16
With Quarterly Executive Letter Volume 2, Issue 12 December 2013
With Quarterly Executive Letter
Volume 2, Issue 12
December 2013
ii© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
December 30, 2013
Turning A Corner
This is our final MarketPulse edition of 2013. With the year rapidly drawing to a close, on behalf of the entire
CoreLogic® team, I would like to wish you a happy holiday season.
The past twelve months have been a period of incremental improvements for the housing and mortgage
finance markets. In many ways, 2013 was a transitional year from the uncertain years after the housing bubble
to a sustainable long-term recovery characterized by reduced levels of loan delinquencies and foreclosure
starts as well as appreciating home values and higher purchase market demand.
Year over year through October 2013, the CoreLogic Home Price Index (HPI®) appreciated more than
12 percent nationwide. Nationally, prices are now 16 percent above the low in the fourth quarter of 2011.
Although price growth has slowed recently, in line with normal seasonal patterns, some deceleration is
welcome since 23 states are now within 10 percent of their home price peaks.
With the gains in home prices in 2013, more than three million residential property owners regained lost
equity. Rising prices have benefited many homeowners, giving them more options in the housing market
and enhancing their employment mobility. Today, more than two-thirds of mortgaged homes in the U.S. have
at least 20 percent equity. As we move ahead, and the economy continues to improve, we have additional
opportunity to ease the drag of negative equity. There are still 6.4 million U.S. residences in negative equity—
a third of which are in Nevada, Florida, Arizona, Ohio and Georgia.
Foreclosure inventories dropped 28 percent year-to-date through October 2013. At the same time, the rate
of serious delinquency hit its lowest level in nearly five years. While the shadow inventory remains elevated
relative to the pre-downturn levels, the directional trend is positive. Over the past year, the value of the U.S.
shadow inventory dropped by $87 billion—another sign of increased market normalcy.
We’re encouraged by the improvements of the past year and have every reason to be cautiously optimistic
about continued progress in 2014. That said, monitoring the current and potential headwinds the industry
faces is critical to your success.
On the top of everyone’s list of concerns is the impact of the explosion of new regulations on the housing market.
New regulatory compliance requirements, particularly the qualified mortgage and the qualified residential
mortgage rules, continue to be an operational priority for lenders as they prepare for implementation at the
beginning of the year. Additionally, as improvements to the housing finance system are debated, the role of
the government-sponsored enterprises raises questions of how changes to the secondary mortgage market
will be implemented and how robust and competitive a future market might be. Like the Mortgage Bankers
Association®, we favor a reform that produces a more stable and competitive system for all lenders, with
greater protections for borrowers and taxpayers.
From the CEO
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Interest rates are another major concern. During the summer, we saw refinance volumes dive sharply lower as
mortgage rates moved off historic lows. Albeit to a much smaller degree, the purchase market activity was also
impacted by the rate rise. As we enter 2014, there is more uncertainty yet to come on rates as the tapering of
quantitative easing begins to be felt in financial markets.
Although much has been published recently about the strengthening U.S. economy, a third major area to watch
is employment. The continued reduction of unemployment levels is perhaps the biggest single positive driver for
the long-term health of housing. The country is certainly making progress in this area but many willing workers
remain unemployed or underemployed, potentially impacting demand for entry-level or move-up housing.
To support your business planning and help you navigate through an evolving market, CoreLogic is dedicated
to providing unique information that can facilitate new insights. The attached issue of the December
MarketPulse explores the maturing of the single-family residential asset class and examines the HPI and
lower-end housing prices for trends in appreciation. We hope you find value in these observations from our
industry-leading economists.
We look forward to being your indispensable business partner in the year ahead as our industry continues to
strengthen and evolve.
Sincerely,
Anand Nallathambi President and CEO CoreLogic
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The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 12
The Authors
Anand K. NallathambiPresident and Chief Executive Officer
Anand K. Nallathambi is the president and chief executive officer of CoreLogic, a leading provider of consumer, financial and property information, analytics and services to business and government. Nallathambi is responsible for all aspects of the CoreLogic business.
Dr. Mark Fleming Chief Economist
Dr. Mark Fleming is the chief economist for CoreLogic. He leads the economics team responsible for analysis, commentary, and forecasting trends in the real estate and mortgage markets.
Sam KhaterDeputy Chief Economist
Sam Khater is deputy chief economist for CoreLogic. He is responsible for providing in-depth economic, mortgage market and real estate analysis.
Molly BoeselSenior Economist
Molly Boesel is a senior economist for CoreLogic and is responsible for analyzing and forecasting housing and mortgage market trends. She has more than 20 years of experience in mortgage market analysis, model development and risk analysis in the housing finance industry.
Gilberto MéndezSenior Business Systems Analyst
Gilberto Méndez is a senior business systems analyst for CoreLogic with the CoreLogic mortgage analytics and economics team. He is responsible for managing all mortgage and real estate data analysis for national and local-market media requests.
Table of ContentsFrom the CEO ............................................................... ii
The Authors ................................................................... iv
Media Contacts ........................................................... iv
The MarketPulse...........................................................1
A Glimpse of the Future .............................................1
Low-End Home Price Correction Over, Portends a Substantial Slowdown in Prices .......2
Slow Money Is Replacing Fast Money ..................4
Unlike Fine Wine ...........................................................5
In the News .....................................................................6
National Summary October 2013.....................7
Largest 25 CBSA Summary October 2013 ...7
State Summary October 2013 ...........................8
Home Prices .............................................................9
Mortgage Performance ...................................... 10
Home Sales .............................................................. 11
Variable Descriptions .......................................... 12
Media ContactsFor real estate industry and trade media:
Bill Campbell [email protected] (212) 995.8057 (office)
For general news media:
Lori Guyton [email protected] (901) 277.6066
The MarketPulse
1© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
Housing Statistics (October 2013)
HPI® YOY Chg . . . . . . . . . . . . .12.5%
HPI YOY Chg XD . . . . . . . . . . 11.0%
NegEq Share (Q3 2013) . . . .13.0%
Shadow Inventory (07/2013) . . .1.9m
Distressed Discount. . . . . . . 42.7%
New Sales (ths, ann.) . . . . . . . . . 379
Existing Sales (ths, ann.) . . . . 3,961
Average Sales Price . . . . . . $247,543
HPI Peak-to-Current (PTC). . .–17.3%
Foreclosure Stock PTC . . . –43.7%
Volume 2, Issue 12
December 30th, 2013
Data as of October 2013
According to the CoreLogic Home
Price Index (HPI), prices have
been rising strongly on a year-
over-year basis every month in 2013. This
upturn in prices represents a continued
improvement from the trough that
happened in March 2011, but was this
prolonged upturn to be expected? The
data in Figure 1 indicates that aggregated
multiple listing service (MLS) real estate
data could have predicted the upturn
in the HPI about four months before it
occurred and could also make a reasonable
short-term forecast of where home prices
are headed over the next few months.
Figure 1 shows the year-over-year change
in the CoreLogic single-family combined
HPI and the year-over-year change in the
asking price of new listings since early
2008. The asking price of new listings is
lagged four months on the chart to show
the relationship between the HPI and new
listing prices. The two data series line up well,
with the new listings price series showing a
little more volatility.
One obvious time period when the two
series decouple is from 2009 to mid-2010,
when the government supported first-time
homebuyer tax credit was used by many
buyers. The HPI gained ground during
this period, and even had a brief period of
above-zero year-over-year growth. Prices of
new listings were slower to adjust, however,
continuing to decline during the period of
A Glimpse of the FutureListing Prices Suggest HPI Is Leveling OffBy Molly Boesel
FIGURE 1. YEAR-OVER-YEAR CHANGE
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
Ap
r-0
8
Jul-
08
Oct
-08
Jan
-09
Ap
r-0
9
Jul-
09
Oct
-09
Jan
-10
Ap
r-10
Jul-
10
Oct
-10
Jan
-11
Ap
r-11
Jul-
11
Oct
-11
Jan
-12
Ap
r-12
Jul-
12
Oct
-12
Jan
-13
Ap
r-13
Jul-
13
Oct
-13
New List Price - YOY Chg Lagged HPI - YOY Chg
Article 1: fig 1
Source: CoreLogic September 2013
Continued on page 6
2© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 12
Footnote
1 Low-end and high-end prices are 25 percent below and above the median, respectively. The same analysis was conducted for low-end versus overall prices and the findings were similar.
Cont...
Low-End Home Price Correction Over, Portends a Substantial Slowdown in PricesLow-End Home Prices Are a Forward-Looking Barometer of Overall Home PricesBy Sam Khater
Most home price analysis is
based on aggregate price
changes for the nation or
by geography. While the overall change
in prices is a useful single metric, it
can sometimes mask large changes
in different segments of the price
continuum, which can provide valuable
information. For example, low-end prices
bottomed in March 2011, nearly a full
year earlier than overall and high-end
home prices, which both reached their
trough in February 20121. Not only can
turning points be different, so can the
momentum in low-end versus high-
end price changes. At the height of
the price boom, low-end year-over-year
price changes peaked at 19.3 percent in
March 2005. Twelve months later, price
growth had decelerated to a 9.3 percent
year-over-year increase. Conversely, in
March 2005, high-end prices were
up 15.2 percent year over year, and
12 months later they were still up
10.8 percent—a much smaller decline.
Analyzing low-end versus high-end
price trends reveals two stylized facts.
First, low-end price changes and levels
lead high-end prices and levels by six
months to a year. The low-end price
trough in March 2011 was clearly
foreshadowing that the market was
set to recover. Second, low-end prices
are much more volatile than high-
end prices, which sometimes makes
turning points easier to catch. The
primary reason for this is that the three
major buyers of low-end priced homes
are typically first-time buyers, lower-
income repeat buyers and investors. For
different reasons, each of these buyer
segments is more sensitive to economic
trends than buyers at the higher-end of
the market. Low-end prices can serve as
a forward-looking barometer for overall
real estate prices, which is magnified
when looking at metropolitan markets.
Analyzing 21 geographically diverse
metropolitan markets reveals very
different price trends in the chart.
Over the last six months, low-end
price growth decelerated in six out of
21 markets, but high-end prices only
slowed down in four markets. While the
numerical difference is not large, the
intensity of the deceleration in low-end
markets is very large relative to high-
end markets. For example, in September
2013, Boston’s low-end prices were up
4.2 percent from the prior year, down
from a 17.0 percent year-over-year
growth rate in March—a very large
slowdown in only six months. During
the same time frame, low-end year-over
year price growth decelerated from
34.1 percent in March to 25.9 percent
in Las Vegas. In Phoenix, price growth
fell from 23.2 percent year over year
in March to 15.5 percent in September.
Among the 21 markets examined for
high-end price movements, Phoenix
had the largest deceleration with
high-end price growth slowing from
16.2 percent in March to 14.6 percent
in September, which is very small
compared to the low-end slowdown.
While some low-end price segments
are declining, some remain strong.
Chicago and Raleigh, N.C., experienced
the largest acceleration in home prices
over the last six months. In Chicago,
low-end prices were flat, but by
September, they were up 9.8 percent
from the prior year—a rapid increase
in such a short time. That acceleration
is consistent with our prior analysis,
which showed that Chicago has had
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The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 12
FIGURE 1. PERCENT CHANGE IN HOME PRICES FROM YEAR AGO
Tampa
Seattle
San Diego
St. Louis
Riverside
Raleigh
Phoenix
Philadelphia
Orlando
New Orleans
Miami
Los Angeles
Las Vegas
Houston
Detroit
Dallas
Cleveland
Chicago
Charlotte
Boston
Atlanta
Low-End High-End
Source: CoreLogic September 2013
the most rapid growth of any market for
owner-occupied purchase transactions
in the past two years. In Raleigh, N.C.,
year-over-year low-end prices were down
1.4 percent in March, but by September,
they were up by 9.1 percent, driven by
the increased presence of investors. For
upper-end prices, the markets with the
strongest acceleration in home prices
were in California, particularly in San
Diego and Riverside.
While there are some caveats, clearly
lower-end home prices are decelerating,
especially in the former boom/bust
markets of the Southwest. More
importantly, the magnitude of the
declines presages lower growth for
prices overall. Between 2000 and the
height of home prices at the peak
in 2006, low-end prices increased
20 percentage points more than
high-end prices. At the price trough
in 2012, low-end prices were still
14 percentage points above their high-
end counterparts. Currently, low-end
prices are 22 percentage points above
high-end prices, the biggest gap during
the last two decades. This indicates that
the low-end price correction is over
and that overall price growth will be
markedly slower heading into 2014.End.
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The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 12
Slow Money Is Replacing Fast MoneyThe Single-Family Residential Rental Asset Class Is Maturing QuicklyBy Mark Fleming
Recently, Scottsdale, Ariz.,
was host to the 2013 REO-
to-Rental Forum sponsored
by IMN (Information Management
Network). The fact that there are
now conferences for single-family
residential institutional investors
speaks volumes about the increasing
maturity of this new investment asset
class. From just a few well-known early
entrants to a variety of participants
with varying business models, and even
securitization and the formation of real
estate investment trusts (REITS), the
single-family residential rental asset
class is growing up.
To be clear, investing in real estate is
far from a new phenomenon. It’s not
uncommon to meet people who own
multiple properties near where they live
or in markets where they like to vacation.
What is different is the aggregation
and professional management of
large portfolios of properties and,
most importantly, the availability of
institutional investor capital to fund
the acquisition of properties. The
combination of institutional and
individual investor demand in recent
years has been critical to the successful
recovery of the housing market. Where
would prices be today if investors had
not been willing to buy distressed
properties in the dark days of the
housing-market just a few years ago?
But times are changing. The maturation
of the market, combined with rising
home prices, is challenging the
profitability of the business. To see
this, we measured single-family rental
cap rates for a number of markets with
significant investment activity in 2012
and again in 2013. Year-over-year August
rates are a good comparison point, as
it signals the end of the home buying
season. The cap rate is the ratio of the
property’s income-producing potential
and the cost of acquiring it. We used
market-level single-family residential
rental rates and assumed one month
of vacancy, leasing costs equal to one
month’s rent, an 8 percent management
fee and a 2 percent maintenance fee
to determine the average single-family
rental property income in each market.
Acquisition cost was based on the
average sale price with a 30 percent
discount (assuming the investor is
buying a distressed asset) and 5 percent
rehabilitation costs.
Figure 1 shows the 10 markets with
the highest cap rates in August 2013.
All markets but Charlotte, N.C., and
FIGURE 1. SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL RENTAL RETURNS GETTING HARDER TO FINDCap Rate
7.0%
7.5%
8.0%
8.5%
9.0%
9.5%
10.0%
10.5%
11.0%
Chi
cag
o
Tam
pa
Orl
and
o
Atl
anta
Ind
iana
po
lis
St.
Lo
uis
Ho
ust
on
Dal
las
Cha
rlo
tte
Riv
ersi
de
Aug-12 Aug-13
Article 1: fig 1
Source: CoreLogic August 2013
Continued on page 6
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The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 12
Unlike Fine WineLoans Originated in 2006 and 2007 Among Worst Performers By Gilberto Méndez
rior to the housing collapse,
conforming loans were
more likely to enter serious
delinquency (90 or more days
delinquent) than non-conforming
loans, as evidenced by the 2004
vintage, in which non-conforming
loans outperformed conforming
loans. This relationship held true until
April 2007, when the overall serious
delinquency rate of non-conforming
loans increased above its counterpart.
This month’s chart focuses on the
comparison between conforming and
non-conforming loan rates for loans
originated between 2004 and 2007.
For the 2004 and 2005 vintages,
non-conforming loans outperformed
their conforming counterparts in the
first full year of seasoning. However,
as the housing crisis began, a shift
in performance occurred, where the
non-conforming loans began to worsen
relative to the conforming segment.
This shift occurs in the 44th month
for the 2004 vintage and in the 19th
month for the 2005 vintage, roughly
corresponding to the beginning of
the rapid deterioration in the housing
market in 2007.
For the 2006 and 2007 vintages, non-
conforming performed worse than
conforming loans from the outset.
This reflects the weakness in non-
conforming underwriting and also
reflects the geographical concentration
of non-conforming loans, which
are generally located in high-cost
metropolitan areas where the largest
booms and subsequent busts occurred.
P UNLIKE FINE WINELoans Originated in 2006 & 2007 Among Worst Performers
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
3 M
on
ths
5 M
on
ths
7 M
ont
hs
9 M
ont
hs
11 M
ont
hs
13 M
ont
hs
15 M
ont
hs
17 M
ont
hs
19 M
ont
hs
21 M
ont
hs
23 M
on
ths
25 M
ont
hs
27 M
ont
hs
29 M
ont
hs
31 M
ont
hs
33 M
on
ths
35 M
on
ths
37 M
ont
hs
39 M
on
ths
41
Mo
nths
43
Mo
nth
s
45
Mo
nths
47
Mo
nths
49
Mo
nths
51 M
ont
hs
53 M
on
ths
55 M
on
ths
57 M
ont
hs
59 M
ont
hs
2004 2005 2006 2007
2004 2005 2006 2007
90+ DQ Pct Count
COTM
Conforming Non-Conforming
Source: CoreLogic September 2013
Continued on page 6
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The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 12
Star-Telegram, December 15Number of delinquent mortgages decreases in DFWIn September, the latest month available, the number of delinquent mortgage holders in Fort Worth-Arlington continued to decline, according to a recent report by CoreLogic real estate data services firm.
HeraldTribune.com,
December 15Home prices cooling, but double-digit gains remain commonPrices of single-family homes in the Sarasota-Manatee region climbed 11 percent in October over last year, according to the latest report from real estate data provider CoreLogic.
National Mortgage Professional
Magazine, December 9Completed Foreclosures Drop 25.6 Percent Monthly in OctoberCoreLogic has released its October National Foreclosure Report which provides data on completed U.S. foreclosures and the national foreclosure inventory.
Chicago Tribune, December 9Number of Chicago homes in foreclosure declinesNationally, since September 2008, about 4.6 million homes have been lost to foreclosure, according to CoreLogic.
CNBC.com, December 9Skyrocketing rents hit 'crisis' levelsHome prices are rising faster than expected, due to heavy investor demand, ironically in single-family rental housing.
MarketWatch, December 3US home prices rise 0.2% in October: CoreLogicU.S. home prices rose 0.2% in October, representing 12.5% year-on-year growth, CoreLogic said Tuesday.
In the News
Houston have had declines in their
cap rates, largely due to the increase
in home prices outpacing any increase
in rental rates. Nonetheless, the implied
return is still strong, especially if you
add in the capital appreciation caused
by house-price appreciation.
Yet, from talking to participants who
attended the conference, the sentiment
toward considering this asset class for
long-term rental cash flow is clearly
positive. The capital appreciation is less
important. Participants at this forum
continually talk about how to select the
right properties and buy them at the
right prices, how to find operational
management efficiency and how to
gain economies of scale, all in order
to attract more investors and capital to
the market. As the asset class matures,
the “slow money” is replacing the “fast
money”—a good sign for the long-term
success of the single-family residential
rental asset class.
Slow Money continued from page 4
Unlike Fine Wine continued from page 5
End.
End.
End.
Eventually, the 2007 vintage for both
conforming and non-conforming loan
originations was among the worst
performers of any vintage.
Beginning with the 2010 vintage, non-
conforming loans outperformed the
conforming segment. After 12 months
of seasoning, the improved performance
on these newer non-conforming
originations was largely due to tighter
underwriting coupled with continued
recovery in home prices in high-cost
metropolitan areas.
the tax credit. The year-over-year change
in the asking price of new listings turned
positive in November 2011, which was
followed four months later by the home
price index. Finally, the price of new
listings began showing double-digit year-
over-year gains in December 2012, two
months before the HPI showed similar
trends. Most recently, the asking price
of new listings has leveled off, with four
continuous months of month-over-month
decreases. If the relationship between new
listing prices and the HPI holds, this is
an indication that the HPI will also be
leveling off soon.
A Glimpse of the Future continued from page 1
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The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 12
NATIONAL SUMMARY OCTOBER 2013
Nov 2012
Dec 2012
Jan 2013
Feb 2013
Mar 2013
Apr 2013
May 2013
Jun 2013
Jul 2013
Aug 2013
Sep 2013
Oct 2013 2010 2011 2012
Total Sales* 4,369 4,305 3,521 3,651 4,514 4,972 5,533 5,609 5,825 5,854 5,214 5,144 4,177 4,046 4,472
— New Sales* 348 358 267 280 337 335 364 374 387 412 393 379 347 302 333
— Existing Sales* 2,972 2,977 2,382 2,498 3,210 3,648 4,180 4,295 4,486 4,519 4,003 3,961 2,702 2,638 3,085
— REO Sales* 634 551 543 534 581 581 562 522 519 521 466 463 803 762 639
— Short Sales* 379 387 301 311 354 377 397 386 401 374 324 311 275 304 376
Distressed Sales Share 23.2% 21.8% 24.0% 23.2% 20.7% 19.3% 17.3% 16.2% 15.8% 15.3% 15.1% 15.0% 25.8% 26.3% 22.7%
HPI MoM 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.3% 2.0% 2.7% 2.6% 1.8% 1.2% 0.7% 0.1% 0.2% -0.3% -0.2% 0.7%
HPI YoY 7.7% 8.8% 9.4% 10.0% 10.8% 11.4% 11.7% 11.5% 11.5% 11.6% 11.8% 12.5% -0.4% -4.0% 3.8%
HPI MoM Excluding Distressed 0.2% 0.1% 0.5% 0.6% 1.8% 2.1% 2.0% 1.4% 0.9% 0.5% 0.2% 0.4% -0.3% -0.3% 0.5%
HPI YoY Excluding Distressed 5.5% 6.5% 7.4% 8.3% 9.3% 9.9% 10.1% 9.9% 9.8% 10.0% 10.4% 11.0% -1.5% -3.8% 1.7%
90 Days + DQ Pct 6.5% 6.4% 6.4% 6.2% 6.0% 5.8% 5.6% 5.6% 5.5% 5.3% 5.2% 5.1% 8.1% 7.4% 6.8%
Foreclosure Pct 3.0% 3.0% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.7% 2.6% 2.5% 2.4% 2.4% 2.3% 2.2% 3.2% 3.5% 3.3%
REO Pct 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.6% 0.6% 0.4%
Pre-foreclosure Filings** 104 95 101 92 92 99 91 81 77 79 86 86 2,103 1,520 1,459
Completed Foreclosures** 64 52 58 50 51 54 49 50 50 47 64 48 1142 928 818
Negative Equity Share N/A 21.6% N/A N/A 19.9% N/A N/A 14.7% N/A N/A 13.0% N/A 25.3% 24.9% 22.7%
Negative Equity** N/A 10,483 N/A N/A 9,697 N/A N/A 7,152 N/A N/A 6,361 N/A 11,904 11,820 10,938
Months Supply Distressed Homes 7.33 7.35 8.88 8.25 6.44 5.62 4.89 4.76 4.49 4.31 4.75 4.70 10.21 9.51 7.81
* Thousands of Units, Annualized **Thousands of Units †October Data
LARGEST 25 CBSA SUMMARY OCTOBER 2013
Total Sales
12-month sum
Total Sales YOY
12-month sum
Distressed Sales Share (sales
12-month sum)
Distressed Sales Share
(sales 12-month
sum) A Year Ago
SFC HPI YoY
SFCXD HPI YoY
HPI Percent Change
from Peak
90 Days + DQ Pct
Stock of 90+ Delinquencies
YoY Chg
Percent Change Stock of
Foreclosures from Peak
Negative Equity
Share**
Months' Supply Distressed
Homes (total sales
12-month avg.)
New York-Jersey City-White Plains, NY-NJ 100,513 14.0% 9.6% 10.2% 9.1% 9.2% -9.4% 8.4% -11.7% -14.5% 8.5% 12.5
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA 92,556 3.5% 20.4% 36.7% 22.1% 19.0% -19.2% 3.4% -43.0% -74.2% 9.9% 4.9
Chicago-Naperville-Arlington Heights, IL 100,197 31.5% 31.4% 35.5% 12.2% 11.7% -24.5% 7.9% -26.3% -44.4% 20.5% 10.2
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA 95,934 29.4% 27.0% 36.6% 16.4% 13.6% -14.5% 5.3% -33.2% -58.2% 20.0% 6.0
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV
73,756 13.7% 15.2% 21.9% 9.2% 9.0% -16.3% 4.3% -22.9% -37.3% 14.8% 5.7
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX 118,685 13.7% 13.5% 18.6% 10.9% 11.1% -0.1% 3.5% -21.3% -48.6% 4.2% 2.7
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 105,903 -1.9% 11.7% 33.4% 15.9% 13.7% -31.8% 2.5% -51.1% -87.2% 23.2% 1.9
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 74,383 0.0% 28.3% 46.6% 24.1% 21.9% -36.2% 4.4% -45.4% -82.1% 20.8% 4.4
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX 91,496 12.9% 14.2% 18.6% 9.7% 9.3% 0.0% 3.6% -20.0% -43.4% 4.7% 2.8
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 60,516 27.9% 15.7% 21.7% 10.3% 9.7% -15.7% 2.7% -34.6% -69.9% 9.9% 3.2
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 46,626 21.9% 16.1% 23.3% 14.5% 14.0% -15.1% 4.1% -37.0% -38.5% 7.3% 5.0
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO 64,287 23.4% 13.6% 23.8% 10.0% 9.2% -0.1% 2.2% -39.4% -71.7% 8.0% 1.8
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD 39,010 20.4% 17.9% 17.5% 4.4% 5.7% -19.1% 7.1% -12.5% -25.5% 11.8% 9.6
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA 45,017 7.7% 20.1% 36.1% 21.4% 18.1% -19.6% 2.5% -48.4% -78.7% 11.4% 2.9
Anaheim-Santa Ana-Irvine, CA 35,048 2.9% 14.6% 31.3% 21.1% 18.6% -17.1% 2.0% -52.8% -76.8% 5.4% 2.9
Nassau County-Suffolk County, NY 24,583 4.7% 6.7% 6.3% 5.1% 4.6% -19.6% 10.0% -10.3% -12.4% 7.8% 20.3
Oakland-Hayward-Berkeley, CA 37,528 -0.2% 19.4% 39.4% 25.1% 18.0% -21.1% 2.5% -50.1% -80.4% 13.9% 3.3
St. Louis, MO-IL 50,682 8.1% 24.6% 27.0% 6.4% 5.7% -14.7% 3.7% -19.9% -49.5% 9.4% 3.6
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 69,018 18.5% 27.5% 29.0% 13.1% 14.2% -36.8% 12.4% -28.4% -43.7% 30.1% 8.8
Warren-Troy-Farmington Hills, MI 45,704 1.2% 27.6% 33.6% 18.2% 13.3% -20.5% 3.0% -37.5% -76.7% 18.9% 3.2
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA 39,193 19.4% 14.5% 25.5% 15.2% 12.9% -13.2% 4.1% -25.3% -30.1% 6.6% 4.7
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC 40,436 30.5% 15.3% 18.5% 7.4% 9.3% 0.0% 4.7% -28.1% -54.2% 8.4% 5.1
Sacramento--Roseville--Arden-Arcade, CA 40,613 2.3% 25.6% 47.1% 24.0% 20.6% -32.5% 3.0% -49.2% -80.8% 16.3% 3.1
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 51,026 12.0% 31.7% 38.0% 15.6% 12.6% -39.7% 11.5% -34.4% -51.7% 32.3% 8.9
Newark, NJ-PA N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.4% 4.9% -22.8% 10.6% -10.9% -13.0% 12.8% N/A
NOTE: * Data may be light in some jurisdictions. †October Data ** Negative Equity Data through Q3 2013
8© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 12
STATE SUMMARY OCTOBER 2013
State
Total Sales 12-month
sum
Total Sales YOY
12-month sum
Distressed Sales Share
(sales 12-month sum)
Distressed Sales Share (sales
12-month sum) A Year Ago
SFC HPI YoY
SFCXD HPI YoY
HPI Percent Change
from Peak90 Days +
DQ Pct
Stock of 90+ Delinquencies
YoY Chg
Percent Change Stock
of Foreclosures from Peak
Negative Equity
Share**
Months' Supply Distressed
Homes (total sales
12-month avg.)
Alabama 54,940 52.7% 19.3% 16.4% 3.0% 8.2% -15.0% 5.0% -12.3% -37.9% 9.0% 5.7
Alaska 11,884 9.5% 10.9% 11.1% 4.8% 4.9% -1.1% 1.8% -15.0% -40.5% 3.9% 1.5
Arizona 148,139 1.2% 19.5% 33.0% 14.0% 12.1% -31.5% 2.7% -46.6% -83.9% 22.5% 2.1
Arkansas 41,142 -5.6% 10.4% 8.0% 0.4% 3.1% -2.3% 5.3% -10.0% -37.9% 8.1% 4.3
California 495,340 2.6% 22.0% 39.4% 22.4% 18.5% -21.6% 3.0% -46.2% -78.2% 13.3% 3.7
Colorado 121,308 17.4% 15.2% 23.9% 9.1% 8.4% 0.0% 2.2% -37.0% -68.7% 8.5% 1.9
Connecticut 41,970 15.8% 18.2% 19.2% 2.4% 4.7% -22.4% 6.6% -14.1% -24.2% 10.5% 8.7
Delaware 11,517 7.7% 16.1% 21.2% 3.8% 3.8% -15.5% 6.0% -13.6% -26.9% 11.1% 9.6
District of Columbia 8,431 15.3% 5.2% 8.2% 7.5% 6.8% -0.2% 4.9% -14.5% -27.0% 6.6% 6.5
Florida 492,951 15.0% 26.5% 29.8% 12.8% 13.0% -37.4% 11.6% -32.1% -51.0% 28.8% 7.7
Georgia 149,206 21.2% 24.0% 31.0% 14.2% 11.9% -14.2% 5.1% -29.7% -56.0% 17.8% 5.6
Hawaii 17,586 12.4% 10.1% 16.6% 12.2% 9.9% -8.3% 5.2% -20.4% -25.6% 5.2% 5.8
Idaho 40,380 12.1% 14.2% 22.2% 11.9% 12.1% -19.3% 3.4% -27.1% -47.7% 9.9% 2.3
Illinois 174,785 20.2% 27.8% 28.7% 9.7% 9.2% -23.3% 6.8% -25.7% -44.4% 17.8% 8.2
Indiana 133,214 19.0% 16.7% 19.6% 3.7% 3.9% -7.7% 5.0% -22.3% -50.0% 5.6% 3.6
Iowa 51,887 8.1% 8.3% 9.1% 2.8% 3.5% -0.6% 3.2% -17.3% -37.7% 7.2% 2.6
Kansas 39,384 14.7% 16.1% 15.7% 3.1% 6.5% -5.7% 3.5% -17.8% -48.6% 5.8% 3.2
Kentucky 48,696 -7.2% 15.9% 13.5% 1.1% 3.2% -6.0% 4.5% -18.7% -44.8% 7.0% 4.6
Louisiana 56,160 4.8% 13.8% 14.6% 1.8% 2.7% -3.3% 5.0% -16.0% -45.7% 13.4% 4.7
Maine 16,918 26.4% 9.3% 9.1% 6.7% 6.0% -10.6% 6.5% -12.9% -19.7% 5.6% 6.5
Maryland 81,743 16.6% 20.1% 21.4% 6.0% 6.7% -22.4% 7.1% -15.3% -28.3% 15.6% 10.1
Massachusetts 96,068 10.6% 5.6% 11.8% 9.8% 9.1% -12.0% 4.7% -14.7% -38.6% 10.4% 5.0
Michigan 183,060 9.5% 32.6% 34.2% 14.1% 11.1% -23.9% 3.8% -30.8% -71.3% 17.8% 3.2
Minnesota 83,643 12.3% 14.1% 18.1% 8.7% 8.5% -14.3% 2.7% -30.6% -67.9% 9.6% 3.3
Mississippi N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.9% 6.0% -11.6% 6.1% -16.8% -50.8% N/A N/A
Missouri 95,979 6.3% 21.9% 24.9% 7.1% 6.1% -13.8% 3.4% -19.3% -54.3% 8.7% 3.2
Montana 16,121 10.2% 12.4% 14.9% 7.3% 6.9% -3.8% 1.9% -26.5% -60.9% 4.2% 1.8
Nebraska 34,892 5.2% 8.2% 9.2% 3.4% 3.2% 0.0% 2.3% -15.2% -48.7% 7.5% 1.7
Nevada 66,450 -7.3% 33.8% 48.3% 25.9% 22.5% -40.7% 7.8% -35.9% -65.7% 32.2% 6.0
New Hampshire 20,899 14.7% 19.3% 24.2% 5.4% 4.5% -16.1% 3.4% -22.2% -50.3% 13.9% 3.5
New Jersey 97,937 16.1% 14.0% 14.6% 5.2% 5.5% -22.9% 10.6% -9.6% -11.5% 13.2% 15.3
New Mexico 27,602 7.8% 17.3% 16.5% -0.5% 3.1% -20.1% 4.7% -19.5% -34.9% 10.3% 4.9
New York 162,334 6.3% 6.3% 6.0% 12.5% 12.4% -1.9% 7.9% -9.7% -11.9% 5.7% 10.5
North Carolina 143,673 17.6% 14.3% 15.1% 5.7% 7.0% -5.9% 4.3% -22.6% -50.8% 8.5% 4.7
North Dakota 14,320 -1.2% 3.1% 3.5% 7.0% 4.0% -0.9% 1.2% -18.1% -26.5% 4.3% 0.6
Ohio 174,912 14.5% 22.6% 24.4% 2.8% 4.2% -13.7% 5.4% -22.5% -46.9% 18.0% 5.1
Oklahoma 82,743 13.2% 10.0% 10.2% 2.5% 3.7% -1.0% 4.6% -15.4% -34.0% 5.9% 2.4
Oregon 64,936 14.5% 14.5% 26.0% 13.3% 11.9% -14.9% 4.5% -20.0% -26.0% 8.2% 4.8
Pennsylvania 159,171 12.0% 12.7% 12.3% 3.5% 3.8% -9.2% 5.6% -10.0% -21.5% 6.8% 5.9
Rhode Island 13,036 5.8% 18.4% 23.6% 7.0% 7.2% -29.3% 6.5% -14.2% -36.8% 16.6% 7.5
South Carolina 77,355 13.8% 19.4% 22.0% 10.8% 9.2% -5.6% 4.8% -23.4% -44.8% 9.2% 4.6
South Dakota N/A N/A N/A N/A 7.7% 7.9% -1.1% 2.0% -18.7% -45.0% N/A N/A
Tennessee 122,406 8.7% 19.3% 20.4% 6.8% 6.5% -4.9% 4.7% -20.3% -58.5% 9.0% 3.3
Texas 494,277 11.7% 12.7% 16.2% 8.1% 8.6% -0.5% 3.5% -18.5% -42.7% 3.7% 2.4
Utah 61,192 9.3% 12.5% 20.6% 11.8% 13.3% -15.1% 3.1% -29.3% -62.6% 7.3% 2.5
Vermont N/A N/A N/A N/A 5.0% 5.0% 0.0% 3.8% -10.3% -22.8% N/A N/A
Virginia 117,846 10.7% 16.2% 21.1% 7.4% 7.8% -15.7% 3.1% -21.0% -54.3% 11.2% 3.9
Washington 109,843 20.4% 17.1% 22.4% 11.7% 12.2% -16.3% 4.7% -29.4% -30.2% 8.5% 5.7
West Virginia N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.7% 7.5% -28.0% 3.3% -13.8% -45.2% N/A N/A
Wisconsin 85,953 8.0% 14.3% 16.1% 3.0% 3.7% -12.5% 3.1% -27.1% -58.8% 10.9% 3.2
Wyoming 8,973 24.5% 10.9% 12.7% 9.0% 4.8% -1.2% 1.7% -17.4% -65.0% 4.7% 1.6
NOTE: * Data may be light in some jurisdictions. †October Data ** Negative Equity Data through Q3 2013
9© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 12
Home Prices ► On a month-over-month basis, including distressed sales,
home prices increased by 0.2 percent month over month
and 12.5 percent year over year in October 2013. This
change represents the 20th consecutive monthly year-
over-year increase in home prices nationally. Excluding
distressed sales, home prices increased 0.4 percent month
over month in October 2013 compared to September 2013.
On a year-over-year basis, excluding distressed sales, home
prices increased by 11 percent in October 2013 compared
to October 2012. Distressed sales include short sales
and real-estate owned (REO) transactions. The small and
shrinking gap between overall price increases and those
excluding distressed sales clearly indicates that the strong
appreciation in home prices is due to the very tight supply
of unsold inventory, not the impact of distressed sales. The
slowdown in price appreciation is positive for the housing
market as almost half the states are now within 10 percent
of their respective historical price peaks.
► Rising home prices continued to help homeowners regain
lost equity in the third quarter of 2013. Approximately
791,000 more residential properties returned to a state of
positive equity during this period, and the total number
of mortgaged residential properties with equity currently
stands at 42.6 million. Nearly 6.4 million homes, or
13 percent of all residential properties with a mortgage,
were still in negative equity at the end of the third quarter.
This figure is down from 7.2 million homes, or 14.7 percent
of all residential properties with a mortgage, at the end of
the second quarter of 2013. The bulk of home equity for
mortgaged properties is concentrated at the high end
of the housing market. For example, 92 percent of homes
valued at greater than $200,000 have equity compared with
82 percent of homes valued at less than $200,000.
YoY HPI GROWTH FOR 25 HIGHEST RATE STATES Min, Max, Current since Jan 1976
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
NV
CA
GA MI
AZ
OR FL
NY HI
ID UT
WA SC
MA IL
CO
WY
MN TX
SD
DC
VA
MT
MO RI
Current
2.58x3.65 5pt gothamPrices: yoy hpi growth for 25 lowest rate states oct 2013
Source: CoreLogic October 2013
HPI BY PRICE SEGMENT Indexed to Jan 2011
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
Jan
-11
Mar
-11
May
-11
Jul-
11
Sep
-11
No
v-11
Jan
-12
Mar
-12
May
-12
Jul-
12
Sep
-12
No
v-12
Jan
-13
Mar
-13
May
-13
Jul-
13
Sep
-13
Price 0-75% of Median Price 75-100% of MedianPrice 100-125% of Median Price > 125% of Median
2.64x3.27 5pt gothamPrices: hpi by price segment oct 2013
Source: CoreLogic October 2013
HOME PRICE INDEXPct Change from Year Ago Pct Change from Month Ago
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
Jul-
13
All Transactions Excluding Distressed All Transactions - Right Axis
2.77x3.66 5pt gotham bookPrices: home price index oct 2013
Source: CoreLogic October 2013
PRICE-TO-INCOME RATIO Indexed to Jan 1976
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
Jan
-76
May
-77
Sep
-78
Jan
-80
May
-81
Sep
-82
Jan
-84
May
-85
Sep
-86
Jan
-88
May
-89
Sep
-90
Jan
-92
May
-93
Sep
-94
Jan
-96
May
-97
Sep
-98
Jan
-00
May
-01
Sep
-02
Jan
-04
May
-05
Sep
-06
Jan
-08
May
-09
Sep
-10
Jan
-12
May
-13
Price/Income Ratio
2.66x3.52Prices: price to income ratio oct 2013
Source: CoreLogic, BEA October 2013
DISTRESSED SALES DISCOUNT
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
Jul-
13
REO Price Discount Short Sale Price Discount - Right Axis
2.72x3.52Prices: distressed sales discount oct 2013
Source: CoreLogic October 2013
10© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 12
OVERALL MORTGAGE PERFORMANCE
0.0%
0.1%
0.2%
0.3%
0.4%
0.5%
0.6%
0.7%
0.8%
0.9%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
Jul-
13
90+ Days DQ Pct Foreclosure Pct REO Pct - Right Axis
2.53x3.42Performance: overall mortgage performance oct 2013
Source: CoreLogic October 2013
SERIOUS DELINQUENCIES FOR 25 HIGHEST RATE STATESMin, Max, Current since Jan 2000
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
FL
NJ
NV
NY
MD IL CT RI
ME
MS
DE
PA
OH HI
AR
GA
LA IN AL
DC
SC
WA
MA
NM TN
Current
2.5x3.57Performance: serious del for 25 highest rate states oct 2013
Source: CoreLogic October 2013
NATIONAL ACTIVE LOAN COUNT SHAREBy Current Interest Rate
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
up
to
4.0
%
4.0
+ -
4.5
%
4.5
+ -
5.0
%
5.0
+ -
5.5
%
5.5+
- 6
.0%
6.0
+ -
6.5
%
6.5
+ -
7.0
%
7.0
%+
2012 2013
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
up
to
4.0
%
4.0
+ -
4.5
%
4.5
+ -
5.0
%
5.0
+ -
5.5
%
5.5+
- 6
.0%
6.0
+ -
6.5
%
6.5
+ -
7.0
%
7.0
%+
2.63x3.6Performance: national active loan count share sep 2013
Source: CoreLogic September 2013
PRE-FORECLOSURE FILINGS AND COMPLETED FORECLOSURESIn Thousands (3mma) In Thousands
0
50
100
150
200
250
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
Jul-
13
Completed Foreclosures Pre-Foreclosure Filings - Right Axis
2.69x3.45Performance: pre foreclosure filings and completed
foreclosures oct 2013
Source: CoreLogic October 2013
Mortgage Performance ► As of October 2013, approximately 879,000 homes in
the U.S. were in some stage of foreclosure, known as
the foreclosure inventory, compared to 1.3 million in
October 2012, a year-over-year decrease of 31 percent.
The foreclosure inventory as of October 2013 represented
2.2 percent of all homes with a mortgage compared to
3.1 percent in October 2012. The foreclosure inventory was
down 2.9 percent from September 2013 to October 2013.
Year over year, the foreclosure inventory, as a percentage
of all homes with a mortgage, has declined almost a full
percentage point to 2.2 percent. The U.S. has experienced
10 consecutive months with at least 20 percent year-over-
year declines in the inventory of foreclosed homes. In
October 2013, 36 states had an inventory of foreclosed
homes lower than the national rate.
► There were 48,000 completed foreclosures in the U.S. in
October 2013, down from 68,000 in October 2012, a year-
over-year decrease of 30 percent. On a month-over-month
basis, completed foreclosures decreased 25.6 percent,
from 64,000 reported in September. As a basis of
comparison, prior to the decline in the housing market
in 2007, completed foreclosures averaged 21,000 per
month nationwide between 2000 and 2006. Completed
foreclosures are an indication of the total number of
homes actually lost to foreclosure.
CONFORMING PRIME SERIOUS DELINQUENCY RATEBy Origination Year
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
3 M
on
ths
6 M
ont
hs
9 M
ont
hs
12 M
ont
hs
15 M
ont
hs
18 M
ont
hs
21 M
ont
hs
24 M
ont
hs
27 M
ont
hs
30 M
ont
hs
33 M
on
ths
36 M
on
ths
39 M
on
ths
42
Mo
nths
45
Mo
nths
48
Mo
nths
51 M
ont
hs
54 M
ont
hs
57 M
ont
hs
60
Mo
nths
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008
2.98x3.45Performance: conforming prime serious del rate sep 2013
Source: CoreLogic September 2013
2011 2010 2009 2008 2013 2012
11© 2013 CoreLogic Proprietary and confidential. This material may not be reproduced in any form without express written permission.
The MarketPulse – Volume 2, Issue 12
Home Sales ► Total home sales increased by a healthy 10 percent year-over-
year in October 2013. Similarly, new home sales increased
8 percent from a year ago. Sales of previously owned homes
soared 21 percent from a year ago and accounted for
77 percent of all home sales in October 2013.
► Nationwide, the share of distressed sales accounted for
15 percent of all homes sales in October 2013, equaling
the level from the previous month. Nationwide, REO sales
accounted for 9 percent of all home sales in October 2013, a
22 percent year-over-year decrease from October 2012. Short
sales in October 2013 decreased 27 percent from a year ago.
HOME SALES SHARE BY PRICE TIERAs a Percentage of Total Sales
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Jan
-01
Jul-
01
Jan
-02
Jul-
02
Jan
-03
Jul-
03
Jan
-04
Jul-
04
Jan
-05
Jul-
05
Jan
-06
Jul-
06
Jan
-07
Jul-
07
Jan
-08
Jul-
08
Jan
-09
Jul-
09
Jan
-10
Jul-
10
Jan
-11
Jul-
11
Jan
-12
Jul-
12
Jan
-13
Jul-
13
0-100K 100K-200K 200K+
2.54x3.42Sales: home sales vol by price tier oct 2013
Source: CoreLogic October 2013
NEW HOME SALES TRENDSIn Thousands In Thousands
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
170
180
190
200
210
220
230
240
250
260
270
Jan
-02
Jun
-02
No
v-0
2A
pr-
03
Sep
-03
Feb
-04
Jul-
04
Dec
-04
May
-05
Oct
-05
Mar
-06
Aug
-06
Jan
-07
Jun
-07
No
v-0
7A
pr-
08
Sep
-08
Feb
-09
Jul-
09
Dec
-09
May
-10
Oct
-10
Mar
-11
Aug
-11
Jan
-12
Jun
-12
No
v-12
Ap
r-13
Sep
-13
Median Price Volume - Right Axis
2.75x3.51Sales: new home sales trends oct 2013
Feb
-12
Source: CoreLogic October 2013
DISTRESSED SALE SHARE FOR 25 HIGHEST RATE STATESMin, Max, Current
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%N
V FL IL
OH
GA
MO
NM TN
MD CT
AL
KY
MS
SC RI
NH
VA
CA KS
WA
DE
NJ
NC
WI
CO
Current
2.39x3.48Sales: distressed sale share for 25 highest rate states oct 2013
Source: CoreLogic October 2013
DISTRESSED SALES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SALES
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
Jan
-06
May
-06
Sep
-06
Jan
-07
May
-07
Sep
-07
Jan
-08
May
-08
Sep
-08
Jan
-09
May
-09
Sep
-09
Jan
-10
May
-10
Sep
-10
Jan
-11
May
-11
Sep
-11
Jan
-12
May
-12
Sep
-12
Jan
-13
May
-13
Sep
-13
Short Sales Share REO Sales Share
2.62x3.64Sales: distressed sales as % of total sales oct 2013
Source: CoreLogic October 2013
SALES BY SALE TYPEAnnualized In Millions
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Jan
-06
May
-06
Sep
-06
Jan
-07
May
-07
Sep
-07
Jan
-08
May
-08
Sep
-08
Jan
-09
May
-09
Sep
-09
Jan
-10
May
-10
Sep
-10
Jan
-11
May
-11
Sep
-11
Jan
-12
May
-12
Sep
-12
Jan
-13
May
-13
Sep
-13
Existing Home New Home REO Short
2.65x3.51Sales: sales by sale type oct 2013
Source: CoreLogic October 2013
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17-MKTPLSEQTR-1213-00
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VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS
Variable DefinitionTotal Sales The total number of all home-sale transactions during the month.
Total Sales 12-month sum The total number of all home-sale transactions for the last 12 months.
Total Sales YoY Change 12-month sum
Percentage increase or decrease in current 12 months of total sales over the prior 12 months of total sales
New Home Sales The total number of newly constructed residentail housing units sold during the month.
New Home Sales Median Price The median price for newly constructed residential housing units during the month.
Existing Home Sales The number of previously constucted homes that were sold to an unaffiliated third party. DOES NOT INCLUDE REO AND SHORT SALES.
REO Sales Number of bank owned properties that were sold to an unaffiliated third party.
REO Sales Share The number of REO Sales in a given month divided by total sales.
REO Price Discount The average price of a REO divided by the average price of an existing-home sale.
REO Pct The count of loans in REO as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the reporting period.
Short Sales The number of short sales. A short sale is a sale of real estate in which the sale proceeds fall short of the balance owed on the property's loan.
Short Sales Share The number of Short Sales in a given month divided by total sales.
Short Sale Price Discount The average price of a Short Sale divided by the average price of an existing-home sale.
Short Sale Pct The count of loans in Short Sale as a percentage of the overall count of loans for the month.
Distressed Sales Share The percentage of the total sales that were a distressed sale (REO or short sale).
Distressed Sales Share (sales 12-month sum)
The sum of the REO Sales 12-month sum and the Short Sales 12-month sum divided by the total sales 12-month sum.
HPI MoM Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined series over a month ago.
HPI YoY Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined series over a year ago.
HPI MoM Excluding Distressed Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a month ago.
HPI YoY Excluding Distressed Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined excluding distressed series over a year ago.
HPI Percent Change from Peak Percent increase or decrease in HPI single family combined series from the respective peak value in the index.
90 Days + DQ Pct The percentage of the overall loan count that are 90 or more days delinquent as of the reporting period. This percentage includes loans that are in foreclosure or REO.
Stock of 90+ Delinquencies YoY Chg Percent change year-over-year of the number of 90+ day delinquencies in the current month.
Foreclosure Pct The percentage of the overall loan count that is currently in foreclosure as of the reporting period.
Percent Change Stock of Foreclosures from Peak
Percent increase or decrease in the number of foreclosures from the respective peak number of foreclosures.
Pre-foreclosure Filings The number of mortgages where the lender has initiated foreclosure proceedings and it has been made known through public notice (NOD).
Completed ForeclosuresA completed foreclosure occurs when a property is auctioned and results in either the purchase of the home at auction or the property is taken by the lender as part of their Real Estate Owned (REO) inventory.
Negative Equity ShareThe percentage of mortgages in negative equity. The denominator for the negative equity percent is based on the number of mortgages from the public record.
Negative EquityThe number of mortgages in negative equity. Negative equity is calculated as the difference between the current value of the property and the origination value of the mortgage. If the mortgage debt is greater than the current value, the property is considered to be in a negative equity position. We estimate current UPB value, not origination value.
Months' Supply of Distressed Homes (total sales 12-month avg)
The months it would take to sell off all homes currently in distress of 90 days delinquency or greater based on the current sales pace.
Price/Income Ratio CoreLogic HPI™ divided by Nominal Personal Income provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and indexed to January 1976.
Conforming Prime Serious Delinquency Rate
The rate serious delinquency mortgages which are within the legislated purchase limits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The conforming limits are legislated by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
Jumbo Prime Serious Delinquency Rate
The rate serious delinquency mortgages which are larger than the legislated purchase limits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The conforming limits are legislated by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).
