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We all think that we have this power called free will... that we have the ability to make our own choices and create our own destiny
We think that we do what we want to do... that we have a host of legitimate options... that we make choices based upon those options... that we’re in control of our own future
In other words, we all think the future is open and undetermined, like a garden of forking paths in front of us
When we deliberate we think we are actually trying to decide which possible future is the one that we want to make actual
Many scientists believe that the universe is deterministic (or mechanistic) in the sense that everything that happens in the universe operates in accordance with a very structured set of natural laws
Determinism is the theory that the state of the universe at any point in time is entirely fixed by the state of the universe at a prior time and the laws of nature
The laws of nature refer to the various principles/forces/powers which govern the natural phenomena of the world…
“All events, even those which on account of their insignificance do not seem to follow the great laws of nature, are a result of it just as necessarily as the revolutions of the sun… [As such], we ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state and as the cause of the one which is to follow...”
If the universe is deterministic, then the future is determined by the conjunction of the past and the laws of nature, which means that the future is NOT open and undetermined
If determinism is true, then only one future is genuinely open to us and all other “futures” are merely illusions
X
X
According to Hume, the question of the nature of free will is “the most contentious question of metaphysics...”
A few different ways of understanding “free will”
Defining free will in terms of doing what you want to do...
According to this op.on, “free will” (or ac.ng freely) merely consists in doing what you want, or choose to do
Defining free will in terms of the ability to do otherwise...
According to this op.on, “free will” (or ac.ng freely) consists in one’s having the power to do otherwise
A helpful example to help understand the difference
John Locke’s famous ‘locked room’ example...
“Suppose a man be carried whilst fast asleep into a room where there is a person that he longs to see and speak with... And be there locked fast in, beyond his power to get out, he awakes and is glad to find himself in so desirable company... so much so that he decides to stay willingly in the room and converse rather than leave...”
Free will is best defined in terms of possessing the ability to do otherwise. So we act freely in doing X if and only if, at the time just before we do X it is in our power to do otherwise than X
Defining free will as the ability to do otherwise...
Defining the “free will” thesis...
To say that we have free will means that we are some.mes in the following posi.on with respect to a contemplated future act:
We simultaneously have the ability to both perform “X” AND refrain from performing “X”
In other words, we freely do “X” if and only if, at the Gme just before we do “X” it is in our power to do otherwise than “X”
Answering the compatibility question...
If you answer “No”, then you’re an incompaGbilist
The “incompaGbilist thesis” is the thesis that determinism and the free-‐will thesis could not both be true
If you answer “Yes”, then you’re a compaGbilist
The “compaGbilist thesis” is the thesis that determinism and the free-‐will thesis could both be true
A fairly intuitive argument for compatibilism
(1) It appears that I have free will and that the future is genuinely “open” like a garden of forking paths
(2) It appears that the universe is determinisGc such that given its state at one .me and the laws of nature, every future state of the universe follows of necessity
Therefore,
(3) It appears that free will and determinism are compaGble with one another
Peter van Inwagen
“It has seemed obvious to most people who have not been exposed (perhaps ‘subjected’ would be a beLer word) to philosophy that free will and determinism are incompaGble... Indeed, people who have not been exposed to philosophy usually understand the word ‘determinism’ (if they know the word at all) to stand for the thesis that there is no free will. And you might think that the incompa.bility of free will and determinism deserves to seem obvious-‐-‐because it is obvious… However, many philosophers are compaGbilists... In fact, compa.bilism has an illustrious history among English-‐speaking philosophers... [and according to some compa.bilist accounts] compaGbilism can look like nothing more than robust common sense...
“I think that compatibilists can make their doctrine seem like common sense only by sweeping a mystery under the carpet and that, despite their best efforts, the bulge shows. People are aware that something is amiss with compatibilism even when they are unable to articulate their misgivings. [And] I believe that it is possible to lift the carpet and dispel the hidden mystery. [For] the notion of ‘not having a choice’ has a certain logic to it...”
Van Inwagen’s consequence argument...
The ‘consequence argument’ is widely regarded as the best argument for the conclusion that if determinism is true, then no one ever really has a choice about anything
For if determinism is true, then our acts are just a consequence of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. And since it's not up to us what went on before we were born nor what the laws of nature are, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us
Van Inwagen’s consequence argument...
A non-‐technical formulaGon of van Inwagen’s consequence argument
(1) No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature
(2) No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail that only one future is possible
Therefore,
(3) No one has power over the facts of the future
Van Inwagen’s consequence argument...
The consequence argument seems to preclude the common sense no.on of free will that we’ve been considering. For if determinism is true, then our acts are just a consequence of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. And since it's not up to us what went on before we were born nor what the laws of nature are, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us
So it looks like free will is inconsistent with determinism, which means that the thesis of compaGbilism is false aNer all
Van Inwagen’s consequence argument...
An important to point to emphasize: Van Inwagen is an incompaGbilist, not a determinist!
In other words, all that Van Inwagen wants to do is show that the“compaGbilist thesis” (namely, the thesis that determinism and the free-‐will thesis could both be true) is false
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The reasoning underwriting the consequence argument is captured in what van Inwagen calls the ‘no choice principle’ (NCP)
The No Choice Principle - Peter van Inwagen
“Here is an example that will illustrate what this thesis/principle implies. Suppose it’s an untouchable fact that the last dinosaur died long before I was born. And suppose also that the following condi.onal statement expresses an untouchable fact: if the last dinosaur died long before I was born, then I have never seen a living dinosaur. It follows from these two supposi.ons that it’s an untouchable fact that I have never seen a living dinosaur. Is the Principle correct? It is hard to see how anyone could deny it. How could anyone be able to do anything about something that is an inevitable consequence of something no one can do anything about? But if determinism is true and if the Principle is correct, then all facts are untouchable facts. So it follows, given the Principle, that determinism implies that there is no free will...”
“This is the hidden mystery that, I contend, lies behind the facade that ‘common sense’ compatibilism presents to the world: the compatibilist must reject the Principle, and the Principle seems to be true beyond all possibility of dispute...”
Van Inwagen’s argument against compatibilism
(1) The theory of CompaGbilism is true only if the No Choice Principle is false
(2) But, the No Choice Principle is not false
Therefore,
(3) The theory of CompaGbilism is not true
Therefore,
(4) The free will thesis and the theory of Determinism cannot both be true simultaneously
How about indeterministic incompatibilism?
Quantum intederminism?
Suppose that our world works in the way that a quantum-‐mechanical theory claims that it does—indeterminisGcally
On this account, if the laws of nature are quantum-‐mechanical, then they merely probilify a set of outcomes rather than determine a single unique outcome
And so, perhaps this indeterminisGc view of the world makes room for the no.on of free will
But do such appeals to indeterminacy really help solve the problem? Is indeterminism any more compatible with free will than Determinism?
“Unfortunately, incompatibilism also holds a mystery... since the indeterminism that seems to be required for free will seems also to destroy free will...”
The Liar example - Peter van Inwagen
“Suppose Jane is in an agony of indecision; if her delibera.ons go one way, she will in a moment speak the words, ‘John, I lied to you about Alice,’ and if her delibera.ons go the other way, she will bite her tongue and remain silent. Let us look carefully at the consequences of supposing that human behavior is undetermined... Let us suppose that there is a certain current-‐pulse that is proceeding along one of the neural pathways in Jane’s brain and that it is about to come to a fork. And let us suppose that if it goes to the leN, she will make her confession; and that if it goes to the right, she will remain silent. And let us suppose that it is undetermined which way the pulse goes when it comes to the fork: even an omniscient being with a complete knowledge of the state of Jane’s brain and a complete knowledge of the laws of physics and unlimited powers of calcula.on could say no more than: ‘The laws and present state of her brain would allow the pulse to go either way...”
The Liar example - Peter van Inwagen
Consequently, no predic.on of what the pulse will do when it comes to the fork is possible; it might go to the le`, and it might go to the right, and that’s all there is to be said.’ Now let us ask: does Jane have any choice about whether the pulse goes to the leN or to the right? If we think about this quesGon for a moment, we shall see that it is very hard to see how she could have any choice about that... If it goes to the leN, that just happens. If it goes to the right, that just happens. There is no way for Jane to influence the pulse. There is no way for her to make it go one way rather than the other. Or, at least, there is no way for her to make it go one way rather than the other and leave the ‘choice’ it makes an undetermined event...”
The basic idea behind the mind argument is this...
The “Mind argument” is a kind of argument designed to show that indeterminism and free will are incompaGble. More precisely, it is designed to show that posiGng indeterminism in key places in the causal chain leading to the agent’s ac.on undermines rather than makes room for free will, by making the relevant acGons seem random and hence unfree
The basic idea behind the mind argument is this...
If my acGons are caused by events or processes that are themselves indeterminisGc, then they won’t be any more “up to me” than if they were caused by events that follow determinis.cally from events that occurred before I was born
So it seems like if we lack freedom of ac.on in a determinis.c world, it’s not clear that we’re going to get it by moving to an indeterminis.c world
So, in the end, it appears that denying determinism is really no help in making space for genuine freedom
“Perhaps the explanation why both compatibilism and incompatibilism seem to lead to mysteries is simply that the concept of free will is self-contradictory... If free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, then, since either determinism or indeterminism has to be true, free will is impossible. And, of course, what is impossible does not exist...”
A very troubling anti free will dilemma to consider...
(1) If the thesis of determinism is true, then the free will thesis is false (by the consequence argument)
(2) If the thesis of indeterminism is true, then the free will thesis is false (by the mind argument)
(3) Either the thesis of determinism or the thesis of indeterminism is true
Therefore,
(4) The free will thesis is false whether the world is determinisGc or indeterminisGc
Since the dilemma argument is clearly valid, and all three premises seem to be well supported (if not true), it looks like we have a very persuasive argument for the conclusion that: contrary to our common sense intuitions there is no such thing as free will after all