The Market Effects of Smartphone Patent War

8/12/2019 The Market Effects of Smartphone Patent War

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The objective of this project is to explore the relationship between patent lawsuits among

smartphone players and their performances in the public market.

Since June 2007, when the first generation iPhone was released to the market, the

telecommunication market has dramatically changed. Its an increasingly competitive industry

with greater demand for constant innovations from the public, and worldwide market share of

smartphone manufacturers has changed quite drastically over the past seven years. In this rapidly

growing industry, patents are an indispensable component of smartphone participants business

assets. It is therefore crucial for us to examine how patent lawsuits will affect companies stock

performances.

The purpose of this paper is fourfold. First of all, the patent ecosystem is evaluated to identify

industry-wide trends using data from USPTO. Second, the author created a database of 59 patent

lawsuit cases that were filed among top smartphone players. These litigation cases took place

from May 2005 to May 2014 in all 94 U.S. district courts, and individual characteristics for each

lawsuit were collected and analyzed. Third, in order to understand how the market reacts to legal

actions and court decisions, with the use of CRSP database, the author tracked firms historical

stock prices to examine their impacts on involved parties. Companies performances in the

public market were then gauged using cumulative abnormal returns and their significances were

tested using cross sectional t-test.

This research would allow smartphone rivals to have a better understanding of the market effectsof their litigation actions, so they can make better decisions using our research results.

Keywords: patent litigation, smartphone players, market impact, abnormal returns


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Introduction ......................................................................................................................................3

Industry Overview ...........................................................................................................................6

Methodology ....................................................................................................................................7

The Players.....................................................................................................................................10

Cases ..............................................................................................................................................13

Empirical Findings and Analyses ..................................................................................................16

Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................31

Reference .......................................................................................................................................33


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On August 24, 2014, Apple won a decisive victory in its patent lawsuit asserting against

Samsung. July found Samsung infringed six Apples smartphone related patents, awarding Apple

nearly $1.05 billion in damage awards. Patent infringement occurs when a party makes, uses,

offers to sell, or sells patented invention without authorization from the patent owner. Apple and

Samsung have been going head to head in courts not just in the U.S., but have filed in total more

than 50 lawsuits in more than 10 different countries.

And they are not alone. An all-out smartphone patent war has unfolded in the past several years;

there have been many major legal actions among Apple, Samsung, Motorola, Nokia, HTC,

Microsoft, etc., and many times a party that has been sued would countersue back to the plaintiff,

making the patent war even more tangled up together and interrelated. Firms have committed

humongous amount of money and energy into litigations; sometimes the damage awards can be

at the scale of millions and even billions of dollars.

These massively-escalated disputes exist for a reason. Apple, as a technology pioneer, started the

smartphone market in June 2007, and triggered more and more competitors to join this

lucratively huge market. At the same time, smartphone market is experiencing radical

technological changes. Many greatly influential mega firms have failed when they simply cannot

keep up with the pace of innovation, and the list includes: Research In Motion (the manufacturer

of Blackberry), Nokia, and Motorola.


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Firms are making every effort possible to continue innovating in order to maintain their market

positions, but this is not the only thing they are doing. Meanwhile, there is a trend that companies

start to use patent lawsuits and countersuits as ways to:

- Protect intellectual capital for their technological innovations- Secure their technology leadership and increase market share- Obtain proper licensing agreements and justified damage awards for infringed patents- Slow down competitors research and development process

What are these legal lawsuits trying to achieve? In general, there are three results the plaintiff is

seeking for:

1. Damages:Plaintiffs can get financial awards for the claimed profit loss due to patent infringement.

2. Injunction:If patents found to be infringed, the court can order injunction against the defendant who

manufactures the infringed products, which is essentially ceasing the defendant to

produce the infringed products.

One example is Apple won an injunction in German court against Samsung over Galaxy

Tab products in August 2011, banned sales of Samsung Galaxy Tab 10.1 in the entire

European Union except for the Netherlands.

3. Licensing:Last but not least, the defendant can pay ongoing royalties to the plaintiff for having used

and continue using the infringed patented technologies. Its arguably mutually beneficial

for both parties. Its obvious that the party who is licensing out the technologies can


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enjoy justified financial awards; for the party who is paying for using the technology, it

now not only has access to the competitors intellectual property, but it can also primarily

focuses on innovating its products rather than spending time and money on lawsuits. This

strategy of enforcing licensing has been largely used by Microsoft in recent years.

However, with more than 250,000 patents in play in the smartphone ecosystem, it is virtually

impossible for either company to achieve a decisive victory. And it appears that there is no

significant influence on brand loyalties regardless of the courts rulings. Firms are using

litigations more as a strategic move to slow down the competition while enjoying dominating the

market sales. The question we need to ask is does winning a patent infringement lawsuit have

any material impact on companies stock performances? Should companies put more thoughts

and considerations into their legal actions in courts?

In this study, we focus on the litigations filled in U.S. district courts, particularly those among

top smartphone rivals. By collecting, analyzing and interpreting patent litigation cases, court

filings and rulings, as well as stock price fluctuations, the author hopes to explore the impact of

patent lawsuits on involved parties stock market performances. This study will be helpful for

directing players in the smartphone ecosystem to make careful and proper decisions, and take

effective and necessary steps regarding patent litigations.


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Using data fetched from United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), we analyzed the

trends of patent filings over year, and paid close attention to the telecommunication industry. The

analysis of USPTO data yielded us some valuable insights.

It appears that there is a rise of patents granted for telecommunication sector in terms of both

number and percentage. The number of patents granted grew by 335.55% during the period from

1999 to 2012, and the percentage of patents granted for telecommunications sector grew from

5.12% to 10.42%.

Figure 1. Number and Percentage of Telecommunication Patents Granted

(Data source: USPTO, All Technologies Utility Patents Report, 2013)

We also notice significant increases on numbers of patents granted for computer and electronic

products, electrical equipment, appliances and components. Specifically, in 2012, 55.84% of

patents granted were from the above sectors.

%


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Figure 2. Number and Percentage of Telecommunication Patents Granted

(Data source: USPTO, Breakout By NAICS Industry Classification, 2013)

In order to derive insights on the relationship between the patent lawsuits and the companies

performances in the public market, the author collected patent lawsuit cases that that took place

from May 2005 to May 2014 in all 94 U.S. district courts, as well as financial market reactions to


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patent lawsuit cases. Three databases were mainly used for researching and collecting data on

patent infringement lawsuit cases: Docket Navigator, Lex Machina, and PACER.

1. Docket Navigator is an independent database and research tool for U.S. patent litigation.It tracks significant events through every cases from all 94 different district courts, the

International Trade Commission, and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.

2. Lex Machina is another independent database that provides intellectual property litigationdata and predictive analytics for users. Its data source comes from Central Public Access

to Court Electronic Records, the International Trade Commission's Electronic Document

Information System, and patent Information from the USPTO.

3. PACER, acronym for Public Access to Court Electronic Records, is an electronic publicaccess service of United States federal court documents. It allows users to obtain case and

docket information from the United States district courts, United States courts of appeals,

and United States bankruptcy courts.

By collecting cases using the aforementioned databases, a dataset of some 59 patent litigation

cases among top ten smartphone competitors from May 2005 to May 2014 were collected, and

326 important court actions and decisions were selected and recorded by manually going through

all the court filings for each and every case.

Next, stock prices were retrieved from The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).

Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for each event were calculated and analyzed using 7-day,

5-day and 3-day event windows; they were then recorded respectively using Value-Weighted

Return-excl. dividends and Equal-Weighted Return-excl. dividends market indices. Due to the


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limitation of the database that CRSP only provides daily stock prices for U.S. stocks, the author

did not collect stock prices for companies that are listed overseas.

A number of court decisions were intentionally removed from the dataset due to the fact that they

were not expected by the author to have material impact on companies public market

performances. These decisions include:

- Transfer to another venue- Transfer to another judge-

Cases closed administratively or statistically

- Stipulation or joint motion to dismiss after news of settlement came out- Court orders of staying pursuant

Elimination of above stated court decisions reduced the number of court events in the dataset to

248. These court actions and determinations include:

- Initial filings and amendments of complaints- Counterclaims and amendments of counterclaims- Filings of and courts rulings on preliminary injunctions and permanent injunctions- Courts rulings on sanctions- Courts rulings on damage awards- Court's rulings on patent infringements- Filings and courts rulings on appeals to the Federal Circuit Court- Consolidations of cases- Settlements- Dismissals


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- Cases closed administratively or statistically, and cases that got reopened

Competition in the smartphone industry is fierce as the top players are fighting for maintaining

and gaining additional market share. Companies have been using their patent portfolios as both

defensive and proactive moves, asserting them all across the globe.

To navigate through the smartphone patent war, we need to identify who are the top participants

in the smartphone industry. There are at least four categories of companies involved with

smartphones: the operating system (OS) designers, the smartphone manufacturers, the wireless

carriers, and the app developers these categories are not mutually exclusive. The following

influential participants are therefore identified according to our criteria:

- Apple: an American corporation that designs, develops, and sells consumer electronics,computer software and personal computers.

- Samsung Electronics: a South Korean electronics company that manufactures electroniccomponents and consumer electronics.

- Nokia: a Finnish communications and information technology corporation that providesinternet services, and telecommunications network equipment and services.


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- Motorola: an American telecommunications company that designed and sold wirelessnetwork infrastructure equipment. The company was divided into two independent

companies, Motorola Mobility and Motorola Solutions on January 4, 2011.

- Research In Motion: now known as BlackBerry Limited, is a Canadiantelecommunication and wireless equipment company best known as the developer of the

BlackBerry brand of smartphones and tablets.

- HTC: a Taiwanese manufacturer of smartphones and tablets. HTC expanded its focus in2009 to devices based on the Android, and in 2010 to Windows Phone.

-

LG: a South Korean corporation that makes electronics, chemicals, and

telecommunication products.

- Sony: a Japanese corporation with its diversified business primarily focused on theelectronics, game, entertainment and financial services sectors.

- Huawei: a Chinese networking and telecommunications equipment and servicescompany.

- Qualcomm: an American global semiconductor company that designs and marketswireless telecommunications products and services.

- Microsoft: an American corporation that develops and manufactures computer software,consumer electronics and personal computers and services.

- Google: an American corporation specializing in Internet-related services and products.The company leads the development of the Android mobile operating system.

For these smartphone participants, Figure 3 shows their 2013 market shares by number of units

sold to end users, and Figure 4 shows their rankings by number of patents owned.


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Figure 3. Worldwide Mobile Phone Sales to End Users by Vendor in 2013

(Date source: Gartner, Market Shares of Top Smartphone Manufacturers, February 2014)

Figure 4. Number of Patents Owned By Top Smartphone Players

(Date source: USPTO, Ranked List of Organizations with 20 or More Patents, 2013)

25%

14%

%4%3%

3%3%

2%2%

2%

34%


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For the 59 cases we studied, there are ten different sets of plaintiffs and defendants:

Table 1. Summary of Litigation Case Counterparties

Plaintiff Defendant Number

Apple Samsung 2

Samsung Apple 2

Apple Motorola 4

Motorola Apple 7

Apple HTC 2

HTC Apple 2

Nokia Apple 6

Nokia HTC 4

Qualcomm Nokia 4

Motorola RIM 6

RIM Motorola 2

Motorola Microsoft 7

Microsoft Motorola 1

Motorola HTC 1

Sony LG 7

LG Sony 2

LG

Toshiba Samsung

Storage Tech 1

Total 59

Apple and Samsung have a series of ongoing lawsuits across the globe. On August 24, 2012 the

jury ruled favorable to Apple and awarded it roughly $1.049 billion dollars in damage. However,

the ruling slashed the amount Samsung is obligated to pay to Apple by about $450.5 million, or

nearly 43%, to $598.9 million on March 1, 2013. On November 21, 2013, a jury ruled that

Samsung has to pay an additional $290 million to Apple in damages for patent infringement.


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Apple won U.S. preliminary injunction against the Samsung Galaxy Tab 10.1 tablet in June

2012, but it was later dissolved in October the same year.

There have been 10 court decisions on patent infringements. Six of them found Motorola did not

infringe Apples patents, three other decisions found the assertion on patent infringement to be

invalid, and the other one found the case on one Apples allegedly infringed patent to be not

invalid. Some cases were dismissed either by court, closed administratively, or dismissed by the

plaintiff Apple with no agreements, written or oral, express or implied, reached.

On November 10, 2012, Apple announced that HTC and Apple have reached a global settlement

that includes the dismissal of all current lawsuits and a ten-year license agreement. The license

extends to current and future patents held by both parties. The terms of the settlement are

confidential. Even if what both agreed is of cross-licensing nature, observers believe given

Apples market strength and its stronger patent portfolio, Apple is probably benefiting more than

HTC in the deal.

Nokia announced on June 14, 2011 that it has signed a patent license agreement with Apple. The

agreement settles all the current ongoing patent lawsuits between these two parties. The financial

structure of the agreement consists of a one-time payment payable by Apple and on-going

royalties to be paid by Apple to Nokia for the term of the agreement. The specific terms of the


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Figure 5. Patent Lawsuits Among Top Smartphone Players

Here is an overview of the characteristics of the patent litigation cases we studied.

Table 2. Case Characteristics

Average case duration 432.44 days

Average number of patents 9.21

Most active case Apple Inc. v. Samsung, 3110 filings

Most active court DED Wilmington

Top plaintiff Apple, 17 lawsuits

Top defendant Motorola, 21 lawsuits

Largest granted damage award $1.049 billion


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Counteractions being taken by

the defendant64.41%

Damage awarded 1.69%

Case settled 49.15%

Figure 6. Case Determination by Types

Patent litigations in the U.S. in general are filed in the following courts, because either they rule

more favorably to patent holders, with shorter time-to-trial durations, have higher success rates,

or grant larger median damages awards:

East Texas Delaware Northern district of California

Below is a comparison between the average duration for the 59 litigation cases we studied and

the overall average duration for each U.S. district court.


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Figure 7. Average Duration for Cases Studied vs. Overall Average Duration for Each Court

,

Through this study, we are trying to answer the following questions:

1. Do patent litigation cases impact the stock price?2. Do all court decisions have the same impact on the stock prices?3. If not, how do their influences differ?

Stock prices fluctuations were collected to see the impact of patent lawsuit related actions and

decisions on stock performances. We utilized one major U.S. stock research database, CRSP, for

stock price tracking and cumulative abnormal return analysis. Center for Research in Security

Prices (CRSP) is a provider of historical stock market data. It was used to collect cumulative

abnormal returns (CARs). Abnormal return is the difference between the expected return of a

security and the actual return (1), (2). Sometimes, abnormal return can be triggered by events. In


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our case, we expect to see some abnormal returns on businesss stock around the time frame

when patent lawsuit related events happened.

)( ,., tmktti

t

tRRCAR =

=

=

)1()1(,., tmkt

t

tti

t

t

RRCAR ++==

=

=

=

Where

Ri ,t= daily return for event firm i on day t

A common t window is 3-day window around the event day. i.e., (-1, 0, +1), where day 0 is the

event day

Rmkt ,t= daily return for the specific market index on day t

CRSP has multiple market indices as market benchmarks. For this study, we used equally-

weighted and value-weighted indices. As these tables show below, the CARs of three different

time windows were collected: 3-day window, 5-day window, and 7-day window.

The Equal-Weighted Index is an Equal-Weighted Portfolio built each calendar periodfrom all issues listed on the selected exchanges with valid prices on the current and

previous periods.

The Value-Weighted Index is a Value-Weighted Portfolio built each calendar periodusing all issues listed on the selected exchanges with available shares outstanding and

valid prices in the current and previous periods.

(2)

(1)


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We expected the market to react positively to favorable events such that:

H0: CAR > 0

H1: CAR < = 0

We expected the market to react negatively to unfavorable events such that:

H0: CAR < 0

H1: CAR > = 0

Cross sectional CAAR t-Test was conducted to test the statistical significance of CARs and

provide insights on the entire population under study. One-tail t-test was performed for the

reason that we formed the null hypotheses in particular ways based on our expectations of

potential market reactions:

Where

N = sample size

d = degree of freedom

CAR = Cumulative Abnormal Return

CAAR = Cumulative Average Abnormal Return

T1= event window lower bound

T2= event window upper bound


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Table 3. CAR for category plaintiff filings

Plaintiff

P File Value-weighted Equal-weighted

7-day 5-day 3-day 7-day 5-day 3-day

CAAR 0.70% 0.55% 0.57% 0.78% 0.63% 0.58%

Cross t-test 1.298 1.160 1.556* 1.377 1.249 1.529*

Defendant

Value-weighted Equal-weighted


CAAR 1.17% 0.80% 0.01% 1.51% 1.16% 0.29%

Cross t-test 2.117** 1.664* 0.028 2.531*** 2.258** 0.704

* denotes statistical significance at 0.10 using one-tail test

** denotes statistical significance at 0.05 using one-tail test

** denotes statistical significance at 0.01 using one-tail test

The category plaintiff filings is comprised of the following events:

- Initial filings and amendments of complaints- Counterclaim by the plaintiff- Appeals to and transmission of appeals by the plaintiff to the Federal Circuit Court- Filings for preliminary injunctions and permanent injunctions- Motion to reopen administratively closed cases by the plaintiff

We can see that whenever the plaintiff proactively files for a legal action against the defendant, it

will increase the stock price by 0.57% to 0.58% at 90% significance level within the 3-day event

window, which is expected since the firm is taking legal actions to protect its intellectual

properties, and they can generate additional revenues for the firm.


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CAAR -0.05% 1.14% 1.62% -0.17% 0.52% 1.26%

Cross t-test -0.04 1.145 0.937 -0.133 0.673 0.843

The category favorable court decisions for the plaintiff is comprised of the following events:

- Court orders granting preliminary injunctions- Court orders granting sanctions- Court filings and decisions granting damage awards- Court rulings that plaintiff won on patent infringement

o Patent infringedo Patent found not invalido Patent found not unenforceable

- Settlements: defendant to pay one-time fees and/or ongoing loyaltiesIt appears that in general, favorable court decisions for the plaintiff do not have material

influences on neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants market returns. Its possible that because

some courts determinations are implied or can be inferred from previous courts activities.

Therefore, we will break these decisions down to a few major categories and analyze them

independently.

Table 6. CAR for category settlements: defendant to pay

PlaintiffSettle D

payValue-weighted Equal-weighted


CAAR 5.13% 4.36% 5.12% 5.78% 5.22% 6.72%

Cross t-test 0.977 0.812 0.791 1.262 1.086 1.110


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Defendant



CAAR 0.34% 1.85% 2.33% 0.18% 1.17% 1.90%

Cross t-test 0.219 1.885 1.047 0.103 1.936* 0.996

The category settlements: defendant to pay is comprised of the following events:

- Settlements: defendant to pay one-time fees and/or ongoing loyaltiesEven though it appears that there is a positive influence of settlements of which the defendant

has to pay on the plaintiffs market performance that the CAAR is from 4.36% to 6.72%, the

return, however, is not statistically significant. Therefore, we cannot generalize that settlements

with defendants payments have material influence on the plaintiffs stock performance.

Looking at the defendants side, even though the defendant has to pay one-time fee and/or

ongoing royalties, the market is actually reacting positively with 1.17% abnormal return for a 5-

day window to the event, and it is significant at 90% level. It makes sense if we interpret the

settlement as now that there is less uncertainty on the defendants position, and the defendant can

focus on innovations with better access to competitors patent portfolio rather than expensive

litigations.

Table 7. CAR for category damage awards

Plaintiff

Damage Value-weighted Equal-weighted


CAAR 1.62% 1.81% 0.19% 1.26% 1.76% 0.17%

Cross t-test 17.770** 1.401 0.171 14.951** 1.415 0.161

Defendant



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CAAR N/A

Cross t-test N/A

The category damage awards is comprised of the following events:

- Court filings and decisions granting damage awardsFrom the table, we can see that being granted damage awards has a positive return of 1.26% to

1.62% on a 7-day window, and it is statistically significant at 95% confidence level.

There is not enough data to study the influence of damage awards on the defendant since the

prices of foreign stocks were not collected.

Table 8. CAR for category sanctions

Plaintiff

Sanction Value-weighted Equal-weighted


CAAR -1.85% -0.53% -3.38% -2.07% -0.92% -3.74%

Cross t-test -0.887 -0.458 -2.108* -0.996 -0.818 -2.271*

Defendant



CAAR N/A

Cross t-test N/A

The category sanctions is comprised of the following events:

- Court orders granting sanctionsSurprisingly, sanctions actually have a negative influence on the plaintiffs stock performance

that it causes -3.74% to -3.38% abnormal return on a 3-day window. This is possibly because of

the nature of the cases we studied. For the sanction cases, the plaintiff actually both received


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Cross t-test -0.822 -1.777 -0.391 -0.676 -0.951 -0.56

Defendant



CAAR -1.01% -0.81% 0.41% -1.08% -1.07% 0.20%

Cross t-test -0.416 -0.416 0.265 -0.425 -0.556 0.135

The category injunctions deniedis comprised of the following events:

- Court orders denying or dissolving preliminary injunctions or permanent injunctionsThe market is neutral when either motions to injunctions got denied or previously granted

injunctions got dissolved. It could be that the public understands the nature of the game that

injunction is rarely granted and less likely to sustain.

Table 13. CAR for category settlements: plaintiff to pay

Plaintiff

Settle P

payValue-weighted Equal-weighted


CAAR -1.31% -1.40% -3.23% -0.38% -1.32% -3.39%

Cross t-test -0.342 -0.398 -1.184 -0.101 -0.405 -1.298

Defendant



CAAR 0.81% 0.41% 0.57% 3.17% 4.02% 5.59%

Cross t-test 1.747 20.25*** 8.41*** 13.035*** 2.143* 2.166*

The category settlements: plaintiff to payis comprised of the following events:

- Settlements: plaintiff to pay one-time fees and/or ongoing loyalties- Settlements: cross-licensing

From the table, we can see that there is actually a strong positive market reaction to settlement

situations when plaintiff is the party to pay for fees and/or royalties. Since in general the market


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would assume defendant is the party who is more likely to pay for damages caused due to

unauthorized uses of patented technologies, having plaintiff to be the party ending up paying for

settlements is expected by the author to induce positive reaction for the defendant.

The battle over smartphone patents has been going on for the past seven years, and its very

likely to continue in the future as long as there is a great demand in the market. We do agree that

it is necessary for players to take legal actions to defend themselves, but what would be the costs

for them to do so?

We used event study method to identify and understand the impact of legal actions taken by the

plaintiff and the defendant as well as courts rulings on involved parties performances in the

public market. After taking into considerations of the capability of generalization over the

number of cases we studied as well as adjusting to their nature, we find that the following events

do have statistically significant influences on the plaintiffs stock performances:

Positive abnormal returns:

- category plaintiff filings- category damage awards- category injunctions granted

Negative abnormal returns:

- category defendant counteractions


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- category dismissalsAnd these events have statistically significant influences on the defendants stock performances:

Positive abnormal returns:

- category defendant counteractions- category settlements: defendant to pay- category settlements: plaintiff to pay

These results show that the plaintiff is actually more likely to be negatively affected by legal

actions. The study results confirmed that smartphone patent war does have significant effects on

involved parties market performances. Our findings are important even outside of the litigation

context. Firms need to be more careful in order to manage their brand recognition and recognize

that their litigations have material impacts on investors expectations.

We found that litigations have unavoidable and significant influences as well as business costs to

companies, but at the same time, they do offer firms opportunities to generate additional revenue

through damage awards and ongoing loyalties. And the goal for many smartphone participants is

experiencing better sales and dominating the market by slowing down competitors in a series of

lawsuits. Intuitively, however, these litigations would reduce smartphone players incentives to

innovate. The smartphone industry is extremely dynamics and is subject to rapid changes. As far

as we are concerned, there is no clear winners or losers in the patent war, but we are glad to see

that companies are becoming more willing to settle cases. We hope that with time, firms will

focus more on research and development rather than litigations.


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Gartner:

http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2665715

CRSP:

http://www.crsp.chicagobooth.edu/products/documentation/stock-file-indexes-0

Online articles:

http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/21011/smartphone-patent-wars-us-perspective

http://www.eventstudytools.com/significance-tests

Papers:

http://lipas.uwasa.fi/~sjp/articles/sp_acta_wasaensia_143_327-354.pdf

http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1554&context=facpubs

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2340899

http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperDownload.aspx?paperID=28079

http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2012/5/v34n4-1.pdf

http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/14-015_8483575c-1f96-4a34-bcbf-

c83d99da8959.pdf

http://www.simon.rochester.edu/fac/warner/jerry%20papers/jfe-september%2080.pdf

Research:


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http://www.pwc.com/en_us/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigation-

study.pdf

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf

http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657103.pdf

http://www.ambercite.com/downloads/The%20Smartphone%20Patent%20Wars%20whitepaper_

March%202011.pdf

http://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-

content/uploads/2014/01/2A01E1CD29DA06AB8C95399AE5D04919.pdf

USPTO:

http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/naics/stc_naics_wgall/all_stc_naics_wg.htm

http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/telecomm.htm#PartB

http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_at.htm

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The Market Effects of Smartphone Patent War

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