The moral self: A review and integration ofthe literature
PETER L. JENNINGS1*,†, MARIE S. MITCHELL2† AND SEAN T. HANNAH3
1Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, California, U.S.A.2Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, U.S.A.3School of Business, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, U.S.A.
Summary The role of the self in moral functioning has gained considerable theoretical and empirical attention over thelast 25 years. A general consensus has emerged that the self plays a vital role in individuals’ moral agency.This surge of research produced a proliferation of constructs related to the moral self, each grounded indiverse theoretical perspectives. Although this work has advanced our understanding of moral thought andbehavior, there has also been a lack of clarity as to the nature and functioning of the moral self. We reviewand synthesize empirical research related to the moral self and provide an integrative framework to increaseconceptual coherence among the various relevant constructs. We then discuss emerging opportunities andfuture directions for research on the moral self as well as implications for behavioral ethics in organizationalcontexts. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Keywords: moral self; moral identity centrality; moral judgment disposition; self-conscious moralorientation; self-conscious moral emotions; moral strength; moral functioning
The corruption and scandals that have plagued organizations in recent years have prompted significant interest in thestudy of ethical work behavior. Accounting for human moral functioning and behavior, however, has proven to be acomplex and difficult problem. Initial research relied heavily on Kohlberg’s (1969) cognitive moral developmenttheory, which emphasizes the importance of moral reasoning to explain ethical behavior. Indeed, research has shownthat cognitive moral development predicts moral behavior (see Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006 for a review) butthat the strength of these effects varies considerably and is modest at best (Blasi, 1980). This weak and inconsistentrelationship between moral judgment and moral behavior is known as the “judgment–action gap” (Walker, 2004, p. 1).This judgment–action gap motivated the search for more comprehensive theoretical frameworks in which moral psy-chologists (e.g., Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004) and, recently, organizational behavior ethics researchers (e.g., Treviñoet al., 2006), have focused on the moral self as the key to explaining the complexity of human moral functioning.We propose that a deeper understanding of what constitutes the moral self, and its development is essential to advancingresearch on ethical behavior in morally complex and challenging organizational contexts.Scholarly interest in the moral self traces back to Aristotle who expounded a holistic concept of the moral self
grounded in character and virtue (Solomon, 1992). Yet, it was only after Blasi (1983) introduced his “self model”of moral functioning that the topic gained momentum. Blasi sought to bridge the judgment–action gap by proposingthat moral action results from the integration of morality into one’s sense of self (e.g., Erikson, 1964). A person has amoral self to the extent that moral notions (e.g., moral values, ideals, goals, and concerns) are central to self-understanding (Blasi, 1993), which motivates felt responsibility to behave consistent with those notions. Blasi’smodel has proven to be foundational for moral self theory and launched the post-Kohlbergian era of scholarlywork (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005). A surge of research followed (e.g., Aquino & Reed,2002; Haidt, 2001; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). However, this work is not integrated into a holistic framework,
*Correspondence to: Peter L. Jennings, Leavy School of Business, Department of Management, Santa Clara University, 500 El Camino Real,Santa Clara, CA 95053, U.S.A. E-mail: [email protected]†Note that these authors are listed alphabetically and contributed equally.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Received 02 May 2012
Revised 10 December 2013, Accepted 10 December 2013
Journal of Organizational Behavior, J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/job.1919
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which has created ambiguity about the nature of the moral self. Reviews (Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Narvaez &Lapsley, 2009; Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008) and edited books (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Narvaez &Lapsley, 2009) have consolidated some aspects of this literature, but a review surveying empirical researchand its significance to ethical behavior in organizations is lacking.Our review seeks to bring clarity to the state of knowledge about the moral self and provide directions for future
research. We begin with an overview of the theory of the moral self and review empirical work that has explicitlyexamined the moral self as a focal construct. Our goals are to capture the main empirical findings associated withthe moral self that are relevant to organizations and synthesize these findings into an integrative framework. We alsodiscuss emerging opportunities and future research directions, with an emphasis on the implications for the nature ofthe moral self and its functioning in organizational contexts.
Theory of the Moral Self
Moral self research is based on the Aristotelian premise that morality is a characteristic of a person and not simply aresult of abstract moral reasoning (Blasi, 1993; Solomon, 1992). Morality is understood to be at the heart of what itmeans to be a person (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009). The moral self is concerned with the morality of selfhood (thequalities by virtue of which a person is oneself) that implicates both who a person is (a person’s sense of self andidentity based on deeply felt concerns, commitments, and attachments) and how a person acts (a person’s character-istic ways of thinking, feeling, and regulating behavior; Baumeister, 1987; Solomon, 1992). These ideas follow anontological tradition in moral philosophy and psychology, which posit that the self involves both a private dimen-sion rooted in the core of one’s being and a public dimension manifested in an orientation to be true to oneself inaction (Erikson, 1964; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; James, 1892/2001; Schlenker, 1980; Solomon, 1992).Thus, moral self research has focused on explaining (i) how morality is internalized into a person’s sense of self,which we refer to as the “having” side of the moral self, and (ii) how that internalized morality influences cognitiveand affective self-regulatory capacities that govern decisions and behavior, which we refer to as the “doing” side ofthe moral self.The “having” side of the moral self is cognitively and socially constructed (Bandura, 1991; Harter, 1999). Social
construction occurs through roles, practices, and interpersonal interactions within the social-moral context in whicha person is embedded, such as family, community, or organization (Harter, 1999; Hunter, 2000). Cognitive construc-tion occurs through individuals’ beliefs about their self (i.e., self-concepts and identities) on the basis of socialinteractions that bring meaning to their experiences (Harter, 1999). When these socially and cognitively constructedbeliefs are based on morality, a person is understood as “having” a moral self.The “doing” side of the moral self emerges when these moral beliefs invoke self-relevant cognitions, evaluations,
emotions, and regulatory processes that motivate moral action (Aquino & Freeman, 2009). The “doing” side under-scores the executive agency of the self to take responsibility, make decisions, initiate actions, and exert control overitself and the environment (Baumeister, 1998). Without this executive function, the moral self would be a “merehelpless spectator of events, of minimal use or importance” (Baumeister, 1998, p. 680). Cognitive and affectiveself-regulatory capacities are essential to agency, governing nearly all the self’s activities, especially thoseconcerning morality (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Higgins, 1996). As such,the “doing” side of the moral self has been described as a self-regulatory mechanism that motivates moral action(e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984; Erikson, 1964; Hart, Atkins, & Ford, 1998).In sum, this “having” and “doing” conceptualization of the moral self implies that the moral self is not a stand-
alone construct or variable but is a complex amalgam of moral constructs and processes, wherein self-defining moralbeliefs, orientations, and dispositions implicate cognitive and affective self-regulatory capacities essential to moralaction. This holistic understanding reflects an emerging trend in both moral psychology (Narvaez & Lapsley,2009) and self psychology more generally (Baumeister, 1998; Leary & Tangney, 2012). Consistent with these ideas,
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
we define the moral self as a complex system of self-defining moral attributes involving moral beliefs, orientations,dispositions, and cognitive and affective capacities that engage regulatory focus toward moral behavior.
Review of Empirical Research on the Moral Self
To be as comprehensive of the published empirical work as possible, we searched abstracts of published articlesappearing in EBSCO and ABI Inform databases, using search terms derived from our moral self definition and fur-ther targeted studies referring to one of the terms “moral” or “ethic.” Our review of the empirical research revealsfive categories of moral self constructs (moral centrality, moral judgment disposition, self-conscious moral orienta-tion, self-conscious moral emotions, and moral strength), which we depict in an emergent process model of themoral self (Figure 1). Below, we describe the five categories of moral self constructs and then summarize empiricalwork examining them. Our review describes research that empirically tested the specific constructs that fit within ourmoral self definition and does not include results of correlates outside of these moral self variables.
Emergent moral self constructs
The five categories of moral self constructs are as follows: (i) moral centrality (the degree to which morality is piv-otal to one’s self-understanding; e.g., moral identity and moral self-concept); (ii) moral judgment disposition (thestable tendency to take a specific moral perspective in decisions and action; e.g., ethical ideology and ethical predis-position); (iii) self-conscious moral orientation (an orientation to perceive and reflect on moral implications of one’sexperiences; e.g., moral attentiveness and moral sensitivity); (iv) self-conscious moral emotions (the degree to which
Figure 1. Synopsis of empirical work on the moral self
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
morality evokes evaluative and affective aspects of the self; e.g., guilt, shame and pride); and (v) moral strength (thedegree to which morality is an enduring quality that provides the capacity and conation [impetus to act] to achievemoral ends; e.g., moral potency and moral character).Constructs associated with moral centrality have received the most research attention in emergent moral self the-
ory. Constructs included in the other four categories are less researched and less frequently associated with moralself theory but nonetheless capture important aspects of the moral self. In particular, constructs associated with moraljudgment disposition and self-conscious moral orientation tend to emphasize the “having” side, as they involve theinternalization of morality into a person’s sense of self and identity. Constructs associated with self-conscious moralemotions and moral strength emphasize the “doing” side, or moral agency. Although these five categories are notlikely all-inclusive, they are the most prevalent in the literature. We describe each category and the constructsaligned within them.
Moral centralityA large body of research has explored how central morality and being a moral person are to one’s self-concept(Table 1). Although a number of constructs and labels for moral centrality have emerged (e.g., moral identity andmoral self-concept), each involve the degree to which moral qualities, concerns, commitments, or goals are signif-icant definitional components of the self. Much of this literature on moral centrality (approximately 70 percent of theempirical work) has adopted Aquino and Reed’s (2002) concept of moral identity, defined as “a self-conception or-ganized around a set of moral traits” (p. 1424). Consistent with the having and doing bases of the moral self, theirapproach offers two moral identity dimensions: internalization (or the degree to which moral traits, such as beingcaring, compassionate, and fair, are central to one’s self-concept) and symbolization (or the degree to which suchmoral traits are reflected in choices and actions). The internationalization dimension aligns with the “having” sideof the moral self, whereas the symbolization dimension aligns with the “doing” side of the moral self.
Moral judgment dispositionMoral judgment disposition refers to how morality is internalized into a person’s self-concept to form a distinctmoral perspective that informs moral judgments. We review three types of moral dispositions: (i) ethical ideology(Forsyth, 1980), (ii) ethical predisposition (Brady & Wheeler, 1996), and (iii) moral communion (Schwartz,1992) (Table 2). Each of these constructs derives from different philosophical and theoretical traditions. For in-stance, ethical ideology describes a tendency to adopt ideal or relative principles in moral decisions (Forsyth,1980). Idealism reflects a “right” course of action—an absolute ethical solution—in all situations. Relativism reflectsa consideration for contextualizing ethical judgments and action choices. These two axis create four “types” of eth-ical ideologies: (i) situationism (relying on context analysis to assess morally questionable actions), (ii) absolutism(relying on universal moral principles), (iii) subjectivism (relying on personal values), and (iv) exceptionism (under-standing exceptions apply, instead of moral absolutes). Alternatively, Brady and Wheeler (1996) proposed thatethical predispositions represent ethical “lenses,” or the tendency to rely on utilitarianism or formalism in decisions.Utilitarianism reflects a reliance on considering consequences in ethical processing, whereas formalism reflects areliance on rules, principles, and guidelines. Last, in his work on cultural values, Schwartz (1992) proposed thatindividuals may hold a tendency to advance the interests of others, called a moral communion.
Self-conscious moral orientationSelf-conscious moral orientation refers to the internalization of moral notions that invokes a sensitivity or respon-siveness to moral implications in ethical and moral issues (Morton, Worthley, Testerman, & Mahoney, 2006;Reynolds, 2006; Sparks & Hunt, 1998). We review research related to two self-conscious moral orientations: moralsensitivity and moral attentiveness (Table 3). Moral sensitivity represents a general orientation toward moral impli-cations on the basis of past decisions and behaviors (Morton et al., 2006; Sparks & Hunt, 1998). Moral attentivenessis “the extent to which one chronically perceives and considers morality and moral elements in his or her experi-ences” (Reynolds, 2008, p. 1028). Reynolds (2008) found that there are two dimensions of moral attentiveness:
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
1.Empiricalworkon
moral
centrality.
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
esOutcomevariables
ofthemoral
self
Aquinoand
Becker(2005)
Neutralization
strategies,
self-concept
theory,theories
oftheself
Experim
ent;192
MBA
students
Moral
attributes
(Z)
Psychological
distress
(IV)
Neutralization
Ethical
clim
ate(IV)
-Denigratio
nMoral
consequences
(IV)
-Minim
ization
Lying
(IV)
Aquino
etal.(2009)
Social-cognitive
theory
(SCT),
theories
ofself,
andmoral
identity
Study
1:Experim
ent;
92undergraduate
business
students
Internalizationmoral
identity
(Z)
Moral
prim
e(IV)
Intentionto
donate
money
Study
2:Experim
ent;
55undergraduate
business
students
Financial
prim
e(Z)
Intentionto
lie
Study
3:Experim
ent;
224undergraduate
business
students
Rew
ardsize
(Z)
Study
4:Experim
ent;
33undergraduate
business
students
Feedbackon
others’
choices(Z)
Aquino
etal.(2011)
Theoriesof
emotion(m
oral
elevation)
andtheself
(self-regulatio
nandmoral
identity)
Study
1:Experim
ent;
436undergraduate
students
Moral
identity
Actsof
uncommon
goodness
(Z)
Prosocialbehavioral
intentions
Study
2:reflectio
nsurvey;443Ipsos
panelists
-Internalization
(IV)
Moral
elevation
(M)
Prosocialbehaviors
Study
3:Experim
ent;63
undergraduatestudents
-Sym
bolization
(IV)
-Money
allocation
Study
4:Experim
ent;129
undergraduate
students
-Donations
Aquinoand
Reed(2002)
SCT,theories
ofself,and
moral
identity
Study
1:Instrument
developm
ent;EFA
sample:
363
undergraduatestudents;
CFA
sample:
347alum
ni,
working
adults
Moral
identity
-Internalization(IV)
-Sym
bolization(IV)
Volunteerism
Intrinsic
satisfactionto
volunteering
(Contin
ues)
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
1.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
the
moral
self
Study
2:Convergent
valid
ity:124
undergraduatestudents
Study
3:Nom
ologicaland
discriminantvalid
ity:55
master’sstudent.
Perceived
freedom
ofvolunteering
Study
4:Cross-sectio
nal,
single-sourcesurvey
study;
160high
school
students
Depth
ofinvolvem
entto
volunteering
Study
5:Cross-sectio
nal,
single-sourcesurvey
study;
330undergraduate
students
Donation
behavior
Study
6:tim
e-lagged,
single-sourcesurvey
study;
145high
school
students
Aquino
etal.(2007)
Theoriesof
self,
neutralization,
moral
disengagem
ent
Study
1:Reflectio
n-based
cross-sectional,single-
source
survey
study;
104
university
employees
Internalizationmoral
identity
(Z)
Moral
disengagem
ent(IV
)Intent
topunish
wrongdoer
Study
2:Experim
ent;69
undergraduates,
administrativestaff,and
community
mem
bers
ofNEU.S.A.
Negative
emotions
Barriga
etal.(2001)
Theoriesof
moral
judgmentand
moral
self-concept
Cross-sectio
nalsurvey;
193undergraduate
students
Moralself-
relevance(IV)
Moral
judgment(IV)
Antisocial
behavior
Self-serving
cognitive
distortio
n(IV)
Gender(IV)
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
1.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
the
moral
self
Brebels
etal.(2011)
Theoriesof
the
self,self-
regulatio
n,and
moral
identity
Study
1:Experim
ent;68
undergraduatestudents
Moral
identity
(internalizationand
symbolization
combined)
(IV)
Regulatoryfocus
Procedural
justice
enactm
ent
Study
2:Cross-sectio
nal,
single-sourcesurvey;270
organizatio
nalsupervisors
-Promotion-
focused
(Z)
Study
3:Cross-sectio
nal,
single-sourcesurvey
with
multip
lesources(focal
andcoworker);103
employee–cow
orker
matched
dyads
-Prevention-
focused
(Z)
Caldw
elland
Moberg(2007)
Theoriesof
moral
imagination,
the
self,and
moral
identity
Scenario-based
experiment;164
undergraduatestudents
Moral
identity
(internalizationand
symbolization
combined)
(Z)
Ethicalcultu
re(IV)
Moral
imagination
Christensen,
Brayden,
Dietrich,
McL
aughlin
,andSherrod
(1994)
Theoriesof
self
(self-esteem
and
self-concept)
Tim
e-lagged,single-
source
survey;609
wom
enwho
received
prenatal
care
atahospital
Moralself-concept(IV)
Self-concept
dimensions(IV)
Neglect
ofbirthedchild
-Physical
Physicalabuse
ofbirthedchild
-Personal
-Fam
ily-Social
Total
confl
ict(IV)
Socialidentity
(IV)
Self-satisfaction
(IV)
Maladjustment(IV)
Psychosis
(IV)
Personality
disorder
(IV)
Neurosis(IV)
Deviant
signs(IV)
Defensive
positiv
e(IV)
Integrationindex
score(IV)
(Contin
ues)
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
1.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
the
moral
self
Conway
and
Gaw
ronski
(2013)
Theoriesof
moral
judgmentand
disassociatio
n
Study
1only:Scenario-
basedexperiment;112
undergraduatestudents
Internalizationmoral
identity
(IV)
Empathy
(IV)
Deontological
inclination
Perspectiv
etaking
(IV)
Utilitarian
inclination
Needfor
cognition
(IV)
Faith
inintuition
(IV)
Religiosity
(IV)
Conway
and
Peetz
(2012)
Theoriesof
moral
licensing
andthe
moral
self
Scenario-based
experiment;151American
MechanicalTurk
participants
Moral
identityvs.
immoral
identity
(IV)
Personal
identity
(Z)
Donation
intention
Côtéet
al.
(2011)
Theoriesof
emotionregulatio
n,theself,and
moral
identity
Scenario-basedsurvey:
131undergraduate
students
Moral
identity
(internalizationand
symbolization
combined)
(IV)
Emotional
regulatio
nknow
ledge(Z)
Prosocial
behavior
Danielset
al.
(2011)
SCT,theories
ofself,and
self-
consistency
Cross-sectio
nal,single-
source
scenario-based
survey;155working
adults(recruitedfrom
Craigslistandcurrentand
recent
MBA
andMA
graduates)
Moral
identity
Ethical
cultu
re(Z)
Ethical
sensitivity
Internalization
(IV)
Sym
bolization
(IV)
Ethicalsensitivity
(DV)
DeC
elleset
al.
(2012)
Theoriesof
power,
self-interest,the
self,and
moral
identity
Study
1:Scenario-based
experiment;173working
adults(recruitedfrom
Qualtrics.com)
Internalizationmoral
identity
(Z)
Pow
er(IV)
Self-interested
behavior
Study
2:Experim
ent;102
undergraduatestudents
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
1.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
the
moral
self
Detertet
al.
(2008)
SCT,theories
ofmoral
disengagem
ent,
moral
agency,the
self,and
moral
identity
Multi-wave(3
timeperiods),
single-sourcesurvey;307
business
andeducation
undergraduatestudents
Internalizationmoral
identity
(IV)
Empathy
(IV)
Unethical
decision
making
Traitcynicism
(IV)
Changein
locus
ofcontrol(IV)
Internal
locusof
control(IV)
Pow
erlocusof
control(IV)
Moral
disengagem
ent(
M)
Doron
etal.
(2012)
Theoriesof
self,
self-perception,
andcognitive
theory
Study
1:Experim
ent;43
undergraduates
Moral
self-
perceptio
ns(IV)
Self-relevant
inform
ation
(Z)
Physical
contam
ination
concerns
Study
2:Experim
ent;150
community
participants
Study
3:Experim
ent;86
community
participants
Frimer
and
Walker(2009)
Theoriesof
self-
interest,theself,
moral
centrality,
andmoral
judgment
Multi-wave(3
timeperiods),
single-sourcesurvey
and
interview
(codingprocedures
for
somevariables);191students
recruitedfrom
public
postingin
studentclubs
Moral
centrality
Moral
behavior
(coded)
-Com
munal
values
(IV)
-Agenticvalues
(IV)
Grubisicand
Goic(1998)
Tim
e-separated,
single-source
survey;2248
undergraduate
studentsfrom
24institu
tions
from
14countries
Country
status
(intransitio
nor
not)
Ethical
values
(DV)
Ethical
values
(Contin
ues)
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
1.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
the
moral
self
Hardy
etal.
(2010)
Theoriesof
psychological
distance,the
self,
andmoral
identity
Cross-sectio
nal,single-
source
survey;1059
high
school
students
Parentin
gstyle
Moral
identity
Social
dominance
orientation
-Autonom
ygrantin
g(IV)
-Internalization
(IV)
Circleof
moral
regard
-Responsiveness(IV)
-Sym
bolization
(IV)
-Dem
andingness
(IV)
Hardy
etal.
(2012)
Theoriesof
social
control,theself,
moral
identity,
and
moral
cognitions
Cross-sectio
nal,single-
source
survey;502
secondaryschool
students
Religious
commitm
ent(IV)
Internalizationmoral
identity
(M)
Empathy
Religious
involvem
ent(Z)
Aggression
Haynes(1990)
Theoriesof
self
andself-concept
Cross-sectio
nal,single-
source
survey;6
0teachers
of14
2random
lyselected
middleschool
child
ren
Moralself-concept(IV)
Self-concept
dimensions(IV)
Classroom
behavior
-Physical
Group
participation
-Personal
Attitude
toward
authority
-Fam
ily-Social
Johnston
and
Krettenauer
(2011)
Theoriesof
emotion,
theself,
andmoral
self
Vignette-style
interview;
205adolescents
Moralself-concept(IV)
Moral
norm
regarded
emotions
(IV)
Antisocial
behavior
Moral
norm
disregarded
emotions
(IV)
Prosocial
behavior
Jordan
etal.
(2011)
Theoriesof
self-
completion,
social
cognition,the
self,
andmoral
identity
Recollection-based,
cross-
sectional,single-source
survey;61
MBA
students
Recalled(coded)
moral
behavior
Moral
identity
-Internalization
(IV)
-Sym
bolization
(IV)
Kavussanu
etal.
(2012)
Theoriesof
the
self,m
oralidentity,
andem
otion
Exp
erim
ent,using
emotivepictures;94
athletes
Internalizationmoral
identity
(IV)
Evokedem
otion
(pleasant,
unpleasant,and
neutral)
(Z)
Startle
reactio
nPain-related
reactio
n
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
1.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
the
moral
self
Kochanska,
Gross,L
in,and
Nichols(2002)
Theoriesof
socialization,
the
self,and
self-
developm
ent
Tim
e-lagged,m
ulti-source
surveys/interviews(coded
observations);112
mothers
with
their
newborn
child
ren
(recruitedviaan
adin
the
community
)
Fear(IV)
Moral
self
(DV)
Moral
self
Mother’spower-
assertive
discipline(IV)
Guilt
(IV)
Kochanska
etal.
(2010)
Theoriesof
the
self,self-
developm
ent,and
moral
self
Longitudinalstudyof
two-parent
families
with
infants(recruitedviaad
incommunity
),assessments
madeat
25,3
8,52,6
7,and80
months.Across
each,N
varied
from
43to
100families.
Observatio
nscoded
Moral
self
(IV)
Internalizationof
motherandfather
rules(IV)
Socialization
Empathetic
concernforeach
parent
(IV)
Kouchaki
(2011)
Theoriesof
self,
self-concept,and
moral
self
Study
2only:Scenario-
basedexperiment;190
undergraduatestudents
Credentialsof
applicant(IV)
Internalizationmoral
identity
(IV)
Willingnessto
express
prejudice
Ethnicity
ofapplicant(IV)
Krettenauerand
Johnston
(2011)
Moral
emotions
theory
and
principles
ofmoral
self
Cross-sectio
nal,single
source,scenario-based
survey;155teenagers,
grades
7through11,w
ithasampleof
50undergraduatestudents
Self-im
portance
ofmoral
values
(IV)
Context
type
Guilt
Guilt
(DV)
-Prosocial
actio
n(IV)
Pride
Pride
(DV)
-Tem
ptation
(IV)
Other
emotions
(embarrassm
ent,
fear,sadness,
happiness,
anger,and
satisfaction)
-Antisocial(IV)
Positive
ornegativ
eem
otion
(Contin
ues)
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
1.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
esOutcomevariables
ofthemoral
self
Kurpiset
al.
(2008)
Theoriesof
moral
judgment,the
moral
self,and
moral
commitm
ent
Scenario-based,
cross-
sectional,single-
source
survey;242
undergraduate
students
Religiosity
(IV)
Com
mitm
entto
moral
self-
improvem
ent(IV)
Importance
ofethics
Ethical
problem
recognition
Ethical
behavioral
intentions
Lee
etal.(2008)
Goaltheory,
theory
ofplanned
behavior
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-sourcesurvey;
491secondaryschool
studentsfrom
school
orclub
competitions
Moral
values
(IV)
Com
petence
values
(IV)
Prosocial
attitude
Antisocialattitude
Taskorientation
(M)
Ego
orientation
(M)
LuandChang
(2011)
Theoriesof
self,
moral
self,and
self-deceptio
n
Scenario-based,
cross-
sectional,single-
source
survey;160
undergraduate
students
Moralself-concept(IV)
Self-consciousness(Z)
Intentionto
help
with
outbenefitto
theself
Mayer
etal.
(2012)
Theoriesof
social
learning,m
oral
identity,
andsocial
cognition
Study
1:Multi-source,
cross-sectional
survey;em
ployees
andsupervisorsfrom
thesameworkunit
recruitedvia
convenient
sampling
technique;
data
for
137departments
(range
of1–5
employeeswith
ineach
department)but
included
only
units
with
3+response
sets;
finalN=115
Leadermoralidentity
Unit-levelperceived
ethicalleadership
(M)
Unethical
behavior
Study
2:Sam
edesign/
procedureas
Study
1;195departments(w
ith891em
ployeesand
195supervisors)
-Internalization
(IV)
Relationalconfl
ict
-Sym
bolization
(IV)
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
1.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
esOutcomevariables
ofthemoral
self
McC
uddy
(2007)
Theoriesof
self
andself-
enhancem
ent
Scenario-based,
cross-sectional,
single-source
survey;388
undergraduate
students
Student
cheatin
g(IV)
Ethical
self-
enhancem
ent(D
V)
Ethical
self-
enhancem
ent
Ethical
norm
sof
cheatin
g(Z)
Other
students’
approvalofcheating(Z)
McFerranet
al.
(2010)
Theoriesof
moral
personality
,the
self,and
moral
identity
Study
1:Cross-
sectional,single-
source
survey;52
femaleem
ployeesof
mid-sized
speech
therapyservices
organizatio
n
Moral
identity
Moral
personality
(conscientiousness,
agreeablenessand
openness
toexperience
combined)
(IV)
Ethical
ideology
(Study
1DV)
Study
2:Cross-
sectional,single-
source
survey;145
undergraduate
students
-Internalization
(IV)
Ethical
ideology
(Study2M)
Citizenship
behavior
-Sym
bolization
(IV)
Propensity
tomorally
disengage
Ethical
ideology
(Study1DV)
Michaelidou
and
Hassan(2008)
Scenario-based,
cross-sectional,
single-source
survey;convenient
sampleof
222
shoppers
Ethicalself-identity(IV)
Foo
dsafety
concern
(IV)
Intent
topurchase
organicfood
Health
conscientiousness
(IV)
Organic
food
attitude(M
)
O’Fallonand
Butterfield
(2011)
Theoriesof
cognitive
moral
developm
entand
social
inform
ation
processing
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;655
undergraduate
students
Internalizationmoral
identity
(Z)
Cow
orkers
organizatio
nal
deviance
(IV)
Observers’
organizatio
nal
deviance
Needfor
affiliatio
n(Z)
Introversion
(Z)
Negative
relatio
nships
(Z)
(Contin
ues)
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
1.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
esOutcomevariables
ofthemoral
self
Patrick
and
Gibbs
(2012)
Theoriesof
socialization,the
self,and
moral
identity
Multi-source
survey
design
();102
adolescentsandtheir
motherparticipated
Parentaldiscipline(IV)
Moral
identity
(DV)
Moral
identity
-Inductio
nPerceived
fairness
-Pow
erassertion
Experienceguilt
-Lovewith
draw
alPositive/negative
emotion
Peruginiand
Leone
(2009)
Theoriesof
moral
developm
ent
andjudgment,
andim
plicit
personality
Study
1:Experim
ent;46
undergraduates
Implicitmoral
self-
concept(IV)
Hon
esty–
humility
(IV)
Cheatingbehavior
Study
2:Scenario-
basedexperiment;
112individuals
Moral
temptation
intention
Moral
evaluatio
ns
Prattet
al.
(2003)
Theoriesof
socializationand
moral
reasoning
Tim
e-lagged,single-
source
survey;896
high
school
students
Com
munity
involvem
ent(IV)
Moral
qualities
ofself-ideal
(DV)
Moral
qualities
ofself-ideal
Parentalmoral
emphasis
(Z)
Ranceret
al.
(1992)
Theoriesof
the
self(self-esteem
andmoral
self-
concept)
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;132
undergraduate
students
Moralself-esteem
(IV)
Effectance(IV)
Verbalaggression
Socialself-
esteem
(IV)
Bodyim
age(IV)
Defensive
self-
enhancem
ent(IV)
Reedand
Aquino(200
3)Theoriesof
the
self(m
oral
self-
conceptand
self-protection)
andmoral
identity
Study
1/Sample1:
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;137
undergraduate
students
Moral
identity
In/out-group
(IV)
Circleof
moral
regard
Study
1/Sample2:
Tim
e-lagged,single-
source
survey;55
MBA
students
-Internalization
(IV)
-Sym
bolization
(IV)
American
identity
(IV)
Responsetype
(IV)
Willingto
exchange
resourcesPerceived
worthiness
Willingnessto
donate
Perceptions
ofacceptable
deaths
Moral
evaluatio
n
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
1.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
esOutcomevariables
ofthemoral
self
Study
2:Scenario-based,
single-sourcesurvey
study;
75undergraduatestudents
Study
3:Scenario-based,
single-source,multi-wave
design,w
here
data
were
collected
5weeks
apartin
3phases;58
undergraduate
students
Study
4:Scenario-based
experiment,2-wavedesign,
where
data
werecollected
2monthsapart;85
undergraduatestudents
Reedet
al.
(2007)
Theoryof
theself
andmoral
identity
Study
1a:Scenario-based,
cross-sectional,single-source
survey;242undergraduate
students
Moral
identity
Charitable
behavior
ofcompany
(IV)
Moral
evaluatio
n
Study
1b:Scenario-based
experiment;convenient
sampleof
58undergraduate
students,adm
inistrativestaff,
andlocalcommunity
residents
-Internalization
(Z)
Corporate
giving
type
(tim
eor
money)(IV)
Donation
preference
Study
2:Cross-sectio
nal,
single-sourcesurvey;274
full-tim
ealum
ni
-Sym
bolization
(Z)
Position
status
(IV)
Donationintention
Study
3:Scenario-based
experiment;convenient
sampleof
179undergraduate
students,adm
inistrativestaff,
andlocalcommunity
residents
Moral
organizatio
n(IV)
Charitablegiving
Cheatingbehavior
(Contin
ues)
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
1.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
esOutcomevariables
ofthemoral
self
Reynolds(2008)
Study
1:Item
developm
entformoral
attentivenessmeasure:
cross-sectional,single-
source
survey;123
undergraduatestudents
Moral
attentiveness
Correlates
(Study
2)
Study
2:Validity
evidence:241
undergraduates
-Perceptual(IV)
-Normlessness
Study
3:Cross-sectio
nal,
single-sourcesurvey;
242managersrecruited
from
StudyResponse.
com
-Reflectiv
e(IV)
-Nurturance
Study
4:Cross-sectio
nal,
single-sourcesurvey;
159MBA
students
Moral
identity
(DV)
-Moral
identity
Study
5:Cross-sectio
nal,
single-sourcesurvey;74
undergraduates
and81
MBAs
-Agreeableness
-Conscientiousness
Moral
behavior
Moral
awareness
Reynoldsand
Ceranic
(200
7)Theoriesof
moral
judgment,moral
self,and
moral
identity
Study
1:Cross-sectio
nal,
single-sourcesurvey;
226undergraduate
students
Moral
identity
Consequentialist
moraljudgment(Z)
Charitablegiving
Study
2:Cross-sectio
nal,
single-sourcescenario-
basedsurvey;292
managersem
ployed
ina
varietyof
organizatio
nsrecruitedthrough
StudyResponse.com
-Internalization
(Z)
Formalistmoral
judgment(Z)
Cheatingbehavior
-Sym
bolization
(Z)
Behavioralintention
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
1.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
the
moral
self
Rosenberg
(1987)
Theoryof
moral
values,p
ersonality
Scenario-based,
cross-
sectional,single-source
survey;1
42undergraduate
students
Moral
values
(IV)
Businessgoals(IV)
Ethical
behavioral
intentions
Rosenbloom
etal.(2009)
Theoriesof
self
andself-concept
Cross-sectio
nal,single-
source
survey;100
undergraduatestudents
Moralself-concept(IV)
Gender(Z)
Reported
dangerousness
ofdriving
RuppandBell
(2010)
Theoriesof
deontic
justice,moral
self-
regulatio
n,and
self-interest
Experim
entandcoding
design;1
56undergraduate
students
Moralself-regulation
motives
(IV)
Retributiv
emotives
(IV)
Punishing
aharm
doer
Self-interested
motives
(IV)
Equality
motives
(IV)
Sachdevaet
al.
(2009)
Theoryof
moral
self-regulation
Study
1:Experim
ent,
recallsurvey
with
acoding
design;46
undergraduatestudents
Positive
moral
traits
(e.g.,internalization
moral
identity
traits)(IV)
Donation
behavior
Study
2:Experim
ent,
recallsurvey
with
acoding
design;39
undergraduatestudents
Negativemoral
trait(IV)
Cooperativ
ebehavior
Study
3:Experim
ent,
recallsurvey
with
acoding
design;46
undergraduatestudents
Neutralm
oraltrait
(IV)
Sageet
al.
(2006)
Theoriesof
the
self,m
oralidentity,
andgoal
orientation
Cross-sectio
nal,single-
source
survey;210male
footballplayers,recruited
from
clubsand
competitions
Internalizationmoral
identity
(IV)
Taskgoal
orientation
(Z)
Prosocial
functio
ning
Ego
goal
orientation
(Z)
Prosocial
judgments
Antisocial
functio
ning
Antisocial
judgments
(Contin
ues)
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
1.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
the
moral
self
Skarlicki
and
Rupp(2010)
Dualprocessing
theories,d
eontic
justice,theories
oftheself,and
moral
identity
Scenarioexperiment;
185managersenrolledin
anexecutiveMBA
program
Sym
bolizationmoral
identity
(Z)
Supervisor
mistreatm
ent(IV)
Retaliatory
intentions
Experientialor
ratio
nalprim
e(Z)
Skarlicki
etal.
(2008)
Retaliatio
nand
deontic
justice
principles,theories
oftheself,and
moral
identity
Cross-sectio
nal,single-
source
survey
that
adoptedcriticalincident
technique;
performance
was
provided
byhuman
resourcesof
the
company;358custom
erservicerepresentativ
esem
ployed
inacallcenter
Moral
identity
Customer
interpersonal
injustice(IV)
Jobperformance
-Internalization
(Z)
Customer-directed
sabotage
(M)
-Sym
bolization
(Z)
StetsandCarter
(2011)
Theoriesof
theself
andmoral
identity
Study
1:Cross-sectio
nal,
single-sourcesurvey;
545undergraduate
students
Internalizationmoral
identity
(IV)
Taskability
(Z)
Perceptions
ofim
moral
behavior
Study
2:Experim
ent;
with
samestudentsas
Study
1
Moral
identity
discrepancy
(IV)
Positive/
negativ
eem
otion
StetsandCarter
(2012)
Control
system
sapproach
ofidentitytheory
Tim
e-lagged,single-
source
survey;369
undergraduatestudents
Moral
identity
Moral
meaning
s(IV)
Guilt
-Internalization
(IV)
Feelin
gsrule
(IV)
Shame
-Sym
bolization
(IV)
Moral
identity
discrepancy
(M)
Shame(D
V)
Moralbehavior
(M)
Guilt
(DV)
Van
derW
aland
deGraaf
(2006)
Cross-sectio
nal,single-
source
survey;778
managersfrom
public
organizatio
nsand500
managersfrom
private
organizatio
ns
Employer
type
(public
orprivatesector)(IV)
Moralself-image(D
V)
Moral
self-
image
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
1.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variablesstudied
onoutcom
esOutcomevariables
ofthemoral
self
Vitellet
al.
(2009)
Self-regulatio
ntheory,theoriesof
self-control,the
self,and
moral
identity
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;110
undergraduate
students
Religiosity
Moral
identity
Moral
identity
-Intrinsic
(IV)
-Internalization
(DV)
-Internalization
-Extrinsic
(IV)
-Sym
bolization
(DV)
-Sym
bolization
Vitellet
al.
(2011)
Moral
justificatio
nandratio
nalization
principles,theories
oftheself,and
moral
identity
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;2
05business
practitioners
recruitedfrom
arand
omsampleof
2500
from
anatio
nal
commercially
provided
mailin
glist
Moral
identity
Institu
tionalization
Moral
justificatio
n-Internalization(IV)
-Implicit
(IV)
-Sym
bolization(IV)
-Explicit
(IV)
Religiosity
-Intrinsic
(IV)
-Extrinsic
(IV)
Weichun
etal.(2011)
Transform
ational
leadership
theory,
theories
oftheself
andmoral
identity
Study
1:672
participantsfrom
research
panel
(Zoomerang.com);
336casesused
totestexploratory
factor
structureof
moral
identity
measure;336cases
used
totest
predictio
ns
Transform
ational
leadership
Moralidentity(D
V)
Moral
identity
Study
2:Scenario-
basedexperiment;
215teachers
from
severalp
ublic
school
system
sparticipated
inweb-based
experiment
Transactio
nal
leadership
(Contin
ues)
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
1.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
esOutcomevariables
ofthemoral
self
Winterich,
Aquino,
etal.(2013)
Social-cognitive
theory;theories
oftheselfandmoral
identity
Study
1:Experim
ental
survey;2
93adultsfrom
anonlin
eresearch
panelin
U.S.A.
Recognitio
nof
prosocialbehavior
Moral
identity
Prosocial
behavior
Study
2:Experim
ental
survey;2
31adultsfrom
onlin
eresearch
panelin
U.S.A.
-Internalization(Z)
-Sym
bolization(Z)
Winterich,
Mittal,
etal.(2013)
Social-cognitive
theory,consumer
identitytheory,
theories
oftheself
andmoral
identity
Study
1:Experim
ental
survey;4
10adultsfrom
anonlin
eresearch
panelin
U.S.A.
Moral
identity
Recognitio
nof
donatio
nbehavior
Donationbehavior
Study
2:Experim
ental
survey;1
97adultsfrom
onlin
eresearch
panelin
U.S.A.
-Internalization
(Z)
-General
recognition
(IV)
Study
3:Experim
ental
survey;2
67adultsfrom
anonlin
eresearch
panelin
U.S.A.
-Sym
bolization
(Z)
-Priv
ate
recognition
(IV)
-Public
recognition
(IV)
Winterich
etal.(2009)
Socialidentity
theory;theories
oftheselfandmoral
identity
Study
1:Scenario-
basedexperiment;143
undergraduates
Internalization
moral
identity
(IV)
Inclusionof
other
inself
(M)
Donationintention
Study
2:Scenario-
basedexperiment;258
undergraduates
Genderidentity
(Z)
Study
3:Scenario-
basedexperiment;233
adultsfrom
anonlin
emarketin
gresearch
panelacross
theU.S.A.
Donationgroup
type
(Z)
Note:
Moral
selfvariablesthat
also
representdependentvariablesin
thestudiesareindicatedwith
theDV
designationandarerepeated
inthe“dependent
variable”column.
IV=independentvariable;DV=dependentvariable;M
=mediatorvariable;Z=moderator
variable.
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
2.Empiricalworkon
moral
judgmentdisposition.
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
themoral
self
Angelidisand
Ibrahim
(2011)
Principlesof
emotional
intelligenceand
ethicalideology
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;344
managersenrolled
inexecutiveMBA
program
from
5universities
Ethical
ideology
(IV)
Emotional
intelligence
Brady
and
Wheeler
(1996)
Principlesof
ethicaldisposition
andethical
decision
making
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source,
scenario-based
survey;141
employeesof
large
financialinstitu
tion
Ethical
predispositio
nCharacter
trait
-Utilitarianism
(IV)
-Formalism
(IV)
Forsyth
(1980)
Individual
differences
principles,
theories
ofmoral
selfand
moral
thought
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;108
undergraduate
students
Ethical
ideology
(IV)
Ethical
attitude
Forsyth
(1985)
Individual
differences
principles,
theories
ofmoral
selfand
moral
thought
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source,
scenario-based
survey;64
undergraduate
students
Ethical
ideology
(IV)
Consequence
type
(IV)
Moral
judgment
Moral
standard
(IV)
Conform
ityto
norm
s(IV)
Forsyth
(1993)
Individual
differences
principles,
theories
ofmoral
selfand
moral
thought
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source,
scenario-based
survey;164
undergraduate
students
Ethical
ideology
(IV)
Motivetype
(IV)
Selfevaluatio
nOutcometype
(IV)
Self-esteem
Gender(IV)
Cognitiv
ereactio
ns
(Contin
ues)
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
2.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
themoral
self
Frimer
etal.
(2011)
Principlesof
agency
and
moral
personality
Cross-sectio
nal,
criticalincident/
recollection-based,
single-source
survey;111
studentsrecruited
from
studentclubs
Com
munionmoral
orientation
(IV)
Agency
orientation
(IV)
Evaluationof
moral
exem
plar
Luzadisand
Gerhardt(2011)
Goalorientation
theory,p
rinciples
ofethicalideology
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;321
undergraduate
students
Ethical
ideology
Goalorientation
-Idealism
(IV)
-Learninggoal
-Relativism
(IV)
-Perform
ance-
approach
goal
-Perform
ance-
avoidancegoal
Marta
etal.(2012)
Principlesof
ethicalideology
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;453
individuals
(recruitedmem
bers
from
theAmerican
Marketin
gAssociatio
n)
Corporate
ethical
values
(IV)
Ethical
ideology
Ethical
intentions
-Idealism
(Z)
-Relativism
(Z)
McFerran
etal.(2010)
Theoriesof
moral
personality
,the
self,
andmoral
identity
Study
1:Cross-
sectional,single-
source
survey;52
femaleem
ployees
ofmid-sized
speech
therapy
services
organizatio
n
Moral
identity
Moral
personality
(conscientiousness,
agreeableness,and
openness
toexperience
combined)
(IV)
Ethical
ideology
(Study1DV)
Study
2:Cross-
sectional,single-
source
survey;145
undergraduate
students
-Internalization
(IV)
Ethical
ideology
(Study2M)
Citizenshipbehavior
-Sym
bolization
(IV)
Propensity
tomorally
disengage
Ethical
ideology
(Study1DV)
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Reynolds(2006)
Principlesof
moral
awareness,moral
intensity
,and
ethical
predispositio
ns
Study
1:Scenario-
basedexperiment;
120MBA
students
Presenceof
harm
(IV)
Ethical
predispositio
nMoral
awareness
Study
2:Scenario-
basedexperiment;
33MBA
students
Norm
violation
(IV)
-Utilitarianism
(Z)
-Formalism
(Z)
Ruiz-Palom
ino
andMartin
ez-
Cañas
(201
1)
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;525
employeesfrom
largebranch
offices
ofbankingand
insurance
companies
Relativistic
ethical
ideology
(IV,Z)
Ethical
policies(IV)
Ethical
behavioral
intentions
Ethical
leadership
(IV)
Schminke
(1997)
Principlesof
gender
andmorality
and
ethicalp
redispositions
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source,
scenario-based
experiment;
convenient
sample
of175full-tim
emanagersand
undergraduate
students
Ethical
predispositio
nDecisionfram
eagreem
ent
-Utilitarianism
(IV)
-Formalism
(IV)
Schminke
(2001)
Structure
theory
and
principles
ofethical
predispositio
ns
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;209
employeesfrom
avarietyof
industries
with
intheMidwestern
U.S.A.who
were
recruitedfrom
the
author’s
College
Board
ofAdvisors
Organizational
size
(IV)
Ethical
predispositio
nEthical
predispositio
nOrganizational
structure
-Utilitarianism
(DV)
-Utilitarianism
-Participation
(IV)
-Formalism
(DV)
-Formalism
-Authority
hierarchy
(IV)
-Formalism
(IV)
Schminke
etal.
(1997)
Theoriesof
organizatio
naljustice
andprinciples
ofethicalp
redispositions
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;209
employeesfrom
11prim
arily
Procedural
fairness
(IV)
Ethical
predispositio
nProceduraljustice
perceptio
nsOutcome
fairness
(IV)
-Utilitarianism
(Z)
Distributivejustice
perceptio
ns-Formalism
(Z)
(Contin
ues)
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
2.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
themoral
self
Midwestern
organizatio
ns,
recruitedthrough
theauthors’
College
ofBoard
ofAdvisors
Schminke
and
Wells(1999)
Principlesof
ethical
predispositio
ns,g
roup
processes,and
leadership
style
Tim
e-lagged,
single-source
survey;117
graduate
and
undergraduate
students
Leadershipstyle
Changein
ethical
predispositio
nChangein
ethical
predispositio
n-Initiatin
g(IV)
-Utilitarianism
(DV)
-Utilitarianism
-Consideration
(IV)
-Formalism
(DV)
-Formalism
Group
-Cohesiveness(IV)
-Perform
ance
(IV)
Singhapakdi
etal.(2001)
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source,
scenario-based
survey;453
individuals
recruitedfrom
anAmerican
Marketin
gAssociatio
nmem
bership
mailin
glist
Country
(Australianvs.
American)
Ethical
ideology
Ethical
ideology
-Idealism
(DV)
-Idealism
-Relativism
(DV)
-Relativism
Perceptions
ofethicalproblem
Intent
toresolve
problem
Corporate
ethicalvalues
Sparksand
Hunt(1998)
Ethical
decision-
makingtheory
and
principles
ofethical
sensitivity
Ethical
ideology:
relativ
ism
(IV)
Subject
type
(IV)
Ethical
sensitivity
Ethicalsensitivity
(DV)
Researchcourse
(IV)
Socialization
-Organizational(IV)
-Professional(IV)
Perspectiv
etaking
(IV)
Emotional
contagion
(IV)
Treise,Weigold,
Conna,and
Garrison(1994)
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;292
Ethical
ideology
Evaluationprogram
contentforchild
ren
Idealism
(IV)
Relativism
(IV)
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
participants
recruitedfrom
alargemallin
southeastern
U.S.A.
Walkerand
Frimer
(2007)
Theoriesof
moral
developm
ent,moral
actio
n,personality
principles
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey
andfollo
w-
upinterview
(which
was
coded);
267moral
exem
plarswho
wererecipientsof
anatio
nalaw
ard
Com
munionmoral
orientation
(IV)
Agency
orientation
(IV)
Evaluationof
moral
exem
plar
Nurturing
personality
(IV)
Generative
personality
(IV)
Optim
istic
personality
(IV)
Walkeret
al.
(2010)
Situ
ationalist
perspectiveof
social
psychology,
personality
principles
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey
andfollo
w-
upinterview
(which
was
coded);
50moral
exem
plarswho
wererecipientsof
anatio
nalaw
ard
Com
munionmoral
orientation
(IV)
Agency
orientation
(IV)
Evaluationof
moral
exem
plar
Wilson
(2003)
Socialdominance
theory,p
rinciples
ofethicalideology
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;160
undergraduate
students
Ethical
ideology
Gender(IV)
Socialdominance
orientation
-Idealism
(IV)
Age
(IV)
-Relativism
(IV)
Yetmar
and
Eastm
an(2000)
Principlesof
ethical
sensitivity,ethical
ideology,and
ethical
decision
making
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;870
Certifi
edPublic
Accountants
recruitedfrom
the
Institu
tefor
Certifi
edPublic
Accountants
Ethical
ideology
Roleconfl
ict(IV)
Ethical
evaluatio
n-Idealism
(IV)
Roleam
biguity
(IV)
-Relativism
(IV)
Jobsatisfaction
(IV)
Professional
commitm
ent(IV)
Zhang
and
Gow
an(2012)
Person-organizatio
nfittheory
and
Study
1:Cross-
sectional,
single-source,
Perceived
company
performance
Ethical
predispositio
nApplicantattractio
nto
theorganizatio
n
(Contin
ues)
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
2.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
themoral
self
principles
ofethical
predispositio
nscenario-based
survey;201
undergraduate
students
Study
2:Cross-
sectional,
single-source,
scenario-based
survey;66
undergraduate
students
-Economic
(IV)
-Utilitarianism
(Z)
Probabilityof
acceptingthe
joboffer
-Legal
(IV)
-Formalism
(Z)
-Social
responsibility(IV)
Machiavellianism
(IV)
Note:
Moral
selfvariablesthat
also
representdependentvariablesin
thestudiesareindicatedwith
theDV
designationandarerepeated
inthe“dependent
variable”column.
IV=independentvariable;DV=dependentvariable;M
=mediatorvariable;Z=moderator
variable.
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
3.Empiricalworkon
self-conscious
moral
orientation.
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
selfvariable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
esOutcomevariables
ofthemoral
self
Ameenet
al.
(1996)
Socialization
principles
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source,
scenario-based
survey;285
undergraduate
students
Gender(IV)
Ethical
sensitivity
toquestio
nable
activ
ities
(DV)
Ethicalsensitivity
toquestio
nable
activ
ities
Blodgettetal.
(2001)
Ethical
decision-
makingtheory
and
principles
ofcultu
raldifferences
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source,
scenario-based
survey;from
TaiwaneseandU.S.
managersfrom
12differentcompanies
in3cities
Pow
erdistance
(IV)
Ethical
sensitivity
for
Ethical
sensitivity
Uncertainty
avoidance(IV)
-The
company
(DV)
-For
thecompany
Individualism
(IV)
-Customers(D
V)
-For
custom
ers
-Com
petitors(D
V)
-For
competitors
-Colleagues(D
V)
-For
colleagues
Lützénet
al.
(2010)
Stresstheory;
principles
ofethicalclim
ateand
moral
sensitivity
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;49
nurses
from
aconvenient
sample
Moral
sensitivity
(IV)
Moral
clim
ate(IV)
Moral
stress
Mortonet
al.
(2006)
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;149
medical
students
Spiritual
maturity
(IV)
Moral
sensitivity
(M)
Moral
reasoning
Ozdogan
and
Eser(2007)
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;667
undergraduate
students
Gender(IV)
Ethical
sensitivity
(DV)
Ethical
sensitivity
College
major
(IV)
Age
(IV)
Grade
(IV)
Fam
ilyincome(IV)
School
ownership
(IV)
(Contin
ues)
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
3.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
selfvariable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
esOutcomevariables
ofthemoral
self
Reynolds
(2008)
Study
1:Item
developm
entfor
moral
attentiveness
measure:cross-
sectional,single-
source
survey;123
undergraduate
students
Moral
attentiveness
Correlates
Study
2:Validity
evidence:241
undergraduates
-Perceptual(IV)
-Normlessness
Study
3:Cross-
sectional,single-
source
survey;
242managers
recruitedfrom
StudyResponse.com
-Reflectiv
e(IV)
-Nurturance
Study
4:Cross-
sectional,single-
source
survey;159
MBA
students
-Moral
identity
Study
5:Cross-
sectional,single-
source
survey;74
undergraduates
and81
MBAs
-Agreeableness
-Conscientiousness
Moral
behavior
Moral
awareness
Sparksand
Hunt(1998)
Ethical
decision-
makingtheory
andprinciples
ofethicalsensitivity
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;188
marketin
gresearch
practitioners
recruitedfrom
the
mem
bershipof
the
American
Marketin
gAssociatio
n
Student
vs.
practitioner(IV)
Ethical
ideology:
relativ
ism
(IV)
Ethical
sensitivity
Coursein
marketin
gresearch
(IV)
Ethical
sensitivity
(DV)
Organizational
socialization
(IV)
Professional
socialization
(IV)
Perspectiv
etaking
(IV)
Emotional
contagion
(IV)
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Whitakerand
Godwin
(2013)
Social-cognitive
theory
andprinciples
ofmoralim
agination
Cross-sectio
nal,
multi-source
data;
162supervisor–
subordinatedyads;
subordinates
were
undergraduate
studentsworking
atleastpart-tim
eand
provided
perm
ission
fortheresearchers
tocontacttheir
supervisors;the
subordinatesurvey
was
scenario-based;
supervisorsreported
onsubordinate
creativ
ity
Moral
attentiveness(IV)
Employee
creativ
ity(Z)
Moral
imagination
Wurthmann
(2013)
Social-cognitive
theory
andprinciples
ofcognitive
moral
developm
ent
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;224
undergraduate
students
Educatio
nin
business
ethics
(IV)
Moral
attentiveness
Perceptions
ofthe
role
ofethics
and
social
responsibility
-Reflectiv
e(M
)
-Perceptual(M
)
Note:
Moral
selfvariablesthat
also
representdependentvariablesin
thestudiesareindicatedwith
theDV
designationandarerepeated
inthe“dependent
variable”column.
IV=independentvariable;DV=dependentvariable;M
=mediatorvariable;Z=moderator
variable.
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
perceptual moral attentiveness (“a perceptual aspect in which information is automatically colored as it is encoun-tered” [p. 1028] by individuals’ experiences) and reflective moral attentiveness (“a more intentional reflective aspectby which the individual uses morality to reflect on and examine experience” [p. 1028]).
Self-conscious moral emotionsAlthough there are different families of moral emotions, such as other-condemning emotions of anger and disgust,self-conscious moral emotions are uniquely tied to the moral self because they occur when people judge themselvesrelative to their internalized moral standards (Haidt, 2003; Leary & Tangney, 2012). Like other moral emotions, self-conscious moral emotions emerge from situations in which others are at risk or are harmed (Haidt, 2003). However,self-conscious moral emotions derive from self-reflection on the moral acceptability of one’s anticipated or engagedbehavior. These self-reflective processes can occur consciously or intuitively, beneath the level of awareness (Haidt,2003; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). The focus on self-reflection and monitoring makes these emotions anintegral part of the moral self (Tangney et al., 2007). Although these emotions are important to one’s sense of selfand identity (i.e., the “having” side; Peterson & Seligman, 2004), when experienced, they motivate and regulatebehavior (i.e., the “doing” side; Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). We review four primary self-conscious moralemotions: guilt, shame, pride, and embarrassment (Table 4). Guilt is experienced when one is the cause or antici-pated cause of others’ suffering or harm. Shame is experienced by a self-appraised wrong or defect with one’s senseof self. Pride is experienced when the person “is responsible for a socially valued outcome or for being a sociallyvalued person” (Mascolo & Fischer, 1995, p. 66). Embarrassment is experienced when aspects of one’s self andsocial identity are damaged or threatened.
Moral strengthMoral strength is the capacity and conation (impetus to act) to achieve moral ends and is a category associated withthe “doing” side of the moral self. For instance, moral character reflects individuals’ enduring moral qualities thatpromote upholding moral principles (Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2006). Other moral strength constructsinclude moral attitudes (Jackson et al., 2008), moral confidence (Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006), moral chronicity(Narvaez et al., 2006), and moral conviction (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Recent work has examined moralpotency (Hannah & Avolio, 2010; Hannah, Avolio, & May, 2011), which is a psychological state involving a senseof ownership over the moral aspects of one’s environment (moral ownership), reinforced by beliefs in the ability toact to achieve moral purposes in that domain (moral efficacy), and the courage to perform ethically in the face ofadversity and persevere through challenges (moral courage). Research has also assessed individuals’ duty orienta-tion, which is a state-like volitional orientation to loyally serve and faithfully support other members of the group,to strive and sacrifice to accomplish the tasks and missions of the group, and to honor its codes and principles(Hannah, Jennings, Bluhm, Peng, & Schaubroeck, 2013). Each of these moral strength concepts reflects the intensitywith which individuals rely on and seek to integrate moral notions in their behavior (Table 5).
Antecedents of the moral self
Moral self theory (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984) draws from self-regulation and social-cognition principles(Bandura, 1991, 1999; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996) to explain how the moral self is basedon individual characteristics and social interactions with others. In other words, central factors of the person and so-cial interactions with others that have moral implications accentuate morality in one’s sense of self. Thus, we reviewempirical work on individual characteristics and social factors as antecedents of the moral self.
Individual characteristicsResearchers have attempted to understand how certain individual characteristics mold one’s sense of morality.Although research suggests that age does not influence moral centrality (Krettenauer, 2011), culture-dependent
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
4.Empiricalworkon
self-conscious
moral
emotions.
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
the
moral
self
Cohen
(201
0)Moral
emotion
theory
Study
2only:
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
scenario-based
survey;172MBA
students
Guilt
(IV)
Empathy
(IV)
Intentionto
engage
inunethical
behavior
Shame(IV)
Perspectiv
e-taking
(IV)
Cohen
etal.
(2011)
Moral
emotion
theory
Study
1:Item
generatio
nof
moral
emotions
measure:
cross-sectional,
single-source,
scenario-based
survey;291
undergraduate
students
Guilt
(IV)
Unethical
business
decision
Study
2:Validity
testof
measure:
cross-sectional,
single-source
scenario-based
survey;862adults
from
natio
nwide
onlin
esubjectpool
Guiltrepair
(IV)
Illegalbehavior
Study
3:Experim
ent;56
MBA
students
Shame(IV)
Deceptio
nShame–
with
draw
al(IV)
Rum
ination
Depressive
symptom
sUnethical
bargaining
behavior
deHooge
etal.(2008)
Moral
emotion
theory
Study
1:Experim
ent;132
undergraduate
students
Imagined
sham
e(IV)
Emotion
influence
Prosocial
behavior
Study
2:Critical
incident
experiment;135
undergraduate
students
Recalledsham
e(IV)
-Exogenous
Prosocial
tendency
Experienced
sham
e(IV)
Induced
sham
e(IV)
-Endogenous
Socialvalue
orientation
(Contin
ues)
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
4.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
the
moral
self
Study
3:Experim
ent;163
undergraduate
students
Study
4:Scenario-
basedexperiment;
150undergraduate
students
deHooge
etal.(2007)
Moral
emotion
theory
and
gametheory
Experim
ent;142
undergraduate
students
Guilt
(IV)
Prosocial
orproself
orientation
(Z)
Cooperatio
nShame(IV)
Cooperatio
ntendency
Else-Quest
etal.(2012)
Moral
emotions
andem
otion
theory
Meta-analysisof
22,665
articles
Gender(IV)
Guilt
(DV)
Guilt
Ethnicity
(IV)
Shame(D
V)
Shame
Age
(IV)
Authentic
pride(D
V)
Authentic
pride
Measure
scale
type
(IV)
Hubristic
pride(D
V)
Hubristic
pride
Dom
ainof
emotion
(IV)
Embarrassm
ent(D
V)
Embarrassm
ent
Ferguson
etal.(1991)
Moral
emotion
theory
and
principles
ofchild
developm
ent
Interview
methodology;24
fifth-gradechild
ren
Norm
violation
Guilt
(DV)
Guilt
-Moral
transgression(IV)
Shame(D
V)
Shame
-Social
blunder(IV)
Fromson(2006)
Theoriesof
moral
emotion
andstress
Cross-sectio
nal,
sing
le-source
survey
using
criticalincident
technique;
98undergraduate
stud
ents
Recountingself-
discrepancy
conditions(IV)
Guilt
(DV)
Guilt
Shame(D
V)
Shame
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Gausel
etal.(2012)
Moral
emotion
theory;theoriesof
theself(e.g.,
need
tobelong,
self-concept)
Cross-sectio
nal,
sing
le-source
survey;379
participants
Appraisal
Shame(IV)
Feltrejection
(IV)
Shame
-Concern
for
condem
natio
nof
in-group
(IV)
Felt
inferiority
(IV)
With
draw
al
-In-group
defect
(IV)
Contributionto
victim
s(M
)
Prosocial
restitu
tion
In-group
identifi
catio
n(IV)
Ghatavi
etal.
(2002)
Moral
emotion
theory
Cross-sectio
nal,
sing
le-source
survey;56
outpatientswith
either
acurrentor
pastmajor
depressive
episode
Current
depression
(IV)
State
guilt
(DV)
State
guilt
Past
depression
(IV)
Traitguilt
(DV)
Traitguilt
Moral
standards(D
V)
Moral
standards
State
sham
e(D
V)
State
sham
e
State
guilt
(DV)
State
guilt
State
pride(D
V)
State
pride
Giner-Sorolla
andEspinosa
(2011)
Moral
emotions
theory
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;86
undergraduate
students
Anger
(IV)
State
guilt
(DV)
State
guilt
Disgust
(IV)
Traitguilt
(DV)
Traitguilt
Grasm
icket
al.
(1993)
Moral
emotion
theory,d
eterrence
theory,and
theory
ofsocial
system
s
Tim
e-lagged
(collected
in1982
and1990),single-
source
survey;330
adultsfrom
annual
survey
ofadults
from
Departm
ent
ofSociology
atthe
University
ofOklahom
a
Shameassociated
drunk
driving
(IV)
Pastself-
reported
drunk
driving
(IV)
Self-reported
drunkdriving
Holmqvist
(2008)
Moral
emotion
theory
and
psychopathy
theory
Interview
methodology,
coding
responses;
47youngcrim
inal
offenders,treated
byinstitu
tions
managed
bythe
NationalBoard
ofInstitu
tionalCare
Psychopathy
(IV)
Shame(D
V)
Joy
(IV)
Shameof
crim
inal
behavior
Sadness
(IV)
Anger
(IV)
Fright(IV)
(Contin
ues)
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
4.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
the
moral
self
HongandChiu
(1992)
Psychological
theory
related
toem
otion
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;321
undergraduate
students
Violatin
gmoral
norm
(IV)
Guilt
(DV)
Guilt
Personal
inadequacy
(IV)
Shame(D
V)
Shame
Presenceof
others
(IV)
Personal
responsibilityfor
violation
(IV)
Kim
and
Johnson(2013)
Moral
emotion
theory
and
principles
ofcultu
ral
differences
Cross-sectio
nal,
single
source
scenario-based
survey;355
undergraduate
students
Pride
(IV)
Anger
(IV)
Purchase
intentionfora
social-cause
product
Guilt
(IV)
Empathy
(IV)
Elevatio
n(IV)
National
origin
(Z)
Independentself-
construal(Z)
Interdependent
self-construal
(Z)
Kochanska,
Gross,L
in,and
Nichols(2002)
Theoriesof
socialization,
the
self,and
self-
developm
ent
Tim
e-lagged,
multi-source
surveys/
interviews(coded
observations);112
mothers
with
their
newborn
child
ren
(recruitedviaan
adin
thecommunity
)
Pow
er-assertiv
emotherparenting
style(IV)
Moral
self
(DV)
Development
oftheself
Guilt
(IV)
Ruleviolation
Konstam
etal.(2001)
Moral
emotion
theory
and
principles
offorgiveness
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey,u
sing
criticalincident
orrecalltechnique;
148graduate
students
Guilt
(IV)
Anger
(IV)
Forgiveness
Shame(IV)
Empathy
(IV)
Pride
(IV)
Perspectiv
e-taking
(IV)
Detachm
ent
process(IV)
Gender(Z)
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Krettenauerand
Johnston
(2011)
Moral
emotions
theory
and
principles
ofmoral
self
Cross-sectio
nal,
sing
lesource,
scenario-based
survey;155
teenagers,grades
7through11,w
itha
sampleof
50undergraduate
stud
ents
Context
type
Guilt
(DV)
Guilt
-Prosocial
actio
n(IV)
Pride
(DV)
Pride
-Tem
ptation
(IV)
Self-im
portance
ofmoral
values
(Z)
Other
emotions
(embarrassm
ent,
fear,sadness,
happiness,anger,
satisfaction)
-Antisocial(IV)
Emotion
Laible,Eye,and
Carlo
(2008)
Theoriesof
moral
emotion,
emotion
regulatio
n,andmoral
developm
ent
Cross-sectio
nal,
single
source,
scenario-based
survey;113
adolescents(ages
14–18years)
from
twopublic
high
schools
Parentin
gstyle(IV)
Guilt
(IV)
Emotion
regulatio
n(IV)
Prosocial
behavior
Shame(IV)
Empathy
(IV)
Moral
conduct
Anger
(IV)
McD
anielet
al.
(2010)
Theoriesof
moral
emotion
andmoral
developm
ent
Cross-sectio
nal,
sing
le-source
survey;258
undergraduate
stud
ents
Spirituality
(IV)
Guilt
(DV)
Guilt
Fam
ilyinteractions
(IV)
Shame(D
V)
Shame
Empathy
Mollet
al.
(2011)
Moral
emotion
theory
Clin
ical
observations
and
functio
nal
magnetic
resonanceim
aging
design,integratin
gamoral
sentim
ent
task;33
patients
referred
toby
specialistsin
alarger
observationalstudy
attheclinical
center
ofthe
NationalInstitu
tes
ofHealth
intram
ural
program
Dam
ageto
frontopolar
cortextand
spectalarea
(IV)
Prosocial
moral
emotion(e.g.,
guilt,p
ity,
embarrassm
ent)
(DV)
Prosocial
moral
emotion(e.g.,
guilt,p
ity,and
embarrassm
ent)
(Contin
ues)
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
4.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
the
moral
self
Murrayet
al.
(2007)
Principlesof
spiritu
ality
andsexuality
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;176
undergraduateand
graduate
students
Sexual
attitude(IV)
Guilt
(IV)
Highrisk
sex
Spirituality
(IV)
Shame(IV)
Sex
afteralcohol
consum
ption
Sense
ofalienatio
nfrom
God
(IV)
Sex
with
multip
lepartners
Olth
ofet
al.
(2004)
Moral
emotions
theory
Interview-based
scenarios;206
child
renfrom
3elem
entary
and2
secondaryschools
Emotion-evoking
event(action
vs.identity
threat)(IV)
Guilt
(DV)
Guilt
Shame(D
V)
Shame
Rooset
al.
(2011)
Moral
emotions
theory
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;384
fourth-
andfifth-grade
students
Gender(IV)
Guilt
(DV)
Guilt
Aggressionlevel
towardpeers(IV)
Shame(D
V)
Shame
Peerwitn
ess(IV)
Pride
(DV)
Pride
Victim
disposition
(sad,
angryor
neutral)
(IV)
Anger
Rothschild
etal.(2012)
Psychoanalytic
theory
Study
1:Scenario-
basedexperiment;
114undergraduate
students
Threattype
Guilt
(IV)
Personal
control(IV)
Scapegoating
Study
2:Not
applicable
toreview
Value
threat
(IV)
Environmental
advocacy
Study
3:Scenario-
basedexperiment;
64undergraduate
students
Control
threat
(IV)
Nothreat
(IV)
Viable
scapegoatin
gtarget
available(IV)
Non-viable
scapegoatin
gtarget
available(IV)
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
StetsandCarter
(2012)
Control
system
sapproach
ofidentitytheory
Tim
e-lagged,
single-source
survey;369
undergraduate
students
Moral
meanings(IV)
Moral
identity
Moral
identity
discrepancy
(M)
Guilt
Feelin
gsrule
(IV)
-Internalization
(IV)
Moral
behavior
(M)
Shame
-Sym
bolization
(IV)
Guilt
(DV)
Shame(D
V)
Stuew
iget
al.
(2010)
Moral
emotions
theory
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;Sam
ple1:
250undergraduate
students;S
ample2:
234early
adolescents;
Sam
ple3:
507
pre-
andpost-trial
inmates
held
ina
metropolitan
area
county
jail;
Sam
ple
4:250at-riskyouth
inmiddle
adolescence
Guilt
(IV)
Externalization
ofblam
e(M
)Aggression
Shame(IV)
Empathetic
concern
(M)
Stuew
iget
al.(2009)
Moral
emotion
theory
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;368
pre-
andpost-trail
inmates
held
in1000-bed
metropolitan
area
county
jail
Guilt
proneness(IV)
Sym
ptom
sof
alcohol
dependence
(IV)
HIV
status
Shame
proneness(IV)
Risky
needle
use
Risky
sexual
behavior
Tangney
(1991)
Moral
emotion
theory
Study
1:Cross-
sectional,single-
source
survey;101
undergraduate
students
Empathy
(IV)
Guilt
(IV)
Study
2:Cross-
sectional,single-
source
survey;97
undergraduate
students
Cognitiv
eem
pathy
(IV)
Shame(IV)
(Contin
ues)
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
4.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
the
moral
self
Study
3:Cross-
sectional,single-
source
survey;213
undergraduate
students
Emotional
responsiveness
(IV)
Study
4:Cross-
sectional,single-
source
survey;241
undergraduate
students
Affectiv
ecue
discrimination
(IV)
Perspectiv
etaking
(IV)
Fantasy
(IV)
Personal
distress
(IV)
Externalization
(IV)
Detachm
ent(IV)
Tangney
etal.(1996)
Moral
emotions
theory
Cross-sectio
nal,
single
source,
criticalincident
recallsurvey;182
undergraduate
students
Guilt
(IV)
Affectiv
eem
otional
reactio
nsShame(IV)
Self-report
perceptio
ns
Embarrassm
ent(IV)
Socialcontext
perceptio
ns
Note:
Moral
selfvariablesthat
also
representdependentvariablesin
thestudiesareindicatedwith
theDV
designationandarerepeated
inthe“dependent
variable”column.
IV=independentvariable;DV=dependentvariable;M
=mediatorvariable;Z=moderator
variable.
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
5.Empiricalworkon
moral
strength.
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
themoral
self
Hannahand
Avolio
(2010)
Theoriesof
theself
andself-regulation,
andprinciples
ofmoral
judgment
andpotency
Cross-sectio
nal,
multi-source
survey;
2572
U.S.A
rmy
soldiers
assigned
to295squads
with
approxim
ately9
soldiers
persquad
Moral
potency
Adherence
toArm
yvalues
-Moral
courage(IV)
Intentionto
reportothers’
unethicalacts
-Moral
efficacy
(IV)
Tolerance
for
mistreatm
ent
ofothers
-Moralow
nership
(IV)
Tolerance
for
torture
Confrontin
gwrongdoers
Hannah,
Avolio
,andWalum
bwa
(2011)
Social-cognitive
theory
andprinciples
ofauthentic
leadership
Tim
e-lagged,single-
source
survey;162
soldiers
attending
atraining
program
atamajor
U.S.
Arm
yschool
Authentic
leadership
(IV)
Displaysof
moral
courage(M
)Ethical
behavior
Prosocial
behavior
Hannah,
Jennings,
Bluhm
,Peng,
and
Schaubroeck
(2013)
Principlesof
moral
philo
sophy,
virtue
ethics,d
eonance,
andreactance
Study
1/Sam
ple
1a:Cross-sectio
nal,
single-sourcesurvey;
2937
activ
eduty
soldiers
inthe
U.S.A
rmy
Ethical
leadership
(IV)
Dutyorientation
(M)
Organizational
deviance
Study
1/Sam
ple1b:
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-sourcesurvey;
2937
activ
eduty
soldiers
inthe
U.S.A
rmy
Transform
ational
leadership
(IV)
Ethical
behavior
Study
1/Sam
ple2:
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-sourcesurvey;
4043
U.S.A
rmy
NationalGuard
and
3383
U.S.A
rmy
Reservists
(Contin
ues)
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Table
5.(Contin
ued)
Study
Theoryused
Researchdesign
Antecedentsof
themoral
self
Moral
self
variable(s)
Other
variables
studiedon
outcom
es
Outcome
variablesof
themoral
self
Study
2/Sam
ple3:
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-source
survey;2953
civilian
(non-m
ilitary)federal
employeesof
U.S.
government
Study
3/Sam
ple4:
Tim
e-lagged,single-
source
survey;229
full-tim
eem
ployees,
recruitedthrough
Empanelsurvey
service
Study
4/Sam
ple6:
Tim
e-lagged,single-
source
survey;376
soldiers
assigned
toU.S.A
rmyDivision
inNEU.S.A.
Study
5/Sam
ple5:
Tim
e-lagged,single-
source
survey;218
soldiertrainees
from
U.S.A
rmy
Hannahet
al.
(2013)
Social-cognitive
theory
andprinciples
ofmoral
agency
Cross-sectio
nal,
multi-source
survey;
1582
U.S.A
rmy
soldiers
assigned
to24
3squads;only
squads
with
atleast4mem
bers
wereincluded
inanalyses
Abusive
supervision
(IV)
Moral
courage(M
)Identifi
catio
nwith
organizatio
nal
values
(M)
Mistreatm
entof
non-combatants
Workunitabusive
supervision
(IV)
Intentionto
reportothers’
unethicalacts
Jackson
etal.(2008)
Principlesof
cultu
raldifferences
Cross-sectio
nal,
single-sourcesurvey;
602public
school
youths
Country
(China
vs.
U.S.A.)
(IV)
Moral
attitude
Gender(IV)
Acceptability
ofmoral
onlin
ebehavior
P. L JENNINGS ET AL.
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
Krettenauerand
Eichler
(2006)
Principlesof
moral
emotionandchild
developm
ent
Sem
i-structured
interviewspresentin
gparticipantswith
vignettes;200
adolescents
Meta-ethicalstance/
judgment(IV)
Con
fidencein
moral
judgment(D
V)
Self-attributed
moral
emotions
(IV)
Con
fidencein
moral
judgment
Delinquent
behavior
Narvaez
etal.
(2006)
Socialinform
ation
processing
and
social-cognitiv
etheory
Study
1:Experim
ent;
254undergraduate
students
Moral
inference(IV)
Moral
chronicity
(IV)
Processingstyle(Z)
Recallabout
ethicalbehavior
Study
2:Scenario-
basedexperiment;
120undergraduate
students
Decisionprobe(Z)
Tim
eto
make
inferenceof
behavior
Skitka
etal.(2005)
Principlesof
moral
convictio
nor
mandatesandattitude
strength
theory
Study
1:Cross-sec-
tional,single-source,
scenario-based
exper-
iment;91
individuals
who
wererecruited
from
public
places
(e.g.,airport,bus
term
inal,and
Amtrak
station)
Moral
convictio
n(IV)
Sourcetype
(friendvs.d
istant
relatio
nship)
(Z)
Socialdistance
from
attitudinally
dissim
ilarother
Study
2:Cross-
sectional,single-
source,scenario-
basedexperiment;82
individualswho
were
recruitedfrom
public
places
(e.g.,airport,
busterm
inal,and
Amtrak
station)
Physicaldistance
from
attitudinally
dissim
ilarother
Study
3:Experim
ent;
80undergraduate
students
Intoleranceof
dissim
ilarother
Note:
Moral
selfvariablesthat
also
representdependentvariablesin
thestudiesareindicatedwith
theDV
designationandarerepeated
inthe“dependent
variable”column.
IV=independentvariable;DV=dependentvariable;M
=mediatorvariable;Z=moderator
variable.
THE MORAL SELF
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job
dispositional traits do.1 For example, Eastern cultures and cultural characteristics (e.g., power distance and uncer-tainty avoidance) more strongly influence moral self constructs (e.g., ethical ideology, Singhapakdi, Marta, Rao,& Cicic, 2001; moral attitudes, Jackson et al., 2008; moral sensitivity, Blodgett, Lu, Rose, & Vitell, 2001) thanWestern cultures and cultural characteristics (e.g., individualism/masculinity). A review of the influence ofindividual differences on the moral self suggests that individual differences have implications for behavioral ethicsin multi-cultural workplaces, especially given widespread globalization and increasingly frequent interactionsbetween organizations’ members across cultures.Gender has also been widely studied. Socialization principles suggest that women should be more concerned with
others and so they are generally stereotyped as having stronger moral qualities than men. Some research supportsthese ideas, showing that women are more ethically sensitive than men (Ameen, Guffey, & McMillan, 1996;Ozdogan & Eser, 2007) and experience guilt and shame more so than men, who are more likely to experience pride(Roos, Salmivalli, & Hodges, 2011). However, a meta-analysis (Else-Quest, Higgins, Allison, & Morton, 2012)demonstrated that such stereotypes lack robustness in terms of self-conscious moral emotions. Results revealedsmall gender differences for guilt and shame, yet gender similarities for embarrassment, authentic pride, and hubris-tic pride. This meta-analysis also revealed that gender differences depend on ethnicity (stronger gender effects forWhite samples), the type of measure used (stronger gender effects for trait versus state scales, rather than measuresbased on situations or scenarios), and the domain of the emotion (e.g., body, sex, and food). Thus, results suggestthat the influence of gender on the moral self is nuanced.Further, studies have shown that an actor’s past behavior and experienced emotions more strongly influence the
“doing” side than the “having” side of the moral self. For instance, moral inferences strengthen moral chronicity(Narvaez et al., 2006). Further, Pratt, Hunsberger, Pancer, and Alisat (2003) found that community involvementenhances individuals’ moral self-ideals (a moral centrality concept). However, our review of research examiningmoral identity highlighted differences in effects. For instance, Jordan, Mullen, and Murnighan (2011) found thatrecalling past moral acts positively influenced individuals’ symbolization moral identity (i.e., the “doing” side)and recalling past immoral acts negatively influenced symbolization moral identity; however, the results suggestrecalling either past moral or immoral acts does not influence internalization moral identity (i.e., the “having” side).Jordan et al. (2011) concluded that their work demonstrates the compensatory nature of past (im)moral behavior.Because symbolization represents the “doing” side of the moral self, these findings suggest that individuals seekto maintain consistent self-images with their past behavior. Specifically, moral recollections strengthen the moralself, whereas immoral recollections engender a stronger sense of incompleteness, which increases moral strivings.These findings imply that organizational socialization programs and cultures that promote ethical behaviors earlyin members’ tenure might influence self-consistency motives and moral striving.Research has found that self-conscious moral emotions—another active, “doing” aspect of the moral self—are also
strongly influenced by behavior. Unethical actions (I did something bad) have been shown to invoke guilt, but acts thatreflect poorly on one’s identity (I am bad) invoke shame (e.g., Ferguson, Stegge, & Damhuis, 1991; Fromson, 2006;Hong & Chiu, 1992; Olthof, Ferguson, Bloemers, & Deij, 2004; Rothschild, Landau, Sullivan, & Keefer, 2012; Stets& Carter, 2012; Tangney, 1991). Further, prosocial acts following a moral transgression have been found to invokepride but not guilt (Krettenauer & Johnston, 2011), and in considering moral norm violations, anger invokes guiltwhereas disgust invokes shame (Giner-Sorolla & Espinosa, 2011). Research has shown a similar pattern in groups:an appraisal of the in-group as holding a moral defect predicts felt shame (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2012).Differences in the “having” and “doing” side of the moral self have also emerged on the influence of religiosity, the
degree to which an individual actively adheres to a religion (Allport & Ross, 1967). Religiosity as a general trait hasbeen found to influence moral self “having” constructs (i.e., moral centrality, Kurpis, Beqiri, & Helgeson, 2008; moralsensitivity, Morton et al., 2006) and “doing” constructs (guilt, McDaniel, Grice, & Eason, 2010; Murray, Ciarrocchi, &
1We recognize that culture is generally considered a social context that influences individuals’ behavioral tendencies. However, we address thesespecific studies within the set of antecedents that focus on individual characteristics because they specifically examine personality traits associatedwith cultural differences (e.g., power distance and individualism).
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Murray-Swank, 2007; shame, Murray et al., 2007). However, when more active versus passive religiosity concepts areexamined, differences emerge. For instance, religious commitment, but not religious involvement, has been shown topositively influence internalization moral identity (Hardy, Walker, Rackham, & Olsen, 2012). Further, Vitell et al.(2009) examined intrinsic religiosity (inherent goals of the person’s religious tradition) and extrinsic religiosity (utilitar-ian motivations underlying the person’s religious behavior). They found that intrinsic religiosity positively influencedboth dimensions of moral identity, whereas extrinsic religiosity negatively influenced only internalization. They alsofound that self-control did not mediate the effects on internalization but fully mediated the negative effects of extrinsicreligiosity on moral identity symbolization. They concluded that extrinsic religiosity depletes one’s self-control, whichexplains its negative influence on symbolic moral action. As approximately 84 percent of the world’s population and,therefore, labor pool formally identifies with a religion (PewResearch, 2012), organizational researchers should furtherinvestigate the differential effects of religiosity on the moral self.A last category of antecedents involves individuals’mental health, which has been shown to influence the “doing”
side of the moral self. For instance, Ghatavi, Nicolson, MacDonald, Osher, and Levitt (2002) found that individualswho were highly depressed experienced more enduring emotions of guilt and shame, and lower levels of pride. Theyalso found that trait guilt was not influenced by depression. Work in this area has yet to investigate whether and howmental impairments influence how individuals define themselves morally (the “having” side).
Social factorsSome work in social psychology has focused on various non-work social influences of the moral self (e.g., parents,Hardy, Bhattacharjee, Reed, & Aquino, 2010; socialization, Pratt et al., 2003; college coursework, Ozdogan & Eser,2007), but limited research attention has been given to organizational antecedents. This work has highlighted the influ-ence of organizational context on both the “having” and “doing” sides of the moral self. For example, research hasshown that perceptions of ethical culture positively influence employees’ moral efficacy (Schaubroeck, Hannah,et al., 2012) and that employees who experience ethics-oriented socialization are more ethically sensitive (Sparks &Hunt, 1998). Organizational structure has also been shown to influence ethical predispositions (Schminke, 2001). In par-ticular, more mechanistic and rigid structures, rather than organic and flatter structures, positively influence employees’level of formalism and utilitarianism. Similarly, employees within public rather than private organizations have beenfound to hold stronger moral self-images (Van der Wal & de Graaf, 2006). Further, Kouchaki (2011) found that knowl-edge about past non-prejudicial hiring actions made by other members of an individual’s group enhanced individuals’internalization moral identity, which then gave them moral license to act immorally in future hiring actions.Finally, leaders are a strong influence. Studies have shown that positive and ethical leader behaviors strengthen
different aspects of employees’ moral self, whereas negative and unethical leader behaviors weaken employees’moral self. For example, the literature suggests that leaders’ initiating and consideration styles strengthen followers’utilitarianism and formalism tendencies (Schminke & Wells, 1999), authentic leadership positively influencesfollowers’ moral courage (Hannah, Avolio, & Walumbwa, 2011), ethical and transformational leadership positivelyinfluences followers’ duty orientation (Hannah, Jennings, et al., 2013), ethical leadership increases followers’ moralefficacy (Schaubroeck, Hannah, et al., 2012), and transformational and transactional leadership positively influencesinternalization moral identity, with transformational leadership having a stronger influence (Weichun, Riggio,Avolio, & Sosik, 2011). Conversely, abusive leader behavior has been shown to deplete followers’ moral courageand their internalization of organizational values (Hannah, Schaubroeck et al., 2013).
Summary of the antecedents to the moral selfResearch supports the premise that individual and social factors influence and shape the moral self. The findingsreviewed show that ethical aspects of the social context, social role models, and behavioral norms strengthen both the“having” and “doing” sides of the moral self. However, we found a distinct pattern in the literature associated withthe influence of individual characteristics.When characteristics involve how individuals define themselves (e.g., gender,cultural background, and culture), such factors influence the “having” side of the moral self (i.e., internalized aspects ofmoral centrality, moral judgment disposition, and self-conscious moral orientation) and more weakly influence the
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“doing” side of the moral self (i.e., self-conscious moral emotions). In contrast, individuals’ engaged behavior, emo-tions, active experiences, and context more strongly influence the “doing” side of the moral self (i.e., symbolizationmoral identity, self-conscious moral emotions, and moral strength). Thus, the findings align with moral self theory(Aquino & Freeman, 2009; Bandura, 1991; Harter, 1999). The construction of the “having” side of the moral self seemsto be more strongly influenced by self-defining characteristics and through social interactions. The construction of the“doing” side of the moral self is also influenced by social interactions but seems to be more strongly influenced byself-relevant cognitions and evaluations in terms of agentic experiences.At first glance, our review suggests that the “doing” side of the moral self is more malleable to organizations, in
that organizational decision makers can create contexts (e.g., structures, climate, and leader or coworker rolemodels) that can influence and strengthen employees’ moral self. However, we believe that it is important to high-light other work on individuals’ traits, such as the Protestant Work Ethic (see Furnham, 1984, for a review) andspirituality (see Karakas, 2010, for a recent review), which suggest that such traits, especially those linking Protes-tant Work Ethic and religiosity to work, highly influence organizational outcomes. Further, it may also be thatdifferent aspects of organizational life indirectly influence the moral self through specific characteristics of anindividual. For instance, Ghatavi et al. (2002) demonstrated that depression made it less likely for individuals toexperience moral emotions—emotions needed to stimulate more ethical choices and behavior when facing ethicaldilemmas. These findings, along with the general literature on mental health and work (see Warr, 2007, for areview), suggest that organizations can influence employees’ mental health (e.g., depression) by way of workplacestressors. Such findings suggest that a more refined understanding is needed of how organizations influence thevarious individual characteristics that impair or facilitate the self-regulatory functioning of the moral self.We note, however, that our conclusions concerning the antecedents of the moral self should be considered in light
of the fact that the studies we review hold a static and variable-centric approach to examining the moral self. That is,studies have not examined how the “having” and “doing” side of the moral self influence each other or whether theyhold reciprocal effects. Such a dynamic approach is needed to better understand the underlying mechanisms andprocesses associated with the construction and functioning of the moral self.
Consequences of the moral self
Research exploring the consequences of the moral self has integrated moral self theory (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002;Blasi, 1984) with principles about social identity (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979), self-regulation, and social cognition(e.g., Bandura, 1991, 1999). The general premise of these theories is that individuals seek to maintain consistencywith their moral self-concepts and, thus, are motivated to align their behavior in various situations with the principlesof morality they hold. We review work on three categories of consequences: (i) decision making and motivationalstates, (ii) behavioral intentions and behavior, and (iii) emotions.
Decision making and motivational statesResearch on decision making and motivational states explains how the moral self inspires an individual to be a moralperson. One general finding is that the moral self heightens the salience of moral principles and ethical characteris-tics of a situation. For example, research has found that reflective moral attentiveness, moral awareness, idealism,and moral identity (both internalization and symbolization) enhance moral sensitivity (Daniels, Diddams, & VanDuzer, 2011; Reynolds, 2008; Sparks & Hunt, 1998) and attention to moral issues (Reynolds, 2008). Further, studieshave shown that moral sensitivity positively relates to moral stress (Lützén, Blom, Ewalds-Kvist, & Winch, 2010).Although one study failed to find a significant influence of the moral self (i.e., ethical ideology, Yetmar &
Eastman, 2000) on ethical decision making, most studies have. For instance, internalization moral identity has beenfound to positively influence deontological and utilitarian moral judgments (Conway & Gawronski, 2013) andethical beliefs (McFerran, Aquino, & Duffy, 2010). Further, research has found that moral judgment disposition(measured in various ways; Brady & Wheeler, 1996; Fisher, Woodbine, & Fullerton, 2003; Forsyth, 1980, 1985;
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McFerran et al., 2010; Schminke, 1997) and moral sensitivity (Morton et al., 2006) positively relate to moral reason-ing and ethical judgments.Studies have shown that moral self constructs also influence motivational states. For instance, moral attentiveness
is positively related to moral imagination, particularly for employees who are more creative (Whitaker & Godwin,2013). Research on moral judgment dispositions has shown that, compared with idealists, relativists (given theirfocus on aspects of the situation and rejection of moral absolutes) are more goal-oriented (Luzadis & Gerhardt,2011). Studies on moral communion have shown that individuals holding both communion and agency, given thisbalance of both an “other” and “self” focus, are more likely to construe critical life events redemptively, are morefrequently identified as helpers, and report more secure attachments (Frimer, Walker, Dunlop, Lee, & Riches,2011; Walker & Frimer, 2007; Walker, Frimer, & Dunlop, 2010). Last, research on self-conscious moral emotions(Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996) has shown that experienced shame heightens a sense of isolation andinferiority, motivating individuals to hide and be less motivated to admit wrongdoing, whereas experienced guiltand shame enhance responsibility and regret for moral transgressions.Further, studies have found that moral centrality influences how individuals perceive and accept others. Moral
centrality heightens individuals’ concern for others (Doron, Sar-El, & Mikulincer, 2012; Hardy et al., 2010), makesindividuals more effective at socializing (Kochanska, Koenig, Barry, Kim, & Yoon, 2010), and decreases socialdominance orientation (Hardy et al., 2010). Similarly, Reed and Aquino (2003) found that internalization moralidentity (but not symbolization) increases individuals’ moral regard for and willingness to exchange resources with,and donate to, out-group members, and that it lessens desires to wish harm to out-group members. Last, research hasshown that moral centrality impairs antisocial attitudes and enhances prosocial attitudes (Lee, Whitehead,Ntoumanis, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2008; Sage, Kavussanu, & Duda, 2006).
Behaviors and behavioral intentionsMoral self theory suggests that individuals with a strong moral self are more inclined to act ethically and refrain fromunethical behavior. Yet, consistent support for this premise has only been found with constructs associated with the“having” side of the moral self (i.e., commitment to moral self, internalization moral identity, moral values, moraljudgment dispositions, and perceptual moral attentiveness).For instance, although only a small number of studies have examined the influence of moral self constructs using data
fromworking adults (i.e., Brebels, De Cremer, Van Dijke, & Van Hiel, 2011; Hannah&Avolio, 2010; Hannah, Avolio,&Walumbwa, 2011; Hannah, Jennings, et al., 2013; Hannah, Schaubroeck, et al., 2013;Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum, &Kuenzi, 2012; Reynolds, 2008; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007; McFerran et al., 2010; Vitell, Keith, & Mathur, 2011), byand large, empirical findings have shown that “having” moral self constructs motivate ethical and prosocial intentionsand behavior. In particular, research has found that “having” moral self-concepts positively influence cooperativebehavior (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009), discomfort with others being harmed (Kavussanu, Willoughby, & Ring,2012), donations and donation intentions (Aquino, McFerran, & Laven, 2011; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Conway & Peetz,2012; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Sachdeva et al., 2009; Winterich, Mittal, & Ross, 2009), ethical behavior and intentions(Aquino et al., 2011; Frimer &Walker, 2009; Gausel et al., 2012; Johnston &Krettenauer, 2011; Konstam, Chernoff, &Deveney, 2001; Kurpis et al., 2008; Lu & Chang, 2011; Michaelidou & Hassan, 2008; Reynolds, 2008; Reynolds &Ceranic, 2007; Rosenberg, 1987; Stets & Carter, 2012; Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, Harty, &McCloskey, 2010; Stuewig,Tangney, Mashek, Forkner, & Dearing, 2009), organizational citizenship behavior (McFerran et al., 2010), andvolunteerism (Aquino & Reed, 2002). However, “having”moral self constructs have been found to negatively influenceunethical and counterproductive intentions and behavior, such as aggression (Hardy et al., 2012; Rancer, Kosberg, &Silvestri, 1992), antisocial behavior (Barriga, Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001; Johnston & Krettenauer, 2011),dangerous driving (Rosenbloom, Ben-Eliyahu, & Nemrodov, 2009), retaliation (Rupp & Bell, 2010), social dominancebehavior (Wilson, 2003), and intentions for and engagement in unethical behavior (Mayer et al., 2012; Perugini &Leone, 2009; Sachdeva et al., 2009; Stets & Carter, 2011).Less consistent empirical findings emerged for research investigating the influence of “doing” side moral self
constructs on behaviors and intentions. A relatively steady pattern of results demonstrated that self-conscious moral
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emotions (i.e., guilt and pride) and moral strength (i.e., moral chronicity and moral character) positively influenceethical behavior and intentions (Cohen, 2010; De Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2007; Kim & Johnson,2013; Narvaez et al., 2006) and negatively influence unethical and counterproductive behavior and intentions (e.g.,self-reported drunk driving, Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993; scapegoating, Rothschild et al., 2012). Still,researchers have found that the effects of self-conscious moral emotions are contingent on moderating and mediatingfactors. For instance, Cohen, Wolf, Panter, and Insko (2011) examined measurement differences in guilt and shameon the basis of negative self-evaluation (NSE) measures and action tendency measures. Both guilt measures werehighly correlated and negatively influenced unethical decision making. Both shame measures were positively relatedto poor psychological functioning (e.g., neuroticism, personal distress, and low self-esteem), but they were weaklycorrelated with one another, and effects on unethical decision making did not converge. Shame-NSE was negativelyrelated to unethical decision making, whereas shame-action tendency was not. Further, de Hooge, Breugelmans, andZeelenberg (2008) predicted and found that experiencing shame motivated prosocial behavior when that felt shamewas relevant for the decision at hand, whereas when shame was not relevant, the effects did not hold.Regarding moral strength, Hannah and colleagues (Hannah & Avolio, 2010; Hannah et al., 2011; Hannah,
Schaubroeck, et al., 2013) found the effects of moral strength depend on leaders’ behavior. For instance, the effectsof moral potency (i.e., moral ownership, moral efficacy, and moral courage) on subjects’ adherence to organizationalvalues, intentions to report others’ (un)ethical acts, and tolerance for mistreating others depends on whether leadersare engaged in ethical acts (Hannah & Avolio, 2010). Further, moral courage has been found to mediate the effectsof leader behaviors (authentic leadership, Hannah et al., 2011; abusive supervision, Hannah, Schaubroeck, et al.,2013) on followers’ ethical and unethical behaviors. Research has also found that followers’ duty orientationmediates the positive relationships between ethical and transformational leadership and ethical behavior, as wellas the negative relationships between ethical and transformational leadership and workplace deviance (Hannah,Jennings, et al., 2013).Differing effects on behaviors and intentions have appeared for moral identity, however, depending on how moral
identity is conceptualized and whether moderators and mediators are considered. For example, Reynolds andCeranic (2007) found that symbolization, but not internalization, influenced charitable giving. Other work hasrevealed non-significant effects for symbolization on prosocial and ethical intentions and behavior (donations anddonation intentions, Aquino et al., 2011; Reed & Aquino, 2003; prosocial intentions, Aquino et al., 2011; organiza-tional citizenship behavior, McFerran et al., 2010). Further, when internalization and symbolization were combinedinto a moral identity composite, the effects did not influence ethical and prosocial behavior unless moderators wereconsidered (e.g., regulatory focus, Brebels et al., 2011; emotion-regulation knowledge, Côté, DeCelles, McCarthy,Van Kleef, & Hideg, 2011). For instance, Reynolds and Ceranic (2007) found that internalization moral identity hadpositive effects on moral behavior and decisions for individuals high in consequentialism or low in formalism, butnegative effects on moral behavior and decisions for individuals low in consequentialism or high in formalism.Mayer et al. (2012) found that internalization (not symbolization) directly influenced unethical behavior and conflict,whereas internalization and symbolization only marginally (p< .10) and indirectly (via the mediator, ethical leadership)influenced those outcomes.
The moral (dis)engagement of behaviors and behavioral intentions. Within the research examining behavior andbehavioral intentions, some scholars have examined the relationship between the moral self and moral disengage-ment. Moral disengagement occurs when individuals use cognitive strategies to “disengage” from moral principles,allowing unethical behavior to occur without self-sanction (Bandura, 1991, 1999). Empirical work has shown thatthe “having” side of the moral self deters moral disengagement, whereas the “doing” side of the moral self canenhance it. Specifically, internalization moral identity and moral judgment dispositions (i.e., idealism compared withrelativism) negatively influence moral disengagement (Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007; Detert, Treviño, &Sweitzer, 2008; McFerran et al., 2010). In addition, Detert et al. (2008) found that internalization indirectly andnegatively influenced unethical decision making, as mediated by moral disengagement propensity. However, Vitellet al. (2011) found that whereas internalization lessened moral disengagement, symbolization made it more likely.
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Similarly, Skitka et al. (2005) found that moral conviction gave individuals’ license to act badly: individuals with astrong moral conviction socially and physically distanced themselves from attitudinally dissimilar others and weremore intolerant of attitudinally dissimilar others in both intimate (e.g., friend) and distant relationships (e.g., ownerof a store that one frequents). They also found that strong moral convictions lessened individuals’ good will, coop-erativeness, and ability to generate procedural solutions to resolve disagreements.By contrast, Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, and Felps (2009) examined the effects of internalization moral identity
on individuals’ moral “engagement.” Results showed that internalization moral identity positively influenced theaccessibility of individuals’ moral self-concepts, which was positively associated with ethical behavioral intentions(i.e., charitable donations and contributions to public goods) and negatively influenced unethical behavioralintentions (i.e., lying). Situational context also moderated the effects: Priming moral traits strengthened the effects,whereas financial incentives for unethical acts weakened them.
EmotionsOnly a handful of studies have examined the influence of moral self constructs on emotions. In general, this researchhas shown that constructs centering on the “having” side of the moral self (i.e., self-importance of moral values,internalization moral identity, and level of idealism) enhance individuals’ emotional intelligence (Angelidis &Ibrahim, 2011) and increase the likelihood they will experience self-conscious moral emotions (e.g., guilt and pride,Krettenauer & Johnston, 2011) and other-oriented moral emotions (e.g., empathy; Hardy et al., 2012). Other work,however, has found more nuanced effects. For instance, Stets and Carter (2011, 2012) found that moral identity self-discrepancy (self-ratings of moral identity lower than manipulated ratings) provoked negative emotion (Stets &Carter, 2011) and guilt and shame (Stets & Carter, 2012). Further, Aquino et al. (2011) found that high levels ofmoral identity internalization (but not symbolization) strengthened the positive effects of acts of uncommon moralgoodness on moral elevation (a surge of emotions involving admiration and warmth), which in turn motivatedprosocial behavior.
Summary of the consequences of the moral selfOverall, researchers have demonstrated that the moral self exerts a significant influence on a variety of outcomes.Individuals with a strong moral self are more attentive to and motivated to act and make decisions that are ethical.Various moral self constructs also invoke a variety of emotional reactions and strengthen emotional intelligence.Our review suggests that considering moderators and mediators can offer a richer understanding of the effects ofthe moral self. The most notable differences were those between the “having” versus “doing” side of the moralself, specifically for research using Aquino and Reed’s conceptualization and measure of moral identity. Usingthis measure, internalization was positively and consistently related to ethical behaviors and intentions and con-sistently negatively related to unethical and counterproductive behaviors and intentions. Conversely, differencesemerged for symbolization moral identity. When internalization and symbolization were combined into a com-posite measure of moral identity, significant results did not emerge unless moderators were considered (e.g., reg-ulatory focus, self-control, group norms, and ethical leadership). The review also highlights some dysfunctionalaspects of the “doing” side. That is, symbolization moral identity (Vitell et al., 2011) and moral conviction(Skitka et al., 2005) may enable moral licensing, whereby individuals feel justified to behave unethically.Our review also suggests measurement matters. “Having” side constructs hold a more consistent relationship
with attitudes, motives, behavior, and intentions. This makes sense, given the types of moral characteristics thatalign with individuals’ self-conceptions, such as being a caring and compassionate person or someone who is ide-alistic or morally sensitive. Yet, the “doing” side should also be influential, particularly because this side of themoral self involves agency. Of the research on the “doing” side reviewed, studies examining self-conscious moralemotions and moral strength demonstrated that these constructs hold more consistent effects on consequencesthan has moral identity symbolization. The review also shows that self-conscious moral emotions have a stronginfluence on individuals’ attitudes, motives, and behaviors; however, the effects could be bounded by moderators.Similarly, moral strength constructs also have a strong influence on attitudes, motives, and behaviors to achieve
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moral agency, with these effects influenced by moderating or mediating processes. Consistent results were alsofound for moral strength constructs of moral potency and duty orientation on various ethical outcomes across mul-tiple organizational field studies. This research suggests that these forms of moral strength exert strong influenceon behavior by bolstering the “doing” side of the moral self.Primary differences and inconsistent results emerged when researchers examined the “doing” side of moral iden-
tity using Aquino and Reed’s (2002) symbolization moral identity measure. Emphasis on the use of this measure isunderstandable, as it is the dominant moral identity model in the literature. The measure, however, asks whetherparticipants purchase products, wear clothes, and engage in activities characteristic of moral traits (e.g., being caring,compassionate, and fair). These acts may not be the best representation of moral engagement, or they may representmore superficial and less potent motives associated with moral self-presentation in organizations. Because moreconsistent findings were found with self-conscious moral emotions and moral strength, these types of constructsmay have stronger motivational effects.Last, it is important to note that although theoretical models emphasize the process dynamics of the moral self in
which the “having” side informs the “doing” side, research has yet to adequately explore these relationships. Indeed,some studies we review suggest there may be recursive effects across the “having” and “doing” sides of the moralself (e.g., Giner-Sorolla & Espinosa, 2011; Morton et al., 2006). We encourage researchers to examine the processesby which self-defining moral orientations and dispositions affect (and, in turn, may be affected by) the cognitive andaffective self-regulatory capacities for moral action.
The moral self as a moderator variable
In general, research has shown that contexts that reinforce ethical behavior (e.g., ethical culture, Caldwell & Moberg,2007; charitable giving by an organization; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007; recognition of donation behavior, Winterich,Mittal, & Aquino, 2013; priming moral context, Aquino et al., 2009; recognition of a focal actor’s prosocial behavior,Winterich, Aquino, Mittal, & Swartz, 2013) generally influence ethical behavior, particularly for individuals withgreater moral centrality. Contexts that impair self-regulatory functioning or heighten self-interest fuel unethical behavior(observed coworker unethical behavior, O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2011; power, DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic,2012; primed self-interest, Skarlicki & Rupp, 2010; mistreatment, Skarlicki, van Jaarsveld, & Walker, 2008), particu-larly for those with lower moral centrality. Additionally, Hannah and Avolio (2010) found that dimensions of moralstrength can reinforce one another: The positive effects of moral ownership on ethical behavior were further enhancedfor individuals with stronger moral courage; individuals high in both moral courage and moral ownership were morelikely to confront others for their unethical acts.Last, research has shown that moral judgment dispositions hold a strong influence on individuals’ reactions to
various moral dilemmas. For example, Reynolds (2006) found that whereas both utilitarianism and formalismincrease moral awareness, formalists were more apt than utilitarians to recognize norm violations and harmagainst others. Schminke, Ambrose, and Noel (1997) found that formalism made individuals more sensitive toprocedural justice issues (issues involving the fairness of decision-making processes) and utilitarianism madeindividuals more sensitive to distributive justice issues (issues involving the fairness of decision outcomes).Moreover, moral judgment disposition moderates the effects of organizational contexts on behaviors and inten-tions, although results are not always consistent. Although Marta et al. (2012) found that relativism strengthened(and idealism weakened) the relationship between perceived corporate ethical values and workers’ ethical inten-tions, Ruiz-Palomino and Martinez-Cañas (2011) found relativism weakened (and idealism strengthened) theeffect of corporate formal ethical policies on employees’ ethical intentions, and they also found that the effectof ethical leadership on employees’ ethical behavioral intentions was stronger for relativists. Last, Zhang andGowan (2012) found that high formalism strengthened the positive effects of both legal corporate social respon-sibility (CSR) and ethical CSR activities on job applicant attraction, whereas utilitarianism weakened the effectsof economic CSR on job applicant attraction.
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Summary of research on the moral self as a moderatorOur review suggests that the moral self (i.e., moral centrality, moral judgment disposition, and moral strength) serves toreinforce individuals’ ethical stance and enables them to react to different situations more effectively and ethically thanindividuals with a weaker moral self. Those with a strong moral self are also better able to refrain from reactingunethically and destructively across situations. Therefore, the findings show that the moral self motivates individualsto maintain self-consistency, regardless of whether, or how, they define themselves in terms of moral attributions (the“having” side of the moral self) or are motivated by agency (the “doing” side of the moral self).
Concluding thoughts on the empirical studies of the moral self
In general, research supports moral self theory by showing that factors critical to one’s self-definition shape howmorality becomes embedded into the self-concept and self-regulatory functioning, thereby engaging motivationfor self-consistency in moral notions. There were some notable trends, however, that emerged from our review.For instance, we found that the literature largely reflects a variable-centric approach. Even though we attemptedto synthesize this body of work into an integrative model (Figure 1), an unfortunate consequence of the vari-able-centric approach is fragmented findings that are difficult to translate into a dynamic and holistic understand-ing of the structure and functioning of the moral self. Additionally, we observed that the majority of the studies(about 70 percent) adopted Aquino and Reed’s (2002) conceptualization and measures of moral identity. This isnot surprising, given that this seminal work produced one of the first measures of the moral self. An over-reliance onthis conceptualization, however, neglects other aspects of the moral self. The moral content used in this measureemphasizes nine Kantian-like moral traits (being a caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hard-working, honest, and kind person). This limited range of moral content may mask insights about the moral self,particularly in contexts where other moral traits and content (e.g., honor, duty, and virtue) may be valued and impor-tant. A last noticeable trend is that the majority of the studies on the moral self have used samples other than full-timeworking employees or those in organizations. Considering the negative consequences that (un)ethical behavior yieldsto organizations (Treviño et al., 2006), clearly more work is needed using organization-based samples to examinehow organizational factors influence the moral self, as well as the implications of the moral self to behavioral ethicsin organizations. We elaborate on these trends and ideas below.
Emerging Opportunities and Future Directions for Moral Self Research
In this final section of our review, we highlight several emerging opportunities for future research on the moral self,including: (i) the need for more applied research in organizational contexts; (ii) the need for clarity on the “having”side of the moral self with regard to both its content and structure; (iii) the need for clarity on the “doing” side of themoral self with regard to the underlying motivational and regulatory processes; and (iv) the need for a moralintegrative and holistic understanding of the moral self.
Opportunities for research in organizational contexts
Arguably, the most pressing need is for more applied research on the moral self within organizations and with datafrom working adults. By and large, the majority of the studies conducted on the moral self use student samples orscenario studies. The work conducted within organizations or using employee samples suggests that organizationalfactors have a significant influence on employees’ moral self and that the moral self, in turn, significantly affectsorganizationally relevant outcomes. To this end, much of Aquino and colleagues’ research (e.g., Aquino & Becker,
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2005; Hardy et al., 2010; Mayer et al., 2012; Reed et al., 2007; Winterich, Mittal et al., 2013) has focused onidentifying organizationally relevant situational factors that influence moral identity. Although predominatelyconducted in laboratory settings, their research suggests that moral identity can be influenced by an array oforganizationally relevant factors (e.g., ethical climate, financial incentives, and recognition). Additionally, theirresearch highlights how organizations present employees with a variety of morally ambiguous situations that arefraught with conflict between self and organizational interests. Much more research is needed to better understandthe relationship between organizational factors and the moral self.To this point, some research has demonstrated that organizational factors may influence the moral self in unexpected
and, perhaps, detrimental ways. For instance, Schminke (2001) theorized that a strong work context (i.e., mechanisticstructure) would create little need for employees to rely on moral inclinations (their moral self), but he found the oppo-site. Other work has shown the “dark side” of the moral self, which suggests that some contexts may inhibit moral func-tioning and promote dysfunctional behaviors. For example, Skitka et al. (2005) and Vitell et al. (2011) found that astrong moral self, specifically aspects of the “doing” side (moral strength and symbolization moral identity), promoteda sense of superiority, causing intolerance of dissimilar others and impairing good will and cooperativeness. Thus, it ispossible that certain individuals (such as those who believe that they are morally superior or highly idealistic/absolutist)may be inflexible to employees or contexts that oppose their philosophical orientations. These dynamics may alsoexplain why employees sabotage other units or organizational outsiders. More work is needed to shed light on howaspects of organizations and relationships within it (viz. supervisors, coworkers, and customers) strengthen or weakenemployees’ moral self and make employees more or less apt to activate or rely on their moral self.Research is also needed to determine the implications of the moral self for the benefit of organizations beyond ethical
outcomes. Of particular interest is the influence of the moral self on organizational functioning, behaviors, andperformance. In our empirical review, only one study assessed job performance as an outcome (Skarlicki et al.,2008). However, this study did not examine the direct or indirect effects of the moral self on job performance;performance was considered as a distal outcome. Further, although a variety of studies have examined general prosocialacts, far less research examined prosocial work behavior, such as organizational citizenship behavior (see McFerranet al., 2010, for an exception).Last, we know relatively little about the effects of the moral self on collective processes or work outcomes (e.g.,
group-level performance and engagement; organization-level climate). As argued by Klein and Kozlowski (2000), itis important to consider phenomena at different levels of analysis because “findings at one level of analysis do notgeneralize neatly and exactly to other levels of analysis, except under very restrictive circumstances” (p. 213). To besure, very limited research attention has been given to aggregate level phenomena (e.g., Hannah, Schaubroeck, et al.,2013) and its impact on and consequence to moral self constructs.
Emerging opportunities on the “having” side of the moral self
Our review highlights the need for clarity on the “having” side of the moral self with regard to its content and structure.Specifically, researchers have relied on a narrow range of moral content (e.g., specific moral traits, values, principles,ideals, and goals) and a limited dimensional structure (e.g., internalization and symbolization). This narrow focusmay obscure or fail to reveal differences in the construction and functioning of the moral self across individuals.
How does the content of the moral self vary and influence moral functioning?Blasi (1984) emphasized that moral identities can vary in content. That is, moral notions (e.g., moral values, prin-ciples, and ideals) that constitute moral identity vary across individuals. Whereas one person may see being compas-sionate and helpful as central to his or her moral identity, another person may emphasize being fair and just, and yetanother being loyal, dutiful, and self-sacrificing. As our empirical review reveals, different moral judgment disposi-tions embody different moral content; ethical ideology assesses idealistic versus relativistic tendencies, whereas eth-ical predispositions assess utilitarian versus formalistic tendencies. Moreover, Aquino and Reed’s (2002) measures
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focus only on a handful of Kantian traits (e.g., caring, compassionate). Blasi’s arguments suggest that a broaderrange of moral content should be considered in moral self research. In line with these ideas, Haidt (2008) describeda “great narrowing” in which the domain of morality has been reduced to a limited set of concerns related to harmand fairness. He asked researchers to consider a broader range of moral concerns that would include group-focusedmoralities related to loyalty and self-sacrifice, respect, and obedience to authority, as well as sanctity and physicaland spiritual wholesomeness. To Haidt’s point, some deontic traits, such as duty and loyalty, are not included inAquino and Reed’s measures but influence work motivation and behavior (Hannah, Jennings, et al., 2013; Shamir,1991). Certainly, employees are likely driven by moral concerns other than those concerning fairness and justice.As an alternative, Walker and colleagues (e.g., Walker & Hennig, 2004; Walker & Pitts, 1998) suggested that
different trait clusters represent different types of moral exemplars. They identified three distinct types of moralexemplars based on their structure of moral traits: Brave exemplars are identified by a structure that includesintrepid, confident, heroic–strong, dedicated, and self-sacrificial traits; care exemplars are identified by a structurethat includes loving–empathetic, altruistic, and honest–dependable traits; and just exemplars are identified by astructure that includes honest, fair, principled, rational, and conscientious traits. Indeed, the self is highly complexand includes more than traits, such as moral notions associated with social roles, autobiographical narratives, andgoal structures, that should be considered in future research on the moral self (Hill & Roberts, 2010; Lord, Hannah,& Jennings, 2011). Such clusters may inform social learning and role modeling effects of leaders in organizations.
How does the structure of the moral self vary and influence moral functioning?The structure of the moral self is more complex than the one or two dimensions reflected in the constructs wereviewed. Two distinctions are discussed below to extend thinking on the dimensional structure of the moral selfbeyond the current attention to internalization on the “having” side and symbolization on the “doing” side: (i)the distinction between the I-self and Me-self and (ii) the distinction between global and domain-specific moralself-concepts.
The I-self and Me-self distinction.William James (1892/2001) introduced an important distinction between the I-selfand Me-self, which has been overlooked in the moral self literature. The I-self refers to the mental presence of aperson’s sense of self (Harter, 1999). Constructs associated with the I-self are as follows: (i) self-awareness (theappreciation for internal states, needs, thoughts, and emotions); (ii) self-agency (the sense of authorship over one’sthoughts and actions); (iii) self-continuity (the sense of remaining the same person over time); and (iv) self-coherence(a stable sense of the self as a single, coherent, bounded entity) (Harter, 1999). The Me-self refers to perceptions,thoughts, feelings, and beliefs of oneself (Harter, 1999). Constructs associated with the Me-self are as follows: (i)self-knowledge (the beliefs of one’s self); (ii) self-concepts, self-identities, and self-schemas (conceptualizations ofone’s self); and (iii) self-evaluations (judgments about one’s value or worth as a person; e.g., self-esteem, self-worth,and self-efficacy; Baumeister, 1998).Our review shows that scholars have devoted attention to the Me-self, specifically self-concepts and identities,
such as Aquino and Reed’s (2002) model. Yet, aspects of the I-self have important implications for moral func-tioning. Blasi (1993) emphasized that people vary in both the degree to which moral notions are central to theirself-concept (Me-self) and the degree to which they experience morality within their subjective sense of self (I-self).A recent study on virtues and character strengths found the I-self to be central to moral strength (Peterson &Seligman, 2004). This subjective I-self experience entails (i) a sense of authenticity (“this is the real me”); (ii) a de-sire to act with character strength; (iii) a feeling of excitement and invigoration as opposed to exhaustion when usingthe strength; and (iv) positive self-feelings (e.g., subjective well-being, acceptance of oneself, and reverence for life).These subjective I-self experiences are thought to not only be associated with the “doing” side of the moral self (i.e.,moral strength) but are also intrinsic to, and a constituent of, the “having” side of the moral self. For instance, theymay be an important experiential aspect of moral centrality—that is, how the experience of morality becomes centralto one’s self-understanding.
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Further, aspects of the I-self hold promise for understanding the construction and development of the moral self.For example, developed capabilities in the I-self (e.g., self-awareness) directly influence the structure and content ofthe Me-self (e.g., self-knowledge) at any given developmental level (Harter, 1999). Thus, I-self processes andchanges are critical to how and why the content and structure of the Me-self changes. Contemporary developmentalpsychologists have, therefore, embraced I-self and Me-self distinctions as a framework for understanding thesereciprocal influences (Harter, 1999). To better understand the construction and functioning of the moral self,attention should be given to the I-self and its reciprocal and dynamic relationships with the Me-self.
Global versus domain-specific moral self. Considering how the content and structure of the moral self vary acrossdomains may also prove useful. Much of the work in our review focuses on the global nature of the moral self. Thisapproach assumes the following: (i) individuals possess a unified moral self that is distinct from other aspects of theself and (ii) the moral self can be more or less central to one’s overall sense of self and identity (Aquino et al., 2009).Although this unified approach is thought to be a defining characteristic of selfhood and moral selfhood (Baumeister,1998), it neglects how the content and structure of the moral self may change across domains, such as the multiplesocial roles a given individual may take on that are both within and external to his or her organization. To be sure,we reviewed research that showed that context influences the moral self, highlighting the possibility for the moralself to be influenced by domain-specific or situation-specific content and structure across social roles.Along these lines, Hannah et al. (2011) proposed a self-complexity approach (e.g., Linville, 1987; Woolfolk, Gara,
Allen, & Beaver, 2004) to moral identity, suggesting sub-identities compose moral identity. These sub-identities arebased on social roles, such as parent or manager, and are developed as people perform these roles over time (Markus& Wurf, 1987). Thus, sub-identities may consist of different forms of moral content. For example, Woolfolk et al.(2004) showed that ethics-related attributes (being honest, selfish, scornful, admirable, bad, dependable, and dishon-est) were represented to a greater or lesser extent across individuals’ various sub-identities. Emerging research alsoshows that individuals’ preferences, values, and ethical judgments and behaviors change when separate sub-identitiesare primed (LeBoeuf, Shafir, & Bayuk, 2010), including professional identities (Leavitt, Reynolds, Barnes,Schilpzand, & Hannah, 2012). Although the moral self may possess a certain global unity, it is also likely to be highlydifferentiated across domains (Markus &Wurf, 1987). A self-complexity approach to theorizing and operationalizingmoral identity may help explain why moral thought and behavior varies across situations, because of variance inwhich aspects of the moral self are activated in each situation (Hardy & Carlo, 2005).
Emerging opportunities on the “doing” side of the moral self
Our review also highlights the need for additional research to add clarity on the “doing” side of the moral self. A recentreview by Schaubroeck, Kim, and Peng (2012) highlights a suite of constructs important to understanding the motiva-tional and self-regulatory influence of the self on how people interact with their work environment. We focus on con-structs significant to the motivational and regulatory aspects of the moral self and ethical behavior in organizations.
How does the moral self motivate moral behavior?A key impetus for research on the moral self was to bridge the judgment–action gap (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). This isparticularly important for organizational settings in which individuals may be at risk of losing their job, becoming os-tracized, or receiving threats for speaking up in support of their values, and in which it is often easier to “not rock theboat.”Muchmore work is needed to determine howmoral motivation operates in organizational contexts.We reviewedsome research that has addressed the relationship between the moral self and motivations (e.g., self-consistency, Jordanet al., 2011; Vitell et al., 2011; self-improvement, Kurpis et al., 2008). Other studies have investigated how moral iden-tity influences motivational states (e.g., moral elevation, Aquino et al., 2011; self-conscious emotions, Tangney et al.,1996). Still, given the significance of the moral self to moral motivation, it is surprising that little attention has beengiven to identifying and measuring specific motivations implicated by the moral self.
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Self-motivations (Shamir, 1991) may assist with this goal, as they emerge directly from and reflect back on theself. The moral self does not function from a purely dispassionate and objective basis. Instead, the subjectiveexperience of and objective beliefs about the self and morality are subject to motivational as well as evaluativeand emotive forces (Baumeister, 1998). Moral self (cf. Bergman, 2004) and social psychology theories (cf.Baumeister, 1998; Leary & Tangney, 2012) highlight several self-motivations to consider.
Self-consistency. Blasi’s (1993) theory suggests that moral identity creates a psychological need to act consistentwith one’s moral principles and ideals. There are three dimensions of self-consistency: (i) consistency in the unityamong different aspects of the self-concept at a given point in time (Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1987), (ii) consis-tency in the continuity of the self-concept across a period (Turner, 1968), and (iii) consistency in the congruencebetween the self-concept and behavior—both in situ and chronically over time (Burke & Reitzes, 1981). To date,research has given some attention to consistency between the self-concept and behavior, but only in a limitedway. More research is required on this important self-motivation.
Authenticity. Prevailing work motivation theories assume that people are hedonistic and instrumentally oriented(Shamir, 1991). For example, VIE theory (valence, instrumentality, expectancy; Vroom, 1964) incorporates instru-mentality directly into the motivational calculus of the individual. Similarly, goal-setting theory (Locke & Latham,1990) directly builds on the idea that individuals are motivated by goals. A less pervasive assumption, but arguablymore central to moral functioning, is that people may also act non-instrumentally and be motivated to give authenticexpression of their moral self. This approach accounts for behaviors that are irrational, altruistic, and self-sacrificing(Strauss, 1969). The most extreme expressions are supererogatory acts, such as a soldier falling on a grenade to savecomrades. Such acts are difficult to explain by instrumental logic but can emerge from motives to engage in ethicalbehavior for the sake of others, a work unit, organization, or community (Shamir, 1991). Gecas (1986) furthersuggests that this “authenticity motive” reflects an individual’s real identity or true self. Such an authenticity motiveis inherent in conceptualizations of the moral self (cf. Aquino & Reed, 2002; Erikson, 1964; James, 1892/2001) butneeds explicit empirical attention in future research.
Self-evaluations and self-enhancement. Individuals are also motivated by the desire to maintain and enhance positiveself-evaluations (Baumeister, 1998). Self-evaluations (e.g., self-esteem) can be considered distinct from self-enhancement in that they rely on different evaluative standards. For example, Higgins et al. (1987) proposedthat self-evaluations are guided by “ought self” qualities of what a person believes she or he ought to possess,whereas self-enhancement is guided by an “ideal self” of qualities representing what a person aspires to pos-sess. The two types of evaluative standards are internalized as part of a person’s self-concept and suggest thatmoral behavior can be motivated by a desire to maintain and enhance positive self-evaluations relative to“ought” and “ideal” self-guides (Bandura, 1986).
Self-efficacy. Self-efficacy is a person’s beliefs about agentic capabilities (e.g., Bandura, 1986), and, specifically, themotivation to perceive oneself as a causal agent to bring influence on one’s own functioning and environment(Bandura, 2008). deCharms (1968) proposed that individuals strive to be “origins” of behavior, rather than “pawns”of impinging forces. Self-efficacy, then, motivates one to be efficacious or agentive, which some argue lies at theheart of the experience of the self (Erikson, 1964; Gecas, 1986; James, 1892/2001). Scholars have argued thatself-efficacy can exist as an aspect of moral self strength and be an important motivator of moral action (Mitchell& Palmer, 2010). Despite its potential significance, we identified only two studies that have examined it (Hannah& Avolio, 2010; Schaubroeck, Hannah, et al., 2012).
Self-presentation. Individuals are strongly motivated by the recognition and acknowledgement of others(Baumeister, 1998). People will rarely see themselves as a great artist, good leader, or moral person unless othersdo and provide affirming feedback. Indeed, individuals’ self-concepts are highly correlated with beliefs of how others
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perceive them (Baumeister, 1998). Self-presentational strategies are used to construct and socially validate one’ssense of self. For example, instrumental self-presentation involves impressing others to achieve an ulterior goal. Ex-emplification self-presentation involves convincing people that you are a good person. Expressive self-presentationinvolves making an impression on others to validate one’s true self (Baumeister, 1998). Testing such self-presentationmotives may help further explain the differential effects reviewed earlier, for example, between internalization andsymbolization of moral identity.These different self-motivations overlap somewhat, but each extend our understanding of the motivational
implications of the moral self. For instance, self-consistency is thought to dominate the more cognitive aspects ofthe self (Me-self), whereas self-expression and authenticity are thought to dominate the more affective aspects ofthe self (I-self) (Baumeister, 1998). Further, social psychology research suggests that self-enhancement is likely astronger motivator than self-consistency and that self-expression and authenticity could be strongest of all(Baumeister, 1998; Gecas, 1986). Also, just as the structure of the moral self may be multi-faceted, so are motiva-tions that derive from it. Nucci (2002) observed that people are typically motivated to moral action for multiple self-relevant reasons, suggesting that different self-motivations should be assessed in interaction. This is particularlyimportant as researchers study the moral self in dynamic and complex organizational contexts where, as notedearlier, an array of situational factors can evoke numerous forms of human motivation. In sum, much research isneeded before we fully understand the motivational dynamics associated with the moral self.
What factors contribute to successful moral self-regulation?Baumeister (1998) argued that the capacity to change and control oneself is one of the most fundamental, useful, andadaptive aspects of the self. Higgins (1996) further emphasized the sovereignty of self-regulation. To this end, themoral self has been described as a self-regulatory mechanism that motivates moral action (e.g., Aquino & Reed,2002; Blasi, 1984; Erikson, 1964; Hart et al., 1998).Research has examined facets of moral self-regulation (e.g., regulatory focus, Brebels et al., 2011; self-control,
Vitell et al., 2009; moral disengagement/engagement, Aquino et al., 2009; Detert et al., 2008). However, attentionto other self-regulatory capacities, such as those that contribute to moral self-regulation success and failure, would beuseful. Social psychology suggests that successful self-regulation requires (i) clear and viable standards, (ii) effectiveself-monitoring, and (iii) potency to act and create change. Failed self-regulation involves (i) confused or conflictingstandards, (ii) poor self-monitoring, or (iii) a lack of strength or capacity to produce change (Baumeister et al., 1994).These ideas may provide a basis for future research to enhance our understanding of the self-regulatory dynamics asso-ciated with the moral self.
Self-regulatory focus. The first two criteria for successful self-regulation involve clear and viable standards andeffective self-monitoring. Regulatory focus theory (RFT; Higgins, 1997) explains how people are motivated differ-ently depending on their desired end state. “Strong oughts” represent beliefs about duties, obligations, and respon-sibilities, and “strong ideals” represent hopes, wishes, and aspirations (Higgins, 1997). RFT proposes that the focusof self-regulation differs in relation to strong oughts versus strong ideals. Ought self-regulation involves a“prevention focus” or sensitivity to avoiding negative outcomes (Higgins, 1997), thereby promoting one to be pru-dent, precautionary, and vigilant in avoiding wrongdoing, mistakes, and omissions related to the desired end state(fulfilling duties, obligations, and responsibilities). Ideal self-regulation involves a “promotion focus” or sensitivityto achieving positive outcomes (Higgins, 1997, p. 1281), thereby promoting advancement, growth, and masterytoward achieving a desired end state (achieving virtue, aspirations, and excellence).RFT can inform moral self theory. The “ought selves” and “ideal selves” serve as two types of evaluative self-guides
or standards that may directly implicate and operate together with certain self-motivations (e.g., self-enhancement) andself-regulatory processes (e.g., self-regulatory focus). Research has not investigated how these and other aspects of themoral self, motivations, and self-regulation operate together as a system, as opposed to discrete variables. As organiza-tions impose role definitions, norms, and reward and punishment systems onmembers, more robust study of how strong
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“oughts” and “ideals” operate on individuals is needed. Further, a study of ideal selves may inform why individualsdevelop into moral exemplars in organizations and may perform virtuous supererogatory acts that inspire others.
Self-regulatory strength. The ability to control and strengthen the self is a crucial resource for self-regulation.Scholars contend that self-regulation can involve strength, consistent with the concept of willpower (Baumeisteret al., 1994) and akin to muscular strength (e.g., Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice, 1999). That is, self-resources associatedwith moral action can be strengthened over time. In this view, impulses that emerge in response to temptation have acertain strength or intensity, and overcoming them requires a corresponding form of self-regulatory strength. Our reviewhighlights recent research focusing on moral strength (e.g., moral potency, moral character, moral attitude, moral con-fidence, and moral conviction) and shows patterns consistent with the strength approach to self-regulation; moralstrength constructs positively influence ethical behaviors and negatively influence unethical behaviors.There are three potential avenues to extend this work on self-regulatory strength to moral self theory. First, self-
regulation research suggests that it is a depletable (but renewable) capacity that operates much like a muscle (Bauer& Baumeister, 2011; Muraven et al., 1999). Like a muscle that grows tired and weak after exercise but strengthensover time with continued exercise, self-regulatory capacity can be strengthened as well with repeated exercise ofself-control. This differs from the perspective of self-regulation as a cybernetic control system, operating like a ther-mostat on the basis of feedback (Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1998). The strength model suggests that self-regulation canbe enhanced or depleted by interaction with personal and situational factors (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009). Indeed,organizational research has shown that organizational factors, such as abusive supervision (see Martinko, Harvey,Brees, & Mackey, 2013, for a review), can impair self-regulatory functioning, which prompt unethical and destruc-tive work behavior (e.g., Hannah, Schaubroeck et al., 2013; Thau & Mitchell, 2010). It would be useful for scholars toexplore how organizations can strengthen employees’ self-regulation through building the strength of their moral self.Second, the study of virtues and character strengths from positive psychology is also relevant. This work suggests
two dimensions of moral strength—negative and positive—operate through two self-regulatory routes that corre-spond to a prevention and promotion focus (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). In the negative dimension, characterstrengths enable a person to persevere and keep to one’s moral commitments despite obstacles, temptations, or con-fusing circumstances (Kupperman, 1991). This involves forms of moral strength and conation, such as moral disci-pline and moral self-control, which can override and restrain base impulses to limit moral distress, disorder, orcorruption (Baumeister, Gailliot, & Tice, 2009). In the positive dimension, character strength enables goal-directedpursuits of morally praiseworthy activities critical to moral fulfillment and flourishing (Peterson & Seligman, 2004).This involves positive forms of moral strength and conation (e.g., ego strength, moral courage, and moral efficacy)associated with realizing moral commitments. This research suggests that moral self-regulation involves dual nega-tive/prevention and positive/promotion modes of functioning (Bandura, 2008).Third, the experience of moral strength is closely associated with the I-self in that it involves the experience of
authenticity, excitement, consistency, and enthusiasm, as well as enhancement and well-being (Peterson &Seligman, 2004). These subjective experiences appear closely related to the self-motivations described earlierand, when combined with positive and negative self-regulatory modes, suggest a dynamic system-like linkageamong these different aspects of the moral self. Indeed, we believe that one of the most needed and promising linesof theory building will be to examine these system-like dynamics among moral self constructs. Such an integrativeapproach is consistent with an emerging theoretical trend toward a more holistic understanding of the moral self (cf.Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009), which we address next.
Toward a more holistic understanding of the moral self
We have framed the moral self as a set of self-relevant moral constructs that constitute a dynamic mode of function-ing. This holistic understanding of the moral self is considerably broader than those represented in our empiricalreview. There are two primary reasons to consider a more holistic approach to the moral self. First, differential
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effects in research findings exist across the “having” and “doing” side of the moral self. The “having” side—both thecontent and structure of the moral self—is multi-faceted and dynamic and may have a certain global unity as well asdomain-specific qualities. Understanding how these dimensions create differential effects requires examining howthey implicate motivational and regulatory aspects of the “doing” side of the moral self. Second, there are recursiveinteractions between the “having” and “doing” sides of the moral self. As noted earlier, both self-motivation andself-regulation of the “doing” side involve complex cognitive, emotive, and evaluative processes that influencethe “having” side of the moral self. This recursive functioning makes it somewhat artificial to separate the “having”side of who a person is from the “doing” side of how a person acts.
Integrative views of the moral selfMore integrative theories of the moral self have begun to emerge in the literature but are largely untested. Forexample, working from a “having” side perspective, McAdams (2009) provided a multi-level framework for themoral self that begins at Level 1 with broadband dispositional traits inherited from evolutionary design, advancesto Level 2 with socially learned dispositional traits that show cross-situational consistency and developmental con-tinuity, then transitions to Level 3 with characteristic adaptations that involve cognitive-affective self-regulatorymechanisms that are highly responsive to situational cues, and ends at Levels 4 and 5 where characteristic adapta-tions emerge into moral self-defining life narratives (Level 4) that are expressed differentially in broader socialand cultural contexts (Level 5). McAdams’ theory is noteworthy because it provides a multidisciplinary perspectivethat integrates the dispositional “having” side with the self-regulatory “doing” side of the moral self to account forboth cross-situational stability and variability (adaptability) of moral self functioning.Other theorists have started from a “doing” side perspective to build integrative frameworks on the basis of social
cognitive and information processing theories. For example, Narvaez (2008) provided what she calls a “triune ethicstheory” of the moral self that builds on a social-cognitive view of the moral self and incorporates insights frompersonality and evolutionary psychology, as well as from neuroscience. Her theory suggests a dynamic view ofthe moral self, expressed as three moral orientations rooted in evolved strata of the brain. These moral orientations(security, engagement, and imagination) can be dispositional or situationally activated, influencing perceptual process-ing and goal salience. Narvaez’s theory is noteworthy because it also integrates the “having” and “doing” sides of themoral self, accounts for cross-situational stability as well as variance, and emphasizes moral self-development, whichhas been neglected in extant empirical research. Hannah et al. (2011) also offered an integrative framework inclusive ofmoral cognition capacities (moral maturation, moral meta-cognitive ability, and moral identity complexity) and moralconation capacities (moral potency as described earlier). This framework attempts to describe the capacities needed toprocess ethical issues from the stage of moral awareness, through judgment, intention, and, ultimately, behavior.Thus, the trajectory of theorizing on the moral self is toward more integrative theoretical approaches that offer more
dynamic and holistic understandings. To date, the theoretical advances toward this end are far ahead of the empiricalresearch, which still uses a discrete variable-centric approach that fragments our understanding of the moral self. Yet,an integrative approach is critical to better understand behavioral ethics in the complexity of organizational settings.The mere making of a moral judgment does not inform why someone will attend to moral issues in the first place,why they will feel the need to act, or why they will overcome pressures and temptations to act unethically. Therefore,an integrative approach that provides a more holistic understanding is critical to resolving the judgment–action gap.To conclude this review, we briefly discuss two final topics that can inform a more holistic view of the moral self.
Evolutionary psychology and neuroscienceOrganizational researchers are increasingly drawing on evolutionary psychology and neuroscience to deepen our under-standing of the internal workings of organizational behavior phenomena, such as work attitudes, workplace discrimina-tion, and perceptions of fairness and organizational justice (Becker, Cropanzano, & Sanfey, 2011). These disciplineshave gained interest among moral self theorists in part because of Haidt and colleague’s (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Haidt &Joseph, 2004) social intuitionist model of moral self functioning. For parsimony, Haidt’s model was not included inour empirical review. However, this approach is compelling because it challenges long-held ontological and theoretical
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assumptions about the nature of the moral self. The social intuitionist approach is similar to the social-cognitive ap-proach (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002) in that both allow for the automaticity of moral functioning but also differs in sig-nificant respects. First, it puts the locus of the moral self in innate moral intuitions derived from socio-biologicalprocesses instead of a cognitively constructed moral self-concept or identity derived through social interactions. Second,it posits that humans are equipped through biological and evolutionary inheritance with intuitive ethics—innate pre-paredness to feel flashes of approval or disapproval toward certain patterns of events involving others (Haidt & Joseph,2004). Whereas the social-cognitive approach emphasizes cognitively based self-regulatory mechanisms (e.g.,chronicity, activation of moral schemas), the social intuitionist approach emphasizes affective self-regulation (e.g.,moral intuitions and moral emotions). Third, the social intuitionist approach asserts that moral cognition follows ratherthan precedes moral behavior, in that moral reasoning rationalizes (im)moral judgments or behavior post hoc. Theseideas contrast withmany core ideas of moral self theory (e.g., Blasi, 1984). Some of the key research questions provokedby the social intuitionist approach (Moll, Oliveira-Souza, & Zahn, 2009) include the following: (i) How do cognitionand emotion interact to produce moral judgments and actions? (ii) To what extent do sophisticated moral capacities(e.g., moral centrality, moral judgment dispositions, self-conscious moral orientation, self-conscious moral emotions,and moral strength) rely on evolutionary-based motivational systems? (iii) What are the neural bases of moral knowl-edge, moral sentiments, and moral values? And (iv) how do biochemical and electrical activity in biological matter ofthe brain give rise to the sense of self and self-conscious moral orientation in the first place?
Cultural psychology and the moral selfOrganizational researchers have long recognized the importance of culture to how individuals form attachments tosocial groups, including social identities, involvement, commitment, loyalty, psychological contracts, and citizen-ship behavior (Beyer, Hannah, & Milton, 2000). Similarly, moral self theorists also recognize that culture plays apivotal role in the construction of the moral self, on the basis of the Aristotelian premise that morality is culturallysituated (Haidt, 2008; Hunter, 2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Solomon, 1992; Triandis, 1989). Although our em-pirical review highlights a few studies addressing the influence of culture on the moral self, research is needed touncover how cultural differences, including differences in organizational culture, influence the moral self, and, spe-cifically, its content and structure.In terms of moral content, morality is culturally relative and particularistic to certain societies, institutions, commu-
nities, and organizations (Hunter, 2000; Leavitt et al., 2012). Thus, variations in morality exist across cultures (andwithin cultures). Our review highlights that much research focus is given toWestern cultural notions of morality, whichtend to focus on a small set of moral concerns related to harm/care and justice/fairness (Haidt, 2008). Researchers shouldbroaden the scope and consider how other types of cultural moral content affect the moral self.In terms of the structure of the moral self, cultural psychology has shown that cultures vary in the relative empha-
sis they place on a variety of self-relevant factors (e.g., relative emphasis placed on the private versus the publicversus the collective self; Triandis, 1989; dimensions including individualism versus collectivism, complexityversus simplicity, and independence versus interdependence; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Thus, research shouldexamine how the structure of the moral self varies along cultural dimensions.
Conclusion
Over the last 25 years, the role of the self in moral functioning has gained increased theoretical and empirical atten-tion. Organizational behavior ethics researchers have taken an interest in the moral self as a way to better understandethical behavior in the workplace. Overall, our review of the empirical work supports the central thesis of moral selftheory, as findings show that the self generally plays a significant role in human moral functioning and ethicalbehavior. Yet, this growing body of research on the moral self has produced a diversity of constructs that, althoughinformative, have provided highly fragmented findings that contribute to a lack of clarity as to the essential natureand functioning of the moral self. Further, much of the literature has examined factors that influence the moral self
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and its influence outside of an organizational context. To continue to advance research on the moral self and itsimplications to organizations, future research needs to adopt a more process-oriented, multidisciplinary, and integra-tive approach, with specific focus on organizational and work contexts.
Author biographies
Peter L. Jennings is as an Assistant Professor of Management at the Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara Uni-versity. His current research focuses on the psychology of moral identity and character, and its significance to thepractice of leadership.Marie S. Mitchell is an Assistant Professor of Management in the Terry College of Business at the University ofGeorgia. Her research focuses on “dark,” destructive, and unethical behavior, examining antecedents and conse-quences of such behavior and which factors make these behaviors more or less likely.Sean Hannah is Professor of Management and the Wilson Chair of Business Ethics at Wake Forest UniversitySchool of Business and is a retired US Army Colonel. He studies exemplary forms of leadership as well as leaderand character development.
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