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The Anglophone Africa Civil Society and Communities CCM Shadow Report and Scorecard Initiative
THE MALAWI CIVIL SOCIETYAND COMMUNITIES
CCM SHADOW REPORT
Authors:
Ali Mwachande (MANERERA+)
Safari Mbewe (MANERERA+)
2
“Africa’s story has been written by others; we need to own our problems and solutions and write our story”.- President of Rwanda, Paul
Kagame, 2013.*
*Every one of the Country Reports were done using Participatory Action Research: the research was developed, conducted, analysed and written by in-country national civil
society activists.
The Malawi Civil Society and Communities CCM Shadow Report
3
Table of Contents
Abbreviations .....................................................................................................................................................................4
Problem Statement ...........................................................................................................................................................5
About the research ............................................................................................................................................................7
Expected Outcomes ...........................................................................................................................................................7
Methodology ......................................................................................................................................................................8
Analysis .............................................................................................................................................................................10
CCM Performance ............................................................................................................................................................10
EPA Tool & Process ..........................................................................................................................................................16
PIP Tool and Process .......................................................................................................................................................16
CCM Scorecard & Shadow Report Tool & Process .......................................................................................................16
Findings .............................................................................................................................................................................18
Finding 1: CSO CCM member election not transparent nor accountable ................................................................18
Finding 2: CCM struggles with some duties and requires regulatory support .........................................................18
Finding 3: CCM secretariat has weak communications with stakeholders...............................................................18
Recommendations ...........................................................................................................................................................19
Notes .................................................................................................................................................................................20
Contact Details .................................................................................................................................................................22
4
Abbreviations
AAI AIDS Accountability InternationalCCM Country Co-ordinating MechanismCoI/CI ConflictofInterestCG Community groupCSO Civil Society OrganisationCS Civil SocietyEANNASO EasternAfricaNationalNetworksofAIDSServiceOrganisationsEPA EligibilityPerformanceAssessmentFBO Faith-Based OrganisationFGD Focus Group DiscussionWSW WomenwhohaveSexwithWomenGF/GFATM GlobalFundforAIDS,TuberculosisandMalariaHIV HumanImmunodeficiencyVirusIDU Injecting drug usersINGO InternationalNon-GovernmentalOrganisationKAP KeyAffectedPopulationsKP Key PopulationsMDR TB Multi-Drug-ResistantTuberculosisMSM MenwhohavesexwithmenNFM NewfundingmodelNCM NationalCoordinatingMechanismNGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisationNPO Non-ProfitOrganisationOIG OfficeoftheInspector-GeneralPAM PeopleAffectedbyMalariaPATB PeopleAffectedbyTuberculosisPIP PerformanceImprovementPlanPLWD PeopleLivingwiththeDiseasesofHIV,TBandmalariaPLWHIV PeopleLivingwithHIVPR Primary RecipientRFA RequestforApplicationSR Subsidiary RecipientSSR Sub-Subsidiary RecipientSW SexWorkersTB Tuberculosis
The Malawi Civil Society and Communities CCM Shadow Report
5
EffectiveCountryCoordinatingMechanisms(CCMs)areavitalpartoftheGlobalFundarchitectureatcountrylevel.
CCMsareresponsible forsubmittingrequests for fundingandforprovidingoversiteduring implementation.With
theintroductionoftheGlobalFund’sNewFundingModel(NFM)inMarch2014,CCMsplayanevenmoreimportant
centralrole,convenestakeholderstoengagemeaningfullyininclusivecountrydialogue,agreeonfundingsplit,and
participateinthedevelopmentofNationalStrategicPlan(NSP)discussionsforthethreediseasesatcountrylevel.
Withtheenhancedresponsibility,theNFMalsointroducedmorerigorousCCMassessmentprocesses.Previously,
CCMssubmittedaself-assessmentattachedtotheirproposal.Now,CCMself-assessmentsarefacilitatedbyconducted
byanexternalconsultant–either the InternationalHIV/AIDSAllianceorGrantManagementSolutions forandon
behalfoftheCCMHub.Further,CCMsarealsomandatedtohaveaperformanceimprovementplantoaccompany
theirassessment,ensuringthatareasofweaknessareaddressedinanopenandtransparentmanner.
DespitetheimportanceofCCMsinGlobalFunddecision-makingatcountry level,studieshaveflaggedissueswith
CCMmembershipbalance,poorrepresentationandlimitedconstituencyfeedback.1,2Further,therecentauditreport
fromtheOfficeoftheInspectorGeneral(OIG)foundseveralpersistentshortcomingswithCCMperformance:
• 10%ofthe50countriesrevieweddidnothavetherequiredoversightcommittee;
• Morethanhalfofthecountriesdidnothavespecificinformationonroles,timelines,andbudgetsintheiroversight
plans,ortheyhadoversightplansthatwereoutdated;
• 62%oftheCCMswerenon-compliantwiththerequirementofseekingfeedbackfromnonCCMmembersand
frompeoplelivingwithand/oraffectedwiththedisease;
• Morethanhalfofthe45CCMsthathaveoversightbodiesdidnotadequatelydiscusschallengeswiththePRsto
identifyproblemsandexploresolutions;
• 58%oftheCCMshadnotsharedoversightreportswithcountrystakeholdersandtheGlobalFundSecretariatin
theprevioussixmonths;and
• 26%didnotsharetheoversightreportswithrelevantstakeholdersinatimelymannerthatcouldhaveensured
well-timedremedialaction.
InlightoftheOIGCCMAudit,andtheenhancedroleofCCMsincountryleveldiseasegovernanceintheFunding
Model,thereisaneedforawiderangeofstakeholderstobeempoweredtodemandimprovedCCMperformance.
WhilethemovetohaveanexternalconsultanttofacilitatetheCCMEligibility&PerformanceAssessments(EPA)and
thedevelopmentofPerformanceImprovementPlans(PIPs)toguidethesubsequentstrengtheningoftheCCMisan
improvement,thefactthattheseEPAsandPIPsarenotpublicisanobstacletoaccountability.
Problem Statement
1 Oberth,G. (2012).Who isReallyAffecting theGlobalFundDecisionMakingProcess?:ACommunityConsultationReport.AIDSAccountabilityInternational.CapeTown,SouthAfrica.Onlineathttp://aidsaccountability.org/?page_id=80942 Tucker,P.(2012).WhoisreallyaffectingtheGlobalFunddecisionmakingprocesses?AQuantitativeAnalysisofCountryCoordinatingMechanisms(CCMs).AIDSAccountabilityInternational.CapeTown,SouthAfrica.Onlineathttp://aidsaccountability.org/?page_id=8094
6
VestedstakeholdersandcommunitiesmustbeabletouseCCMassessmentsandimprovementplansasaccountability
mechanismstodemandbetterperformance.
AddedtothisisthatfactthatcurrentlyCCMAssessment&PerformanceImprovementPlanslackquestionsthatspeak
toqualityofperformancesuchasmeaningfulengagement,useofdocumentationandinformation,etc.
CivilsocietyneedstobefurtherengagedwiththeCCMAssessment&PerformanceImprovementPlansinorderto
holdstakeholdersaccountable.Similarly, thesesamecivilsocietywatchdogsandaffectedcommunitiesmusthave
thetools,knowledgeandinformationtheyneedtobeabletomeasuretheperformanceoftheCCMmembersthat
representthemandtoholdCCMsaccountable.
Problem Statement
The Malawi Civil Society and Communities CCM Shadow Report
7
About the research
Long term goalMoreaccountableCCMs.
Medium term objectiveIncreased transparency around
CCMperformanceandimprovementplans.
Theprojectcomprisesoftwotypesofresearch:
The Country CCM Shadow Reports
ThesereportsdrilldownintoissuesatcountrylevelandassessCCMperformancefromtheperspectivesofbothCCM
membersaswellastheperspectiveofotherstakeholderssuchasprincipalrecipientsandsubrecipients.Thereport
isbasedontheGFATMCCMAuditProgressAssessmentToolbutalsoincludevariousotherquestionsthatareseen
tobelackingintheexistingauditsbyGeneva.Thereasonwhytheresearchisconsideredashadowreportingexercise
isthatmethodologicallyandintermsofcontentwearehopingtobuildandimproveonthemethodsbeingusedby
Genevaatthistime.Shadowreportsareusedtosupplementand/orprovidealternativeinformationtothatwhich
wassubmittedintheoriginalreports. Inthiswork,ouraimisthesame:tosupplementand/orprovidealternative
informationtothatfoundintheoriginalCCMaudits.
TheCivilSocietyCCMScorecardandCountryCCMShadowReportswillnotduplicate theGlobalFundsupported
EligibilityandPerformanceAssessments(EPAs).ThisisbecausewhilstEPAsareconsultantfacilitatedself-assessments
ofCCMsthatarelargelydrivenbytheGlobalFundtofacilitateaccountabilityusingatopdownapproach;theCivil
SocietyCCMScorecardandCountryCCMShadowReportswillbeundertakenbycivilsocietyincountry,usingabottom
upapproach.Inaddition,theCivilSocietyCCMScorecardandCountryCCMShadowReportssoughttointerviewboth
CCMmembersaswellas implementingpartners (principal recipients (PRs)andsub-recipients (SRs))who interact
withCCMs.TheresearchfortheCivilSocietyScorecardandtheCountryCCMShadowReportswasfacilitatedbycivil
societyresidentincountrysotheexercisecouldbothempowercivilsocietyandsustainthecultureofdemanding
accountabilityfromCCMsincountryandbereplicatedacrossothergrantimplementers.
The Civil Society CCM Scorecard
Acomparativeanalysisthatrankstheparticipatingcountriesagainsteachotherintermsoftheirperformance.Using
theAAIScorecardmethodology,datafromtheCountryCCMShadowReportsisanalyzedandcountriesaregraded
ontheirperformance,asameanstouncoverbestandworstpractice,whoisahead,whoisfallingbehind,andother
similaritiesanddifferencesthatmightmakeforgoodentrypointsforadvocacy.
Focus Countries
Ninecountriesparticipatedintheresearch:Ghana,Kenya,Malawi,Nigeria,Rwanda,Swaziland,Tanzania,Ugandaand
Zambia.
Expected Outcomes
Short term aimEmpoweredcivilsocietyand
communitygroupswhocandoeffectiveshadowreporting.
8
Thetechnicalteam(AAIandEANNASO)developedaquestionnairebasedontheGlobalFundEligibilityandPerformance
Assessments(EPAs)questionnaire(calledtheProgressAssessmentTool).AAIalmostexclusivelyusesParticipatory
Actionresearch(PAR) forfieldresearch,abestpractice inwhichcommunityandcountrycivilsocietypartnersco-
developedthemethodology,researchtools,conductedtheresearchandwrotethefinalreportsandanalysis.
Localcivilsociety,whodonotsitontheCCManddonotreceiveGlobalFundmoney,wereidentifiedtodoconduct
theresearchatcountrylevel,includingdatacollectionandanalysis.Weselected3localwatchdogsineachofthe9
countriesforatotalof27localwatchdogstobetrained,mentoredandsupportedtodotheresearch.Thetraining
alsoequippedcivilsocietywithskillstoenablethemtoengagewiththeCCMSecretariattoplanandschedulethe
interviewsandFGDs.Civilsocietyconductedinterviewstocollectdatausingamixofquestionnaireinterviewsand
focusedgroupdiscussions(FGD).ComprehensivequestionnaireswithopenendedquestionsandFGDguideswere
providedtocivilsociety;theseallowedforprobinganddiscussionswhilstcollectingdata.
First,thecoregroupofrespondentsfromtheCCMfortheinterviewandfocusgroupdiscussionsweredrawnfroma
crosssectionofCCMmembersrepresentingtherespectivegovernments,faithbased,civilsociety,privatesector,key
populations,peopleaffectedbythediseases,thebilateralandmulti-lateralpartnersandtheCCMsecretariat.Civil
societyconductingtheresearchwereexpectedtoundertakeaminimumofeightfacetofaceinterviewsandconduct
onefocusgroupdiscussionofnotlessthansixCCMmembers.
These interviewsandaFGDcollectively includedallofthefollowingsectors:government, faithbased,civilsociety,
privatesector,keypopulations,peopleaffectedbythediseases,thebilateralandmulti-lateralpartnersandtheCCM
secretariat.
Secondly,civilsocietyalsoconductedaFGDof10-12nonCCMmembersmainlydrawnfromimplementinggovernment
andcivilsocietyPRsandSRs.ThesecondFGDenabledtheresearchtogettheperspectivesofnonCCMmembers
whohaveinteractedwiththeCCM.Keyareasofdiscussionincluded:
• HowtheyhavebenefittedfromtheoversightfunctionoftheCCM;
• How,whenandtheoutcomesoftheoversightfieldvisit;
• IftheoversightreportsandoutcomesareformallysharedandpublishedthroughtheCCMwebsite
• WhetherwomenandKPsareadequatelyrepresentedontheCCM;
• Ifcivilsocietymemberswereelected/selectedinanopenandtransparentmanner;
• AnunderstandingofthelevelofmeaningfulparticipationofKPsinCCMleadership;
• AnunderstandingofthelevelofmeaningfulparticipationofKPsinformalandadhoccommittees;
• ThemethodsofsolicitingKPinputandthenthisfeedbacktothelargerconstituency;
• Conflictof Interest (COI)e.g.howgrant implementers (SRs)whoarealsoCCMmembersmanageCOI inCCM
meetingsetc.
Methodology
The Malawi Civil Society and Communities CCM Shadow Report
9
Oneaimwastobuildthecapacityofthelocalcivilsocietywatchdogstoengagewithavarietyofdifferentresearch
techniquesanddatagatheringmodalities,sothefollowingwillcontributetothisobjective:
• CivilsocietyreceivedtrainingonFGDsattheworkshop;
• Civilsocietycompletedhardcopiesofthequestionnairesatcountrylevelandthenalsocapturedthedataonline
intoasurveymonkey.
• Civilsocietydevelopedtheirown2-3pageanalysisofeachofthe2FGDs,talkingaboutkeyfindings(estimate5-8
findings)andrecommendingstrategicentrypointsforadvocacy(estimate3-5)
• In addition to this, civil societywrote their own 5-8 page analysis of all of the data as they understood and
interpreteditandsubmittedthistothetechnicalteam.Thisanalysisformedthebasisofalloftheresearchthey
conducted,andinformedthetechnicalteam’sanalysisofthedata.
Sub-grantsweremadetoeachofthelocalwatchdogstosupporttheirimplementationoftheshadowreporting.The
contentfromthecountrydatacollectors,onceenteredintothesurveymonkeytool,wasanalysedbyAAI,presented
toEANNASOandcountryteamsatameetinginKigali,RwandainFebruary2017,andfeedbackfromthismeetingand
fromemailcorrespondencefromcountryteamswasincludedtodevelopthefinalreports.
10
CCM PerformanceAllCCMsarerequiredtomeetthefollowingsixrequirementstobeeligibleforGlobalFundfinancing:
1. Atransparentandinclusiveconceptnotedevelopmentprocess;
2. AnopenandtransparentPrincipalRecipientselectionprocess;
3. Oversightplanningandimplementation;
4. MembershipofaffectedcommunitiesontheCCM;
5. Processesfornon-governmentCCMmemberselection;and
6. ManagementofconflictofinterestonCCMs.
Belowisahighlightoftheresearchfindingsaspertheaboveeligibilityrequirements:
1. Transparent and inclusive concept note development.
Basedonthetoolsthatweusedduringthescorecardprocesstherewerenoquestionsthatdirectly linkedtothe
issuesofthedevelopmentoftheconceptnoteprocessandthePrincipalRecipientselectionprocessin-country.So
allmembersnevertouchedonthoseissuesalthoughmembers,moreespeciallytheNon-CCMmembers,wantedthis
issuebetalkedaboutaswell,butwewererestrictedfromgoingoverboard.
Fromthefindings,allmembersfromaffectedcommunitiesarewellrepresentedontheCCMandtheyattendthe
CCMmeetingsallthetime,whilesomearealsoindifferentcommitteesliketheOversightCommittee,butthereare
nopropermechanismstoremovenon-performingCCMmembersfromtheCCMapartfromwaitinguntiltheendof
theirterm.
GenderhasbeenmainstreamedintheCCMgovernancedocumentssuchastheconstitution,by-laws,andoversight
guidelinesandtherepresentation isgenderbalanced. Itwasfoundthatthishashelpedtomainstreamgender in
conceptnotesandotherprogrammingplanningatCCMlevel.AslongastheCCMrepresentationisgenderbalanced,
thereisnoneedtoconsiderhavingagenderexpertontheCCM.
TheperformanceofGFATMwasratedtobegood,butmostCCMmemberswerenotawareoftheexistenceandthe
functionsoftheCCMHub.However,concernswereraisedintermsofarrangingmissionsonveryshortnotice,that
thetimesofmeetingsareconstrainedandnotallrelevantissuesarediscussed,andalsodelayregardingtheprovision
offeedbackonissuesthathavebeenreferredtotheGFATM.
TheGFATMshouldcommunicatetheirmissionsingoodtime,haveadequatetimefordiscussionstoensureallthe
relevantissuesarediscussed,andalsoimproveonprovidingfeedbackonissuesthathavebeenreferredtothem.
Analysis
The Malawi Civil Society and Communities CCM Shadow Report
11
2. An Open and Transparent PR Selection process
FromtheFDGsandfacetoface interviews,CSOsmembersrecommendedthattheselectionofthePRshouldbe
transparentbyadvertisingthePRselectioninnewspapersandontheradio,andthisshouldincludeaclearselection
criteria.TheFindingsarethatcurrentlythesearenotsufficientlydone.
TheCCMallowsobserverstoattendtheCCMmeetingsbutnotspeak.Itwashoweverfoundthatmostlytheobservers
arefromthegovernmentsideanddevelopmentpartnersbutnotnecessarilyfromcivilsociety.Civilsocietyactors
shouldbeencouragedtoparticipateinCCMmeetingsasobservers.
ThereisgoodandpropercommunicationinsidetheCCM.However,itwasnotedthatcommunicationfromtheCCM
secretariattothemembersinmosttimesisdelayed.
The communication between the CCM and other stakeholders is almost non-existent as evidenced by a lack of
informationformoststakeholdersontheCCM’soperations.CommunicationfromtheCCMSecretariattomembersis
oftendelayed–andthereisnocommunicationbetweentheCCMSecretariatandthestakeholders.
“Let’s advertise the selection of PR in newspapers.”
ThereisaneedforwrittencommunicationfromCCMSecretariattoitsmembersandthisshouldbetimely.TheCCM
Secretariatshouldimproveitscommunicationwithstakeholdersthroughradioannouncements;newspaperadverts
sothatthestakeholdersandthepublicshouldbeawareoftheCCM’soperations.
3. Oversight Planning and Implementation
18%
25%
9%
13%
64%
40%
50%
13%
27%
14%
17%
38%
88%
36%
60%
50%
38%
27%
71%
67%
50%
9%
14%
17%
13%
25%
9%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ghana
Kenya
Malawi
Nigeria
Rwanda
Swaziland
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
QuesGon:Oversight:Howwouldyouratetheperformanceoftheoversightbody?
Totallyunacceptablequality Unacceptablequality Acceptablequality Goodquality Perfectquality Idon'tknow
Question: Oversight: How would you rate the performance of the oversight body?
100%
90%
90%
86%
100%
73%
100%
100%
88%
0%
10%
10%
14%
27%
13%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ghana
Kenya
Malawi
Nigeria
Rwanda
Swaziland
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
1.AFendmeeGngs?
Yes No Idon'tknow
88%
100%
70%
75%
50%
45%
67%
100%
50%
13%
30%
13%
38%
55%
33%
50%
13%
13%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ghana
Kenya
Malawi
Nigeria
Rwanda
Swaziland
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
2.Speak&beheard?
Yes No Idon'tknow
TheCCMisfulfillingitsoversightroleandisinclusiveasmembersofthecivilsocietyarealsopartoftheOversight
Committee.TheOversightCommitteehasitsownmeetingswhereitreceivesreportsfromPRsandprovidesitsreport
attheCCMmeetinganditalsoconductssitevisitsinordertogetfirst-handinformation.
Generally, the CCM allows observers to attend the CCM meetings but not speak. Considering that civil society
organisationsaresupposedtobekeymembersoftheOversightCommittee,themembershipisverycompromised
duetothefactthattherewasnotransparencyintermsofhowsomecivilsocietyrepresentativesfoundtheirway
ontotheCCM.Thiswasalsopartlybecausesomecivilsocietyconstituenciesarenotproperlyorganisedanditwas
verydifficulttohaveatransparentwayofidentifyingsomeoftherepresentatives,assuchtheperformanceofthe
oversightbodywasfoundtobeofacceptablequality.AmongalltheCSOsintheCCM,it’sonlythePLHIVconstituency
thathasaclearprocessforselectionofthememberthathastogoandrepresentthem,butfortherest,theselection
processisnotclearuptonow:howwastheselectiondone,andhowdidtheybecomemembers;somedidnotknow
theproceduresofselection.
Allthecivilsocietyconstituenciesshouldbeproperlyorganisedandconstituted.Thereshouldbeaverytransparent
andaccountablewayofidentifyingcivilsocietyrepresentativesappointedtotheCCM.TheCCMSecretariatshould
ensurethereisproperdocumentationintermsofhowcivilsocietyrepresentativeswereidentified,includingfollowing
upwithindividualconstituenciesinordertoverifytheprocess.
“Certain assignments are done independently though other remain questionable.”
“We should look at the expenditures, but (key affected populations (KAP) and people living with the
diseases (PLWD)) both are represented in the (oversight) Committee (,) to make sure that their
sector are benefiting from the intervention.”
Analysis
ATTENDANCE DOES NOT EQUAL BEING12
TheGhanaCivilSocietyandCommunitiesCCMShadowReport
88%
100%
60%
67%
50%
27%
86%
100%
88%
13%
40%
17%
38%
73%
14%
13%
17%
13%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ghana
Kenya
Malawi
Nigeria
Rwanda
Swaziland
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
3.ParFcipatemeaningfully?
Yes No Idon'tknow
63%
100
50%
57%
50%
18%
50%
92%
25%
13%
40%
14%
38%
73%
50%
75%
25%
10%
29%
13%
9%
8%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ghana
Kenya
Malawi
Nigeria
Rwanda
Swaziland
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
4.Influencedecisions?
Yes No Idon'tknow
4. Membership of affected communities in the CCM
CommonlyKAPsandPLWDsareable toattendCCMmeetingsbutdonotparticipatemeaningfully,donotspeak
andbeheard,andthereforearenotabletoinfluencedecisions.Thereisamajorconcernregardingthecivilsociety
constituenciesintermsofthembeingproperlyconstituted,transparencyandaccountabilitywiththeselectionofthe
CSOrepresentatives,andthisthereforecompromisestheirabilitytospeakandbeheardandinfluencedecisions.
Thecivilsocietyconstituenciesshouldbeproperlyconstitutedanddefined,andtheselectionoftheirrepresentatives
shouldbetransparentandaccountableinordertoselecttherepresentativeswiththeabilityandcapacitytospeak
andbeheardandinfluencedecisions.
“Most of the time CCM is dominated by donor community and Government and ill represented of CSOs.”
“The composition is there and quality of member should be improved.”
“Some constituencies of the KPs such as MSM have been missing in CCM undertakings.”
“Some constituencies of PLWD are themselves not very organized such as the TB constituency
and the Malaria constituency but this is being worked out.”
5. Process for non-government CCM member selection
Saveforonlyoneconstituencyofcivilsociety,PLWHIV,thereisliterallynoconstituencyconsultationbythecivilsociety
representatives.Thereisnopropermechanismandsupporttoenablecivilsocietyrepresentativestoconsulttheir
constituencies.Thiswasalsoattributedtothefactthatinsomecasestheconstituenciesarenotproperlydefined.
Evenwhereconstituenciesareproperlydefined,meetingsdon’ttakeplacetoagreeonrepresentativestotheCCM,or
feedbacktothemembership:thisisattributedtoalackoffundsforthemeetings,ortoalackofscheduledmeetings
todeterminesuchissues.
ABLE TO INFLUENCE DECISION MAKING 13
14
TheCCMSecretariatshouldprovideresourcesandsupportforconstituencyconsultations.TheCCMSecretariatshould
developaclearpolicyonconstituencyconsultation.Constituenciesshouldimproviseaccountabilitymechanismsto
agreeonmembershipandfeedback.
“In some constituencies such as PLHIV the process was transparent while in some constituencies
such as TB, KPs, NGO the selection was not transparent.”
OwingtotheconstrainedcapacityoftheCCMsecretariat,somenewCSOrepresentativeshavenotbeenorientedto
theCCM.TheothermajorkeyfindingwasthatsomeAlternateDelegatesfromtheCSOrepresentativeshavenotyet
beencontactedbytheCCMsecretariatandthereforearenotawareoftheirselectiontobeAlternateDelegatestothe
CCM.ThecapacityoftheCCMSecretariatshouldbestrengthenedintermsofhumanresources.
AlltheCSOrepresentativestotheCCMshouldbeproperlyorientedontheirrole.AlltheCSOAlternateDelegatesto
theCCMshouldbecontactedandbeinformedabouttheirselectiontotheCCMasAlternateDelegates.
6. Management on Conflict of Interests on CCMs
Theconflictofinterestpolicyisavailableandbeforethestartofeachmeeting,membersarerequiredtodeclaretheir
conflictofinterestonanyitemoftheagenda.Thereisaclearmechanismofmanagingtheconflictofinterestthatall
membersareadheringtomaketheprocesstransparentandaccountable.
Analysis
18%
13%
43%
18%
14,29
38%
36%
100%
14%
14%
9%
17%
50%
50%
27%
86%
43%
55%
57%
50%
38%
36%
14%
33%
13%
14%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ghana
Kenya
Malawi
Nigeria
Rwanda
Swaziland
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
CSOQuality:WhatisthequalityofcivilsocietysectorrepresentaSon?
Totallyunacceptablequality Unacceptablequality Acceptablequality Goodquality Perfectquality Idon'tknow
The Malawi Civil Society and Communities CCM Shadow Report
15
10%
70%
20%
13%
64%
27%
13%
20%
20%
63%
9%
20%
60%
60%
27%
40%
45%
75%
25%
20%
13%
10%
10%
25%
18%
75%
40%
9%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ghana
Kenya
Malawi
Nigeria
Rwanda
Swaziland
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
QuesGon:ArethereanyconflictsofinterestintheCCM?
AlltheGme VeryoRen SomeGmes/Occasionally Seldom Never Idon'tknow
16
Fromtheface-to-faceandfocusgroupdiscussionforCCMsmembersitshowedclearlythatallmembersigntheCOI
beforeanymeetingsstartandsomemembershavebeenforceto leavethemembershiptoCCMbecauseof the
COI.DeclaringconflictsofinterestwasfoundtobeastandingagendaitemforalltheCCMmeetings.Thepracticeof
declaringaconflictofinterestbeforethestartofanyCCMmeetingshouldbecontinuedandencouraged.
EPA Tool & ProcessThegeneral feelingwas that theassessmentsofCCMsdonotmeasure thequalityof theCCM’sworkbut rather
whethersomethingisdone,andnothowwellitisdone.Itwasfoundthatthequalityofhowwellsomethingwasdone
wasnotverymuchemphasised.Theassessmentsshouldfocusonqualityissuesandnotjustwhethersomethingis
done.AftertheEPA,feedbackshouldbegiventotheCCMmembersandNon-CCMmembers.
PIP Tool and ProcessThe Performance Improvement Plan (PIP) addresses the CCMperformance gap. It was found that while the PIP
addressestheCCMperformancegaps,notmuchintermsofimplementationisdonetoensuretheidentifiedgaps
areactuallyaddressed.AllthegapsidentifiedduringthePIPshouldbeaddressedasamatterofurgencyassome
gapskeeponrecurringinseveralPIPs.
CCM Scorecard & Shadow Report Tool & Process
Strengths
ThemeetingwithbothCCMandNon-CCMmembersweregood.
HoldingtheFDGsandface-to-faceinterviewsenrichedtheprocess,becauseduringtheFDGs,membersmightcome
withgoodpointsthattheyforgotduringface-to-faceinterviews.
Weaknesses
Toomanyquestionswereoverlapping,sothereisaneedtostreamlinethequestions.Thereporttemplatedidnot
tallywiththeformatofthequestionnaire.Therewerealotofadditionalrequirementswhichwewerenotinformedof
duringthetraininge.g:thevalidationofthereportwiththeCCM’sSurveyMonkeywasnotproperlyexplained.
TheCCMdoesnotinformNon-CCMmembersofwhenandwheremeetingswilltakeplace.Moststakeholdersandthe
generalpublicarenotawareofwhenandwhereCCMmeetingswillbetakingplace.
TheCCMSecretariatshouldpublicisetheentitysothatthegeneralpublicisawareofitsexistenceandfunctions.The
CCMSecretariatshouldmakethepublicawareofitsmeetingsthroughradioannouncementsandnewspaperadverts.
Analysis
The Malawi Civil Society and Communities CCM Shadow Report
17
43%
63%
90%
100%
100%
90%
50%
83%
100%
57%
38%
10%
10%
50%
17%
13%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ghana
Kenya
Malawi
Nigeria
Rwanda
Swaziland
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
CantheexisHngEPAbeimprovedon?
Yes No
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Ghana
Kenya
Malawi
Nigeria
Rwanda
Swaziland
Tanzania
Uganda
Zambia
DoesyourcountryPerformanceImprovementPlan(PIP)addresstheCCM'sperformancegaps?
Yes No Idon'tknow
OverallthereisgoodandpropercommunicationinsidetheCCM.Howeveritwasnotedthatcommunicationfromthe
CCMsecretariattothemembersinmostcasesisdelayed.ThecommunicationbetweentheCCMandotherstakeholders
is almost non- existent as evidencedby the lack of information formost stakeholders on theCCM’s operations.
CommunicationfromtheCCMSecretariat tomembers isoftendelayed.There isnocommunicationbetweenthe
CCMSecretariatandthestakeholders.WrittencommunicationfromtheCCMSecretariattoitsmembersshouldbe
timely.TheCCMSecretariatshouldimproveitscommunicationwithstakeholdersthroughradioannouncementsand
newspaperadvertssothatthestakeholdersandthegeneralpublicshouldbeawareoftheCCM’soperations.
18
Findings
Finding 1: CSO CCM member election not transparent nor accountableCivilsocietyorganisationsarenotproperlyconstituted,andlacktransparencyandaccountabilityintheirprocessesof
selectingrepresentativestotheCCM.Thiscompromisestheirabilitytospeakandbeheardandinfluencedecisions.
SomeCSOconstituenciesarenotproperlydefinedandconstituted.SomenewCSOrepresentativeshavenotbeen
orientedtotheCCM,whilesomeAlternateDelegateshavenotevenbeeninformedoftheirselection.
Finding 2: CCM struggles with some duties and requires regulatory supportWhileCCMLeadershipworkshardandabidesbyCOI,PIPandEPAprocesses,itwasfoundthattherearenoclear
guidelinesandmechanismsthatcanbeusedtoremovenon-performingCCMmembers.CCMleadership isoften
rushedandtime-constrainedbecauseofotherduties,andthereisalackofqualitycontrolregardingCCMoperations,
andaconsistentfailuretoaddressgapsidentifiedbythePIP.
Finding 3: CCM secretariat has weak communications with stakeholdersTheCCMSecretariatisslowtocommunicatewithCCMmembers,andhaszerocommunicationswithotherstakeholders
andconstituencies.ThisrendersitinvisibletomanyKAPsandCSOs.
Generally,thequalityofcivilsocietysectorrepresentationispoorduetolackofproperlydefinedCSOconstituencies
aswellastoalackoftransparencyandaccountabilityinselectingtheCSOrepresentatives.Civilsocietyconstituencies
should be properly defined and constituted, the selection of CSO representatives at the CCM should be very
transparentandaccountable,newCCMmembersshouldbeproperlyoriented,CSOrepresentativesattheCCMshould
besupportedwithresourcestoenableconstituencyconsultation,meetingsoftheCCMshouldbewellpublicisedand
thecapacityofboththeCCMSecretariatandCSOrepresentativesshouldbestrengthened.
MembersoftheCCMweresatisfiedwiththeperformanceoftheCCMLeadership.Butwhiletheperformanceofthe
CCMLeadershipwasfoundtobesatisfactory,sometimesCCMbusinessisrushedowingtothefactthattheCCM
Leadership isoftenextremelybusywith theirotherduties.CCMbusinessshouldbegivenadequate timeso that
deliberationsarenotrushedthrough.
The Malawi Civil Society and Communities CCM Shadow Report
19
Recommendations
TheCCMSecretariatshouldpublicisetheentitysothatthegeneralpublicisawareofitsexistence,itsmeetingsand
operationsthroughradioannouncementsandnewspaperadverts,andcivilsocietyactorsshouldbeencouragedto
participateinCCMmeetingsasobservers.
Thecivilsocietyconstituenciesshouldbeproperlyconstitutedanddefined,theselectionofitsrepresentativesshould
betransparentandaccountableinordertoselecttherepresentativeswiththeabilityandcapacitytospeakandbe
heardandinfluencedecisions.
ThecapacityoftheCCMSecretariatshouldbestrengthenedintermsofhumanresources:alltheCSOrepresentatives
to theCCM shouldbeproperly orientedon their roles; and theCSOAlternateDelegates to theCCM shouldbe
informedabouttheirselectiontotheCCM.
Properguidelinesandmechanismsshouldbedevelopedtofacilitatetheremovalonnon-performingCCMmembers
evenbeforetheendoftheirterm
CCMbusinessshouldbegivenadequatetimesothatdeliberationsarenotrushedthrough.
TheGFATMshouldcommunicatetheirmissionsingoodtime,haveadequatetimefordiscussionstoensureallthe
relevantissuesarediscussedandalsoimproveonprovidingfeedbackonissuesthathavebeenreferredtothem.
EPAandPIPassessmentsshouldfocusonquality issuesandnotjustonwhetherornotsomethingisdone–and
gapsidentifiedmustbeaddressedandnotjustallowedtorolloveruntilthenextassessment.AftertheEPAandPIP,
feedbackshouldbegiventotheCCMmembersandNon-CCMmembers.
22
Contact Details
Ali Mwachande (MANERERA+): [email protected]
Safari Mbewe (MANERERA+):[email protected]
Olive Mumba (EANNASO):[email protected]
Phillipa Tucker(AIDSAccountabilityInternational):[email protected]