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The Media Strategies ofIntelligence ServicesShlomo ShpiroPublished online: 10 Nov 2010.

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SHLOMO SHPIRO

The Media Strategies of Intelligence Services

Interaction between the open media and secret intelligence has often beenbased both on con£ict and on cooperation. An inherent con£ict existsbetween the open media, that wish to publish security-related informationas part of their responsibility toward their audience, and intelligenceservices, which work on the basis of secrecy and often attempt to preventthe publication of information on their activities and sources. Yet both themedia and intelligence services require information for their basicfunctions, and often discover that cooperation can provide importantknowledge without harming their security interests or operationalcapabilities. Quite often, information on intelligence published by themedia comes from leaks, disaffected employees, or even pure speculation.At other times, intelligence services knowingly provide the media withsecret information for publication, as part of their media strategy.

THE GLOBAL VILLAGE AND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Even a cursory examination of newspapers or investigative televisionprograms in many countries reveals extensive media coverage on a varietyof intelligence related issues. The media are attracted to intelligence issuesfor a variety of reasons. First and foremost is the media’s inherentfascination with secrets. Most young journalists dream of discovering and

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence , 14: 485^502, 2001Copyright # 2001 Taylor & Francis0885-0607 /01 $12.00 + .00

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Dr. Shlomo Shpiro is an Assistant Professor in the Department of PoliticalStudies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel. Formerly Director of theIsraeli Government Ministries Security Unit, he was later ResearchCoordinator at the Israeli Parliament (Knesset). In 1999, he was appointedNATO Research Fellow for the Mediterranean, directing a project onimproving intelligence cooperation between NATO and the easternMediterranean countries. An earlier version of this article was prepared fordelivery at the annual meetings of the International Studies Association,Chicago, Illinois, 21 February 2001.1

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publishing some secret material, revealing the unknown to the audience. Themedia also ful¢ll a democratic responsibility of uncovering of¢cialwrongdoing. Since intelligence services are inherently secret, many in themedia tend to believe that considerable wrongdoing is hidden behind thatsecrecy. Intelligence services deal with a variety of such newsworthysubjects as national security, espionage, crime, and violence. Mediaintelligence coverage is also a lucrative business. Many mediaprofessionals admit that intelligence stories sell. In the intense competitionamong newspapers, television, and the Internet, revelations aboutintelligence services often generate signi¢cant sales or increased ratings.Last but not least, many people are interested in intelligence issuesbecause they are perceived as being exotic and fascinating. The publicimage of the ¢ctional James Bond, mixing money, sex, and adventure,ensures that intelligence related issues are never far away from the publiceye in many democracies.

In an age characterized by rapid technological advances in communications,the global media reach into the house of practically every citizen. Yet, regardingintelligence coverage by the media, the so-called ``media revolution’’ is not new.In the 1950s, the media were fascinated by revelations of intelligence featscarried out during World War II. During the Cold War, many intelligenceservices had to adopt a structured strategy in their interaction with themedia. The type of media strategy adopted by a country’s secret servicesdepended on numerous factors, including the threats they were facing, theirpolitical and legal standing, the level of public legitimacy they enjoyed, andtheir involvement in internal politics.

Despite the development of the academic discipline of Intelligence Studiesover the past decade, the interaction between intelligence services and themedia still remains largely unexplored. Abram, Shulsky’s Silent Warfarebrie£y examined ways by which the local media were used as agents ofin£uence, for example by the Soviet Union’s KGB in Japan.2 Britain’sMichael Herman examined the effects of a more open world on futureintelligence requirements and operations. In his book Intelligence Power inPeace and War, he speculated that the proportion of covert collection willdecrease in the future due to more information being available fromnongovernmental open sources, such as the Cable News Network (CNN).3

Pat Holt, a former congressional staff member, examined the role of themedia in overseeing the United States intelligence community.4

Strategic Media Approaches

Two models of intelligence service media strategies, the ``Defensive Openness’’model and the ``Controlled Exclusion’’ model, are explained here. Thesemodels are analyzed within the context of two countries which adopted

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these models, Germany and Israel, respectively. The individual components ofeach model are examined, as are the reasons why a particular model wasadopted within a speci¢c context.

Due to the sensitivity of the relations between intelligence services and themedia, much of the information on this interaction is highly classi¢ed. Nointelligence service wants to admit openly that it engages in manipulatingthe media, and even less that it uses media credentials as operationalcover. Beyond direct media sources, part of the information containedhere was extracted from the memoirs of intelligence of¢cers and servicechiefs. Information was also obtained through extensive interviews withformer intelligence of¢cials who dealt with media relations.

The following sections present the media strategies adopted by the Germanand Israeli foreign intelligence services. Many of the media strategies andconclusions presented here also apply to internal security services.

I. GERMANY: DEFENSIVE OPENNESS

The German intelligence services have maintained a fairly extensive level ofmedia openness over the past three decades. But this openness has beenaimed, more often than not, at protecting the services from adversepublicity rather than being merely the result of openness for the sake ofcivic responsibility or public service. The German intelligence servicesdeveloped their media strategy into a form best described as ``defensiveopenness,’’ whereby a limited amount of openness is maintained towardthe media in order to in£uence media content.

As early as 1972, the German Federal Intelligence Service, the BND(Bundesnachrichtendienst ), established its own press of¢ce. It was the ¢rstWest European foreign intelligence service to do so. The BND’s originslie in the immediate post-war period, with the establishment of anindependent intelligence-gathering service known as the ``OrganizationGehlen’’ (OG), working under the aegis of the U.S. Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA). The OG was ¢nanced by the CIA in an attempt to expandAmerican intelligence collection capability in Eastern Europe and theSoviet Union. The head of the OG, General Reinhard Gehlen, previouslyheaded intelligence for the German army’s eastern front during WorldWar II. After operating for almost a decade as a semi-privateorganization, the OG became a West German federal service in 1956.Gehlen retained control of the BND until 1968 and played an active rolein internal West German politics. The BND has traditionally been close toChristian Democratic (CDU) conservative circles in German politics. Untilthe 1970s, it enjoyed almost unquestioning support from conservativenewspapers associated with the CDU and Bavaria’s Christian SocialUnion (CSU) political parties.5

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From its establishment in 1956, and until 1972, BND media relations werecarried out by a special department known as Section 923, based at theBND headquarters in Pullach, south of Munich. Section 923 maintainedregular contacts with over 200 journalists throughout Germany. Theirmain function was the building of a positive picture of the BND inGerman public opinion. In 1972 Section 923’s functions were taken overby the BND’s press of¢ce. Through in£uencing media coverage, BNDchiefs hoped to expand the public legitimacy of their organization andthus ensure its future and political standing.

Public AcceptancePublic legitimacy was a constant issue of contention in the activities of WestGermany’s intelligence services. Public opinion was generally adversetoward ``secret police’’ type organizations. These negative feelings werebased on the legacy of the Nazi regime, where numerous secretorganizations played a key role in the Third Reich’s horrendous crimes.This adversity toward intelligence services was further strengthened by theactivities of East Germany’s infamous secret police, the Stasi, whichformed a central element in the Communist regime of the GermanDemocratic Republic (GDR).

West German intelligence chiefs tended to believe that their organizationslacked public legitimacy. As a result, the BND found itself in a constantstate of uncertainty as to its future, budgets, and authority. Consecutiveheads of the West German intelligence services sought, therefore, todefend their organizations against adverse media coverage, as a ¢rst lineof defense in their struggle for enhanced public legitimacy.

The ``Defensive Openness’’ model adopted by the BND as its media strategycomprised four main elements:

. continuous in-house media monitoring

. proportionality of response

. balancing denial with providing information

. rewarding journalists rather than threatening

a. Media monitoring

The ¢rst element in the BND’s media strategy was continuous in-house mediamonitoring activities. Each day press of¢cers routinely examined numerousnewspapers for adverse coverage of the BND. Although this monitoringwas mainly done by the press of¢ce staff at the BND headquarters, it wasalso carried out by BND of¢cers in Hamburg and Berlin, the two maincities of the West German newspaper world. Articles containing negative

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information on the BND were collected, ¢led, and passed on for further action.These monitoring activities were later expanded to include televisionbroadcasts.

In addition to monitoring printed articles, the BND press of¢cedeveloped close relations with journalists and newspaper editors whocould alert it to upcoming articles and investigative reports. BNDagents or journalists employed by the BND often monitored the largeGerman publishing houses, including the Bauer, Springer, Bertelsmann,and Studio Hamburg groups.6 The BND handsomely paid some ofits agents in the media world for information on future publications.In 1970, for example, some BND agents in Berlin were earning up to900 Marks a month, not an inconsiderable sum in those days, formonitoring daily newspapers and radio broadcasts.7 By having advanceinformation on publication, the press of¢ce had time to arrange aresponse, an especially important element, considering the short leadtimes of newspapers.

This ``early warning’’ reaction was well illustrated in the early 1980s whenthe editor of the newspaper Muenchner Merkur, Rudolf Lambrecht,received from an anonymous source sensitive material about allegedunethical connections between the BND and senior German politicians.When Lambrecht approached the BND press of¢ce for comment, he wasasked to present the documents in his possession. Refusing to disclose thedocuments in order to protect his source, Lambrecht was invited for abackground talk in Pullach with BND president Klaus Kinkel. To hisamazement, Lambrecht found out during the talk that the BND alreadyhad a copy of the secret document with Lambrecht’s own hand writtennotes on it. The copy could possibly have come from only anotherjournalist on the Muenchner Merkur staff.8

The BND also sought to increase its contact with media throughinvolvement with journalists’ unions. It closely monitored theestablishment of two German media organizations, the Bund DeutscherPublizisten , established in 1966, and the Gesellschaft zur FoerderungOeffentlicher Verantwortung e.V., established in 1971.9 The BND pressof¢ce perceived these covert contacts as an effective way to maintainconnections with right-wing or conservative journalists. In 1973, the BNDestablished a club for journalists who provided it with information, theInternationale Association Deutcher Medienleute (IADM), which wascomposed of German journalists working around the world, includingeight BND members. The BND sponsored the activities of the IADM,which conducted meetings all over the world.10

When the press of¢ce received word about an upcoming article orinvestigative report that would show the BND in a negative light,attempts were made to prevent or delay its publication. This was

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sometimes done by contacting editors and providing them with informationthat would contradict the planned article.11 At times, some editors could beconvinced that the publication of a particular article could harm nationalsecurity. Most of this work was conducted quietly, behind the scenes,and the BND refrained from seeking help from the courts and judicialsystem, mainly because its heads feared that losing one legal battlecould open the way for many more adverse publications.

The BND was interested not only in preventing negative media coveragebut in also actively promoting its public image. The press of¢ce providedits favorite journalists with inside information, aimed mainly atilluminating BND’s successes in the ¢eld. It also provided somejournalists with large amounts of information that enabled them towrite books on the BND. In 1966, a book written by Eva Jentschprovided, by the help of inside information, a positive picture of theBND.12 In 1971, Herman Hoehne and Heinz Zolling published a booktitled Pullach Intern, which was serialized in the popular weekly DerSpiegel.13 The Hoehne and Zolling book quickly became a best-seller.What the general public did not know, however, was that Zolling hadapparently worked for the BND and received a large amount of secretinformation for his book. The volume gained credibility by includingsome very critical insights on the service. But this criticism was aimedat the BND’s previous leadership, blamed by many insiders for pastfailures.

In the late 1970s, the BND press of¢ce assisted the publication of anotherbook, written by Heiner Emde.14 Emde’s book credited the BND forobtaining early warning information on the Soviet Union’s invasion ofCzechoslovakia in 1968. This information, in reality provided to theBND by the Mossad, was presented to German politicians as havingcome from the BND’s own sources in Eastern Europe.15 Some sourcesclaim that the BND also provided secret information to sympathizingjournalists to have them write critical books on Social Democraticpoliticians. For example, both West and East German sources claimedthat the BND induced one of its journalist contacts to write biasedbooks against SPD politician Horst Ehmke, a strong critic of theintelligence services who was later appointed head of the FederalChancellor’s Of¢ce.16

The BND press of¢ce maintained excellent contacts with the DeutscheWelle, West Germany’s overseas radio broadcasting organization. It alsodeveloped contacts with public sector broadcasters WDR and ZDF.17 Inthe early 1970s the BND even provided some of its secret handbooks totelevision presenters for use in their programs.18 Information provided tothe media was aimed at highlighting the operational capabilities andpolitical usefulness of the BND.

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b. Responding to criticism

The second element in the BND’s media strategy was maintaining aproportionality of response. Activities against a particular article or reportwould be initiated in accordance to the perceived damage that could becaused by its publication. Rather than trying to keep everything from thepress, the press of¢ce concentrated on thwarting articles or reports thatwere considered to be politically, rather than operationally, damaging. Thepolicy sought to, ¢rst and foremost, maintain a positive image of theBND at home, rather than merely prevent secrets leaking to its rivals abroad.

The BND also used its close relations with the media to strengthen itsposition against West Germany’s other intelligence services. It was notabove leaking information to its press contacts on the failures of thenation’s internal intelligence service, the Of¢ce for the Protection of theConstitution (BfV). For example, in 1958 the BND reportedly encouragedauthor Maynhardt Nayhauss to write a critical article against the BfV andCIA’s involvement in an espionage debacle. In 1972, a BND mediacontact began a smear campaign aimed against Dieter Nollau, thepresident of the BfV and a longtime critic of the BND.19

Despite extensive efforts, not all of the BND’s attempts at silencing negativecriticism were successful. In 1993 the service failed to suppress the publicationof Erich Schmidt-Eenboom’s critical history of the BND, perhaps the ¢rstcomprehensive history of the German intelligence services written withoutinformation provided by the services themselves. Following its publication,the BND press of¢ce provided a journalist at one of Germany’s leading dailynewspapers with information to write a critical report on Schmidt-Eenboom’sbook.20 Despite unof¢cial harassment and legal threats, Schmidt-Eenboomwent on to write two more highly informative books on the BND.

In the early 1990s, the BND press of¢ce developed good relations with thejournalist Udo Ulfkotte, who received con¢dential information for use inhis articles. Ulfkotte was apparently given access to highly classi¢edsecrets for a book he was writing on the BND. These good relations cameto an end in 1997 when the BND tried to stop the publication ofUlfkotte’s book, after ¢nding out that it would be critical of many BNDoperations. In an attempt to prevent its publication, the BND stoppedproviding Ulfkotte with information, discussed the matter with his bosses,and even tried to sue him.21 But, all these attempts were in vain. Thebook was published and caused the BND severe political embarrassment.22

c. Doling out data

The third element of the BND’s media strategy was balancing denial withproviding information. BND chiefs understood that a press of¢cer havingonly the classic response of ``no comment’’ would not be taken seriously

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by the investigative media. Effective media relations must be a two-way street,with journalists convinced that they are receiving something useful whencontacting the press of¢ce. The of¢ce tried, therefore, to provide at leastsome information when queried by the media. Since the early 1990s, theof¢ce has also issued regular press releases that are dispatched to amultitude of media outlets.23

The BND press of¢ce has responded to media revelations, not only behindthe scenes but also by direct letters to the editor of the relevantnewspaper. For example, in 1993 the of¢ce wrote an of¢cial letter ofdenial to the editor of Der Spiegel, after its publication of an article aboutthe building of a new BND communications monitoring station.24 TheBND has also published a regular newsletter, the VereinigterWirtschaftsdient , which was distributed to leading economic and politicaldecision-makers. 25

d. Carrots without sticks

The fourth element in the BND’s media strategy has been the rewardingrather than the threatening of journalists. Unlike many otherintelligence services, the BND has relatively few judicial tools in itspotential arsenal against the media, largely because of the specialprotection awarded to the media by the German Constitution. Inrecognition of the special role of the media in an open anddemocratic society, the German Constitution provides specialprotections to the media as an institution and to individuals engagedin media work. It also expressly prohibits all forms of censorship.Journalists enjoy full legal protection for their sources and cannot bemade to reveal them, even in a court of law. Editorial of¢ces, and insome cases even the private houses of journalists, are protected fromof¢cial searches and the monitoring of communications.26

Lacking of¢cial ways to harass or threaten journalists, the BND turnedto rewarding them for their cooperation. An analysis of Germanintelligence^media relations concluded that threatening the media usuallymakes them dig even deeper into issues that the services want kept outof public knowledge. On numerous occasions, of¢cial or unof¢cialharassment of journalists has made little impact on their ¢ndings andpublications. Instead, rewards tend to create a form of long-termcommitment on behalf of the recipient. Rewards could involve directpayments, a regular salary, or other ¢nancial bene¢ts.27 But they couldalso be the providing of bits of information for publication, therebyassisting the recipients’ career by proving they have ``good sources.’’ TheBND seems to have used journalists’ need of information as a trigger for

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cooperation. KGB mole and former BND of¢cer Heinz Felfe acknowledgedthat the most important reward for journalists working with the servicewas information for their articles and books.

How successful the BND media strategy has been over the ¢ve decades of itsexistence is dif¢cult to assess. It has certainly moderated criticism in manycases, but has not eliminated negative coverage, especially that emanatingfrom left-wing newspapers. The partial success of the BND media strategyseems to have been dependent on its wide range of media contacts, whichcould easily be mobilized against the publication of particular articles orreports. While the German media published numerous operational detailson the BND over the years, before and after reuni¢cation, the BNDseems to have been partially successful in keeping many of its politicalconnections away from public view. This media strategy may not havebeen operationally useful for BND collection efforts abroad, but it didcontribute to its political standing within Germany’s conservative circles.

Despite intensive efforts by the BND press of¢ce, much of themainstream media have remained critical of the BND, aswell-illustrated by scathing reports on some of its more spectacularfailures. Throughout the Cold War, the BND never achieved thepublic legitimacy it sought. After the Cold War questions began to beraised, in Germany’s public and political spheres, about the BND’ssize, budget, and activities. Indeed, some members of the Green Party,which joined Uni¢ed Germany’s governing coalition in 1998, beganquestioning the very need for a foreign intelligence service. The BNDpress of¢ce did its best to furnish information for this debate, whichwould show the service’s importance and its successful operations. Forthe time being, the BND seems to have won a political reprieve, andhas even been incorporated in the German government’s return toBerlin as its capital. The establishment of a sizeable BND of¢ce at aformer U.S. Army barracks in Berlin is seen as a move signaling acloser political role for the BND in the future.

II. ISRAEL: CONTROLLED EXCLUSION

The very heart of the Israeli intelligence community’s media strategy is its wishto exclude the media. Constant threats to Israel’s security have always placedits intelligence services at the forefront of national security policy. Theintelligence community has enjoyed a very high level of public legitimacyand political freedom of action. A career as an intelligence of¢cer isperceived as highly desirable within Israeli society.

Israeli intelligence chiefs are thus much less sensitive to the need forin£uencing public opinion on their services through the media. Theirperception of the media is conditioned mainly by the inherent secrecy

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of intelligence work. According to this view, because intelligence work dependson secrecy for its success, it should be kept out of the media entirely. This is acontrolled exclusion, dependent not only on the good will of journalistsand editors, but also on having the means to ensure acquiescence andpunish any unauthorized disclosures.

Mossad’ s Institutional Norms

The Israeli Mossad, founded in 1951, traces its direct origins to the Hagana,the pre-independence Jewish underground organization responsible for theillegal immigration of Jews into Palestine, and for covert procurement ofarms and munitions. As Palestine’s Jewish community struggled tostimulate international pressure on Great Britain to allow more Jews toimmigrate into the country, Hagana operatives discovered the skills ofworking with and manipulating the international media. The worldwidepublicity surrounding the voyages of ships carrying European Holocaustsurvivors into Palestine through the British blockade resulted in muchcriticism of Britain’s policy, and ultimately paved the way for the 1947United Nations resolution establishing a Jewish State in Palestine. Thepolitical leadership of the new Israel concluded that an active mediastrategy was important not only for world opinion but also as aprerequisite for effective security policy.

After Israel’s independence in 1948, many of those involved in the illegalJewish immigration became of¢cers in the newly founded Mossad. A coreelement of the Mossad’s institutional norms, drilled constantly into newrecruits, was that of total secrecy. Of¢cials argued that only bymaintaining total secrecy over every aspect of the organization couldMossad personnel hope to succeed in the face of overwhelming odds. Thesecrecy element extended to many issues not considered secret in manycomparable services, such as the location of headquarters or even thenames of directors. For many years, the Israeli press was prohibited fromeven printing the word ``Mossad’’ in its reports, referring instead tonameless ``security forces.’’

Consecutive Israeli governments gave the Mossad a very wide freedom ofaction in its operations abroad, in countering terrorism and collectinginformation on Israel’s enemies. A similarly broad freedom of action wasawarded to the Shabak, Israel’s internal security service. Though limitedby Israeli law, this enabled the intelligence services to apply a range ofoperational tactics that were considered effective against terrorism.Included were such extreme means as assassination, sabotage, and physicalinterrogationsömeasures that were often externally perceived as beingsemi-legal at best.28

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Heads of the Mossad considered any media coverage of their organizationas limiting its operational freedom. They also feared that extensive mediacoverage could endanger the delicate balance between democracy and theuse of semi-legal means. Their media strategy would seek to exclude themedia from the intelligence sphere altogether. The Mossad thus developedthe ``Controlled Exclusion’’ model, based on three main elements:

. suppressing operational revelations

. threatening or punishing uncooperative media outlets

. using the media for building up deterrence

Restricting Information

The strongest tool in Mossad’s arsenal for suppressing media revelations is theIsraeli Military Censorship. Operating under emergency legislation datingfrom 1945, the Censorship enjoys wide legal powers.29 All Israelinewspapers, radio, and television stations are required to submit to theMilitary Censorship, prior to publication or broadcast, any report dealingwith security issues. The Censorship has the power to delete parts of thematerial submitted, or even ban its publication altogether, if it considersthat the information could harm national security. The de¢nition of whatis harmful to ``national security’’ was outlined in general principles by tworulings of the Israeli Supreme Court, in 1953 and 1989, but its practicalapplication is left to the discretion of Censorship of¢cials.30 For manyyears the Military Censorship formed the Mossad’s ¢rst line of defense inpreventing the publication of details on its organization or operations.

The Military Censorship has the right not only to delete material, but also toorder the closure of newspapers, either for a limited time or permanently. It isalso empowered to con¢scate the printing presses of newspapers that commitcensorship offenses. This authority, though rarely used, was neverthelessexercised on several occasions upon the request of the intelligence services.In the early 1950s, for example, the Mossad and Shabak closed downnewspapers and con¢scated printing presses belonging to former membersof the Ezel and Lehi Jewish underground organizations who opposed thegovernment of David Ben-Gurion.31 In 1995, Head of the Shabak CarmiGilon recommended the closure of the popular Saut-el-Hak Islamicnewspaper, since it was considered to be seditious and was calling for arebellion against the State of Israel.32

The closure of a newspaper, even for just a few days, imposes a severeeconomic loss on its owners. In the past, the mere threat of such a closurewas suf¢cient to in£uence editors and journalists from infringing upon theCensorship’s rulings. When the intelligence services could not legallyrestrict publication they tried to use other means of in£uence, especially

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¢nancial ones. An extensive, if somewhat extreme, example of this approachconcerned Rimon, a weekly journal subsidized by the Israeli intelligencecommunity.

Hidden Funding and Competition

The Rimon affair began as a response to a series of negative reports on theMossad and Shabak published by the weekly magazine Haolam Haze. Itseditor, Uri Avineri, was known for his anti-establishment views. In themid-1950s, his magazine covered Israel’s intelligence services in a wayperceived as too critical by intelligence chiefs. When Haolam Hazefeatured a series of critical reports on the Mossad and the people whoheaded it, the Mossad leadership decided to act. Since Avineri wouldclearly not bow to unof¢cial pressure, the Mossad sought to counterHaolam Haze’s accusations in a way that would undermine Avineri’spublic credibility. The Mossad decided to publish a magazine similar toHaolam Haze in style and coverage, directly competing for the sameaudience, and thus reducing Haolam Haze’s circulation and pro¢ts. Thus,in 1956 a new weekly magazine, Rimon, appeared in Israeli stores.Of¢cially founded by independent journalists, it was in practice funded bythe intelligence community. The Rimon used every opportunity to attackHaolam Haze and Avineri. Rimon was published for three years but hadto be closed down due to heavy ¢nancial losses. Despite large hiddeninvestments, it never achieved its aim of offsetting the sales of HaolamHaze, which did, however, suffer ¢nancial losses during that period. TheRimon affair demonstrated the extent to which the Mossad was preparedto go in order to silence adverse media coverage.33

The ’ ’ Bus 300’ ’ Affair

In 1984, Shabak of¢cers killed two Palestinian terrorists who had kidnapped abus full of civilians on its way from Tel-Aviv to Ashkelon. The of¢cialannouncement, made shortly after an elite military unit stormed the busand freed the hostages, maintained that all terrorists were killed duringthe exchange of ¢re during the rescue operation. But a press photographerworking for the daily newspaper Hadashot was nearby and took picturesshowing two terrorists still alive, being led away by intelligence of¢cers.The paper decided to publish the photos without the approval of theMilitary Censorship, since the pictures were almost certain to be banned.The authorities responded by ordering a closure of the newspaper for fourdays, in£icting a signi¢cant ¢nancial loss on its owners. However, theensuing public outcry forced the government to form several committeesof investigation to explore the scandal. The ``Bus 300 Affair,’’ as it laterbecame known, was a milestone in the interaction between intelligence

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services and the Israeli media. It demonstrated the media’s power to publishintelligence wrongdoing when willing to risk de¢ance of the militarycensorship.34

Collaboration for Deterrence

Despite the policy of media exclusion, the Mossad and Shabak encouraged,and even created, some forms of media coverage for increasing thedeterrence effect of the Israeli intelligence community. In exceptionalcircumstances, details of operational successes were leaked to the press inorder to expand the impression of the ``long arm’’ of the Mossad andShabak in combating terrorism and penetrating the secrets of foreign regimes.

Mossad’s ¢rst controlled use of media as deterrence followed its spectacularkidnapping of Nazi criminal Adolf Eichmann in Argentina. Eichmann, whowas responsible for the deportation of millions of Jews to concentrationcamps during World War II, was located by the Mossad living undercoverin Buenos Aires. In May 1960 he was kidnapped by Mossad agents andcovertly taken to Israel, where he was tried for genocide and laterexecuted.35 Details of this daring action were leaked to a select group ofjournalists and published all over the world. These details, coupled withthe wide coverage given to Eichmann’s trial, contributed signi¢cantly tothe emergence of the ``Mossad myth’’ as an all-capable service with globalreach.36

Hitting Back

Following the massacre of eleven Israeli athletes by Palestinian terroristsduring the 1972 Munich Olympic Games, the Mossad embarked on anassassination campaign against Black September terrorists in Europe.Almost all those responsible for the Munich massacre were located andeliminated by Mossad hit teams. To further enhance the effect of itscampaign, the Mossad leaked details on its assassinations to contacts inthe Western press. The result was a panic within the Palestinianorganizations based in Europe; many of their leaders sought refuge atdistant camps in Lebanon or Yemen, thereby severely weakening thePLO’s command structure.37

In July 1973, several members of a Mossad hit team were arrested inNorway after the shooting of a Moroccan waiter in the town ofLillehammer. The waiter was mistakenly believed to be Ali HassanSalameh, a senior Black September leader held by the Mossad asresponsible for the planning of the Munich massacre. Israel’s attempts todownplay Mossad’s involvement failed. The arrests caused an uproar inthe European press and severe embarrassment for the Israeli government.Five of the Israeli agents were sentenced to imprisonment and some

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seemed to have given the Norwegian press details of Mossad assassinationtradecraft. Although these revelations forced changes in operationalpractices and undercover infrastructure, their disclosure also had the effectof increasing the PLO leadership’s fear of the Mossad.38 The Lillehammeraffair resulted in the publication of several books, full of hair-raisingexploits of determined agents, and claiming to tell the true story of theassassination campaign. But, how much the Mossad was involved in thewriting of these books, which certainly went a long way toward enhancingits fearless image, is not known.39

In January 1993, Shabak agents arrested two couriers belonging to theIslamic Hamas terror group. The couriers were suspected of bringing largeamounts of money from the United States to Israel for ¢nancing terroristactivities. During the investigation, the Israeli government approached theU.S. administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),requesting cooperation in stemming the £ood of American money fundingterrorism in the Middle East. But FBI of¢cials were sceptical of Mossad’sevidence on the extent of Hamas fundraising activities within the UnitedStates. In order to convince the American public of the acute threat,Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin asked the Shabak to allow a U.S.journalist to witness the interrogation of the Hamas couriers. The reporterpresented the Shabak with a list of questions and attended, unseen, theinterrogation session where the questions were submitted to the suspects.The resulting report, published on the front page of the New York Timesand syndicated in numerous other newspapers, helped convince U.S.of¢cials of the need to act decisively against terrorist fundraising in theUnited States.40

In September 1997, a Mossad hit team failed in its attempt to assassinateKhaled Mashal, a leader of the Islamic Hamas terror group in Jordan.After Jordanian authorities arrested two Mossad agents, Israel had torelease numerous Arab terrorists serving prison sentences to secure theirrelease. The Military Censorship, though able to delay publication of thestory until the exchange was completed, had to allow reporting in Israelof facts that had already become common knowledge abroad. The failedattempt prompted severe criticism in the Israeli media. For perhaps the¢rst time, the Israeli media went on the offensive against the Mossad.Notably, however, most of the criticism was directed at the operationalfailure, not at the need to assassinate Mashal.

This wave of press criticism, and the ensuing resignation of Mossad HeadDani Yatom, was perceived by Mossad leadership as an indication of thethreat to operational capacities presented by adverse media coverage. Thenew Head of Mossad, Efraim Halevy, subsequently reiterated his ¢rmbelief in the need to keep the media totally away from the intelligencesphere, and has instructed the service accordingly.41 Halevy de¢ned

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Mossad’s dif¢culty in operating under conditions of wide media access toplaces and issues it could not cover in the past. Intelligence is a plant thatcan only grow in darkness, he continued, pointing to the need for secrecyto enable operational successes. Despite the progress made in mediaopenness and public accountability, Halevy ¢rmly maintained that ``Ourethos is not to be in contact with the media . . . . Anyone who thinks thatway [that the Mossad should take possible media coverage into accountwhen planning operations] cannot be the Head of the Mossad.’’

UNDERSTANDING INTELLIGENCE^MEDIA INTERACTION

As the media revolution turns the world into a smaller global village, newforms of mass communication such as the Internet are almost impossibleto censor. Intelligence services worldwide are faced with the need to adapttheir media strategies to these advanced technologies. Two models ofmedia strategies examined here have been adopted by intelligence services,models that were shaped by the development of each country’s intelligencecommunity, as well as the level and form of its media freedoms. InGermany, the intelligence services, concerned with an acute lack of publiclegitimacy, developed a defensive media strategy based on close relationswith some media elements. In Israel, the broad range of measures used inthe ¢ght against terrorism created the perception that media coverage ofintelligence issues restricted operational freedom. The resulting strategywas an attempt to exclude the media from the intelligence sphere, anattempt that was only partially successful, as several well-publicizedscandals have illustrated.

In addition to regulating its relations with the media, a structured mediastrategy enables an intelligence service to increase the effectiveness of anylegal instruments it has in its arsenal. The expansion in global masscommunications means that many media corporations are not evenlocated in the countries they cover, and therefore enjoy relative immunityfrom local statutes and regulations. The dif¢culties in regulating globalmedia corporations almost negate national-level legislation, sinceworldwide publication of secrets discovered by these newsgatheringorganizations is easily possible. Intelligence services must thereforeconstantly adapt their media strategies to the newest technological andsociological developments in mass communications.

One way to do so is to concentrate secrecy on a small core of operationalsecrets, giving the media relative freedom to report on wider, moregeneral intelligence-related issues. The declassi¢cation of numerousadministrative, and even ¢nancial, issues would negate their inherentsensationalist value for the media, since the publication of informationalready in the public domain is neither lucrative nor a ``scoop.’’

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Intelligence traditionalists may frown upon the release of any suchinformation, but in reality much of this material has little relevance tooperational capabilities. The services could then concentrate on keepingsecret mainly matters relating to covert collection, capabilities, andsources. The U.S. intelligence community has already made signi¢cantstrides in this direction, but Europe and the rest of the world lag way behind.

Another strategy option might be the splitting up of large intelligenceservices into smaller, highly specialized organizations, which are easier tokeep away from media scrutiny. This trend would be similar todevelopments in the corporate world, where larger traditional corporationsgive way to much smaller ¢rms with narrow, specialized market niches.Smaller services would mean easier information management and tightercontrol over media relations.

Whatever their form, contemporary media strategies must take into accountthat the prime source of information for the media is the human being. Unlikeintelligence services, media organizations rarely engage in SIGINT, andtherefore rely upon people to provide them with information, secret oropen. By restricting controls to what should really remain secret,intelligence services could still maintain a comfortable level of operationalsecrecy in a world that is increasingly saturated by media.

If intelligence of¢cers are made to understand the structure, operation,advantages, and weaknesses of the modern media they could also betterevaluate the importance of the intelligence^media interaction. Whileintelligence has often been described as the second-oldest professionin the world, journalism obviously did not lag much behind. A betterunderstanding of media policies and needs would enable intelligenceservices to develop more effective media strategies for the region, threats,and legal systems in which they operate.

REFERENCES1 The author acknowledges his gratitude to Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, whose

pioneering work on the BND brought to light the extensive media relationsof that service. He also thanks the former Head of the Mossad, Isser Harel,for his encouragement and assistance.

2 Abram Shulsky, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence(Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1993), pp. 92^93.

3 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 256^357.

4 Pat Holt, Secret Intelligence and Public Polity (Washington, DC: CQ Press,1995), pp. 171^188.

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5 The Christian-Democratic Union (CDU) is the main right-of-center politicalparty in Germany. The Christian Social Union (CSU) is its sister party in theFederal State of Bavaria.

6 Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, Undercover (Cologne, Germany: Kiepenhauer &Witsch, 1997) p. 24. Also Der Spiegel, 47/1994, p. 74.

7 Schmidt-Eenboom, p. 10.8 Interview with Rudolf Lambrecht, see Schmidt-Eenboom, p. 125f.9 Schmidt-Eenboom, pp. 244^245.

10 Vereinsregister beim Amtsgericht Koeln VR 6882 and Protokoll derMitgliederversammlung der IADM of 23.3.1979; Schmidt-Eenboom, p. 27f.

11 Author’s interviews with German intelligence of¢cials.12 Jentsch’s book Agenten unter Uns was quoted in Schmidt-Eenboom, p. 274.13 This book was later published in English under its original title, and again in 1972

under the title Network.14 Schmidt-Eenboom, p. 202.15 A former senior German politician, who was a member of the Bundestag Defense

Committee at the time and was closely involved with intelligence matters,con¢rmed this information to the author. See Emde Heiner, Die geheimenNachrichtendienste der BRD (Heidelberg: Decker & Mueller, 1979), p. 16.Also Schmidt-Eenboom, p. 202.

16 The sources are Thomas Walde, ND-Report , 1971, p. 352, and Heinz Felfe, ImDienst der Gegners, 1988, p. 308f. See Schmidt-Eenboom, p. 313.

17 Schmidt-Eenboom, pp. 281^302.18 Albert Charius and Julius Mader, Nicht Laenger Geheim (Berlin, 1978). Also

Stern, 8/1978, p. 17. See Schmidt-Eenboom, p. 299f.19 Nollau was for many years a bitter rival of BND president Gehlen.

Schmidt-Eenboom, p. 300.20 Four years later the journalist apologized to Schmidt-Eenboom for having been

misled. See Schmidt-Eenboom, p. 54.21 Schmidt-Eenboom, p. 57f.22 Author’s interviews with senior intelligence of¢cials.23 The author was able to examine a variety of BND press releases from the years

1996^1998.24 Schmidt-Eenboom, p. 175.25 Heinz Felfe, Im Service des Gegners, 1989, p. 304. See also Schmidt-Eenboom,

p. 251.26 For a discussion on the special legal protections of the media see Heinz Puerer,

Medien in Deutschland (Konstanz, Germany: UVK Medien, 1994), pp. 259^295.27 Schmidt-Eenboom, p. 157.28 While these measures were often frowned upon outside Israel, there did not seem

to be strong opposition within the Israeli public to anti-terrorist assassinations.

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29 The British Mandate authorities established the Military Censorship as a way ofcensoring the Jewish press, which tended to support the Hagana struggleagainst the British. These regulations, known as the Defense (Emergency)Regulations of 1945, were later adopted by the Israeli government.

30 In the 1953 ruling on a petition made by the newspaper Kol Haam, the IsraeliSupreme Court declared that freedom of expression can be restricted onlywhen there is a ``close certainty’’ that security would be harmed bypublication. See Zeev Segal, Freedom of the Press: Between Myth and Reality(Tel-Aviv: Papyrus, 1996), pp. 70^75.

31 Isser Harel, Security and Democracy (Tel-Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1989), p. 110.32 Carmi Gilon, Shabak Between The Lines (Tel-Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2000),

p. 176.33 For the Rimon affair see Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, The Imperfect Spies

(London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1989), pp. 90^91.34 For the internal repercussions of the ``Bus 300’’ affair on the Shabak, see Yaacov

Perry, Strike First (Tel-Aviv: Keshet, 1999), pp. 127^137.35 For the Eichmann kidnapping see Isser Harel, The House on Garibaldi Street

(London: Frank Cass, 1997).36 Gad Shimron, The Mossad and the Myth (Tel-Aviv: Keter, 1996), p. 101.37 Gordon Thomas, Gideon’s Spies (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 101.38 For details see Ian Black and Benny Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars (London:

Hamish Hamilton, 1991), pp. 275^277.39 Perhaps the most detailed of these books, if somewhat colorful, is George Jonas,

Vengeance (London: William Collins, 1984). See also David Tinnin, Hit Team(London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1976).

40 Yaacov Perry, op. cit., pp. 172^173.41 Halevy was interviewed by Uri Neeman and Aharon Klein for the CSS News

bulletin, April 1999, pp. 5^6. He clearly stated that in the Mossad ``there is asweeping decision not to talk to the media.’’

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