The Liberals and the Formation of Imperial Defence Policy I 8 9 2-5

I N I 877 J. C. R. Colomb could claim, with some justification, that ‘ Imperial defence has been split up into little bits and strewed about the world’.l Partly through the writings of Colomb and other defence experts, by the eighteen-nineties there grew an idea of Imperial defence as a connected whole. Its supporters endeavoured to replace the ‘army centred Fortress- England idea’ by emphasizing the primacy of the Royal Navy and minimiz- ing the importance of elaborate fortifications.2 Strategic planning was necessary but an essential preliminary was the modification of the current process of British defence policy formation, tending, as it did, to divide the services from one another and the politicians from both. Nor were the defence responsibilities restricted to Britain. ‘ Under the existing system ’, wrote Lord Ripon, the Colonial Secretary, in 1893, ‘the central government retains control of all those matters, such for instance as Imperial defence, which relate to the Empire as a whole and in the settlement of such questions it has the advantage of the advice and co-operation of the governments of all the colonies’.3

The idea of Imperial defence had been greatly assisted since the early eighteen-eighties by two powerful and connected agitations : one favoured increased naval expenditure, the other a closer union of Britain and her colonies. The naval defence acts of 1889 and 1894, which provided for building programmes designed to maintain British supremacy in battleships over her two nearest rivals, may be regarded as the fruits of navalist4 pressure. The main body urging closer political union of the empire was the Imperial Federation League (1884-93) whose ‘most active members ’, claimed a member of its council, Sir Charles Tupper, the Canadian high commissioner, ‘were mainly intent on levying a large contribution on the revenue of the colonies for the support of the army and navy of Great Bri-

J. C. R. Colomb, The Defence of Great and Greater Britain (ISSO), p. 153 (in a paper read before the Royal Colonial Institute, May 1877).

2D. M. Schurman, The Education of a Navy (1964), p. 18. Professor Preston has recently emphasized the distinction between ‘Imperial Defence’ and the defence of the empire (R. A. Preston, Canada and ‘Imperial Defense’ (Durham, N. C., 1966), pp. xiv-xxi). In relation to the former phrase a useful distinction may also be drawn between the idea or plan of Imperial defence presented by the publicists and British policy. This article examines the impact of the idea on the formation of British policy.

3C[olonial] O[ffice] to Hopetoun, 25 Jan. 1894 (Public Record Office, Colonial

4Marder’s term for those who pressed for a considerable expansion in naval Ofice 309/139).

expenditure (A. J. Marder, British Naval Policy 1880-1905 (1940)).

I M P E R I A L D E F E N C E P O L I C Y I 892-5 ‘89 tain’.1 The League proposed in 1893 the formation of a defence council of the empire with British and colonial representatives. Although Gladstone welcomed the prospect of colonial contributions to Imperial defence, neither he, nor most of the colonial premiers, welcomed the prospect of Imperial Federation. As the first lord of the admiralty, Lord Spencer, noted on the proposal, ‘Divided management would be useless l.2

One result of the dissolution of the League in late 1893 was that the moderating counsels of such federationists as Young and Labilliere were lost.3 The tone adopted by the self-appointed successor to the League, the Imperial Federation (Defence) Committee, was far more strident. Its message was a simple reiteration of the disparity between the colonial governments’ and the British government’s expenditure on defence.4 The identification between the navalists and federalists became plainer, although the two movements had always had an overlapping membership.5

The service vote increased as much in the period 1890-5 as it had in the previous twenty-five years. The Imperial Federation (Defence) Com- mittee’s agitation for a greater colonial contribution to Imperial defence expenditure won indiscreet praise from Harcourt, the Liberal chancellor of the exchequer, in 1894.6 Lord Ripon and Sydney Buxton, who were responsible for colonial administration, were far more careful in their statements, praising the existing colonial contribution to defence.7 That is not to say that they were unaware of the possibilities of greater co-operation and planning in Imperial defence. Two features of the suggestion were, however, unwelcome: on one hand there was Imperial Federation which seemed an unacceptable constitutional charge and on the other there was the possibility of the delicate fabric of the empire being rent by an attempt to tax the colonies. The replacement of Ripon by Joseph Chamberlain at the Colonial Office in 1895 seemed to offer the defence federationists a new and tempting opportunity to press their proposal on the government. Chamberlain was, however, more concerned with the economic closer union of the empire. He and the service ministers agreed to put the committee off without any searching examination of their plans although, from the

1 Imperial Federation, viii (I 893), I I I . 2A. Loring to Spencer, 28 Nov. 1892. (This, and following extracts from the

Spencer MSS., reproduced by courtesy of Earl Spencer.) 3Sir Frederick Young (1817-191 3) London merchant, traveller and writer, as well

as F. P. Labilliere, former resident of Victoria and writer, were closely associated with the Royal Colonial Institute and helped found the Imperial Federation League.

4Both Labilliere and Young argued that the Imperial Federation (Defence) Com- mittee was approaching the colonies incorrectly, some form of representation had to be offered before their supposed shortcomings were raised (the committee’s pamphlet No. 3, Under Fire, British Museum, Add. MS. 50356).

5Am0ng those who were both were Lord Charles Beresford, Lord Brassey, H. 0. Arnold-Forster, Sir John Colomb, G. S. Clarke and K. B. Murray. During 1895, propaganda for colonial contributions was increased by the formation of the Navy League with, once again, much the same supporters.

6Hansard, Purl. Debates, 4th ser., xxv, cols. I 15-17. ’Bid., xxvi, cols. 566 and 1465.

190 T H E L I B E R A L S A N D T H E F O R M A T I O N O F

admiralty, Goschen noted ' Under some wave of feeling it might be possible to carry the colonies into some system of contributions. Otherwise the negotiations would last for years '.I At the 1897 Colonial Conference, Chamberlain suggested the formation of an Imperial Council, reminding his listeners that this involved contributions to Imperial expenses, but the conference decided that the present constitutional relations were satis- factory.2

In the eighteen-nineties the general notion of co-operative defence of the empire found support among those to whom federation was a very distant prospect, or even ' chimerical '.3 So long as it was presented on the basis of retaining British government control, it won sympathy from both Gladstone and Salisbury and influenced Colonial Office policy.4 Burgeoning defence expenditure, as well as the trend towards Imperial closer union, made its appeal strong. The colonies might contribute to the defence of the empire in various ways: meeting the costs of the navy, contributing troops for service abroad or simply by more effectively defending themselves. Still colonial contributions were not enough : mutual defence necessitated planning. Progressive military theorists stressed this, with the analogies of the Prussian lightning invasions before them and the international tension of the last quarter of the century reinforced their verdict.5

Some of the gravest obstacles to the formation of a plan of Imperial defence were to be found not in the colonies but in Whitehall. The defence depart- ments were jealous of attempts to reduce their area of responsibility by con- ceding any control, either to the colonies or to any other department of state. Differences of opinion between the army and navy, and even within them, tended to stifle any attempt to elaborate an Imperial strategy. 'The Naval authorities contend ', reported the Hartington Commission in I 890, that it is essential to the efficiency of the Fleet, and the success of Naval operations, that absolute freedom of action shall be left to Naval Commanders in time of war, and that this freedom of action would be impaired by any regulations or under- standing involving retention of certain ships at certain stations in order to aid in their military defence. On the other hand, the Military authorities consider that it is essential to the completeness and efficiency of their preparations that they should be informed what amount of assistance they can definitely reckon upon from the Navy.6

1Goschen to Chamberlain, 28 Aug. 189j, filed with Loring to C.O., 13 Aug. 189j

2Report of the 1897 Colonial Conference, conf., p. 3 (P.R.O., C.O. 885/6-I I I). 3The description used by Sir Robert Meade, Permanent Under-Secretary at the

Colonial Office. 4See Salisbury's reply to the Imperial Federation League delegation in 1891, and

Gladstone's in 1893 (Papers and Addresses by Lord Brassey, iv, Imperial Federation andColonisation, ed. A. H. Loring and R. J. Beadon (1895), pp. 184-5, 231-2).

5C.O. to Kintore, 8 Sept. 1891, No. 17046 (drafted by George Clarke) (P.R.O.,

6Preliminary and Further Reports . . . of the Royal Commissioners appointed to inquire into the civil andprofessional administration of the Naval and Military Depart- ments. [C. 59791 p. vi. H.C. (1890). XIX, I.

(P.R.O., C.O. 323/403).

c.0. 12/147).

I M P E R I A L DEFENCE P O L I C Y I 892-5 191 The admiralty was intent on retaining command of the sea; it thought inva- sion of Britain so unlikely that it was reluctant even to consider it. At the same time, the War Office planned extensive domestic defences and the maintenance of a sizeable army at home in case the navy should fail to pre- vent an attack.1 But in the same office, although occupying subordinate positions, were representatives of the Colomb school. They shared the admiralty belief that the invasion of England was improbable, urged a reduc- tion in fortifications and the preparation of a larger army for service abroad. The director of military intelligence was an advocate of these views, but his letter book 1891-3 makes sad reading. Mobilization plans were kept secret from him, and his efforts to have the policy of the home forces defined as offensive were unavailing.2 The heads of both services were reluctant to commit themselves to detailed strategic plans in case of war. The War Secretary, Campbell-Bannerman, opposed ‘ planning possible operations in possible wars’.3 ‘I think’, he wrote to Spencer, ‘ [War Office and admiralty] will without much delay concert a proper plan in the event of an emergency ’.4

Spencer was not much more eager: ‘We are rather shy at the Admiralty of multiplying papers on the subject of possible strategic combinations ’.5

T o the lack of co-operation between the two services and the inadequacy of defence planning within each, must be added a third difficulty: there was no person or committee charged with the preparation and review of an Imperial defence plan. Although the cabinet had the ultimate responsi- bility, it was not suitable for the expert and detailed work involved.6 Nor was it an easy task to fashion a suitable body while retaining cabinet res- ponsibility. Any aggrandizement of the power of the service chiefs might impair that responsibility, for it was the ministers, not the service chiefs, who were responsible to parliament. There were other problems. Such a body might lead to increased army and navy estimates. Furthermore, although the present commander-in-chief, the duke of Cambridge, was entrenched in his position with the support of his cousin, the queen, he was not competent to act as principal military defence adviser to the cabinet.7 I t was against this background that the Hartington Commission suggested, rather than recommended, the establishment of a naval and military council consisting of the service ministers and their chief professional advisers, with the prime minister presiding. The Commission envisaged its having wide

The impasse this produced in defence planning is exemplified by the report of Admiral Colomb’s Landing Places Committee 1894 (P.R.O., W[ar] O[ffice] 33/54- 29)-

XhapmantoBrackenbury, zDec. 189zand 16March 1893 (P.R.O., W.O. 106/16). 3[C. 59791 p. n ix . H.C. (1890). XIX, I . 4Campbell-Bannerman to Spencer, 20 Sept. 1893 (Spencer MSS.). 5Spencer to Kimberley (copy) 12 May 1894 (Spencer MSS.). He went on to

6See, for example, Balfour’s comments in S. L. Gwynn and G. M. Tuckwell,

’See J. A. Spender, The Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman (2 vols., 1923),

suggest that such subjects could best be handled by conference.

The Life of Sir Charles W. Dilke (2 vols., 1917), ii. 420.

i. 148.

192 T H E L I B E R A L S A N D THE F O R M A T I O N O F

powers and possessing continuity through the keeping of minutes.1 Four- teen years later, after the disasters of the South African war, the substance of this suggestion was implemented in the Committee of Imperial Defence.

The last decade of the century was not, however, barren of attempts at Imperial defence planning. In 1891 the War Office established the Joint Naval and Military Committee. This inter-departmental body was under the presidency of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for War, and included the adjutant general, the director of artillery and inspector general of forti- fications, as well as the senior naval lord and two other admiralty representa- tives. It was to make recommendations to the two departments on the defence not only of Great Britain, but also of all coaling stations and military posts in the empire.2 These functions overlapped with those of the Colonial Defence Committee, which was also inter-departmental and had been con- vened since 1885 by the Colonial Secretary. The C.D.C. will be given con- sideration below; all that need be noted now is that in fact the joint commit- tee came to deal principally with technical matters, especially concerning itself with port defences.

The return to power of the Liberals in 1892 could have strengthened the opposition to Imperial defence planning. In addition to the traditional British distrust of a standing army, there was the Liberal opposition to militarism and passion for economy. To orthodox Gladstonians ' any sug- gestion of organized defence planning, whether inside departments or between them, was tantamount to a suggestion that Britain should plan aggressive war ' .3 But the cabinet was not purely Gladstonian.

The Liberal Imperialist Rosebery, when Foreign Secretary in 1893, made an urgent attempt to bestir the two service departments. France and Britain had been brought close to war over Siam, and the possibility of conflict was renewed with the approaching visit of the Russian fleet to Toulon. Rosebery summoned the two intelligence directors, General Chapman and Admiral Bridge, to the Foreign Office in late July and found that they shared his appreciation of the threat to the Mediterranean balance of power.4 The War Office therefore pressed on the admiralty

the necessity for clearly laying down in an authoritative manner General principles which should direct our Naval and Military policy in such a case as the possibility

1[C. 59791 p. viii. H.C. (1890). XIX, I . zW.0. to C.O., 7 Dec. 1891 (P.R.O., C.O. 323/384). A printed prCcis of the

work of this committee is available, with its reports (P.R.O., Cabinet Office 18/22A). The original conception of the committee's functions was narrow (chiefly submarine defence and regulation of port traffic). See admiralty to W.O., 21 Nov. 1890, conf., and subsequent correspondences and minutes (P.R.O., W.O. 32/266-40261/1).

3N. H. Gibbs, The Origins of Imperial Defence (Oxford, I955), p: 5 . 4This was not the first occasion on which the two intelligence directors had been

jointly consulted by the Foreign Office on a major policy question. Salisbury had consulted them over the Straits in I 892 (L. M. Penson, Foreign Affairs under the 3rd Marquess of Salisbury (I 962), p. I o), and Kimberley was to refer to them in connection with Constantinople in 1894 (Spencer to Kimberley (copy) 12 May 1894, Spencer MSS.).

I M P E R I A L DEFENCE P O L I C Y 1892-5 I93 of rupture between this country and France . . . and that those principles should be thoroughly understood in India and the Colonies in order that there should be continuity of effort in all our possessions abroad in case we are ever suddenly cut off from communication with them by cable.

It concluded by recommending that the two intelligence officers be added to the Joint Naval and Military Committee for this purpose.1 In fact, neither Campbell-Bannerman nor Spencer regarded the matter as urgent,2 despite Rosebery’s repeated appeals for action.3 Spencer wrote from the admiralty with revealing ingenuousness,

Rosebery spoke to me again & asked me whether any scheme was ready in case of war, Russia being joined to France. I sent for the head of our Intelligence Depart- ment and find that such a scheme is on paper, it will probably need revision but still there it exists, so that may console him a little.4

The caution of Liberal service heads on defence planning has been already noted, but there was the prospect, particularly unwelcome at this time, of a paper scheme for war preparations acting as an incentive to increased esti- mates. ‘ I do not want to rouse my “experts ”, now perfectly quiescent ’, wrote Campbell-Bannerman in August ;5 but he was unduly hopeful. Chapman perceived, after the Foreign Office interview, that he and Bridge had ‘now an opportunity of urging the necessity of an increase to the strength of the Navy & the Army’.6 Bridge did what he could at the admiralty to further this, and there was pressure from the parliamentary opposition for an increased navy.7 Bridge also supported the idea of the joint committee drawing up a plan but with the important proviso that it should ‘decide on the General Principles (only) that should direct our Policy in the event of war. The actual disposition and movements of our fleet and naval forces must almost entirely depend upon the conditions at the time’.* That pro- viso was basic to the admiralty approach to Imperial defence planning, and limited it repeatedly. The joint committee met on 29 September, agreed on a plan of preparations for war with France and appointed the intelligence

1 W.O. to admiralty, conf., I 2 Aug. I 893 (P.R.O., Adm. I /7 I 7 ~ ~ 2 0 6 ) . 2That the War Office letter did not reflect Campbell-Bannerman’s views is plain

from Campbell-Bannerman to Spencer, 18 Aug. 1893, and same to same, 20 Sept. 1893 (Spencer MSS.). See also Spencer to Campbell-Bannerman, 17 Sept. 1893 (Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 41228).

3The summer was, of course, an inconvenient time for a departmental war scare. Rosebery commented, ‘Your councillors care more, I think, for grouse than the Empire’ (Rosebery to Campbell-Bannerman, 12 Sept. 1893, Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 41226). See also same to same, I Sept. 1893 (&id.).

4Spencer to Campbell-Bannerman, 17 Sept. 1893 (Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 41228). SCampbell-Bannerman to Spencer, conf., 18 Aug. 1893 (Spencer MSS.). 6Chapman to Bridge, private, 3 Aug. 1893, filed with W.O. to admiralty, 12 Aug.

7E.g. Hansard, Pad. Debates, 4th ser., xvi, cols. 1227-1245. 8W.O. to admiralty, 12 Aug. 1893. Minute by Darrow for director of naval intel-

1893 (P.R.O., Adm. 1/7170-0206).

ligence (P.R.O., Adm. 1/7170-0206). 13

I94 THE LIBERALS AND THE FORMATION OF

directors as a sub-committee to frame schemes for the seizure of certain French ports at the outbreak of hostilities.1

There followed a lull during which the threat to peace decreased,2 and the service departments produced a report on ‘ Naval and Military Policy on the out-break of War ’ which the joint committee approved in December.3 Rose- bery now, with ‘experience of the past and apprehension of the future’, urged the appointment of a Foreign Office representative to the joint committee, the functions of which would be enlarged. He also suggested that he and the two service ministers should meet the joint committee with- out delay.4 Campbell-Bannerman opposed the latter suggestion, probably because it might not sufficiently ensure the supremacy of the ministers over their professional advisers. He proposed instead a cabinet defence committee which could summon such members of the joint committee, or other ex- perts, as it wished.5 Spencer thought it ‘possibly better to have the Adjutant- General and the First Sea Lord with us when we meet to discuss Military and Naval problems’.6 Whether the three ministers ever met the joint committee or not, the seeds of development in the immediate future lay in Campbell-Bannerman’s suggestion of a cabinet committee.

The idea of a cabinet defence committee had long commended itself to Balfour, the opposition leader in the house of commons. He was at this time pressing the idea on Asquith.7 Dilke was simultaneously discussing this matter with Balfour. Like Sir John Colomb, Dilke had for years attempted to influence public and parliamentary opinion on the need for a concerted Imperial defence policy.8 Nor was it coincidental that Rosebery, Balfour and Dilke, all advocates of a stronger navy, should be pressing at this time for steps which would give the service experts a greater influence in policy making; for on 19 December, Lord George Hamilton moved a resolution in the House calling for an announcement of the government’s plans for increased naval estimates.9 Gladstone took it as a vote of censure and it was defeated on party lines, but Dilke and Balfour looked to a bipartisan approach to the question of ‘National Defence’, and the former began to prepare a letter to all party leaders, appealing for administrative changes so that the cabinet could give special consideration to ‘national defence as distinct from

1W.O. to admiralty, 12 Aug. 1893. Minute by Sir A. Hoskins and Hoskins to

2 Campbell-Bannerman to Spencer, 23 Oct. 1893 (Spencer MSS.). 3The report was amended in Jan. 1894, but never issued officially. I have not

seen the report, all but three copies of which were destroyed. (Prtcis of work of the Joint NavalandMilitary Committee, secret, 1903, P.R.O., Cab. 18/22A, andThomp- son to Campbell-Bannerman, 16 Jan. 1894, Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 41230).

4Rosebery to Campbell-Bannerman, 19 Dec. 1893 (Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 41226). *Campbell-Bannerman to Spencer, 19 Dec. 1893 (Spencer MSS.). 6Spencer to Campbell-Bannerman, 20 Dec. 1893 (Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 41228). 7 Gwynn and Tuckwell, ii. 454. Elbid., ii. 424, and ch. lvi. 9Lord George Hamilton was first lord of the admiralty 1886-92 (Hansard, Purl.

Spencer, 4 Oct. 1893 (Spencer MSS.).

Debates, 4th ser., xix, cols. 1771-1886).

IMPERIAL DEFENCE POLICY 1892--5 I95 and superior to the administration either of the navy or of the army ’.I Dilke finally agreed with his co-signatories (H. 0. Arnold-Forster, Sir George Chesney and Spenser Wi1kinson)Z to concentrate on one solution: a single minister for the two services, the cabinet having one professional adviser from each service who would ‘ stand or fall ’ by his recommendations.3

This was not the plan which Balfour, Rosebery and Campbell-Bannerman had come to favour, and Dilke took care not to restrict himself to this par- ticular form in the debate which he raised on the army estimates in March 1894. The basic difficulty was that the two service estimates came before the cabinet separately, and a ‘real responsibility of the Cabinet’ had to be secured in the face of this. Dilke and Lord Randolph Churchill, former Conservative chancellor of the exchequer, suggested several plans, but Balfour, for the Opposition, was firmly in favour of a cabinet committee with permanent records to ensure a degree of continuity. While admitting the importance of expert professional advice in defence, he stressed the consti- tutional necessity for ministerial responsibility. Campbell-Bannerman indicated his general agreement with Balfour, although opposing the keep- ing of minutes. He spoke of a cabinet defence committee in such a way as to leave the impression that it was already in existence and viewed its functions as including the part to be played in defence by each service, rather than the drafting of the separate service estimates.4 In fact, although a conference for the co-ordination of the services was held in November, it was not until 1895 that a defence committee was formed consisting of Rosebery, Campbell- Bannerman, Spencer and Ripon.5 The difficulty of separate consideration of the estimates for each service was partly met by the use of a naval com- mittee of the cabinet, consisting of Campbell-Bannerman, Spencer and Ripon, as well as the chancellor of the exchequer, Harcourt, and the Secre- tary for India, Fowler.6

The I 895 Salisbury administration had a cabinet defence committee under the chairmanship of the lord president of the council, the duke of Devonshire, the former marquess of Hartington, but it did not include the Foreign and Colonial Secretaries. It kept no minutes and seems to have concentrated on settling inter-departmental differences rather than

1 Gwynn and Tuckwell, ii. 418. *Arnold-Forster was a Liberal Unionist M.P. (West Belfast), Chesney a Conser-

3Gwynn and Tuckwell, ii. 417-19. 4See ibid., ii. 457; Hansard, Pad. Debates, 4thser., xxii, cols. 462-507. The phrase

quoted is from Dilke (col. 47 I). The influence of the naval lords at the admiralty in helping to bring about Gladstone’s resignation may have strengthened Campbell- Bannerman’s resolve not to give the professional advisers higher standing in relation to the cabinet. 5R. 0. A. Milnes, marquess of Crewe, Life of Rosebery (z vols., 193 I), ii. 497-8. 6This committee is mentioned in Campbell-Bannerman to his wife, I I Jan. 1895

(Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 52520). The Financial Secretary at the Treasury sometimes attended it as an expert adviser (Sir E. Hamilton’s diaries for 1 1 and 17 Jan. 1895, Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 48665).

vative M.P. (Oxford), and Wilkinson a civilian defence expert.

196 THE LIBERALS AND THE FORMATION O F

attempting to concert an Imperial defence policy for cabinet approval. In this, the committee followed the ideas of Salisbury rather than of Balfour.1

While the cabinet was feeling its way towards the creation of a body to concert an Imperial defence policy, ideas for such a policy were germinating in the departments. Sir Robert Meade of the Colonial Office was a key figure in this development both as Assistant, when he specialized in defence matters, and as Permanent Under-Secretary from 1892. Ripon was well placed to forward such co-operation in defence; he had been head of both the admiralty and War Office and enjoyed high standing with his colleagues. The Colonial Office was not without support for its views, even within the War Office and admiralty. The two intelligence directors, Chapman and Bridge, were keen advocates of closer Imperial union for defence. Similar views were held by Sir Andrew Clarke, acting agent-general for Victoria in 1892, and formerly president of the Colonial Defence Committee, and Matthew Nathan, secretary of the committee in 1895.

The chief source of the ideas which formed the basis of the Colonial Defence Committee’s work was Major George Sydenham Clarke, its secre- tary 1885-92. He was born in 1848, the son of a Lincolnshire vicar, joined the Royal Engineers in 1868, and made the acquaintance, in 1878, of Cashel Hooey, secretary to the agent-general for Victoria. Their friendship was important, for through it George Clarke won the patronage of Sir Andrew Clarke and of H. C. Childers, the Liberal statesman. He was converted to Imperialism, coming to regard it as ‘almost a religion’.2 When Andrew Clarke was appointed inspector general of fortifications at the War Office, George Clarke joined his department. ‘ I brought to my new post’, he wrote later, ‘some strong convictions with regard to the Empire, the navy, fixed defences and their mutual relations. It became my ambition to develop a school of thought in regard to the broad aspects of national defence and security founded upon the teaching of the past’.3 He held that Britain’s commerce was her life; the navy, which was its safeguard, should be partly supported by regular colonial contributions, or there should at least develop a sense of partnership. Drawing lessons from his study of the bombardment of Alexandria in I 882, he insisted that in the past too much money had been spent on fortifications, for a quite moderate expenditure was sufficient to deter warships from attack. Naval policy would predetermine the part to be played in war by the army, which would include colonial units. Finally, he stressed that the defence of the empire should be treated as a whole with as much assimilation as was profitable. In his plans the federation of the empire would start with small units and gradually expand; thus Australian federal forces would operate within the area of the Australian station. Local committees would be in charge of the defence of these regional units, and

‘For this, see D. 0”. Judd, Balfour and the British Empire (1968), pp. 26-8, and J . P. Mackintosh, ‘The role of the Committee of Imperial Defence before 1914’, Eng. Hist. Rev., lxxvii (1962), 491-3.

*G. S. Clarke, Baron Sydenham, My Working Life (1927), p. 169. 3Ibid., pp. 40-1.

I M P E R I A L DEFENCE P O L I C Y I 892--5 I97 they would be in touch with the Colonial Defence Committee, of which all agents-general would be ex-officio members. The machinery would be completed by colonial conferences held in London every five years.1 His writings on Imperial defence were extensive, emphasizing the same few themes and not tolerating opposition.* The success of his technical works was considerable, and although the success of his popular articles and books was even greater, it was not always achieved among his War Office superiors.3

By I 892 the focus and administrative expression of these departmental ideas on Imperial defence was the Colonial Defence Committee. It had been formed in 1885 with Sir Andrew Clarke as first president and George Clarke soon became its secretary, but Meade was ‘father and mainstay of the committee from first to last’.4 By 1892 it included both intelligence directors, army specialists on mobilization and artillery and a Treasury representative. The size of the committee had increased, as had the quantity and importance of its work. I t prepared printed memoranda for the colonies on colonial defence matters, such as steps to be taken in preparation for war, regulation of colonial port traffic and the preservation of secrecy about fortifications. The colonies drew up schemes of defence based on the C.D.C. recommendations. These were revised each year and the C.D.C., in issuing remarks upon them, had the chance to enunciate the principles which it thought the colonies should follow. It also gave recommendations on Colonial Office and War Office papers and George Clarke became the un- official defence adviser to the Colonial Office.5

The C.D.C. went through a crisis in 1891-3, mainly due to the opposition of the War Office adjutant-general Buller, who wished to have all defence planning under his own control. He was an enthusiast for home defence, and the principles which the C.D.C. recommended to the colonies were contrary to his. Moreover, as a Colonial Office committee, it injected an unwelcome civilian element into military affairs, especially since British

‘The best summary of G. S. Clarke’s views on Imperial defence is in Imperial Defence, which he wrote in 1897, especially page 21 I . His consistency is shown by the similarity of the ideas he expressed in his chapter in F. P. de Labilliere, Federal Britain ( I 894) and, anonymously, in Imperial Defence-reprinted from Edinburgh Review April, 1889 (1890).

*See H. Breton, ‘Thoughts on Imperial defence’ in Blackmood’s Magazine in May 1895 and George Clarke’s rejoinder in June, Breton’s reply in United Service Magazine, new ser., xii (1895-6), 163-86, and Colomb’s answer, ibid., pp. 372-88.

3 A n anonymous series of articles on War Office reform in The Times, 3 N0v.-12 Dec. 1891, was preserved in Confidential Print with the critical comments of the War Office hierarchy. See also G. S. Clarke, My Working Life, p. 146 and Nicholson to Wilkinson, 24 Oct. 1895 (Wilkinson MSS. by courtesy of Ogilby Trust).

‘+Memorandum by G. L. Ryder, March 1897 (Meade MSS. by courtesy of Mr. Charles and Lady Aileen Meade).

5F0r the work of the C.D.C. see P.R.O., Cab. 7/7, 8/1 and 91’1. George Clarke, who was later described by Campbell-Bannerman as ‘ wirepullerissimus ’, made full use of his inter-departmental position (e.g. W.O. to C.O., 17 July 1891 (P.R.O., C.O. 418/1); Campbell-Bannerman to Spencer, 9 June 1893 (Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 52.5 17)).

198 troops were stationed in some of the colonies. The influential position acquired by Clarke, a Royal Engineers Major, was an additional irritant within the War Office. In December 1891 the War Office suggested that the C.D.C. be merged into the new Joint Naval and Military Committee. The Colonial Secretary, Knutsford, opposed that, but agreed to new regulations which provided that the C.D.C. was to have no executive function ar,d was only to deal with matters of detail, principles being decided by the joint com- mittee.1 Buller was not, however, content with the action of the Secretary for War, Stanhope, in agreeing to the new regulations, and threatened to resign. The point at issue was the executive function of the C.D.C. Meade claimed that departmental representatives spoke for their departments as far as possible, but Buller asserted that ‘no man [can] speak for my Depart- ment unless instructed by me ’.2 By private intervention, Meade secured his agreement to a new regulation by which the three departments would approve the Remarks on Defence schemes before their dispatch. The Colonial Office offered this additional regulation with some reluctance since it would hamper the efficient co-ordination of advice for the colonies on defence-the raison d’ktre of the C.D.C.3

The Colonial Office valued the C.D.C. highly. For the sake of Imperial relations it was necessary to reconcile the views on colonial defence of the departments concerned. Moreover, it was useful to the Colonial Secretary to have a committee which he could convene to advise him on defence problems. For the colonies, the Colonial Office claimed that

it is not too much to say that [the C.D.C.] recommendations now command a confidence which in the case of the self-governing colonies especially, is not easily won and which, in general Imperial interests, it is most desirable to retain. Ex- perience on the other hand shows that recommendations on these subjects which emanate from the Colonial Office or the War Office do not unfortunately com- mand [the same respect] . . . no single recommendation of the C.D.C. approved by H.M.G. has ever been rejected by any Colonial Government.4

Despite the understanding with Meade, Buller had the functions of the C.D.C. referred in July 1892 to the Joint Naval and Military Committee which recommended a procedure which seemed to allow the War Office to

1 W.O. to C.O., 7 Dec. I 891 and attached regulations ; C.O. to W.O., 2 I Dec. I 89 I ,

2Buller to Meade, 3 0 March 1892, filed with W.O. to C.O., 7 Dec. 1891 (ibid.). ,This account is based on the papers filed with W.O. to C.O., 7 Dec. 1891 (ibid.).

Andrew Clarke, when acting as agent-general for Victoria in Apr. 1892, provided timely evidence of the value of the C.D.C. with a memorandum to the Colonial Office praising its work. He suggested that the colonial agents-general should be represented on it. George Clarke and Chapman were supporters of the idea, which although not adopted, was later revived in relation to the Committee of Imperial Defence (A. Clarke to Meade, 8 Apr. 1892, enclosure (P.R.O., C.O. 3091138); G. S. Clarke, Imperial Defence (1897), p. 228; Chapman to Brackenbury, secret, 9 Dec. 1892 (P.R.O., W.O. 106/16); The Cambridge History of the British Empire (8 vols., 192+3), iii. 435 and 595).

T H E L I B E R A L S A N D T H E F O R M A T I O N O F

No. 23669 (P.R.O., C.O. 323/384).

4C.O. to W.O., 2 Dec. 1892, No. 16602 (P.R.O., C.O. 323/389).

I M P E R I A L DEFENCE P O L I C Y 1892-5 ‘99 communicate directly in some cases with senior officers in the colonies. Over the strenuous protests of the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Ripon, George Clarke was removed from secretaryship of the C.D.C. and sent abroad. Finally, the commandant at the Cape dispatched the colony’s defence scheme direct to the War Office, whereas it would previously have gone to the Colonial Office through the governor and thence to the C.D.C.l Ripon then dissolved the C.D.C. in December 1892. That was a tactic and a successful one, for the other departments supported the Colonial Office side of the controversy. The War Office started to regret ‘what they have brought about seeing the difficulties they will have in getting any policy carried out by the self-governing or even the Crown colonies’.2 The War Office therefore expressed enthusiasm for the C.D.C., and it was revived in January 1893 under regulations very similar to those agreed twelve months before, but now signed by Ripon, Campbell-Bannerman and Spencer.3

The C.D.C. did not emerge from its years of crisis unaltered. First, the personal differences which threatened its existence were greatly lessened by Sir George Clarke’s departure. As a member of the committee noted, ‘eventually the C.D.C. will gain in being worked by a man who is directly [the inspector general of fortification’s] appointment instead of by one who looked to a great extent to the C.O. to support his views’.4 Secondly, the conflict between the War Office and Colonial Office over defence responsi- bilities was lessened. It was not, however, obliterated. For example, the Joint Naval and Military Committee asked the Colonial Office to help establish namesakes in the colonies to consider harbour defences, instead of using the chain of local defence committees which had been formed at the instance of the C.D.C. Thirdly, there was a reduction in the practical, as distinct from the theoretical, independence of the C.D.C. Because the sub- jects considered were represented as detailed, because they apparently did not touch home defence, members had been allowed to speak with some freedom for their departments. The new regulations requiring the written consent of the two service departments prior to the despatch of reports, along with the restriction on the freedom of action of the secretary, impaired the C.D.C.’s efficiency in dealing with colonial defence. Finally, the C.D.C. had attempted in 1890 to define some general principles of Imperial defence, although they could not, of course, be called such since that would have involved cabinet consent. The 1893 regulations, however, required that questions of principle be decided by the Joint Naval and Military Commit- tee. In May 1895, Matthew Nathan became C.D.C. secretary. An able

1W.O. to C.O., 18 Aug. 1892, enclosure ( i b d . ) ; Ripon to Campbell-Bannerman, 5 Sept. and 15 Oct. 1892; Campbell-Bannerman to Ripon, 12 Sept., 12 and 16 Oct. 1892, conf. (Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 43517); the file P.R.O., Adm. 1/7162 contains much relevant correspondence.

ZHoskins to Spencer, 19 Dec. 1892 (Spencer MSS.); Treasury to C.O., 26 Dec.

3W.O. to C.O., 7 Jan. 1893, and enclosure (P.R.O., C.O. 323/394). The agreed

4Chapman to Brackenbury, 18 Nov. 1892 (P.R.O., W.O. 106/16).

1892 (P.R.O., C.O. 323/389).

regulations are in P.R.O., Cab. 8/1-45M.

200 I M P E R I A L DEFENCE P O L I C Y 1 8 9 2 - 5 Imperialist and friend of Sir George Clarke, he was able to frame a memo- randum on ' The Principles of Colonial Defence '.I Part of this was publicly announced by the duke of Devonshire as the policy of the Salisbury admini- stration in 1896.2 As Devonshire, president of the Cabinet Defence Com- mittee, acknowledged, the principles had been acted upon by the C.D.C. for years. The change was that they were now formally accepted by the cabinet. The speech represents the meeting point of two main developments in defence policy formation in the eighteen-nineties ; the growing influence of the idea of Imperial defence within the departments, and the movement towards the creation of a central body to co-ordinate defence planning.

There comes then a turning point in British defence administration around I 891. Before that time the C.D.C. was the only bridge between the admiralty and the War Office. Its plans for colonial defence were, under the guidance of George Clarke, infused by the principles of the Colomb school. As Pro- fessor Johnson has pointed out, the C.D.C. produced no plan for combined land and sea operations for Imperial defence.3 Still it was a considerable feat to have advanced a little towards that goal and to have had an important educative influence within the departments. While it had no executive responsibility it had advised the cabinet directly in 1885 and might have done so again in another emergency. The C.D.C. avoided absorption in the Joint Naval and Military Committee which was formed in 1891. In the face of War Office opposition a Liberal Colonial Secretary preserved the C.D.C. in 1893 for much useful work in a narrower field in subsequent years. Attempts in 1893 to breathe life into the Joint Naval and Military Committee failed, but faced with the need for a co-ordinated army and navy approach, the Liberal government chose a political solution-the Cabinet Defence Com- mittee of 1895. The Liberal interest in administrative change derived partly from the personalities involved-the Imperialist Rosebery, the defence enthusiasts Ripon and Meade-but also from the influence on them of the idea of Imperial defence. Still, the Liberal cabinet committee and its Conservative successor only went a little way towards closing the gap between the services and that between the politicians and the service chiefs on the question of Imperial defence planning. The South African war was needed before fuller progress was achieved in these fields.

LUKE TRAINOR

1P.R.O., Cab. 8/1-57M, 19 May 1896. This memorandum acknowledges its debt to the C.D.C. paper of 15 May 1890 on colonial defence principles as applied to the Australian colonies (Cab. 9/1-40R).

2The Times, 4 Dec. 1896, p. 7. 3F. A. Johnson, Defence by Committee (1960), pp. 21-2.