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The Moderate Muslim BrotherhoodAuthor(s): Robert S. Leiken and Steven BrookeReviewed work(s):Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 2007), pp. 107-121Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20032287 .
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The Moderate
Muslim B rotherhood
Robert S.Leiken and SterenBrooke
FRIEND OR FOE?
THEMUSLIMBROTH RHOODs theworld'soldest, argest,ndmost
influential Islamist organization. It is also the most controversial,
condemned by both conventional opinion in theWest and radical
opinion in theMiddle East. American commentators have called the
Muslim Brothers "radical slamists"and "a italcomponent ofthe enemy's
assault force ...deeply hostile to theUnited States."Al Qaeda'sAyman
al-Zawahiri sneers at them for "lur[ing] thousands of youngMuslim
men into lines for elections ... insteadof into the lines ofjihad."
Jihadists loathe theMuslim Brotherhood (known inArabic as
al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) for rejecting global jihad and embracing
democracy.These positions seem tomake themmoderates, the very
thing theUnited States, short on allies in theMuslim world, seeks.
But the Ikhwan lsoassails .S. foreign olicy, speciallyashington'ssupport for Israel,and questions linger about its actual commitment to
thedemocratic rocess.Over the past year,we havemet with dozens of Brotherhood lead
ers and activists fromEgypt, France, Jordan, Spain, Syria,Tunisia, and
theUnited Kingdom. In long and sometimes heated discussions, we
explored theBrotherhood's stance on democracy and jihad, Israel and
Iraq, the United States, and what sort of society the group seeks to
ROBERT S. LEIKEN isDirector of the Immigration and National
Security Programs at theNixon Center and the author of the forthcoming
Europe'sAngry Muslims. STEVEN BROOKE is aResearch Associate at
the Nixon Center.
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Robert S. Leiken and StevenBrooke
create. he Brotherhood s a collection f national roups ith differingoutlooks, and the various factions disagree about how best to advance
itsmission. But all reject global jihad while embracing elections and
other features of democracy. There is also a current within the
Brotherhood willing to engage with the United States. In the past
several decades, this current-along with the realities of practical
politics-has pushedmuch of theBrotherhoodtowardmoderation.
U.S. policymaking has been handicapped byWashington's tendency
to see theMuslim Brotherhood-and the Islamist movement as a
whole-as amonolith. Policymakers should instead analyze each
national and local group independently and seek out those that are open
to engagement. In the anxious and often fruitless search forMuslim
moderates, olicymakershould ecognizehat heMuslimBrotherhoodpresentsa notableopportunity.
BIG BROTHERS
SINCEITS ounding nEgypt in 1928, heMuslim Brotherhoodhas
sought to fuse religious revivalwith anti-imperialism-resistance to
foreign domination through the exaltation of Islam. At its begin
ning, theBrotherhooddiffered romearlierreformersy combininga profoundly Islamic ideology with modern grass-roots political
activism.The Brotherhood pursued an Islamic society through tarbiyya
(preaching and educating), concentrating firston changing theoutlook
of individuals,then families,and finally societies.Although theBrother
hood's origins were lower-middle class, it soon pushed Islamization
into the local bourgeoisie and then clear to the palace. At the sametime, it formed the armed Special Apparatus, replicating Young
Egypt's Greenshirts, theWafd's Blueshirts, nascent Nazi Brown
shirts, and other paramilitary organizations that were rife in the
Middle East at the time.
In 1948,with civil strife looming, the Egyptian government dis
solved the Brotherhood. Later that year, a number of Brothers were
implicated in the murder of the prime minister. Despite his public
denunciation of the assassins, Hasan al-Banna, the Brotherhood'sfounder, was soon assassinated aswell-leaving the factionalized
Brothers squabbling over a successor.
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AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS
VotersfromheMuslimBrotherhoodprayingutsidepollingstation,
ElMansura,Egypt,Decemberl, 005
In a gesture of conciliation to the palace (and also to prevent a
singlefaction romdominating), heBrotherhoodchoseanoutsider,therespectedudgeHasan al-Hudaybi, osucceed anna as its leader.
Hudaybi's selection coincidedwith themilitary coup that toppledtheEgyptianmonarchy. he FreeOfficersMovement, ledbyColonel
Gamal Abdel Nasser and his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, had
worked closelywith theMuslim Brothers,who were attractedby
the soldiers'nationaliststance and Islamicrhetoric.But the FreeOfficers'promise to Islamize the new constitution soon provedillusory. n embitteredmemberof theBrotherhood'sparamilitarySpecialApparatus mptiedapistolatNasserduringaspeech, rompting the new regime to herd into Nasser's squalid jails much of the
organization,ewmembers fwhich hadany nklingfthe hair-brainedassassination dventure. asser, uninjured ndunfazed,emergedasa stoichero,theBrotherhood'sotorious pecial pparatusas thegang
thatcouldnot shootstraight.In prison, the guards applied the kind of torture thatwould
make Arab nationalism infamous, inEgypt aswell as in Iraq and
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Robert S. Leiken and StevenBrooke
Syria.The Brothers'wounds throbbed ith fatefulquestions:Howcould those who stood shoulder to shoulder with us against the
British and the king now set their dogs on us? Can those tormenting
devoutMuslims reallybeMuslims themselves?SayyidQutb, thenthe Ikhwan's ost profoundthinker, roducedan answer hatwouldecho into the twenty-first century: these were the acts of apostates,
kafireen. ccordingly,the torturers nd theirregimewere legitimatetargets of jihad.
But fromhis own cell,Hudaybi disputedQutb's conclusion.Only
God, he believed, could judge faith. He rejected takfir (the act of
declaring another Muslim an apostate), arguing that "whoever
judges that someone is no longer aMuslim ... deviates from Islam
and transgressesod'swill by judginganotherperson's aith." ithintheBrotherhood,Hudaybi's tolerantview-in linewith Banna's
founding ision-prevailed,cementing hegroup's oderatevocation.But it appalled the takfiris,who streamed out of the Brotherhood.
Qutb, who breathed his last on Nasser's gallows in 1966,went on to
become the prophet and martyr of jihad. "Qutb has influenced all
those interested in jihad throughout the Islamicworld," said a founding
member of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, an erstwhile jihadist group known
for its vicious campaign against foreign tourists in Egypt during
the 1980s. "The Brothers," he continued sadly, "have abandoned the
ideas of Sayyid Qutb."
The Ikhwan followed the path of toleration and eventually came
to find democracy compatible with its notion of slow Islamization.
An Islamic society, the ideagoes, will naturally desire Islamic leaders
and support them at the ballot box. The Ikhwan also repeatedlyjustified democracy on Islamic grounds by certifying that "the umma
[theMuslim community] is the source of sulta [political authority]."
In pursuit of popular authority, theBrotherhood has formed electoral
allianceswith secularists, nationalists, and liberals.
Having lost the internal struggle for theBrotherhood, the radicals
regrouped outside it, in sects that sought to topple regimes through
out theMuslim world. (Groups such as al Jihadwould furnish the
Egyptian core of alQaeda.) These jihadists view theBrotherhood'sembraceof democracy asblasphemy. Channeling Qutb, they argue that
any government not ruling solely by sharia is apostate; democracy
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TheModerateMuslimBrotherhood
is not just amistaken tactic but also an unforgivable sin, because it
gives humans sovereignty overAllah. Osama bin Laden's lieutenant,
Zawahiri, calls it"the deification of thepeople."Abu Hamza al-Masri,
the one-eyed radicalclericwho presidedoverLondon'snotoriousFinsbury Parkmosque, considers democracy "the call of self-divinity
loud and clear, inwhich the rights of one group of people, who have
put their idea to vote, have put their ideas and their decisions over
the decisions of Allah." Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (whom a recent
West Point study found to be the most influential living jihadist
thinker) nveighs,"Democracysobviouspolytheismand thusjustthe kind of infidelity that Allah warns against, inHis Book."
Many analysts,meanwhile,sensiblyquestionwhether theBrotherhood's adherence to democracy ismerely tactical and transitory
anopportunistic commitment to, in the historian Bernard Lewis'words,
one man, one vote, one time." Behind thatwarning is an extensive
history of similar cadre organizations that promised democracy and
then recanted once in power: the Bolsheviks, theNazis, the Baath
Party in Iraq and Syria, even the Nasserists. There is slim evidence
that the Brotherhood has pondered what itwould do with power.
Although it has been prodded by the electoral process to define its
slogan-"Islam Is the Solution"-Islamistgovernmental lueprintsare scarce, even ones as sketchy as Lenin's State and Revolution or
Marx's Critique of theGotha Program.
But in at least one respect, the Brotherhood differs from those
admonitory precedents: its road to power is not revolutionary; it
depends onwinning hearts through gradual and peaceful Islamization.
Under this Fabian strategy, the Brotherhood seeks a compact with
the powers that be-offering a channel for discontent while slowly
expanding its influence. As one seniormember told us, "Itwould be
unjust if theBrotherhood were to come topower before amajority of
the society isprepared to support them."Another Ikhwan leader told
us that if theBrotherhood should rule unwisely and then face elec
toral defeat, "wewill have failed the people and the new party will
have the right to come to power.We will not take away anyone's
rights."nd inextensive onversationsith theMuslim Brotherhood'sdisparate allies throughout theMiddle East,we heardmany expressions
of confidence hatitwould honordemocratic rocesses.
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INTERNAL DEBATES
MIDDLEEASTERNails,petrodollars,eopoliticalrivalries,nd the
"Muslim Awakening" have given rise to a highly variegated Islamist
movement.Unfortunately, uanceis lostinmuch of currentWestern
discourse.Herding thesedifferentbeasts into a single conceptual
corral labeled "Salafi"or "Wahhabi" ignores the differences and fault
lines between them-and has thwarted strategic thinking as a result.
When we askedMuslim Brothers in theMiddle East and Europe
whether theyconsidered hemselvesSalafists(as theyare frequently
identified), heyusuallymet ourquestionwith aClintonianresponse:"That depends onwhat your definition of Salafist is."If by Salafismwe
meant themodernist, renaissance Islam ofJamal ad-Din al-Afghani
andMuhammadAbduh (turn-of-the-twentieth-centuryeformers
who influencedBanna), thenyes, theywere Salafists.Yet theubiquitous
Web sitewww.salafipublications.com, which is run by Salafists who
believe that religion should nevermix with politics and that existing
rulers houldbe supported lmostunconditionally, ttacksAfghani
andAbduh forbeing "faraway from the Salafi aqidah [creed]." (This
is the view, for obvious reasons, of the Saudi religious establishment.)
Such "pietists,"most ofwhom were trained inofficial Saudi institutions,
argue that the Brotherhood's participation in politics has converted
them nto he"Bankruptrotherhood."ccording oone,"TheMuslim
Brothers have political goals and strategies,which induce them tomake
concessions to theWest. For us, theSalafists, thegoal ispurely religious."
Other critics speculate that the Brotherhood helps radicalize
Muslims inboth theMiddle East and Europe. But in fact, it appears
that the Ikhwan works to dissuade Muslims from violence, instead
channeling them into politics and charitable activities. As a senior
member of the Egyptian Brotherhood's Guidance Council told us
inCairo, "If itwasn't for theBrotherhood, most of the youths of this
erawould have chosen the path of violence. The Ikhwan has become
a safetyvalve formoderate Islam."The leaderof theJordanian Islamic
Action Front, theMuslim Brotherhood's political party in Jordan,
said that his group outdoes the government in discouraging jihad:
"We'rebetter able to conduct an intellectual confrontation, and not
a security confrontation,with the forcesof extremism and fanaticism."
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In London, Brotherhood leaders contrasted their approach to that
of radical groups, such asHizb ut-Tahrir (HT), that "seek to bring
society to aboiling point."The Brotherhood claims success at sifting radicalism out of its
ranks hrough rganizationalisciplineandapainstaking ducationalprogram. OneMuslim Brothernoted that the organization'sotto
could be "Listen andObey.") If aMuslim Brother wishes to commit
violence, he generally leaves the organization to do so.That said, a
numberof militants have passed through heBrotherhood since itsinception, nd thepath from heBrotherhood
to jihad is not buried in sand. Defectionshavehistorically ccurred hen theorganization has faced a conjunction of internal
and external pressures, aswhen the takfirielement merged nderrepressionoproduce
theEgyptian ihadist ovement.Today, owever,Brotherswho leave the organizationaremore likely to join themoderate center
rather than to take up jihad. In themid-9ggos, internal dissent overregistering as a political party occurred in the context of agovernment
crackdown against a jihadist assault. These pressures resulted in
an exodus of Brothers, many of whom formed the core of the liberal
Islamistwasatiyyamovement, including hemoderateHizb al-Wasat(CenterParty).
One issue of enduring concern isQutb's ambiguous legacy in the
Brotherhood. Critiquing "themartyr," asQutb isknown, requires a
surgeon's touch: he died in the service of the organization yet hadstrayed far from the founder's vision. Even Hudaybi's Preachers,Not
Judges,an indirect but clear refutation ofQutb, never mentions him.
Today, the Brotherhood lionizes Qutb, admittedly amajor figure
whose views cannot be reduced to jihad. But it straddles a barbed
fence in embracing Qutb while simultaneously arguing that his violent
teachings were "taken out of context."What lessons will younger
members tempted to radical action draw?
While jihadistshave been sortingout the finerpoints of internationalslaughter, the Ikhwan has hunkered down topursue national goals. In
theNovember 005 egislativelectionsnEgypt,independentandidates
FOREIGN AFFAIRS March/April2007 [113]
The Brotherhood
seems to dissuade
Muslims fromviolence,
channelingthem into
politics and charity.
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Robert S.Leiken and Steven Brooke
affiliated ith theIkhwan, hich isofficially annedbut still tolerated,won a surprising 0 percentof the assembly-especially impressive
consideringidespread overnmentraud ndvoter intimidation.n thenew parliament,heBrotherhood as coordinatedts legislativeffortsby forming n internal xperts ommittee, icknamed theparliamen
tarykitchen," hatgroupsBrotherhoodcandidates ccording o their
specialties. nstead f pursuinga divisivereligious r cultural genda,theBrotherhood aspushed ormore affordableousing,criticized hegovernment's handling of the avian flu threat, and demanded account
ability for the recent series of bus, train, and ferry disasters.
These electoraladvancesandmoderate, practicalcriticismshavemade for an increasingly tense relationshipwith the Egyptian govern
ment. The Ikhwan's electoral gains were followed, inMay 2006, by
theirsupport orjudicialreformand independence.residentHosniMubarak's suspected preparations for handing over power to his son
Gamal have led to further crackdowns on the opposition.
Suchpressurexacerbatesifferences etweenvarious endenciesn
theEgyptianBrotherhood. incethe1980S, iddle-classprofessionals
have pushed it in amore transparent and flexible direction.Workingwithin laborunions andprofessional rganizations, hesereformershave learned to forge coalitions with and provide services to their
constituents. A leader of the reformist faction told us, "Reform will
only happen if Islamistswork with other forces, including secularistsand
liberals."This current finds a comfortable home within theEgyptian
umbrellamovementKifaya(Enough ), hich embraces heBrotherhood along with allmanner of secularists, liberals, nationalists, and
leftists. Kifaya was born in fervent opposition to thewar in Iraqand now forms thebattered core of Egyptian democratic opposition.
(It is ironic that awar waged in the name of promoting democracy
has midwifed a democratic front inEgypt that is at odds with the
United States and itswar.)
The Brotherhood's eformist ing contendswith conservativesn
high positions in the organization who bear the scars of repression
and secrecy.The sharpest divisions have occurred over the issue of
forming a political party, a key plank of the reformist agenda. Doingso, reformists argue,would serve the broader goals of the organi
zation by giving the Brotherhood a platform to spread itsmessage
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to an otherwise unavailable audience. The conservatives argue that a
party should be an annex to themovement, devoted solely to politics.
Meanwhile, the Brotherhoood'ssocialmovementwould performtasks outside of politics, such as charity, education, and health.
BROTHERLY LOVE OR SIBLING RIVALRY?
ALTHOUGH THE Egyptian branch remains the most influential
Brotherhood group, offshoots have prospered throughout theMiddle East and Europe. But there is no Islamist "Comintern."
The Brotherhood's dreaded International Organization is in fact a
loose and feeble coalition scarcely able to convene its own members.
Indeed, the Brotherhood's international debility is a product of its
local successes: national autonomy and adjustability to domestic
conditions.The ideologicalaffiliations hatlinkBrotherhoodorganizations internationally are subject to the national priorities that
shapeeach individually.Suppressed throughout much of theMiddle East, the Brother
hood spread across theArab world and, via students and exiles, to
Europe. In the early 198os, theEgyptian Ikhwan sought to establish
coordinationamong dozens of nationaloffspring.But oppositionwas universal. Right next door, the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood
powerhouse Hasan al-Turabi protested, "Youcannot run theworld
from Cairo." When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Kuwaiti
Muslim Brothersobjectedto theacquiescence f theInternationalOrganization andwithdrew, takingwith them their plump wallets.
The U.S.-installed government in Iraq is another apple of discord.
While Muslim Brothers throughout theMiddle East and Europe
inveighed against the "puppet" Iraqi government, the Iraqi branch
of theMuslim Brotherhood satprominently in the IraqiParliament.
More recently, the alliance between the Syrian Muslim Brother
hood and Abdel Halim Khaddam, the dissident former Syrian
vice president, has beenwidely offensive to other Brotherhoodbranches. The war inLebanon last summer sharpened that divide,
as theSyrianBrothers leaped todenounce President Bashar al-Assad's
meddling in Lebanon, while the rest of the Brotherhood rallied
behindHezbollah.
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The national branches also have divergent views ofthe United States.
In Egypt and Jordan, even as it has considered a partnership with
Washington against"autocracynd terrorism,"heBrotherhood, rivenpartlyby electoral oncerns,has harshlycriticizedtheUnited States.The Syrian rotherhood, eanwhile,keenly upports heBush administration'sfforts o isolate heAssad regime; hekindof inflammatory
anti-U.S. statements typical inJordan and Egypt are rare in Syria.
Even on the central issue of Israel, each national organization calls
itsown tune.EveryMuslim Brotherhood eader ith whom we spokeclaimed a willingness to follow suit shouldHamas-the Palestinian
offshootof theBrotherhood-recognizetheJewishstate.Such earnestprofessions may be grounded in the confident assumption of Hamas
recalcitrance,but that position nonetheless stands in sharp relief to that
ofmost jihadists.As Zawahiri expresses the jihadist view, "No one has
the right,whether Palestinian or not, to abandon a grain of soil from
Palestine,which was aMuslim land,which was occupied by infidels."
The Brotherhood does authorize jihad in countries and territories
occupied by a foreign power. Like inAfghanistan under the Soviets,
the Ikhwan views the struggles in Iraqand against Israel as "defensive
jihad" against invaders, theMuslim functional equivalent of the
Christian doctrine of "justwar."However, the Brotherhood's failure
to stress the religious dimension incenses the jihadists,who mock the
Brotherhood (including Hamas) for conducting jihad "for the sakeof
territory" rather than for the sake of Allah. Compare the statement
from the Brotherhood's Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who argues that "the
enmity between us and theJews is for the sakeof land only,"with this
one from Zawahiri: "God, glory to him, made the religion the cause
of enmity and the cause of our fight."
Muslim Brothers expressly deny theirorganization is anti-Semitic.
The currentEgyptian general guide,Muhammad Mahdi Akef, argues
that there is no conflict between theMuslim Brotherhood and the
Jews, only between theMuslim Brotherhood and theZionists (who,
Akef told us, "arenot Jews").Despite these denials,Brotherhood litera
turehas expressed hatred for allJews, not just "Zionists."The October
1980children'ssupplement to theBrotherhood newspaperA/Dawa, for
example,was designed to instructyoung children on "the enemies of
your religion":"Such are the Jews,my brother,Muslim lion cub, your
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enemies and the enemies of God. ...Muslim' lion cub, annihilate their
existence."But in a recent sermon at aSomalimosque inNorth London,
Kamal El Helbawi-reportedly themost influentialMuslim Brother in
theUnited Kingdom-declared that tobe agoodMuslim, faithwas not
enough.After faith therewas neighborliness, andHelbawi relateda story:
"Thewell-known scholarAbdullah Ibn al-Mubarak had aJewish neigh
bor.The Jewwanted to sellhis house. The buyers asked him the price,
and he said, 'Two thousand.'They said tohim, 'Butyour house isonly
worth one thousand.'He said, 'Yes, ut Iwant one thousand formy house
and another one thousand because of the good neighbourwhom I am
going to leave behind."' After the service,we asked Helbawi whether
recent ewsaccounts fMuslim anti-Semitismn theEnglishMidlands
inspiredhis sermon,which publicly laudedaJew fordisplaying a sacred
Islamic irtue."Precisely,"e replied.Islamists avebeen accused f usingdeceptive"double iscourse":
good moderate cop inEnglish, bad fumndamentalistop inArabic. A
recent article in the journal Current Trends in Islamist Ideology found
worryingdiscrepanciesetween heEnglishandArabicversions f cer
tainarticleson the officialMuslim BrotherhoodWeb site.But Helbawi's
sermonwas deliveredexclusively inEnglish,with no restatement inAra
bic. This public, on-the-record displaywas farmore persuasive than the
usualBrotherhood pinseparatingnti-Zionism romanti-Semitism.
BROTHERS ABROAD
INEUROPE, rotherhood-led roupsrepresent inorities in secular,
democraticountries,ndtheyunderstandhat heywill emain inorities for the foreseeable future.None actively pursues the objective of
converting itscompatriots to Islam. Instead, the emphasis fallson the
rights f religiousminorities.(Ironically,heEuropeanBrotherhoodinspired organizations take full advantage of Europe's extreme official
religious olerance,nspired y theexperience fNazi anti-Semitism.)One example of the Brotherhood's European approach came after
aDanish newspaper printed cartoons satirizing theProphetMuhammad
last year.Although its transnational networks helped spread theword about thecartoons, allbranches officiallycalled forpeaceful protest.
The Federation of Islamic Organizations inEurope, a grouping of the
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Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke
most importantEuropeanBrotherhood-ledbodies, condemnedtheEuropean papers that printed the cartoons but hardly in stinging
terms.Although itcriticizedthe cartoons or"hurt[ing] he feelingsofMuslims," itdevoted more space to calling for increasedcooperation
betweenMuslims andnon-Muslims.The jihadists, n contrast,wereoffering loodmoney for theheadsof thecartoonists ndcoordinating"embassy urningdays."
In France, the sheer number of Muslims, alarming press and
government reports about the Islamization of schools, radical "garage
mosques,"clamorousMuslim protestsagainstIsrael,desecrations fJewish graveyards, attacks on uncovered women, and several foiled
terroristplots have created the general impression, inside and outside
the country, of a powerful rising Islamism. That iswhy a number of
Frenchandoverseasobserversrushedto labelthe stone-throwing,car-burning riots of 2005 in the largelyMuslim slums "the French
intifada."But in threeand ahalfweeks of riots, Islamism failed tomake
itspresence felt, still less to establish sharia in some obscure precinct,
as reported by overwrought observers. "Islamic radicals played no
role in the triggering or spreadof the violence," according toFrance's
domestic intelligence service, Renseignements Generaux. "On the
contrary, they had every interest in a rapid return to calm in order to
avoid being accused of anything."The chief of theParis branch of the
Renseignements Generaux told us that of the 3,ooo rioters arrested
inParis last fall, therewas "notone known asbelonging to an Islamist
crowd, andwe monitor them quite closely."
In fact,when the Islamistsemerged, itwas to try to calm the autumn
rioters,who often greeted thesemissionaries with hails of stones.TheBrotherhood-linked organizationUnion des Organisations Islamiques
de France (UOIF)repudiated the riots in a fatwa.That fatwawas the
culmination of aUOIFstrategy, forged 15years earlier, to be perceived
as a reliable partner of the French government. The highest-ranking
permanent official of the domestic surveillance agency told us that
the UOIF"needs" them, presumably to certify that the organization
poses no danger.
Similarly,when French authorities banned thewearing of the hijab(or foulard), the position of the UOIFwas accommodation. The UOIF'S
cautious stance on the lawdisappointed other European branches of the
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Brotherhood. hey wished theirFrenchcounterpart ould bemoreaggressive and feared theFrenchwere setting aprecedent of quiescence
forother European Islamist groups of amore separatistpersuasion.As partof theircollaborationist,ow-profile trategy, heUOIFas
alsomaintained a prudent distance from such lightning rods as the
Ikhwan igureQaradawi,notorious ntheWest forjustifying ihadinIsrael and Iraq.Qaradawi has gone notably uninvited to recent UOIF
annual congresses. (Formany Islamists, Qaradawi isno radical; as far
as the jihadist ideologue Abu Basir al-Tartusi isconcerned, Qaradawi
deserves xcommunicationorhis "moderation.")
The UOIFewspaperA/Ittihadevenreats hePalestinian uestioncautiously,supportingonly charitabledonations to refugees andpresenting hePalestinians svictimsratherthanwarriors. he UOIFoesnotparticipateinpro-Palestinianemonstrationsnd steersclearof the chargedArab-Israeli dispute.It did not take part in the 2003 national dem
onstration against thewar in Iraq,nor in the
massive marches in the springof 2006.The organization's bsence fromboth theriots and themarches, in theEuropean country with themost Mus
lims, ought to soothe fears of an Islamist takeover of Europe.
The UOIF'Siscretiondifferssharply rom itsBritishcounterpart,theMuslimAssociationofBritain(MAB),hichwarmlywelcomesthelikesof Qaradawi. Although a quarter the size of theFrenchMuslim
population, theUnited Kingdom'sMuslim population ismore
angry and assertive, and farmore prone to terrorism.The UOIF iSmore influential than theMAB,but the smallerMABsplashes in amuch
stormier sea.When theMuslim Brothers formed theMAB in 1997, it
was but one of many Muslim organizations in the United King
dom.Many were radical, rejecting themild, ifmore frundamentalist,
Deobandi andBarelwi traditions of theirparents.Already in the field
for ageneration was theU.K. IslamicMission, an offshoot of the
Pakistani slamistmovement foundedbyAbulAlaMaududi.While
theUOIF'SoiceboomedinthesmallroomofFrenchMuslim activists,the MAB'Swas a small voice trying to be heard in a vast auditorium
inwhich the young were already pitching rotten eggs at their elders.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS March/April2007 [119]
Policymakersmust
learntodifferentiate the
Muslim Brotherhood
fromradicalIslam.
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Robert S.Leiken and Steven Brooke
As theMAB rew inprominence, tbegantoworkwith theBritish
government.his cooperation asbeen notableatLondon'sFinsbury
Parkmosque.Thatmosque gained notorietythanksto its infamouserstwhile reacher.espiteMasri'sarrestndexpulsionrom hemosque,
his followerseturnedndquickly egainedontrol. he police,hesitant
to intervene irectlyin a houseof worship,offeredtheMAB ontrol
of themosque in exchange for ridding it of radicals.The MAB gained
amajority on themosque board and gathered to retake the building.
AlthoughMasri'smen triedtostormthemosque, theassembledMAB
supporters routed them. Since then, Scotland Yard tells us that their
"reliable nd effectivepartners" ave even "deradicalized"omeofMasri's formerfollowers.
Open cooperation with the authorities has put the MAB at odds
with radical groups such as HT. The contest between the MAB and
HTroughly ollowsethnic andgenerational ines: oungMuslims of
Pakistani descent areheavily represented inHT,whereas the older and
fewerMuslims ofArab descent join theMAB. formerHTmember
told us that his group "dominates the British scene."He estimated
that HT had some 8,500 members in the United Kingdom; theMAB
could boast only i,ooo. The formally nonviolent HT itself is a full step
away from the subjects of theBritish internal security chief's recent
assessmentof jihadistactivity:"Some200 groupingsor networks,
totaling over 1,6oo identified individuals (and therewill bemany we
don't know) who are actively engaged in plotting, or facilitating,
terrorist acts here and overseas." In light of these numbers, nowonder
MABofficials told us that their group was "adecade behind," and not
gaining ground against, radical groups in theUnited Kingdom.
DIVIDE AND ENGAGE
BORN AS an anti-imperialist asmuch as an Islamic revivalistmove
ment, the Brotherhood, like theUnited States, will follow its own
star.If individualbranches resist the intercessionoffellow organizations,
how much less likely is it that theywill embrace U.S. tutelage?But
cooperation in specific areas ofmutual interest-such as oppositionto alQaeda, the encouragement of democracy, and resistance to
expanding Iranian influence-could well be feasible.
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TheModerateMuslim Brotherhood
One place to startwould bewith representativesofthe Brotherhood's
reformist wing, especially those already living in theWest. The
United States lost an opportunity tohear from one of these reformers
last October when Helbawi-the imamwhom we heard deliver a
sermon extolling aJew--was forcedoff a flight en route to a conference
at New York University. This treatment of a figure known for his
brave stand against radicalIslam and for his public advocacyof dialogue
with theUnited States constitutes yet another bewildering act by the
Departmentof Homeland Security, hich providedno explanation.This London-based admirerof Shakespeare and theBrontes appears
tobe exactly hesortof interlocutorho couldhelpbridge ivilizations.Instead, his public humiliation was a gift for the radicals, a bracing
serving of"we told you so"on the subjectof engaging Americans.
U.S. policy toward heBrotherhoodiscontestedbetween thosewho view theBrotherhood and its affiliates as a vital component of
the global jihadistnetwork and thosewho argue that theBrotherhood's
popular support in keyMuslim countries andmoderating potential
require some degree of engagement. The formerview seems ascendant
and explains an increase inU.S. efforts to isolate theBrotherhood
such aspreventingHelbawi and other reformistmembers of theBroth
erhoodrom ntering heUnited Statesorprohibiting.S. governmentpersonnel romengagingwith theBrotherhood.
But if theUnited States is to cope with theMuslim revivalwhile
advancing key national interests,policymakersmust recognize its almost
infinitevariety of political (and apolitical) orientations.When itcomes
to theMuslim Brotherhood, thebeginning ofwisdom lies indifferenti
ating it from radical Islam and recognizing the significant differencesbetweennationalBrotherhoodorganizations.hat diversity uggests
Washington should adopt a case-by-case approach, letting the situation
in each individual country determine when talking with-or even
working with-the Brotherhood is feasible and appropriate. In the
United States'often futilesearch or"moderate uslims"with activecommunity support-and at amoment when, isolated and suspect,
Washington should be taking stock of its interests and capabilities in
theMuslim world-a conversation ith theMuslim Brotherhoodmakes strongstrategic ense.@
FORE IGN AFFAI RS March/April 2007 [121]