FT

9l,6LBt66

L?P-.T?L0002 g8ite'IrtJg

(ara:puy t:aqo1) .v lreqou'rros1r41 .Il _zg6f ,.,J 1ue:c,llrx.I .LrorteuBldxE.Z .uor1ru303 .;

(reded'\e) r&zLL-297,-o NgsI 'xepur pue sJJuera3a: 1e:rqde_r8orlqrq sapn[]rrl

'uoslrA\.v,,.Iooq ProJpBrg v,,

'rur .duaqotJ pur IraX .-)

)Lrerg ,{q palrpa 7 rrorlruSor pue uorteueldxg

elu([ uorte:x1qn.1_ur_Fur8oplr3 ssa"r8uo3 ;o .,Lre:qr1

-EJrrerLrV Jo setEts petrun eqt ur punoq pue pelur-rd

Srrog ''pr1 -ra11asad.,(1 las-rs"tr ,{q oq.,r"g ur res se^\ {ooq srqJ

.{.3o1orrqraa Jo rtntrlslrl slrrsnllrcssel^I 0002 o)

';aqsrlqnd aqr ..ro{ Eurlr-,,tr ur uorssrrlr:ad lnoq]r.r* (Jr,tar-r1eJ

puE a8e;ors uorl -sruJoJul :o 'Surpro::-r '3ur'{doroloqd Strrp.pur) ,,r"".,,'l'fru'r{le.r Jo fruorrlJla

due dq uuo; Lur ur pernporda-r aq .{ein looq srql Jo 1-recr o51 .pelrasrr slqSr.r

1y

se.r\ pue Suoy

The Naturalness of Religion and the Unnaturalnessof Science

Robert N. McCar-rley

Aristotle's observation that all hunran beings by natr-rre desire to knowaptly captures the spirit of "intellectualist" research in psychology andanthropology. Intellectualists in these fields asree that humans have fun-damental explanatory interests (which reflect their rationality) and that theidioms in which their explanations are couched can differ considerablyacross places and times (both historical and developnrental). Intellectualistsin developmental psychology (e.g., Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997) nrainrainthat young children's conceptual structures, like those of scientists, aretheories and that their conceptual development-like the developnrent ofscience-is a process of theory formation and change. They speculate thatour explanatory preoccupations result, at least in part, from a natural driveto develop theories. Intellectualists in the anthropology of religion (e.g.,Horton 1,970, 1993) hold rhat, although it may do many other things aswell, religion is primarily concerned with providing explanatory theories.They maintain that religion and science have the same expianatory goals:only the idioms of their explanations differ.

The connections between the concern for explanation, the pursuitof science, the persistence of rel igion, and the cognit ive processes under-lying each clearly merit further exanrination. By considering both theircultural manifestations and tl-reir cognitive foundations, I hope to clarifynot only how science and relision are related but some of the ways theirexplanatory projects differ.

I shall argue that, despite their centuries' old antagonisnrs, no devel-opment in science will ever seriously threaten the persistence of reiigionor the forms of expianation religion employs or the entergence of newreligions. (l strongly suspect that science will never seriously threaten thepersistence of particular relisions either, but I only aim to defend the

poller s€r{ (J2661) :e.{og Iprsed teq^a uo tsar t€rlt sernteg e^€q dar{tJI'esuoselllfrJlseJ eJour € ur ((leJnl€u,, Jq ol pres osle uEJ slfe Jo slqSnoqJ

'(g'g uortres ur 966I IIe) pue ltrrreg Jo uorssnlsrp 'eldrurxa :oy

'eas) Surssaco"rd enrtruSor eurl-uo ur strella str ruleq.r\ra.Lo Lllerrddr purru

Jo slrq€q elrtJageJuou 's:nffo sJeneru snor8rla.r tnoqe uortfageJ uor{,&\uela trr{t osl€ sr lurod eql'seop afuerls tnoqe qfnru s€eJaqAA 'uorlraga:

ldruord uelr tou seop tr trqt elqeprne Llrpear os sr uor8rlar tnoqu qlnuItq] elou o1 d1e-reu lou sr esues lsJrJ srql ur .(le.rnleuun,, otuerJs Jo seJnleeJdueru pu€ ,,lrJntuu,, uorSr1eJ Jo saJnleeJ ,(ueu Surgrr Jo turod eql

'sror^€r{eq pue stuellr8prl eu{-uo rror{luo tredrur qJmu eleq ot d1e1r1un sr uortJopteJ teqt 'seter8

Frlos eqt rueqlot pa1;edur dln3sserrns eleq sreple rraqt pepr.to.rd qSnoqlp 'a1lenbrle gouetsl.s rrrr{t LuroJur teqt uortr;ede.rd pur seldnur.rd aqt uo {fua1 te tregertq8rru eldoad 'aldruexe ro{ 'surtruop qlns ur uort)JueJ epnpaJd 'as.rnor

3o'tou saop tuephe-Jles ro snorlqo a-re deqt teqJ'uortfeger e:rnba; lou opdprrd& esues

lil"ffi:,;j;Tr;,rrtr,:,,';'i:i :::,:::T',fi, u,o sluJAO Jo esJnof IEruJou eqt sE stunol teq^\ 'osJnof

JO 'Jouurp Sur.lnp s8ur:

auoqdalel -rnol. ueq^\ >luiqt ol Sulql ,6lrrnteu,, eqt sr eur1 oqt Jo pue raqtoot{t uo uos;adseps r Surtradxa llge-rp plol e ur Surltrs uor{.^A op ot Surql

,,leJnteu,, eqt sr .lAopurl\\ aql Sursol3 'sluele Jo asJnof IeruJou eql go r.red

sluses lI ueq^a-uollfeHeJ lnoqtr^\ auop Jo pleq to 'anrtrntur '1uapr.r.e-Jles'snornqo 'JerlrrurJ sr lr ueq,AA

,(l€fnleu,, sr uorlfe Jo Jer1eq € leql ,&s e7y1'o^.r uo snloJ

Ileqs I 's8urueeru elqrssod Jo requnu

ts€A e rroddns uer (.leJnleu,, se llnpuor Jo oJII I€luerrt uerunq Jo lredseeruos Surqr:rseq'leJnteuun d1e3.re1 sr teqt JJuorJS pu€ I€rnteu sr leql uorS-rler sr 1r '3ur1eeds dlerrrlruSor 'teqt an8re

Wqs I 'sp1-ro.u 1e.rn1eu:adns qtt.&\

peuJJJuol sluees uor8rla: puc plJo,lA IeJnleu eqt sorpnts efuerls qSnoqlly

serreurrurleJd I'E

'suerunq ot l.1p:n1eu II€ te oruof tou saop

sfuerfs stuou eruos uo ts€el te leqt ./!\oqs ot eq ruA\ z'g uorlJss 3o ure 1ed-rrur-rd oqJ',,leJnJerfut1,, ruees deru uor8rleJ r{lrq,&\ ur slcedseJ euros eloupuE pulru ur eAEr{ I ,,lEJnlEu,, Jo sesues ar{l lnoqE spJo,^a .AAaJ e ,/res lsmu 1'qSnoqt 'ts.rrg 'uorlruSor pur uorlerfosse u€Lunq

Jo lueluor pue JelfuJer{feql Jo qt.tro.r31no .(pJnleu,, E eJE uorleueidxe Jo sruJoJ JrlsrJelleJer{f slr pueuot8qer teqt .&\oqs ileqs I't't, uortfes u1 ('a:aq rur€ll alrttelloJ '.re>1ea.ra.

,(apw241'Z9

Naturalness of Religion, (Jnnaturalness of Science

"noncultural" foundations. This second sense is more restrictive: things

counted as "natural" on the basis of their comparative independence from

specific cultural input form a subset of those deemed natural in the first

sense, that is, ones that seem familiar, obvious, or self-evident.These aspects

of human activify and mental life not only do not require extensive

cultural support, often it is not obvious that they require much of any

cultural support.TWo considerations bear on "natural" in this second sense. The first,

less easily measured consideration concerns the relative superfluousness of

particular cultural arrangements for the generation and persistence of the

behavioral patterns and cognitive accomplishments in question. The

second, more important consideration for the purposes of this chapter is

cognitive.Some cognitive capacities seem to turn neither on any particular cul-

tural input nor, as in the case of face recognition, on any peculiarly cul-

tural input at ail. Childrent procliviry to acquire language and nearly all

human beings' appreciation of some of the basic physics of solid objects,

their assumptions about the mutual exclusiviry of taxonomic classes in

biology, and their abilities to detect and read agents' minds are just some

of the proposed candidates for human cognitive capacities that arise inde-

pendently of any particular cultural input.These capacities seem in place comparatively early in human devel-

opment, and their functioning usually seems both automatic and fast. Their

operations occasion no conscious searches for evidence, and even if they

did, the associated inferences seem woefully underdetermined by whatever

evidence might be available.'Why, for example, should shifting his weight

to his other side and momentarily raising an eyebrow make us so confi-

dent that our interlocutor is skeptical of our claim?

Whether such considerations (together with the noncultural status

of the underlying cognitive processes and representations) require that

these capacities also be innate has been a point of considerable debate over

the past thirry years (see, for example, Spelke 1,994).The more interesting

question, though, is what being "innate" might amount to (see, for

example, Karmiloff-Smith 1992).AsJeffrey Elman and his colleagues (..g.,

1,996, 369) have noted, some of the representations and processes in

question are, quite possibly, the nearly inevitable outcomes of compara-

tively min or varlations on farnlliar principles guiding Tearning in neural

networks.

63

qlnu os luJoJuI lEt{l sluarulluos al{l ol dJ?rtuo3 '(sasuas tueleler eqt Jo

qtoq ui) .(lernteu,, s€ peqrrrsap ,(1:rca eq u€l (uorleueldxe Jo surroJ ledpur.rdslr Surpnpur) uoiSrler qlrq.^a ur srredsar rql ssnrsrp Iprls I ..6sseulcrnreu-un,, quor8qa-r 3o uorssa_rdtul slqr e>ler{s ot q .g., uortres ur po8 d61

r'l€rntEuuou 3q1 qtl.&\ slE3p tr t€r{lJo IEJnlEuun sI uotStie-t leql uorldrunss€ eqt ruo-13 tinsoJ sporltolu Jgrtuorlsuo suoll€lllul1 anrtelnd JSrtll 'peepul 'euaruoueqd snor8rla-r ot sotuoftI ueq^A elenbepeur ro petrurq dlenedse erg plro,&\ Igrnteu eqt Jo uortefi-IJSoAUI oqt ur opq.^Aquo.^A tsoLu perlroep dp*tr

Jo seporu eqt ter{t ,treuaur '8urp1oq-€uaruoueqd snor8ile-r

Jo stunor x Euqpl ple!( [r.4A saruarrsIsllos puE i€lnl€u eql uI uolleueldxe Jo srLItoJ L:etuolsnr teql .{uep {.,{J'1r ureldxa ol sPsodo-rd rgrluarrs

Jo sseualrtroJJo eqt uo tur€rtsuor pald-trut.rd '-reln8urs e stes sntets alrtfurtsrp s,uor8rler

teqt umlupru (g L ,266Luaped pue igp'966L uouu€J :Og-gg,gg6I Lai_reg ,eldruexe :oy ,ees) uor8qe:Jo sreloqls snorre^,{pnrs Jo spoqteru pDeds sa.rrnba-r uorSqe; leqr (7) e:o3-aJeqt pue lanbrun ere'"re1nrrt;ed ur ,aJueuedxe snor8rle-r pue uor8rla_r

leql(1) Sunsrsul Jo selpnts snorStle: Jo pleg eqr rnoq8norqr eorrre;d aql u'rlleJour lE-rnlBuun sr uorSrle; teqt uortorr Jql salourord,qSnoqr,8urqlo5

'serlrnrlJ€sselturod dl:eltn e>lII '.uJUo eJoru tnq 'rseq rE sur.roJ drdrue alrl ruoes uruosFnlru 'uorsse;drul sF{t ot setnqrrtuoJ oslc slentrr

Jo sseusselasn tua.reddeeqJ 'snorrep{ ro arfiezrq roqtre se uteqt e>lrrts

teqt gerirq snor8rler uorletuo{uol dlprrporJed uorSrlor Jo sJeloqls e^rtrsues pu€ peluar.redxa tsorueqt uaAE 'esues uou-ftuoJ s auoL;a,la ]so[rle q]1.{\

lllEtuol sluena snolnf€JrrudpaSege '.lle re5y'oJuerrs uer{t

Frnteu ssel sr uor8rla-r tei{t uortrntur rqt ololnqlJtuof s8urqt L-reurp-routxe op pu€ seruedo.rd d_reurproeJtxJ a^uq oq.Aslua8e uerunq-radns tnoqe suorldurnserd snor8rlox 'Frnteuun sr uor8rla"r13ql esues € lelsoj UEJ suollBueldx: stl seure{ uotSrler qlHA\ ur sruorpr aqluo Suisnro{ 'seJueJeadde ot z(:e-rluoJ oJE uor8rla.r

lnoq€ surrell qlns'Jfuorfs rltr.^A rsuf eqt sr ueqt rndur

IEJntlnJ dl"rerlnrad uenalo 'tndul

I€JnllnJ Jo sruJoJ -relnorr:ed '1ndur Ierntlnl ;elnrrued uo ssel J€J

L1a-r leql sessarord errrtruSor suJJruol uor8qer 8ur,(1:epun dllnrtre a,trtru8orailt Jo tsoru 'puora5 ('palsrxa JJAJu eler{ suortntrtsur

leJntlnl Furqrea_r_-re3qrns's;e.req1e3-_relunll lrJotsrqa.rd Fuorue,aldruexa -ro3,sruetsds snor8rla_reluos loJ '{peapul) 'uor8r1al

Jo esef eqt ur op deql uEqt aJusrfs Jo ef uetsrs--rad pue uollereue8 aql uI elor p.r8elur erolu -reg e .&1d qcea Surpunorrnssuonnlllsul IEJnllnr et€Joqtle eql 'tstrC 's8urql ozwl SurtsaSsns rue

I ,esuespuoles srql ur ((leJnJeuun,, efuerfs pue ((lEJnJEu,, uor8rla; 8ur1pr u1

laya3tlqf9

Naturalness of Religion, Unnaturalness of Science

research in the fieid of religious studies, many features of "religious

cognition" are not at all extraordinary, ar.d thus the methods and findings

of the cognitive sciences can iiiuminate them. Consequently, contrary to

widespread assumptions in both religious studies and anthropology, gaining

insight into related aspects of religious systems may not depend on scrupu-

lous attention to all of the details of cultural contexts. My case turns iargely

on surveying analyses of religious idioms (concerning both thought and

action) and their underlying ontologies that have emanated over the

past decade from cognitive accounts of religious phenomena. Those

accounts reveal just how "natural" the forms of religion and of reli-

gious explanation are-at least in comparison to the explanations science

advances.First, let us turn to respects in which science may be described as

"unnattJral" in the two senses at hand. Let me emphasize that I do not

intend to portray the comparative naturalness of religion and science as a

stark or obvious contrast, but only to suggest that it is religion and not

science that has the greater natural appeal.

3.2 The Unnatural Nature of Science

In making my case for the comparative unnaturalness of science relative

to religion, I do not aim to undermine arguments of deveiopmental psy-

chologists (Carey 1985; Gopnik 1,996; Gopnik and Meltzoff L997) to the

effect that the cognitive maneuvers of children and scientists are similar in

many respects. These developmentalists argue (1) that scientists' and chil-

dren's conceptuai structures are theories; (2) that, for children as well as

scientists, these theories provide explanations of events in the world; (3)

that, like scientists, children are sensitive to the role evidence can play in

improving their conceptual structures; and (4) that conceptual develop-

ment in children is, like scientific change, a process of formulating, eval-

uating, amending, and sometimes even replacing theories.2

In claiming that religion is more natural than science, it does not

follow that nothing about science comes naturally. lJndoubtedly, some

cognitive activities scientists engage in-their formation of hypotheses,

their attention to evidence, and their elaboration, modification, and

replacement of theories-predate the emergence of distinctively scientific

traditions and institutions and probably do constitute fundamental opera-

tions in cognitive development.

65

'op sSulaq ueunq leqto ter{t suouetlrul pue soserq a^r]ru3or eru'S er{l

llqlqxa deql se JEJosuI osF lnq 'sar8ele-r1s pu' srsererur d.roreueldxe relrurrs

llqlqxa daqr se rejosui dpo lou '{uJrpirq) e>lrl er€ 'Burpuelsqrr.^alou esrl

-;edxo pue Sururer elqeJJprsuof .rreql ,slsrtuorfs sE stsrtuens oi1l4 pateJrl

-srqdos a>lrl qrnu os rou are uorplrqJ.uv-t1,L66L JJozrlew pue ryudog)

lde os sl ,,p[q] se lsrluerfS eyt,,3o Surleeds dq.r,r uoseeJ e osp sr tJ 'll

op or '^Aor{ Suiu:ea1 pue rr Suru-rea1 qloq ,fupluJlp r{rns e^eq dueruos dq'r'r' pue ryEnal eq rsn.' ef,uorrs dqn suoseor eqr

Jo euo sr sFll'puruurrunq or{t Jo slrqeq euof,eq ,{iprrleuotne rou s8uieq urunq ol euror.,(flecrteruo]ne rer{trou s[i>ls e]lsrnbe; er{J.e77.dse ,166I uene8undrrsurespu€ ralra-rg) eluoifs ur efuspr^e prr-rrdrue Sursre_rdde pue ,SuDnpo_rd'3utns;nd '(lerrleruals.{s go ,t1nrg3rp

rql pue dlrle-r1u33 rqr r{roq Bunq8rl-q8lq uo urnr e>le.' or r{sl^a

I srurod eql ,;aqre11 .lse88ns ilrr,r t.t. uoltf,as

ur d.roruaru uo s>lJeurar se ,eiqetrJeqr dlnpun aq deru reql ,q8noqr

'.reqtre tuog srql uo snorSqer 3i{t uortsenb 1 pqs roN .eJueprrre Surrraloo

Jo elu'lJodiur oqr Jo uouruS0ra-r s uerplrq] uorrsanb o1 rou sl sF{r'(ZZZ'166I ue.r.e8undererues

pue re.^Aorg pue lg0g ,966y lrudog :gg '02'L66I

flozllew pue Tudog aes) sesse:o.rd esoqr ur deld-suor1,e1rpe.rdo'rirru80c d-reurp:o Jno or pesoddo se-sru3luo3ue.r.re

IeJnrlnf, pue IETJOSlrqr solor Ieronrd eql'puoras'pue serroeqr l.-roleueldxe roJ r.rodrur

Esluep -I^e leql Jo luerussessB aql ol pue aluopr^e prr-rrdrua

Jo uorteraua8 aqt olqloq s8ui-r9 lr drDrreruals.{s pu€ uoirerrlsrqdos olrlelal er{r ,rsJU ,sr eluarfssaqsrn8unslp tel{7!t 2luaudoleaap pnldaruor pue uorfirl3r ruog

uede ySutllas pue (,,p-rnJln),, dlprluasserurnb ro)

,.p;nreuun,, rr Eurqqnp segrlsnfleql olualrs lnoqB ]i sI leq^A uaql 'uotBIIeJ pu€ 'tueudolerrep

pnldofuof 'of,uarls ur {1rua-re3grp q8noql l.lpnbe pedeidsrp uorteurlrur .lerntlnruou B .sr

teqt '.lerntuu dlpcrSoloqrdsd E sr srrrorr{t d-roteueldxa roJ a^rrp eqr JI

'uortrueldxo Jo sasod_rnd ar{t roJ (urer teqt Jo esuas peorq dla.trle-redruor

,stsrSoloqcdsd Ieluerudolelap eqt ur_((serJoeql,,) serntfnJts IEntdaruorsdoldep lI leql luolxe aqt ot sueunq ur uorr'u4f,ur

I'rnreu sn{r sesse-rdxe 'efuorf,s ueqr sser ou 'uor8rrox 'sr aruerrs ueql

lredse.r sn{r ur leJnreussal 0u st uoiStlar ueqr '4ce;r tqSr: eqr uo sr uor8qe.r

Jo runorre rs{enrfal-lelul ue JI lBql elou lng 'puei{ lr sesues oqt ur

uretsds e.trtru300 ueunqOql Jo suoll€ulllul IeJnleu afe suorreueldxa Sururelqo lnoqe suJOJuoJpue suorldunse:d 8ur11nse.r eqr reqr ulurureur dr,{J .ruoqr punor€ pl.ro^\eql Jo osuos e{elu ol suoll€urPur lelrSoloqcLsd IISEq aneq s8uroq uprunr{13ql uollrr^uol eql (elrotsuy pue) d3010qrr(sd

Ft,r.-doieaep ur srs{e-ntleiietul qtr^\ aJeqs uor8qe;;o .,(Folodorqtue oLIt

ur stsrientlefletul

larya2ryy99

Naturalness of Reli,gion, Unndturalness Ltf Scierrce

Whether as children or educated scientists, human beings seek explana-tions, generate theories, and consider evidence, but they also operate withvague hypotheses, perform fallacious inferences, have memory lapses, anddisplay confirmation bias (see the ftnal paragraphs of this section).

Scientists can get around some of their cognitive limitations byexploiting a vast ^rray of tools (such as literacy and mathematicaldescription) and cultural arrangements (such as journals, professionalassociations, and the division of labor). Children, by contrast, mostly workin comparative isolation unaided by these tools, unabie to take advantageof such arrangelxents, and unacquainted with the enormous bodies ofknowledge to which scientists have access (Brewer and Samarapungavanreel).

The institution of science does an even better job than either indi-vidual scientists or local research teams of getting around cognitive limi-tations because it is the collective product of an international communityof inquirers for whom prestige, fame, and wealth turn, in no small part,on their seizing opportunities to criticize and correct each other's work.Such communal features of the scientific enterprise establish and sustainnorms that govern scientific practice. They also ensure that the collectiueoutcome of the efforts and interactions of mistake-prone individuals andsmall research groups with one another in the long run is more reliablethan any of their individual efTorts are in the short run. (Contrary to theintellectualists in anthropology, the divergent idioms in rvhich science andreligion frame their expianatory theories are not the only things that dis-tinguish them.)

Gopnik and Meltzotr (1997, 13) concede that insofar as such socialconsiderations "are an inrportant part of theory formation and change inscience, whatever the children are doing ts not science." The creation ofexplanatory theories and the insistence that they stand up to empiricalevidence are necessary but not sufficient conditions for science. In addi-tion to these cognitive proclivities, the invention, persistence, and progressof science depend crucially on developing traditions for extending andcriticizing theories with increasing systematiciry and insight. Pursuing thatprocess is what Thomas Kuhn (1970) called doing "normal science." Devel-oping such traditions is at least indirectiy responsible for the huge rangeof activities scientists undertake in the course of their work. The pivotalrole of these additional cultural arrangemenrs guarantees that science willnot inevitably erupt only from cognitive dispositions to formulate theories

67

"aou patfeuuoJJetur ,(1.re1n3al ar€ doqr 11 ue^e 'srure

alu€s er{t lou eJe aJuolfs sezrJatleJeqJ t€i{t aJnleu Surpurls-rapun ur tsa-ralur IeJrteroaqt ttrertsqe eqt pue dSolouqrat Jo uortetuorro Ierure-rd eqlteqt sI lutod IerJnrr eqa'ue8-rory ro IIe.&\xEW s€ qlns stsrtuarf,s rlJreese-r sesJIlIAIlft etues aql alrnb pans-rnd Jou slseJetur aures eqt atrnb peq Jaqtrouuosrpg ro IIeg o11 sarSolouqlat ^\eu Jo srotuelur teqt uortrntur punos tngLpra.r pue q8no"r e ssossod [r]s a1!\ 'oJuerJS uJepou

3o e8e aqt ur ueAE'(SO-SO '9661 uaqlrry) sauneqtrd

-ol€rlsnv el{l Jo etuos 'sdeq"rad 'pue saezuedruiqc 'ou.tog snueS aqt un{tr.^asor:eds raqto-sloot pornpo.rd e^eq senads raqto teqt .^.ou>l .&\ou alft'suerunq

Jo lueruelarqle elrsnlJxa erll lou sr 'efuJrfs e{rTun 'r{Solouqrel'uolllpPe uI 'eruelrs

Jo ple 3q1 lnoqll A os pip deql lnq 's1oot go ,fterJene pedola.Lap pue pauSrsep srotselur frrotsrqerd :ng d.rolsrq ueurnq utqtlmpalrur8r:ro eruerrs '(-rene* teqt roJ 'uor8rla-r pur) ,{8o1our{rot e{{un

'strns.rnd porSolouqJet Jo eruap

-uadapur prlualod oqt Jo suortertsnfir snor^qo e-re doera]r1 oroJaq pe:eaddeicql sloot er{t Jo IIe ueqt 'rruolfs Surssessod pue Surop roJ uonrpuor d-res-soJJu e sr ,(ce.retrl JI 'punos atrsrnbxe rrar{t pue uortlnrtsuoJ Jraql uee,^At3qsuortrruuol eqt urrldxa plnol auodue oroJaq 3uo1 su4on tea.r8 epeurIre^Iperls oluoluv'sualqord tue^alor eqt pelrJ d1Je1n8e-r or{.^A uarlrsuBJfpuB sre>lro^A Jo ,brnrteo.rt pue ,brnuaSur prnoerd eqt uo dltsotu peurnlO^eq serrnluef .&\oJ tsel eqt irtun sloot plor{asnoq lrs€q uo.l,e pue 'uorl

-rt.rodsue-rt Jo srrroJ d.ruodea.u 'sanbruqret pue sluarueldur Ierntlnlr-r8e go

tuaruano;dur pur uortuelur aql'keOt uadloTy$ aruerfs go luerudole^epeql ot pelelarun dilsoru sr ,(Solouqlet Jo d-iorsrq eqt t;n1uer r{tuarteuruoql oroJog 'uoueruouaqd luere.r dlanrlr-redruor e sl gyo-urds

1err8o1ou-Hrel stl pue r{lJeesat furtuorJs lrs€q ueJ.^ teq uorlfeuuol ar{t 'lsJIJ

'turod srql .,!r:r11 dsul-3rrrtrads-rad lpf,Irotsqa.rd aruos

'paeput-anttredsrad Fl:o1srq eruos 'efuorts

Jo tuapuodepur ,(11oq,tt sr.uoruo pue eq uel trSolouqret esneteq lnq ,{Solourllot Jo tuopuedepur srafuans esneJeq 1su-gu1ql alues er{t tou a.re d8oiouHret pue aruen5'd8o-louqJet qtr.la eluens Sursn3uoJ tou uo uJnl deru Lll:u leqt SurzruSore;'eluos tog'L1rnt str sr 'uorJru8or

Jo sruJoJ tinluJrp dlarrrle-redruol pu€ uoru-ruoJun lrutue teqt stuetrra8ue;-rr leJntlnr uo ofuopuadap i€rtuetsqns slr Joef,uaprle 'sr leqt 'sseuletntruun qofuerrs

JO efuoprle tseq aqt Jo aruos

lEilt t't

tr"aya34,y

('l:oddns lurntlnt ssol rEJ sa:rnbe;'tse;Juof dq'uor8lia-ruortres ur en8-re 11eqs I) 'eJueprle

lerr-rrdrue tnoqe Jrer ot pue

89

l'laturalness of Religiort, LJnnaturalness of Scietrce

Rejecting the relatively firm distinction between science and tech-

nology for which I am arguing leaves the problem of explaining impor-

tant, discontinuous episodes in the history of human thought. According

to many historians and philosophers of science, science has existed at least

twice in human history-once among the ancient Greeks and a second

time beginning in early modern Europe.t In both instances, science insti-

tuted ongoing exchanges concerning competing theories about the world

that turned, at least in part, on the systematic pursuit, accumulation, and

assessment of empirical evidence.Among the huge range of activities scientists undertake, two deserve

particular attention when considering the unnaturalness of science:

1. Scientists develop explanatory theories that challenge received views

about empirical nratters; and2. Their critical assessment of those theories highly values evidence born

of empirical tests.

Most of the puzzle solving of normal science foliows on these activities,

especialiy the second. The important point, for now, is that neither the

rcntents of scientific theories that dispute received views nor the -forms of

thought required for such critical assessment come to human beings very

readily.The contents of most new, popularly unassimilated scientific theories

agree with conlmon sense no more (and often a good deal less) than do

the most fantastic religious beliefs. Science and religion concur that the

empirical world is not always the way it appears, and both supply pro-

posals about the realities behind the appearances. Moreover, we sometimes

have no better accounts of the underlying forces and factors science cham-

pions than we do for the entities religious systems proffer. The accom-

plishnrents of Newton and Darwin are examples. Both men advanced

theories that depended on presumptions (about graviry and inheritance

respectively) for which they had no satisfactory accounts nor, in Newton's

case, even any hypotheses.Science challenges our intuitions and common sense repeatedly.-With

the triumph of new theories, scientists and sometimes even the public

must readjust their thinking (Thagard 1993).'When first advanced, the

suggestions that the earth moves, that microscopic organisms can kill

human beings, and that solid objects are mostly empfy space were no less

69

-,4rer^rnd L:oleueldxa str uIt{]L&\ II€J ttqt stur^r Jo les _ie8:e1 e osle tnqsldoruor uotuluof tuo{ stda:uor pazrlepads stl Jo efuetsrp eqt lsnflou sa^lo^ul qldep Sursee.rrur s d-roaqt v 'qldap IElrteroaqt Sursee;rurJ0 suoqeueldxa sens-rnd eJuerrs 'srusruerlreur 1ecr3o1ors,(qdo;neu 3rl-d1.repun aqr Jo srunorre Ielrtueqlolq eqr qrr.^A spooru Jo lier d-reruorsnrJno ro d8o1o-roalru Jo ,fuelnqeron Ierrur{Jet aqt qt1a\ ror{tta.^. rr{lJo {l€l d:eutp-to lsertuo] 'Euotuoueqd depd.la^a

Jo suortdr;rsep uoruruolIuo{ dlqe.raprsuor reJJIp suortdr-rrsep Jurtuarls {ge-raua8 oroW

((tgel ltruueq) 'sualsds xelduor 3o

suone.redo eql Surssnrsrp ueq.^\ 11er prrSoloelat pue ieuortuatur olur asdel0l solluapuet (slsltuelJs sapnpul slrlJ'stueruoru pep-ren8un ur dlaleunur.rr-slpur afuels puorlualur eql idope ol suorlEurlJ]ur (.lo.tn1gu,,,aLrJ)eHaJun.su€unq petuep ueaa dlp"req o^er{ slueruqsrldruorre esoiit-tiq e Surled-nuuy) 'r(Soioqcdsd :o3 erups aqr Suiop pre.&\ot de,l.r eruos oB p.tn sarrnl-uoJ ,lAeJ txJu eqt teql stsuuarls elrtruSor tsoru Jo uortlrluol eqt sr lr puedSolorq uro4[ suoneueldxr peruer"ro-1ue8r qrns pe8-rnd seq oruerfs d-rntue:-q]ol]ur.^Al pu€ -tiluaeleulN 'srusrueqreu (:rlsrlrqeqo:d dpsoru)

Jo surraluI suatuouaqd 3o slunoffe 1er1"led 'pollelap eJoLU 'JeAAoJJBu r{lr.4A suortfe

PUr SUOrSrJep ,SluaSe Jo sruiel ur stue^a puB sessef otd TetryeuJo suortBu-qdxe elrrsn€r{xa dlpel:od-rnd pereldar seq eruerrs 'reqtoue rorye ur€ruopouo ul (OgOI pueF{lrnr{f) uorleueldxe aler.rdo-rdde ue sotntrtsuoc &l-Psnel tue8u qlHl roJ eueruoueqd go e8ue-r eqt Jo uortJrJtsor Sursea;rurdq pa1-reru ueoq seq oluerfs Jo d-rolsrq oqt ,eJnteu

Jo stunoJf€ snor8-rloJ ol lsEJluof uI 'lunol Jeqloue uo

IEJnlEuun sruaas eSueqt frjrluerss

Jo lJeJJa olrt€lnrunl oi{t 'uor8qo.r go ,fuolsrq eqt ot po_reduor ueqlx\' GOOy'8661 p:e8eqa) uortertsnfir

Suutg e sr srrJln go droaqr rqt ur leneeqdn tueJor eL{J.sureruop re.^AorJeuqrnu ureruot dp:rddr seiroor{t pano-rdur eqt pu€ suorleueldxe Burte-rl-oued oJoru eqt tuqt lsnf sr 11 'pa8ueqf tou srr{ rure

le:tuer srqt ,;e,ra,uoq'eruJrrs d-rerodruatuo) tsoru

Jo r{JJ€aseJ pezrlenads dgEF{ er{r ur uaAE'fuoaql

Ftuarugpun3 too:dn ot tno tou ere depol sreuortitre:d go drr;ofeulsBA erit (d-rlsrueqr ''3'e) seruerrs pedole.Lep-ile^\ ur {penrupy

'(gSO1 Lape3:141) s.rrr.araEu4rc,La-rd r{ilua.r-rnr Iuelddns-.,(1,&\ols sa11litetuos {prrnb serurtetuos-puslloJJoJ lerll solJoeqt d.roleueldxa Surle-rleuad a.rou tE eArJJe ol sr ofuerfs

Jo lult Ierluer e 'eSueqr qtoq uol8r1a.r pue eruerls q8noqtly {-rntuarqlortuo^At 3r{l ur sn JoJ pe.r.o-rd e^eq sJru€qJetu runtuenb Jo saluenbesuorO^nrnlurJalunof lsoru aql uEql esues uoruluof puE uorlrnlur ol d.rrJluo:

laya3tlqOL

Naturalness ttJ Religion, Llnnaturalness of Scienrc

yielding a wider range of empirically testable consequences. It searchesfor accounts of realiry that are more comprehensive and discerning andfor which the production of evidence requires progressively more rarefiedcircumstances- The efforts and costs associated with apparatus for pro-ducing these exotic environments (e.g., a supercollider) or with getting tothem (e.g., launching the Hubble telescope into orbit) are sometimesmonumental.

Explanatory theories in science possess increasingiy greater theoreti-cal depth because, unlike religion, science is finally concerned with under-standing nature for its own sake and not merely for its effects on us. LewisWolpert argues that the historical scarciry of inquiries committed to theintrinsic value of understanding nature is evidence not only of the com-parative unnaturalness of such inquiries but of the limits of humans'naturalcuriosity. "The idea that man is innately curious is partial myth: man,scuriosity extends only to what affects his conduct" (woip ert 1992,54). Intheir pursuits scientists are not impervious to our practicai concerns withnature, but such concerns are not necessary for doing science. Manyscientists devote their entire careers to highly esoteric, impractical studiesof nature's narrowest corners. Their interests in appraising comparativelydetailed, low-level proposals ensure that those theories remain empiricallyresponsible (see Barbour 1980, 242).

In addition to the persistent unnaturalness of scientific proposals, insti-tutionalized science also involves forms of thought and fypes of practicethat human beings find extremely difhcult to master. The acquisition ofscientific knowledge is a painstaking and laborious process. To become aprofessional scientist requires at least a decade of focused education andtraining, and even then, the scientist rypically gains command of only onesubfield within a single scientific discipline. Not only is scientific knowl-edge not something that human beings acquire naturally; its mastery doesnot even guarantee that someone will know how to do science. After fourcenturies of astonishing accomplishment, science remains an overwhelm-ingly unfamiliar act.ity, even to most of the rearned public and even inthose cultures where its influence is substantial.

The more felicitous comparison here is not with religion on the hoofbut with theology. The pursuit of theology involves many of the sameforms of thought (e.g., deductive and abductive inference) in whichscience engages. unlike science, though, such sophisticated forms ofthought are not necessary for either the occurrence or persistence of

.7 -1/ I

'asrrJedxo ssessod deqr e.req^A seere ur Burre:edo e.re deql

u3q.^A srorre 30 saddr aruos o>leu ol dle{q ssel aru daql qSno qlv , (zg6Ld1s-rena pue 'frlolg ,uerueuqey) BuruoseeJ

Jo sruJoJ snoeuoJre ot auo.rdsorurlauros eJe sJeqfJeeseJ peruar"redxs uoAE .ssrJooql srJrluerfs

Jo lueu-ssesse Fuoller roJ 3lq?llns efuareJul

Pue lueru8pnfJo surroJ aql trqrqxe olIreJ ueuo sruepnrs ofuerrs 1ene1-e3e1lor r€ql paFe^er aneq (1g6i neudygpue dr:aqoq deue,ua) slsrSoloqrdsd pluaruuadxa .ef,uorrs Burop

JosortlnluJrp eqr rnoqE afuspr^e pernpo-rd o.teq ,senlesueql ,s1squalf5

'otllo Fntrafle]ur ue dq suos rrral

-oso lsour eql Jo uollleUrr pe8uolo-rd pue uoJJe paurruratep Jo tlnser eql

s,{e.nn1e sr a8pel.uo''l reqr 'ern11nr e uqr' ^ sure8 e8pel.Lr.ou>l rurruorrs ,(rua.r

-Jnf JJAeleqTyl's8uraq ueurnq ol dllsee.ro d1e_rnleu ourof teqt Sertr1rlf€ tou

Ore aseqJ'set'rolrafe:l rUlfeds d-ra,t Suop srrnpord pue selrtoe-rd Burllnsa-raqt Surduqs 'sJuo lrrlrru'J

Jo tuaurauge: Buro8uo -rreql se ile,^a se sloola'tttru3or .^aeu Jo uorruelur ,spnprlrpul paryy8

Jo-uorrerfosse pue uorref-rumuruof lEuorsseJo-id

3o sonue^E qSnorql-uortEurpJoor eql uo puedeptuJoJ I€rntlnf E se eluerfs Jo eJuetsrs;ad pue afueS.iarue Jr{J .sro^eepuaa8pa-SulrlnJ alnlqsuof t?qt selrl^Irfe SunJnse-r eql pue Buruosra-r

[e,,uap -I^o puE SutztJoaql t\toleueldxe porerqsrqdos ororu dlanrssa-r8o.rd lnoqlr.u.

Polsxe eleq lou plnol\ 'I.-rolsrq sfl fnoq8notql ,aruerts ,1se;1uor dg

'uonerf,ossepu€ uottiuSor ueurnq Jo srrnleg dlar.re.L-uep-re8

Jo sicnpo:d_dqelqBrlsr se dge-rnleu Jnffo [{JII{A\ 'stualsds snorSrle.r go eruatsrs-rad

JoocueS-rarue aqr JoJ dresserau ip le rou sr 'esue soop rr aJeq^\

[Er]u' -nHul ueUo q8noqlie'suorlnltlsul ro slenprrupur rorllre dq dpnls oneruetsds

sr d8oioeql '(prrSoloeql ro I€f,rtsersellre -reqlra) ot{e paurert dler

-IJalosJ ue Jo esrt"rodxe er{t Jo suortntrlsur IeJnllnf JteJoqele uo spuadap

uol8qal Jo efualsts;ed erlt Jou arueS.rerue eqr Jer{lrau 'eluerfs euun'uotlsanb ur stualsds o,i\\t eqt

Jo afuatsrsJod aql 8ur-rnsue -ro3 Lilse.nsrolllp rqqnd pelolnlun ue Jo osoqt qrr^\ poredtuor atila peururt dlq8rq?Jo sef,uouadxe pue serrrnrrrs 0r{rJo ofu€uodur eqa.(sqldruJo stuotuofoqt ot posoddo se serrooqt Jo stuatuor or{t ,.8.e) sler:oteru (L;oleueldxe)rusleler eql Surdeqs ul alor ruefuiuSis a;oru rEJ e ,/re1d ,seuo prr3010qr-,kd 1ene1-re.^aol or rserruol ur 'se:-rog

I?rnllnf 1erro1--req8rq aruerf,s ul'uortraUar prrSoyoaqt rrteuretsdsun

tno Ktrct uola tou op deql leqtpue l8oloeqt qtI^A pou.ref,uorun dleleldruor ere eeurnC ^ aN

Jo ue111et>lg€f0q1 leqr srsrsul Gtot) qr:eg >lrrprrJ 'uor8r1e; rreqt

Jo uorssnfsrp frssslf srr{ur'fi66r eqel,/K) d8oloaql moqrtm e^r'{r saop pu€ uer uor8r1e11 .uor8rle:

,{a1na3t1yOL

llaturalness of Religion, Llnnaturalness d Science

These sorts of findings have at least two implications. First, over-

coming the cognitive biases and errors to which human beings seen-r all

too naturally prone requires extensive study and experience, yet even these

provide no guarantee against such shortcomings. Second, it is the com-

paratively narrow community of research scientists that is primarily respon-

sible for maintaining science's critical traditions. Scientific standards, just

like scientific knowledge, depend mostly on the evolution of the expert

scientific communiry'.s collective judgment in the long run. Individual

scientists are far too susceptible to such problems as errors in reasoning.

flawed heuristics, and confirmation bias.

The difficulties associated with reasoning properly, judging reliably,

and comprehending esoteric scientific concepts go some way toward

explaining why science progresses so slowly most of the time. These dif-

ficulties are also excellent indications ofjust how unnatural doing science

is from a cognitive standpoint.

3.3 Religion: Doing'What Comes Naturally

In making a case for the relative unnaturainess of science, I looked briefly

at both the practices and modes of thought characteristic of science as

well as the contents of the resulting scientific products. A survey of the

same considerations for religion will disclose just how naturai religion is

in these respects. Various large-scale indications suggest that aspects of

religious cognition rely far less on cultural foundations than is typicaliy

presumed. Religion's beginnings are less singular, its changes are (far) less

fundamental, and its scope is more broad than is the case with science. I

w i l l d iscuss each in turn .First, the birth of religion is less exceptional. Religion dates from our

prehistoric past. Both the archeological and the anthropological evidence

shows that human religious activities do not depend on keeping chroni-

cles or on inventing writing or even on establishing fixed settlements. If

burial of the dead constitutes sufTicient evidence of religious activiry then

Neanderthal burial practices confirm that religion was not even always

confined to a single species (see, however, Mithen 1996).

Second, many religious ideas and forms have recurred throughout

history across a wide ^rray of physical and cultural settings. All religious

systems (including Buddhism as it is popularly practiced) look to agents

and their actions as the critical variables for making sense of both the

73

Jo sepou ar{t pu€ srurElf snorSrlar Jo stuJluof oqt lnoqe qJnw .tueru-drnba a.rrtruSor prepuets Jno uo dleluaruepunJ aJoru JEJ serloJ uoi8ile-r'efuerfs or rseJruof uJ 'uorsnlluof, srqr or

rurod osle oraq.^Aosle pel'fo^p€arreq (s-raqlo pue) I reqr uos eql Jo eueuouaqd snor8qe-r 3o ses(puy

'suortJolrpo.rd onitruSorrno Jo uortfunJ e uvd flelus ou ur sr seepr snorSqe:3o pedde eq] ,seaprlglluolfs uI lseJalul ol uoslJedruoc uI lseal ry ('uorsse-rddns lferrp JO areJ3I{l uI ueAe '1ou se uauo se '1sts-red suor8rla-r 'a,LqeSuaso-rda.i sr d-rnluer

q1erl-ua.^Al or{l Jo aruar-redxe eql31) 'suorllpuor

Irrntlnl pneds due uo spuadepdlerrtr-rr uorSrle: 3o aruersrs-red eqr rou qrrlq eqj reqrreu snqJ

'slgrldorsnsd1-re1nrrl-red tuees sueurnll qlFI^A ot seepr punodo-rd suor8rla; .snor8-?tuof er€ seepi snorSrle-i 'sen3;e (goeil -reg.red5 u?c sy .lnoqtL\\ ruo{[sep€Aur dlqetineur uetsds snorSqe.r Surtsxe ue ueql dtanos ua.tr8 e urqtr^\q8noua dlltrnb arelns tou seop uor8rle.r .^Aeu e JI .(0g6y l:eq.rrE)suorlelndod ueunq ur dn 8ur-rds d1-reln8e-r suor8qo-r ^AeN .se8.reruae.rdlqtlt^o..tt 1nq -readdeslp tou soop JIOSTT uoiSqe.r '1lur1xe seruoraq uor8qe-r.relnorl-red e uarlA\ ueAE 'aJnllnf u?unq l",tana ut sJnffo uorSqe_r ,eluerf,so{qun 'snor8rle: sr Sureq ueunq d_rerre

tou q8noqlp ,pr1{t puv'(elqrsneldrur dllue.redsuu.rt a.re spo8 osoqt uoq.^. uene)

s\epp naql {o llg u! errtre:d snor8rle; ro dlrsorSr1ar Jo surroJ rorlree atetrl-snsor ot tnq srrelle Jo setets Surpe.re-rd eqt ^\orquelo o1 l.1uo tou sr rurelrc4dxa eqt JJer{,la eneq sdno-r8 snor8rleJ eruos teqt suortnloler elrtelres-uol eqt euoS.repun tou suq efuorfs ,uorlrppe u1 .suorldrunsse prrsdqdelaruPlue{uePunJ lsotu s(oluelf,s Jo suorlrlo-rd.relure-r pe"rrnbal saurrloruos o1eqlrql (uorretuasa;de-r pelnqrJlsrp 'd:oueu lnrldur d:oeqr soer{f ,;e11erurlue'd-roaqr runluenb 'srttstJuls

IEIlueJoJur',(.rooql pleu (uoBleles IEJnleu ,l]rne:B

'snlncpc eql) sloot Fnlderuor pue selrooqt ^\ou pete;eue8 d1-rrln8a-r seq

Itns;nd slI 'a.apnluur ,(.1anbrun s efuerfs 'JInJ oqt lou pu€ uortdarxa eql

sIUJas srqt 'eluarfs Jo d:otsrq eqt ur JeJ os lsBel t€ ,pa_redso.rd dlenluarra

deql e-roJeq ere euo u€qr eroru ui uoBeroprsuor pepuorxe po-rrnbe-r (gup pl-uaulluof 'tusllt-tluolollel{ 'rusrruole) seJpr flJrluarfs \eJ €

qSnoqtly'puFu

Jo sstets puB suortJ€ rraqt Jo esues e>leIII ot puru3o L-roaql prepuets lno Jo &ilq" eqt pue ,stuafie se s.re.ra.od

Fsner rreql's1ua8e (SaC) ueunq:edns patelntsod dllt-rnllnr ot stuerutrruluof

Jo >Fo.^A-aure{ E uir{tl.^a sate.lado dlqerla-r-parrtru-rd dporuruor sr tr 5s-u61ffrT3x'esodrur .{eu atqe snorS4a: e (drrur-ra dloH aql ,.8.e)

suortetuesa;de; ate-r-oqela srolu re^eleq^e Jo sselpre8a; an-rl sl slqJ 'splro.^A

Iernteu pue lerf,os

laya3q,yfL

Naturclness of Reli.gion, Unnaturalness of Science

religious thought are "natural" in both of the senses I discussed. Comparedto science, religion regularly involves assumptions that are more common,materials that are more familiar, and judgments that are more intuitive.

Humans come by the modes of thought religion utilizes far morereadily than they come by many of those that science employs. With theexception of a few extraordinary individuals (Faraday comes to mind),becoming a scientific participant virtually always requires extensive formaleducation. Although considerable education is sometimes a prerequisite forreligious activiry this is true only about some forms of participation tn somereligious systems.

Science has never arisen in nonliterate cultures. As I argued in section3.2, rts practice and appreciation demand developed intellectual skills, ofwhich the most fundamental are literacy and mathematical fluency.Possessing such forms of intellectual expertise-together with systems ofexternal scientific symbols (Bechtel 1996)-is a key to discerning, retain-ing, and engaging scientific materials. Standard scientific works-like the-ological and ecclesiastical works but quite unlike most other religiousworks-are usually carefully reasoned, tightly constrained by detailed con-ventions, and couched in relatively dry, antiseptic prose.

The vehicles for imparting religious knowledge and the cognitivecapacities on which they depend are far more basic. Typically, religion (incontrast to both science and theology) relies primarily on theater and nar-rative. (This is not to imply either that rituals are simply plays or thatmyths are simply stories, but only that the cognitive processes involved ineach are essentially the same.) Myth and ritual are essential ingredients inevery religion. A fundamental point about myths and rituals is that theyare supposed to have been handed down from one generation to the nextwithout change. (The invention of writing and reading has mostly encour-aged that assumption.)

Religiont explanatory "theories" are usually embedded in or inferredfrom myths, which take the form of stories. These special religious storiesaccount for arrangements in the natural and social worlds by appealing tothe actions, intentions, and mental states of CPS agents, who possess extra-ordinary properties and who operate both within and beyond the worldof everyday experience.

Rituals are actions. CPS agents have allegedly either modeled or pre-scribed rituals, which participants in the religious system are supposed torepeat.That is also the usual rationale for why participants always do rituals

75

'puedap efuorrs Jo sserSord eqt pue uortrsrnbf€ oql

qtoq i{rlrl./!\ uo sllDIS luntrollotur pezrierlods Jo t"ros eqt Jo due 3o uorssessod:o luaudolslap se-rrnbe.r slulrotetu snor8ile.r Jo uortuoteJ Jou uorsueqe.rd-ruof raqlrau teqt si turod Ierfn-rf eqa'pe8ue[eq] pu€ uo pelrouer ueqlJoqter'pellnusuert pue peur€tar eg ol dp-rrrur:d Jr€ sqtnrt snor8rle; dlpn-edsa sSurltes eseqt uI 'stxat

Jo uorssessod eqr uo d1a.r tou seop uorssrursueJlslr eJarl.^A pue s8uruur8sq sll peq uor8qe.r arar{.^A ,sorlerfos aleJotrluou urlurl;odrut d1-rrlnrrl"red sr srqa 'uortrrrel rlqrr^ go aSue-r ei{t trurrl dgerluels-qns uer sturertsuof, oseqt ':aqteSot uJ>let lsqlftu pue spntrl qtoq

Jo sruroJpue stuatuol or{t uo stur€rtsuot sasodlur suort€.roprsuof aseqt Jo qlBE

'QOet rossreN pue pe;8oul1A.:6661 da1ne3r141) ,,.sai.r

-oureur qlnqqseg,, eq-repun teqt solq€rr€A orues eqt Jo dueru lroidxe ueryo

'aSessedJo setlr se l{fns'afuo.(pro seop tuedicrt.red purou e qlnlr\a's1en1r:pateade.r-uoN 'dr{lqerotuetu rleqr olueque ol stlaJJo Lcuanbe.lg raaqs uo,(p.rerur-rd d1e-r 'seryrJfes sE r{)ns 'spn1r-r peleadeU 'spre Jruorueuru Jaqtotsrluo plro,^A aqt lnoqSno-rqr suorSqa.r'de.u, lerlrurEJ e r{lns ur Jeqle3o1 Sueqsdr.tnp tou op suoitre peldr.rrs eqt otaq,^A'slentu u1 .,(e,u. Jeqto due ur srrelleuerunq tsour roqruaure-r ol aldoed :o3 tlnlgJrp sr tI .pe^lo.rur stua8e eqt urpurru Jo selels pue suortfe Joqto uorsef,fo teqt saJuonbasuor rgpods a.teqdeqi pue 'serurr ryr:eds le sareld rgroads ur areld oler suortry'ecuonbesrrlnrrtJed e ur Jnffo slue^a 'Jor{toue ouo qtr.^a patJouuol Llesnec e.rettqt sde.u. ur s8urqt Surop pue'8ur>1urql'8ur1aag stueSe tnoqe ere selrterr€N'seJnlfnJls aATIEJJEU frseq se

[oA\ se 'selr.l,ep ,,dJeJe]I1,, JOr{lO pue '-roqdeleur

'aru,(q.r d"raSeur Surpnpur 'd-roruaru ueunq Jo sortrsuado-rd 1e-rn1eu er{l

ot padde teqt selqelr€A Jo tsoq e atelndrueru sqldur ur esoqt o{rl sJlrterreu.^aor{ patertsuoruop sErl (966I ulqnx) dSoloqrdsd a.r.rtruSof ur r{frrasau('sesrlea.rl lerrldpue ro lerltrroel{t requorua.r daql ueql dppeer ororu sarrotsJaqruaruoJ stsrtuerrs uanE) 'JJe sauo elqeJoureu tsour eql

Jo ge d1-lueu 1nqsqldu rre srxer snor8rle: il€ toN 't€eJ ueoru ou sr srqr ,(pelnrrt.red drera{ll Jo oluesqe eq} ur lsler.relmr rlJns qlr.^A tunoruuJ€d sr uorlelJsseJd

'splro^& Ierfos

Pu? I€Jnl€u Jleql '-re.r.o lo.tluor etuos Sursodur pue 'ur JapJo Jrrros Surqsrl

-q€tsJ roJ sueeur E Lltrl\\ su€unq seprno;d suortfe lentr_r osaqt lno Burd;-JeJ 'Errelrrf sllslnba-r eqt

Jo IIE leur seq efueruroJ-red ,(ue JeqtJq,^A eJnsroJ ,lnou>l slue8e Sdl er{r dluo 'sde,u elqegneds ui srr€JJ€

Jo setets (ure1-urtru -ro) e8ueqr reqtra si€ntrr pauro3-red dl"rado-rd qSnoqlly.surroJ rreqlpelelndrls e^€q oq,r\ 'ile rou€ 'spo8 arlt sr t1 dpepr ts€el tE {e,u eures eql

laywSty19L

Naturalness of Religion, Unnaturalness of Science

Religion rests on far more basic cognitive abilities, the mostimportant of which is the abiliry to distinguish agents and their actionsfrom other things and events in the world. Agents are entities in ourenvironments who merit very different treatment from everything else.Their detection is critical to humans' physical and social survival, andresearch in developmental psychology (see, for example, Golinkoff1983, 1986) affirms that children possess this abiliry in their first year oflife.

Events that involve agent causaliry require representations cruciallydift-erent from those for events that do not. The cognitive representationof ritual actions depends on a basic action representation system that is"in place" quite early in human development. Indeed, Tom Lawson and Ipawson and McCauley 1990) have argued that the representational prin-ciples and the resuiting action structures for religious rituals differ not onewhit from those for ordinary actions. Beyond introducing into action rep-resentations CPS agents from a religious conceptual scheme, nothing aboutthe cognitive representation of religious rituals differs from the represen-tat ion of any other act ion.

By their faciliry at representing agents and their actions, human beingsare thus particularly well prepared to generate, comprehend, recollect, andtransmit reiigious stories, beliefl, and rituals.'Where scientific explanationsprovide progressively more detailed and systematic analyses of complexprocesses and mechanisms, religion summons CPS agents and their actionsfor explanatory purposes. At least four rypes of evidence suggest that thelatter approach comes more naturaiiy to the human mind.

First, human beings-chiidren in particular-seem to be inveterateanthropomorphizers. Our cognitive mechanisms for detecting the eyes,faces, and forms of macroscopic organisms that have them, and of humanbeings in particular, as well as the related mechanisms for attributingxgency, mentaliry and personaliry to things in the world, are pro;foundlyliberal rn their operations, generating false positives at every turn (Guthrie1993).-We not only see faces in the clouds; we routinely talk about ourcars' and computers' recalcitrant moods. Advertisers have anthropomor-phized everything from cleaning products to vegetables to airplanes.Indeed, superimposing human characteristics on products is probablysecond only to sex in the advertiser's bag of tricks for grabbing humanattention. Attributing agency and psychological properties to various parts

77

'puFu Jo selels s,luane ue ol Jou suorl3e ol Jer{lreu eJusJaJaJ so]Eru quEe

oql qtr.^A tredrur s,roel3ru aSnq r dq pesnel ragteo.^A eql ur p.tuaqdn ue

Jo siseq eqt uo uoltfurtxe sseru e SurureldxE 'Surprelsru ere seruu.reeddeqlns ln€l 'solr]eJJeu elgtuesoJ ol ruoes sorurloruos Leru sJJuJTJS

I€Jnleuer{l ur uJAe suorleueldxo 'sluJna

i€nprlrpur Jo seruanbas Suruieldxe u1'ra.^Asue u€) salJots dpo t€qt suortsenb

3o spuq sesr€r stuo8e ienprnrpur 3ur-lnportul d-rols E seq lua8e d-rene osneJaq selrteJreu 8u4u;agqo:d se:rnbe;Llqtlrnaui stuoSe 3urle-ragqord 'solrtrrreu elrrp teqt saur8ua 8urd1-rapunoql aJe pupu Jo selets puz suorlre ,slueSy 'slua8e lnoqtL\\ a"raq.Lr,ou oB'1t ;al3e 'sezrge:re51 'arttce-rd pue tq8noqt snoiSrlor ur deld senrlerreu teqlalor I€rtuel aqt i{tr.^A af,erd e go sr suortfe rrorlt pue stua8e SdJ proJlzsiuetsds snor8rla-r eluauruo-rd eqa'uorfezrueS;o e8pel.la.ou>l Jo sruroJ rerltoot pe.redruor 'dofua selrleJJuu se8rluenpe rruorueuru pouorlueru dpue"rpa^eq I 'pu€q ur pueq oB sanrte.rreu pue sarSololuo snor8rie.r 'prlr{*

'seruoflno 3q1 Eurunu-Jotap ur solels ieluJru pue suortfe ,slue8e Jo eloJ l€frlrJf ei{t Jo pefurluoftnq oluengur ,solqerrel asor{t Jo erc.^Aeun .{po tou urcure-r l.lprrddr strofqnsasoqt'sesuodso.r ,slrefqns uI af,uerJe^ eql JoJ tunofl€ lei{l selqerJel luapuad-apq eqr ereindru€ru l'pado sretueruiradxa ueq,^a uoAE 'puFu

Jo satetsnoqt pue stua8e lnoqr sorrooqt peret{s l.1pr:osJo sturet ur srorler{aq,srer1topue u.^ao llsql Jo slunof re arrtS o1 pasodsrpe.rd d13unu1eq.A^ro^o e.re s8uraquerrrnH 'OOOy rouioA pue '.llnrx '.uosropuy :SAOy euopw pu€ troqlrC ees'suolssnrsrp roJ) stunor osaqt uo tueru8pnf ueunq ur seserq 3ur11et pa:a-Aolsrp e.teq slsrSoloqrdsd Frlos 'Surleedde d1p:nteu ororu suortre rreqlpue slue8e Jo sruJat ur suoueueldxe puU ol ruees suerunq '.puofas

'etspoi.^aou>I

snor8rla-r dlanbrun due uo tou ts€al te ro 'luetuol Ierntlnl dlecAneds

due uo urnt tou saop et€redo spo8 aqt .^aoq lnoqu a8pa1.la.ou1 s,oldoed 3opap pooS e ttr{t elerrpur s8urpug asai{I'elpul ur suref ro '{sq>lrs 'snpur11's.uoqs qf-reasar luanbosqns se 'Jo setets pollun eqt ur stsreqt€ :o 'szllof'sJueJseJo.rd '!sr{oqt€J ar€ doql reqlaq.&\ os op (aqa'stuoruoru enrtlegteroJoru Sur.rnp po3 lnoqe sluoruelunouo:d ,,ttoJJof d1prr8o1oeqt,, 'Jrr{d

-:oruodo-rqturuou Jrer{t Jo ssalp"reSa: 'Surssolo.rd enrlruSof eur1-uo Jraqt urdlecrqd-roruodorqlue seqrep 1ua:1 dlqerle-r slrefqns ttrit u1!\oqs aleq (9661)

IaX >luBJJ pue llorreg urlsnf 'sluerur-rad"t J: ros Surn8lrlul uE ul'\L9|-V9I '99 '966r ueqttw

eas) sSureq uerunq ur uorslndruor e.trlruSor e ,(1-reeu sruaas-ofuoprlotserdunls eqt Jo slseq aql uo serulJoruos-esrelrun letrsdqd eqt Jo

,(,arya24,t118L

Ilaturalness of Religion, (Jnnaturalness of Scicnce

Descriptions of chains of efficient or material causes do not constitute anarrative.

Finally, as Boyer (1994) has emphasized, by appropriating such fun-damental notions as "agent" (and the conception of causality that accom-panies it) for the purposes of charac terizing the invisible forces of theuniverse, religious systems provide participants with a huge amount ofinformation "for free". This iast point deserves some elaboration.

Boyer (1,999, 2000) argues that religious categories are parasitic on ahost of "natural" ontological categories, which even young children readilydeploy (see also Keil 1979, 1989). Concomitant with each category arenondemonstrative inferences that provide an army of default assumptionsconcerning that category's instances. Knowing, for example that a toasterts an artifarl immediately entitles us to assume that it has a determinatesize, shape, and weight, that human beings have had some influence on itscurrent state, but aiso that it does not respirate, contemplate, or copulate.Similarly, knowing that gods are agents licenses inferences about theirvalues, preferences, mental states, and actions.

'What distinguishes religious from natural ontologies, according to

Boyer, is the violation or transfer of some of the intuitive properties asso-ciated with entailed superordinate categories. For example, if something isan agent, then (normally) it is also a physical object and possesses all ofthe associated physical properties. CPS agents may differ from normalagents in that they uiolate the constraints this superordinate category, "phys-ical object," imposes. Thus, they may pass through solid objects or beeverywhere at once. CPS agents may violate constraints that other super-ordinate categories, such as being an organism, impose. So, CpS agentsmay be eternal, parentless, or capable of recovering from death. on theother hand, the transfer of psychological properties appropriate to agentscan render artifacts, such as statues or ebony trees, capable of hearing, com-prehending, and remembering humans' pleas.

Compared with scientific categories, those in reiigion lack theoreti-cal depth. Contrary to first impressions, religious accounts of things differlittle from everyday accounts. Religious systems import all of our famil-iar, commonsense psychology about agents' intentions, belie6, desires, andactions for the explanation of phenomena throughout the natural andsocial worlds.Whether applied to other drivers on the road or to the rulersof the cosmos, this system performs quite nicely most of the time forunderstanding and anticipating agents' actions and states of mind. The

79

oruos uo spuedop uor8rior Jo uortrsrnbr€ eqt tcqt uortsaSSns aqr 'q8noqr'snor8r1e-r tou eJE s8uraq u€unq

FruJou osr,AAJar{lo oruos Jfurs'afuorls

Jo uortrsrnbre aql roJ ureqle.redard tou soop tr teqt Le.u, e ur uorSrlar Jo uortisrnbre or{t roJ eldoadso-rede-rd srde:uor drpd:e.ta liutssessod 'r{tdap

Ielrtrroeqt eFtll os o^eqsuotldecuot snotSrlo:l lelorrrd dueu os asntrfag *'lueurdolalap uerunq urdpta ast.re ot rueos qllq^ 'suorllsodsrp enr1ru8or slroldxa uor8qe.r'e8en8uel

I€Jnt€u a>lrl 'serlrunruluor rrtsrn8url pue snor8rlal orut urcq eJe suerunH'uoltrnJtsur tnrldxe 'tlue

11 'Jlnll se:rnbo-r uoryo eSpalzrroul snor8qo.r 3ur

-"rrnbry'eJuerJS snorres op ol ,(:essacau sp>ls puu a8pal.ra.ou{ or{t 3ur:al-seu e>lII sI tI ueql a8rn8uel Iernteu e 8ur:rnbre oI{ ororu qf,ntll sr ruatsLssnorSqe: E ul alednrl;ed ot d.ressereu e8pal,loul Jqt 3ur:rnbcy

uor'rla.r e.rrnb:e srued,rrred lrql rrBJ eqr ,r.o '::;i:t Thf::":r:.";osoqt ueqt elqelle^e Lppee-r pue pee-rdsapl ̂. ef oru ere teqt streJt elrtru-3o: sdrl uor8qe: teqt pue eJuerfs ugqt rerlrueJ eJour l.lennruSor sr uor8-ll3r reqt rseSSns suoltEreplsuol rseqr Jo IIy'luaurdola^ap ueunq ur d1:eaosu€ t€qt saJJnoseJ anrtruSor go .(e-r"re ue uo dgelueruepury puadep sruelsdssnor8qe;';enoe:oyq'pa1e:qdruofun pue J€rlrueg ,(1ensn o.re lioldxa sruatsdssnor8qe.r teqt uort€ueldxa Jo surened eqt pue rq8nor{t Jo seporu er{J'tuaur-do1a.r,ap e,trtruSoc ao i-red FruJou e ;o 'o,Lrtrntur 'erelduoruruol leqlro otettr{l sruJoJ a>let pue suortdrunsse dpoqrue sl€rJoletu snor8qe-r 'sluo:g lsourug d.rolsrq serepe-rd put eJntln: ,Lrena ur sJnlfo uor8qe: :,laorloJ oI

{,'lueruas€edde pue loJluof, Jo saJnseerue1e:edsap snorJEA Suid"rl pue-tl prel\\ol eJueJS Ieuortuatul aqt Surrdope-olqetlrpa;dun eqi Surdgruos:ed roJ Jlltes ot peq suo'8uoi€ ouref o3uerf,s

[]un,, 'pe1;eue; ser{ (ZZt '866I) ueuurcl

Ierueq sV 'suoxtlpo,r1 tluuanss4)q luetJodur tsolu sdeq.red 'pue ';ot:alap lueSe oArJfeJOAo uB sessassod'suorteueldxe s>lees dlsnoauellnurs tuqt ruats(s onuruSol E

Jo seuroflnoolqetr^oui Jqt ore tueqt Surseadde pue Surllortuol JoJ slentrr pur 'ueql

tnoqe serrots'stuaSe SdJ 'uorlecrldde rreqt ur alqixeUur l.lenrte.redruol puecgnads ureurop eg ol -rreddr uego qJIq^\ 'suorlrsodsrp elrtruSor p.rnteuJloqt uo ,{1e-r s8ureq uerunq 'sertrlrdrl enrleur8erul pue

IerrlrJt (sueurnq3o qt.Lro-r8 enrllrllol aqt ratsoJ ter{t sruroJ Ierntlnf, Jo aJuosqe oql ul

'lBrlUJo snor8qe-r pacueuedxetsotu eqt ot sr tr se plrqr E ot elqrsueqa:druor dppee; se sr t)npuof, s rurlrrloqt qtln\ a:nsealdsrp s rolseJue l€qt uo pas€q suorluelJetur s,Jotsacueur Jo tlnseJ er{t se ssoullr s,euoeruos Jo uorteueldxe ue 3url.1-rapun apuorleJ

,bpo2t608

Naturalness of Religion, LJnnaturaln.ess of Science

domain-specific cognitive mechanism devoted just to it is not at all plau-sible (despite the underlying uniformities of religious cognition I haveemphasized). Still, the evidence I have been surveying is consonant withthe proposal that cognitive mechanisms that arose to address very differ-ent probiems-such as distinguishing basic ontoiogical categories and dif-ferentiating actions frorn other sorts of events-are fundamentally engagedin the generation and acquisition of religion. (l am unconcerned hereabout how responsible innate factors are for the development and even-tual shape of these mechanisms.)

If the acquisition of basic religious conlpetence turns so criticaily onthe possession and operation of such naturally occurring cognitive incli-nations, then participation in a religious system should be largely inde-pendent of differences in intelligence, and so it seems to be. Indeed, theacquisition of and participation in a religious system seem to turn no more(and, perhaps, even less) on so-called general intelligence than do theacquisition and use of natural language.

Advocates of cognitive modul artty, who hold that specific, dedicatedneural mechanisms underlie such capacities, argue that one sort of evi-dence for the existence of mental modules is precisely the fact that thesesingular mechanisnx occasionally get disconnected in a small fraction ofthe population. Some persons, who might have most other cognitivecapacities essentially intact, may, for example, prove severeiy impaired(either congenitally or as the resuk of injury) with respect ro such thingsas the recognition of faces, the production of grammatical speech, or thedetection of agents. Prosopagnosics are incapable of recogntzing faces.Broca's aphasics are incapable of producing grammatical speech. SimonBaron-Cohen (1995; Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner 1993) argues thatautism is precisely the inabiliry to detect agents and to read their minds.The abilities of autistic people ro recognize agents and to distinguishactions from other events seenl substantially impaired, while their abilitieson most other fronts often fall within the norrnal ranse.

Oliver Sacks (1995) describes an autistic woman who has learned tomanage well enough to earn a Ph.D., teach at the college level, and runher own business. Still, he reports that she does not comprehend manyfeatures of even standard social exchange. Baron-Cohen (1995) argues thatrather than benefiting from the virtually automatic operation of what hecalls our "theory of mind module," such people manage by enlisting theirgeneral intelligence for carrying out standard inductions about their social

8 1

ut I-s,uelPllqf duIZIlelfEJeqJ os lnoge suouEtrsaq ou aAEr{ I puB 'lElrleJoeql sE pools-ropun tseq err sarntrnrts Ientda:uor ,stlnp€ leql (1961 dape3:yg) panSrr e^eq | .Z

'suondrunsa:d (,,1etr8oloeqt,, -ro) snor8rleJ lJelof sepnlluruouoJIaslI selpnls snotSqa-r leql an8re 01 (e661'666y LaprCrW pue uos.u.e1) atu puBuos./y\ef IUOJ sE qlns slIlIJl pal seq leql uorldrunssE lEr{t lsnf sr tr tng 'ees ot tlnruJrp srIIII?3J IrJnlPu eqt puo,(,aq sreDEnr r{tr^\ sFep uor8rlar teqt Sununss€ tnoqtl,\\ pJlur^pEaq pFol .{aql .,no11 'pan8-rr

1:a.ta 3D Llarer tng peursse d1:e1n8a: ale srurelr qlns .I

'reururrs &1n:eg LroruE L66l eql

Jo sraquaru eql puE 'uos1r41 qo11 'uruos uo^ uErtsrJtlc 'rapLu5 saruef ,ugqJs a11r3r,rg'uaurersdd4 E>plll '.ressreN llrln 'uos.tre1 seruoqJ 'E 'llex >lurrJ f:o8a-rg

IIErlsrrW '1atq:eg IuBIIII/K 'nops;eg f,trc1 '1]ar-reg rrrlsnf :1uarua8e-rnorua pue stuaruruo:)

pydlaq rreqt roJ slenprrupur 8ur.ro.o11og egl ot apnlrle;8 Lru ssa;dxa ot qsr,.lr I .r(8o1oqr-ds4 pue Lqdosopq4 ro3 &ar:o5 er{t ol sserppe pnuaprsa:d Lu se 'g66t,tl aunf uoeloseuurw 3o dtrsJa.nrun aqt te poluasard se,u. taideqr srqt Jo uorsre^ pelBr^erqqE uy

eloN

'ure8e ssol str tuoAJJd JaAJ

PInO,^A JJntEu u€lunr{ tnoqe Surqtou tEqt sr ̂aer^ dru 3o efuanbesuol euo'poluelurar eg ol peq pue tsol eruo s€̂. eruerrs teqt ploq tqSnoqt uretsely\

Jo drotsn{ eqt ur sJposrda pfrtrrf o.^at ot turod oq.^A oluarts Jo steqd-osopqd puu suerrolsrq esoqJ {qenb ot sruees dprel-rer '8ur1urql

Jo sruroJpozrlerleds slr pue 'srurull e^rlrnlurJelunof slr 'slse-relur frJeloss slr qlr,AA'oJuetlg 'se8eluelpssrp

IEJnleu aler{ s.AAerA auros 'e-rn11nr Jo uorssrursueJt aql

ur 'sr trqt 'seepr Jo aleldte>lrurrr pqop eqt uI '3urpue1sqlr.^Atou aoueurruord

luoJJnJ slr-sn uJeJuof plnoqs leql nuaDs Jo uorle,r-resa-rd eql sr 1r '1la:-roJ

sr srsdpue d* JI '{poepul 'uor8rla-r ol e8uollerlf tueruru8rs ou sasod eruarrs'pen8;r eAEq I se

IeJnt€uun se sr ofuarJs pu€ Iernleu se sr uorBrTOJ Jl'suolleurlfur

arrtlruSoc frseq lsoru Jno Jo etuos Jo uorssoJdxa eqr sellolur uor8rla: ueql'lfot;ol sI seItIArTJo-rd snorBIIeJ Jno

Jo sur8rJo pue JJtJeJerlJ er{t Jo srsdleued* Ji pue enrt sr teqt JJ 'erues eqt stse8Sns snue8 rno

Jo sroquraur roqtotnoqe eruepile lerrSoloaqrre eql'(SgOt uotrqlf\ pue eu:dg 'elduexa .rog'oes) sururni{ uJapou

Jo suorssessod earsnpxe eqt tou oJe spuru rreqt peerpue slueSe tretop ot sertrlrqe aqt ter{t ureturetu stsrSololerur-rd due141

'erueJp pue sql^u ,(q ,,pe-repli.t\eq,, se,r,r. lrefqns

slq IEI{] suoder (eSZ'5661) sqre5 trqt Surtou r{tro.^A sr tr 'uortlouuol sqlu1 'a.rrnbre ro puaqardruor dppee-r tou op

1e.te1 qSrq e r{rns 1e Suruorl:un;suos-rad frtsrtn€ ua^e teqt Surqlaruos sr uor8rle-r 'drrpqesrp JrJqt

Jo llnseJ € se'teqt sr teq dyg 'prolJ€ uel rusrrol^€qaq

Jo spoqteru eqt terl^A ueqt trnpuoruEtunr{ lnoqE aSpelLr.oml sJoru ou ssessod ot peurtsap JJe drql'acuer-redxa

la1na3t1yZ8

Naturalness of Religion, Unnaturalness of Science

far more optinlistic now about the ability of connectionist and neural network modelsto account for our conceptual resources (see Churchland 1989; Barsalou 1999). I amalso sympathetic with the view that semantic and conceptual development is usefullyconstrued in terms of changes in theories, though I hasten to note that theoreticalprogress does not always involve revolntionary changes. Theory development in sctenceand, I suspect, in scientists and children as well is often evolutionary rather than rev-olutionary (see McCauley 1986).

3. Compare the position of Karl Popper (1992, 136-165), who sees these two casesas discontinuous, and thus sees two separate points of origination for science, with thatof Lewis Wolpert (1992, 35), who holds that they constitute a single, continuoustradition.

4. This point seems uncontroversial.The disagreenlents arise about how elaborated theinitial dispositions are (see Elman et aL. 1996,41).

References

Anderson, C. A. , Krul l , D. S. , and'Weiner, B. (1996). Explanat ions: Processes and con-sequences. In E. T. Higgins and A. W. Kruglanski, eds., Social psychology: Hdndbook ofbasic principles. New York: Guilford Press.

Barbour, I. (1980). Paradigms in science and religion. In G. Gutting, ed., Pdradigrns andReuolutions. Notre Dame, IN: LJniversity of Notre Dame Press.

Baron-Cohen, S. (1995). Mindblindness: An essdy on autism and tlrcory o-f mind. Cam-bridge, MA: MIT Press.

Barrett, J., and Keil, F (1996). Conceptualizing a non-natural entity: Anthropomor-phism in God concepts. Cogni t iue Psychology,31,219-247.

Barsalou, L. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behauioral and Brain Sciences, 22,577-660.

Barth, F (1975). Ritual and knowled,qe amlng the Baktaman of I'Jeut Cuinea. New Haven:Yale Universiry Press.

Bechtel ,W (1996). What should a connect ionist phi losophy of sc ience look l ike? InR. McCauley, ed., Thc Churchlands and their crit ics. Oxford: Blackwell.

Boyer, P. (1994). The naturalness of reli,qious ideds. Berkeley:University of Califbrnia Press.

Boyer, P. (1999). Cultural inheritance tracks and cognitive predispositions: The exampleof religious concepts. In H. Whitehouse, ed., Mind, euolution, and cultural transrnission.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boyer, P (2000). Evolution of a modern nind and origins of culture: Religious con-cepts as a limiting-case, In P. Carruthers and A. Chamberlain, eds., Euolution and thehuman mind: Modularity, language an.d metd-co,qnition. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversiryPres.

Brewer,'W: F, and Samarapungavan, A. (1991). Childrens'theories vs. screntific theo-ries: Differences in reasoning or differences in knowledge? In R. R. Hoifinan andD. S. Palernro, eds., Cognition and the symbolic processes:Applied and ecological perspectiues.Hillsdale. NT: Erlbaum.

83

'ssord oSeJrr{JJo .{lrs;elrun :oSrrrqC 'pe pe .suorynp.xat

$tuans {o a,tnpru1s aryJ .hL6l) I ,uqny

'sserd JIW:yy41 ,a8pr-rqueO .parudolanap pnldasuot pua,spur>1

\ldatnoS.GgOt) U.[eX

Atrsranrun pr€̂rtH :y141,a8pr:qtutC .pawdolanap'ssoJd

pnldatuot puo rrtualuaS .(OfOt) .J ,llex

'sserd IIW ;y141 ,a8pr_rqru€C .iluaDS

antlruSot uo aarpadvadpluawdolanap y :i{.1ua1npow puo,("ag . (ZOeil .V,qlFus_lrolnurex'ssa:4 dtrsranrun a8pr:qru'O :a8pr:que3 .sasuq

put) srtj*ltnaH :l,ryru1tasun Dpun rrlaw)\prf'Qgo) 'spe ''y f1s-rarr; pu' ,a ,rrno15 ,,q ,uerueuqry

ssa:4 dtrs;anrun e8pr:qrue] :a8pr-rqrur3 .arua7spua'uot7rlat't\pw no st(.ussE :tsaA4 aqt pua wr{V ur ryEnoql

{o suta11a4.GOet).1 ,uol_ro11

'.^Ao)l pue -radrrpl :>lro1 .^^JN .r(,1t1auoqag''pa 'uos1r7y1'g uI 'erualrs urelsalY\ pue

tq8noqt IEuoIrrpEJr urrr{V 'OL6l) '11 'uol.ro11'ssa-r4 .{1rsra^run proJXO :proJXO .spnop

aql w saro1 .G,OO J.g ,ar.rqtr_rg

'ssaJdJIW :VW 'a8pr-rqrue3 'sauoaqJ pua 'st7\noqt ,spto714 -(tOOt) .y

gozllayrg pue ,.V ,ryudog

VLg_Sgf ,99 ,an.rang Jb L1doso1ryr1 .plrqr sE tsrtuarrs eqJ.(966I) .y,ryudog

'gLf-Sgt'Ey 'aEan8uaj plltD fo purnof ,,.sa8es

-saupelrtJjouorlcrto8aupg;anardaqa:,uop:ed:nodEaqI,,,.(9g6I) .W Ugo>1ur1og

'runrqlrg :f5 'eppsllH'uotlnrunwutot tqsmSuq o1 Vsmnulatd wo,t{ uoqxsuau aqJ ,.pe

$oIurToC'11 uy'sa8rssetu pelrcJJo uortcrlo8au pq_re,ra.rd aqg.(EgOt) .W .X goluqog'88_IZ,LLL

(uuatustn,orowk'rr.",:"":T;ffi ;Tr',n,f)r;i,,:;::;:rT:,"r;:;

'sserd Jlw :yyg 'aSprrq.ore3 'ruatudopnap

u() aulsadvad lsruoq)atruu v :sseuauLtur iluqun1laY.(qoo t) x'Ialunld pue ''C 'rsrJe.1 ''V,qtrtug-golrrure) ,.H .W ,uosuqof ,.V.E ,sateg ,.1 .f ;u".u1E

'L6l-gLl ,67 ,suor7tla4 {o [to1srg .re)_ns]eprg

-1o Lpnlses?3 y:suorSqa:.uau asauedrf3o uorleuuoJ eqt3o.fuoaqr E pre.^ oJ,.(OSOt) .H.uEqrBE

'gZl_SI1 ,91 ,uo1811ag {o lpnlg atp ur ,hoa4a puo poqDry

astgaueq-teq.rlr ro-orl7y\ :serueru snor8qa: Jo uortnlola eqJ .(gOOt) .J .e ,pauuaq'sserd

IIW :y141 ,a8pr_rqrueC .aruzls lzuotttnlut ar7 .(Lg6il.C .g ,rauuaq

'ssard rlw :y141 'aSprrqru€l 'anutadstad puorlzlndwuotnau

v Gset).w a ,puelrprnqS'sserd

JIW :yy41 ,e8pr_rqrut3 .poorlpltry ur a7uatp pqdatuoS.(EgOt) .g .(a:e3

'qlro.AAsPeAl :Y3'ruoulag 'uor|qat au\woduot toJ'4tomauta,(-v:sno6qa,t

Eulaq {o s[um xrg .(geo1.g ,uouue3'ssa:6 dlls:a^run proJXO :proJXO .su,wnq

pua ,sada ,s,b4uo*t ut pallalut {o uounl -lna

aqt pua asrltadxa pDoS :atua\t11a1ut uoqpnauppry .(gSOt) .V,uatlry1 pue ,.U .eurLg

tr"a1nn344f8

Naturalness of Religion, Llnnaturalness o-f Scicncc

Lawson, E.T., and McCauley, R. N. (1990). Rethinkin.q relision: Connecting cognition andculture. Cambridge: Carnbridge universiry Press.

Lawson, E. T., and McCauley, R. N. (1993). Crisis of conscience, riddle of identiry:Making space for a cognitive approach to religious phenomena . Journal of the AmericanAmdemy of- Religion, 61,201-223.

McCauley, R. N. (19i16). Intertheoretic relations and the future of psychology. Philos-ophy o.f Science, 53, 17c)-199.

McCauley, R. N. (1987). The role of theories in a theory of concepts. In U. Neisser,ed., Concepts and conceptual development. Cantbridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mccauley, R. N. (1999). Brineing ritual to rnind. In E.winograd, R. Fivush, and'WHirst, eds., Ecological approaches to cognitiort:E-s-say-s in honor of Ulrk Nelsser. Hillsdale, NJ:Erlbaum.

Mithen, S. (1996). The prchistory of tlrc rnind:The co,gnitiue origins of art, religion and science.New York: Tharnes and Hudson.

Paden,W. (1992). lnterpreting the sacred.l3osron: Beacon Press.

Popper, K. (1992). Coniectures and refutations. London: Routledge.

Rubin, D. (1995). Memory in oral tradition: Tl'te cognitiuc psychology o-f epic, ballads, andcounting-out rhymes. New York: Oxford lJniversiry Press.

Sacks, O. (1995). An anthropologist on Mars. NewYork: Knopf.

Spelke, E. S. (1994). Initial knowledge: Six suggestions, Cognition, 50,432-145.

Sperber, D. (1996). Explainin.q culture :A ndturalistic approach. Oxford: Blackr,vell.

Thagard, P. (1993). Conceptual reuttlutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Thagard, P. (199f1). ulcers and bacteria: 1. Discovery and acceptance. Studies in Historyand Philosophy of Scierce: Part C., Studies in History and Philosophy o;f Biotogy and Bio-mediml Scienccs. 20. 107*136.

Thagard, P. (1999). Hout scientists explain diseasc. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tomasello, M., Kruger,A., and Ratner, H. H. (1993). Cultural learning. Behauioral andBrain Scicnces, 16, 495-552.

Tweney, R., Doherty, M., and Mynatt, C., eds. (1981). On scientific thinking. Newyork:Columbia (Jniversity Press.

Wiebe, D. (1991). The irorry of theology and the nature of religious thought. Montreal:McGill-Queen'.s (Jniversity Press.

Winograd, E., and Neisser, (J., eds. (1992). A-ffeu and accur(tcy in recall. NewYork: Carn-bridge University Press.

Wolpert, L. (1992). Thc unnatural nttture