrcc (2) d~sagrcr( I ) strongly dlcagrcr. h(:cll valucs arc thc pcrcrtltagc who rrspond 'agrrc',jr 'strcjngly agrcc:

'(:ell valucs arc thr prrccntagr whu rcspund 'strongly agrrr?

I C S ~ O ~ I S Ck>rmat 1s a fivr-pozot scalr: (5) very uftcn (4) oftrn (3)s,jrnrrlmcs (2) rarcly (I) ncvcr.

Cell valurs arc tlrc pcrcrntagc who rrspond 'oftrn'<,r 'vcry oftco'.

JAMES R. KLUEGEL ETA1

Table A2. Sanlple characteristics

Country

Great Britain \!?st German1 LSA Bulgaria

Czech Republic

East Germany

Hungary

Russia

Year TYpe

1991 In-Person 1991 In-Person 1991 Telephone 1991 In-Person 1996 In-Person 1991 In-Person 1995 In-Person 1991 In-Person 1996 In-Person 1991 In-Person 1996 In-Person 1991 In-Person 1996 In-Person

Response Rate

71 71 72 90 86 83 78 71 72 74 -

76 67

Organization

RS GB ZUSIA INFAS ISR SRC Acad of Sci T71TOSHA STESI STESI ZUhILl IhFAS GFLI-GETLIS TARKI hIRI T'CIOLI \'CIOLI

The refusal rate \\-as less than five per cent Sample des~gn makes calculation of the response rate Inappropriate.

.\itr~-: RSGB - Research Surveys of Great Britain.

ZYSI.\ ISF.\S - Zentrum fur Umfragen, Slethoden und 'inaljsen Inst~tut fur 'ingelvandte Soz~al\v~ssenschaft. C;FAI-GF.T.IS - C;esellschaft fur hiarketing , l i ommunika t~onsund Soz~alforschung mbH.

ISR SRC - Institute for Soc~al Research Surve! Research Center (University of l l ich~gan)

\cad of Sci - Rulgar~an ,\cadem! of Sciences. \ LTOSH.4 - \ itosha Research, Center for the Stud! of Democrat!, Sofia. STEAI - Center for F.mp~rical Research (Prague).

SIR1 Slinority Research Inst~tute. \'CIOAI - Russian Center for Publ~c O p i n ~ o n and Market Research.

factors were found for five of the six sets of multi- ple indicators (excluding Fair Pa!- Ratio) in each country and for each year. Indicators of Egalitarian Principles and Government Interven- tion tended to load on a single factor. However, we maintain a separate index for each because of their conceptual distinctiveness.

Reliability coefficients (Cronbach's alpha) for these indices, across countries and over time, gener- ally range from 0.4 to 0.7 Although some are lower than may be desired, two considerations should be noted. First, for practical reasons, we could ask only a few questions concerning each of our concepts.Kt could not ask the larger number of questions about a single concept that usually produce higher reliabil- ity estimates. Second, the items we employed have extensive histories of use in research, and have known validity and reliability In addition, for most of the indices, reliability increased from 1991 to 1996. This suggests that some unreliability reflects inexperience with survey questioning on the part of postcommunist respondents.

To examine the effect of unreliabilit!; we applied corrections for attenuation to the correlations in

Tables 3 and 4.K hen corrected for unreliablllt!; the average slze of these correlations Increases by two- thirds to 100 per cent. Howeter, we reach the same conc/~{- szons tlszng the 1{ncorrectedJand corrected correlatzons

Samples

Sample design and interviewing were carried out by leading survey research organizations in each coun- try The target population for each country is all residents 18 years of age or older. Certain major fea- tures of the samples for each countryanalysed in this paper are given inTableA2 below. Detailed descrip- tions of sampling and data collection for each country may be found in Alwin, Klingel, and Diel- man (1993) and in the document il~lethodolo~ofthe 1996ISJP Stlrvc):

Analyses of the match between distributions of sociodemographic variables in each survey and respective census distributions for the nearest year in each country show a close match in nearly all cases. Post-stratification weights were created in a given year and country where mismatch was greater

THE POSTCOMMUNIST LEGITIMATION OF CAPITALISM

than would be expected by chance. Hourever, results Authors' Address given in the tables of this paper are for unweighted data. we use unweighted data because it gives a Department of Sociology, University of Illinois at

more accurate basis for statistical inference, and Urbana-Cham~aign,'02 S. Wright St., Urbana, IL

because the analyses we ran with weighted data do 61801, 'SA. Tel.: 217-33301950; fax: 217-333-5225;

not differ in any non-trivial way from analyses e-mail: j kluegel@uiuc.edu

using weighted data. hlanuscript received: February 1998.

You have printed the following article:

The Legitimation of Capitalism in the Postcommunist Transition: Public Opinion aboutMarket Justice, 1991-1996James R. Kluegel; David S. Mason; Bernd WegenerEuropean Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 3. (Sep., 1999), pp. 251-283.Stable URL:

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4 Ideological Basis of the Market Economy: Attitudes toward Distribution Principles and theRole of Government in Western and Eastern GermanyEdeltraud RollerEuropean Sociological Review, Vol. 10, No. 2. (Sep., 1994), pp. 105-117.Stable URL:

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