RESISTANCE TO COLONIZATION: THE CASE OF THE MOROS AND THE KARENS - A CONTINUING SAGA OF RESISTANCE 1946-2000

A COMPARATIVE STUDY

By:

Nelson Sixto H. Ganancial

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Secession or separatism is one of the various forms of resistance to a perceived neo-colonialist. Though colonialism or imperialism to a certain degree is a thing in the past, the recurrence of this issue has been observed from the different periods of history, particularly in countries that were once under colonial rulers. The Philippines and Burma are no exception. The problem of resistance to colonization was present during the colonial period of these two countries. But while the British used education and giving equal opportunities to the Karens in Burma with other ethnic groups, the Spaniards used the sword and the cross in dealing with the Moros of Mindanao. To compare the separatist movements of the Moros in the southern Philippines and the Karens of Burma is complicated because they have few things in common. First: Burma was colonized by the British while the Philippines was colonized by Spain and America, in short they were colonized by different colonial powers; Second: The Moros are Muslims, while majority of the Burmans are animists, except for the ten percent that practice either Buddhism or Christianity, hence, they could not be compared with the use of religion; and Third: The Moros were not totally conquered by the Spaniards and not even by the Americans. Though in the eyes of the Americans they conquered the Moros, the Moros think otherwise because they signed treaties of friendship not surrender. The Karens however, were defeated and relocated from their homeland and distributed throughout Burma by the British. Though they did not have the same colonizers and similar experiences during the colonial period of their countries, both the Moros and the Karens signified their opposition to their inclusion in the independent to be nations. Aside from this, there is a persistence of their ethnocentric attitude that binds them together. The Moros are ethnocentric though diverse in their cultures and values, because they are composed of at least 13 cultural groups with the Tausogs, Maguindanaons and the Maranaos as the dominant groups. Aside from the ethnocentrism of the Moros, their Islamic faith contributed much to their solidarity. On the other hand, the Karens are also diverse not only in culture but in religion as well. There are Red Karens and other sub-races among them, and Buddhists and Christians as well. These complexities add more color to the study than ambiguity. However, they have two things in common, their ethnocentric nature and their aspirations for independence. As both these groups (Moros and Karens) are ethnocentric, this study attempts to find out whether ethnocentrism transcends culture and religion in order to achieve their goal.

NSHG It is interesting to note at this point that the Karens considered the Burmans, as

their first oppressive colonizers but not the British. On the one hand, though the British conquered Burma, the Karens were treated and given equal opportunities with the Burmans, thus, their positive attitude towards their British colonizers. This infuriated the Burmans because they consider the Karens as backward hill tribe people. Thus, the control of the Burmans of the seat of power meant a continuation of the rule of their original oppressors. The Moros on the other hand consider the Spaniards as their enemies because the Spaniards tried to conquer them and destroy their religion but they did not the Americans as their enemies. Like the Karens who consider the British as better than the Burmans, the Moros also consider the Americans as better than the Christian-Filipinos. They do not even consider themselves Filipinos, because the Spaniards were not able to conquer them. The irony about it is that the Christian-Filipinos are considered as the alter ego of the Spaniards that they consider greatest enemies than the Americans who did more damage to them than the Spaniards.

It appeared therefore that the Karens look at the rule of the Burman and later the Burman dominated SLORCs as the return of their pre-Western colonizers, while the Moros, considered the rule of the Christian dominated Philippine government as the carry-over of Spanish colonization,1 although it was the United States of America that granted Philippine Independence. The only difference between these two cultural groups or Indigenous Peoples is that, the Karens do not regard religion as an important factor of being a Karen but their race, while the Moros though they belong to different ethnic groups consider religion as a uniting factor.2

Ethnic pluralism: The consequence of colonial rule is Ethnic pluralism. However, one could still

distinguish different types of ethnically homogeneous society, depending on the socio-historical basis on which minority communities are differentiated. According to past studies, minority communities may be divided into three major categories: The first consists of minority immigrant population; The second is represented by groups such as the Aborigines in Australia, the American Indians, etc.; and the Third category results from incorporating autonomous peoples under an alien authority, or from diminishing the sphere of authority of local and regional groups under a policy of unification and centralization under a national government. This study is concern with the third group where the Moros and the Karens belong. Among these groups, separatism is perceived not only as having a socio-historical logic but also as being a practical possibility because of the coincidence of geography and cultural plurality, distance from the center of authority, and the support of sympathetic groups outside the state.

1 This explains why the Moros always consider any project or development programs for them to have hidden agenda against them.

2Among the Moros, the Maranaos strictly adhere to their traditions. Though one may have been born or even have a Muslim father if he is not a Muslim, he is considered as an outcast, but not is Sulu. As long as you had been born and grew-up in Sulu, you are considered as one of them, whatever your religion is. The only difference is that, you do not have a chance of course to be proclaimed as sultan or whatever royal position because you do not belong to the royal clans.

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NSHG An ethnic minority or what is called as Indigenous Peoples (IP)3 is a group of

people who differ in race or color or in national, religious, or cultural origin from the dominant group, often the majority population of the countries in which they live. The different identity of an ethnic minority may be displayed in a number of ways, ranging from distinctive customs, lifestyles, language or accent, dress, and food preferences to particular attitudes, moral values, and economic or political beliefs espoused by members of the group.

Characteristically, the minority is recognized but not necessarily accepted by the larger society in which its members live. The nature of the relationship of the ethnic minority to the larger society tends to determine whether the minority group will move in the direction of assimilation in the larger society or toward self-segregation. In some cases ethnic minorities have been simply excluded by the majority, a striking example being African Americans in the American South during the late-19th and 20th centuries.

Ethnocentrism is the tendency to regard the beliefs, standards, and code of behavior of one's own culture or subculture as superior to those found in other societies. Because humans tend to take for granted the culture they are born and raised in, the tendency toward cultural bias in favor of one's own group is universally present. Ethnocentrism thus may serve the socially useful function of encouraging cohesion and solidarity among group members; it may also contribute, however, to attitudes of superiority, intolerance, and even contempt for groups having different customs and ways of life. In the 19th century, for example, ethnocentrism served to reinforce colonial rule in Asia and Africa. Because European society tended to consider non-Western cultures inferior to its own, the notion evolved that it was the "white man's burden" to teach Western traditions and techniques to non-European peoples.4

Ethnic Solidarity:

There are many perspectives on ethnic solidarity that could be gleaned from different disciplines and points-of-view. Three of these that are relevant to this study are the following:

First: Reactive Ethnicity: Internal colonialism and the Cultural Division of Labor Theory. Ethnic solidarity (ethnic mobilization) is seen as a reaction of the culturally distinct periphery against the exploitative core. The theory predicts reactive ethnic solidarity when economic activity within periphery is concentrated in the hands of the core ethnic majority or when a pattern of structural discrimination exists.

Second: Competitive Perspective of Ethnicity. This suggests that a large part of the conflict stemmed from competition of different ethnic groups for positions in the national bureaucracy and in the armed forces.

3 Indigenous Peoples is the accepted term to refer to what was referred before as ethnic group, cultural minority or national minority etc. This is approved by the UN conference on Indigenous Peoples.

4 Forbes, H. D., Nationalism, Ethnocentrism, and Personality (1986); Reynolds, V., The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism: Evolutionary Dimensions of Xenophobia, Discrimination, Racism and Nationalism (1986); Robertson, W., The Ethnostate (1993). Copyright (c) 1999 Grolier Interactive Inc. Please see also the work of W.K. Che Man on Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1990), pp. 1-16.

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NSHG The third is Ecological Competition Theory: This states that ethnic conflict is

mainly the result of intense competition between ethnic groups for the occupation of social niches.

Islam and Nationalism

In the Muslim world, Islam is a political ideology and a way of life as well. Everything revolves around it and mobilizes the people to mass action. The mosques, for example, provides a somewhat a safe place to meet but also to discuss matters concerning them, especially during their Friday worships. Their Imams and other religious leaders are symbols of integrity and selflessness that contrasted sharply with the corruption and aggrandizement of the ruling powers.

BuddhismBuddhism is one of the great world religions, which originated in India in the 5th

century BC. It derives its teaching from Buddha, who is regarded as one of a series of such enlightened beings. The chief doctrine is that all phenomena share three characteristics: they are impermanent, unsatisfactory, and lack a permanent essence (such as a soul). All beings, including gods, are subject to these characteristics, but can achieve freedom through enlightenment.

Terms used in this articleAbu Sayyaf – A Moro resurgent group in Basilan founded by Abdurajak

Janjalani. The group used Jihad as their means of attaining their goal.BMLO – Bangsamoro Liberation Organization.

Burma – The old official name of the country now called Myanmar. The study used Burma instead of Myanmar as it the accepted term by the Karens and other ethnic races that rebelled against the Burmese government.

Burman – A member of the ethnic race in Burma.Burmese – Term used to mean the Burmese government.Karen – An ethnic race in Burma who migrated to the Kawtholei area.KNL – Karen National League – Canadian based Karen organization supporting

the Karen struggle.KNU – Karen National Union, the umbrella organization of the Karens and it acts

as their political arms for their armed struggle.Manerplaw – The Headquarters of the Karens.MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation FrontMNLF – Moro National Liberation FrontMoro – It came from the word Moors or people of Morocco but applied to the

Muslims in the Philippines because for the Spaniards all Muslims are Moros. It became pejorative when the Muslims retaliated against Spanish incursions in Mindanao in their infamous piratical and slave raiding activities.

Secessionism or separatism - An act of severing official membership or ties from a country, province, region or state.

SLORC – This abbreviation means State Law and Order Restoration Council. The present rulers of Burma/Myanmar and were mostly composed of Burman army personnel.

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NSHG Sultanate – The political system of the Moros.

Chapter IIBackground

PHILIPPINESPhilippine History is incomplete unless the history of the periphery shall be

incorporated and this includes the Muslims in Mindanao. Lately, history writers tried to include the Moro history and their struggles against the colonial powers. However, they could not give justice to the aspirations of the Muslims or Moros not because of their biases but mainly because of the insufficiency of data from the Muslims themselves. Muslim history can never be completed because of the sensitivity of the issues and unless the Muslims themselves help straighten the records by opening their genealogies to scholars.5

Present historians agree that Philippine history should be written in the Filipino point-of-view but attempts were taken to place the Moro Resistance during the Spanish regime in the right perspective in Filipino history. Even those who wrote the history of the Muslims failed to place the Muslim in the proper context in the history of the Filipinos in general. Their model in analyzing the Moro activities is influenced by western historiography.6 Thus, to write the history of the Philippines without considering the Muslims is incomplete. Likewise, to write the history of the Muslims without taking into consideration its role in the overall history of the Philippines is also a liability rather than an asset in the pursuit of knowledge. There will always be contradictions because of the psychological orientations of both the Christianized-Filipinos and the Moros (Muslim-Filipinos).

The so-called slave raids and piracy are seen as notorious campaigns of the Moros against the helpless and hapless Christians in the coastal areas of the archipelago, without analyzing the aims and objectives of such activities. Thus, the term Moro7 became a

5 Moro history is very sensitive that even the Mamitua Saber Memorial Research Center appeared to have been burned not only because of harassment for employment purposes but for the documents that put some prominent families in Lanao in bad light.

6 By western historiography, I refer to the superiority of the whites and the much dependence on written sources, and the inferiority of Oral history. Though Oral History had been institutionalized in the 70s, in the United States of America, in the Philippines documents and records stand superior to Oral sources. Lately, Oral History became one of the subjects which show that Oral History is getting the attention that it needs, particularly in a country where people are not a writing people.

7 This is the description of the Moro in the Internet. Moro, member of any of a number of Muslim communities in the Philippines, speaking Moro or related dialects of the Tagala branch of the Indonesian languages, and living on the islands of the Sulu Archipelago, on southern Palawan, and on Mindanao in the regions of Lake Buluan, Lake Lanao, and the northwestern and western coasts. The Moro are of mixed Malayan stock, with some Arab and Chinese admixture. They are a short, brown-skinned, black-haired people, following an economy based on fishing, some farming, and the manufacture of cloth, brass, and steel. Moro homes, often on or near water, are raised high on poles. The timbers are lashed together with rattan, and the sides and roofs are made of palm leaves sewed together. The Moro were converted to Islam in the 15th and 16th centuries. Polygamy, sanctioned by their religion, was formerly widespread but is now generally confined to the rulers of the tribes. Slavery was also a recognized institution, the slaves being acquired by raids on neighboring tribes. Local government is patriarchal and is headed by a chief called a sultan. The supreme ruler of the tribes is the sultan of Sulu. At the present time his rule is nominal and does

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NSHG pejorative title for the Muslims in the Philippines. This negative image of the Muslims that is further reinforced by the Spanish friars, is very difficult to eliminate after more than three centuries of the being the accepted nature of the Muslims in the Philippines. Hence, Moro piracy and raids are interpreted as criminal activities, not as the heroic resistance of the Muslims against colonization. Not because it was not a resistance per se, but because the victims of their resistance were the Christianized Indios from northern Mindanao to the shores of Luzon, especially the Bicol area. Thus, Albay was then referred as a Moro Gulf.8

An in-depth analysis is not yet achieved for fear of misunderstanding and re-opening of old wounds as well as the sensitivities or sensibilities of both groups. However, as we had just celebrated the Centennial of the Declaration of Independence of the Philippines,9 it is imperative that the Moro Resistance be placed in the right perspective of our history to make the records straight.

Short History of the Moros (Muslim Filipinos)

The Coming of IslamTo understand the resurgence of Moro Resistance against the neo-colonialist-

Manila it is first better to review their history. According to Najeeb Saleeby, the first scholar to do a study on the Moros, “Islam penetrated the Philippines through Makhdum who came to northern Mindanao and Sulu sometime in 1380.”10 However, he continues, the “Moro history and nationality owe their beginning in the Philippine Islands to two persons: Abu Bakr and Sarip Kabungsuwan in Mindanao.”11 Abu Bakr or Sayed-Al-Hashim Abubakar12 came from Mecca and arrived in Bwansa (or Buansa, the ancient capital of Sulu) in 1480. He married Paramisuli, the only daughter of Rajah Baginda and became the judge and a high priest. After the death of Baginda, Abu Bakr assumed leadership and assumed the title sultan, as well as introduced the sultanate system to the Tausugs. He proceeded to organize his kingdom, taught former priests with the Quran; he built mosques, converts people to Islam, levied taxes and tribute and published the first code and a system of courts. He organized the whole archipelago of Sulu into one nation.

From 1460 to 1521, the Sulus or the Tausogs lived unmolested and prospered. But after this date, they seemed destined for a different experience. The Moros watched

not extend beyond his personal following; he has sworn allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. According to a recent estimate, the Moro, with other Muslims in the Philippine Islands, number about 3 million.

8 Francisco Mallari, “Maritime Response, 1793-1818,” Philippine Studies Journal Vol. 34, (1986), p. 471.

9 I would like to differentiate the Declaration of Independence of the Sang-Katagalogan by Andres Bonifacio from the Declaration of Independence of the Philippines by Aguinaldo. Although, it refers to the same country but the first was complete independence while the latter as under “the protection of the benevolent government of the United State of America.

10 Najeeb Saleeby, The Early History of the Moros, (Typescript, a reprint by W. Mijares, MSU URC, from the personal files of Mamitua Saber, personal file of the researcher), p. 3.

11 Ibid., p. 1. Please see also the work of the Filipinas Foundation, Inc., The Anatomy of Philippine Muslim Affairs, pp. 45-50.

12 Please see also the work of the Filipinas Foundation, Inc., The Anatomy of Philippine Muslim Affairs, pp. 50-68.

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NSHG the progress of Legazpi at Cebu, Panay, and Luzon, and they also knew how the pagan chiefs were subjugated as well as the expulsion of their Muslim brothers from Manila under Rajah Solaiman. Their love of home and family prompted them to resist and fight the colonizers.13

Actually, the first person to introduce Islam in the Philippines was Makhdum (or Sharif-ul-Makhdum in other records). He was an Arabian scholar who reached Malacca in circa 1350. Later, he went to Mindanao and Sulu in 1380, and made a few converts. He was believed to have built the first mosque in Bwansa, formerly the capital of Sulu. However, the honor to have introduced the sultanate and converted the majority in Sulu and Mindanao belongs to Abu Bakr and Sarip Kabungsuwan respectively. They were responsible to the introduction of the Quran to the people of Sulu and Mindanao. The Quran contains the words of God; they call Allah, which were revealed to Mohammad through Archangel Gabriel (Jibrael).14 The basic teachings of Islam are:

1 Profession of Faith; that there is no other God than Allah and Mohammad is his Prophet;

2 Praying five times a day;3 Fasting during the month of Ramadan;4 Alms giving (ten percent of anyone’s income);5 Pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime.The Moros were and still are obdurate, daring, tenacious and adventurous, but

highly ethnocentric or we might coin the word tribalistic. These would explain the differing motives of their piratical activities and slave raids, economic, political, religious or mere adventure. They did not have a central government, though culturally diverse; one thing unified them – Islam, the Dar-ul-Islam (house of Islam). They did not also have any standing army and navy, but they had boats, forts, and firearms as well as able-bodied men as their soldiers and sailors, armed and ready to fight when called to duty. It is a shame of a Moro and his family to surrender. “Life itself meant nothing to them, as against Islam and honor. No defeat could bend such people to submission.”15 They prefer death than the shame of surrender.

Spanish PeriodIn the attempt of the Spaniards to bend the knees of the Moros to submission and

to destroy their religion, the Moros retaliated. They attacked and brought havoc to the countless civilians of the Christianized areas particularly from the northern part of Mindanao, the Visayan Islands and Luzon especially in the Bicol area that displaced a lot of people in order to escape the Moro raids. Their offensive operations were called in Spanish records as guerras piraticas or pangayao16 in the local dialect. They added the miseries of the families of their Christianized-Filipino victims who were also suffering from the hands of the Spanish colonizers. There were towns that were totally erased from

13 Saleeby, p. 2.14 Ibid., p. 3.15 Mayo, p. 290.16 A paper entitled, Pangayao: The Moro Response to Spanish Incursion in Mindanao was also

done by this researcher as a requirement of the course KAS 321 was written by this researcher. Please refer also to the article of Mamitua Saber, Ilanun of Sabah: An Ethnic Extraction from Mindanao,” (Typescript) Mamitua Saber Research Center, 1984.

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NSHG the map because their whole population was either killed or brought down to Mindanao as slaves.17 The different Moro tribes, the Maranaos, the Tausogs and the Maguindanaons, either in single or multi-ethnic groups ravaged these areas. They became so notorious that the mention of the term Moro is already enough for people to feel the chill of fear and panicked for mass evacuations from their pueblos or towns. 18 The Spaniards were not able to totally check these activities until their last days in the Philippines.

In spite of their diversity because of cultural, linguistic and ethnic differences, yet, they are united by Islam and by their traditional datuship system. Nonetheless, this diversity was also their asset as well as a liability. An asset because once a sultanate or datu surrenders, the others were not obliged to follow because they were not politically united (unlike other places that when their leader/s of the superior tribe surrenders, the rest surrendered as well); A liability because there were times when one tribal group was forced to compromise, others just did not bother.19 In spite of this, the Moros were not totally subjugated or conquered.20 They may have signed treaties, but these treaties did not mean surrender or subjugation for them. It is an indication of their equal status with the enemies. These treaties are only ploys of the Moros according to Tomas Comyn,21 and most of the time they were shattered by their offensive operations22 on the Spaniards and the Christian-Filipino territories.

Then, late in 1895 the Spaniards when they were about to control totally the last bastion of the Moro resistance in Mindanao – Lanao, they left. They left the lake area to concentrate their efforts to smash the Katipunan that was the Philippine Revolution followed and they never return again. It was a blessing in disguise because it halted the massive operations of the colonizers against the Moros. However, to their dismay, the Spaniards included their territories when it turned over the colony to the new colonizers - the American. Until now the Moros regretted this historical event because for them they were not part of the Spanish colony in the Philippines.

Saleeby pointed out that the failure of the Spaniards to influence or subjugate the Moros was caused by the following reasons:

1. Intolerance and impatience (of the Spaniards);2. Non-occupation of Moroland with forces sufficient to maintain Spanish

supremacy in the South;

17 Please refer to the two articles of Francisco Mallari about the Raids in Bicol and the Naval Response of the Spaniards and the Bicolanos.

18 Mallari, “Maritime Response, 1783-1818,” p. 473.19 Let us be reminded that an agreement or treaty of peace for the Spaniards it signify surrender,

but for the Muslims it is only a strategy to consolidate their forces for another possible offensives.20 This is the same argument that the Cordillerans raised in order to demand their autonomous

status. They too never surrendered or defeated. They prefer to run into the hinterland than being subjects to the Spaniards as to the Moro’s preference to die than surrender.

21 Quoted by Francisco Mallari, “Muslim Raids in Bicol, 1580-1792,” Philippine Studies Journal (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1986), p. 266.

22 Please take note that this researcher uses the term offensive operations not Moro piracies and slave raids because it is an established fact that the sultanate was a political institution and when hostilities between two sovereign nation occur, any act of violence inflicted on one side is a strategy not a criminal one.

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NSHG 3. Failure to rule the people through their chiefs and to give proper respect

to native authority;4. Failure to understand the “Agama System,” for the basis of the Moro laws

and government.23

The American Period

The Americans also suffered the same problems on the Moros at the beginning of their colonization. But they soon succeeded in bringing the Moros into the claws of the American eagle without necessarily surrendering but friendship.24 First, they did not force the issue on religion but tolerance; Second, they used force to persuade them to submit and compromise; and Third, they had a strong force to counter any attempt of the Moros to counterattack,25 which the Spaniards had none. They resisted but defeated because of the superiority of the American weapons compared with their bladed weapon. Later, they accepted American Imperialism in the guise of friendship. Treaties after treaties were signed which appeared on surface level to indicate their equal status with the Americans but not with the Christians. This could be seen in the number of letters sent to General John J. Pershing by the different Datus of Lanao. In a letter of Datu Aliyodan of Pualas and his brother Pagabangan, it reads:

In view of our father’s death (Ami Pakpak) and as this your friend we notify you of his leaving us with the object that you may not that his children have not notified you of the fact and at the same time we offer you our friendship, as same as you have professed to our father.

Received June 28, 1902. 26

When the Americans hinted to recognize the Philippine Independence and Mindanao would be part of it, the Moros were mad and demanded that they should not be ceded to the Philippines when independence will be granted. Among the spokesmen who opposed to inclusion of the Moros is the Philippines was Ami (Ama-i or father of) Binaning. During the visit of Quezon to Lanao, campaigning for the independence in June 1923, he did not gain the support of the Moros because, “He attacked the Moro’s friend (Gen. Wood)27 and he threatened them with ‘grave consequences.’” Quezon said on that meeting, “America’s day is done, her government in the Philippines to-day is a fable. It is the Filipino Legislature that governs you Moros. This man Wood is a figurehead. It is only a question of a little time and every American in the Islands will be chased out. You Moros will do well to submit to us now.” Amai Binaning in front of Quezon and the Constabulary declared, “You shall not govern us. We stay with

23 Saleeby, p. 4.24 John J. Pershing, “Lake Lanao Expedition, May 15-September 14, 1902,” Box No. 370, Library

of Congress Manuscript Division. (MSU Mamitua Saber Memorial Research Center).25 Mark Twain in a newspaper article accused the American government to use brutality while

claiming to be Christians. This is because of the letters of volunteers in the Philippine Campaigns that had been published in the New York Times telling how they shot women and children to force the Tausugs to surrender if not they will kill their women and children including their helpless olds.

26 John J. Pershing Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C., Box 319.27 Quezon told the Maranaos that Gen. Wood could anymore help them because he is only a

figurehead. The Maranaos reacted negatively.

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NSHG America.”28 Later, the Constabulary attacked and killed Amai Binaning together with his family.29 “They simply died-for honor and for America.”30

The Moros sent letters after letters of appeal to be excluded from the Philippines, but it never reached America or Leonard Wood. One of such letters reads:

United States of America,Philippine Islands,Province of Zamboanga

Datu . . . . being duly sworn, upon his oath states:

That he has been informed that his alleged signature is attached to a petition asking for Philippine Independence and containing statements said to be derogatory to his Excellency Governor-General Leonard Wood. That the affiant has never signed any such petition, but that he has always, during the many years he known Governor-General Wood, had the greatest respect and admiration for him, both as a man and as a public official.

That he has never been a party to, nor has he ever signed a petition or document criticizing the Governor-General in the slightest degree. The affiant is in favor of the segregation of Mindanao and Sulu and Palawan from the Philippine Islands and the re-organization of same under the American Flag as an unorganized territory of the United States, or otherwise as Congress may deem best.31

The American congress did not know all this. In the House Committee’s hearing

on March 6, 1924, then Speaker Roxas said:With reference to the assertion made by the Secretary of War that the Moros are

opposed to Independence, we beg to differ with him. If there is any such opposition, it comes from those few who, as a result of the organized activities of American enemies of Independence in getting the Moros to express themselves as opposed to Independence, salaried agents being employed for this purpose, have been persuaded . . . to express opposition.32

Whether the U.S. Congress had objectively looked into the allegations of the Secretary of War and verified the contentions of Roxas, we would never know.

Commonwealth PeriodThough the Philippines was already run by Quezon and his men during the

Commonwealth Period, the Muslims did not lost hope that their aspirations for either statehood, dependency status or complete independence of Mindanao will still be

28 Mayo, pp. 308-309.29 It appeared that Quezon would like to posture himself like the Americans, that whosoever

disagree with him shall die. It is now becoming clear that this Moro opposition to be part of the Philippine territory got the ire of the men behind Quezon that to some extent explains why the Moros were not treated as equal with the Christians. History would show that representatives to the Philippine Congress representing the Moroland were appointed not elected. In Lanao for example, election was never held until the second term of Marcos.

30 Mayo, p. 310.31 Ibid., p. 318. 32 Ibid., p. 331. Of course this is not true. The Pershing papers that had just been declassified

recently would disprove Roxas, and there is even the possibility of those working in the Post Office to be accused of criminal liability because of opening and censoring letters.

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NSHG considered by the American Congress before granting33 Philippine Independence in 1946 as stipulated in the Tydings-McDuffie Law. The negative reaction of the Moros against the Christian-Filipinos ruling over them, as they considered them (Christian-Filipinos) as their enemies,34 was already showing during the Japanese Occupation. The Maranaos for example confiscated the arms and ammunitions of the fleeing USAFFE soldiers.35 Moro guerrilla leaders like Pendatun, Dimaporo, Mindalano, and many others defended their homeland but no record would show that they had Christian members. But it is a fact that only in Lanao that there was an uprising against the Japanese, and where the Japanese were afraid to go out in their camps without many escorts.36

Modern NationAfter the war the Americans granted the Filipinos their independence. The

Congress of the United States of America included the Muslim Mindanao into the Philippine Republic, but retained the territories they deemed useful for them, the Marianas group of islands, supposed to be part of the Philippine territories under the Spanish colony. But, “the Moros resisted, since their historical enemies now had formal state power”37 over them, the perceived enemies.

The newly independent Philippine government decided to divide Lanao into two provinces not only to give way to the clamor of the Muslims for leadership of their homeland but because the Maranaos were afraid that sooner or later their territory will be populated by their perceived enemies. Lanao del Norte was given to Christian leadership and Lanao del Sur was given to the Muslims. However, though Lanao Sur was already a separate province, there was no election until the Marcos regime. The provincial and municipal executives were appointed from the prominent families by the government. In Maguindanao and Sulu however, the Christians continued to take an active role in the political arena. It was at this time that there was a grave agrarian problem in the Luzon, that as a palliative solution to the problem, they encouraged tenants and Huk surrenderees to go to Mindanao through the resettlement program. Later, more Christian prospectors, industrialist, loggers, and politicians, in collaboration with Moro elite, dispossessed the Moros (in Cotabato area) and the Lumads of their lands through legal and illegal processes.38 But it was not according to Hashim Salamat he said:

Since the granting of the Philippines Independence in the year 1946, the Manila government launched "settlement programs" for the Christians from Luzon and Visayas in the Moroland. Prior to that the Moro Muslims had been enjoying the 33 This researcher uses the term granting because the Declaration of Independence of Aguinaldo on

June 12, 1898 was a declaration of protectorate rather than an independent Philippines. Take note on the statement: “under the protection of the benevolent government of the USA.”

34 Mayo, p. 298.35 The Japanese Occupation was the opportunity of the Muslims to collect and gather arms and

ammunition without being arrested for position of deadly weapon. The Americans disarmed them in the early decades of the American rule, which explain the silence of the Moros during the American regime and even during the Commonwealth Period.

36 Please see Nelson Ganancial, Guts and Common Sense: Intelligence During the Japanese Occupation 1941-1945 MA Thesis UP Diliman, Q.C., 1994.

37 Nunez, p.17.38 Samuel K. Tan, The Filipino Muslin Armed Struggle, 1900-1972 (Manila: Filipinas Foundation,

1977), pp. 113-114.

11

NSHG administration of the region by themselves as the Provincial governors, the Municipal mayors and the Barangay captains were among themselves. The Christian settlers, with the assistance of the Manila government, started to take over the strategic politic and socio-economic posts soon after their influx into the Moroland.39

In other words, though records would show that the Muslim elites collaborated with the unscrupulous Christian politicians in exploiting the Moro homeland, Salamat still put all the blames to the Christians who were also victims of land grabbing in Luzon and the Visayas. That was the very reason for their migration to Mindanao for better opportunities. Of course the hidden agenda of the government then is to use the Christians to educate the Muslims and civilize them.

In an informal discussion with some Maranaos, this researcher learned that before the Japanese Occupation, Maranaos were not also appointed into the highest position in the province, much more in congress. Christian politicians like Lluch and Cabili always got the appointment, while only the municipal positions were given to the Maranaos. When Lanao was divided into two, politics in Lanao del Sur specifically became worst when they were allowed to vote for the leaders. Clan rivalries became the order of the day. During election vote buying is rampant to make sure that they would win. Thus, after election winning candidates cannot sit in office because of alleged election frauds that there is a saying that “even the dead had voted.” Since money is involved during election, as in other places in the Philippines, winners had to replenish their expenses by graft and corruption. According to former Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez, if the money allotted for the development of Lanao had been spent honestly, the money was enough to buy the materials to cement the whole Lake Lanao itself. This statement contradicts the opinion of Salamat quoted earlier.

Later, Cotabato province was also divided into three provinces, North Cotabato, South Cotabato and Maguindanao. Of these three provinces, Maguindanao is the only one ruled by the Muslims. The arms and ammunition that the Moros had saved during the Japanese Occupation were used this time against the Christian homesteaders in Cotabato and Lanao (particularly in Wao). This was beginning of the so-called Mindanao Crisis that coincided with First Quarter Storm in Manila. Then the Martial Law Regime followed.

These divisions of the Moro provinces were all for the sake of political accommodations for the Muslims.

BURMA40  

Introduction

Burma was the original name of Myanmar. Even before the advent of the Western colonizers, in their case the British, Burma was already having problems on secessions. However, these problems were solved by the ruling powers. Its history is

39 Sheik Abu Zahir, “The Moro Jihad: Continuous Struggle for Islamic Independence in Southern Philippines.” An exclusive Interview with Sheikh Salamat Hashim. Internet.

40 Though the present name of Burma is Myanmar, this research would like to use the original name Burma as it is the name accepted by the majority of the so-called secessionists.

12

NSHG also incomplete without referring to the numerous uprising by the different ethnic minorities or races that tried to gain their independence from the oppressive Burman majority. One of these ethnic groups is the Karen. Their role in the Burmese history is not also placed in its right perspective, so that the Karen’s struggles for recognition and equality are never known except as ethnic disturbances.41 The worst of it all, the Karens are considered as only good as porters and slaves. In order to understand as well the psyche of an oppressed ethnic race it is better to have a glimpse of their history according to them.

Short History of the Karens

The Karens is one of the races or indigenous peoples of Burma (Myanmar), numbering about 3 million, who live principally in Kayah State in Myanmar. In physical characteristics they resemble the Burmese. The Karens are monogamous and practice a form of nature worship, although about 10 percent practice Christianity or Buddhism. The Karen language, a member of the Tai branch of the Sino-Tibetan languages, is one of the pre-Chinese languages spoken in Lower Myanmar and on the borders of Thailand. They are a people of Thai-Chinese stock but do not compose a single ethnic group. The Karen languages are spoken by about four million people, many of whom live in Karen State, others in Shan State, but most of whom live in Myanmar's Kayah (formerly Karenni) State. It is important not to confuse the Karen subgroup, Karenni (red Karens), with the Karens, but just the same they are still considered Karens.

The Karens, according to the KNU (Karen National Union) are much more than a national minority. They are a nation with a population of 7 million,42 having all the essential qualities of a nation. They have their own history, language, culture, land of settlement and economic system of life. By nature the Karens are simple, quiet, unassuming and peace loving people, who uphold the high moral qualities of honesty, purity, brotherly love, co-operative living and loyalty, and are devout in their religious beliefs. Historically, the Karens descended from the same ancestors as the Mongolian people. The earliest Karens (or Yangs as called by the Thais), settled in Htee-Hset Met Ywa (Land of Flowing Sands), a land bordering the source of the Yang-tse-Kiang River in the Gobi Desert. From there, they migrated southwards and gradually entered the land now known as Burma about 739 B.C. They were, according to history, the first settlers in this new land. The Karens named this land Kaw-Lah, meaning the Green Land. They peacefully began to clear and till their land from all hindrances. Their labors were fruitful and were very happy with their fate. They changed the name of the land to Kawthoolei, meaning pleasant, plentiful and peaceful country. They lived characteristically simple, uneventful and peaceful lives, until the advent of the Burman.

Burman Feudalism, British Imperialism and Japanese Fascism41 For a short history of Burma (Myanmar please refer to the appendices.42 It must be noted at this point that the population of Karens depends on which record one will

consult. Statistics show that even the non-Karen speaking Karens were not included in the Karen census.

13

NSHG The Karens could not enjoy peaceful life for long. The Mons was the next to

enter into their territory, followed by the Burmans. Both the Mons and Burmans brought with them feudalism, which they practiced to the full. The Burmans later won the feudal war, subdued and subjugated all other ethnic races in the land. The Karens suffered untold miseries at the hands of their Burman lords that they considered to be their first colonizers. The Karens experienced persecution, torture and killing, as well as suppression, oppression and exploitation under the hands of the Burmans. They always tell stories of Burman subjugation of the Mons and the Arakanese, and especially the past atrocities against the Thais at Ayudhaya. These events stand as firm evidence of Burman feudalism, so severe that those victimized peoples continue to harbor a deep-seated resentment of the Burmans until the present.

As a result, many Karens fled for their lives to the high mountains and thick jungles, where communications and means of livelihood were extremely difficult and diseases are common. They were thus cut off from all progress, civilization and the rest of the world, and were gradually reduced to backward hill tribes. The rest of the Karens were made slaves, forced to do hard labor and cruelly treated.

When the British colonized Burma, the conditions of the Karens gradually improved. With the introduction of law and order by the Colonial Central Authority, the Karens began to earn their living without fear, and they could go to school and be educated. This infuriated the Burman, to see the despised Karens being treated equal with them by the British. Ba Maw in his Memoirs wrote: “They (British) also gave the Karens military training in the British army in Burma, whereas the Burmese, in spite of their long and notable fighting history, were kept out altogether. However, in many similar ways the British encouraged the two races to be more aware of their differences and less of their common interest and destiny.”43 The progress of the Karens in almost all fields was fast, that by the beginning of the 20th Century, the Karens were ahead of other peoples in many respects, especially in education, athletics and music. It could be said that the Karens had a breathing spell during the period of the British Regime. But during the Second World War, in 1942, the Japanese invaded Burma with the help of the Burma Independence Army (BIA). These BIA troops took full advantage of the situation by insinuating that the Karens were spies and puppets of the British, and therefore were enemies of the Japanese and the Burman. With the help of the Japanese, the Burmans began to attack the Karen villages, using a scheme to wipe out the entire Karen populace, which closely resembled the genocidal scheme Hitler was enacting against the Jews in Germany.44 The Karens in many parts of the country were arrested, tortured and killed. Their properties were looted, women were raped and killed, and their hearths and homes were burned. Conditions were so unbearable that in some areas the Karens retaliated fiercely enough to attract the attention of the Japanese Government, which mediated and somewhat controlled the situation.

43 Ba Maw, Memoirs, p. 187. 44 Ibid., pp. 192ff.

14

NSHG Post WWII Period

The bitter experiences of the Karens throughout their history in Burma, especially during the Second World War, taught them one lesson, that unless they control a state of their own, they will never experience a decent life with peace, and freedom from persecution and oppression. They will never have to work hard to grow and prosper, as most of the Karens are in forced labor.

Soon after the Second World War, all the nations under colonial rule aspired for their national independence. As the possibility of granting Burma’s independence was in the offing, the Karen sent a Goodwill Mission to England in August 1946, to make the Karen aspirations be known to the British Government and people, and to request for a true Karen State. But the reply of the British Labor Government was "to throw our lot with the Burman."45 The Karens deeply regretted this, for as it predictably has turned out today, it was a gesture grossly detrimental to their right of self-determination that condemned them to further oppression. It is extremely difficult for the Karens and the Burmans, two peoples with totally opposite views, outlooks, attitudes and mentalities, to live together.

Nevertheless, differences in nature and mentality are not the main reason for their refusal to throw in their lot with the Burman. There are other more important reasons for sticking to their demand for their own State within a genuine Federal Union. These are:

1. The Karens are concerned that the tactics of annihilation, absorption and assimilation, which have been practiced in the past upon all other nationalities by the Burman rulers, will be continued by the Burman of the future as long as they are in power.

2. The Karens are concerned about the postwar independence Aung Sun-Atlee and Nu-Atlee Agreements, as there was no Karen representative in either delegation and no Karen opinion were sought. The most that the Burman would allow them to have was a pseudo Karen State, which falls totally under Burman authority. In that type of Karen State, they always live in fear of the cruel abuse of the Burman authority over them.46

On January 4, 1948, the British granted Burma its independence. The Karens continued to ask democratically and peacefully from the Burmese Government the Karen State for self-determination that would comprise the Irrawaddy and the Tenasserim Divisions, the Hantha Waddy and Insein Districts and the Nyauglebin Sub-Division, where they are the majority. But instead of negotiating with the Karens peacefully, the Burmese Government and the Burmese Press started a black propaganda accusing the Karens as puppets of the British and enemies of the Burman (ethnic race). The Burmese Government agitated the Burman people toward ethnic or communal clashes between the Karens and the Burman. Another accusation against the autonomy of the Karens was that it was not the entire Karen people who desired a Karen state, but a handful of British loyalists who wanted the destruction of the Union of Burma.

45 KNU, Internet.46 Ibid.

15

NSHG To show that this black propaganda was wrong and that it was the desire of

whole Karens for a Karen state, a peaceful demonstration all over the country was held on February 11, 1948 participated by over 400,000 Karens. The banners that they carried during the march contained four slogans, namely: 1.Give the Karen State at once 2. Show Burman one Kyat and Karen one Kyat 3. We do not want communal strife. 4. We do not want civil war. These slogans reflected the same desire of the British Colonies after the Second World War: Liberty, Equality, and Peace. They followed the established democratic procedure in requesting for their own Karen state.

This mass action of the Karens was untimely considering the political situation at that time. There were successive desertions in the AFPFL that put U Nu, the then Premier, in grave trouble. The revolts of the Red Flag Communist Party in 1947 were still fresh in their memory. Their peaceful demonstration in February 1948 was followed by another revolt of the Communist Party of Burma in March 1948. In June of that same year the People's Volunteer Organization revolted also followed by the mutinies of the 1st. Burma stationed at Thayetmyo and the 3rd Burma Rifles (army) stationed at Mingladon, Rangoon (August 15, 1948). U Nu approached the Karen leaders to help the Government by securing Rangoon, and save it from destruction. The Karens did not take advantage of the situation; they readily complied with the premier’s request and helped him out of his problems. The KNDO (Karen National Defense Organization), officially recognized by the Burmese Government, was posted at all the strategic positions along the routes leading to Rangoon (Yangon). They (the KNDO) faithfully took charge of the security of Rangoon. The KNDO was actually formed in 1947 to protect the members of its community.47

The KNDO according to the official Karen Internet Web, . . Was given several tasks in forming an outer ring of defense, particularly at Hlegu and Twante. Most important of all was the reoccupation of Twante town, Rangoon's key riverine gateway to the Delta towns in upper Burma. This little town had fallen several times to the communists. Each time it was retaken by regular troops, only to fall back into the hands of the rebels as soon as conditions returned to normal and control was handed back to the civil authorities and the police. This time, a KNDO unit under the leadership of Bo Toe and Bo Aung Min was ordered to retake Twante, which was once more in the hands of the Red Flag Communists. They succeeded with their own resources and without any support from the regular army other than river transport. After wresting the town from the Red Flag Communists hands, they garrisoned it in accordance with their given orders.48

The mutineers of the two Burma Rifles marched down south, unopposed along the way until they reached Kyungale Bridge, near the town of Let pa-dan, where they were stopped by a company of Karen UMP (Union Military Police). Their truck carrying arms and ammunition received a direct hit from the mortar fire of the Karen UMP and was destroyed. So, they retreated after suffering heavy casualties.

47 The Far East and Australasia 1995 (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1995), p. 613.48 KNU, Internet.

16

NSHG However, while the Karens were busy defending Rangoon, the Burmese

Government was hastily organizing a strong force of levies to make an all-out effort to destroy the Karens. In December 1948, they arrested the Karen leaders in many parts of the country. Karen service men in the armed forces were disarmed and imprisoned. General Smith Dun a Karen, General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Burma Army, was forced to resign. Many Karen villages were attacked, and Karens’ homes were burned and destroyed. On January 30, 1949, the Burmese Government declared the KNDO unlawful, and on the next day Burmese troops attacked the KNDO Headquarters at Insein, a town about 10 miles north of Rangoon, where most of the top Karen leaders lived. The Karens had no other alternative but to fight back. An order was issued to all the Karens throughout Burma to take up whatever arms they could find and fight for their lives, their honor, and their long cherished Karen state: Kawthoolei.49

Because of these development and the failure of the government to give them the state they requested as well as the cultural protection they thought they deserve,50 and agitated further by the ungrateful act of U Nu and his army, the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) rebelled against the government. Three battalions of Karens from the Burmese Army deserted and joined the KNDO. The KNDO captured Mandalay, raided Bassein, and even attacked Yangon (Rangoon), but eventually the hard-pressed government prevailed and the organization collapsed because they were not yet prepared for a revolution. They had to withdraw from many fronts, allowing Burmese troops to reoccupy these areas. It was also compounded by the call of the Burmese Government to all other uprising Burman rebel groups for unity. These Burman rebels saw the Karens as their greatest obstacle to seize power, so, they joined hands with the Burmese Government and fought against the Karens. Soon the Karens found themselves fighting against all the armed elements in the country.

Another cause for their setbacks was their lack of external support because, as stated earlier, they were not prepared for the revolution. The Burmese Government on the other hand received large amounts of foreign aid, including military aid from both capitalist and socialist countries and even from the so-called non-aligned nations. In spite of the shaky condition of the Burmese Government, it managed to sustain its war against the Karens mainly through the aid from abroad. They even went to the extent of begging for support and supplies on the streets and it is hard for the Karens to believe the Burman bowls had always come back filled. In other words, there was really a concerted effort against the Karens. It is not however clear whether the other ethnic minorities aided the Burmese government in crashing the Karens.

Tired perhaps of fighting against the audacious and tenacious Karens, the government formed the Karen State in 1952, largely consisting of the Salween district. In 1955 five additional townships voted for inclusion. Originally it was planned to include the Karen populated areas of the four Karenni states east of Toungoo, but three of these states decided to merge as the separate Kayah State and the fourth decided to join

49 KNU, Internet.50 The Far East and Australasia, p. 613.

17

NSHG the Shan State. In the early 60s the population of the state of Karen was estimated at more than 600,000; by 1994 it had reached an estimated population of 1,323,000. It is located in the upper part of the country with an area of 30,383 sq km (11,731 sq mi), and its capital is Pa-an, a small community east of Thaton, on the Salween River. The northern portion of the state is hilly and covered with thick jungle. Much of its southern part is lowland and is bordered on the east by the Dawna Range of the Bilauktaung mountain range. The climate is tropical, and rainfall averages 3800 mm (150 in) annually.

Present Situation

Though the Karens have their own state, still they have been oppressed politically, economically, and culturally. In education for example, the Karen schools and institutions were taken by force by the government and many were destroyed. They are no longer allowed to study their own language in Burmese schools. Even the Karen newspapers and literary books were banned. Economically, their farms were nationalized and confiscated in the guise of socialism. They have to work hard all year round and forced to take all their products to the Burmese Government for sale at its controlled prices, leaving little for their subsistence. Culturally, the Burmese government had attempted to absorb and dissolve Karen language, literature, traditions, and customs. The Karens were denied all political rights; they had been systematically exterminated as part of the annihilation, absorption, and assimilation program of the Burman. As a consequence the educational and living standards of the Karens have dropped considerably, falling far behind the Burman in all respects. “These efforts and actions against the Karens are as strong, or stronger, at present as ever before in the past.”51

Since 1960s, the Burman government has been attacking the Karens with what they call as the "Four Cuts Operations." According to the official Karen Internet Web:

The four cuts includes cutting the Karen lines for supply, cutting the line of communication between the masses and the revolutionaries, cutting all revolutionary financial income and resources, and cutting off the heads of all revolutionaries. To make the four cuts operation successful, the Burmese troops used and still are using strong suppressive measures. They destroy the fields and crops of the villagers and eat their grains and livestock. They take away whatever they like and destroy the things they cannot carry away. Captured villagers, men as well as women and adolescents, are made to carry heavy loads as porters for the Burmese soldiers. Many of the villagers have been forced to work as porters for several months; deliberately starved, and regularly beaten, raped, or murdered. When the Burmese soldiers enter a village, they shoot the villagers who try to escape. Some of the villagers have been accused of helping the revolutionaries and then murdered. In certain areas, the villagers have been forced to leave their villages and have been moved to camps some distance away. They are not permitted to leave the camps without permission from the Burmese guards. Some of the villagers, who have been found in their villages after being ordered to move to the camps, were shot and killed by the Burmese soldiers with no questions asked.52

51 KNU, Internet.

18

NSHG These situations and sometimes-even worst are happening constantly

throughout Kawthoolei that caused a large number of Karens and Shans to leave their villages and take refuge along the Thai border. What worsened these difficulties is the lack of financial support for these Karen and Shan refugees to provide for their subsistence. To add their miseries, refugee camps were also attacked by the government forces. In spite of all these odds, they are determined to move on, even though there is no end of the war in sight. The Karens are moving forward the best way they can although they are unable to obtain assistance from other countries.

In this long and harsh forty-three years of war, the Karens have seen many changes that took place in their revolution. The strong will and determination of their fighting forces and their masses to fight and win the war is increasing in magnitude. They were able to endure the hardships, both physically and mentally. They grew in strength, not only in quantity but also in quality. The Karen masses have shown more cooperation by even participating in the battlefields to fight against the enemy in various ways. Karens from other enemy occupied towns and cities have joined the revolution in great numbers. University students and graduates have joined the fight, thus enriching the quality of their revolution. One of these is a physics student named Sonny Mahinder. Mahinder was not prepared for the life in the jungle, but his knowledge in computer brought about a new dimension of their struggles. The BurmaNet News calls it the “Wired Revolution.”53 From then on, first hand information of the encounters of the Karens and the government forces reached around the globe via the Internet.54 News on the abuses of the government forces is known by the world through the electronic mails (just like how the majority of the data in this research were collected).

There is an old adage in the annals of guerrilla warfare that says: “Guerrillas as like the fish and the people are the water. Without water, the fish will die, without the support of the people the guerrillas will also die.” This is true in Burma. Karen’s villagers throughout Kawthoolei are actively supporting the secessionists, boasting their morale, discipline, and military skills of their fighting men. They were able to inflict great setbacks on the Burmese Army in all their encounters, and presently against the SLORCs.

The United Front

Burma is inhabited by different races that it is even considered as a multi-national country. After independence, these ethnic races, the Kachin, Arkanese, Karenni, Lahu, Mon, Pa-O, Palaung, Shan, and Wa, etc. were also denied the basic rights of freedom, self-determination, and democracy. Thus, almost all the other nationalities in Burma have also revolted against the Burmese Government for their own self-determination.

52 KNU, Internet. For samples of these atrocities, please refer to the appendices for the details supplied by the BurmaNet News.

53 Thomas Crampton, “Latest Technology Links Jungle Rebels: Wired Revolution Helps Guerrillas,” International Herald Tribune, BurmaNet News, October 18, 1999, Internet.

54 Please refer to the appendices for the data on the abuses done to the Karens and other ethnic races in Burma.

19

NSHG These once divided ethnic races fighting individually for their own existence are now united in their National Democratic Front (NDF) composed of nine different organizations namely: 1) Arakan Liberation Party (ALP); 2) Chin National Front (CNF); 3) Kachin Independence Organization; 4) Karen National Union (KNU); 5) Karennie National Progressive Party (KNPP); 6) Kayan New Land Party (KNLP); 7) Lahu National Organization (LNO); 8) New Mon State Party (NMSP), and 9) Wa National Organization (WNO).

This National Democratic Front (NDF) has resolved to form a genuine Federal Union of Burma, composed of all the states of the different nationalities in Burma, including a Burman state, on the basis of “liberty, equality and social progress.”55 This united front is determined to fight on until victory is achieved, and requests the people of all classes and walks of life to join hands and fight the Ne Win-Than Shwe military dictatorship and the SLORC.

In 1988, the oppression of Ne Win's military regime had become so harsh that even the Burman masses rose up against it. The regime responded by shooting thousands of peaceful demonstrators, mainly young students and monks. But Ne Win could not subdue them all, so, he was forced to resign, apparently handing over power to his chosen successors in the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), yet, he still controls the strings of power from behind the scenes. In late 1988, the KNU proposed that the NDF form a broader political front along with the newly formed Burman groups to meet the developing political situation. The other NDF members agreed to the proposal. Thus, the birth of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB), that includes all the members of the NDF as well as groups such as the All Burma Students' Front (ABSDF) and the All Burma Young Monks' Union (ABYMU). The DAB is committed to the following four principles:

1. The removal of the military dictators. 2. The establishment of democratic government. 3. The cessation of civil war and the establishment of internal peace. 4. The establishment of National Unity and a genuine federal union.56

Because of this development the SLORC promised a multi-party election and held it in 1990, however, instead of handing over the power to the winners the SLORCs arrested them and put them to jail or house arrest. Disgust and hopelessness drove thousands of Burmese students, monks, and other dissidents to flee to the areas governed by NDF member organizations, which they once despised. They were accepted and sheltered by the ethnic peoples, particularly in the Karen areas, where no less than 6,000 students arrived along with other dissidents, all wanting to organize and struggle against the dreaded SLORC. “This marks for the first time that the people of all races, even the

55 KNU, Karen Internet Web Site.56 Ibid.

20

NSHG Burmans, have been united in trying to throw off the yoke of an oppressive SLORC’s regime.”57

Comparative AnalysisPre-Colonial

The pre-colonial history of the Karens and the Moros differs in some aspects.

The Moros on the one hand, belong to a mixture of ethnic races or tribal affiliations. They are highly diverse even with the coming of Islam. The Moro history has some similarities and dissimilarities with the Karens. First: The Moros were the first migrants to their traditional homeland they called at present as the Bangs Moro homeland – Mindanao. Second: They are also highly ethnocentric like the Karens that they were able to maintain their racial identity, particularly the Maranaos who look at disgrace at those who married non-Maranaos, especially Christians (especially women); Third: The Moros however is not democratic when it comes to religious preference. For them a Moro is a Muslim or to put it right a Maranao, Tausog, Maguindanao, etc. is always a Muslim; Fourth: The Moros are cosmopolitan too but selective. They prefer the Arabian culture than western.

Further, the Moros never care about other tribal groups in the southern Philippines. For them they are their subordinates and good as slaves. However, there was one leader who consolidated the whole western Mindanao into cohesive body to fight against the colonizers, he was Sultan Kudarat, had the Moros convince other tribal groups including the Christianized ones, our history should had been different, but they attacked them and made them slaves. Thus, the term for slaves for the Moros is bisaya.

The Karens on the other hand were: First: They were also the first migrants to their traditional homeland they called Kawtholei; Second: They are highly ethnocentric that they were able to maintain their racial identity; Third: They are democratic and respects one’s religious preference; Fourth: They are cosmopolitan. The Karens actually descended from the Mongolian racial stock called Yang by the Thais. They are friendly, peace loving people and prone to accept changes while maintaining their traditional customs and traditions. This friendly and peace loving attitudes were misunderstood by the next waves of migrants as inferiority. They are not like the other migrants who through intermarriages lost their cultural and racial identity. The Karens maintain their unique way of life but strongly ethnocentric. The sense of peace and democracy allowed the Karens to maintain their identity while some members adopted other religions. Among the Burmese nationals, the Karens had a number of Christian members,58 yet they never lost their identity as a Karen. The hatred against them by the other ethnic races was actually caused by the conversion to Christianity of some of their racial members. For a Burman only the Buddhists are pure Burmese. Anyone who is not a Buddhist is a Kala (from the Indian word caste) or a foreigner and lost his nationality as a Burmese. This is the result when Buddhism was declared as a state religion. By cosmopolitan it means that the Karens accepts and even adopt changes

57 BaSaw Khin, “This Karen National Union,” Karen Internet Web Site. 58 They have even a Karen Christian Militia.

21

NSHG brought in from the outside while again maintaining their ethnic identity. Take for example education. When the British occupied their country, the Karens accepted education and the technology that were brought by the colonizers. They became educated more than their former oppressors the Burmans.

The Karens are natural leaders if we have to look at the history of the struggle of the Burmese against the SLORC. They are willing to submit themselves to others as long as it is for the benefit of everybody. They are not also vengeful to those who adopted other religions and those who got away from the war fronts and decided to accept government sponsored states. There were some who even joined the Shan State rather than pursuing their aspirations for a single state for the Karens. Yet these changes after 40 years of struggle never weakened their determination to end their suffering from the hands of their Burman/Burmese and now the SLORC oppressors. Whether they will accept it or not their perseverance to demand their independence is the inspiration of the political leaders of other ethnic races in Burma in their desire to end the oppressive SLORCs.

Colonial Period

The greatest difference between the two groups was their response towards the colonial powers. While the Karens and other tribal races in Burma were defeated and subjugated and forced to move from their traditional homeland to be scattered around the country, the Moros were not. While the British allowed Christian missionaries to preach the gospel of Christ and convert the people the Spaniards used force to destroy the Islamic faith. This is of course caused by their previous experiences with the Moors who occupied Spain for more than seven centuries, as a form of revenge, they vowed to destroy Islamic believers they called “Moros.” The Karens adopted the education of the British but maintained their own ethnic identity. The Karens threw their lot to the British but the Moros did not. Instead, they retaliated and attacked the occupied areas of the Spaniards and victimized the Christian-Indios or Christianized Filipinos from the northern portion of Mindanao up to the northern part of Luzon, but concentrated their attacks mostly in the Visayas and Bicol.

By nature the Moros are warriors. There were times when the Moros surrendered, not because they were defeated, but this was one of their strategies to consolidate their forces. While there were treaties signed, these treaties were good as nothing because these were mere ploys of the Sultans, a deceptive strategy to know the strength and weakness of their enemies. Though treaties were signed, there were times that the sultan could not control his men who raided the Visayas and Bicol. In some cases to show the sultan’s word of honor, they returned their captives,59 but no record of returning their loots and booties.

It is interesting to note that the Moros had two western colonizers the Karens had only one with the Burmans as their first colonizers. However, if the Spaniards

59 Francisco Mallari, Muslim Raids in Bicol, 1580-1792, Philippine Studies Vol. 34, 257-86 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1986), p. 266.

22

NSHG were not able to subjugate the Moros, the second - the Americans did. The Americans duped the Moros into believing that they are treated equal with them as suggested by the treaties of friendship that had been signed with the sultans. So that when the Philippine Independence was about to be granted, the Moros wrote a number of letters expressing their desire to stay with America and not with the Filipinos, like the Karens who signified their desire for independence from Burma once independence would be granted.

After the granting of independence of both countries, the Karens started their campaign for secession by their march in the major places in Burma, while the Moros did not. The incident that triggered the Karens’ armed struggle was the attack done by the Burmese troops against the KNDO. In the Philippines, the Moros waited for the right time until the so-called Jabidah Massacre.

Chapter IIITHE RESURGENCE

IntroductionThe researcher selected the Karens of Burma and the Moros of Mindanao in this

comparative study, firstly because they had similar history of the resurgence of their resistance to colonialism, and until now there is no tangible solution yet to be found of their problems. On the one hand, when Burma was about to be granted its independence after the Second World War, the Karens requested from the British government the creation of their own state. The British government, suffering from a major setback due to the war and the problem of rebuilding their country, did not act on the request and handed down the responsibility to the new independent government. The Moros, on the other hand, did the same. When the American government was preparing to grant Philippine independence, the Moro Leaders in Mindanao and Sulu sent a number of opposition letters to the Congress of the United States of America to exclude them in the territory of the Philippines and proposed to be one of the states or protectorates of America. Just like what the British did to the Karens in Burma, so did the Americans to the request of the Moros in the Philippines. The following are the short details of the Karens and the Moro Secessionist Movements.

MoroThe secession of Mindanao from the Philippines started even before the country

got its independence from America. The first move of the Moros was their letter of opposition for the inclusion of Mindanao as part of the Philippines when independence would be granted. Letters after letters were sent, even as early as 1932, but just the same the Moros were included in the modern Filipino nation. Unable to press their demand for lack of means, the Moros waited for the right time. The event that ignited the renewal of their desire to secede was the Jabidah Massacre. It was started by Datu Udtog Matalam of Cotabato of his Mindanao Independence Movement, and followed by the MNLF. But this Moro secession was later concentrated in the Muslim dominated areas. There was also a Christian led Mindanao Independence Movement by Reuben Canoy of Cagayan de Oro City, but it did not get the support of the Muslims so it failed. At present the

23

NSHG secession is centered in the Maguindanao area led by Hashim Salamat, but still the objective is the secession of the thirteen provinces as provided for in the Tripoli Agreement.

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) The Moro (Muslim) aristocrats and politicians conceptualized the Moro National

Liberation Front (MNLF) after the Jabidah Massacre on March 18, 1968.60 The trainees code named Jabidah Forces, were composed of Muslim youth, trained in Corregidor Island, for marine maneuver and attack to penetrate and reclaim Sabah,61 and to split the Islamic ranks. This was the last option of then President Ferdinand Marcos if the Malaysian government rejects the peaceful settlement of the Sabah Case. The lone survivor of the massacre explained that the trainees were shot after they responded negatively of their mission to invade Sabah. This incident was the eye-opener of the Muslims. The first to react, on the one hand was Datu Udtog Matalam of Cotabato. He declared the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM),62 to free Mindanao from the imperial Manila. On the other hand, Congressman Rashid Lucman, according to Nuñez “responded to a Malaysian offer to train and arm dedicated young Moros for war against Manila.”63 Negotiations were done and the first trainees, according to instructions must come from the villages or “village boys.”64 However, the trainees were majority “City boys,” called the “Top Ninety.”65 These aristocrats and politicians were mad upon learning that the trainees were educated ones. But they could not do anything because they already left. It was perhaps the reason why Lucman organized the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization,66 in anticipation of the moves of the educated Moro youths. However, in the study of Taher, he wrote that “the selection of the Top Ninety was based on the recruit’s physical and intellectual capabilities to spearhead and implement guerrilla-type warfare in their respective territorial jurisdictions with the ultimate goal of maintaining the nationhood and independence of the Bangsa Moro Homeland.”67 One member of the Top Ninety related that during their training they were not the only group

60 Omar Taher, “Marawi City Uprising in 1972,” Undergraduate Thesis. AB History, MSU Marawi City. p. 13.

61 Even the Christians were also being prepared for the repercussions. Young men were called for reservist training for the defense of Mindanao, in case Malaysia would retaliate.

62 Then he organized his Blackshirts.63 Ibid. According to my respondent whose will be withheld, Senator Domocao was also involved

because the wife of Rashid Lucman was Princes Tarhata Alonto, the sister of the senator. This offer is comprehensible as a token of gratitude that the young members of the Jabidah Forces whose main target was their territory in Sabah.

64 The interviewee did not give any reason of the instruction. However, we could surmise that, village people are less educated and are bound to obey what they are ordered to do by their superiors, particularly from prominent Muslims and Royal Titleholders.

65 The Top Ninety according to my own knowledge are: Nur Misuari, Abulkhayr Alonto, Dimas Pundato, Jamil Lucman, Datu Ali, Ronnie Malaguiok, Al Kaluang, Native Membisa, Camar Riga, Indar Tampi, Sali Wali, Maas Bawang, Punduma Sani, Ali Alibon, Otto Salahuddin, Julhambri Misuari, Suboh Gayanandang, Toni Malaguiok, Asrap Tayuan, and Abdul Alonto. Others, I do not know.

66 It is alleged by some writers that this group is different from the MNLF. However, Prof. Sani noted that they were the same in Maguindanao and Lanao, that the MNLF was not really formally organized as such. He did not even know until the middle of the 70s.

67 Taher, pp. 13-14.

24

NSHG being trained for clandestine operations. There were other nationalities too, and their trainers were British and Malaysian Army Officers.68

What the Moro aristocrats and politicians were afraid of really happened. The training graduates or the TOP NINETY organized themselves into the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF),69 with Nur Misuari, Hashim Salamat and Abulkhayr Alonto as the prominent figures. Misuari was a UP professor, Hashim Salamat, an active student leader in Cairo University and Alonto, the son of former Senator, Domocao Alonto. It was at first, Muslim National Liberation Front, but since their ultimate aim is the liberation of the whole Mindanao from the imperial Manila, they changed it to Moro because anybody coming from Mindanao is considered a Moro, whether he is a Muslim or not, and beside it is also historical.70 The implication of the organization of the MNLF is the breakaway of the progressive youth from the Moro traditional-politics of royalty and patronage. Another feared event that came true was the proclamation of Martial Law. But, the politicians did not read Marcos right. Marcos approached them instead for help. Hence, Princess Tarhata Lucman was appointed Governor of Lanao del Sur, but soon relieved by Mohammad Ali Dimaporo, because Jamil Lucman and Abulkhayr Alonto refused to surrender. Later, they surrendered and were given government positions. Alonto (1978) was appointed as ambassador, and Dimas Pundato (1982) was given the Office of Muslim Affairs. One MNLF commander lamented that they were left fighting while they (the children of prominent aristocrats and politicians) enjoyed appointments in the Marcos government.71

People of Manila and other parts of the country were made to understand that the first encounter between the government and the MNLF was during the Marawi City Uprising on 21 October 1972. It was not! The MNLF was still consolidating their forces and were training their cadres at this time. The Marawi City Uprising was the response of the Maranaos who were deceived into believing that Martial Law was intended to Christianize them. This misinformation campaign was perpetrated by unscrupulous appointed local officials of Lanao del Sur and by two or three Muslim religious organizations. These local officials knew that they would be arrested because of their graft and corruption cases. To solve their problem, they approached the two big Muslim religious organizations for help.

Soon after a call for support and mass action was aired over the radio with the propaganda that since Martial Law was proclaimed, “the soldiers would come and Christianize the Muslims by force.” The people responded and Marawi City rose to arms. It was around six o’clock in the morning when the Maranaos got out of their hiding places and shouted “Allah-uh-Akbar,” and attacked Camp Keithley (now Camp Amai Pakpak Elementary School), the Chinese community in Bangolo, Marawi City and

68 No wonder that the American government did not really take hand in solving the problems in the south, except in case of CPP-NPA, because their close ally, Britain was responsible for the training of the Moro rebels. Once they are going to interfere, they would be in quarrel with each other.

69 Please refer to the appendices for other pertinent data on the MNLF.70 This is according to one interviewee, an MNLF Commander, name withheld. 71 Name withheld, because he is now also working in the government after the GRP-MNLF Peace

Accord was signed.

25

NSHG prominent Christians particularly a certain Dr. Primero who allegedly owned a big track of land from Baloi, Lanao del Norte to Marawi City.72 As a result, the Chinese business district in Bangolo, Marawi City was destroyed and the Chinese fled to Iligan City.73 The eminent arrests of the unscrupulous local officials did not happen because they are now instant rebel commanders. The government did not pursue their arrests in the belief that the MNLF was behind the event. Thus, even today, Manila based writers still believed that the Marawi City Uprising was the first salvo of the MNLF offensives.

Though the MNLF did not participate in the uprising, they were there all along; always prepared if the Military of Marcos will attack their camps. Actually, it appeared that the leaders of the Marawi City Uprising could not wait for the completion of the tactical plan of the MNLF. The original plan was to attack Iligan also, particularly the National Steel Corporation, but Punduma Sani, then the leader of the Green Butra Command was opposed to the plan because their enemies are not the Christians but the Marcos soldiers and to destroy the steel plant would not gain them anything if they hope to have an independent Mindanao.74

Actually, the roots of Mindanao crisis started way back when the government started to bring to the south farmers and surrenderees of the Huks in Luzon and the Visayas, and other migrants seeking a more-greener pasture.75 Those who settled in what is now North Cotabato were majority from Ilocos and in the south, now Maguindanao were from Panay and Negros. The Maguindanaons welcomed them at first and some even bartered their lands with goods from the new settlers.76 However, tension arose when the natives of the area noticed the large influx of new settlers particularly in the sixties. They resented this and started demanding back their lands, but the settlers refused because they had already spent so much money and efforts to develop the once neglected swamps and logging areas into productive farms, thus, Cotabato gain the name, the Rice Bowl of the Philippines. The natives started harassing them and stealing their goods and animals. At first some Christians moved to other provinces like Lanao del Sur and Zamboanga del Sur. Those who remained left their farm houses and built their communities that later became full pledged municipalities (Surallah, Nurallah etc) because of their agricultural production. Because of the destruction of their farms and lost of their farm animals, the Christian settlers organized their home defense unit to guard against carabao rustlers and bandits who were known later as the Blackshirts. These small home defense units became the ILAGA (meaning rat or pejoratively the Ilongo-Ilocano LAnd Grabbing Association).77

72 It would appear that even the Marawi City Uprising is still connected with agrarian problem.73 Prior to the uprising Iranian students in MSU were killed after they robbed of their valuables.74 Personal friend of this researcher and he related this stories a number of times during their

conversations.75 Please see May, p. 128.76 This is according to some interviewees who came from Cotabato and are not residing in Wao,

Lanao del Sur. Name withheld. 77 I had a chance to talk with the bodyguard of Commander Ligaya, the sister of Commander

Toothpick. He told me that Commander Ligaya was formerly a Nun who was raped in front of her parents tied to a post of their house by a group of Muslim natives in Cotabato. Mistaken her to be dead, they cut-off her right breast and killed her parents. This incident triggered the formation of the home defense unit they named Ilaga. As part of the so-called low-intensity-conflict strategy, the Ilagas were used at the

26

NSHG Coincidentally, the organization of the Ilaga happened when the Top Ninety

were training in Malaysia, so much so, that when the offensives of the MNLF started, their first encounters were against the Ilagas and not with the government forces. Later, the military used the Ilagas as their front liners in exchange of arms and ammunition and in what is called in the US Military Manuals as “Low Intensity Conflict.” Hence, the fear of the Maranaos and Maguindanaos of the Ilagas was shown by their distrust to Ilongo students in MSU because they were also considered as Ilaga members. Because of the knowledge of the Ilagas on the strategies of the Moros and with their amulets, believed to make them invulnerable to bullets, Christian politicians hired them as their private armies. Gov. Quibranza of Lanao del Norte hired the services of the Ilagas against the Barracudas of Ali Dimaporo.

Then the OIC and Libya intervened elevating the internal problem to international status forcing Marcos to negotiate in exchange for the much-needed oil in the country. The Tripoli (in Libya) agreement was signed on December 23, 1976, and Marcos implemented it according to his own interpretation of the provisions of the agreement and decreed the creation of the autonomous region of Mindanao composed of twelve provinces and ten cities. But the Muslims demanded that it should be thirteen provinces as mandated by the Tripoli Agreement. Marcos appointed his loyalist Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to the post of Regional Governor while holding the positions of governor of Lanao del Sur and Acting-President of Mindanao State University. Dimaporo appointed his closest associates to other regional positions to the resentments of other Muslim groups.

The MNLF members later found themselves plagued by internal problems. Solution was hard to reach because Misuari went to Saudi Arabia in self-exile. Differences of policies they claimed are the main reason for the division of the MNLF into different factions. Hashim Salamat from Maguindanao organized his Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF – March 1984), which is fundamentally Islamic in outlook, and the MNLF Reformist Group78 (1982) under Dimas Pundato, a Maranao, that supported autonomy.79 Pundato, as earlier stated surrendered and gained a post under the Marcos regime.

Corazon Aquino, the wife of the assassinated Benigno Aquino, a.k.a. Marcial Bonifacio, deposed Marcos and the contribution of her government to the peace process was her initial dialogue with Misuari. Her hastily and emotionally done 1987 Constitution provided for the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the signing of the Organic Act of Muslim Mindanao (RA 6734).

frontlines. Simply because they knew the terrain and the style of fighting of the Moros. It is on record that the Ilagas were the ones who controlled the Moros not the Military. Please see also the work of Nunez, p. 22.

78 Please refer to the appendices for other pertinent data.79 It is interesting to note that, when Misuari finally signed the Peace Accord in 1996, all the Top

Ninety members were given a Tamaraw FX each.

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NSHG During the early and mid-1990s, the southern Philippines was the site of

renewed guerrilla violence by Muslim separatist forces. After the initial meeting of then Pres. Aquino and Nur Misuari formal negotiations started in 1993 after the Indonesian President Suharto offered Jakarta as the site for the resumption of the stalled peace talks between the Philippine government and the MNLF. The First Exploratory Talks were held in Tripoli in October 1992, followed by the 2nd round of exploratory talks, three rounds of formal talks and eight meetings of the Mixed Committee and scores of sub-committee meetings. The first step in the peace process, after the venue in Jakarta was agreed upon was the signing of the interim cease-fire agreement in April 1993. However, on May 29-31, 1993, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres held secret talks with Misuari in Dubai, Saudi Arabia. Misuari pointed out the desire of the MNLF to implement the Tripoli Agreement comprising of 14 southern provinces and 10 cities with Muslim populations. Torres compromised by proposing a five-man Commission for Peace and Development of the Southern Philippines (later the SPCPD). This would set up to oversee the areas covered by the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. Five years after this, full autonomy will be granted, with a consultative assembly of some 70 people, including 25 from the MNLF, who would advise the chairman. The government formally offered this compromise deal in Davao GRP-MNLF Talks where the issues of the structure of the autonomous government and the integration of the MNLF into the Philippine Armed Forces was dealt with.

President Fidel V. Ramos issued the guidelines to the RP Panel in negotiating with the MNLF on August 26, 1993. He said "the conduct of the formal talks shall be in line with the aim of the national comprehensive peace program to seek a principled and peaceful resolution of armed conflict, with neither blame nor surrender, but with dignity for all." The following are the guidelines:

OBJECTIVES OF RP PANEL IN GRP-MNLF PEACE TALKS

1) The return of the MNLF into the mainstream of Philippine society;

2) The attainment of lasting peace and security in Southern Philippines under a meaningful program of autonomy for Filipino Muslims; and

3) The establishment of a continuing and constructive consensus with the Islamic world, through the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), on a peaceful, comprehensive and durable settlement of the problem of Muslims in Southern Philippines.

GENERAL APPROACH

1) Seek a comprehensive solution to the problem taking into consideration the existence of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, the other Muslim rebel groups, and the sentiments of affected communities and sectors;

2) Establish common ground with the OIC; and

3) Find a meeting point between the aspirations of the MNLF and the political, social and economic objectives of the Philippine government.

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NSHG PRINCIPLES

1) While the Tripoli Agreement shall be the starting point for the talks, each party shall be free to introduce into the discussions issues that may lead to the attainment of a just and lasting peace in Muslim Mindanao;

2) The Tripoli Agreement provides for rights and obligations that are not self executory. Autonomy is a dynamic and evolving concept whose ultimate goal is to secure the greatest benefit for the greatest number of Muslim Filipinos in Southern Philippines; and

3) The options for a "transitional structure and mechanism" must be consistent with democratic processes provided for in the Constitution.80

During the Jakarta Peace Talks between the GRP and the MNLF, Chairman Nur Misuari gave a number of fiery speeches in the three rounds of talks and his "war" threats if his demands were not granted. However, according to some observers, it is evident that he, together with the members of the GRP panel, does not fully perceive the autonomy that will work for the Moros (Muslims). They have given much attention on the execution of the Tripoli Agreement thinking that the 13-province autonomy would work for the Muslims,81 but it will not.

According to Rudy Rodil:

GRP-MNLF Peace Process

As we all know, the Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was signed on September 2, 1996. The opening line of the document clearly states: "the final agreement on the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement." It represents the product of four years of exploratory and formal peace talks. It reflects an honest to goodness attempt on both the GRP and the MNLF to come to an agreement on the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement signed nearly twenty years ago on 23 December 1976.

Participants in the talks were the Organization of Islamic Conference Ministerial Committee of the Six and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic conference. Indonesia as Chair of the Committee of the Six presided over all meetings.

Agenda of the Talks

As agreed upon in Par. 14 of the Statement of Understanding between the GRP and the MNLF, signed in Cipanas, Indonesia, on 16 April 1993, "the agenda for the formal talks will focus on the modalities for the full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement in letter and spirit, to include specifically:

a. Those portions of the Agreement left for further or later discussion; and

80 Guidelines to GRP Panel on Peace Negotiations. Internet.81 Please refer to the appendices for the facts and fallacies concerning the Mindanao peace process.

This article is in the Internet.

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NSHG b. Transitional implementing structure and mechanism.82

During the early and mid-1990s, the southern Philippines was the site of renewed guerrilla violence by Muslim separatist forces. In September 1996 the government reached a peace agreement with one of the largest rebel groups, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The agreement established the Special Zone for Peace and Development (SZPD), consisting of 14 Mindanao provinces. The agreement includes economic assistance to develop the impoverished region. The following are the stages of the implementation of the peace accord:

Terms of Agreement

After three years of peace negotiations, the two parties signed what is now popularly known as the Peace Agreement of September 2, 1996. There are 154 points of consensus in the Agreement. Let me quote pp. 7-8 of the document itself.

I. "Implementing Structure and Mechanism of this Agreement

Phase 1 shall cover a three (3) year period starting after the signing of the peace agreement with the issuance of Executive Order establishing the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD), the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), and the Consultative Assembly.

During this phase, the process of joining in of MNLF elements with the Armed Forces of the Philippines will start. The joining in of MNLF elements with the PNP as part of the regular police recruitment programme will also take place in this phase.

Phase 2 shall involve an amendment to or repeal of the Organic Act (RA6734) of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) through Congressional action, after which the amendatory law shall be submitted to the people of the concerned areas in a plebiscite to determine the establishment of a new autonomous government and the specific area of autonomy thereof.

While peace and development programs are being implemented in the SZOPAD, a bill to amend or repeal the RA 6734 shall be initiated within Phase 1 (1996-1997). The bill shall include the pertinent provisions of the Final Peace Agreement and the expansion of the present ARMM area of autonomy. After a law shall have been passed by Congress and approved by the President, it shall be submitted to the people for approval in a plebiscite in the affected areas, within two (2) years from the establishment of the SPCPD (1998).

The new area of autonomy shall then be determined by the provinces and cities that will vote/choose to join the said autonomy (1998). It may be provided

82 Rudy Rodil, Kalinaw Mindanaw, Internet.

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NSHG by the Congress in a law that clusters of contiguous-Muslim-dominated municipalities voting in favor of autonomy be merged and constituted into a new province(s) which shall become part of the new Autonomous Region.83

Other rebel groups, however, continue to oppose the Philippine government. "47

SPCPD

The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development or SPCPD is perceived to be the last attempt of the Philippine government to formally solve the so-called Mindanao Crisis. The creation of the SPCPD is perceived to the stepping-stone for the "full implementation of the Tripoli Agreement." The Peace Agreement describes the area covered by the SPCPD consisting of fourteen (14) provinces and all the cities therein as stipulated by the Tripoli Agreement. These areas shall be the focus of intensive peace and development efforts, where public and private investments shall be channeled to stimulate economic development and uplift the conditions of the people therein. But of these places only five at most where there are Muslim majority.

This SPCPD is composed of one Chairman, one Vice Chairman, and three deputies, one each representing the Muslims, the Christians, and the Lumads (non-Christian indigenous people, Manobo, Bagobo, Higaunon, etc.). President Ramos appointed Misuari as the Chairman in spite of the oppositions from other sectors because he is the incumbent governor of the ARMM. The SPCPD is not provisional governments as the majority of the Muslims are thinking. It is not a governing authority, and it has no law-making power. Neither the SPCPD is an autonomous region or a political subdivision of GRP, nor a public corporation. It has no separate judicial personality; hence, it cannot sue or be sued. It is a transitory administrative arm under the control and supervision of the President of the Philippines; in other words, it is the alter ego of the president when it comes to the solution of the Mindanao problems. The power and functions of the Council shall be as follows:

1. To take charge of the promotion, monitoring, and coordination of the improvement of peace and order in the area;

2. To focus on peace and development efforts, especially in the depressed areas and initiate the implementation of appropriate projects;

3. To support the local government units, when needed; 4. To use other powers needed to implement its mandate as may be delegated by the

President; 5. To assist in the holding of elections, referenda, or plebiscite, and peoples' initiative in

the area, if deputized by the Commission on Elections upon the recommendation of the President; and

6. To recommend the creation of such offices or instrumentalities necessary for the effective and efficient administration of the affairs of the area. There shall be approval from the Office of the President for budgetary purposes.84

83 Rudy Rodil, Kalinaw Mindanaw, Internet. 84 SPCD, Internet.

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NSHG In the performance of the above functions, the SPCPD on the one hand, shall

coordinate with local officials and request their assistance in order to promote the improvement of peace and order, and development in the area or in causing the implementation of its peace and development projects. Since the SPCPD is under the direct control of the President of the Philippines, it cannot posses a power or functions beyond the authority of the President to delegate, or which only Congress by law can grant to an agency like the Council.

The Consultative Assembly on the other hand is not a law-making body but a forum for consultation and discussion of issues and concerns, formulation and recommendation of policies to the President, and provides appropriate advice to the Council. It is composed of 81 members as follows:

1. The Chairman of the Council shall be the head and presiding officer of the Assembly;

2. The Governor and the Vice Governor of the ARMM, the 14 Governors of the provinces and the 10 City Mayors therein the area;

3. 44 members from the MNLF; and

4. 10 members from various sectors recommended by NGOs and POs after due consultation with the MNLF.85

Majority membership of the Council and the Assembly is given to the MNLF. It is considered a concession to allow full and responsible participation of the MNLF in the democratic processes and within the fold of the law as a confidence-building measure. But there is check and balance. In turn, the MNLF agreed to: drop their demand for a provisional government; recognize the need for a plebiscite in establishing a new autonomous government; accede that the new area of autonomy will be determined by the choice of the people in the said plebiscite; and implicitly recognize the Constitution.

The Consultative Assembly shall exercise the following functions and powers:

1. To serve as forum for consultation and ventilation of issues and concerns; 2. To conduct public hearings as may be necessary and to provide appropriate advice to the SPCPD; and

3. To formulate and recommend policies to the President through the Chairman of the Council and make rules and regulations to the extent necessary for the efficient and effective administration of the affairs of the area.86

However, the secession or separatist issue did not end with the signing of the Peace Agreement. Hostilities erupted when the renegade faction of the MNLF, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf (AS) renewed their offensive operations against the military and hapless civilians. They abducted foreign (except

85 SPCD, Consultative Assembly, Internet.86 Internet.

32

NSHG Americans) and local civilians as the declaration of the renewal of their demand for independence.

Moro Islamic Liberation Front

In an exclusive interview by Sheik Abu Zahir entitled “THE MORO JIHAD: Continuous Struggle for Islamic Independence in Southern Philippines,” Salamat divided the Moro Jihad into three phases; First Phase: the Moro Jihad against the Spanish invasion (1521-1898) 377 years; Second Phase: the Moro Jihad against the American colonizers (1898 - 1946) 47 years; and Third Phase: the Moro Jihad against the Philippine colonizer (1970 - present).87 Salamat even claimed that he was the contact man between the Moro politicians and the Malaysian government that resulted in the training of the “Top Ninety” or what he termed as the “Batch 90.” In this same interview Salamat disclosed his vision of the government of the Islamic State of Mindanao. The interview is very comprehensive. It covered the history of the Moros from the point of view of the Moros or Muslims themselves. Hashim Salamat is determined to pursue their goal of secession. Thus, after one year of the signing of the peace accord between the Philippine government and the MNLF, the MILF started their offensive operations against the government forces.

There is fear of some alliance88 between the MNLF and the MILF after Misuari and Salamat met in Camp Abu Bakr in Cotabato, but Misuari is strong in his stand to give peace a chance. But if Misuari will rejoin their struggle they will welcome him with both hands, according to the MILF spokesman and said that: "That reformism is not the way to the liberation of our people." It goes like saying that the MILF will never, at this time submit for a proposed peaceful solution to the secession issue. This researcher one time asked a Maranao employee of the Mindanao State University, of what is the MILF all about, he answered that the MILF is the alter ego of the MNLF. He continued to say that, “When the negotiation succeeds and later discovered to be defective, the MNLF members are still assured that they have something to fall back to.”89 After the refusal of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to accept former rebels for integration into the AFP due to age and educational requirements, it was observed that a number of former MNLF cadres rejoined the armed struggle of the MILF.

As earlier mentioned differences of policies was the main reason for the division of the MNLF into factions. Hashim Salamat from Maguindanao organized his Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF – March 1984). MILF is fundamentally Islamic in outlook. And the MNLF Reformist Group (1982) under Dimas Pundato, a Maranao, supported autonomy. But what really happened according to Sheikh Abu Zahir in his interview with Hashim Salamat:

87 Sheikh Abu Zahir, “THE MORO JIHAD: Continuous Struggle for Islamic Independence in Southern Philippines.”

88 Please refer to the appendices for the text of an interview by Al Jacinto and Joel Vega from Gulf News with Mohagher Iqbal of the MILF member. Internet.

89 Name withheld. This Maranao is a former member of the Philippine Constabulary and a senior officer of this researcher in their ROTC Officers Organization, the MSU REARGURADS.

33

NSHG While the “Front” was still at the stage of organization, a conflict between Misuari and one of the then Cairo graduates (a doctor) broke out as both expressed aspirations to the chairmanship of the “Front.” Sheikh Salamat Hashim, who was the leader of the whole group, did not insist to the chairmanship to avoid further dispute and eventual failure. So Misuari became the chairman of the “Front.”

After a few years of the start of the struggle Misuari’s inefficiency had unveiled itself and most, if not all, of the field commanders signed a petition that Misuari should step down and give way for Salamat Hashim to assume the chairmanship, but Misuari cunningly insisted to stay and Salamat Hashim has to lead the "front" in accordance with the choice of the majority.

In order to avoid confusion, the members of the Central Committee had decided to replace the word “National” with the word “Islamic” so the true “Liberation Front” aiming at the re-establishment of a sovereign Moro Islamic State was given the title “Moro Islamic Liberation Front.”90

But who is Hashim Salamat that he could have been the chair of the MNLF.

Salamat Hashim was born on July 7, 1942 in the municipality of Pagalungan, Maguindanao. He comes from a religious family of seven: four boys and three girls.

Salamat’s first teacher was his mother. . . . At the age of six he started his formal education in the Philippine public school. He finished his elementary education in 1954 with honors and his secondary education in 1958 also with honors. . . . While pursuing his formal education, he enrolled in the village madrasah where he attended classes during Saturdays and Sundays. He finished ibtida’iyah at about the same time that he graduated from high school.

In 1958, Salamat joined the pilgrims from the Philippines in journeying to Makkah for the hajj. He took this opportunity to stay behind and study in Makkah under the care of Sheik Jawawi. He attended regularly the halakat held at the Masjidul Haram and enrolled at the Madrasatu As-Sulatiyah ad-Diniyah.

In 1959, he went to Cairo . . . graduated from Al-Azhar’s Ma’had al-Buuth al-Isslamiyah as-Sanawiyah in 1963. Then he enrolled at Al-Azhar’s College of Theology for a bachelor’s degree program majoring in Aqidah and Philosophy and graduated in 1967. Pursuing his scholastic inclination further, he took up his postgraduate courses in the same university and finished his master’s degree in 1969. He completed the academic requirements for a doctoral degree, but he was unable to write his dissertation because he had to return to the Philippines by then to organize the Moro revolutionary movement.

Salamat also became interested to learn the English language so he enrolled at the British International Correspondence School and the American University in Cairo.

90Sheikh Abu Zahir, Interview with Sheikh Salamat Hashim, Amir of the Moro Mujahideen, Continuous Struggle for Islamic Independence in Southern Philippines, http://www.Islam.org.au/articles/23/ph2.

34

NSHG Salamat was an active student leader. His active participation in different

student activities exposed him to various revolutionary trends, both Islamic and secular, which Cairo was known for at that period. This exposure brought him awareness of the colonial oppression his Muslim brothers and sisters were suffering back home, an awareness which gradually transformed him from a scholar to an Islamic revolutionary later on in his life. …It is interesting to note that among the contemporary Muslim thinkers who influence Salamat, two Muslim personalities made a lasting impression on him: Syed Qutb of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun and Syed Abul A’la Mawdudi of Jamaati Islami. It was, however, Syed Qutb’s writings which shaped his Islamic outlook and political beliefs. The impact that Syed Qutb and Mawdudi made on him was what inspired him to plant the seeds of Islamic revolution in the Bangsamoro homeland.

….As a cover for his mission, Salamat found a convenient employment as provincial librarian of North Cotabato.

In the organization of the MNLF, Salamat served as the first chairman of the Kutawato Revolutionary Committee (KRC), a Committee in charge of foreign relations. Using his contacts and connections in the Middle East, Salamat was able to bring to the attention of the Muslim world the cause of the Bangsamoro struggle for de-colonization of their homeland, thus gaining for the MNLF moral, political and material support.As a person, Salamat is serious in everything he does. He is well organized with regards to his family and his work. His personal discipline was developed during this spiritual sojourn with Sufism.

As an alim, he loves learning so much that even in his jungle base he maintains a library. He is also a prolific writer and lecturer in Arabic, English and Basa Magindanaon, his native language.91

The following are the stand of Salamat on the issue of Mindanao problem:

1. Salamat Hashim believes that "Any solution [to the Mindanao problem] less than full independence of the Bangsamoro Muslims will not work." To Salamat and the MILF, their objective is the reestablishment of the Bangsamoro state, and to continue the building of the political institutions in accordance with the supremacy of the law of God which was impeded with the coming of the Western colonizers. In one occasion he made it clear:

2. All what the Muslims are asserting are their legitimate rights to self-determination that is independence of the Bangsamoro homeland.

3. Salamat envisions establishing not a secular state but an Islamic state founded on the doctrine of the sovereignty of God, an Islamic government in the Bangsamoro homeland.

4. Salamat believes that government is an instrument for realization and perfection of man’s worship to God. The function of government is to regulate the affairs of humankind so that individually and collectively they can perform their worship to

91 Abhoud Syed Mansur Lingga, The Peace Process: Salamat Hashim’s Concept of Bangsamoro State and Government, http://www.Mindanao.com/kalinaw/peaceproc/salamat-2.html.

35

NSHG God. Government should ensure that justice prevails and should eradicate all forms of evils and encourage all forms of virtue and excellence.

5. Salamat’s model which shall be considered in the establishment of the Bangsamoro government is the government organized by the Prophet, peace be upon him, when he migrated to al-Madinah. Likewise, the rule of his four immediate successors, al-Khulafa al-Rashidun, shall also be considered.

6. The Qur’an does not recommend a definite form and structure of government. Salamat’s position is that this should be decided through consultation with the people. Experiences of other people, Muslims and non-Muslims, have to be studied to determine what form and structure that may be suited to the political culture of the Bangsamoro.

7. Salamat made known his personal view in favor of a federal system where the Muslims, indigenous inhabitants of Mindanao and the Christian migrants will reach constitute separate autonomous states.

8. In practice, the organizational structure of the MILF is similar to the structure of the Philippine government. The executive functions are exercised by the Office of the Chairman, the legislative functions by the majlis as-Shura (Consultative Council) and the judiciary by the Shari’ah Court.

9. The position of Salamat is that government should ensure that its citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims, enjoy freedom, justice, equality and democracy, and their human rights are protected and promoted.

10. To the non-Muslims of Mindanao who do not want to join the Bangsamoro state, Salamat commits that the MILF is duty-bound to help them if they opt to be free from the oppression and exploitation of the Manila government.

11. Salamat is of the opinion that the imam shall be elected. However, the manner of election will depend upon the situation and level of political maturity of the people. If the condition is so that the people can freely choose the leader and they can judge fairly who is the most qualified among the nominees, he is for direct election. If not, the election of the imam shall be delegated to a council called ahl al-hal wa ‘al-aqd, composed of scholars, professionals, thinkers and sectoral leaders.

12. The foundations of governance, according to Salamat, are shura (consultation), justice and equality. In his view, justice is the natural consequence of shura and equality is the natural consequence of justice. There will be no equality if there is no justice, and there will be no justice unless the affairs of men are conducted through consultation.92

The preceding presentation is very clear that Salamat’s goal is to establish a Bangsamoro Islamic State and government. His theocratic state is no doubt contradicts the constitutional provision that sovereignty resides in the people, because in theocracy God is sovereign. For the MILF, autonomy as an alternative political solution to the problem in Mindanao is no longer feasible and viable as shown by the events that followed after the GRP-MNLF Peace Accord was signed. Salamat believes that the only

92Ibid.

36

NSHG way that the Bangsamoro Muslims will attain prosperity and development is the implementation of an Islamic government.

This is the problem that the Philippine government has to deal with seriously if it has to preserve its territorial integrity and sovereignty. But the government is confident that they can hurdle this obstacle because the MILF is not supported by the OIC. According to Malacañang:

Malacañang maintained Wednesday that the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) does not recognize the Moro Islamic Liberation Front as the representative Muslim group in the Philippines and said any foreign government that supports the MILF will be interfering in the country’s internal affairs.

Presidential spokesman Jerry Barican made this clear in response to reports that the MILF is seeking support from Islamic governments worldwide for international recognition. In a statement, Barican said the only Muslim group in the Philippines recognized by the OIC is the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) headed by Gov. Nur Misuari .of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

In 1996, the MNLF forged a peace deal with the government brokered by the OIC, a grouping of more than 40 Muslim countries. "In fact, the MNLF still has observer status in the OIC," Barican added, noting that it was the OIC that facilitated the peace process between the government and the MNLF in 1996. Barican pointed out that the peace process with the MILF is purely an internal affair of the Philippines.

"Therefore, any foreign government that supports the MILF will be interfering with the internal affairs of the Philippine government, aside from contradicting the position of the OIC," he said. The MILF is negotiating a peace agreement with the government, following the success of peace talks between the Ramos administration and the MNLF.93

What Malacañang is hiding from the public is the fact that the OIC can help the MILF officially or unofficially. Officially, means that there is an approval from the members of the conference, while the unofficial support could be made by the individual member nation like Libya. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Another group that is also giving headaches to the government is the Abu Sayyaf Group that is basically a criminal element engaged in extortion and abduction of local foreigners and is believed to have some links with the MILF. According to an official report of the US Department as of April 1999:

Description

Smallest and most radical of the Islamic separatist groups operating in the southern Philippines. Split from the Moro National Liberation Front in 1991 under the leadership of Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine police on 18 December 1998. Some members have studied or worked in the Middle East and developed ties to Arab mujahidin while fighting and training in Afghanistan.

93 Daily Inquirer Internet Edition.

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NSHG Activities

Uses bombs, assassinations, kidnappings, and extortion payments to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the southern Philippines heavily populated by Muslims. Raided the town of Ipil in Mindanao in April 1995, the group's first large-scale action. Suspected of several small-scale bombings and kidnappings in 1998.

Strength

Unknown, but believed to have about 200 members.

Location/Area of Operation

The ASG operates in the southern Philippines and occasionally in Manila.94

The encounter between government forces and the MILF is still going-on. One had given peace a chance; the other is still waging their war because the change that they are waiting to see is not happening except for some MNLF members who are now members of the bureaucracy. It must be noted as earlier stated that there are three factions of the MNLF; one faction was under by Misuari and his members are mostly Tausogs, the other was led by Pundato and mostly were Maranaos, and still another, the MILF under Salamat and mostly Maguindanaons. Pundato surrendered earlier but his men had been left behind, Misuari accepted the peace accord but the bulk of the old members are left without job. Salamat took these people into his fold, and that is why the MILF has a strong following from the three Muslim dominated areas. Will the men of Pundato rise again and demand for secession once the peace agreement with Salamat is reached, so, that they will have a portion of the big cake? We would never know, except the fact that people are now suffering because of the renewal of hostilities not only by the MILF but also the Abu Sayyaf claiming to be fighting also for the secession of the Moroland.

There can be no peace in Mindanao unless understanding the history of the Moros is not achieved. It could not be possible too unless the Moros themselves will accept the fact that Mindanao had been lost for them already and they have to accept the realities that there is still peace in co-existence. All the people in the affected areas in Mindanao are victims of the “internal colonization” process that they were not able to anticipate because they allowed themselves to believe that education is a Christianizing agent. This left them behind from the rest of the major groups in the Philippines. The few qualified and educated Muslims could not be blamed on the government Christians but themselves. As their fallback, they resorted to Islamic fundamentalism and ethnocentrism to get the support of the Muslim world and their people who want peace. Nobody, I mean nobody among the Muslims when interviewed would say that they will not support the MILF least they will be the next victim. But in private conversations, these people are already fed up and frustrated of the use of religion in the trouble in Mindanao but they

94 United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998. April 1999.

38

NSHG could not do anything except to be the silent opposition and victim at the same time. Some of those who can afford left their homeland and search for a peaceful job outside Mindanao and be free from the politicization of their religion.

Karen National Union

The Karen National Union (KNU) was organized on February 5, 1947 “to unite and spearhead their movement for freedom.”95 The organization was timely, as the British colonizers would be granting the independence of Burma. The KNU is basically a political arm of the Karens while the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO later the KNLA) was the military arm. From the very beginning, the KNU adopted the principle of “solving their political problems by fair, lawful and civil dialogue within political context.”96

The KNU represents the Karen people and while sincerely attempting, with full commitment, to solve their problems, and also problems relating to the unity of the indigenous people, preservation of the Union, and achieving genuine and definitive peace, through nonviolent, political process, such puissant and pugnacious operation against the KNU Headquarters simply indicated that the SLORC's verbal expressions and declarations differ completely from their practical and ruthless actions.97

As history has it, they sent a Goodwill Mission to the British government to express their desire for self-determination and political autonomy. However, the British government did not bother about it and left it to the independent Burman led government to decide. So, the Karens tried their lot by negotiating with the ruling AFPFL in 1947 but to no avail. On February 11, 1948 a month after Burma was granted its independence, and a year after the organization of the KNU, the Karens staged a peaceful march requesting for their autonomy. This was participated by more than 400,000 Karens all over Burma, disproving the allegations that only few wanted autonomy. But the elected officials were busy preparing for the next election that they even forgot to give the needs of their people. As it happened, there were rebellions of the Communists and mutinies of the Burman Army personnel. The military arm of the KNU; the KNDO was requested for help, particularly to secure Rangoon. In spite of the deaf ears of the government of their request, the Karens willingly assisted the Burmese government. As stated earlier they succeeded in preserving Rangoon. What happened after was history. The Burmese government started to attack the Karens all over the country that forced them to retaliate. Unprepared for a revolution they had to withdraw later from the war fronts and adopted guerrilla warfare. From then on the Karens suffered extremely from the hands of the Burmese government.

Yet, they still hold on to the principles by which the KNU was organized, “fair, lawful and civil political dialogue.” The creation of the Karen State did not solve the problem of persecution and ethnic violence. In 1960, when a Caretaker Government

95 KNU, Web Site, Internet.96 Ibid. 97 Ibid.

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NSHG under Bo Ne Win was formed, the KNU again tried to offer a peaceful solution to their problem but just the same the government did not care about it. They tried again in 1963 under Bo Ne Win’s Revolutionary Council but failed. Ethnic persecution continued unabated. Thousands and thousands of lives of the Karens and other ethnic races were lost because of what appeared to be the first ethnic-cleansing campaign after that of Hitler in WWII. Because of Martial Law the sufferings of the Karens were never known. In 1984 the Burmese government began a military campaign against the Karen National Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU).

In 1988 after the SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council) took control of the government, Gen. Saw Bo Mya, president of the KNU sent a letter offering a solution to the political problems in Burma through dialogue and negotiations which follows:

KAREN NATIONAL UNIONTHE SUPREME HEADQUATERS

To:  Senior General Than Shwe Chairman State Law & Order Restoration Council

Dear General:

We see that it is imminently necessary to establish genuine and durable internal peace in the entire country of Burma. We also need to strive for a suitable and appropriate step-by-step approach, in order to secure that peace,

In this ascending step by step approach to obtain genuine peace, the first desirable stage is where mutual trust and close relationship can be established with preliminary representatives of both sides meeting face to face and planting the good seed of frank and open discussions.

To obtain mutual relationship and trust, both sides should respect each other's dignity and arrange for security in order to cultivate initial open and frank discussions. The KNU is thus ready to begin this incipient good seeding through direct conference at a mutually agreeable external (foreign) locality where the preliminary representatives could meet. For this purpose, we are sending this letter with Rev. Enos, through whom communications should be made, to formally find out the Senior General's opinion.

General Saw Bo MyaPresidentKNU - Karen National UnionManerplaw, June 7, 1994.98

There was no answer to this letter. The Karens also tried to negotiate through the Military Attaché in Burmese Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, named Colonel Thein Hswe and through Anglican Bishop Andrew Mya Han to hold a dialogue and peace negotiations between the KNU and the SLORC. During these exploratory discussions the following are suggested for consideration:

98 KNU, Web Site, Internet.

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NSHG

1: That the negotiations should not be made separately with each group or party alone; instead, to definitively represent all the opposition parties as a whole in the discussions for solutions, they should be made between the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) and SLORC.

2: That the locale (place) for the negotiations should be a foreign country acceptable to both sides.3: That this meeting for peace negotiations be conducted under the supervision of the United Nations. 4: That this meeting for peace negotiations be accessible to people of the news media, and news conferences can be openly held with them.99

These suggestions were rejected by the SLORC, so General Mya again sent the same letter that he sent on June 7, 1994 urging the ruling power to start a peaceful solution to their problems. However, the SLORC responded by attacking and taking over the KNU Headquarter in Manerplaw in January 1995. They also increased the use of Karen civilians as forced laborers (1995-96), especially to build the Ye-Tavoy railway and road. Karen villages were also relocated, crops destroyed and property confiscated,

forcing thousands to flee to Thailand.100

Two months after the Manerplaw attack, in March 1995, the KNU convened an emergency meeting of the Central Committee. It was decided to hold a bilateral negotiation between the KNU and the SLORC instead of holding on to the proposal of including other members of the DAB. The issues to be tackled during the formal negotiations of preliminary intermediaries with the SLORC’s representatives were identified. The following terms for negotiations are:

1. For this KNU and SLORC negotiation, the rank and number of responsible representatives should be discussed and agreed upon. (Members of the delegation of each side should comprise First Line Leaders and the KNU should be represented by 7 members, plus 4 office staff members to record minutes, a total of 11 members to attend the negotiations).

2. To settle on the time and place for the delegations to meet (To discuss for agreement that the negotiations should take place no later than the first week of January, 1996, and that a suitable place in Rangoon be chosen, and only if that is not possible, then Pa-an be considered as the venue.)

3. To discuss for the arrangement of broadcasting over the radio and announcement in newspapers about commencing negotiations by the two delegations one day ahead of time (on the eve of the meeting).

99 Ibid.100 James F. Guyot, "Myanmar," Microsoft® Encarta® Encyclopedia 2000. © 1993-1999

Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

41

NSHG 4. To discuss and settle on allowing the attendance by the peace intermediaries during the negotiating sessions.

5. To settle on the freedom of recording of all of the negotiating sessions from beginning to end by video camera, movie, still camera and audiotape.

6. To discuss and settle on the KNU holding a press conference at the end of the negotiations at a suitable place in the city where the negotiations are held. (This can be omitted if SLORC objects to it. However, each side, on its own, should always hold the right to dispense information to the news media.)

7. To discuss and settle on the access to telephone/telegraph/radio communication between the KNU delegation and the KNU Central Headquarters.

8. To discuss and agree on the security arrangements for the KNU delegation by SLORC.

9. To discuss and settle on the absence of internal or external threat or threatening gestures and actions during the negotiating sessions.

10. To discuss and agree on the right of the KNU representatives to meet freely with relevant people and to be able to attend religious / worship services of each own faith at will without any restriction during the negotiation period.

11. The right to meet with relevant people means:

(1) Leaders of Karen people organizations

(2) Educated elites and Persons trusted and revered by the Karens.

(3) Buddhist Monks / Abbots and Christian Clergy Leaders.

(4) Relatives and Close Friends

(5) Members of Ethnic Political Parties and Political Leaders supported by the people or mass.

At the end of the negotiations, to make known to the country through radio and TV broadcasting, and also through newspapers and periodicals all the minutes taken during the entire sessions.101

The first round of negotiations was on December 18, 1995, but of the 11 points

presented by KNU delegates for SLORC’s considerations, points 2, 3, 6, and 10 were rejected. The SLORC representatives were adamant and unyielding to point number 10, as if they would like to isolate the KNU with the rest of the political leaders. The agreed points for discussions during the formal negotiations were inadequate in the point of view of the KNU, but they did not press the issue and prepared for the next negotiation on February 15-16, 1996. During the second round of negotiations the KNU being the

101 KNU, Internet..

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NSHG interested party submitted and discussed the cease-fire arrangements to be observed during the coming negotiations. The following are:

1. Memo on the KNU Viewpoint concerning Cease-fire for the During the Negotiation Sessions. It is necessary to observe cease-fire during negotiations between SLORC and KNU. The necessity derives from:

- the desirability of cultivating trust by each side during negotiation;

- the need to avoid military matters during the negotiation;

- the essentiality of conducting the talks under secure conditions;

- both sides to obtain the trust, reliance and confidence of relevant parties, organizations, ethnic peoples, and the entire mass (people) of Burma.

- in continuation, along with the cease-fire, the following items are deemed necessary and proposed for mediation by the KNU; they are:

2. The need for SLORC to let the entire country know about the cease-fire.

This need to declare the cease-fire to the whole country rests on the following reasons:

(a) Without the declaration of cease-fire to the entire country, (troops of) KNU allies in the basic KNU territories and the contiguous areas, and within as well as outside the KNU regions, would continue fighting with SLORC, and, inevitably, the KNU troops in the basic KNU territories would be, in some way, involved in the conflict. It is therefore highly desirable that SLORC officially announce the cease-fire to the whole country to avoid these complications.

(b) Everyone is aware that the fighting and battles between SLORC and KNU have been the fiercest. In view of this, to alleviate the obduracy and antagonistic sentiment between both sides, and, concurrently, mitigating the hardened animosity and hostile emotions between all other armed resistant powers in the country and SLORC, it is desirable to cultivate a good seedling in starting this negotiation by the two sides.

(c) The countrywide declaration of cease-fire can provide encouragement to the people of the whole country. They will have faith on this negotiation, and support and cooperation can be forthcoming from them. And these are extremely desirable to be attained.

(There has been a precedence when in 1963, during negotiations with the then ruling Revolutionary Council, the Rev. Council government made an official declaration of country-wide cease-fire.) 

3. It is desirable that reinforcement for the offensive forces and movement of heavy weapons to frontline areas be suspended.

If reinforcement for the offensive SLORC forces in the KNU territorial grounds were not suspended during the negotiation sessions of the two sides, there will be no doubt that the KNU as well as the Karen people cannot put any faith in this negotiation. Thus, it is imperative that this extremely important point should be seriously taken into account.

43

NSHG It is necessary that construction and maintenance activities of roads used in the military offensive operations should be suspended.

4. The front line roads used by SLORC offensive operations are threatening gestures to the KNU and the Karen people living in the KNU territories. Therefore, if construction, improvements and maintenance work on these roads are not suspended during the talks, there would be troop movements and confusion will undoubtedly arise between army units on both sides as well as among the people in these areas. Thus, to prevent these problems road construction and maintenance activities must be suspended.

Recruiting new army personnel, engaging porters for the troops, enlisting locals for watchmen or security duties, and raising corvee should be suspended.

5. During the cease-fire period, rounding up new recruits for the army, drafting porters, getting watchmen from the locals, and calling for volunteer workers or corvee are activities directly related to the public which can cause complications, bad feeling and confrontations, and thus should be suspended. Only then the negotiation can earnestly proceed without these concerns and anxieties.

6. It is necessary to suspend all the levying of money on the people in lieu of porters, watchmen or people for security duties, corvee or 'volunteer' workers, and demanding provisions from the people.

SLORC's various demands on the people, things that are seriously detrimental to the people, must be absolutely stopped. Should instances like these arise, the most appropriate actions should be taken. If not, the negotiation between KNU and SLORC and the cease-fire would not be beneficial to the people, and the negotiation, undoubtedly, in some way would be harmed or impeded. Therefore these things should cease, and in case they still happen, actions should be immediately taken against them.

7. To refrain from forcibly relocating people; and those that have been reestablished elsewhere by coercion, those who have to run away and hide to avoid forced relocation, should be allowed, arrangement and security given them, to return to live in their own villages.

Not to forcibly resettle people elsewhere, and allowing for the return, with guarantee of full security, those who have been relocated by force as well as those who managed to escape and hid to avoid relocation, would be highly required and demand immediate action. If this is not done, it would not be easy for the cease-fire and negotiations to be successfully conducted. Additionally, permission should be given for necessary help that can be rendered to the suffering people by various NGO's.

8. Information and messages should be promptly available to both sides concerning necessary personnel and troop movements.

During the cease-fire and negotiation period, prior notification and messages on necessary troop movements on both sides should be sent to each other. In only this way would accidental encounter and firing on each other be avoided. Since this can create messy and complicated situations, each side's troop positions should be precisely demarcated.

44

NSHG During the cease-fire period, KNU must be able to freely communicate with their own ethnic people.

Since the negotiation between SLORC and KNU is the political destiny for all the Karen people, during the cease-fire and negotiation period, the KNU should be able to personally meet and discuss with, and obtain the suggestion and counsel of the Karen people, revered Karen Buddhist and Christian clergy members, educated elite and respected Karen leaders. Therefore, it is desirable that these contacts and communication should be guaranteed with freedom and security. Only then the negotiations can be carried out honorably.

9. To mediate and solve problems that may arise during the cease-fire period, negotiating committees represented by delegates of both sides should be formed.

Since there could be problems between the two sides, many questionable and difficult situations concerning the people and mass, necessitating promptly mediated solutions, it is desirable to organize negotiating committees within both the upper echelon leaders and lower members of the delegations.

10. The cease-fire should be observed by an observer delegation from the United Nations Headquarters, acceptable to both sides.

Monitoring should be available to ascertain whether or not the cease-fire terms are strictly observed. For this, impartial and fair observer groups, acceptable to both sides, should be maintained. Inasmuch as the most suitable people for this are available from the UN, both sides should request for help from the United Nations.

11. During the cease-fire period, the KNU Central Committee member P'Doh Mahn Yin Sein and KNU members and Karen people arrested by SLORC should be released.

In order to implement the cease-fire with positive results, it is desirable to free the arrested and detained KNU members and other Karens. In releasing the KNU members who were arrested in 1995, including P'Doh Mahn Yin Sein, the Karens should be unconditionally freed. If this were not carried out, the KNU soldiers and the Karen people cannot look forward to any hope on this cease-fire and negotiation. Thus, this situation must be implemented with practical results.

12. Within 30 days of mutual declaration of the cease-fire agreement obtained during the negotiation by both sides, negotiation should be started on fundamental problems related to internal peace for the country.

The cease-fire being particularly for discussion and mediation of basic problems of the country, both sides should begin serious negotiation, aspiring for a firm and lasting peace in the country. Only then progress (the ascension) toward genuine unity of people in the country and an authentic federation system can be achieved.102

Of the 12 items above proposed by the KNU, five were disapproved and accepted seven (# 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 11). These 5 items were again resubmitted for considerations in the third round of negotiations on June 29 to July 2, 1996. In the overall analysis of the points presented by the SLORC was for the Karens to stop their

102 Ibid.

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NSHG armed struggles and return to the fold of the government. The meeting ended with the assurance that both sides “to look for answers to bring their positions closer” during the fourth round of negotiations.

At the fourth round of negotiations on November 20, 1996, the KNU submitted the following proposals:

(1) The problems between the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and the Karen National Union (KNU) should not be solved by military means or armed struggle, and to maintain cease-fire;

(2) Once the cease-fire goes into effect, the SLORC and KNU should continue negotiating on matters concerning the Union (of the country), unity among the peoples, and the achievement of a firm and durable peace in the country;

(3) In order to maintain the cease-fire, mediation and demarcation to be made on the positions of the troops of the two sides, and regulations and rulings to be followed by troops of both sides.103

These three proposals were submitted by the SLORC delegation leader, Colonel Kyaw Win, to his SLORC superiors who countered with the following points:

 To relinquish the armed resistance course of action and enter the 'legal fold', and make legal declaration (on these).

Observation of cease-fire.

Mediation on the demarcation of troop positions.

Cooperation on projects for the regional development.

To attend the National Convention, relating to politics.

When the Constitution has been drawn up (at the National Convention), to finally reject all arms and weapons, and form a lawful/legal political party.

 When the SLORC delegation sought the impression on their 6 items of counterproposal, the KNU responded that they would furnish their reply on these by the end of December 1996, and the Fourth Negotiation was brought to a close.104

Proposals and counter-proposals were submitted but the negotiations were stalled at some issues that are unacceptable to the SLORC. After the fourth round of negotiations the SLORCs began their offensive operations against the Karens. However, the KNU continues to pursue a peaceful solution to the war raging in Burma. On January 7-14, 1997 they held an Ethnic Nationalities Seminar at Mae Tha Raw Hta in Kawtholei, and agreed upon the following items:

103 Ibid.104 Ibid.

46

NSHG 1. AGREEMENT RELATING TO POLITICAL AIMS(a) To dismantle the military dictatorship and establish peace in the country.(b) To practice the democratic political system;(c) To achieve the rights of equality and self-determination for each and every nationality;(d) To establish a federal union.

2. AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE SLORC'S NATIONAL COVENTION The sham National Convention being held by the SLORC, present, is for the perpetuationof military dictatorship. Since absolutely no rights will be gained for the ethnic nationalities, we, the Ethnic Nationalities Seminar, do not in any way recognize the SLORC's National Convention and agree to oppose it.

3. AGREEMENT REGARDING TRI-PARTITE DIALOUGEWe, the Ethnic Nationalities Seminar, accept the tri-partite dialogue agreed to by Daw Aung San Su Kyi, and called for the by the resolutions of the UN and international organizations. The tri-partite dialogue must include three forces, namely the force composed the NDF, UNLD, PDF and other ethnic nationalities, the pro-democracy force led by Daw Aung San Su Kyi and the SLORC military clique.

4. AGREEMENT RELATING TO FEDERAL UNIONWe, the Ethnic Nationalities Seminar unanimously agree to establish a genuine federal union composed of national states having the full rights of national equality and self-determination.

5. AGREEMENT RELATING TO ECONOMIC POLICYRegarding the economic policy, we, the Ethnic Nationalities Seminar, agree to practice market economic system and invite foreign investments. However as foreign investments, at present, are benefiting the SLORC military dictatorship only and increasing its oppressive power, we strongly object to them.

6. AGREEMENT RELATING TO NARCOTIC DRUGSWe, the Ethnic Nationalities Seminar, unanimously agree to cooperate with international narcotic drug eradication organizations for the eradication of the entire business of narcotic drugs, including cultivation, production and trafficking.

7. AGREEMENT REGARDING PRO-DEMOCRACY FORCESWe, the Ethnic Nationalities Seminar, agree to raise the fight on all sides in the fields of politics, diplomacy and people's action for the dismantling of the SLORC military dictatorship.

In this struggle, we agree also to join hands with the pro-democracy forces led by Daw Aung San Su Kyi, and act unitedly and simultaneously for the achievement of rights of the nationalities as well as democratic rights.

Moreover, we acknowledge the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Daw Aung San Su Kyi as the winner of 1990 general election in accordance with the true, will of the people and democratic process, we fully support all acts of opposition against the SLORC, by it.

8. AGREEMENT RELATING TO ASEANWe the Ethnic Nationalities Seminar, agree to send letters to ASEAN requesting it to delay, indefinitely, acceptance of Burma under the SLORC, as a member of the organization.

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NSHG 9. AGREEMENT RELATING TO ALLIANCEWe, the Ethnic Nationalities Seminar, agree unanimously to help develop the National Democratic Front (NDF), the nation-wide alliance body of the ethnic nationalities, into a politically militarily and organizationally more solid entity.

10. We, the Ethnic Nationalities Seminar, agree to maintain and implement the results of the seminar and to have reunion at least once a year.105

All the efforts of the KNU appeared to be useless for the SLORCs continued their attacks on the hapless and helpless ethnic minorities; even refugee camps are not spared.106 But it is not a hopeless case as long as the SLORCs are also willing to meet on the negotiating table.107 In an email answer of BaSaw Khin to the queries of this researcher concerning the present stand of the Karens on the issue of secession, BaSaw noted that the situation before and when the article in the Internet was written is different at present. With the developments of the negotiations and the unity of the population against the SLORC, BaSaw seems to believe that most likely autonomy of the different ethnic races will be achieved in the near future.108

In the introduction of the KNU Web Site in the “Summary of the KNU and SLORC Negotiation Process” General Saw Bo Mya, President of the KNU wrote:

It has been almost fifty years of civil war, which began since Burma gained her independence in 1948. This civil war has continued through this long period because of two enormous basic political problems concerning: ethnicity / the different ethnic peoples, and democracy / the democratic principles for the entire population of the country that have failed to be resolved by peaceful, political means.

From the time it was organized in 1947, the KNU (Karen National Union) has never desired to solve problems through the military method. During the demonstration of more than 400,000 Karen people on February 11, 1948, the Karens emphatically expressed their strong emotion against internecine strife by proclaiming loudly the slogan "(we) don’t Want Civil War". Simultaneously declared was the desirability to seek fair, just and peaceful solution to political problems. However, when the KNU and the Karen people were provoked and attacked by force, in order to defend themselves, and with whatever available weaponry, they had to resort to (taking part in) the unavoidable revolutionary war.

In any event, endeavors have been made throughout this time to solve the country's political problems through nonviolent, political means. After the SLORC military took power in 1988, the combined efforts of KNU together with other ethnic

105 Ibid. 106 Please refer to the appendices for the reports concerning SLORC’s atrocities.107 Rodi Rodil, a member of the GRP Panel during the GRP-MNLF Peace Talks said, that during

their meeting, at first the Indonesian government arranged the tables far apart. Then, as the negotiations progressed, the tables were moved closer that the negotiators need not have to use their microphones and they could even reach one another’s hand. There was one coffee table so that everyone would like to offer each other coffee.

108 Email letter of BaSaw Khin. Yahoo.com, Internet. It could not be retrieved because of technical problems with the PLDT.

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NSHG groups and powerful democratic forces to resolve political problems by civil and peaceful means have been in vain.

By December 1995, the beginning of conferences between the KNU and SLORC was made possible through the striving/toiling of those committed to peaceable process. Unfortunately, when the fourth meeting ended, the then prevailing mutual cease-fire agreement was unilaterally broken off by SLORC which, on the first week of February, 1997, started an intensive military operation, thereby resuming hostilities, and effectively discontinued and destroyed the peace negotiations.

While conducting violent and ruthless military operations against the KNU and Karen villages, SLORC maliciously implied that the KNU was responsible for the breakdown of talks, and it was the KNU that made unreasonable demands during the conference. From their vantage point, propaganda is carried on through their radio and television stations, making calumnious statements, and creating suspicion and misunderstanding against the KNU.

It is hoped that through this clarification document, keeping in forefront the just and best interests of the Karens and all the ethnic nationalities, the actual, truthful proceedings during these negotiations that the KNU had participated with much liberal attitude, would be, to some extent, made known to all the people of the country. It is also hoped that the Karens and all the different ethnic peoples in the country are able to differentiate between right and wrong, and can faithfully hold on to truth and justice.109

In other words the Karens at first started their campaign for an independent state in a peaceful means as also outlined in the history of the Karen people. However, the hard stand of the Burmese government against the Karens and other ethnic races made it hard to achieve a practical and long lasting solution to their perennial problem of peace and order and ethnic discrimination. However, as BaSaw wrote, the possibility for the granting of autonomy will be the best alternative to secession once they ousted the SLORCs from Burma.

Comparative Analysis

Resurgence of ResistanceThe secession movements of the Karens and the Moros, by the KNU and the

MNLF/MILF are basically caused by the failure of their governments to address the needs of the people. The Burmese government abused the Karens even though they helped that government against the rebels after their independence was granted. The Moros on the other hand felt that the incursion of the Christian settlers into their ancestral homeland was the strategy of the government to complete the colonization of the south. Their miseries from the hands of their (Moro) politicians were blamed on the government while the sufferings of the Karens were really instigated by their own government. The pre-conceived Christian hatred against the Moros, which has no reality, is the result of their guilt and fear of vengeance of the Christians who were their victims during their naval guerrilla war against Spain. Majority of the Muslims living in the Christian areas did not meet this kind of attitude and mistrust from the Christians. The Karens is another case. Their friendly and democratic attitude to foreigners and freedom of choice of religion of their ethnic race members seemed to be the basic

109 General Saw Bo Mya, KNL, Internet.

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NSHG causes of being alienated in their own country because of the concept that a “Burmese is not a Burmese unless he/she is a Buddhist.”

The resurgence of colonial resistance of the Karens was ahead of the Moros. Right after their independence they already started their request for autonomy, while the Moros were still observing their fate under the rule of their pre-conceived enemies. However, the black propaganda against the Karens worsened their suffering. They were later fighting all other armed groups in Burma, perhaps because they are perceived as foreigners due to religion (some Karens who adopted Christianity). But this is not enough reason to hunt the Karens. It is the strong ethnocentric attitude of the Burmans and not the Karens; to lord over other ethnic races has to be blamed. But the perseverance of the Karens for their cherished dream of autonomy if not secession or freedom encouraged others to fight. The event that triggered the secession of the Moros was timely because it happened in what is called as the First Quarter Storm. The Marcos government could not fight all the discontented factions in the Philippines. The martial law regime helped in promoting the cause of the Moro leaders among their people because of the use of the military to crash them. As the Christians are the pre-conceived enemies, the soldiers who were majority Christians provided the excuse or propaganda that indeed Martial Law will Christianize the Moros.

However, on the one hand, though the Karens were ahead in their secession or autonomous demand, the solution to their problem is still bleak because of the martial law regime in Burma. The only advantage of the Karens at the turn of the new century is the use of the cyberspace or Internet in providing the needs of the outside world to know what is going on inside Burma. Though earlier, the Karen state was created for propaganda purposes (just like the change of Burma to Myanmar) and as a partial solution to the problem confronting the Karens, however, it did not help any better. The SLORC’s armies would like to annihilate them and other races, in other words the problem is still there but it is more political than racial because all other races are also victims. The unity of the ethnic races and the Burman themselves to oust the repressive SLORC is a sign of development for the Karens. Now the fight transcends racial barriers, hence, Khin believes that there will be positive outcome of their struggle because other races had joined hand with them.

The problem of the Moros on the other hand, is still raging. However, the partial solution to this was already put in place, but when it comes to the tangible results, it is still more wanting. The concentration of the programs of the SPCPD is in the Sulu archipelago, while leaving the other areas. Misuari said that his budget is not enough to cover the whole Muslim areas. No wonder that discontentment is ever present. But the Moro resurgence to colonization did not end there with the signing of the Peace Accord. The war is still raging in Mindanao between the government forces and the Moros (MILF, and the renegade MNLF faction that do not believe in compromise as the solution to the problems of the Moro people) with a bleak possibility of peace at present. There is also the Abu Sayyaf that rides on the bandwagon of secessionists.110 For them there is no other solution but independence.

110 Please refer to the appendices of the report about the Abu Sayyaf.

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NSHG As the Karens are gearing towards real autonomy the Moros under the influence

of the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf is going an all out war that is even exported to Manila, to press their demand for complete independence.111 What united the Karens on the one hand in their aspirations for respect and self-determination is their strong ethnic identity. The Moros on the other hand had more edge over the Karens because beside their strong ethnic identity too, their Islamic religion became their rallying point and a source of external support.

Chapter V

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE AND EXTERNAL SUPPORT

Philippine Government

The Philippine Government that represents the Christians – the perceived enemies of the Moros and a neo-colonial power did not scatter the Moros all over the islands to prevent them from reorganizing. They were allowed to stay in their homeland, and continued their illegal activities that resemble their age-old practice of Pangayao or piracies and slave raids, which took the modern form of abductions and extortion activities. While the Moros are aggressive, the Christians are patient; hoping and waiting for the time to come that the Muslims will change and accept them as co-Filipinos as the Christian accepted them. A case in point was the abduction of Christian students by the Maranaos in 1992. The Christians were planning to retaliate by abducting Muslim students in Cagayan de Oro City. But cool minds prevailed and negotiations were made. The government is very patient with them because it only reacted when attacked. In fact it was the government who negotiated for a peaceful solution rather than the Moros.

Burmese and SLORC’s Response

Right after the Second World War, the Karens outwardly opposed their membership into federated Burma. Even before the independence of Burma was granted, the Karens were already blacklisted by the Burman leaders for their desire to secede from Burma. The government that followed was ruled by the Burman ethnic group, so, knowing of the Karens’ war exploits as proven by their successes in defending Rangoon, it scattered the Karens all over Burma except those places where the Karens were the majority. They were forced to work with low salary, their houses were confiscated and their children and families were also scattered, a sort of ethnic cleansing. Nonetheless, they persisted and even grew in number. But just the same they could not do anything because the racist government saw to it that nobody from among the Karens would get the right education because of their threat to the Union of Burma. Aside, from this, the other reason perhaps is that, they could not get the right leader to represent them because they themselves are divided. Other Karens preferred to form their own separate autonomous state rather than continuing their fight for

111 Please refer to the appendices for some reports of their offensives.

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NSHG autonomy. Another factor might be religion as earlier pointed out. The Karens are divided into Buddhism, Christianity and their pagan beliefs (majority). Christianity and Buddhism among the Karens is only ten percent of the population. Thus, they could not influence the majority who are pagans. As the Christians have many denominations, the Buddhists in Burma have many sects too. Hence, they could not influence the total population. One sect may not have the same beliefs from the others, thus, alienating one from the other. With the military as the lords and masters, the monks had no way of uniting the people as they themselves are disunited.

External Support

Moros

The Moros being Muslims had the support of the Islamic countries all over the world. The Moros may be the least developed, Muslims but just the same they are still Muslims and according to the teachings of the Islam all Muslims are brothers and as brothers they have to help one another. Take the case of Malaysia. Malaysians offered to help train the first (Top Ninety) and the succeeding batches (Batch 300 and others) of the MNLF, because they felt that it is their obligation to help their Muslim brothers who are abused by the Philippine government. The liquidation of the Muslim trainees in Corregidor Island popularly known as the Jabidah massacre got the sympathy of Malaysia. They were able to ascertain that the trainees were trained in order to invade Sabah. The massacre became their excuse to help the Moros of Mindanao, because they were killed for their refusal to attack Sabah, the grand design of Marcos if the Malaysian government refuses to return Sabah to the Philippines. The claim of the Philippines over Sabah is based on the concept stating that what is owned by its citizen is also owned by the state, and the concept that a citizen of a country is under the protection of its government. Malaysia until it got its independence paid the Sulu Sultan an annual rent as stipulated in the lease agreement between the Sulu Sultan and the British government. However, whether the Jabidah massacre happened or not, Malaysia was still obliged to help the Moros because of the concept of “dar-ul-Islam.”

The OIC is very influential for the cause of the Moros because from its member nations the Moros were able (and still are as in the case of the MILF) to get the much needed logistics and assistance for the families of the guerrillas. Actually, without the OIC the Moros of Mindanao would not last in their struggle because of their ethnic diversity. Never was there any representative from the United Nations to oversee how the ceasefire agreements between the government and the Moro rebels were implemented but there were Muslim observers from other countries. The American government did not in any way interfere with the problems of the Moros because in the first place because they are blamed by the Moros for including Mindanao into the Filipino nation. Not only that. The Americans won’t allow the incident in the 1970s to happen again. They were threatened by the OIC and OPEC that if they would not convince Marcos to negotiate with the MNLF, the Arabs and Egypt will not enter in the negotiating table with Israel for peace and order in the Middle East, and without the repercussions on their oil needs.

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NSHG Having external support which is a basic requirement for successful

unconventional and progressive fighting, gave the Moros the advantage over the Karens. Although members of the OIC are secretly giving aid to the MILF to continue their fight, officially the OIC gave the Philippine government the assurance that it does not recognize the MILF. This statement was issued so that the OIC will not appear to be contradicting their actions, because they cannot support peace process of the government and the MNLF at the same time giving assistance to the fighting MILF. The ongoing support to the MILF is shown by the number of Arabs entering the Moroland in the guise of evangelization, but they are actually military advisers to Hashim Salamat. The training of new recruits in Pakistan in the pretext of participating Islamic religious conference indicates that the OIC is still supporting the Moro mujahidin or Holy Warriors of the MILF.

Karens

In the early stage of the Karens secession movement, there was no external support. While the support of the people is vital to the success of the fighters, the people supporting the Karens were also hunted so the Karens have nowhere to turn to. The Karens likewise lacked external support, be it in the form of arms and ammunition or subsistence supplies. The war that the Karens waged was at first thought of as a case of ethnic strife because their main antagonists were the Burman race, their first colonizers. That is why there is not much attention given to it from the outside because it is basically an internal problem.

However, reports on the violations of human rights against the Karens became severe that the United Nations mediated to find the solution. Even the non-combatants are still attacked, annihilated, abused and exiled. The pathetic condition of the Karens caught the attention of Human Rights activists all over the world, so that a number of international support groups for the cause of the Karens and other ethnic races in Burma the whole Burmese population who are suffering under the regime of the SLORCs. The Karen National League for example is based in Canada. There are also those that are based in Thailand. The function of these support groups is basically to relay to the world through the Internet or the tri-media what is happening within Burma. But as the support is through information, this will not help a lot because what they need most are arms and ammunition.

Careful analysis of the events in Burma will prove that the atrocities of the SLORCs had in a way or the other helped the Karens as well. The situation: First: the Karens are not the only ethnic race (they prefer to call it a race than group) in Burma that are being hunted by the SLORCs but a lot of them, i.e. the Cachins; and Second: the Burman ethnic race as represented by the daughter of Aung San is also suffering from the abuses of the SLORCs. This scenario made the other races in Burma realize that unless they are united they cannot win against the SLORC that has the support of the multinationals operating in Burma. As pointed out earlier the different ethnic races formed the DAB or the Democratic Alliance of Burma. The DAB is their united front in order to defeat the repressive martial law regime of the SLORC. Even the Burman

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NSHG students who were at first anti-Karens are now taking refuge in the Karens refugee camps. In spite of the use of the modern technology to inform the world of what is happening in Burma, external support is still lacking.

Unlike the Moros that have the support of the OIC and other Muslim countries, the Karens have none. While the Moros have their Muslims supporters, the Karens who are majority Buddhists have no Buddhist country that could afford to extend their help because majority of these countries are also suffering from their economic problems, i.e. India. The United Nations on their part cannot enforce sanctions on the SLORCs because the SLORCs argue that it is not within the bounce of the UN to interfere in an internal problem of the country. The United States cannot also interfere as it interfered in the Middle East and in Europe because it has no interest to protect in Burma.

CONLUSION

Summary

The history of resistance movements of the Karens and the Moros can be traced back to the time when the colonizers came into their homelands. But, while the Karens were overwhelmed by the superiority and the trickery of the conquerors, the Moros were not. The Moros became the stumbling block of the imperial design of the Spaniards in Mindanao. But as the Karen experienced earlier, the Moros changed positions. They did not surrender to the Americans but made treaties of friendship, which placed them on equal footing with the conquerors. They stopped fighting upon learning that the Americans meant business, and accepted the treaties of friendships. But for the Americans, it meant surrender. Hence, when they opposed their inclusion to the Philippines, they could not do anything but accept the fact that their perceived enemies, the Christian Filipinos would be their rulers. The same is true of the Karens. The Burmans, who were aliens of their place centuries ago became their rulers, hence, they did not like to be ruled by them again.

After the Second World War when independence was granted to the Philippines and Burma, the Moros and the Karens renewed their efforts to regain their freedom by organizing their secessionist movements. The resurgence of the Karens’ secessionism was ignited when the Burman dominated Burmese government attacked them after defending and preserving the capital City of Rangoon (now Yangon) and of course the ethnic cleansing campaigns by both the Burmese and the SLORCs. On the part of the Moros, the slow response of the government for the development of Mindanao, and the influx of the Christians into their ancestral domain became the rallying point in the resurgence of anti-colonial resistance. This resurgence was ignited by the Jabidah massacre in 1968.

The governments on both countries tried to solve the secessionist movements in their respective countries that plagued their administrations using different approaches.

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NSHG While the Philippine government, even during the feared Martial Law, used persuasion and negotiations, the Burmese government used force and firepower to crush the Karens. While the Karens were made as forced-laborers, the Muslims were pampered, money were poured to Mindanao to show to the Muslims that the government would like to fulfill the promise that Mindanao is the land of opportunities. Nevertheless, the money fell into the pockets of their own (Moro) politicians, but they (Moros) are made to believe that it is the fault of the Christian government not of their Moro leaders.

The escalation of war between the Moros and the Christian-led government forces compelled the OIC to intervene, which the Philippine government could not refuse because of the much needed oil and of course as dictated by America. As earlier discussed, at the time when the trouble in Mindanao was intense, the peace negotiation between Israel and Egypt and other Islamic countries was in progress. The OIC and the OPEC secretly demanded from the US government that they would only enter into the negotiations if the US convinces the Marcos government to suspend military operations against the Moros and to negotiate with the rebels instead, if not, no Middle East negotiations would occur. This is not present in Burma. There are no Buddhist or pagan countries that produce what the SLORC government needed most, or any world power that can influence them, just like the influence of America over the Philippines. Of course there are American companies in Burma, but the US government cannot interfere with affairs of private enterprise. In short, the Karens have no external support while the Moros have.

Conclusion

In all of the preceding discussion, there is only one denominator of the resurgence of anti-colonial resistance. This is basically cultural in nature. The Karens do not want to be ruled by their perceived former conquerors, the Burmans, although, the sufferings of the Karens are more on the ethnocentrism of the Burmans than of the Karens. As history has it, the Karens are friendly, fair, and democratic. They are also cosmopolitan hence they are able to achieve higher education during the British period than in any other period of their history. Nonetheless, the Karens had already won in their fight. They had proven to the other ethnic races in Burma that the Karens are not the problem but the oppressive Burmese and SLORC governments. They were able to show that they are willing to cooperate with others for the benefits of the greater majority. What really preserved and encourage the Karens to go on is their ethnocentrism, but a more positive kind of ethnocentrism. They would like to preserve their own identity while learning from other ethnic races.

The Moros on their part do not like to be ruled by their pre-conceived enemies - the Christians Filipinos; of course this is not true. If ever there are people that should be blamed for the alleged neglect of the government on the people of Moroland, these are their own politicians. There is no time in Philippine history after the granting of independence that there are no Muslim legislators. These people are supposed to protect the interests of their constituencies but they too became power hungry that they forgot the needs of their populace. These people were despised and called palatikos a pejorative

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NSHG term for dirty politicians, yet the Moro masses blamed the government for their failures, they elected them into office. While it is true that the Christians had taken their lands, history would show that majority of these small farmlands were acquired legally. Those big tracks of lands that are owned by absentee owners are the ones acquired illegally through their own unscrupulous (Moro) politicians.

Both the Karens and the Moros felt that their homeland is so small to have another group of people to stay, hence, the ethno-centric and the competitive theories on ethnicity apply to their problems. On the one hand, with the present developments in Burma this ethnocentrism is now a part of the past. They are now learning to see the good thing from one another, which in a way caused by the ethnic or religious cleansing of the SLORCs. Because of SLORC’s atrocities the different ethnic races are now helping one another to fight their single enemy – the SLORCs that resulted in the organization of the Democratic Alliance of Burma spearheaded by the KNU or the Karen National Union.

On the other hand, if ever the Moros could not be hired into the bureaucracy because of their lack of necessary qualifications, the blame is on them because they thought that education would make them Christians, hence, they refused and look down on those Moros who sent their children to school. As in the case of the Karens, since they are not allowed to use and learned their language, it did not make education less important, also look down on the Burmese educational system. However, unless the Moros and the Karens will stop thinking as Moros and Karens but as a citizen of their countries without surrendering their respective ethnic identities, secession or separatism or more appropriately resurgence of anti-colonial resistance won't end.

In conclusion, since the secessionist or separatist movements of the Karens and the Moros are caused more by their refusal to be ruled over by another group whom they consider as enemies, rather than the alleged neglect by their governments, and the destruction of their ancestral domain, therefore, these movements are ethnocentric in nature. Since the war being fought is ethnocentric in nature rather than political or military, then it is an encounter of cultures. And since the Burmans are thought of as the original oppressive colonizers of the Karens (who first settled Burma), and the Christian-Filipinos as the alter-ego Spanish colonizers, therefore, the encounter of cultures popularly called secessionist or separatist movements is the resurgence of anti-colonial resistance than mere insurrection or rebellion.

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