The Limits of Ontology

7/30/2019 The Limits of Ontology

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The Limits of Ontology: The Good to Evil in Pseudo-Dionysius

J. S. Kupperman

Apostolic Johannite Church Conclave

26 May, 2013

In the late fifth or early sixth century CE, the Christian mystic, or possibly a pagan

writing as a Christian,1

The Dionysian chain of being has some fourteen links. God is not one of them, nor is

evil, both of which exist, if I may use such a word, outside of the system. What extends between

these two extremes are nine choirs of angels, the sacraments, four orders of clergy, initiated

humanity, profane humanity, animals, plants, and non-living things. The angles, sacraments, and

humanity are described primarily in the Celestial Hierarchy and the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy.

God, in singular, plural, and negative modes, is discussed in theDivine Names andMystical

Theology. Evil is the topic of the second half of the fourth chapter of theDivine Names. These

four texts, along with several letters, make up what survives, or what was written, of pseudo-

Dionysius corpus.

and Neoplatonist now known as Pseudo-Dionysius writes a number of

treatises outlining creations relationship with God. In doing so, Dionysius attempts to describe

the nature, mundane and metaphysical, of God, the angelic choirs, the sacraments, humanity, and

the rest of creation. This chain, from God to humanity and back, constitutes not only a

hierarchical but an ontological structure. A transcendent God is the source of all Being, and

everything proceeds from, and reverts to, God, so far as possible. Outside of this divine cycle of

abiding, proceeding and reversion is evil, which has no Being of its own. This paper explores the

nature of the Dionysian chain of being in terms of its Christian and Neoplatonic heritages and its

continuing relevance to modern liturgical practice.

1 Lankila, Crypto-Pagan, 14-15.


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Being

TheDivine Names has what appears to be a rocky relationship with God. Here God is

described with increasingly contradictory language. God is One, God is many, God is nothing,

God is in everything. The names of God are undifferentiated but many. The names of God are

differentiated but one. God has no name. The difficulty in understanding God is that God is

beyond comprehension, beyond ineffability. And yet God is right here, in everything, the root of

everything within everything, while not being any of those things.2

Dionysius understanding of God relies heavily on the theology of the late pagan

Neoplatonist Proclus, just as Proclus relies heavily Iamblichus earlier work. This reliance is so

heavy some have speculated Dionysius may have been a member of the Athenian Platonic

academy. It is not, therefore, surprising to find Dionysius God modeled directly on the

Neoplatonic One, especially as found in later Neoplatonism a term describing Neoplatonism

from Iamblichus to the close of the Athenian academy in 529 CE, a year after the first reference

to the Dionysian corpus by Severus, a Monophysite leader.

3The One is an utterly transcendent,

utterly unknowable, non-Being, a superessential and hidden Deity,4

Being is an important concept in Hellenic philosophical thought. Since at least

Parmenides, Greek thought has seen Being as that which can be grasped by intellection. On this

Parmenides says For you could not know that which is not, for it is impossible, nor express it;

that is the source of all

Being.

2C.f. DN V.8.

3 Lankila, Crypto-Pagan, 32.4 DN I.2.


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for the same thing is for thinking and for being.5

The most ontologically superior beings, such

as the gods in Iamblichean thought, are full of Being, and that Being is distributed to

ontologically posterior beings through projectedlogoi or reason-principles, and the Platonic

Forms. Through participating the proper reason-principles an entity, such as a rational soul,

comes to be most fully itself. This is the essence of Being; it is that which distinguishes one thing

from another, giving entities their ultimate nature,6

making something this as opposed to that.

With the exception of God and evil, everything that exists has Being, though not necessarily to

the same extent. The seraphim, the highest of Dionysius angelic choirs, have more Being than a

human, but both are very real. God and evil have no Being, but do not do so in very different

ways.

An Aphophatic God

Understanding God in the Dionysian corpus is complicated. The God of theMystical

Theology is utterly transcendent, and reminiscent of the first moment of Iamblichus One, the

ineffable One, which exists within itself beyond all Being. The super-essential nature of God7

Dionysius is quite explicit about Gods not this-ness. God, as the pre-eminent cause of

everything perceptible is none of those perceptible things.

is one of the most explicitly Neoplatonic elements of Dionysius theology. And, as in pagan

Neoplatonism, it is the foundation of that theology.

8

5 In Perl, Theophany, 6.

Nor is God any of the intelligible

6DM I.5.

7 MT II.1.8 MT IV.1.


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things It causes.9

While Dionysius does not discuss the traditional Neoplatonic realm of Soul,

presumably God is also not any of the souls It causes, either. Gods nothingness is absolute, so

much so the language we use to describe Gods nothingness easily leads us into thinking of God

as something. When we say God is beyond Being we think of God as a being beyond Being.

When we say God is beyond thought, we think of God as a being we cannot think about.10

Alluding to Parmenides, Dionysius writes For, if all kinds of knowledge are of things

existing, and are limited to things existing, that, beyond all being, is also elevated above all

knowledge.

And

this is the problem.

11 As Parmenides says, we cannot have knowledge of something that is not. God is

beyond Being and therefore beyond thought. God is nothing at all. Any statement, positive or

negative, we make about God does not describe God. We cannot say God exists, but neither

can we say God does not exist. Even saying God is nothing is inaccurate. To quote Plotinus,

This phrase beyond being does not mean that it is a particular thing-for it makes no positive

statement about it, and it does not say its name, but all it implies is that it is not this.12

Further, beyond Being, does not refer to something with infinite Being. In Neoplatonic

thought something that is limited and definable, is superior that which is infinite and indefinable.

Further, Being is defined by limitation because Being is what distinguishes one thing from

another. Infinite Being is therefore a contradiction in terms,

We

must say of God not only not this, but also not not this.

13

9 MT V.1.

and God is neither limited nor

unlimited but outside of the concept of limitation. Instead the One is more akin to the

10 C.F. Perl, Theophany, 13.11

DN I.4, 593A.12 Enn V.5.6.2-11.13 Perl, Theophany, 12.


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Pythagorean Monad, which is neither finite nor infinite, neither even nor odd, and not even a

number as number implies distinction, and the monad comes before distinction. Instead, again

quoting Plotinus, the One is not anything, but before each and everything, and is not a being; for

being has a kind of shape of being, but that has no shape, not even intelligible shape. For since

the nature of the One is generative of all things it is none of them.14

Dionysius apophatic theology is not merely a linguistic theory. Dionysius God, like the

ineffable One of Iamblichus, is transcendent in that it is not part of reality in any way at all. We

cannot think of God not because of a limitation on our ability to think. We cannot do so because

there is nothing that is God to think about. Because of this, Dionysius apophatic theology is not

merely negative. To make a negating statement about something is to assume there are positive

qualities to negate. Contradicting Aristotle, Dionysius says we should not consider the

negations to be in opposition to the affirmations, but far rather that It, which is above every

abstraction and definition, is above the privations.

15

This unspeakable, unthinkable, super-essential God is the source of Being. This, again, is

part of Dionysiusian Neoplatonism. In Neoplatonic thought the ontological source of some

quality or thing, such as Being, Life, or Wisdom, does not itself possess that quality or thing.

Although Dionysius does not explicitly use the language of Iamblichus noetic moments;

unparticipated, participated, and in participation, his understanding of God as the cause of Being

reflects Iamblicus One-Being, the third moment of the One.

When Dionysius says we cannot say

anything about God it is not because we have nothing to say, but there is nothing about which to

speak.

14 Enn VI.9.3.38-41.15 MT I.2, 1000B.


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have Being and therefore are not illusions but are real, leading to simultaneous singularity and

multiplicity.

The One, in its third moment, is the source of Being beyond all Being.19 The One itself

does not produce other things. Production is movement and movement must be based on that

which is motionless.20

To explain this, Dionysius uses the allegory of light similar to the allegory of the sun in

PlatosRepublic. The light is not what is illuminated but is beyond what is illuminated, and

without light there is no illumination. God is the source of the light, which in Neoplatonic terms

represents Gods logoi. Within God there is no distinction between the logoi, but exterior to God,

they are the distinguishing principles that make beings be.

Late Platonic ontology depends on the idea of the unmoved mover, the

stable ground upon which everything else moves, and this is the One. If the One produced, and

therefore moved, it would need to rely on something superior to itself, and there is no such thing.

If there is, then that is the One, which is, again, unmoved. So God does not produce but is

production, the means by which other things move and produce. This is the source of Being

which is beyond Being because God does not exist amongst that which It produces.

21

19

CH I.4.177D

As Gods light not only illuminates

things, but makes them what they are by being within them, God is simultaneously transcendent

and imminent. Transcendent in that God is not a being in any way and imminent in that God is in

all beings. However, this is not a form of monism or pantheism. The multiple beings, though

images of God, are still real and adding up all the things that exist does not give us God, because

God is not in any way itself a thing.

20 Proclus, ET, 26.21 Perl, Theophany, 29.


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God, though without Being, is the source of all Being. According to Proclus, in the

Elements of Theology, a major source of Dionysian ontology, Every productive cause is

superior to that which it produces.22

It is at least theoretically possible for something else, also without and above Being, to be

the source of Being. For example, in Proclean theology the henadic gods are also above Being

and in Iamblichean theology there is a pre-essential Demiurge, although that Demiurge is a

vertical extension of the One-Being in the intelligible realm. Dionysius, however, does not

appear to have either of these. After God are the angels, all of which have Being. Because there

seems to be no other Beingless thing in Dionysian theology, God must be the Beingless source of

Being.

God is the ultimate causative principle and must be

superior to everything that follows. This does not necessarily mean God must be the source of

Being, but it does mean God, as ultimate cause, must be prior to Being and whatever does

produce Being. As weve seen, by cause Dionysius does not mean the actual creator of any

particular thing. Instead God is the necessary requirement for anything to have existence.

A Kataphatic God?

Although God-as-Nothing is the ultimate point of Dionysius theology, he spends much

more time talking about God as though It were something. Dionysius says Gods essential

nature lies in Goodness and as the source of Being, the former of which, like the latter, is derived

from Platonic terminology. Dionysius first writes of God as something, in the Divine Names,

because God-as-nothing is part of the theoretical theology of the usually placed laterMystical

22 7.


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Theology. TheDivine Names is his practical theology. Citing Matthew, Nehemiah, Exodus,

Revelation, Hebrews, John, and others,23

Dionysius employs the divine epitaphs in two ways: as unified names and as distinct

names. Names such as Super-Good, Super-God, Super-Living, and Good, Life, Wisdom, Being,

Beauty, and so forth are the unified names common to all of God.

Dionysius describes God. God is Life. God is Wisdom.

God is Beauty. God is the Father, the Word, the Spirit.

24The super terminology

refers to God as abstraction and beyond all such normal good, gods, life, etc. The normative

language refers to God as cause of all things, and the names actually refer to Gods gifts.25

Together, these are the Divine Unions.26 These names do not refer to distinct divine elements

but to God as a whole because of Gods super-unified Unity.27

Because God is one, and the

One, any title applied to God must apply to all of God. Anything less is blasphemy because it

denies Gods one-ness.28

Seemingly despite Gods unity, and even proof-texts such as John 10:30, I and the

Father are One, the epitaphs of Father, Son, and Spirit are called distinctions,

29

because

there is no interchange or community in these.30

This means that although the Son and the

Father are One, they are not the same, and Dionysius attests to this.31

These are the

manifestations of the Godhead itself, beyond the logoi-likegifts of the Divine Unions.32

23

DN II.1

A

further distinction is the incarnation of the Word. The Father and Spirit did not share in this,

24 DN II.1, 3.25 DN II.3.26 DN II.4.27

DN II.1.28Ibid.29 DN II.4.30

DN II.3.31 DN II.5.32 DN II.4.


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except through the overall omni-benevolence of the unchangeable God and the overall divine

work, theurgy, in which Jesus engaged.33

However, despite their distinct qualities, Dionysius calls the Trinity the One-springing

Persons

34as a mark of their unity. To explain this Dionysius uses the metaphor of lamps. Even

as each of three lamps is distinct, their light mingles so as to be indistinguishable.35

Even though

the divine light is one, the source of that light, in the form of the One-springing Persons, fixed

in the union itself, unmingled and unconfused.36

With all this we are presented with a problem. Dionysius God is paradoxically No-thing

and some-thing, and in everything, all at once. While some metaphysical conundrum is well and

good, the Neoplatonists take their ontology seriously. It is not that they do not like confusion in

their system of thought but that no such confusion may exist. Part of the problem, that which is

related to the unified names that exist in everything, is solved when we understand that what

Dionysius describes are divine activities rather than divine essences. This idea stems from the

Aristotelian trinity of essence, power, and activity, which is brought into Neoplatonism by

Iamblichus and preserved by Proclus. We may therefore see the unified names as akin to the

Platonic Forms and theirlogoi, which in later Neoplatonism exist at the noeric rather than noetic

level, descended into generation. Dionysius symbolizes these as divine lights that are fully

graspable by the mind.

37

The distinctive names of the Trinity present a more theologically challenging problem.

Dionysius seems to negate these names, along with all other kataphatic qualities, in theMystical

33 DN II.6.34 DN II.4.35

Ibid.36 DN II.5.37 C.f. CH I.1.


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Theology. This brings up the question of whether or not Dionysian theology is Trinitarian. A

subject that is important if Dionysius was in fact a Christian, but not as important if he is a pagan

posing as a Christian.

A close reading of chapter five of theMystical Theology, which suggests an alternative

meaning to spirit other than that which is commonly used, an idea that may be applied to the

rest of the Trinity,38

does not necessarily eliminate Gods Trinitarian nature, but qualifies it.

While the regular activities of the Trinity may be negated, the Trinity itself is, in its essence,

beyond being and is unknowable. This sense is also suggested in the beginning of this text,

where the Trinity is invoked as Triad supernal, super-God and super-good,39

But is the Trinity transcendent as the ultimately unknowable God? If a Christian reading

of Dionysius is accepted then the answer is perhaps yes. However, if, as suggested by Carlo

Maria Mazzucchi and Tuomo Lankila, there is a crypto-pagan background to the corpus, then the

answer need not be. Instead the Trinity can reflect Proclus pre-essential henadic gods, who are

simultaneously distinct entities and unities not dissimilar to Iamblichus idea of the gods as

monoiedes, of a single form, or his pre-essential Demiurge as an extension of the One-Being.

which points to

the Trinitys transcendent nature.

40

38

MT V.1; Jones, Status, 649.

If

this is so it adds an otherwise missing, but important, element of late Neoplatonic thought to

Dionysian theology. This is the idea that the lowest level of one hypostasis is also the highest

level of the next. In Iamblichus we see this as the pre-essential Demiurge Aion being a vertical

extension of the One-Being in the noetic realm. Proclus does not make much of Iamblichus pre-

essential Demiurge, but does have pre-essential gods in the same position. These henadic gods

39 MT I.1.40 Clark, Gods, 56-7.


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are typified, much like the Trinity, by being distinct individuals while simultaneously being in

union with one another.41

What of the incarnation? The language of the Celestial Hierarchy IV.4, where the

Incarnation explicitly engages in the same creative and organizing activity of the Demiurge of

Platos Timaeus, suggests Dionysius saw Jesus in a similar, demiurgic role. The late Platonic

Demiurge, identified as Helios in Iamblichean theology, is noeric in nature, and rules over both

the noeric and celestial realms, the latter of which is encosmic in nature. As one of the visible

gods, Helios has a body, the sun, but is not of that body, controlling it from without,

transcendently. Certainly, there is a difference here between Iamblichean and Dionysian

theology, as the Dionysian equivalent to the visible gods is an order of angels and is in no way

analogous to the Incarnation. However, there are similarities as well. In Dionysius the divine

element is described in the transcendent, mind-nullifying terms of the pre-essential One, a pre-

essential reality that has somehow, through a mystery, comes to take on a human body.

Although the body of Jesus is real, physical, and human, the divine element is above

form.42

Hence, since through love towards man, He has come even to nature, and really

became substantial, and the Super-God lived as Man . . ., and in these He has the

supernatural and super-substantial, not only in so far as He communicated with us

without alteration and without confusion, suffering no loss as regards His super-

fulness, from His unutterable emptying of Himself but also, because the newest

of all new things, He was in our physical condition super-physical in thing

substantial, super-substantial, excelling all the things of us from us above

us.

Combining Platonic and Christian thought, Dionysius describes Jesus as follows:

43

41

Butler, Being, 94-95.42 DNII.10.43 DNII.10.


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Like the visible gods, the Son inhabits His body super-physically. All of this may reflect pagan

Neoplatonic theology concerning the Demiurges, which are vertical reflections of one another.

Here we may see Jesus, as noeric Demiurge, possible acting as a reflection of the element of the

pre-essential Demiurge, in the form of the Trinity, relating to the Son, assuming the Trinity itself

does not instead reflect Proclus henadic gods.

But what of our kataphatic God? Ultimately, there is no such thing in Dionysius. The

divine unions are not God but divine qualities, akin to the Platonic Forms and the logoi. They are

certainly divine, and have an anagogic affect to raise us to be like God, so far as possible, but

they are not, in themselves, God.

The Celestial Hierarchy

The angels of the celestial hierarchy are called Heavenly Minds,44

incorporeal

Minds,45 God-loving Minds,46 and super-heavenly Beings,47 of whom the demiurgic Jesus

is the supercelestial Cause and arranger.48

44 CH I.2; II.2.

The language of the mind is not accidental, placing the

angelic choirs in the noetic realm. Renaissance Neoplatonist, and eventual Catholic priest,

Marsilio Ficino, who translates Iamblichus, Proclus, and Dionysius, refers to the noetic or

intelligible realm as the Angelic Mind. As intelligible entities angels have Being and, unlike

God, are graspable, in some fashion, by the mind.

45 CH II.446

CH III.347 CH IV.4.48Ibid.


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The angels are the beginning of the divine hierarchy, with God existing, as it were,

transcendently above or beyond the Angelic Mind. Dionysius defines hierarchy as:

a sacred order and science and operation, assimilated, as far as attainable, to the

likeness of God, and conducted to the illuminations granted to it from God,

according to capacity, with a view to the Divine imitation.49

The purpose of the heavenly hierarchy is the assimilation and union, as far as attainable,

with God. Although the language of as far as attainable appears in other Christian writings, it

is also thoroughly Platonic, going back at least the Theatetus, where the question as to the chief

human good is asked. To this Socrates answers becoming like God, so far as possible.

50

There are nine, now common, angelic orders in Dionysius angelic hierarchy. These nine

are likely modeled, by way of Proclus, after Iamblichus hierarchy of greater kinds. This

includes a variety of kinds of gods, angels, heroes, and daimons that rather neatly, and not

surprisingly, form a group of nine ranks. Once again Ficino seems to have put together the

connection between the pagan Neoplatonic divinities and the Dionysian angelic hierarchy when

he writes Certainly the gods, or as our theologians say, the angels, admire and love divine

beauty.

The

angelic hierarchy leads humanity upwards to this goal. In Platonic thought this means the angels

are necessarily ontologically prior to rational souls, placing them above us on the Dionysian

chain of being.

51

The angelic hierarchy consists of the orders of Seraphim, Cherubim, Thrones,

Dominions, Powers, Authorities, Principalities, Archangels, and Angels. These are nine are

49CH III.1.

50Theat, 176b.51 DAm I.2, 37.


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divided into three groups of three, with the powers or qualities of perfection, illumination, and

purification descending through each triad. Each level both participates in these qualities and

expresses them. The Seraphim, for instance, both perfect what is below them and participate

divine perfection. The Dominions participate in Seraphic perfection52 and likewise perfect the

orders beneath them, all the way down to their effects on human souls through the sacraments

and ecclesiastical hierarchy.53

This three-fold activity its basis in the Porphyrian intelligible triad

of Being, Life, Intellect but more specifically in ProclusElements of Theology andPlatonic

Theology, which set out how different levels of beings affect those below them,54

which itself

has precedents in IamblichussDe Mysteriis.

55

As the modern meaning of hierarchy implies, the angelic orders are ranked vertically.

As the orders descend, their ontological distance from God increases. The first series, the

Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones, are established immediately around God

56and receive their

powers directly from their source.57

The Dominions, Powers, and Authorities, however, receive

their powers through participating the choirs above, and the final series receive theirs through

these.58

The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy

Beneath the angelic hierarchy is the ecclesiastical hierarchy, which is divided into two

ontological levels. Acting as a bridge between the divine and human realm are the sacraments, or

52 CH VIII.2, c.f. CH VII.2.53

EH V.7.54 ET 56-7, PT III.3, c.f. Wear and Dillon, Dionysius,61-2.55 DM V.22, 267.56

CH VII.1.57Ibid.58 C.f. Wear and Dillon,Dionysius, 57.


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sacred rites as Dionysius calls them. The rites appear ontologically prior to even the most pure

human souls as found in Dionysius Hierarchs or Bishops. This is seen in how Dionysius

discusses each of the rites and in the way in which theEcclesiastical Hierarchy is ordered,

beginning with the rites and then shifting to the human hierarchy. The Hierarch is fully initiated

into the sacred rites. Through these rites the Hierarch communicates sacred reality to the lower

ranks of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and other sacred people.59

Like the celestial and human hierarchies, the sacraments have various purifying,

illuminating, and perfecting functions. In the terms of later Neoplatonism the mysteries are a

form of theurgy, what Dionysius typically refers to as hierogia, the sacred rites in imitation, and

participation of Christ. He reserves theourgia, divine activity, for the activities of Jesus.

Although there is no discussion of

this, we may be able to place the sacraments, though they may ultimately take physical form, in

the noeric or intellective realm. This places the essences of the liturgy at the same level of the

Platonic Forms as found in Iamblichus and grants the mysteries a Being outside of and above

their physical manifestations as enacted rituals.

60

Dionysius enumerates seven primary sacred rites: Illumination or baptism, Synaxis or the

Eucharist, the consecration of anointing oil, the consecrations of the priesthood, and the

consecration of monks.

61

59

EH I.3.

In describing these Dionysius employs the same technical language and

ideology, except as noted above, as Hellenic Neoplatonic theurgy. The Dionysian mysteries are

theurgic rites, in the Hellenic sense of the word, with a divine rather than human origin. Just as

the angels have an anagogic effect on each order beneath them, the sacred rites raise those

initiated into them into greater participation of the heavenly hierarchy and God, with an end-goal

60Ibid., 99.61 He also includes rites for the dead, which include elements of the first three rites.


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of divinization, so far as possible.62

It is unclear as to whether or not Dionysius ordered his description of the mysteries

ontologically, or if there is an ontological difference between them. It is further unclear as to how

they may be ranked as many rites are dependent upon one another. For instance baptism includes

being anointed by consecrated oil, but only a Hierarch can consecrate the oil but before

becoming a Hierarch a person must first be baptized. Also, unlike as with the celestial hierarchy,

with its neat arrangement of purifying, illuminating, and perfecting triads, the sacred rites are not

divided as such. The mystery of Illumination, is both purifying and illuminating,

This is only possible if those rites come into being

ontologically prior to rational, which is to say human, souls.

63 Synaxis is

illuminating and perfecting,64

Whether or not there are ontological differences between the mysteries, it is clear no such

ontological hierarchy exists amongst the ranks of humanity. Despite the angelic nature of the

Hierarch, and their deep theosis through initiation, a Hierarch, like the rest of the human

ecclesiastical hierarchy, is human, possessing human or rational soul. A Hierarch is not

ontologically superior to any other human and the ecclesiastical hierarchy represents a horizontal

extension rather than a vertical extension. This must be the case as human souls all have the

same ontological source beneath the noetic realm, and this positioning is an innovation of later

pagan Neoplatonism.

and the initiations into the priesthood are purifying, illuminating,

and perfecting, and perhaps most closely resemble the angelic triads.

65

62 EH I.1-I.3.63

EH II.3.1., II.3.3.64 EH III.1.65 DAm I.3. 38


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Although all humanity is ontologically equal, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is still a

hierarchy. The sacerdotal ranks include perfecting Hierarchs, illuminating priests, purifying

deacons. Beneath these, and outside of the priesthood, are monks, baptized contemplatives, and

those being purified in preparation for baptism. Finally there are the multitudes of the impure

who, in imitation of the Orphic command to Depart all ye profane, and close the doors,66

are

dismissed from the sanctuary before the ministration of the sacred rites.67

This human hierarchy

appears to be an extension of Iamblichus extension of Platos view of humanity. Iamblichus

divides humanity into three: the great herd, the transitioning philosopher and theurgist, and the

theurgic sage. The level of transitioning theurgist is also divided into three, pointing towards the

theurgists spiritual orientation.68

The difference between the various levels of humanity is a matter of participation rather

than ontology. The Neoplatonic idea of participation is based on the idea that an ontological

level, emanating from a level above, lacks some quality of its source, otherwise they would be

identical. In order to be most fully itself the lower level must participate the higher, ultimately

reverting, to use Proclus language, to its source and completing its proper circular motion of

remaining, proceeding, and reverting.

Dionysius appears to divide each level into three, the mass

herd of humanity being the impure, including the possessed, the initiated being the transitioning

theurgist, and the priesthood being associated with the theurgic sage.

69

66 In Eusebius,Evangelicae,664b, also quoted by Porphyry in On Images, fr. 1.

Dionysius uses the same ideology, though not always the

same language, and presents the sacred rites as the primary means through which participation

and revision to theosis occurs. The consecration into the order of monks, or the ranks of the

priesthood, is initiation into higher levels of contemplation and participation. This means that

67EH VI.1.1-3.

68 DM V.18, 257.69DN IV.8-9. C.f. ET 35; Shaw, Theurgy, 89-90; DM I.9, 39-41.


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while a Hierarch is not ontologically superior to either a priest or one of the impure, a Hierarch

does participate the divine levels more closely70

Beneath humanity Dionysius specifically mentions irrational souls, or non-human

animals, plants, and non-living things as having Being. These are ontologically posterior to

humanitys rational souls but not derivative of those souls. Dionysius has little to say about

these.

and is therefore more like a soul in its unfallen

state, or the purified souls of Iamblichean theology, which represent the lowest level of divinity.

Evil

Dionysius writings on the nature of evil are contained in the second half of the fourth

chapter ofDivine Names, sections 18-35. The entire discussion can be seen as a highly repetitive

summary of Proclus On the Existence of Evils. The primary difference, if there is a difference, is

eschatological. The late Platonists believe in reincarnation and the ability of any being to remove

the hylic accretions associated with hamartia through catharsis. Dionysius appears to limit this

ability to the single life of any soul. Those who live a life of sin, and die that way, lose any

chance of redemption. The reason for this has to do with God having given humanity the power

to resist evil, but the discussion of how Dionysius justifies eternal punishment is to be found in

his Concerning Just and Divine Chastisement, which islost, never written, or a mentioned as a

blind to disguise his paganism. This, however, may only be an apparent difference. The later

Neoplatonists allowed for impermanent eschatological punishment to help purify the soul before

70 C.f. EH.I.1.3


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reincarnation.Divine Names, while saying there is punishment, does not say for how long, nor

even when that punishment occurs, during life or after.

What is evil? Proclus lengthy discussion of the subject can be seen as a refutation of

Plotinus idea of the existence of absolute evil.71

A privation and failure, and want of strength, and want of proportion, and want of

attainment, and want of purpose; and without beauty, and without life, and

without mind, and without reason, and without completeness, and without

stability, and without cause, and without limit, and without production; and

inactive, and without result, and disordered, and dissimilar, and limitless, and

dark, and unessential, and being itself nothing in any manner of way whatever.

While Proclus, and Dionysius, agree that evil

is a privation of the Good, or God, in some given thing, they both deny the existence of an

absolute or primary, extent source of evil. To speak of absolute evil as existing makes no

sense. Evil is a privation, a lacking to some degree of the Good as exhibited by a being going

against its proper mode of existence. Evil is not in any thing but in what it lacks, it is:

72

Specifically,

To a demon, evil is to be contrary to the good-like mind to a soul, to be contrary

to reason to a body, to be contrary to nature.73

For absolute evil to be, it must be a complete privation, something that does not simply

have no Being, as God can be said to have no Being, but to be beneath Being. Further, where

God is everything in everything, absolute evil would have to be nothing in nothing. Unlike God,

where we can point to things and say this exists because of God, there is nothing we can point

of and say this exists because of evil, because if it exists at all, such as in demons, it is because

71Enn I.8.4-5, 59-60.

72 DN IV.32.73Ibid.


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of God and the Goodness that is within demons, even if that goodness is only their desire to

exist.74

There may be a difference between Dionysius and the Hellenic Neoplatonists on what

kinds of beings can engage in evil. For Iamblichus and Proclus the gods, archangels, and angels

participate the Good too closely to allow for evil. The gods, especially, are incapable of evil,

even by accident. Lower beings, such as some daimons, and of course human souls, can admit

the privations necessary to their genre to engage in evil.

So, Dionysius follows Proclus and finds that evil, if it can be said to exist at all, does so

only when mixed with good, and is caused by upsetting of the proper ordering of the parts of a

whole.

75 Dionysius allows angels to engage in

evil and become demons. However, he does not say what kinds of angels may do so. His

description of the Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones as being administered to directly by

Godhead suggests they would not be capable of evil. In this it is probably no coincidence that

these choirs roughly correspond to the hypercosmic, hyper-encosmic, and encosmic gods

primarily discussed in IamblichusDe Mysteriis,76

This completes the Dionysian chain of Being. The chain itself consists of intelligible

beings; the angels, and sensible beings and things; humans, animals, plants, and non-living

things, and the sacraments which have both intellective and sensible forms linking the above and

below. The Chain of Being is theoretically, but not actually, bookended with non-Being: God

and evil. However, where God transcends Being evil cannot be said to not exist in the same way

we might speak of Gods non or super-existence. Instead, evil exists as cracks in the system.

God, on the other hand, while not connected to the Chain is nevertheless found in every link. In

which are incapable of evil.

74DN IV.23

75 Chlup, Prolcus, 28-9.76 Kupperman,Living Theurgy, unpublished MS 160-167.


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this we may not say the Chain is hanging from God, but exists because of God and is suspended

on the grounding of its own intelligibility. What we see is a self-suspending chain with

immaculate links at the top and some rust and cracks at the bottom.

Dionysian Ontology in Practice

Let us then elevate our very selves by our prayers to the higher ascent of the

Divine and good rays, - as if a luminous chain being suspended from the celestial

heights, and reaching down hither, we, by ever clutching this upwards, first with

one hand, and then with the other, seem indeed to draw it down, but in reality we

do not draw it down, it being both above and below, but ourselves are carriedupwards to the higher splendors of the luminous rays.

77

Dionysius explains the purpose and function of the liturgy in this sentence. The sacred

rites, whether Dionysian hierogia or Hellenic theourgia, are, above everything else, anagogic. In

Iamblichean doxography Dionysius mysteries are types of material theurgy, engaging with a

knowable, kataphatic God, with the Eucharist especially focusing on the mystery of the

incarnation and Jesus sacrifice. The focus, as Dionysius repeatedly states, is on theosis, so far as

possible. To achieve this, the theurgic ideology behind the mysteries must be seen as practical as

well as theoretical. That is, from the late Neoplatonic perspective, the theurgic aspects of the

sacred rites are real and, when properly approached, achieve their intended results.

To achieve this end, hierogia, like theurgy, must be accompanied with proper knowledge

of the rites.78

77 DN III.1.

This is evinced in their descriptions in theEcclesiastical Hierarchy. Each ritual is

described and explained three times. First the rites and its purpose are introduced. This is

78 C.f. DM II.11.


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followed by a description of the physical actions of which the rite consists. Finally there is a

contemplation explaining a higher meaning to the rite that transcends its physicality.

This knowledge is, however, ultimately reserved for the priesthood, especially the

Hierarchs who perform the most important of rites and also act as a monad for their priests and

deacons. The Hierarch, by being in an elevated spiritual state, and having the proper sacred

knowledge, transmits to the priests and deacons the divine rays necessary to perform the

mysteries. Without a Hierarch the rites cannot be performed effectively.

From the first sacred rite an individual may experience, the mystery of Illumination,

which Dionysius also calls divine birth, the sanctified begins the spiritual ascent towards

divination. It is not, however, entirely through their power and knowledge this occurs. The power

to resist evil comes from God and is transmitted through the angelic hierarchy to the Hierarch

who, through their intellectual and gnostic knowledge transmits it to the rest of the clergy and

the ranks of the initiated, those baptized into the sacred mysteries.

Once again, Dionysian ideology evokes Proclus theology of remaining, proceeding, and

reverting.79

The purpose of the sacred rites is to revert those who participate them back to their

divine source, where they will abide before once again proceeding and reverting. The Chain of

Being is therefore not meant to be mono-directional, moving from above to below. The liturgy is

established through divine eros, its manifestation the result of Gods love for humanity. The

power of divine eros, as manifested in the mysteries and those consecrated to perform them, calls

us back to God80

79 ET 35

through the ecstasy of the divine rites, and the eros they inspire in us, through

80 C.f. DN IV.11.


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and in which, like Saint Paul, Christ lives.81

And, while we do not change our ontological level

through engaging in the sacred rites, we more fully claim our place in the heavenly chain through

them, becoming like God, so far as possible.

81Ibid. IV.13; Gal 2:20.


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The Limits of Ontology

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